242-252-digest.docx

242. G.R. No. L-6239

April 30, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO TAN FACTS: On August 21, 1951, arraignment and trial of the accused, the latter failed to appear and thereupon the court issued an order for the confiscation of his bond. Time was given the surety to produce the body of the accused and to explain why judgment should not be rendered against it, but the latter failed in both. So the court ordered the surety to pay the Government P2,000. On May 3, 1952 the surety moved to surrender the person of the accused and that it be allowed to withdraw the bond, but the court denied the motion. Again on June 2, 1952 the surety filed a motion for reconsideration but the accused pleaded guilty to the charge and was then and there sentenced. On September 4, 1952 the court reduced the payment of P2,000 by the surety to P200. ISSUE: WON the court has discretionary power to reduce judgments of confiscation bonds of accused in criminal cases. HELD: The discretion lodged in the courts to reduce judgments against sureties on bonds of the amused in criminal cases has always been recognized. It will be noted that under section 2 of Rule 110 the obligation of the bondsman before conviction is "that the defendant shall answer the complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be transferred for trial." If a bondsman or surety fails to produce the person of the accused at the time of the arraignment or trial, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that he (surety or bondsman) has committed a complete and irrevocable breach of his obligation; for he may at a later date be able to have the accused arrested and surrendered to the court to be dealt with according to law and thereby still comply with his obligation. The aim of the law is to have the accused brought to court at any cost and at any time, even after the confiscation of his bond, in order that he may be made to answer for the offense with which he is charged, and consistent therewith the policy of the courts has been to encourage bondsmen or sureties to help in bringing the accused to court even after a previous failure and bond confiscation. So that if at a subsequent date (after confiscation), the bondsman finally surrenders the person of the principal, he thereby ultimately complies with his obligation, even if he had failed to do so, at an earlier time. In this case there has been a failure to produce at a previous time, it is true, but there has been an ultimate compliance with his obligation on the bond. Therefore, upon failure of a bondsman to produce the principal at a date set by the court, it cannot be stated that there is already a complete and irrevocable breach of the bond; neither does it follow that the judgment then rendered against the bondsman to pay the amount of the bond is a

final irrevocable judgment. The judgment of confiscation rendered is merely provisional in character subject to the contingency that the bondsman may finally secure the arrest of the principal and the production of his person in court and thereby ultimately comply with his obligation. If after the provisional judgment, the bondsman succeeds in getting the accused to court, the happening of the contingency resolves his full liability under the confiscated bond, and the court is given the power to set aside or modify the previous judgment. The above is the explanation for the rule that courts may modify, judgments of confiscation of bonds even if the ordinary period for orders and judgments to become final had long passed. The happening of the fact of compliance with the obligation gives jurisdiction to the court to set aside the previous order of confiscation and the order of execution. In the case at bar, as the surety succeeded in bringing about the arrest of the accused and in surrendering his person to court, it had thereby ultimately complied with its obligation under the bond, for which reason the court had the authority to set aside or modify the judgment rendered against it by reason of the previous breach. The order is affirmed with costs de oficio. So ordered.

243. G.R. No. L-29640

December 22, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. DOMINGO CALABON FACTS: On September 5, 1925, Domingo Calabon was convicted of homicide by the CFI of Laguna and sentenced to suffer twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal. He appealed and gave a bail bond in the sum of P12,000 and in which Valeriana Raymundo and Teodora Falconan were sureties jointly and severally. Due to failure to appear, the CFI ordered for his arrest and declared his bail forfeited. The sureties filed a motion for extension of thirty days for the apprehension of the accused but when unsuccessful in their search, they were ordered to jointly and severally pay the sum of P12,000 with the costs. From this judgment the sureties appealed to SC, where the appeals were dismissed on the ground that the appellants had failed to file their briefs within the time prescribed by the rules. Upon the return of the record to the CFI, Raymundo and Falconan presented a motion to the lower court asking that they be relieved from all responsibility on the bond on the ground that they had made all possible efforts to secure the arrest of Calabon. The motions were opposed by the provincial fiscal of Laguna, but the court granted the motions and cancelled the bond, whereupon the Attorney-General brought this appeal. ISSUE: WON the court exceeded its jurisdiction in discharging the sureties from all liability upon a bail bond which had been declared forfeited more than thirty days before the issuance of the order of discharge. HELD: The court held that there is some merit in the contention. While it is true that the courts only authorize to discharge a forfeiture within the period of thirty days from the time of the declaration of such forfeiture, and it seems obvious that a complete discharge cannot be granted after the expiration of that period, the court has held that this does not entirely deprive the court of its inherent discretionary powers in regard to the amount of the liability of the sureties and that where after forfeiture of bail, the purpose of the recognizance has been accomplished by placing the principal in prison to serve sentence, the bondsmen may be relieved from a part of the liability according to the merits of the particular case. Following this rule and taking into consideration the efforts of one of the sureties to apprehend the convict and the fact that said convict finally was arrested and commended to serve his sentence before the appeal of the sureties had been dismissed by the court, the liability of said sureties upon the bond was reduced to P3,000 by the court.

