189 Cm Iraq File

Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Iraq File Iraq File....................................................................................................................................................................................................1

Iraq File...................................................................................................................................................................1 Strat Sheet................................................................................................................................................................................................3

Strat Sheet...............................................................................................................................................................3 ***1AC Advantage***...........................................................................................................................................................................4

***1AC Advantage***..........................................................................................................................................4 Extension – Air Force K2 Mil..................................................................................................................................................................8

Extension – Air Force K2 Mil...............................................................................................................................8 Extension - Tech K2 Readiness.............................................................................................................................................................10

Extension - Tech K2 Readiness...........................................................................................................................10 Extension – Air Force K2 Winning the War..........................................................................................................................................13

Extension – Air Force K2 Winning the War......................................................................................................13 Extensions – Iraq Failure Bad................................................................................................................................................................14

Extensions – Iraq Failure Bad............................................................................................................................14 Extension - Air Force Key to War..........................................................................................................................................................16

Extension - Air Force Key to War......................................................................................................................16 Impact – Middle East Stability..............................................................................................................................................................17

Impact – Middle East Stability...........................................................................................................................17 Impact – Terrorism.................................................................................................................................................................................18

Impact – Terrorism..............................................................................................................................................18 ***Iraqi Airforce Advantage***............................................................................................................................................................20

***Iraqi Airforce Advantage***........................................................................................................................20 A/T: Iraqi Airforce ready now...............................................................................................................................................................26

A/T: Iraqi Airforce ready now............................................................................................................................26 A practical first step in this reinstatement process is to establish sector-specific forward air controllers (FAC) for the top 12 to 15 "hot spots" in Iraq with round-the-clock coverage. The actual implementation of such a concept would have to come in stages, since frankly, the Iraqi air force is not ready, and the US Air Force does not have the ready assets to fully put into practice the ideas that follow. The critical core capability does exist, however, within the US Special Operations Command, specifically, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) within Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Though limited in number, these combat aviation advisors (CAA) have the requisite language and trainer skills to lead the way; furthermore, they are acutely aware of the cultures in which they operate and can avoid the natural pitfalls to which an untrained American would be susceptible. The first products of such an implementation would be dramatic improvements in SA; significantly reduced reaction times; and ever-present, on-scene "eyes for the commander." .....................................................................................................................................................26

A practical first step in this reinstatement process is to establish sector-specific forward air controllers (FAC) for the top 12 to 15 "hot spots" in Iraq with round-the-clock coverage. The actual implementation of such a concept would have to come in stages, since frankly, the Iraqi air force is not ready, and the US Air Force does not have the ready assets to fully put into practice the ideas that follow. The critical core 1

Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank capability does exist, however, within the US Special Operations Command, specifically, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) within Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Though limited in number, these combat aviation advisors (CAA) have the requisite language and trainer skills to lead the way; furthermore, they are acutely aware of the cultures in which they operate and can avoid the natural pitfalls to which an untrained American would be susceptible. The first products of such an implementation would be dramatic improvements in SA; significantly reduced reaction times; and everpresent, on-scene "eyes for the commander." ..................................................................................................26 Extension – Iraq Air Force K2 winning the war....................................................................................................................................27

Extension – Iraq Air Force K2 winning the war...............................................................................................27 ***Iraq Disad***...................................................................................................................................................................................28

***Iraq Disad***.................................................................................................................................................28 Extension - Air Force k2 sustaining war................................................................................................................................................32

Extension - Air Force k2 sustaining war............................................................................................................32 Extension – Iraqis oppose Iraq...............................................................................................................................................................33

Extension – Iraqis oppose Iraq...........................................................................................................................33 Impact – Root of all Middle East problems...........................................................................................................................................34

Impact – Root of all Middle East problems.......................................................................................................34 Iraq Pullout Good - Stability..................................................................................................................................................................35

Iraq Pullout Good - Stability..............................................................................................................................35 Pullout Good - Terrorism.......................................................................................................................................................................36

Pullout Good - Terrorism....................................................................................................................................36 Iraq Pullout Bad – Ethnic Cleansing......................................................................................................................................................39

Iraq Pullout Bad – Ethnic Cleansing.................................................................................................................39 Iraq Pullout Bad – Heg decrease............................................................................................................................................................40

Iraq Pullout Bad – Heg decrease........................................................................................................................40 Iraq Pullout Bad – Civil War..................................................................................................................................................................41

Iraq Pullout Bad – Civil War..............................................................................................................................41 Pullout Bad – Genocide.........................................................................................................................................................................42

Pullout Bad – Genocide.......................................................................................................................................42 Pullout Bad - ME Chaos........................................................................................................................................................................43

Pullout Bad - ME Chaos......................................................................................................................................43

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Strat Sheet There are two scenarios for an aff advantage in this file. The first is that solar tech is key to the military which is key to winning the war and losing the war is bad. The second scenario is the Iraqi Airforce scenario. This says that the U.S. air force is k2 developing the Iraqi air force, and the Iraqi airforce is critical to withdrawal, which increases military readiness, which is low now, and high military readiness is k2 heg, and heg collapse bad. There is also an Iraq disad which says that the air force is key to sustaining the mission, or preventing withdrawal, and pullout is good. All extensions follow the shells. Good luck

