Group 3- Commissioner Of Immigration V. Fernandez - Lopez V. City Of Manila-2.docx

Notice of Hearing (When required) GR No. L-22696, May 29, 1964 COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION v. F. FERNANDEZ

report. More than one (1) year after the issuance of the Warrant of Exclusion and the report of the Investigator of the Department of Justice, or on March 10, 1964, noon time, Teban Caoil was arrested, by virtue of the Warrant of Exclusion, by Capt. Delfin Macalinao and two CIS agents. Teban Caoili was detained at the CIS, PC compound, Camp Crame.

Facts: On June 7, 1961, Teban Caoili and his three (3) brothers, Vicente, Santos and Felipe, arrived from Hongkong on board a CPA plane. All of them were provided with certificate of registration and identity, issued by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong. They came to join their father, Antonio Caoili, whom they claim to be a Filipino citizen. They apply for admission as Philippine citizens were thus, the Bureau of Immigration Board of Special Inquiry No. and on June 23, 1961, the said Board of Special Inquiry rendered a decision admitting them as Filipino citizens, by birth. Under date of July 7, 1961, the then Board of Commissioners composed of Commissioner Galang and Deputy Commissioners de la Rosa and Talabis, affirmed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, with Commissioners de la Rosa and Talabis voting for the admission of the Caoilis, while, Commissioner Galang voted for their Exclusion. After the Board of Commissioners affirmed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, Teban Caoili was issued Identification Certificate No. 15648 on July 10, 1961. On June 23, 1962, however, a new Board of Commissioners which replaced the old Board, due to the change of Administration, allegedly reviewed motu proprio, pursuant to the provision of Sec. 27(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, notwithstanding the fact that the same had been already affirmed by the old Board. By a unanimous decision, the new Board of Commissioners, voted to exclude Teban Caoili and his three brothers, as aliens not properly documented, for admission in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29(a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and ordered them returned to the port whence they came or to the country of which they were nationals. After the issuance of the above Warrant of Exclusion, the Office of the Secretary of Justice conducted an investigation regarding the status of Teban Caoili and his brothers, and on January 25, 1963, the investigator rendered a

That when the Board of Commissioners conducted a review of the proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry, TEBAN CAOILI was not notified nor present. Petitioner cannot bewail the fact that he was not notified of the proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry. Issue: Whether or not the claim of petitioner Commissioner of Immigration that failure to notify Teban Caoili of the hearing and bring him to the jurisdiction of the new Board Commissioners was due to his elusiveness? Held: It was admitted that no notice of the exclusion proceedings was given to Teban Caoili because he allegedly went into hiding and his whereabouts were unknown to the Commissioner. While it may be true that the proceedings is purely administrative in nature, such a circumstance did not excuse the serving of notice. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of administrative character, the first of which is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635) GR No. L-43027, Jan 31, 1979 CONSOLACION BAUTISTA v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION Facts: Petitioner is the surviving spouse and the only heir of the late Andres Bautista, claimant in BWC Case No. 7601-ROI, who died while his disability compensation claim was pending review by the respondent Commission. In 1

his lifetime, Andres Bautista was employed as switchman by respondent Philippine National Railways since 1945. On August 16, 1973, he filed his application for retirement on the ground of disability; which was likewise pending action at the time of his death. Thereafter or on September 29, 1975, the hearing officer dismissed the compensation claim of claimant for the reasons of repeated non-appearance of the claimant and counsel during the scheduled hearings of this case despite due notice to them, and it appearing that the evidence adduced was not enough to warrant an immediate Award in favor of the claimant, the case was then dismissed and respondent PNR is absolved from any liability. On October 16, 1975, counsel for claimant filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out that the hearing of the case was delayed by reason of the repeated non-appearance and motions for postponement on the part of counsels for the respondent employer and the consequent withdrawal of the original counsel; that his failure to appear at the last two (2) scheduled hearings was excusable for the reason that he received the notice of hearing two (2) days after the scheduled date of hearing and he informed the clerk of the hearing officer of this fact; that the counsel of respondent employer was likewise not present at the last scheduled hearing; that all notwithstanding, the evidence already presented was sufficient to entitle claimant of an Award; and prayed therefore that the September 29, 1975 order of dismissal be set aside and that further hearing be held or that a decision be rendered on the basis of the evidence already presented. In the same motion, he informed the hearing officer of the fact that claimant is already dead without however stating the date and cause of death. Issue:

the issue of denial of due process squarely presented by claimant's counsel. The very rules of the Commission require the giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office address or if he is represented by a counsel, through the latter (Sec. 2, Rule 15, Revised rules of the WCC, 1973), so as to ensure observance and protection of an interested party's right to a hearing (Sec. 1, Rule 15, Revised Rules of the WCC Patent therefore is the failure of the hearing officer to observe these rules. Under the circumstances, claimant was clearly deprived of his day in court. Consequently, the dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and his counsel's "repeated non-appearance" at the aforestated hearings cannot stand. In passing, We noted that hearing officer tilted his discretion in favor of the employer and to the prejudice of the laborer, the late claimant Andres Bautista, as demonstrated by his obdurate handling of claimant's excusable non-appearances at scheduled hearings, on one hand, and his mild treatment of respondent employer's repeated failure to appear at scheduled hearings and its motions for postponement, on the other. The records clearly show that while respondent had asked for and was granted at least five (5) postponements; claimant, on the other hand, only moved for postponement once and that was even on a joint motion with respondent employer (pp. 16, 20, 21, 27, 28, 31, 44, 52, 53, & 54, WCC rec). This posture of the hearing officer unabated by the respondent Commission is a foul blow to the social justice clause of the Constitution and its injunction for the State to afford protection to labor. Indeed We have repeatedly reminded agencies of the government, especially labor agencies, that they are under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless pattern."

Whether or not the claim of the petitioner that her deceased husband was deprived of due process by the respondent Commission's hearing officer is meritorious?

GR No. 102467, June 13, 1997 EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v. NLRC

Held:

Facts:

Yes. In the light of the foregoing facts, we rule that the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in ignoring and in not passing upon

Petition to go against the decision of NLRC in holding that Sadac as the VP for the legal department of bank a regular employee of the bank. 2

Sadac was appointed VP for the legal department of bank with monthly salary, allowance and Christmas bonus, with specific legal tasks to perform for the bank. Later, nine lawyers of the bank's legal department addressed a petition-letter to the chairman of the board of directors accusing Sadac of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanagement, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. Sadac promptly minifested to file criminal, civil and administrative chrges against the nine lawyers. Then Chairman Morales called the lawyers in attempt to resolve the differences, but didn't result positively. Morales in the board meeting then apprised the situation, directors adopted a resolution directing one of the directors (Banico) to look further into the matter and determine the best course of action for the bank. Banico after his meetings with the lawyers and exploring various alternatives to solve the crisis, but failed wrote to the board of directors his findings affirming the charges against Sadac. Morales then sent Sadac a memorandum informing him of the charge, the findings of Banico and the expression of the boards' loss of confidence upon him and that they advise and awaits for Sadac's resignation. In reaction to the memorandum, Sadac addressed a letter to Morales with copies furnish to the directors, stating that the findings of Banico contained libelous statements and the decision of the board will amount to illegal dismissal; with request for a full hearing by the directors so he could clear his name. Vice-chairman Romulo answered Sadac that they are exercising its managerial prerogative to control, conduct business in the manner deems fit and to regulate the same. In reaction thereto, Sadac requested for a full hearing and formal investigation but the same remained unheeded. On 9 November 1989, respondent Sadac filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against petitioner Bank and individual members of the Board of Directors thereof. After learning of the

filing of the complaint, petitioner Bank terminated the services of respondent Sadac. Finally, on 10 August 1989, Sadac was removed from his office. Labor Arbiter rendered decision that Sadac’s termination was illegal and entitled to reinstatement and payment of full back wages. NLRC affirmed the decision upon appeal by the Bank. Issue: Whether or not Sadac was deprived of due process? Ruling: The NLRC ruled that private respondent was denied the right to due process with the bank's failure to observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The 10th August 1989 memorandum could not have been a substitute for notice because it did not manifest petitioners' intention to dismiss him from employment, and neither the meeting between private respondent and the complaining lawyers nor those held between private respondent and petitioner Banico could be considered the "investigations" which private respondent had consistently sought. For having violated private respondent's right to due process private respondent shall, considering the attendant circumstances particularly his repeated, but unheeded, request for a hearing, be entitled to an amount of P5,000.00. Uy, et al v. COA, GR No. 130685, March 21, 2000 FACTS: Former Governor Paredes dismissed from service more than sixty employees, allegedly to scale down the operations of the office. The Merit Systems Protection Board (under CSC) rendered a decision that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordered the reinstatement of the workers. The Commission on Audit (COA) rendered a decision ruling that the back salaries of the workers have become the personal liability of the Governor because the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith. 3

ISSUE: Whether or not COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the CSC.

that the respondent Court reconsider its order. Both were denied hence the present petition. Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport without hearing violates his constitutional right to due process.

HELD: Decision: NO. The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Payment of backwages to illegally dismissed government employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable. Further, Gov. Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA and it would be unfair to hold him personally liable for the claims of petitioners without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense.