244. G.R. No. L-8091. February 17, 1956 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO PUYAL, ET AL. FACTS: Upon the conviction of Alfredo Puyat in the CFI, he appealed and filed a bond in the amount of P10,000, executed by the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. The date of the appeal is March 2, 1951. On April 11, 1953, the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. was notified that the promulgation of the sentence of the Court of Appeals was to take place on April 27, 1953. Upon petition of his counsel, the date of the promulgation was postponed to June 10, 1953. Before this date, counsel asked for another extension of ten days, but this was denied. Thereupon the court ordered the confiscation of the bond, the arrest of the accused, and the production of his person within 30 days. On October 30, 1953, the Fiscal moved for judgment against the surety and the arrest of the accused. This motion was granted on November 3, 1953 but the surety was given another period up to December 1, 1953 to produce the person of the accused. The bondsman filed another motion for another extension of time, but this was denied. The execution of the bond was again ordered, as well as the arrest of the accused, as the surety failed to comply with the court’s order. On March 30, 1954, the accused voluntarily appeared before the court for the reading of the sentence, and at the same time his counsel moved to lift the order of confiscation of the bond. It is alleged in the motion that his failure to contact his lawyers was due to his belief that his case was still pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. This motion was denied on the same day. On May 6, 1954, the surety moved to have the order of confiscation reconsidered, and to reduce its liability on the bond. The surety invoked the discretion of the court, in view of the diligence it had exerted to locate the whereabouts of its principal and produce him in court, and the unbroken line of decisions to the effect that where the accused has already been arrested, the court may relieve the surety from a part or portion of its liability according to the circumstances of each particular case. This was also denied in an order of May 13, 1954. In the case at bar the accused submitted himself to the court only after ten months from the date when the confiscation of his bail was ordered. ISSUE: WON the court can do partial remission of the bondsman’s liability. HELD: The liberality which we have shown in dealing with bondsmen in criminal cases and in mitigating their liability on bonds already confiscated because of the delay in the presentation of Defendants, finds explanation in the fact that the ultimate desire of the State is not the monetary reparation of the bondsman’s default, but the enforcement or execution of the sentence, such as the imprisonment of the accused or the payment by him of the fine imposed. That interest of the State cannot be measured in terms of pesos as in private contracts and obligations. The surrender of the person of the accused so that he can serve his sentence is its ultimate goal or object. The provision for the confiscation of the bond, upon failure within a reasonable time to produce the person of the accused for the execution of the sentence, is not based upon a desire to gain from such failure; yit is to compel the bondsman to enchance its efforts to have the person of the accused produced for the execution of the sentence. Hence after the surety has presented the person of the accused to the court, or the accused already arrested, we have invariably exercise our discretion in favor of the partial remission of the bondsman’s liability.

A further reason for such liberality lies in the fact that if the courts were strict in enforcing the liability of bondsmen, the latter would demand higher rates for furnishing bail for accused persons, making it difficult for such accused to secure their freedom during the course of the proceedings. If courts were strict in the enforcement of the monetary responsibility of bondsmen, bail, which is considered a precious right, would be difficult to obtain. Bondsmen will reduce rates only if the courts are liberal in dealing with them in the performance of their obligations. Lastly, if the courts are averse to mitigating the monetary responsibility of bondsmen after confiscation of their bond, bondsmen would be indifferent towards the attempts of the State to secure the arrest of Defendants, instead of helping it therein. But while we are committed to a policy of liberality towards bondsmen, the circumstances of each case must determine the degree in which said liberality should be exercised. Diligence on the part of the bondsmen in the performance of their obligation must be the gauge for such liberality. In the case at bar, we are not fully satisfied with the explanation given why the presentation of the person of the accused was delayed for a period of 10 months. On the other hand, the bond confiscated (10,000) is not proportional to the sentence which is 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional. We believe that the ends of justice will best be subserved if we reduce, as we hereby reduce, the liability of the bondsman, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc., from P10,000 as ordered by the trial court, to P3,000.