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

***1AC Advantage*** Lack of energy efficient tech makes the army vulnerable in Iraq Defense Industry Daily, 3-17-06, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/energy-conservation-moving-uppentagons-agenda-02036, Junaid DID has covered contracts that begin to illustrate the US military’s massive requirement for fuel, and also noted measures like wind power installations, the US Navy’s alternative energy projects, R&D efforts like camouflage solar structure surfaces from Konarka, Solar Integrated, et. al., the installation of fuel cells, and more. And how about this solar parking lot? Meanwhile, advanced green technologies like hybrid drive vehicles offer both fuel economy and stealth benefits in combat, a significant plus in the urban warfare scenarios that appear to be such a big part of future wars. The truth is that the military can’t live without fuel, but every gallon of it is both a logistics burden and a financial burden. While some military items cannot realistically be converted, every conservation success or renewable energy conversion within the military’s jurisdiction makes it more deployable to the field, and more self-sufficient once there. Now add the fact that diversified “green infrastructure” lowers vulnerability to the kind of “system disruption” attacks one sees in Iraq, and the military/ security benefits become compelling. That means the military will be willing to invest in these technologies even when the dollars and cents case alone may be in question. It’s a trend that has already started… and it’s about to pick up speed.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Solar tech increase military capabilities in Iraq Defense Industry Daily, 3-17-06, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/energy-conservation-moving-uppentagons-agenda-02036, Junaid A $1.6 million contract with Konarka Technologies Inc. for an unspecified number of flexible solar panels aims to lighten the load for U.S. troops, who must transport and carry batteries to power everything from night vision goggles to GPS units. In the immediate term, these panels could ease the load on U.S. troops and Special Forces, while reducing the military’s logistical requirements. Over the longer terms, it could become part of military structures and eventually find its way into the casing of laptops or even consumer clothing. Konarka said it would also work to improve its ability to print camouflage-patterned material so that it could be used on military structures, and possibly even on clothing. Rather than relying on camouflage covers that disguise the solar collectors but also impair power generation, Konarka’s materials can be printed with the appropriate images built in while still maintaining their power generating capabilities.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank A strong military is essential to winning the Iraq war Brent Budowsky - was an aide to former Sen. Lloyd Bentsen and to Bill Alexander, then-chief deputy whip of the House; 5-15-07; “How to Win the Iraq War” The Hill, http://thehill.com/op-eds/how-to-winthe-iraq-war-2007-05-15.html Success can still be achieved in Iraq along historic precedents of Ireland, South Africa and El Salvador when armed combatants ended their wars and joined the political process. The current escalation is doomed because it encourages the dominant party to sectarian war, the Maliki government and its allies among Shi’ite militias and Iran to intransigence, using American troops to achieve military victory in their war against Sunnis. If Senate Republicans demonstrate clarity and conscience they can save our country from continued catastrophe, save their party from electoral disaster, and save Iraqis from a cauldron of carnage that will bring war without end. Official Washington almost universally believes privately that the Iraq enterprise is doomed because official Washington also believes, incorrectly, that the president will never change the policy. The president vowed to never negotiate with Syria and Iran, insulting even the Speaker, who advocated this. The president changed that policy. The pressures are rising dramatically. Republicans increasingly recognize the disaster. Incoming British Prime Minister Gordon Brown will not support escalation, but could lead a global coalition for major economic aid to post-sectarian war Iraq.The president morphs all combatants into one blob he calls “terrorism,” resulting in a fog that obscures the mission and destroys our ability to accomplish it. There are two wars in Iraq, both of which can be won, through completely different tactics. There is a war against al Qaeda that must be won through military victory, uniting America with patriotic Iraqis of all factions who oppose occupation by America, Iran or al Qaeda. There is a war pitting Shi’ites against Sunnis for dominance in post-occupation Iraq. The escalation places America on the side of Iraqi Shi’ites and Iran. It destroys the one hope for victory through a political solution similar to El Salvador, Ireland and South Africa. General Petraeus cannot change this, and almost certainly knows it. The elevation of General Petraeus to false sainthood is a disservice to the general, the country and the truth because it obscures what is really happening, and what we must do to succeed. We can only win military victory in the first war, against al Qaeda, by achieving political victory that ends the second war, among Iraqis. While we urgently want a political solution, the Iraqi parliament wants a two-month vacation to avoid it. While we urgently want an Iraqi government for all Iraqis, Maliki removes Iraqi generals seeking reconciliation because he wants military victory over the Sunnis, and will fight to the last American to achieve it. We view the surge as American blood buying time for an Iraqi political solution. Maliki and Shi’ite allies use it to buy time for sectarian military victory. It is not enough for 11 Republicans to visit the president, make these points, wave their polls, and then continue the policy. It accomplishes nothing for senators to express exasperation with the Iraqi government, unless they act on it. Congress should send the president an Iraq bill that requires a new vote within 90 days. Democrats, Republicans and the president should apply maximum and extreme pressure for a political breakthrough. In any Iraq plan the value of benchmarks is zero percent and the value of enforcement is 100 percent. The only enforcement is a new vote by Congress. We can reduce American casualties by 80 percent with a policy offering a higher probability of success, through a redeployment of troops within Iraq, but the president will not agree, yet. The alternative is a new vote in Congress within 90 days, to make it clear that America will not shed blood for Shi’ite dominance and endless war. Will Maliki and his allies agree to Iraqi power-sharing that is genuinely pluralistic, tolerant and fair? If not, Americans should not die for a sectarian cause serving Iranian interests. If they will, it happened in El Salvador, South Africa and Ireland and can happen in Iraq with demonstrable progress within 90 days. Plan A escalates war without end, and carnage without hope. Plan B is hard, but the history of El Salvador, South Africa and Ireland proves it is possible. We win one war, by ending the carnage among Iraqis, and win the other war, by killing the real terrorists, who pose the real threat.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Failure in Iraq will cause regional terrorism and nuclear war- zero question of withdrawal Reuel Marc Gerecht, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 18-07, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25407/pub_detail.asp, Junaid If we leave Iraq any time soon, the battle for Baghdad will probably lead to a conflagration that consumes all of Arab Iraq, and quite possibly Kurdistan, too. Once the Shia become both badly bloodied and victorious, raw nationalist and religious passions will grow. A horrific fight with the Sunni Arabs will inevitably draw in support from the ferociously anti-Shiite Sunni religious establishments in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and on the Shiite side from Iran. It will probably destroy most of central Iraq and whet the appetite of Shiite Arab warlords, who will by then dominate their community, for a conflict with the Kurds. If the Americans stabilize Arab Iraq, which means occupying the Sunni triangle, this won't happen. A strong, aggressive American military presence in Iraq can probably halt the radicalization of the Shiite community. Imagine an Iraq modeled on the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. The worst elements in the Iranian regime are heavily concentrated in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence, the two organizations most active inside Iraq. The Lebanese Hezbollah is also present giving tutorials. These forces need increasing strife to prosper. Imagine Iraqi Shiites, battle-hardened in a vicious war with Iraq's Arab Sunnis, spiritually and operationally linking up with a revitalized and aggressive clerical dictatorship in Iran. Imagine the Iraqi Sunni Islamic militants, driven from Iraq, joining up with groups like al Qaeda, living to die killing Americans. Imagine the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan overwhelmed with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Sunni Arab refugees. The Hashemites have been lucky and clever since World War II. They've escaped extinction several times. Does anyone want to take bets that the monarchy can survive the implantation of an army of militant, angry Iraqi Sunni Arabs? For those who believe that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the epicenter of the Middle East, the mass migration of Iraq's Sunni Arabs into Jordan will bury what small chances remain that the Israelis and Palestinians will find an accommodation. With Jordan in trouble, overflowing with viciously anti-American and anti-Israeli Iraqis, peaceful Palestinian evolution on the West Bank of the Jordan river is about as likely as the discovery of the Holy Grail. The repercussions throughout the Middle East of the Sunni-Shiite clash in Iraq are potentially so large it's difficult to digest. Sunni Arabs in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia will certainly view a hard-won and bloody Shiite triumph in Iraq as an enormous Iranian victory. The Egyptians or the Saudis or