Petition denied. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution

Notice of Hearing (When not required) De Bisschop vs Galang GR 18365 31 May 1963 Suntay vs. People 101 Phil. 833 (1957) G.R. No. L-9430, June 29, 1957 Facts: Facts: Emilio Suntay is facing criminal charges and flee the country. private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order “directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the NBI and DFA, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. Court granted the motion and DFA Secretary and asked the Ambassador to USA to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. Suntay wrote to the Secretary to reconsider the action taken against him and and filed in the criminal case a motion praying

Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country for three years. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. However Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa reported that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a communication of Customs of Iloilo demanded from petitioner the paytion of 10 September 1959, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. to forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation 4

proceedings, de Bisschop filed an appeal. Writ of preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a quo on the same day ordering herein respondent-appellant to desist from arresting and detaining petitionerappellee. Issue: Whether or not the right to notice and hearing is essential to due process in administrative proceedings? Decision: Order appealed is reversed. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al. G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991 FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-avis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board

issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success. Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat. 5

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board. G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016 QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY JESLI A. LAPUS, RESPONDENT. FACTS: This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] praying that respondent Department of Education's Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 (Department Order) be nullified for being unconstitutional and contrary to law, and that a writ of prohibition permanently enjoining the Department of

Education and all persons acting on its behalf from enforcing the assailed Department Order be issued. On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level. Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present Petition in the belief that the provisions undermine the independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the constitutions and by-laws of existing PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its constitutional rights to organize and to due process, as well as other existing laws. ISSUE: Whether Department Order is invalid and ineffective as no public consultations were (supposedly) held before its adoption, and/or as it was not published by the Department of Education. HELD: Contrary to petitioner's contentions, the adoption of the Department Order is not tainted with fatal procedural defects. Petitioner decries the supposed lack of public consultations as being violative of its right to due process. Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power. In Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel: Previous notice and hearing, as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasijudicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general 6

rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise[:] .... "It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law. See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual.' . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing." In any case, petitioner's claim that no consultations were held is belied by the Department of Education's detailed recollection of the actions it took before the adoption of the assailed Department Order: 1. On March 1, 2003, pursuant to D.O. No. 14, s. 2004, respondent DepEd created a task force to review, revise, or modify D.O. No. 23, s. 2003 (the existing guidelines), in order to address numerous complaints involving PTAs and PTCAs and to resolve disputes relative to the recognition and administration of said associations. The task force came up with draft guidelines after consultations with parents, teachers and students; 2. On May 3, 2003, pursuant to D.O. No. 28, s. 2007, the task force was reconstituted to evaluate the draft guidelines prepared by the original task force and to review the provisions of D.O. No. 23;

3. On February 2, 2009, the reconstituted task force, after soliciting comments, suggestions and recommendations from school heads and presidents of PTAs or PTCAs, submitted a draft of the "Revised Guidelines governing PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level;" 4. The draft was submitted for comments and suggestions to the participants to the Third National Federation Supreme Student Governments (NFSSG) Conference held in February 2009. The participants, composed of regional education supervisors, presidents of regional federations of Supreme Student Governments (SSG), and representatives from the SSG advisers, submitted another set of revised guidelines; 5. The draft was subjected to further review and consultations, which resulted in the final draft of D.O. No. 54, s. 2009.[67] (Emphasis supplied) Apart from claiming that no consultations were held, petitioner decries the: non-publication, by the Department of Education itself, of the assailed Department Order. This does not invalidate the Department Order. As is evident from the previously quoted provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code all that is required for the validity of rules promulgated by administrative agencies is the filing of three (3) certified copies with the University of the Philippine Law Center. Within 15 days of filing, administrative rules become effective. G.R. No. 215847 GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P. ALDON, and RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, Respondents. FACTS: Facts: Sec. 261 (d) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits coercion of subordinates by public officers. Sec. 68 empowers the Commission on Elections to administratively disqualify any candidate who violates these provisions. Later, R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Sec. 261 (d) and increased the penalty for grave coercion in the RPC if the said felony was committed in violation of a person’s right to suffrage. 7

COMELEC Resolution 9385 set the election period for the May 2013 elections from January 13, 2013 to June 12, 2013. An administrative complaint was filed against Mayor Roquero. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) recommended that Governor Javier preventively suspend Roquero. Roquero filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the SP and Javier. The RTC granted a preliminary injunction. Javier, Vice Gov Dimamay, and the SP filed for certiorari with the CA which issued a TRO. COMELEC issued Resolution 9581, prohibiting the suspension of any elected city officer, among others, during the election period for the May 2013 elections. The RTC then decided the case in favor of Roquero, ordering Javier not to suspend Roquero. However, Javier, through an executive order, preventively suspended Roquero. The SP also suspended Roquero.

(2) No. Hence. Congress has already defined the elements of elections offenses. It was not necessary that there be subsequent hearings and the submission of other pleadings and pieces of evidence. The due process requirements are different. He would not be allowed to participate. The power of the COMELEC to fix the election period. The essence of administrative due process is the right to be heard and to be given an opportunity to explain one's side. G.R. No. L-22257. May 25, 1977. GO YU TAK WAI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, VIRGILIO GASTON and MARCIAL RAÑOLA, in their capacity as Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, respectively, composing the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, respondents-appellants. FACTS:

Aldon and Raymundo Roquero filed a petition for disqualification with the COMELEC against Javier on the ground of Sec. 261 (d). After the elections wherein Javier won for Governor, the COMELEC 2nd division issued a resolution disqualifying Javier and annulling his proclamation, on the basis of Sec 261 (d). It held that although Sec. 261 (d) has been repealed, the repeal did not remove coercion as a ground for disqualification under Sec. 68. Also, there was no implied repeal under the general repealing clause. However, the case was elevated to the en banc coz the vote was 1 in favor, 1 against, and 1 not participating. The COMELEC en banc agreed as a matter of internal agreement to submit their opinion or concur with either of division Commissioners who made their vote. In the en banc, there was a 4-2-1 vote in favor of disqualification. Hence, Javier was disqualified and his proclamation annulled. Hence, this petition for certiorari by Javier. ISSUE: Whether or not there was lack of due process? HELD:

On November 8, 1961 Go Yu Tak Wai arrived in Manila on board a plane of the Cathay Pacific Airways. She is a widow. She was provided with a passport issued by the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China stationed at Macao. Stamped on that passport was her immigration non quota visa issued by the Philippine consulate at Hongkong. On March 22, 1962 a Board of Special Inquiry, investigated the application of Go Yu Tak Wai for admission as a returning resident. The Board found that the applicant arrived in the Philippines for the first time in 1930 with her late husband, Jose Go, a permanent resident who operated a store at Villalobos Street, Manila. In 1941 the spouses left for China. Jose Go died in 1948 in Amoy, China. Due to the war and the occupation of China by the communists, the applicant was not able to return to the Philippines. Chua Guat, a Chinese resident who allegedly managed Go's store in his absence, and Arsenio Clarin, a Filipino who allegedly prepared the travel papers of the Go spouses in October, 1941, corroborated the claim of Go Yu Tak Wai that she was a returning resident. The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that Go Yu Tak Wai had satisfactorily proven her right to admission as a returning resident notwithstanding her twenty-year absence from the Philippines and the fact that she had no reentry permit. After due deliberation, they voted to exclude Go Yu Tak Wai. 8

Whether, for purposes of section 27(b) of the Immigration Law, a resolution of the Commissioners which reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and which was adopted within one year from the promulgation of the said decision is sufficient.

ground that it is patent from section 21 (b) of the Immigration Act as cited on pages 4-5 of the decision penned by Mr. should "be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision".. Only six (6) Justices (Fernando. The absence of such a requirement with respect to the decision of the Board of Commissioners supports the view that such decision need not be promulgated within the oneyear period. Excluding an alien..adopted by them as a Board. Necessarily.

HELD:

SICHANGCO v BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION

This Court had already held that "the operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and Written and signed" because "the decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the resolution to exclude was adopted. Muñoz Palma. The extended opinion had to be posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse the findings of the Board of Special inquiry". It follows that the trial court's decision should be reversed. And the writer) voted for reversal. RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 27(b) specifies that as a rule the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry "shall be promulgated and the findings and recommendations. Makasiar. It suffices that the Commissioners should review the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and deliberate upon it within one year from the promulgation of the Board of Special Inquiry's decision and that the minutes of their deliberation should reflect the action which they took within the said statutory period. For lack of necessary votes to reverse the trial court's decision. Justice Aquino that "the decision of any two members of the Board [of Special. Submitted not later than two days from the date of the deliberation". Regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared. JJ. However. No such requirement is provided for in section 27(b) with respect to the Commissioners' decision in case them motu proprio review the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. In contrast. J. in proper cases. WHEREFORE. No costs. The trial court erred in holding that under section 27(b) a written decision should be signed and promulgated by the Commissioners within one year from the promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same is considered affirmed. The Court has found it unnecessary to hold a rehearing. Martin. Section 27(c) expressly requires that the decision of the Commissioners in case of an appeal from the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. OBITER DICTUM: As noted by the Solicitor General. TEEHANKEE. Concepcion Jr. dissenting: I dissent on the

FACTS

ISSUE:

The Bureau of Immigration recognized Benito Sichangco (Sy Te) as a Filipino citizen by birth in an order dated February 19, 1960. He was married to Cheng Yok Ha and had 3 children—Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna—all born in China and allegedly out of their marriage. The Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration admitted into the Philippines these 3 minor children from Hongkong on the basis of the finding that they were children of Sichangco, a Filipino citizen. When the decision was submitted to the Board of Commissioners of Immigration (BCI), it “noted” the decision. The Secretary of Justice (Diokno) issued an order (Memo Order No. 9) setting aside all decisions of the BCI, since it had not been collectively deliberating on the cases filed before it. Thus, the BCI reversed the previous decision and ordered the exclusion from the Philippines of the minor children. Thus, in behalf of these minors, Sichangco filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction before the CFI of Manila to annul the decision of the BCI excluding these minors from the Philippines. The CFI granted the petition. The BCI appealed. ISSUE Whether the Secretary of Justice may validly issue Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the BCI HELD YES. The BCI was and still is under the supervision and control of the DOJ. By virtue of his power of control, the Secretary of Justice can modify, nullify or 9

set aside the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, as well as the act of noting of the decision by the BCI. He can even directly exercise the powers of the chief of the bureau or office under him pursuant to Sec. 37, Act No. 4007, which provides that: The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division, or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division, or service. Moreover, BCI’s act of “noting” the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was NOT a valid decision of affirmance by the BCI in the exercise of its power of review motu proprio under the Immigration Act of 1940. The word “noted” simply meant that the members of BCI had taken cognizance of the existence of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) asking that respondent be ordered to comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot, and to pay damages. On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the complaint was challenged by REVI in its answer, rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot and to pay private respondent damages and costs of the suit. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President, herein public respondent.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION vs SENDINO 233 SCRA 665

On January 7, 1993, the public respondent rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the public respondent on January 26, 1993. Consequently petitioners come before this Court, in this petition, which the Court resolves to treat as a petition for certiorari.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque for P307,800.00 as its purchase price. She paidP1,000.00 as partial reservation fee on January 15, 1989 and completed payment of this fee on January 20, 1989 by paying P4,000.00. On July 18, 1989, private respondent paid REVI P16,600.00 as full down payment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so.