245. Burgos versus CA, G.R. No. 169711, Feb. 8, 2010 Facts: In 1992, assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma killing Sarah et.al. Four months after the incident, the police arrested suspects, who pointed two others and respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing. After 10 years of hiding, respondent Co surrendered. The prosecution charged him with two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges. On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail which the RTC granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same prompting petitioner to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed without involving the OSG, in violation of jurisprudence and the law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it for lack of merit. Thus, this case is about the legal standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in their personal capacities and without the Solicitor General’s intervention, reversal of the trial court’s order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence of strong evidence of guilt. Issue: WON private offended parties have legal standing, without Solicitor General’s intervention, to seek reversal of trial court’s order granting bail to the accused? Held: No. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court. As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus it is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule summarily dismissed. The Court denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals.

246. G.R. No. 175457

July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: An information was filed before the Ombudsman against herein petitioners Ambil and Apelado, then governor of Eastern Samar and Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, respectively, for allegedly ordering and causing the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim in violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the allegations in the Information reasoning however that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. After trial, the Sandiganbayan found them guilty of the offense charged. ISSUE: WON the transfer of Adalim is valid. HELD: With respect to bail concern, the Supreme Court held that under Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, it provides that, “No person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.” Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor.

247. G.R. No. 199113 RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY FACTS: In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225. On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8 In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause in the MTC which was denied. He elevated the case to RTC but was also denied. ISSUE:

WON the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due process. HELD: On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Redetermination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court. The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus: In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez: The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

248. G.R. No. 196161

September 26, 2012

CYRIL CALPITO QUI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The information alleges that on or about the month of December 1999 in Quezon City, the accused abused Christian John Ignacio, 8 years of age, by angrily shouting invectives while pointing her fingers at said minor and threatening to knock down his head which acts are prejudicial to the child’s psychological and emotional development. On June 18, 2010, the RTC Branch 94 in Quezon City convicted petitioner as charged, and sentenced her to two equal periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum. On July 1, 2010, petitioner applied for Bail Pending Appeal which respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG opposed. The OSG urged for the denial of the bail application on the ground of petitioner’s propensity to evade the law and that she is a flight-risk, as she in fact failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the issuance of three warrants for her arrest. On December 17, 2010, the CA denied the application for bail. ISSUE: (1) WON there is a manifest absence of all the conditions justifying a denial of bail under Sec. 5 of Rule 114; (2) WON the conviction of petitioner is for a bailable offense and the evidence of guilt against her is not strong; (3) WON since petitioner’s conviction by the RTC is under appeal, hence not yet final, she should be accorded the constitutional guaranty of innocence until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: (1) Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. The Court held:

Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.6 Petitioner’s plea for bail pending appeal is bereft of merit. The CA properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. The CA’s determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight is not without factual mooring. Indeed, the undisputed fact that petitioner did not attend the hearings before the RTC, which compelled the trial court to issue warrants for her arrest, is undeniably indicative of petitioner’s propensity to trifle with court processes. This fact alone should weigh heavily against a grant of bail pending appeal. Petitioner’s penchant to disobey court processes may also be deduced from the fact that she lied in order to wiggle out of, and justify her non-appearance on the March 8, 2010 hearing before the RTC. Petitioner gave the convenient but false excuse that her father, Cirilo Calpito, was hospitalized on said hearing day (i.e., March 8, 2010) and that Cirilo died on March 24, 2010. The lies foisted on the court were exposed by: (1) the Death Certificate of Cirilo Calpito clearly showing that he died on March 24, 2009 or a year before the aforesaid March 2010 RTC hearing; and (2) the Certification issued by Dr. Aniana Javier stating that Cirilo went to her clinic on March 9, 2009. Lest it be overlooked, the RTC notice sent to petitioner’s bonding company was returned with the notation "moved out," while the notice sent to petitioner’s given address was returned unclaimed with the notation "RTS no such person according to Hesita Family" who were the actual occupants in petitioner’s given address. The fact of transferring residences without informing her bondsman and the trial court can only be viewed as petitioner’s inclination to evade court appearance, as indicative of flight, and an attempt to place herself beyond the pale of the law. (2) Petitioner’s argument that she has the constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends. As to the strength of evidence of guilt against her, suffice it to say that what is before the Court is not the appeal of her conviction, let alone the matter of evaluating the weight of the evidence adduced against her. (3) Consequently, the Court agrees with the appellate court’s finding of the presence of the fourth circumstance enumerated in the above-quoted Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and holds that the appellate court neither erred nor gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. The appellate court appeared to have been guided by the circumstances provided under the Rules. As the Court categorically held in People v. Fitzgerald, "As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e) x x x." 8 Evidently, the circumstances succinctly provided in Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure have been placed as a guide for the exercise of the appellate court's discretion in granting or

denying the application for bail, pending the appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years.

