21 Usa, Pakistan And The Nuclear Issue

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Ueyft? FAKISTAM §~! ifff1*1 i? i P f©@ffi > Hy-i?LEAo.l&oli£ Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Defence Department's budget request for the fiscal year 1997 on March 5, 1996, US Defence Secretary, William Perry, said: "Today we face the dangers attendant to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue nations or terrorists are especially dangerous because, unlike the nuclear powers during the Cold War, they might no be deterred by the threat of retaliation". Earlier, on February 6, 1996, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in an answer to a question, he had stated: "We have to be prepared to have defensive systems to defend against potential nuclear attacks from nondeterrable nations", a phrase coined by his predecessor, Les Aspin. " Perry mentioned three "rogue states", Iraq, Iran and Libya, as nondeterrable. In addition to the above threat justifying the tension of nuclear weapons, in his testimony, Perry said: "Vital US interests can be t risk when the United States or an ally is threatened by conventional military force, by economic strangulation or by the threat of weapons of mass destruction. These threats to vital interests are most likely to arise in a regional conflict and b\ definition, may require military intervention". Subsequently, he stated: "Despite our best efforts to reduce the danger of weapons of mass destruction, it is still possible that America - and our fortes and' our allies - could again be threatened by these terrible weapons. That is why it is important for. the United States to maintain a small but effective nuclear force." Perry mentioned a third reason necessitating the retention of. nuclear forces; the possibility of re-cmergencc. at some future time, of the threat of a global conflict. Thus we see that in the perceptions of the USA, nuclear weapons are very much a part of their military preparedness. In these circumstances nuclear weapon disarmament is not on its agenda, not in the foreseeable future. The difference in perceptions of Pakistan and the USA must be fully understood to realise that despite what we have said till to

>vith respect to nuclear disarmament, they have different 'h'cctivcs vis-a-vis weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Pakistan °, •* l(j an(j joes stand for total nuclear weapons disarmament as the . wav to deal with this courage and of course with India signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). CTBT and Fissile Cut Off arc steps towards this end. Pakistan has time and again nroposcd an international convention on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the CTBT as a measure supportive of the elimination of nuclear weapons, mainly because we are apprehensive of our neighbour and arch-enemy's ambitions of dominance and hegemonic designs ~ having already done nuclear testing once, in 1974 - to break our back and the menacing statements given time and again by its leaders and government highups associated with the nuclear weapons programme. In the early half of the year, Narasimha Rao openly threatened to blast Pakistan off while campaigning for elections and then his successor Atal Bihari Vajpyee - the sixteen-day phenomenon - gave bombastic statements as regards India going nuclear and teaching Pakistan a lesson. On the other hand, for the USA, it is important to maintain an effective nuclear force; be it to deal with nondeterrable 'rogue states', of the threat of WMD arising out of regional conflicts or the emergence of a global conflict or the some future time. Its objectives arc therefore limited to . non-proliferation and perverting development of new generation weapons and technologies. Total disarmament is not acceptable. The reference to this goal, be it in Article VI of the NPT or the preamble of the CTBT is more in the way of an ethical backdrop rather than a statement of intent. Both John Hoium and Ralph Earie, the Director and Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the USA, refer in their speeches advocating the acceptance of the CTBT to the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear arms and elimination of nuclear weapons, but are most upset by any linkage of the treaty to disarmament. Non-proliferation is an objective which is limited in scope in as far as the problem of WMD is concerned. And even that objective is not being achieved. NPT has not prevented proliferation. Iraq and North Korea, both signatories continued their quest. As long as nuclear weapons exist, nations which have adversary relations with others and 'perceive war a possibility, would continue to strive to acquire these, so as not to find themselves in a situation of asymmetry. 88 Emporium Current Essays Emporium Current Essays 89 an (interested) observer but does not have any plans to become a party to the Treaty as Song as India refuses to do so, although we strongly support the intention and idea of the establishment of a nuclear free world. Anyway the USA had its way and the treaty was indefinitely extended. It has legitimised the arsenals of the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). Initially, there \\crc no more than 75 or so supporters. However, the pressure of