Whether or not the public respondent committed serious error in declaring that the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions notwithstanding absence of express grant by E.O. No. 90 which created it

For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI, through its Vice-President for Marketing, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989.

RULING: No. It is settled that rules of procedure are as a matter of course construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. In the instant case, the original suit for specific performance and damages was filed by the private respondent with the HLURB-OAALA, an administrative body not hamstrung by the strict procedural technicalities of the Rules of Court. Under the circumstances, it was certainly appropriate for the HLURB-OAALA to have acted on the substantive questions relating to the validity of petitioners' unilateral rescission of the contract without unduly concerning itself with a mere procedural slip, the non-joinder of private petitioner's husband in the original complaint before the HLURB. 10

Moreover, since petitioners participated in the administrative proceedings without objecting to or raising the procedural infirmity, they were certainly estopped from raising it on appeal before the Office of the President and before this Court. Feliciano v. Director of Patents Facts: Pending examination of the application, Meliton D. Albaña filed a motion to intervene claiming that the applicant-inventors had "sold and/or bartered and assigned to him their right to contract or deal the sale of their invention called Fel-Tap Meter Guard and Detector to or through the Corporation that they were then organizing under his direction and to fix and decide on the purchase price of it to at least P200,000 in installments cash and P300,000 in shares of stock of said Corporation . . . " and praying that applicant-inventor Maximo D. Tapinio be compelled to sign a contract (Appendix I) and, together with the other applicant-inventor Dolorito M. Feliciano who had already signed it, to acknowledge it and another contract (Appendix II) before a notary public, to have both contracts recorded in the Patent Office and in the office of the Register of Deeds, and that the patent for the invention be issued in his name and in the name of the inventors ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of Patents has jurisdiction over this case RULING: Assignments of patents and inventions covered thereby may be recorded in books and records kept for the purpose in the Patent Office if presented in due form (Republic Act 165, sections 51-53). But where a person other than the inventor files a motion with the Director of Patents praying that the applicant-inventor be compelled to sign the contract executed by a co-applicant-inventor and both applicant-inventors to acknowledge it before a notary public as well as another document which refers to the minutes of a meeting of the organizers of a manufacturing corporation, and then to have both documents recorded in the Patent Office and in the office of the registrar of deeds, the Director of Patents has no power and authority to compel the applicant-inventors to do what the movant is asking them to perform. What the movant asks the Director of Patents to do for him is essentially a judicial function which would require the determination of finding by a court of competent jurisdiction as to whether there was a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties before it could compel any of them to perform what the movant prays the court to order him to do.|||(Feliciano v. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-4572, [May 22, 1953], 93 PHIL 113-116)

Carino v. CHR FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. ISSUE: Whether or not the CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations RULING: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to 11

those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

Simon v. CHR FACTS: The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sarisari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. ISSUE: Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt. RULING: No. The CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt. Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights". In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as

temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA FACTS: Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because: because R.A. 7160 provides: Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section. (b) The Sangguniang Bayan may: (1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . . (2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawagkawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal waters by nets, 12

traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . . xxx xxx xxx (XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal waters. ISSUE: Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned RULING: LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes. Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Mateo v. CA FACTS: Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed under preventive suspension and Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager. He was later dismissed on January 7, 1993. On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners. The petition embodied three (3) causes of action. Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission; and (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation Held: No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court 13

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. CAB FACTS: On November 24, 1994, private respondent GrandAir applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Board. Accordingly, the Chief Hearing Officer of the CAB issued a Notice of Hearing setting the application for initial hearing on December 16, 1994, and directing GrandAir to serve a copy of the application and corresponding notice to all scheduled Philippine Domestic operators. On December 14, 1994, GrandAir filed its Compliance, and requested for the issuance of a Temporary Operating Permit. PAL filed an opposition to the application on the ground that the CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the application until Grand Air first obtains a franchise to operate from Congress. The Chief Hearing Officer denied the opposition and the CAB approved the issuance of the TOP for a period of 3 months. The opposition for the TOP was likewise denied. The CAB justified its assumption of jurisdiction over Grand Air’s application on the basis of Republic Act 776 which gives it the specific power to issue any TOP or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. Issue: Whether or not the CAB can issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or TOP even though the prospective operator does not have a legislative franchise? HELD: Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature. Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately afford.

Thus, the Board should be allowed to continue hearing the application, since it has jurisdiction over it provided that the applicant meets all the requirements of the law.

ERB v. CA FACTS: Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of importing crude oil, refining the same and selling various petroleum products through a network of service stations throughout the country. Private respondent Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates a Caltex service station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City. On June 30,1983, Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda Marcos Avenue of the same municipality. The application, which was docketed as BEU Case No. 83-091319, was initially rejected by the BEU because Shells old site had been closed for five (5) years such that the relocation of the same to a new site would amount to a new construction of a gasoline outlet, which construction was then the subject of a moratorium. Subsequently, however, BEU relaxed its position and gave due course to the application. PDSC filed an opposition to the application on the grounds that: 1.] there are adequate service stations attending to the motorists requirements in the trading area covered by the application; 2.] ruinous competition will result from the establishment of the proposed new service station; and 3.] there is a decline not an increase in the volume of sales in the area. Two other companies, namely Petrophil and Caltex, also opposed the application on the ground that Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements. ISSUE: Whether or not the ERB has jurisdiction over this case? HELD: Time and again this Court has ruled that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence; that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud 14

or error of law. Petitioner ERB is in a better position to resolve petitioner Shells application, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit public interest and the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate courts. Delta Ventures Resources Inc. vs Hon. Cabato FACTS: Petitioner Dela Ventures filed a third-party claim before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) prior to the auction sale, and the Labor Arbiter (LA) issued an order directing the suspension of the auction sale until the merits of petitioner's claim has been resolved, But barely a month after, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for injuction and damages with a prayer for TRO, reiterating the same allegations in the third-party claim. ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to quash the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter (LA) may prosper? Held: No. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal who rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. Petitioner should have filed its third-party claim before the Labor Arbiter (LA), from whom the writ of execution originated before instituting the civil case at Regional Trial Court (RTC)

Jesus Lim Arranza v. BF homes FACTS: Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivisions and selling residential lots. One of the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes Paranaque Subdivision, which now sprawls across not only a portion of the City of Paranaque but also those of the adjoining cities of Las Pinas and Muntinlupa. One of the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes Paranaque Subdivision. With the withdrawal of substantial investments in BFHI , respondent filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation. Atty. Florencio Orendain was appointed as receiver. He was later relieved by the SEC of his duties as a Receiver. The new Board of Receivers revoked the authority given by Orendain to use the open spaces at Concha Cruz Drive and to collect community assessment funds; deferred the purchase of new pumps ; recognized BF Paranaque Homeowners Association (BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners; took over the management of the Clubhouse and deployed its own guards. Consequently, on 5 July 1995, herein petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "for and in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeowners in the subdivision" against respondent BFHI, BF Citiland Corporation, PWCC and A.C. Aguirre Management Corporation "to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots" in BF Homes Paranaque. Respondents asserts that the SEC, not the HLURB, has jurisdiction arguing that the SEC, being the appointing authority should be the one to take cognizance of controversies arising from the performance of the receiver’s duties. ISSUE: Does HLURB has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint for specific performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots? HELD: In the case at bar, petitioners complaint is for specific performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards rights of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and security. Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint. The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. A receiver is a person appointed by the court, or in this instance, by a quasi~judicial administrative agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property and preventing its 15

possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the parties.

Cooperative Development Authority vs Dolefil Agrarian Beneficiaries Coop Inc. FACTS: The record shows that sometime in the later part of 1997, the CDA received from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI for brevity), an agrarian reform cooperative that owns 8,860 hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato, several complaints alleging mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent officers and members of the board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein private respondents. Before the private respondents could file their answer, however, CDA Administrator Alberto P. Zingapan issued on December 15, 1997 an order, upon the motion of the complainants in CDA-CO Case No. 97-011, freezing the funds of DARBCI and creating a management committee to manage the affairs of the said cooperative. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cooperative Development Authority (CDA for brevity) is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intracooperative disputes HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the action taken by the Court of Appeals, 13th Division, on the Twin Motions for Contempt of Court and to Nullify Proceedings insofar as it nullified the election of the officers and members of the Board of Directors of DARBCI, violated the constitutional right of the petitioners-in-intervention to due process. The requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely: (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.The appellate court should have first required the petitioners-in-intervention to file their comment or opposition to the said Twin Motions For Contempt Of Court And to Nullify Proceedings which also refers to the elections held during the general assembly on July 12, 1998. It was precipitate for the appellate court to render judgment against the petitioners-in-intervention in its Resolution dated February 9, 1999 without due notice and opportunity to be heard. Besides, the validity of the general

assembly held on July 12, 1998 was not raised as an issue in CA-G.R. SP No. 47933.