both will go for their own nukes. What little chance remains for the Americans and the Europeans to corral peacefully the clerical regime's nuclear-weapons aspirations will end with a Shiite-Sunni death struggle in Mesopotamia, which the Shia will inevitably win. The Israelis, who are increasingly likely to strike preemptively the major Iranian nuclear sites before the end of George Bush's presidency, will feel even more threatened, especially when the Iranian regime underscores its struggle against the Zionist enemy as a means of compensating for its support to the bloody Shiite conquest in Iraq. With America in full retreat from Iraq, the clerical regime, which has often viewed terrorism as a tool of statecraft, could well revert to the mentality and tactics that produced the bombing of Khobar Towers in 1996. If the Americans are retreating, hit them. That would not be just a radical Shiite view; it was the learned estimation of Osama bin Laden and his kind before 9/11. It's questionable to argue that the war in Iraq has advanced the radical Sunni holy war against the United States. There should be no question, however, that an American defeat in Mesopotamia would be the greatest psychological triumph ever for anti-American jihadists. Al Qaeda and its militant Iraqi allies could dominate western Iraq for years--it could take awhile for the Shiites to drive them out. How in the world could the United States destroy these devils when it no longer had forces on the ground in Anbar? Air power? Would we helicopter Special Forces from aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf into a distant war zone when our intelligence information on this desert region was--as it would surely be--somewhere between poor and nonexistent? Images of Desert One in 1980 come to mind. Neither Jordan nor Kuwait may be eager to lend its airfields for American operations that intend to kill Sunnis who are killing Shiites.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Extension – Air Force K2 Mil Air force key to battleground Emonson DL, and Vanderbeek RD; March 1995; “The Use of amphetamines in U.S. Airforce tactical operations during Desert Storm and Storm” NCBI, Pubmed.gov, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7661838 Today's battleground requires round-the-clock air support. Modern aircraft systems enable tactical aircraft to be flown in all weather conditions, day or night, and for prolonged periods. U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) aircrew who deployed to the Southwest Asia Area of Responsibility (SWA AOR) for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm were retrospectively surveyed to determine the extent and effectiveness of dextroamphetamine use in support of sustained flying operations. Surveys were sent in May 1991 to each tactical squadron that participated in Desert Storm. Of pilots who were surveyed, 65% used amphetamines during the deployment to the SWA AOR and/or during Operation Desert Storm. Pilots who used amphetamines in air operations described it as "occasional." The most frequent indications for amphetamine use were "aircrew fatigue" and "mission type." Of pilots who used amphetamines, 58-61% considered their use beneficial or essential to operations. Dextroamphetamine (5 mg every 4 h) was used effectively and without major side effects in tactical flying operations. Amphetamine use enhanced cockpit performance and flight safety by reducing the effect of fatigue during critical stages of flight.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank The airforce is key to military operations General Ronald R. Fogleman; 7-16-96; “Airforce Doctrine Document 4” Space Operations Document http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usaf/afdd4.htm The United States is the world's foremost air and space power, and space forces are essential elements of modern warfare. Space systems and capabilities enhance the precision, lethality, survivability, and agility of all operations--air, land, sea, and special operations. Space power is also one of the key elements in achieving and maintaining information dominance. The employment of space power to achieve space superiority and support military operations in theaters of operations has increased significantly. Available space support includes, but is not limited to, ballistic missile early warning, navigation, environmental monitoring, communications, intelligence support, spacelift, and satellite operations. The broad doctrinal tenets of space power described in Air Force Basic Doctrine are derived from our combat experience, insights into emerging technologies and capabilities, and professional judgment. They will continue to evolve and become more focused as space-derived information becomes integrated into plans, exercises, and training.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Extension - Tech K2 Readiness Solar power increases military effectiveness and decreases casualties in Iraq Defense News, 8-15-2006, Renewable Energy Demand Reaches U.S. Front Lines, http://www.evworld.com/news.cfm?newsid=12776 At remote U.S. military bases in Iraq, one of the most oil-rich countries in the world, American commanders are pleading for solar panels and wind generators to save the lives of troops forced to protect lengthy and vulnerable supply lines that wind through the country and feed the military's voracious fuel appetite. The urgent request for renewable energy systems was submitted July 25 by U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, who commands U.S. forces in western Iraq's restive Anbar province. The document pointed to the vulnerability of American supply lines to insurgent attack by ambush or roadside bombs, and said reducing the military's dependence on fuel for power generation could reduce the number of road-bound convoys. Electricity to power everything from computers to air conditioners on U.S. bases is by means of monstrous diesel-fueled generators kept running 24 hours a day. Feeding those generators -- and fueling the many vehicles used to patrol Iraq's roadways -- requires fuel convoys that originate as far away as Kuwait. The document said the majority of the supply convoys on Iraq's roads are carrying fuel. "Without this solution [renewable energy systems], personnel loss rates are likely to continue at their current rate. Continued casualty accumulation exhibits potential to jeopardize mission success," the request said. Coming as it does from a battlefield commander who has directly tied the potential for renewable energy to reducing American casualties in Iraq, versus an initiative pushed from cost cutters from inside the department, the request for renewable energy systems could very well represent a tipping point in the Pentagon's commitment to renewable energy, said experts who have advised the military on reducing fuel consumption. "This is the beginning of the people trying to understand that the whole notion of energy means being more effective in operations," said Terry Pudas, deputy director of the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation. He said the military has long thought more in terms of effectiveness than efficiency, a notion that is changing as "the burden of logistics and energy on the battlefield now really does become an effectiveness issue." The American military has embraced a doctrine of war fighting designed for nonlinear battlefields, such as Iraq, where the traditional notion of front lines and secure rear areas in reality no longer exists.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Solar power increases military readiness in Iraq Defense News, 8-15-2006, Renewable Energy Demand Reaches U.S. Front Lines, http://www.evworld.com/news.cfm?newsid=12776 To fight in smaller, more agile and distributed forces on such battlefields will require shedding impediments that slow a unit's ability to react to rapidly changing battlefield developments. "Clearly, dragging around a lot of tanker trucks is an impediment," Pudas said. He cited a recent Pentagon study that said 70 percent of what the Army hauls around the battlefield is fuel. The U.S. military is in many ways far ahead of the civilian sector in using renewable energy, said Amory Lovins, chief executive of the Rocky Mountain Institute and co-author of "Winning the Oil Endgame." While solar and wind generation are in use at military installations around the world, this is the first known request for such systems from a front-line commander, he said. Lovins has urged the military to develop a decentralized power system in Iraq, not so vulnerable to insurgent attacks, and said there exists real potential with solar and wind power. Because of the number of sunlight days in Iraq, it is an ideal locale for solar power, he said. The Pentagon's fuel cost calculations have traditionally been based on wholesale prices, and have not taken into account the actual cost of delivering it to front-line units, said Lovins, who advises a Defense Science Board panel on fuel efficiency. Before the Iraq war, "fuel logistics were assumed to be free and uninterruptible." "If you're talking about getting the gas to an M1A1 tank in Fallujah, the supply lines, the tanker vehicles and their protection could drive the cost up to $100 a gallon or more," said Jim Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and currently an energy adviser to the Pentagon and Congress. Speaking to Washington reporters recently, John Young, the Pentagon's research and engineering director, who has commissioned a task force on energy efficiency and renewable fuels, said the Defense Department is trying to develop a more accurate calculation for the delivered price of fuel to forward-deployed troops. He said those calculations will be used to price the life-cycle costs of future acquisition programs, including everything from vehicles to generators to aircraft, and will influence where the department spends money. Young said the department is fully committed to renewable energy, citing one of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's recent memos urging the department to cut its fuel costs.