COLLADO v. CA G. R. No. 107764 CARPIO, J.:
October 4, 2002
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land attaching therewith the technical description of the Lot which stated that the lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. They claim, however, that EO 33 (law which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation in 1904) contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private rights, if any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation. And even without prior right attached before 1904, by virtue of Proc. No. 1283, an area was excluded from the MWR to be a part of a townsite. They claim that the lot is part of the excluded area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141. The Land registration court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The judgement became final and the LRA was directed to issue the corresponding decree. The SolGen however filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground that the land had not been previously declared as A&D. The CA reversed the decision stating that the petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated from the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. The technical description which the petitioners attached to their application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed. This has been confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report.
been in possession of the Lot for only 2 years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33, the petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the State. Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance of EO 33, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus, ever since, the land has become non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 could no longer be counted because the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable and disposable public agricultural land and not to forest lands, including watershed reservations. Possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation No. 1637, revising the area and location of proposed townsite. The new proclamation excluded the Lot in question and reverted it to MWR coverage. The certification presented by the petitioners that says that the Lot is covered by the reclassification is contradicted by the several documents submitted by the Solicitor General. In a Report, the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration confirmed that the Lot forms part of MWR and re commended the dismissal of the application for registration. Also, in a Letter, the Deputy Land Inspector of the DENR, confirmed that it is within the MWR. Lastly, Collado’s application attached a technical description stating that the Lot is inside the Mariquina Watershed. Once a parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, there is the presumption that the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown. 2. NO. The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public land. The Land Registration court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties.
Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE 1. WON petitioners have registrable title over the Lot 2. WON the decision of Land Registration Court is null and void. HELD: 1. NO. Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA 141 as amended by PD 1073 (30 years immediately preceding the filing of application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure), the law prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for registration. When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva had
The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. Estoppel or laches does not validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. Res judicata must be disregarded if its application would sacrifice justice to technicality. Also, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.