De Jesus v. COA FACTS: An auditing team from the COA Regional Office No. VIII in Candahug, Palo, Leyte, audited the accounts of the Catbalogan Water District (CWD) in Catbalogan, Samar. The auditing team discovered that between May to December 1997 and April to June 1998, members of CWDs interim Board of Directors (Board) granted themselves the following benefits: Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA), Rice Allowance, Productivity Incentive Bonus, Anniversary Bonus, Year-End Bonus and cash gifts. These allowances and bonuses were authorized under Resolution No. 313, series of 1995, of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). During the audit, the COA audit team issued two notices of disallowance dated 1 October 1998 disallowing payment of the allowances and bonuses received by petitioners, namely: Rodolfo S. De Jesus, Edelwina DG. Parungao, Hermilo S. Balucan, Avelino C. Castillo and Danilo B. De Leon as members of the CWD Board as well as Alice Marie C. Osorio as the Boards secretary (collectively petitioners). The audit team disallowed the allowances and bonuses on the ground that they run counter to Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198 (PD 198). Petitioners appealed to the COA Regional Office No. VIII but COA Regional Director Dominador T. Tersol denied the appeal. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the COA which in a decision dated 12 September 2000 denied the petition. The COA also denied on 5 July 2001 petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by law even if authorized by the LWUA. HELD:Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters. The COA is vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. A Water District is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant to 16

special law, PD 198. The COA can disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA. Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without knowledge that payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be refunded.

CSC v. Alfonso FACTS: Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of PUP. On July 6, 2006, Dr. Zenaida Pia, Professor IV in PUP-Sta. Mesa, and Dindo Emmanuel Bautista, President of Unyon ng mga Kawani sa PUP, jointly filed an AffidavitComplaint against Alfonso for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, charging the latter with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and violation of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The affidavit-complaint was lodged before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In their affidavit, Dr. Pia and Bautista alleged, among others, that respondent repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUPs personnel department when the latter prepared and included his name in Special Order Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services, ostensibly authorizing him to work for 24 hours straight from May 16 to 20, May 22 to 27 and May 29 to June 2, 2006. As a result thereof, Alfonso made considerable earnings for allegedly working in humanly impossible conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three consecutive weeks. In his Counter-Affidavit dated August 30, 2006, respondent averred that he only rendered overnight work on May 17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29 and 31, 2006. He explained that his daily time record explicitly indicates that it covers overnight services pursuant to S.O. No. 1004, series of 2006, and that an entry such as Day 17, arrival 8:00 PM; Day 18, departure 8:00 AM connoted only a day of overnight work and not continuous two (2) days of rendition of services. Issue: Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against Alfonso Held: We find in favor of petitioner As the central personnel agency of the government,[21] the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all

PUP officers and employees, whether they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation. Villanos v. Subido FACTS: On April 1, 1957, petitioner-appellee wrote a letter jointly addressed to Mrs. Esperanza F. Sebastian and Miss Anacleta Faypon, her co-teachers in the same school, containing libelous remarks against the two. Upon receipt thereof, Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Faypon lost no time in instituting a criminal action against petitioner-appellee in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur charging the latter with the crime of libel. On March 30, 1959, petitionerappellee was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs. This libel conviction was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision which it rendered on December 21, 1960. Review of the latter decision was denied for lack of merit by this Court in a resolution dated March 6, 1961. A few days after the commencement of the criminal action, or on April 11, 1957, Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Faypon lodged before the Division Superintendent of Schools an administrative charge against petitionerappellee for (1) gross discourtesy to them as her co-teachers, and for (2) notoriously disgraceful and/or immoral language and/or conduct. They supported their charge with the same libelous letter, basis of the criminal action. Issue: Whether or not this case is premature due to non- exhaustion of administrative remedies Ruling: We find no merit in this argument. It has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one. It is charged and We have found it is true that petitioner-appellee was denied due process. Such being the case, the rule of exhaustion invoked is not applicable here. 17

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, vs. HON.FELIXR. DOMINGO and JUAN MAFE,respondents. GR. NO. No. L-30772. October 29, 1971.

FACTS: Private respondent Juan Mafe, a mechanic in the employ of the Philippine National Railways was charged in an information for qualified theft. However, the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt” and rendered judgment “acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt.” After promulgation of the verdict of acquittal respondentaccused filed a motion for amendment of respondent court’s decision, alleging that respondent had already been dismissed from the service of the Railways “with prejudice to reinstatement”, because of the very incident subject matter of the criminal charge of which respondent court had acquitted him, and praying that respondent court amend its decision so as to include therein his reinstatement, with payment of back salaries and restoration of all accrued rights and privileges. However, respondent court denied its motion to set aside the amendatory decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over it and over the subject matter of reinstatement and back salaries and of lack of due process. ISSUE: whether the trial court in a criminal case, in rendering a judgment of acquittal, may properly decree the payment of salaries during the period of the accused employee’s suspension from the service, and where the employee was dismissed, order his reinstatement in the service. RULING: The trial court in the criminal case, has no authority, in the event of an acquittal of the accused employee, to order payment of back salaries. The acquitted employee’s right to the payment of back salaries during the period of his suspension, or reinstatement in the case of his dismissal, in appropriate cases, lies not in the same criminal case wherein he is acquitted but in the proper administrative or civil action prescribed by law.

18

THE POLICE COMMISSION v. HON. JUDGE GUARDSON R. LOOD. G.R. No. L-34637. February 24, 1984.

FACTS: Respondent Simplicio Ibea had been dismissed from the police service by the then Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo pursuant to the decision of petitioner commission finding him guilty of serious irregularity in the performance of duty on complaint of Jose Lee, Jr. Ibea thereafter filed his complaint with respondent court (CFI Rizal) seeking his reinstatement. He was sustained by respondent court which rendered its decision declaring the decision of the Police Commission as null and void and ordered the town mayor to "reinstate the plaintiff to his former position as patrolman in the Police Department of San Juan, Rizal with back salaries and remunerations pertaining to said position from the date of his suspension to the time of his reinstatement to the service."

Yes. The record amply shows that petitioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence consisting of the affidavit-complaint (which was duly affirmed when complainant Jose Lee, Jr. appeared and testified before the board) and the documentary evidence duly marked by the board as exhibits for the complainant (and which were not questioned by respondent). As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence on the record, or stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence The documentary evidence which convinced petitioner as to the veracity of the charges against respondent were certainly more than persuasive and substantial. Respondent court therefore erred in choosing to believe the theory of the defense put up by respondent Ibea on the equally erroneous ground that there was no evidence to support the findings of the Police Commission.

Respondent court ruled that the decision of petitioner commission was based on incomplete records as there was no transcript of the testimonies of witnesses or minutes of the proceedings before the Board of Investigators and that the commission’s conclusion was without factual basis and was in violation of administrative due process. Respondent court also ruled that the question of the temporary status of the appointment of Ibea for lack of civil service eligibility (which was raised in the court below by the answer of Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada) had become moot and academic upon respondent Ibea’s subsequent acquisition of a civil service eligibility. ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in disturbing the findings of facts of the Police Commission, an administrative agency duly vested by Republic Act No. 4864 with the power and authority to render decision in administrative cases against policemen and whose decision is final. RULING: 19

OCAMPO vs OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACTS: Jesus Ocampo is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration. The Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) requested NIACONSULT for training of small-scale community irrigation development, and Ocampo attended to the request. o Ocampo requested an advance of 30% of training fees to the amount of US $9600 = PhP 204,960. o He also accepted two instalments of the training fee for P61,488 and P143,472. NIACONSULT demanded Ocampo to turn-over the total training fee paid by ADBN which Ocampo personally received, but failed to remit the amount. This prompted NIACONSULT to file an administrative case before the OMBUDSMAN. o Ocampo failed to present a counter-affidavit amid being ordered twice by the OMBUDSMAN to do so. o The decretal portion of the Resolution stated that Ocampo was to be discharged from the service, with forfeiture of special benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold office in government; without prejudice to any civil action NIACONSULT may institute to recover the amount retained by Ocampo. o Ocampo now assails lack of due process for not having been given the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and to present his evidence. [Bulk issue of the case, but not our concern in this topic. The decision just says that he waived his right to due process when he failed to produce a counter-affidavit amid being ordered twice to present his side] While the case is pending, a criminal complaint for estafa and falsification was filed against Ocampo based on the same facts or incidents. The Regional Trial Court DISMISSED the case. OCAMPO’S CONTENTION: RTC’s dismissal of the criminal case serves as a bar to the administrative case that can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed.