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Solar power increases combat readiness in Iraq Defense News, 8-15-2006, Renewable Energy Demand Reaches U.S. Front Lines, http://www.evworld.com/news.cfm?newsid=12776 To fight in smaller, more agile and distributed forces on such battlefields will require shedding impediments that slow a unit's ability to react to rapidly changing battlefield developments. "Clearly, dragging around a lot of tanker trucks is an impediment," Pudas said. He cited a recent Pentagon study that said 70 percent of what the Army hauls around the battlefield is fuel. The U.S. military is in many ways far ahead of the civilian sector in using renewable energy, said Amory Lovins, chief executive of the Rocky Mountain Institute and co-author of "Winning the Oil Endgame." While solar and wind generation are in use at military installations around the world, this is the first known request for such systems from a front-line commander, he said. Lovins has urged the military to develop a decentralized power system in Iraq, not so vulnerable to insurgent attacks, and said there exists real potential with solar and wind power. Because of the number of sunlight days in Iraq, it is an ideal locale for solar power, he said. The Pentagon's fuel cost calculations have traditionally been based on wholesale prices, and have not taken into account the actual cost of delivering it to front-line units, said Lovins, who advises a Defense Science Board panel on fuel efficiency. Before the Iraq war, "fuel logistics were assumed to be free and uninterruptible." "If you're talking about getting the gas to an M1A1 tank in Fallujah, the supply lines, the tanker vehicles and their protection could drive the cost up to $100 a gallon or more," said Jim Woolsey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and currently an energy adviser to the Pentagon and Congress. Speaking to Washington reporters recently, John Young, the Pentagon's research and engineering director, who has commissioned a task force on energy efficiency and renewable fuels, said the Defense Department is trying to develop a more accurate calculation for the delivered price of fuel to forward-deployed troops. He said those calculations will be used to price the life-cycle costs of future acquisition programs, including everything from vehicles to generators to aircraft, and will influence where the department spends money. Young said the department is fully committed to renewable energy, citing one of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's recent memos urging the department to cut its fuel costs.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Extension – Air Force K2 Winning the War Air force critical to winning the war Air Force News Agency; May, June 2008; “Frontline Duty: faceless warriors sustain war effort” Airman, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBP/is_4_52/ai_n25454518 To fight the war on terrorism, Senior Airman Bryan Gallagher makes sure aircraft have fuel to fly and fight--night and day. On any given day in Iraq and Afghanistan, other faceless Airmen do their part to win the war. Airman Gallagher, a fuels technician at a base in Southwest Asia--and thousands of others serving in the war zone--remain committed to ensuring the Air Force can sustain operations against the forces that seek to undermine security on both war fronts, and around the world. These Airmen may not be kicking in the doors to insurgent strongholds or dropping bombs on al-Qaeda, but each has a valuable job to do. Nurse Capt. George Moctezuma cares for the wounded at the Air Force theater hospital at Balad Air Base, Iraq. At another Southwest Asia base, crew chief Senior Airman Justin Brown maintains his C-130 Hercules ready to deliver critical cargo across the region. And at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, explosive ordnance disposal Senior Airman Sarah Burrill searches for and destroys unexploded munitions. Each job requires total dedication and sometimes unlimited sacrifice. That's the only way Airmen will ensure the Air Force maintains--above all--the capabilities it must have to dominate air, space and cyberspace. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Airman staff FUEL TIME. Fuels technician Senior Airman Bryan Gallagher gets ready to pump fuel from a fuel bladder onto a fuel truck at a base in Southwest Asia. The Airman is with 386th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron. Airman Gallagher and his fellow workers do a daily fuel inventory and provide and issue fuel to vehicle operators and aircrews. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] WARTIME CARE. Operating room nurse Capt. George Moctezuma removes a sterile dressing from a patient after a surgical procedure at the Air Force Theatre Hospital, Balad Air Base, Iraq. The captain deployed from Wilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] TOW 'N GO. C-130 Hercules crew chief Senior Airman Justin Brown checks for the proper fit before he connects a heavy tow bar to one of the four turbo-prop cargo planes at a base in Southwest Asia. The sergeant is with the 386th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] BARRIER CHECK. Power production technician Tech. Sgt. Emmanuel Ramirez readies turn buckles and spacers before driving four-foot stakes in the ground to prevent an arresting barrier system from shifting during an emergency landing at Balad Air Base, Iraq. The sergeant is with the 332nd Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] FRAGILE LOAD. Senior Airman Sarah Burrill cradles an unexploded ordinance as she carries it to a joint explosive ordnance rapid response vehicle at a village in the Kapisa Province of Afghanistan. The Airman is a member of a 755th Air Expeditionary Group explosive ordinance disposal team at Bagram Air Base. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] WELD DONE. As hot gas and sparks fly onto his protective mask and leather clothing, machinist Staff Sgt. Jacob Schargus uses a gas-metal arc weld to repair a damaged air compressor at Balad Air Base, Iraq. The sergeant is with the 332nd Expeditionary Maintenance Squadron. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] JACKED UP. Crew chiefs jack up a C-17 Globemaster III before doing a final operations test on a nose landing gear strut they fixed at Balad Air Base, Iraq. Before releasing the transport back to duty, they performed landing procedures from the cockpit. The Airmen are with Detachment 5, 721st Air Mobility Maintenance Group.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Extensions – Iraq Failure Bad Iraq failure leads to civil war Jim Lobe, Washington Bureau Chief, September 26, 2005 INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY http://www.ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=30428 Barring a major U.S. intervention to ensure that Sunni interests are addressed, according to the report, "Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry", "Iraq is likely to slide toward full-scale civil war and the break-up of the country." Similarly, no one outside the administration doubts the under-reported judgment made here just last week by visiting Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal. "Iraq is a very dangerous situation and a very threatening situation," he said. "The impression is (that it is) gradually going toward disintegration. There seems to be no dynamic now that is pulling the country together." "All the dynamics there are pushing the (Iraqi) people away from each other," he said, adding that, if current trends persist, "It will draw the countries of the region into the conflict..." This view was shared by members of a high-powered panel of Iraq and Iran specialists at the quasi-governmental U.S. Institute for Peace earlier this month. Amid these gloomy, not to say apocalyptic, warnings, a public debate over U.S. withdrawal -- and specifically whether the U.S. military presence is making all-out war more or less likely -- has intensified outside the administration. The mainstream position still sees the U.S. forces as a bulwark that is preventing, or at least braking, the trend toward war. According to Ferguson, who was a warbooster, the current situation, as bad as it is, is just "a little local difficulty" compared to the alternative of all-out civil war and its regionalisation.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Failing in Iraq would end all progress made towards democracy and Iraq would fall into civil war RON CLAIBORNE, staff writer, March 26, 2008 ABC News“McCain Asserts Iraq Withdrawal Could Mean Civil War” http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=4528489&page=1 GOP presidential hopeful John McCain on Wednesday cast America's commitment to Iraq as a "moral responsibility" to avert a genocidal civil war that could ensue if U.S. troops are withdrawn too soon. In a major address in California on foreign policy, the presumptive Republican nominee said, "It would be an unconscionable act of betrayal, a stain on our character as a great nation, if we were to walk away from the Iraqi people and consign them to the horrendous violence, ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide that would follow a reckless, irresponsible and premature withdrawal." McCain Sees Progress in Iraq. Speaking to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, McCain, who has supported the war from the beginning, pointed to what he said were signs of progress: a decrease in violence and civilian and military deaths, Iraqis returning to work, markets open, and oil revenues increasing. He also said there have signs of political reconciliation at the local level, but he acknowledges, "political progress at the national level has been far too slow. … but there is progress." McCain spent two days in Iraq on a congressional visit one-and-a-half weeks ago. He has previously said that to be elected president, he will need to convince American voters that whatever they think of the wisdom of having gone to war, the U.S. has a vital interest in keeping troops there long enough to quash the threat posed by Al Qaeda. The Challenge in November In his speech, he said he believes it is still possible for Iraq to become a stable democracy and it is in the geopolitical interests of the United States to see that Iraq and Afghanistan attain that goal. "Those who claim we should withdraw from Iraq in order to fight Al Qaeda more effectively elsewhere are making a dangerous mistake," he warned. "Whether they were there before is immaterial. Al Qaeda is in Iraq now. If we withdraw prematurely, al Qaeda will survive [and] proclaim victory … Civil war in Iraq could easily descend into genocide, and destabilize the entire region as neighboring powers come to the aid of their favored factions. I believe a reckless and premature withdrawal would be a terrible defeat for our security interests and our values."