249. G.R. No. 180504

October 5, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN ULAT FACTS: On February 10, 2003, a confidential informant relayed information regarding the illegal drug pushing activities of one alias Pudong along Seabird Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City to Barangay Chairman Dreu, head of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) Cluster. The MADAC Cluster 6 coordinated with the Makati Police Drug Enforcement Unit to conduct an entrapment operation. Thus, at about 7:15 p.m. of February 10, 2003, Pol-ot and the confidential informant went to Seabird Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City. Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal of the said entrapment, PO1 Santos and Rogelio Patacsil approached alias Pudong and apprehended him. Alias Pudong was then ordered to empty the contents of his pockets and the marked money was recovered. PO1 Santos immediately asked alias Pudong his real name. PO1 Santos then informed him of the nature of his arrest and apprised him of his Constitutional rights in Tagalog. Thereafter, alias Pudong was brought to the barangay hall of Barangay Rizal to have the incident listed in the barangay blotter. The confiscated substance contained in the plastic sachet which Pol-ot bought from alias Pudong was then marked "EUA". Subsequently, alias Pudong was brought to the Makati DEU office for proper investigation. The duty investigator prepared a request for laboratory examination of the specimen marked "EUA" and a drug test for the accused. The following day, PO1 Santos and MADAC volunteers Pol-ot and Patacsil executed a sworn statement entitled "Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng Pag-aresto" in connection to the buy-bust operation which led to the arrest of appellant Edwin Ulat. On the other hand, the defense narrated a different version of the incident. After due proceedings, the trial court convicted appellant of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. ISSUE: WON the court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty with violation of section 5, article II of RA 9165 despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. WON the court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the inconsistent and contradicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. HELD:

In the instant petition, appellant’s chief argument highlights the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution allegedly presented conflicting testimonies on material points regarding the chain of custody of the illegal drug taken from appellant, resulting in the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti and engendering doubt as to appellant’s guilt. The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proved. This basic constitutional principle is fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, owing to the built-in dangers of abuse that a buy-bust operation entails, the law prescribes specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, independently of the general procedures geared to ensure that the rights of people under criminal investigation and of the accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded. A meticulous review of the records of this case has led us to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to demonstrate with moral certainty that the identity and integrity of the prohibited drug, which constitutes the corpus delicti, had been duly preserved. In a string of cases, we declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before it was finally offered in court, fatally conflicts with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused. The court held that the unjustified failure of the police officers to show that the integrity of the object evidence - shabu - was properly preserved negates the presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by them in the pursuit of their official duties.

250. G.R. No. 191411

July 15, 2013

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA vs. SANBIGANBAYAN FACTS: Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental for three (3) full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer. On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office. On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares prepared a Resolution, finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. This was filed before the SB. On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted. The SB denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash for lack of merit. Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration but were also denied. ISSUE: WON the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated. HELD: The petitions are meritorious. A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides: SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

In the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.24 Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated. First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete. Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case largely remains unjustified. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases. Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them. Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads: "Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As the institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case. Corollarily, for the SB’s patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied the quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the criminal case against petitioners be dismissed.