RATIONALE: No. The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all aspects. On quantum of evidence: The RTC’s dismissal simply means that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absence of any evidence whatsoever. The rule in administrative proceedings is substantial evidence which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Considering this difference, one decision cannot be binding on the other.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case affect the validity of the administrative case’s resolution? 20

MIRALLES VS GO FACTS: This case is about a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the SAC- Napolcom finding Miralles administratively liavble for grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal. On Dec. 7, 1977 an administrative complaint was filed against Miralles, alleging that Miralles committed grave misconduct by wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just motive, and with the intent to kill assaulted Pat. Ressurrecion by use of firearms, which directly caused the death of Pat. Resurrecion and Merculio. After the investigation it was recommended that Miralles be dismissed from service, the decision was appealed by Miralles to the Adjudication Board, which was denied. The petitioner then appealed to the Special Appellate Committee of NAPOLCOM. The appeal was also dismissed at this point. subsequently the issue was appealed to the CA, and the CA ruled that the action of Miralles was pre-mature and it should have filed its action before the Civil Service Commission. Despite this procedural error, the CA went on to decide on the case and it affirmed the decision of the lower courts. ISSUES: 1. Whether CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. 2. Whether the dismissal of the petition can be sustained by the evidence presented/used. 3. Whether the petitioner sufficiently establish his alibi of self-defense. HELD: The Court ruled that Miralles should have filed his appeal in the Civil Service Commission first, pursuant to RA 6975. The court found that the contention of Miralles is untenable, he argued that the decision was promulgated in 1989, years before the implementation of RA 6975, therefore he should be not be covered by the said RA. However the Court said that, it is true that the decision was promulgated on 1989, however Miralles only received such copy of the decision sometime in 1991, and by then the RA was already implemented, therefore Miralles should have filed its action before the CSC. The Court went on and say that the right to appeal is a statutory right, therefore one who seeks to avail the right, must comply with the statute or the rile in effect when the right arose, in this case the right arose or vested when the notice was delvered to Miralles, therefore Miralles should have complied with the new rule. Lastly the Court went on to say that the issues is moot and academic. Regarding the evidence used against Miralles, according to him it

was all hearsays which should not be entertained by the Court, Miralles alleged that the evidence did not properly identified the persons who executed them, hence such becomes inadmissible. The Court however has a different opinion, it states that except exhibits B and C, the rest of the documents are public documents, hence they are prima facie evidence. Furthermore the contention of Miralles that the testimony of Lamsen was recanted by Lamsen in a cross-examination, the court by searching the record proved that there was no recantation by Lamsen during the cross examination. In fact the said recantation was actually a statement made by Lamsen as a witness for the defense, in which Lamsen was never crossexamined, making his defense testimony inadmissible. Lastly, the Court found that the facts of the case has been consistently the same under the lower court and committees, it ruled that the Supreme Court respects the integrity of the facts finding of the lower court, and according to such Miralles failed to establish his defense of self-defense sufficiently. With all things considered the Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

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FERRER V. SANDIGANBAYAN Does a finding of lack of administrative liability of a respondent government official bar the filing of a criminal case against him for the same acts? 5. FACTS: 1. On January 29, 2001, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 was filed against petitioner a. DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., being the Administrator of the Intramuros Administration (IA), Manila, while in the performance of his official and administrative functions as such, and acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to Offshore Construction and Development Company, by causing the award of the Lease Contracts to said company, involving Baluarte de San Andres, Ravellin de Recolletos, and Baluarte de San Francisco de Dilao, Intramuros, Manila, without conducting any public bidding as required under Joint Circular No. 1 dated September 30, 1989 of the Department of Budget and Management, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Department of Public Works and Highways, and by allowing the construction of new structures in said leased areas without any building permit or clearance required under the Intramuros Charter (P.D. 1616) and the National Building Code, to the damage and prejudice of public interest 2. On April 4, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, alleging that the Office of the Ombudsman disregarded certain factual matters which, if considered, will negate the finding of probable cause DENIED petitioner's contentions are all evidentiary in nature and may be properly considered only in a full-blown trial 3. On September 12, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Shortly thereafter, he filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that the complainants were guilty of forum shopping, due to the earlier dismissal of the administrative case against him DENIED 4. Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration. Again, he cited as his ground the alleged forum shopping of the private complainants DENIED there was no forum

6.

7. 8.

shopping since the administrative and criminal cases are two different actions, so neither resolution on the same would have the effect of res judicataon the other (the public respondent dismissed the second motion for reconsideration as a pro forma and prohibited motion) P filed a special civil action for certiorari with the SC DISMISSED MR denied with finality On May 19, 2003, before he can be arraigned, petitioner filed yet another motion with public respondent, this time a Motion for Redetermination of Probable Cause, invoking the ruling of the Office of the President (OP), dated February 29, 2000, which absolved petitioner of administrative liability. The OP reviewed the administrative case filed against petitioner with the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) and held that petitioner acted in good faith and within the scope of his authority the Sandiganbayan denied this Hence, this petition P’S CONTENTIONS: insists that the Sandiganbayan should have dismissed the criminal case filed against him, since the alleged wrongful acts complained of in the case are the same as those alleged in the administrative case against him which have been dismissed

ISSUE Does a finding of lack of administrative liability of a respondent government official bar the filing of a criminal case against him for the same acts?

THE PETITION IS DEVOID OF ANY MERIT. 1. PAREDES V. SANDIGANBAYAN: But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint 2. It is clear from Paredes that the criminal case against petitioner, already filed and pending with the Sandiganbayan, may proceed 22

3.

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despite the dismissal of the administrative case arising out of the same acts. TAN V. COMELEC: an investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and an inquiry into the administrative charges by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) are entirely independent proceedings, neither of which results in or concludes the other. The established rule is that an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. The dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint. Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case against them based on the same subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while that in administrative cases is only substantial evidence .While that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. To sustain petitioner's arguments will be to require the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman to merely adopt the results of administrative investigations which would not only diminish the powers and duties of these constitutional offices, but also violate the independent nature of criminal and administrative cases against public officials. This will also amount to untold delays in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman, as every criminal trial and investigation before these bodies will be made to await the results of pending administrative investigations. Such is not the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the laws governing public officers. The present case differs from Larin because here, the administrative case was filed independently of the criminal case. The administrative case was not filed on the basis of a criminal conviction, as in fact, the administrative case was dismissed without regard for the results of the criminal case. This is in contrast with Larin, where the administrative

case was dismissed only after its basis, the criminal conviction, was overturned on appeal. 7. The independent nature of a criminal prosecution dictates that the Sandiganbayan must determine petitioner's criminal liability without its hands being tied by what transpired in the administrative case. The court is duty-bound to exercise its independent judgment.35 It is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the ruling in the administrative proceeding. It is axiomatic that when the court obtains jurisdiction over a case, it continues to retain it until the case is terminated. 8. Under the Rules of Court, petitioner's absolution from administrative liability is not even one of the grounds for a Motion to Quash 9. Moreover, petitioner lacked the right to file the instant petition.chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner already raised the issue of his discharge from administrative liability in his supplemental motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated July 13, 2001.38 When the motion was denied, he again alleged such fact in his motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration. 39 Both motions have already been denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolutions dated December 11, 200140 and April 29, 2002.41 Petitioner's argument on private respondents' alleged forum shopping was not sustained by the Sandiganbayan, since administrative and criminal cases are two independent actions. It correctly held that neither action barred the filing of the other, and that both cases did not pray for a common relief or share the same parties 10. The Court resolves to deny the motion for re-determination of probable cause, the argument advanced therein having been passed upon and resolved by this Court in accused's motion to dismiss as well as motion for reconsideration and where the resolution of this Court was sustained by the Supreme Court

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Philippine Movie Pictures Workers' Association v. Premier Productions Inc 92 Phil 843 (1953) Facts: 1. Respondent filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) an urgent petition seeking authority to lay off 44 men working in three of its departments, first batch to be laid off 30 days after the filing of the petition and the rest 45 days thereafter. In order that in the intervening period it may finish the filming of its pending picture. The ground for the lay off is the financial losses which respondent was allegedly suffering during the current year. 2. Petitioner opposed, alleging that the claim of financial losses has no basis in fact it being only an act of retaliation for the strike staged by the workers days before in an attempt to harass and intimidate them and weaken and destroy the union to which they belong. 3. When the urgent petition was set for hearing, at the request of counsel for respondent, judge Roldan of the CIR, held an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises of respondent. He interrogated about 15 laborers who were then present in the place. a. Judge Roldan allowed respondent to lay off the workers with respect to Unit No. 2 and those assigned to the Ground Maintenance Department subject to the condition that, in the event that work is available in the future, they should be reemployed. (nov 8 order) 4. A subsequent hearing was held in connection with the workers assigned to Unit No. 1 and on the strength of the evidence submitted by respondent, Judge Roldan again found the petition justifiable and authorized their lay off in an order under the same condition as those contained in his previous order. 5. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of both orders- Court in banc DENIED; Hence this petition for review. Issue: May the CIR authorize the layoff of workers on the basis of an ocular inspection without receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such layoff?

Petitioner (contention)- such a procedure is unfair to the labor union in that it deprived the workers affected of the opportunity to disprove what apparently was represented to the court during the ocular inspection which at best may only be the result of a prearrangement devised by the company to justify its claim of lack of work and that what the court should have done was to make a full-dress investigation if not a formal hearing giving both parties all the time and opportunity to present their evidence before deciding such an important matter which affects the position and the only means of livelihood of the workers affected by the petition. *With the procedure adopted by the court, the workers were deprived of their employment without due process of law. Respondent- claims that the labor union had its day in court because its counsel was present in the investigation or ocular inspection and even presented some witnesses to protect its interest. Held: No In the course of the ocular inspection Judge Roldan proceeded to interrogate the workers he found in the place in the presence of the counsel of both parties. The testimony of those interrogated was taken down and the counsel of both parties were allowed to cross-examine them. Judge Roldan also proceeded to examine some of the records of respondent company among them the time cards of some workers which showed that while the workers reported for work, when their presence was checked they were found to be no longer in the premises. And on the strength of the findings made by Judge Roldan in this ocular inspection he reached the conclusion that the petition for layoff was justified because there was no more work for the laborers to do in connection with the different jobs given to them. The record before the court on this matter is not clear and for such reason it has no way of determining the truth of both claims. The stenographic notes taken during the ocular inspection have not been elevated for the reason undoubtedly that this is a petition for review and the only issue before the court is one of law. The only guide that the court finds is the order itself of the court of origin which contains a reference to the evidence that it has considered for the layoff of the workers. – NOV 8 Order 24