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Extension - Air Force Key to War Air force critical to winning the war Air Force News Agency; May, June 2008; “Frontline Duty: faceless warriors sustain war effort” Airman, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBP/is_4_52/ai_n25454518 To fight the war on terrorism, Senior Airman Bryan Gallagher makes sure aircraft have fuel to fly and fight--night and day. On any given day in Iraq and Afghanistan, other faceless Airmen do their part to win the war. Airman Gallagher, a fuels technician at a base in Southwest Asia--and thousands of others serving in the war zone--remain committed to ensuring the Air Force can sustain operations against the forces that seek to undermine security on both war fronts, and around the world. These Airmen may not be kicking in the doors to insurgent strongholds or dropping bombs on al-Qaeda, but each has a valuable job to do. Nurse Capt. George Moctezuma cares for the wounded at the Air Force theater hospital at Balad Air Base, Iraq. At another Southwest Asia base, crew chief Senior Airman Justin Brown maintains his C-130 Hercules ready to deliver critical cargo across the region. And at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, explosive ordnance disposal Senior Airman Sarah Burrill searches for and destroys unexploded munitions. Each job requires total dedication and sometimes unlimited sacrifice. That's the only way Airmen will ensure the Air Force maintains--above all--the capabilities it must have to dominate air, space and cyberspace. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Airman staff FUEL TIME. Fuels technician Senior Airman Bryan Gallagher gets ready to pump fuel from a fuel bladder onto a fuel truck at a base in Southwest Asia. The Airman is with 386th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron. Airman Gallagher and his fellow workers do a daily fuel inventory and provide and issue fuel to vehicle operators and aircrews. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] WARTIME CARE. Operating room nurse Capt. George Moctezuma removes a sterile dressing from a patient after a surgical procedure at the Air Force Theatre Hospital, Balad Air Base, Iraq. The captain deployed from Wilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] TOW 'N GO. C-130 Hercules crew chief Senior Airman Justin Brown checks for the proper fit before he connects a heavy tow bar to one of the four turbo-prop cargo planes at a base in Southwest Asia. The sergeant is with the 386th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] BARRIER CHECK. Power production technician Tech. Sgt. Emmanuel Ramirez readies turn buckles and spacers before driving four-foot stakes in the ground to prevent an arresting barrier system from shifting during an emergency landing at Balad Air Base, Iraq. The sergeant is with the 332nd Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] FRAGILE LOAD. Senior Airman Sarah Burrill cradles an unexploded ordinance as she carries it to a joint explosive ordnance rapid response vehicle at a village in the Kapisa Province of Afghanistan. The Airman is a member of a 755th Air Expeditionary Group explosive ordinance disposal team at Bagram Air Base. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] WELD DONE. As hot gas and sparks fly onto his protective mask and leather clothing, machinist Staff Sgt. Jacob Schargus uses a gas-metal arc weld to repair a damaged air compressor at Balad Air Base, Iraq. The sergeant is with the 332nd Expeditionary Maintenance Squadron. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] JACKED UP. Crew chiefs jack up a C-17 Globemaster III before doing a final operations test on a nose landing gear strut they fixed at Balad Air Base, Iraq. Before releasing the transport back to duty, they performed landing procedures from the cockpit. The Airmen are with Detachment 5, 721st Air Mobility Maintenance Group.

