J1st10cases.docx

CASTILLO v. PADILLA, JR. [127 SCRA 743 A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984] PLANA, J. FACTS: Atty. Jose M. Castillo was the counsel for the defendants in Criminal Case for forcible entry before the MeTC of Caloocan. Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while Castillo was formally offering his evidence, he heard Padilla say "bobo." When Castillo turned toward Padilla, he saw the latter looking at him menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, Castillo was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended. Thereafter, Atty. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings. While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. ISSUE: WON the disciplined?

Atty. Padilla, respondent, should be

HELD: Yes, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. Use of intemperate language uncalled for in the case at bar, whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt

complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. In Re: ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970] CASTRO, J.: FACTS: Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered his appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. He also relied to Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. ISSUE:

duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. US v. Ney [8 Phil 146 G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907] TRACEY, J.: FACTS: In 1902 this court decided that J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, on the ground that after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain Spanish, as such was not qualified for admission to the bar. In 1904 he made an arrangement with Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque". The paper was headed "Law Office — Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español — C.W. Ney, abogado americano." Since then papers from the office were signed with the words "Ney & Bosque — C.W. Ney, abogado." On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding.

WON Atty. Soriano be granted the plea of appearance HELD: No. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his

The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law under Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure. ISSUE: WON either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?

HELD: Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows: 1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge; 2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions. In the case, no direct order or command of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. Even had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made on his own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. The fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law. Consequently, the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party. TAPAY v. BANCOLO [A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013] CARPIO, J.: FACTS: In October 2004, Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Divinagracia, a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia and declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his, which was later alleged to be forged by the secretary- Mary Jane

Gentugao. Hence, a complaint was filed against Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the filed cases. Thereafter complainants filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder. The IBP’s resolution, regarding the report of Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, pronounce that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder case was dismissed. Thereby, recommended Atty. Bancolo be suspended for one year from the practice of law. Hence the motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON the resolution of the IBP is correct finding Atty. Bancolo administratively liable and dismissed Atty. Jarder case. HELD: Yes. The court agreed with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: Canon 9 A Lawyer Shall Not, Directly or Indirectly, Assist in the Unauthorized Practice of Law. Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. On the other hand, the complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

BONIFACIO v. ATTY. ERA and ATTY. BRAGAS [A.C. No. 11754 October 3,2017] TIJAM, J.: FACTS: An illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation Complainants therein Abucejon Group were represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era. The Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and, consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group. Thus, a Writ of Execution and a Notice of Garnishment were issued to implement decision. Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, where the Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years from 2013-2015. On the scheduled public auction Atty. Era actively participated therein. As the parties were not able to settle regarding the payment of judgment, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business establishment together with their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned properties. This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing. Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court during his suspension. Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint. Investigating Commissioner Cabrera recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The IBP Board of Governors reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions, pronouncing Atty Era of unauthorized practice of law and thereby suspended for 3 years and Atty. Bragas for her assistance of unauthorized practice of law suspended for a month. No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party. Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant administrative case. ISSUE:

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WON Atty. Era and Atty. Bragas ars subject to disciplinary action

HELD: Yes. We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors. Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law". It is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the properties. Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year. Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice. Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be reproved. There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically: CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in education and character. Hence, shall be subject to disciplinary action. ALAWI v. ALAUYA [A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997] NARVASA, C.J.: FACTS: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, they were

classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-atlaw.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney HELD: No, He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

GUBALLA v. CAGUIOA [G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977] SANTOS, J: FACTS: Jose Guballa is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. A complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. Because Guballa and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration, signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, was denied. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm, however was likewise denied and was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution. A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge. On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. Judge Caguioa denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Hence the instant Petition. ISSUE: WON the respondent judge’s denial of the Petition for Relief is proper HELD: Yes. Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the

person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve. In sum, the law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" is hereby ordered to explain why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil when he is not a member of the Bar. FIVE J TAXI v. NLRC [G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994] REGALADO, J.: FACTS: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by Five J Taxi, petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. They were required to pay the daily boundary of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their boundary for every actual working day. Maldigan in less than 4 months, he already failed to report for work and later learned that he was already working for Mine of Gold Taxi Company. On the other hand, Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate. Thereafter Sabsalon was re-admitted, however, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company." Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement

of his daily cash deposits for 2 years but was denied. While Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. Private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. However, was dismissed. The NLRC concurred with modification by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC. Hence, the petition. ISSUE: WON the NLRC erred in ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees. HELD: The questioned judgment of respondent NLRC was modified by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof. The accounting shows that Sabsalon was able to withdraw his. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. On the matter of the car wash payments, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. There was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play. On the of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only

(1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. MASINSIN v. ALBANO [G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994] VITUG, J.: FACTS: An ejectment suit was filed by Vicente Caneda against Miguel and Thelma Masinsin. As a result of the case, the trial court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises, to remove their house/apartment, to surrender possession of the subject land, and to pay the sum of P100 a month from January 1987 as compensation for the use of the premises until the land is actually vacated. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On August 22, 1985, the Masinsins filed before the RTC of Manila seeking the annulment of the decision of the ejectment case but was dismissed. On October 7 1985, a complaint for “Annulment of the judgment, Lease Contract and Damages” was filed by the Masinsins asking for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed due to res judicata. Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. When petitioners refused to remove their house, a demolition order was issued. But before the completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by the RTC following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and for declaratory relief. Petition again was denied. Petitioners again filed the same suit before a different branch of the Manila RTC. Petition was ultimately dismissed on August 23, 1990. In this present petition for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority development by the National Housing Authority on December 1 1987 by authority of PD 2016.

ISSUE: WON MTC of Manila lost its jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit due to PD 2016

HELD: No. The NHA is definitely not acquiring the said land and therefore is not part of PD 2016. Thus, the MTC of Manila has jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment case. What immediately catches one’s attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this court has been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complainants and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and executory. The petitioners through different counsels tried to nullify the same MTC decision before different branches of the court. The lawyer’s oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable. The pertinent part of the lawyer’s oath involved in this case: I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man’s cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power. HUEYSUAN-FLORIDO v. FLORIDO [A.C. No. 5624 January 20, 2004] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS: In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. HeysuwanFlorido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and

living separately from each other. Respondent went to complainant's residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent. In January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals' resolution. At the hearing, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

HELD: Yes. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication. The records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what

is asserted by counsel. A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer's arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.