It is true, as counsel for respondent avers, that hearings were conducted by the court a quo xxx but it is likewise true that those hearings do not necessarily refer to the petition under consideration but to other matters such as the petition of the labor union containing 14 demands and the petition of the same union to declare respondent in contempt for having violated certain directives of the court. At any rate, this matter does not appear clear and we are inclined to resolve the doubt in favor of labor considering the spirit of our Constitution. * The right to labor is a constitutional as well as a statutory right. Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own industry. A man who has been employed to undertake certain labor and has put into it his time and effort is entitled to be protected. The right of a person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees. That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work without due process of law Although the CIR, in the determination of any question or controversy, may adopt, its own rules of procedure and may act according to justice and equity without regard to technicalities, and for that matter is not bound by any technical rules of evidence, this broad grant of power should not be interpreted to mean that it can ignore or disregard the fundamental requirements of due process in the trials and investigations of cases brought before it for determination. As aptly pointed out by this court, there are certain cardinal primary rights which the CIR must respect in the trial of every labor case. One of them is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. An ocular inspection of the establishment or premises involved is proper if the court finds it necessary, but such is authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt, reaching a conclusion, or finding the truth. But it is not the main trial nor should it exclude the presentation of other evidence which the parties may deem necessary to establish their case. It is merely an auxiliary remedy the law affords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened determination of the case. Considering the merits of the controversy before us, we are of the opinion that the required due process has not been followed. The court a quo merely acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the respondent company. The petition for layoff was predicated on the lack of

work and of the further fact that the company was incurring financial losses. These allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when such inspection was conducted at the request of the interested party. As counsel for petitioner says, such inspection could at best witness "the superficial fact of cessation of work but it could not be determinative of the larger and more fundamental issue of lack of work due to lack of funds". This fundamental issue cannot be determined without looking into the financial situation of the respondent company. In fact, this matter is now being looked into by the court a quo in connection with the fourteen demands of the labor union, but before finishing its inquiry it decided to grant the lay- off pending final determination of the main case. This action is in our opinion premature and has worked injustice to the laborers.

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BUAN v. PAMPANGA BUS CO. and LA MALLORCA (1956)

1. Each parties presented their pieces of evidence.

DOCTRINE: The law, vesting the Public Service Commission with the power of supervision and control over public transportation, has also clothed it with broad discretion in the exercise of that power. As such, the court cannot intervene except if there is a clear case of abuse. Thus, the findings of the Commission are binding upon the Courts.

Buan  14 witnesses, resolutions of municipal councils, petitions, inability of the PBC to register its authorized number of units, and non-compliance on the part of PBC and LM with the terms of their certificates by suppressing trips on hours when they do not expect a sufficient number of passengers

FACTS:

PBC and LM  6 witnesses + documentary proof to show that they were rendering service in accordance with the requirements of their certificates and that the needs of the traveling public were being adequately served

1. The estate of Florencio P. Buan, is an authorized bus operator along various lines in central and northern Luzon, with authority to operate 8 autotrucks along the Manila-Bagac line and 11 along the Moron Dinalupihan line. 2. Allegedly because of resolutions by municipal councils and petitions by civic and labor groups, Buan applied in four cases in the Commission for certificates of public convenience to operate additional trips between Manila and various municipalities and barrios in Bataan, with a total of 83 units distributed. 3. The Pampanga Bus Company (PBC) and La Mallorca (LM) opposed alleging that they are authorized to operate and are actually operating on the lines applied for and that the additional services applied for are superfluous, will not promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner, and will result in cut-throat and ruinous competition 4. The Public Service Commission (Commission) denied the applications of Buan (in all 4 cases) stating that the services provided by PBC and LM were adequate and sufficient for the actual needs of the public and that the grant of the applications would only result in unnecessary or wasteful competition. MR denied, thus this petition to review. ISSUES: WON the services provided by PBC and LM as well as Buan are already adequate and sufficient to serve public needs RULING + RATIO: YES, no need for additional trips by Buan

2. The Commission ordered a survey of the passenger traffic on the lines applied for stationing 2 checkers/ agents to observe and report the situation in Bataan (bus terminal). Result: not warrant additional service; 2 companies operate in accordance with certificates 3. The findings are supported by more than substantial evidence and are therefore binding upon this Court. The Court is not required to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision below. 4. The law, vesting the Public Service Commission with the power of supervision and control over public transportation, has also clothed it with broad discretion in the exercise of that power. As such, the court cannot intervene except if there is a clear case of abuse The Commission sent 2 checkers to inspect the situation to aid in the determination of whether or not additional service is needed by the public. On the basis of the information obtained, the Commission was able to conclude that there was indeed no need for additional services. Absent proof that the Commission abused it’s discretion/powers, Court respects Commission’s judgment. DISPOSITION: Wherefore, the decision below is affirmed, with costs against the petition. 26

NOTE: Petitioners contended that 2 respondent companies were servicing unauthorized trips, the routes which Buan was applying for. Since Buan applied for these routes, his applications should therefore be applied. However the court said that the unauthorized trips passed through its other authorized routes. The court does recognize however that the 2 respondent companies are liable for some disciplinary action but such ground is not enough to authorize additional trips to Buan since the Commission already found that there is already more than adequate service for the said trips.

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No. L-16487. July 31, 1964. MANUEL BORJA, petitioner-appellee, vs. HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, ET AL., respondents, HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications, and BENJAMIN YONZON, respondents-appellants. Borja is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of some 104 hectares in Pampanga. This land, utilized as a fishpond, was acquired by him from Ayala and Company. An administrative complaint was filed with the office of respondent Secretary by Benigno Musni and others, including then Senator de la Rosa, against a number of landowners, among them petitioner Borja, for abatement of nuisance and demolition of illegally constructed dams, dikes or any other works in the public navigable rivers in Macabebe, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. In the particular case of Borja, he was alleged to have closed the stream called Matlaue, supposedly public, which runs through his land. Benjamin Yonzon, an attorney in the Department of Public Works and Communications, was designated by the Secretary to investigate the charges in the complaint and order for the removal of dams. The foregoing- decision of respondent Secretary was assailed by petitioner Borja in the latter's petition before the court a quo on several grounds; that it was based on erroneous findings of fact; that it was contrary to law; that the investigation constituted a usurpation of judicial power and hence beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Secretary; that- the delegation to Benjamin Yonzon of the authority to investigate was illegal and therefore null and void; and that the investigation was conducted with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not such evidence may properly be considered at all, in view of the manner in which the administrative investigation was conducted RULING: There is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of respondent Secretary that the Matlaue stream is a public navigable river. This evidence consists of the testimony of two witnesses, one a farmer and the other a fisherman, and of the result of the ocular inspection conducted by the investigator, appellant Yonzon, as embodied in the report subsequently submitted by him and depicted in a sketch prepared by the assistant engineer of the Pampanga River Control Project. If the decision of the administrative official carries substantial evidence, as the premise upon which it rests, a finding that certain property claimed by a private party to be his in f act part of

the public domain, it does not seem fair to take that finding as conclusive upon the courts just because it is supported by substantial evidence, although there may be evidence to the contrary which, if properly considered and evaluated, would lead them to a different conclusion. The substantial evidence rule in administrative decisions does not apply to the adjudication of a claim of private ownership of property, vis-a-vis the Government.

Maceda vs. ERB 192 SCRA 363 Sarmiento Facts: 1. Petroleum companies Caltex,Shell and Petron filed separate applications with the Energy Regulatory Board for permission to increase the wholesale prices of petroleum products, and meanwhile, for provisional authority to increase temporarily such prices pending further proceedings. 2. The Energy Regulatory Board, in a joint order granted provisional relief and authorizes said applicants a provisional increase. 3. The petitioners, Senator Ernesto Maceda and Atty. Oliver Lozano submits that the same was issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Executive Order No. 172, and has been issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 4. Hence, this petition praying for injunctive relief, to stop the Energy Regulatory Board from implementing its order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products.

Issue: Whether or not the Order of the Energy Regulatory Board is valid? 28

Held: YES. Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of a hearing, have overlooked the provisions of Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172 which authorizes the Board to grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should the Board find that the documentary evidences substantially support the provisional order. Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected parties.: na Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. Bantolino vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003 Posted by Mark Joseph Morales | July 19, 2018

FACTS:  

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62 employees of the Coca-Cola (the company) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice. Allegedly, the employees, in the performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle segregators, and others, where replaced and prevented from entering the company premises. Such act by the employer is deemed an illegal dismissal. The company averred that there was no employer-employee relationship thus the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter then rendered a decision in favor of the employees and ordering the company to reinstate the complainants to their former posistions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages.

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Coca-Cola then appealed the decision to the NLRC which sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Then, the company elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the existence of an employer-employee relationship but set aside the favorable decision of 7 employees for lack of sufficient evidence. According to the CA, the affidavits of the 7 employees should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. Only those 3 employees where declared regular employees since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination.

ISSUE: WON the affidavits should be given probative value despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo test of cross-examination.

HELD:

The Rules of Evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. Citing Rase v. NLRC, tt was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined as it would negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence. DOCTRINE:  

The Rules of Court, specifically on Rules of Evidence does not strictly apply to an administrative body performing quasi-judicial functions. The failure of the affiants to appear in court for purposes of crossexamination shall not render their affidavits inadmissible as it will negate the rationale and purpose of the nature of summary proceedings. 29

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Strict observance of the rules with respect to Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping allows an exception upon showing of reasonable cause for failure to observe the same. A waiver and quitclaim which is contrary to public policy may be recognized as valid and binding if the agreement is voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement. Where a person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction shall be valid and binding.