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Impact – Middle East Stability A. Victory in Iraq is key to Middle East stability Wall Street Journal, 3/22/06, What if we lose?, http://www.theabsurdreport.com/2006/what-if-we-lose/ Broader Mideast instability. No one should underestimate America’s deterrent effect in that unstable region, a benefit that would vanish if we left Iraq precipitously. Iran would feel free to begin unfettered meddling in southern Iraq with the aim of helping young radicals like Moqtada al-Sadr overwhelm moderate clerics like the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Syria would feel free to return to its predations in Lebanon and to unleash Hezbollah on Israel. Even allies like Turkey might feel compelled to take unilateral, albeit counterproductive steps, such as intervening in northern Iraq to protect their interests. Every country in the Middle East would make its own new calculation of how much it could afford to support U.S. interests. Some would make their own private deals with al Qaeda, or at a minimum stop aiding us in our pursuit of Islamists.

B. The Middle East instability leads to extinction Richard Holbrooke, Former US ambassador to UN, 8/11/06, Guns of August, http://www.nysun.com/article/37776 Two full-blown crises, in Lebanon and Iraq, are merging into a single emergency. A chain reaction could spread quickly almost anywhere between Cairo and Bombay. Turkey is talking openly of invading northern Iraq to deal with Kurdish terrorists based there. Syria could easily get pulled into the war in southern Lebanon. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are under pressure from jihadists to support Hezbollah, even though the governments in Cairo and Riyadh hate that organization. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of giving shelter to Al Qaeda and the Taliban; there is constant fighting on both sides of that border. NATO's own war in Afghanistan is not going well. India talks of taking punitive action against Pakistan for allegedly being behind the Bombay bombings. Uzbekistan is a repressive dictatorship with a growing Islamic resistance. The only beneficiaries of this chaos are Iran, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and the Iraqi Shiite leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, who last week held the largest anti-American, anti-Israel demonstration in the world in the very heart of Baghdad, even as 6,000 additional American troops were rushing into the city to "prevent" a civil war that has already begun. This combination of combustible elements poses the greatest threat to global stability since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, history's only nuclear superpower confrontation. The Cuba crisis, although immensely dangerous, was comparatively simple: It came down to two leaders and no war. In 13 days of brilliant diplomacy, John F. Kennedy induced Nikita Khrushchev to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba. Kennedy was deeply influenced by Barbara Tuchman's classic,"The Guns of August," which recounted how a seemingly isolated event 92 summers ago — an assassination in Sarajevo by a Serb terrorist — set off a chain reaction that led in just a few weeks to World War I. There are vast differences between that August and this one. But Tuchman ended her book with a sentence that resonates in this summer of crisis: "The nations were caught in a trap, a trap made during the first thirty days out of battles that failed to be decisive, a trap from which there was, and has been, no exit." Preventing just such a trap must be the highest priority of American policy. Unfortunately, there is little public sign that the president and his top advisers recognize how close we are to a chain reaction, or that they have any larger strategy beyond tactical actions.