the USA was such and the consideration of individual states' relations with the country weighed so much that most finally buckled, particularly as the proposal for A secret ballot was rejected. There are now 178 signatories. Having to the NPT extended indefinitely, the USA was anxious to get the CTBT signed as early. as possible. We had proposed a comprehensive test ban long ago. The USA was not interested then and has come round to its acceptance only in 1993. Having refined its weapons and built its arsenal, it is now keen on arms control particularly as the East-West confrontation has come to an end; from MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) to MAS (Mutual Assures Security) according to a phrase coined'by Defence Secretary Perry. START 1 has been brought into force in December 1994. START II has been ratified by the USA in January 1996. However, the reduced ceiling of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the year 2003 by the USA and Russia will still be between 3000 and 3500 by each side. The US objectives in regard to WMD have been mentioned earlier. The zero yield, verifiable CTBT which has be"en recently adopted by 158 states in the UN General Assembly -- after having earlier failed to get through in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva -r is an arms control measure to check the spread and further development of nuclear weapons as well as emergence of new technologies in the field of nuclear weapons. However, it does not ban all kinds of nuclear testing and it can drive testing into laboratories by those who have the resources to do so. It can rn no way be regarded as a global disarmament commitment and does not make a "gentleman's promise" for elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework. John Holum reminds us: "Remember that nearly all the world's nations have separately committed themselves, in effect, not to test, as a part of their broader commitment under the NonProliferation Treaty, or NPT. So the test ban is fundamentally a limitation only on countries that have nuclear weapons or hold an open nuclear option". By the same token it may also be pointed out that, with 178 states having abjured nuclear weapons as signatories to the NPT, the CTBT targets only the threshold states, India, Israel •Hid Pakistan. In as far as development of new technologies and new generation weapons is concerned, the NWS could prevent this by signing a convention among themselves; a CTBT is not necessary on this count. , There are some serious snags in the scope of the CTBT and the question of its linkage to disarmament. It proposes banning of all explosions. However, all tests should be banned. The US plans to continue carrying out sub-critical tests which will have a yield of up to 2 kg of TNT. Sub-critical is a misnomer s there can be no test without a nuclear yield. Hence, all hydro-nuclear and hydrodynamic tests should be included in the Treaty's scope. Secondly, a particular time frame should be given for the complete and total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Even if Pakistan and India decide to become signatories to the

Treaty (with probably they won't, at least in the near future), they must insist that it should come into force only after all parties have committed themselves to the attainment of the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a well-defined time frame. Banning of explosion wHl constrain spread of nuclear weapons and the development of new generation weapons. However, insistence on conducting sub-critical tests and maintaining laboratories or rather to build new mammoth ones and super computers to provide functional equivalent of full-scale testing, make the bona fides of the USA suspect. One wonders if the CTBT is primarily to "lock in" other NWS in general and China in particular at the present level of technology. Now, how docs the CTBT impinge on Pakistan' interests; on its national security and its nuclear weapons status? There are two major views on these issues. One that Pakistan' present nuclear status is not credible. Do we have a viable weapons? This school recommends that Pakistan should carry out a test or two and sign CTBT as a NWS. It should make it clear that it docs not intend to build up a large arsenal. The second view challenges such a course and raises the question as to why Pakistan has not carried out a test over all these years, even when India tested a nuclear device 22 years ago? Pakistan (if it has a bomb), this school believes, does not need a test. It has a non-weaponised deterrent and nothing will be gained by going overt. On the other hand, it would attract drastic Punishment as not only the USA but also Japan and Germany have -strong views on not providing aid in such circumstances. <)0 Emporium Current Essays On the question of signing CTBT, apart from the fact that we won't sign the Treaty unless India signs it and also keeping aside the argument of those who favour going overt and signing it, there are those who feel that although signing would not alter Pakistan's aonweaponiscd deterrence, it should retain its option and not sign. It-has lived with not having signed the NPT and can go. so in case of CTBT also. Then there are those who argue that having initially proposed a test ban, Pakistan should not isolate itself as the USA will, eventually see that the Treaty goes through, with or without India and Pakistan. / Genuine concerns about the weapons of mass destruction can be addressed only by disarmament. CTBT does not address this issue. Pakistan's participation in the NPT Review Conference last year, its active support to the concept of nuclear disarmament in the CD and at the UN' recently highlights our firm desire to encourage disarmament but it should not sign a flawed treaty and of course minus India. , The period 1994-95 saw an intense debate on the extension of the NPT. Pakistan participated in the NPT Review Conference as