30

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. TRISTAN C. COLANGGO G.R. No. 174935 April 30, 2008 FACTS: A complaint questioning the eligibility of teachers in Surigao del Norte was filed in the Civil Service Commission (CSC) CARAGA. The CSC-CARAGA immediately investigated the matter. In the course of its investigation, the CSC-CARAGA discovered significant irregularities in respondent's documents. The photographs of "Tristan C. Colanggo" attached respectively to the PBET application form and picture seat plan did not resemble respondent. Furthermore, the signature found in the PBET application form was markedly different from that affixed on respondent's PDS. It appeared that someone other than respondent filed his PBET application and still another person took the exam on his behalf. Thus, the CSC-CARAGA filed a formal charge for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service against respondent. After evaluating the evidence, the CSC concluded that respondent did not apply for and take the PBET exam. Thus, in Resolution No. 021412, the CSC found respondent guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and ordered his dismissal. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA alleging that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion. He pointed out that the pieces of evidence against him were inadmissible as they were unauthenticated photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS. The CA granted the petition. It ruled that the photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS should have been authenticated. Only documents or public records duly acknowledged or certified as such in accordance with law could be presented in evidence without further proof. Consequently, the CA annulled and set aside Resolution No. 021412 and ordered the dismissal of charges against respondent. The CSC moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not unauthenticated photocopies of evidence are admissible in administrative proceeding. RULING: The CSC essentially avers that the CA erred in finding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering Resolution No. 021412. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform Rules) does not require strict adherence to technical rules of evidence. Thus, it validly

considered the photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS in resolving the formal charge against respondent in spite of the fact that they were not duly authenticated. The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS (though not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges against the respondent. Worth noting was that respondent never objected to the veracity of their contents. He merely disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were not authenticated. As a general rule, a finding of guilt in administrative cases, if supported by substantial evidence (or "that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion"), will be sustained by this Court.

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FORTICH vs. CORONA 289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998 DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said agency has lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision. FACTS: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agroindustrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers. Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory. ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and executory, had any legal effect. HELD: No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration

is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all Qua Chee Gan vs Deportation Board G.R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963 FACTS: The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari by the petitioners. On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged petitioner before the Deportation Board. The crimes: •Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong •Attempted bribery of Phil and US officials. In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authority to file warrants of arrest. HELD: Yes but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of deportation. Arrest would have been necessary for deportation to take effect. However, in 32

the case at bar, investigations were still ongoing and no order for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398, series of 1951: declared illegal Deportation may be effected in 2 ways: 1. by order of President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the RAC 2. by Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 Crime was an act profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of US dollars. Santos

Santos vs. Commissioner 74 SCRA 96 (1976) FACTS: This case involves the application for habeas corpus filed by petitioner who was detained under a warrant of arrest issued by respondent on the ground of his being a Chinese citizen who entered the country illegally. Petitioner denied such assertion that he was an alien in his petition. Respondent official could order the arrest of an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation." Such was not the case here as admitted in the brief of respondent. On January 18, 1966, the lower Court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the Commissioner of Immigration to produce before it. on January 19, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. the person of Lucio Santos; to explain under what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained; and to show cause why he should not be set at liberty. On the scheduled day, respondent Commissioner asked the lower Court for three days within which to submit his written return. The lower Court granted his request and the hearing was set anew for January 25, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. On January 21, 1966, respondent official filed his return to the writ of habeas corpus. In respondent’s written return, it is stated :1. That petitioner is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese subject whose real name is Ong Hiong King.

2. That petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. 3. That deportation proceeding against petitioner was pending hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry. 4. That petitioner had confessed that he was an illegal entrant to this country. 5. That based on his own application for registration with the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong for documentation as a Filipino, it is evident that petitioner is a Chinese because, even if he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, his election of Filipino citizenship was made much too late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino citizenship. 6. That the lower Court is without jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action — the deportation of petitioner — is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportation. 7. And that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. The lower court, however, without passing on the question of citizenship, ordered the release of petitioner upon posting a bond of P5,000 to insure his appearance at the deportation hearing when ordered to do so. This order was appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent could order the arrest of an alien only after there is already an order of deportation? HELD: The SC ruled that the appeal cannot prosper. At the time of the challenged order (the release the petitioner), the deportation proceeding was still pending. Moreover, the release was provisional. The order of the lower court dated February 5, 1966 is affirmed with no costs. 1. The question that had to be decided in Qua Chee Gan was whether the power of the President to conduct an investigation leading to deportation carries with it the authority to order an arrest. It was answered in the negative. Thus: "Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is therefore, even 33

doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to CARRY OUT a FINAL FINDING of a VIOLATION, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is NOT that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause.

HARVEY VS DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO (1988) [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 June 1988] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights| Deportation| FACTS: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72, Dutch Citizen Adrian Van Den Elshout, 58, and 19 other foreigners residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna were apprehended at their residences. The ―Operation Report of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation (CID) read that Harvey, Sherman and Van Den Elshout, et. al. were suspected pedophiles. Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and living with him. Seized during their apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. The petitioners were apprehended after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID. Deportation proceedings were then instituted against and warrants of arrest were issued for violation of the Immigration Act. ISSUE: Whether deportation proceedings and warrants of arrest issued are valid.

HELD: Yes. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant after a determination of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. The state has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag 175 SCRA 318 (1989) FACTS: A complaint was filed with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation against petitioner alleging that the French national is an undesirable alien for “committing acts inimical to public safety and progress.” Respondent CID commissioner issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner after the latter twice refused to go to the CID headquarters for verification of his status. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued and petitioner’s subsequent arrest were valid and legal. RULING: NO. Petitioner was “invited” by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent. 34

Petition is DISMISSED. Salazar vs Achacoso 183 SCRA 145 (1990) FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER. The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery. On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved. ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the

judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles: 1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. De La Rosa 197 SCRA 853 (1991) FACTS: The then Secretary of Justice issued a memorandumdirecting the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of Immigration issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of Immigration was valid. RULING: NO. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null and void for being unconstitutional. A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, respondent Gatchalian included. 35

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

c. IMPOSITION OF FINES AND PENALTIES OCEANIC STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v STRANAHAN 214 US 320; White; June 1, 1909 Facts: - Oceanic Steam Navigation Co sought the recovery of money paid to the collector of customs of the port of New York which was exacted by that official under an order of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The findings of the court showed that the money was paid to the collector under protest, and involuntarily. It was established that the company was coerced by the certainty that, if it did not pay, the collector would refuse a clearance to its steamships plying between New York City and foreign ports at periodical and definite sailings. - Both the Secretary and collector were expressly authorized by law, entitled “An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States”, enacted on March 3, 1903. Section 9 of said Act, under which the Secretary and collector acted, provides: That it shall be unlawful for any person, including any transportation company other than railway lines entering the United States from foreign contiguous territory, or the owner, master, agent, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to the United States any alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease; and if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Treasury [Secretary of Commerce and Labor] that any alien so brought to the United States was afflicted with such a disease at the time of foreign embarkation, and that the existence of such disease might have been detected by means of a competent medical examination at such time, such person or transportation company, or the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any such vessel, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for each and every violation of the provisions of this section; and no vessel shall be granted clearance papers while any such fine imposed upon it remains unpaid, nor shall such fine be remitted. - Oceanic Steam argues that:

1. However complete may be the power of Congress to legislate concerning the exclusion of aliens, and to entrust the enforcement of legislation of that character to administrative officers, nevertheless the particular legislation here in question is repugnant to the Constitution because it defines a criminal offense, and authorizes a purely administrative official to determine whether the defined crime has been committed, and, if so, to inflict punishment 2. Even though it be conceded that Congress may, in some cases, impose penalties for the violation of a statutory duty, and provide for their enforcement by civil suit instead of by criminal prosecution, nevertheless that doctrine does not warrant the conclusion that a penalty may be authorized, and its collection committed to an administrative officer without the necessity of resorting to the judicial power. In all cases of penalty or punishment, enforcement must depend upon the exertion of judicial power, either by civil or criminal process, since the distinction between judicial and administrative functions cannot be preserved consistently with the recognition of an administrative power to enforce a penalty without resort to judicial authority. 3. The fines which constituted the exactions were repugnant to the 5 th Amendment, because amounting to a taking of property without due process of law, since, as asserted, the fines were imposed, in some cases, without any previous notice, and in all cases without any adequate notice or opportunity to defend. Issue: WON the power conferred upon the named officials is consistent with the Constitution Held: YES - The exaction which the section authorizes the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose, when considered in the light afforded by the context of the statute, is clearly but a power given as a sanction to the duty which the statute places on the owners of all vessels, to subject all alien emigrants, prior to bringing them to the United States, to medical examination at the point of embarkation, so as to exclude those afflicted with the prohibited diseases. In other words, the power to impose the exaction which the statute confers on the Secretary is lodged in that officer only when it results from the official medical 36

examination at the point of arrival not only that an alien is afflicted with one of the prohibited diseases, but that the stage of the malady, as disclosed by the examination, establishes that the alien was suffering with the disease at the time of embarkation, and that such fact would have been then discovered had the medical examination been then made by the vessel or its owners, as the stature requires. - The power thus lodged in the officers was intended to be exclusive and that its exertion was authorized as the result of the probative force attributed to the official medical examination for which the statute provides, and that the power to refuse clearance to vessels was lodged for the express purpose of causing both the imposition of the exaction and its collection to be acts of administrative competency, not requiring a resort to judicial power for their enforcement. - The report of the Senate committee on immigration is considered: “Section 10 [which became Section 9] therefore imposes a penalty of $100, to be imposed by the [Secretary of Commerce and Labor] for each case brought to an American port, provided, in his judgment, the disease might have been detected by means of medical examination at the port of embarkation. This sufficiently guards the transportation lines from an unjust and hasty imposition of the penalty, insures a careful observance of the law, and leaves in their own hands the power to escape even a risk of the fine being imposed, since they can refuse to take on board even the most doubtful case until certified by competent medical authority to be entirely cured.” - Court’s discussion on Oceanic Steam’s arguments: 1. The various sections of the Act accurately distinguish between those cases where it was intended that particular violations of the Act should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly, and those where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute crime, but merely entail the infliction of penalty, enforceable in some cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil suit. The sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the statute provided, thus tending, by the avoidance of controversy and delay, to secure the efficient performance by the steamship company of the duty required by the statute, and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of Congress. 2. The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government would be productive of nothing but mischief.