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Impact – Terrorism Iraq Failure means increased terrorist attacks Wall Street Journal, 3/22/06, What if we lose?, http://www.theabsurdreport.com/2006/what-if-we-lose/ The third anniversary of U.S. military action to liberate Iraq has brought with it a relentless stream of media and political pessimism that is unwarranted by the facts and threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophesy if it goes unchallenged. Yes, sectarian tensions are running high and the politicians of Iraq’s newly elected parliament are taking a long time forming a government. But the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra several weeks back has not provoked the spiral into “civil war” that so many keep predicting. U.S. casualties are down over the past month, in part because Iraqi security forces are performing better all the time. More fundamentally, the coalition remains solidly allied with the majority of Iraqis who want neither Saddam’s Hussein’s return nor the country’s descent into a Taliban-like hellhole. There is no widespread agitation for U.S. troops to depart, and if anything the Iraqi fear is that we’ll leave too soon. Yet there’s no denying the polls showing that most Americans are increasingly weary of the daily news of car bombs and Iraqi squabbling and are wishing it would all just go away. Their pessimism is fed by elites who should know better but can’t restrain their domestic political calculations long enough to consider the damage that would accompany U.S. failure. A conventional military defeat is inconceivable in Iraq, but a premature U.S. withdrawal is becoming all too possible. With that in mind, it’s worth thinking through what would happen if the U.S. does fail in Iraq. By fail, we mean cut and run before giving Iraqis the time and support to establish a stable, democratic government that can stand on its own. Beyond almost certain chaos in Iraq, here are some other likely consequences: • The U.S. would lose all credibility on weapons proliferation. One doesn’t have to be a dreamy-eyed optimist about democracy to recognize that toppling Saddam Hussein was a milestone in slowing the spread of WMD. Watching the Saddam example, Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi decided he didn’t want to be next. Gadhafi’s “voluntary” disarmament in turn helped uncover the nuclear network run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and Iran’s two decades of deception. Now Iran is dangerously close to acquiring nuclear weapons, a prospect that might yet be headed off by the use or threat of force. But if the U.S. retreats from Iraq, Iran’s mullahs will know that we have no stomach to confront them and coercive diplomacy will have no credibility. An Iranian bomb, in turn, would inspire nuclear efforts in other Mideast countries and around the world. • Broader Mideast instability. No one should underestimate America’s deterrent effect in that unstable region, a benefit that would vanish if we left Iraq precipitously. Iran would feel free to begin unfettered meddling in southern Iraq with the aim of helping young radicals like Moqtada al-Sadr overwhelm moderate clerics like the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Syria would feel free to return to its predations in Lebanon and to unleash Hezbollah on Israel. Even allies like Turkey might feel compelled to take unilateral, albeit counterproductive steps, such as intervening in northern Iraq to protect their interests. Every country in the Middle East would make its own new calculation of how much it could afford to support U.S. interests. Some would make their own private deals with al Qaeda, or at a minimum stop aiding us in our pursuit of Islamists. • We would lose all credibility with Muslim reformers. The Mideast is now undergoing a political evolution in which the clear majority, even if skeptical of U.S. motives, agrees with the goal of more democracy and accountable government. They have watched as millions of Iraqis have literally risked their lives to vote and otherwise support the project. Having seen those Iraqis later betrayed, other would-be reformers would not gamble their futures on American support. Nothing could be worse in the battle for Muslim “hearts and minds” than to betray our most natural allies. We would invite more terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Osama bin Laden said many times that he saw the weak U.S. response to Somalia and the Khobar Towers and USS Cole bombings as evidence that we lacked the will for a long fight. The forceful response after 9/11 taught al Qaeda otherwise, but a retreat in Iraq would revive that reputation for American weakness. While Western liberals may deny any connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, bin Laden and the rest of the Arab world see it clearly and would advertise a U.S. withdrawal as his victory. Far from leaving us alone, bin Laden would be more emboldened to strike the U.S. homeland with a goal of driving the U.S. entirely out of the Mideast. We could go on, but our point is that far more is at stake in Iraq than President Bush’s approval rating or the influence of this or that foreign-policy faction. U.S. credibility and safety are at risk in the most direct way imaginable, far more than they were in Vietnam. In that fight, we could establish a new anti-Communist perimeter elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The poison of radical Islam will spread far and wide across borders if it can make even a plausible claim to being on the ascendancy, and nothing would show that more than the retreat of America from Iraq. We still believe victory in Iraq is possible, indeed likely, notwithstanding its costs and difficulties. But the desire among so many of our political elites to repudiate Mr. Bush and his foreign policy is creating a dangerous public pessimism that could yet lead to defeat — a defeat whose price would be paid by all Americans, and for years to come.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Terrorism risks extinction Kirkus Reviews 99 [“New Terrorism, Fanaticism, Arms, Destruction”, http://www.amazon.com/New-Terrorism-Fanaticism-Arms-Destruction/dp/productdescription/0195118162] Terrorism is nothing new. Fanatical groups have been wreaking havoc from time immemorial. Today

two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terrorists be they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutations seem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations. On all of this, Laqueur is quite convincing. Useful, too, is his elaboration on the nature of the various terrorist threats we face. Yet he too often falls back on questionable, if not offensive, opinion. He asserts, for instance, that in non-Western countries ``human lives count for less,'' and so the danger of terrorism in these countries is greater. This is simply unacceptable doggerel. Useful in pointing out the terrorist danger, but be wary of the author's more outlandish pronouncements.

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***Iraqi Airforce Advantage*** Air force k2 Iraqi air force development Trevor Tiernan; March-April 2008; “Giving Iraqis New Wings: American airmen help rebuild country’s shattered airforce” bnet, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBP/is_3_52/ai_n25353882 Eighteen years ago the Air Force did all it could to destroy Saddam Hussein's military. Iraq was the region's military superpower. But by the end of the Gulf War. U.S. airpower had devastated Iraq's military and destroyed most of its highly touted air force of more than 500 combat aircraft. By the end of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the country's air force lay in ruins. But coalition military leaders knew Iraq needed a strong military to survive and to give the shattered country new hope. It was a decision welcomed by Iraqis like Brig. Gen. Abdul Kareem. "The air force is a great symbol for any nation," said General Kareem, commandant of the Iraqi Air Force Training School at Taji Air Base. Today, a group of more than 300 Airmen is helping rebuild Iraq's air force into a modern, self-sufficient, defense force. The Airmen, from a host of different specialties and backgrounds, make up the Coalition Air Force Transition Team, which Brig. Gen. Robert Allardice commands. He said the team's job is to help Iraq stand up its air force and return to the air. "By 2003, the Iraqi air force was decimated," General Allardice said. "They didn't have any infrastructure, any people and there were no airplanes flying. It was completely taken apart." The plan to rebuild Iraq's shattered air force began that same year, with a small group of former Iraqi airmen. By 2005, the Air Force took the challenge of turning a former adversary into a strong ally. But progress was slow. By January 2007, Iraq's air force still did not have an air force academy, a flight training school, a technical school or a basic military training school. Because of the team's work, all these schools are in place and actively graduating students less than a year later, General Allardice said. Iraq's air force also started to take off, increasing its sortie rate from about 30 missions per week to more than 350. The general said the hope is that the relationship Airmen are building with their Iraqi counterparts will not only increase the fledging force's power and capacity, but that will make the new air force "understanding and friendly to our needs and interests." The transition team is working toward that end. Operating from several locations in Iraq, the team's training mission closely follow that used in the training pipeline U.S. Airmen pass through on their way to the operational Air Force. Initial training is at Taji and Rustimayah air bases. Flying training takes place at Kirkuk Air Base. And operational squadrons are flying sorties from Taji, Basra and New Al Muthana air bases.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank A trained Iraqi military is key to withdrawal Associated Press; 4-12-06; “U.S. airforce to stay in Iraq” http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/2006/2006April/007312.html The US Air Force may remain in Iraq for a "long time," most likely in a capacity similar to its lengthy patrols of the nofly zone after the first Gulf War, the top Air Force general said today. General T Michael Moseley, Air Force chief of staff, said that even as ground forces begin to come out of Iraq, the Air Force will be needed to carry troops and supplies, to perform surveillance and reconnaissance, and to strike targets. He said the Air Force will remain in Iraq while that country works to establish its own air defences. "I think the Air Force will be there like we were for the no-fly zone for a long time," Moseley told defence reporters. "I don't know yet how many bases. We're looking at reducing the number of bases. We have 18 we are flying airplanes off of right now. I see that number coming down. But I don't see the air and space component leaving soon." Military action As the fourth year of the Iraq war begins, close to 21,000 Air Force personnel are in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the bulk in Iraq. Overall there are about 132,000 US forces in Iraq. Military officials have expressed hope they can reduce the number below 100,000 by year's end. Moseley said the Iraqi Air Force has three C-130 transport planes and a variety of other smaller aircraft. In other remarks, Moseley said it is not appropriate to comment on any specific plans for military action against Iran. Asked whether the US Air Force has the ability to destroy nuclear targets buried deep in the ground there, he said it would depend on how deep the structure is and how it is built. (AP)