251. G.R. No. 162206

November 17, 2010

MONICO V. JACOB vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: From 1993 to 1997, Petron Corporation (Petron), received Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) by assignment from 18 private firms registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). The TCCs were issued by the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit & Duty Drawback Center (OSS), an office under the Department of Finance (DOF), created by virtue of Administrative Order No. 266 dated February 7, 1992. Petron used the assigned TCCs to pay its excise tax liabilities. The practice was for the BOI-registered firms to sign the Deeds of Assignment upon delivery of the TCCs to Petron. Petron then forwarded said documents to the OSS, with a request for authorization to use said TCCs to pay for its excise tax liabilities. DOF Undersecretary Antonio P. Belicena approved the request of Petron through the issuance of Tax Debit Memoranda (TDM) addressed to the Collection Program Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The BIR Collection Program Division accepted the TCCs as payment for the excise tax liabilities of Petron by issuing its own TDM.5 The control numbers of the BIR-TDM were indicated on the back of the TCCs, marking the final utilization of the tax credits.6 However, the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman eventually found that the aforementioned transactions involving the TCCs were irregular and violative of the Memorandum of Agreement between the BOI and the DOF, which implemented Article 21 of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.7 After the termination of the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against several public officers and private individuals, including petitioners Monico V. Jacob, President, and Celso L. Legarda, Vice-President and General Manager for Marketing, both of Petron, for perpetrating the so-called "tax credit scam." On April 10, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a total of 62 Informations, charging them with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In the meantime, petitioner Jacob was arraigned on 1 June 2000 while petitioner Legarda was arraigned on 18 May 2001. In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense verbally and consistently invoked their right to speedy trial and moved for the dismissal of the cases. In the course of more than one year, however, the [Sandiganbayan 4th Division] kept affording the prosecution one chance after another. The sixty days granted to the prosecution became more than four hundred days – still, there was no resolution in sight. Thus on 20 August 2001, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, through its Chairman, Justice Nario] issued a verbal order dismissing the cases. ISSUE:

(1) WON the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners’ right to speedy trial. (2) WON the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that petitioners have not been put in double jeopardy. (3) WON the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not considering the glaring lack of evidence against petitioners. HELD: (1) An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.13 Hence, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure also include provisions that ensure the protection of such right. The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court. The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.18 (Emphases ours.) In the Petition at bar, Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 were filed on April 10, 2000. Petitioner Jacob was arraigned on June 1, 2000, while petitioner Legarda was arraigned on May 18, 2001; with both petitioners pleading not guilty. Since then, there had been no other significant development in the cases since the prosecution repeatedly requested for deferment or

postponement of the scheduled hearings as it awaits the result of the reinvestigation of the Office of the Ombudsman. Judge Nario verbally ordered the dismissal of said cases during the hearing on August 20, 2001. Thus, the criminal cases had been pending for about a year and four months by the time they were dismissed by Justice Nario. The accused, including petitioners, had consistently asked in open court that the criminal cases be dismissed every time the prosecution moved for a deferment or postponement of the hearings. The prosecution attributed the delay in the criminal proceedings to: 1) the 23 motions for reinvestigation or reconsideration filed by the accused, which was granted by the Sandiganbayan in its April 17, 2000 Order; and 2) the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to terminate its reinvestigation and submit its report within the 60-day period fixed by the said graft court. Irrefragably, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the Sandiganbayan, and even more than a year thereafter. That there were 23 Motions for Reinvestigation filed is insignificant. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. It is simply a chance for the Office of the Ombudsman to review and re-evaluate its findings based on the evidence previously submitted by the parties. The Office of the Ombudsman should have expedited the reinvestigation, not only because it was ordered by the Sandiganbayan to submit a report within a period of 60 days, but also because said Office is bound by the Constitution20 and Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,21 to act promptly on complaints and cases pending before it. Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman delayed the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, the said process could not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for the protection of the rights of petitioners themselves (and their co-accused) and their rights should not be compromised at the expense of expediency. Thus, even though we acknowledge the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by petitioners and their co-accused by reason thereof, the weighing of interests militate against a finding that petitioners’ right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases involving them would have justified the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939. We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Nario’s dismissal of the criminal cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. (2) In the cases at bar, the dismissal made in open court by the Chairman, which was not reduced in writing, is not a valid dismissal or termination of the cases. This is because the Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without the approval or consent of the other members of the Division. The Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its internal rules prevailing at the time (Rule XVIII, Section 1(b) of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which is now Section 1(b), Rule VIII of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan), an order, resolution or judgment, in order to be valid - that is to say, in order to be considered as an official action of the Court itself - must bear the unanimous approval of the members of the division, or in case of lack thereof, by the majority vote of the members of a special division of five.

We agree with the foregoing ratiocination. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective. Justice Nario failed to issue a written resolution dismissing the criminal cases for failure of the prosecution to submit its report on the reinvestigation of the cases within the sixty-day period fixed by the graft court. Moreover, the verbal order was rejected by majority vote of the members of the Sandiganbayan Special Division. In fine, there has been no valid and effective order of dismissal of the cases. The Sandiganbayan cannot then be faulted for issuing the assailed resolutions. Neither are the petitioners entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the Sandiganbayan to reinstate the cases, considering that the verbal order of Justice Nario as aforestated does not exist at all in contemplation of law.26(Emphases ours.) Given that Justice Nario’s verbal order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 is null and void, and does not exist at all in contemplation of law, it follows that petitioners cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated: (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.27 In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far no valid dismissal or termination of the criminal cases against petitioners. (3) Finally, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did not commit grave abuse of discretion nor erred in not considering the glaring lack of evidence against petitioners. As we pointed out in Rizon v. Desierto28: Time and again, we have held that a prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. He merely determines whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause, therefore, does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that the prosecutor believes that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A trial is intended precisely for the reception of prosecution evidence in support of the charge. It is the court that is tasked to determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented by the parties at the trial on the merits.29