- The legislation of Congress from the beginning has proceeded on the conception that it was within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations, and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power. 3. Court did not think it necessary to entertain the controversy, as it is evident that the statute unambiguously excludes the conception that the steamship company was entitled to be heard, in the sense of raising an issue and tendering evidence concerning the condition of the alien immigrant upon arrival at the point of disembarkation, as the plain purpose of the statute was to exclusively commit that subject to the medical officers for which the statute provided.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v PHIL. AIRLINES INC. 63 SCRA 524 ESGUERRA; APRIL 30, 1975 Nature: Appeal from 2 resolutions of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Facts: - On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of 20 passengers from Baguio to Manila who could not be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these 20 passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio on its way to Manila and pick up these passengers. - Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CAB before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of RA 776, the CAB, through the first questioned resolution, imposed a fine of P5000 upon PAL. Upon PAL’s MFR, the CAB, through the second questioned resolution, reduced the fine to P2500. It also stated that “Public Act 4271, as amended, requires the grantee (of a legislative franchise for air service), PAL Inc. to comply with the provisions of RA 776, and regulations promulgated thereunder from time to time.” - PAL claims that there is nothing in RA 776 which expressly empowers the CAB to impose a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in this case. “The power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and that such power 37

and authority cannot be delegated to the CAB by mere implication or interpretation.” Issue: WON the CAB has authority under the Civil Aeronautics Act to impose penalties Held: YES. Ratio The CAB is empowered to impose administrative penalties or those violations punishable by a fine or civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations but no power to impose fines in the nature of a criminal penalty. Reasoning RA 776 created the CAB and the CAA (Civil Aeronautics Administration) so that in the exercise and performance of their powers and duties, they shall consider among other things, “as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity” certain declared policies which include: “… the regulation of air transportation in such manner as 'to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic condition in, such transportation, and to improve the relation between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; …to promote safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines;” (Sec. 4, RA 776) “… the general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and control over, air carriers as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise, in so far as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act” (Sec. 10 RA 776) “… power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, upon petition or complaint, or upon its own initiative, any temporary operating permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity” (Sec. 10(c) (1) RA 776) “…power to investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision, or rules and regulations so issued.” (Section 10(D) RA 776) “…power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the

violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder. It has the power also either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be. (Sec. 10(F) (G) RA 776) “…power to impose fines and/or civil penalties and make compromise in respect thereto is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator (Sec. 32(17) RA 776) - The fine imposed on PAL by CAB is that fine or civil penalty contemplated in the provisions of RA 776 and not a fine in the nature of a criminal penalty as contemplated in the RPC, because the “fine” in this case was imposed by CAB because of PAL’s violation of CAB rules on flagstops without previous authority. The CAB explained in its resolution that the “imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency.” - There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.A.B. is fully authorized by law (RA 776) to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the CAB of that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to “impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise” “fines and civil penalties,” a power which is expressly given to the CAA whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the CAB of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. If everytime the CAB would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air transit. - However, PAL committed the violation of the CAB regulation against flagstops without malice and with no deliberate intent to flout the same. For this reason, the penalty imposed by the CAB may be mitigated and reduced to a nominal sum. 38

Disposition Resolution appealed from is modified by reducing the administrative fine imposed on the appellant PAL to P100.

SCOTY'S DEPARTMENT STORE v MICALLER 99 Phil 762; BAUTISTA ANGELO; August 25, 1956 Nature: Petition for review Facts: - Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Dept Store - This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. - Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said employers had been questioning their employees regarding their membership in said union and had interfered with their right to organize under the law. - The employers denied the charge. They claim that the complainant was dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her co-employees so much so that several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed the corresponding informations against her and the same are now pending trial in court. - the court found the following facts: Nena Micaller was earning P4.80 a day. After every New Year, she was given from P180 to P200 as bonus whereas the other employees were only given P60. For three consecutive years, she was given a first prize for being the best seller, the most cooperative and most honest employee. She organized a union among the employees of the store which was latter affiliated with the National Labor Union. Later, the National Labor Union sent a petition to the store containing ten demands and Nena was called by the management for questioning and, in the manager's office, she was asked who the members of the union were, but she pretended not to know them. - Richard Yang and Yu Si Kiao, together with a brother-in law, went to Nena’s house and questioned her regarding her union membership.

- Nena was brought by her employers to the house of their counsel, Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, and there she was again questioned regarding her union activities and was even made to sign a paper of withdrawal from the union. - the manager of the Store, Yu Ki Lam asked each the every employee whether they were members of the union. - the union gave notice to strike to the management. Upon receipt of the notice, the management hired temporary employees equal in number to the old. The new employees were affiliated with another labor union. - an information for threats was filed against Nena Micaller before the municipal court. This was dismissed. Another information was filed against Nena Micaller for slander. A third information for slander was filed against her before the same court. And on November 30, she was dismissed for "insulting the owner of the store and for taking to the girls inside the store during business hours." And on the strength of these facts the court found respondents, now petitioners, guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered them to pay a fine of P100. - Petitioners contend that section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 being penal in character should be strictly construed in favor of the accused and in that sense their guilt can only be established by clear and positive evidence and not merely be presumptions or inferences as was done by the industrial court. In other words, it is contended that the evidence as regards unfair labor practice with reference to the three above-named petitioners is not clear enough labor practice and the fine imposed upon them is unjustified. Issue: WON petitioners can be legally punished by a fine of P100. HELD NO. Ratio The power to impose the penalties provided for in section 25 of RA 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2(a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified. Reasoning SEC. 25. Penalties.- Any person who violates the provisions of section three this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, or both by such free and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court. 39

Any other violation of this Act which is declared unlawful shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred pesos for each offense. - The above provision is general in nature for its does not specify the court that may act when the violation charged calls for the imposition of the penalties therein provided. It merely states that they may be imposed "in the discretion of the court." - The word “court” cannot refer to the Court of Industrial Relations for to give that meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every accused by our Constitution. We refer to those which postulate that "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that "In all criminal prosecution the accused . . . shall enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf". - The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial Relations in dealing with the unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in court for the courts of law or equity cannot be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this act that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members and its Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objective and without regards to technicalities of law of procedure. - legislative record containing the deliberations made on the bill eliminating the criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relation show that the real intent of congress was to place that court on the same footing as the Public Service Commission and the Court of Industrial relations by confining their jurisdiction exclusively to civil matters. - on the issue of WON there was unfair labor practice, the court did not rule on this as it involves questions of fact. The industrial court has made a careful analysis of the evidence and has found the petitioners have really subjected complaint and her co-employees to a series of questioning regarding their membership in the union or their union activities which in contemplation of law are deemed acts constituting unfair labor practice. This finding is binding upon this Court following well-known precedents. Disposition decision appealed from is modified by eliminating the fine of P100 imposed upon petitioners.

U.S. VS BARRIAS 11 Phil 327; Tracey; Sept 24 1908 Facts: - The defendant was charged in CFI Manila with violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs. After a demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: “No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power. - Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court. - By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows: SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed. SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both. - Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of 40

authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power. Issue: WON Act No. 1136 is valid (as far as Sections 5 and 8 are concerned) Held: YES - The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. - This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.) - This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep. 402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of

the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the use of canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. - In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statues authorizing them to do so, the court saying: Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature. Disposition judgment of the CFI as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is revoked, and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of $25

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), v BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS G.R. No. L-43653; MARTIN; Nov 29, 1977 Nature: Petition for review by certiorari Facts: - This involves 2 cases consolidated by the Court for decision. - In the first case, Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the 41

burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Santiago, Isabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. - In the second case, Pacifico Innocencio claims that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-receipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lources Innocencio) has not been notified about its non-delivery. As a consequence Pacifico Innocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada, Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages. - After hearing, the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1. Hence, this appeal Issue: WON the Board can impose a disciplinary fine on RCPI Held: NO. RATIO The Board exceeded its authority when it imposed a fine on RCPI since its enabling law does not authorize it to do so. Its power is limited only to management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by radio companies. REASONING The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases before Us complainants Diego Morales and Pacifico Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence, the

proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of P200 upon the petitioner. - In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236) and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled: "There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. What it did then in these two petition lacked the impress of validity. - In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Board lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion. Disposition both decisions of Board of Communications reversed, set aside, declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction

PEREZ V LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC 492 SCRA 638 QUISUMBING; Aug 28, 2007 Facts: - Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4 - On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33, which provides among others (pls see original for list of offenses and penalties) SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS. (REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT SHALL 42

TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR) A. LPG Refiller/Marketer 1st Offense – Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder 2nd Offense – Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder 3rd Offense – Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit - It is alleged that Circular No. 2000-06-010 (the “assailed Circular”) listed prohibited acts and punishable offenses which are brand-new or which were not provided for by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended; and that B.P. Blg. 33 enumerated and specifically defined the prohibited/punishable acts under the law and that the punishable offenses in the assailed Circular are not included in the law.

pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetarry penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. - Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.

Issue: WON the circular is valid Held: Yes - For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. 1.The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants. 2.As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum 43