Here, there has been no trial yet. Therefore, there has been no occasion yet for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature that shall be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

252. G.R. No. 205952

February 11, 2015

ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR. vs. ERWIN YERRO, ERICO YERRO and RITCHIE YERRO FACTS: This is a estafa case filed by petitioner against respondents Erwin Yerro, Erico Yerro, and Ritchie Yerro before the RTC. In the course of the proceedings, the counsel on record, private prosecutor Atty. Norberto Luna, Jr., manifested that there was an on-going settlement between petitioner and respondents, and that they would file the necessary motion relative thereto. Thus, the prosecution was given 10 days to submit such motion and directed them to furnish the accused’s counsel a copy of the same for their comment. The prosecution failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the Compromise Agreement of the parties and file the necessary motion as manifested. As a result, the RTC dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to comply with the court’s directive. 2 years from the issuance of the Dismissal Order, petitioner, through a new collaborating counsel, Atty. Bernarditto M. Malabago, filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that he learned of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order only on June 7, 2004, and that he believed in good faith that the case was merely archived in accordance with the terms of the Compromise Agreement. The RTC denied petitioner’s motions, holding that the dismissal, which was grounded on failure to prosecute, had long become final and executory and thus can no longer be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The RTC also denied due course to the appeal relative to the criminal aspect of the case since the dismissal was grounded on the accused’s right to speedy trial, but gave due course to the notice of appeal with respect to the case’s civil aspect. In so far as the criminal aspect is concerned, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, averring in the main that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s notice of appeal. The CA dismissed the certiorari petition. It confined that the dismissal of the criminal case for failure to prosecute had long attained finality and thus can no longer be the subject of review. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s ruling denying due course to petitioner’s notice of appeal with respect to the criminal aspect of the case. HELD:

The petition lacks merit. Essentially, petitioner’s course of action is anchored on the propriety of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order that was grounded on failure to prosecute in consideration of respondents’ right to speedy trial. Petitioner asserts that the same was issued without due process as respondents did not move for the case’s dismissal and that no violation of the right to speedy trial was committed, adding that the prosecution was very much interested in prosecuting the case but the proceedings were merely held in abeyance in view of the impending settlement between the parties.33 He also argues that the above-mentioned Order has not attained finality since, in fact, it was his counsel, Atty. Malabago, who went to the court and discovered its existence. 34 Thus, he posits that the date of discovery of said counsel should be deemed as the date of receipt. The submissions have no merit. In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private respondents for the denial of their right to speedy trial.1âwphi1 In a long line of cases, we have held that a dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused’s right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Thus, we have held that where after such dismissal the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the court re-set the case for trial, the accused can successfully claim double jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final and cannot be reconsidered. No such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the RTC in dismissing the case for denial of the respondents’ right to speedy trial. Aside from the lapse of two (2) years and nine (9) months from the time the case was dismissed to the time petitioner sought for a reconsideration of the same, it is also not disputed that it was petitioner who caused the inordinate delay. As culled from the records, it was the private prosecutor who sought for a temporary suspension of the case during the September 12, 2000 hearing with a manifestation that they would file the necessary motion relative to the settlement. Despite having executed a Compromise Agreement – which this Court notes was not notarized – petitioner and his counsel failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the same or comply with the directive to submit the necessary motion. Even when the respondents reneged on their obligation under the Compromise Agreement having failed to pay not only the first two (2) installments, which was already a ground to revive the criminal case under paragraph 3 (d) thereof,41 but rather all 36 monthly installments, still, petitioner and his counsel failed to lift a finger to prosecute the case.42 Such inordinate and unjustified delay on the part of the prosecution clearly prejudiced the respondents. Hence, there can be no gainsaying that their right to speedy trial had been violated. While it may appear that the respondents consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the Compromise Agreement, the prosecution neither presented the same for the court’s approval nor filed the required motion to that effect such that no order was in fact issued granting the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, petitioner’s assertion that the respondents are estopped from invoking their right to speedy trial is without basis.