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank The Iraq war is depleting U.S. military readiness Ann Scott Tyson - Washington Post Staff Writer; 3-19-05; “Two Years Later, Iraq War Drains Military” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48306-2005Mar18?language=printer Two years after the United States launched a war in Iraq with a crushing display of power, a guerrilla conflict is grinding away at the resources of the U.S. military and casting uncertainty over the fitness of the all-volunteer force, according to senior military leaders, lawmakers and defense experts. The unexpectedly heavy demands of sustained ground combat are depleting military manpower and gear faster than they can be fully replenished. Shortfalls in recruiting and backlogs in needed equipment are taking a toll, and growing numbers of units have been broken apart or taxed by repeated deployments, particularly in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. "What keeps me awake at night is, what will this all-volunteer force look like in 2007?" Gen. Richard A. Cody, Army vice chief of staff, said at a Senate hearing this week. The Iraq war has also led to a drop in the overall readiness of U.S. ground forces to handle threats at home and abroad, forcing the Pentagon to accept new risks -- even as military planners prepare for a global anti-terrorism campaign that administration officials say could last for a generation. Stretched by Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States lacks a sufficiently robust ability to put large numbers of "boots on the ground" in case of a major emergency elsewhere, such as the Korean Peninsula, in the view of some Republican and Democratic lawmakers and some military leaders.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Withdrawal from Iraq would increase U.S. military readiness Steven N. Simon senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, FEBRUARY 2007 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS “After the Surge :The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq” In practical terms, that means carrying out the disengagement in coordination with the Iraqi government and, as necessary, armed groups outside of it and that U.S. forces in the queue for redeployment are put to good use. A further step would be to convene a group of UN Security Council members, Japan and Canada, and states bordering Iraq, including Syria and Iran, to participate in a regional stabilization project. Its purpose would be to encourage Iraq’s neighbors to pursue their common interest in a unified, stable Iraq in mutually reinforcing ways. The intention to withdraw should be declared as the results of the surge become clear. A coordinated declaration of this kind would not entail setting a certain date on which the last American soldier would depart Iraq. Since there exists a remote possibility that the situation on the ground might change radically during the drawdown period, the United States could qualify its declared intention to leave on a specific timetable with appropriate caveats. If, for example, there were a dramatic increase in intercommunal violence leading to a flood of refugees, U.S. forces might be needed to set up camps, administer aid, and provide security for the refugees. Alternatively, if the current surge strategy works, political compromises are made, ethnic cleansing operations cease, militias are brought under the government’s control, a multiconfessional army including a meaningful number of Sunni officers is created, and the United States is asked to remain to battle a lingering insurgency, it might behoove Washington to suspend the drawdown. A twelve-to-eighteen-month time frame for disengagement, to commence once the results of the surge have become apparent, would leave the United States with the flexibility to respond to such changes. The surge results should be clear well within six months. Nevertheless, the departure timetable would not hinge on specific benchmarks, since the Iraqi government is probably incapable of curbing militias and accommodating Sunni concerns; nor is it likely to generate an effective, multiconfessional army in the foreseeable future. The U.S. drawdown should not be hostage to Iraqi performance.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank U.S. military readiness k2 heg Stephen Gardner - Managing director of www.euro-correspondent.com; June 04; "Questioning American Hegemony," http://www.nthposition.com/questioningamerican.php The second main underpinning of the orthodoxy of American hegemony is American military power. US military spending is vast. It will be an estimated USD 400 billion in the budget year 2005, dwarfing the defence spend of any other country. The US has the world's most technologically advanced and potentially devastating arsenal. Once again, the media reflects the orthodoxy that American military might is hegemonic. In The Observer in February 2002, for example, Peter Beaumont and Ed Vulliamy wrote, "The reality - even before the latest proposed increases in military spending - is that America could beat the rest of the world at war with one hand tied behind its back."

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Collapse of U.S. heg causes multiple scenarios for extinction Niall Ferguson – is a professor of history at the University Harvard and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution; 2004; “A World without Power” Hoover Digest http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world’s established powers—the United States, Europe, and China—retreating into their own regional spheres of influence. But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World War? The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each considers itself in some way representative of the “international community.” Surely their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages. Yet universal claims were also an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, may even have believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom or an all-embracing Empire of Heaven, but political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward, to supranational institutions, but downward. With the end of states’ monopoly on the means of violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication, humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as by integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors who truly wield global power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—meaning that friction between the world’s disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on fresh water and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too; it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe’s Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists’ infiltration of the E.U. would become irreversible, increasing transatlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home were preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?

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A/T: Iraqi Airforce ready now Iraqi air force is not ready now Robyn Read; Spring 2005; “Effects-based airpower for small wars: Iraq after major combat” BNET A practical first step in this reinstatement process is to establish sector-specific forward air controllers (FAC) for the top 12 to 15 "hot spots" in Iraq with round-the-clock coverage. The actual implementation of such a concept would have to come in stages, since frankly, the Iraqi air force is not ready, and the US Air Force does not have the ready assets to fully put into practice the ideas that follow. The critical core capability does exist, however, within the US Special Operations Command, specifically, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) within Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Though limited in number, these combat aviation advisors (CAA) have the requisite language and trainer skills to lead the way; furthermore, they are acutely aware of the cultures in which they operate and can avoid the natural pitfalls to which an untrained American would be susceptible. The first products of such an implementation would be dramatic improvements in SA; significantly reduced reaction times; and ever-present, on-scene "eyes for the commander."

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Extension – Iraq Air Force K2 winning the war Iraqi air force k2 winning the war Anthony H. Cordesman - holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is also a national security analyst for ABC News and a frequent commentator on National Public Radio and the BBC; September 2007; “IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT: Conditions for Success, Consequences of Failure” http://www.csisbookstore.org/index.asp?PageAction=VIEWPROD&ProdID=172 The creation of effective Iraqi security forces is vital to the success of U.S. and Coalition efforts in Iraq. Without a minimum level of security, Iraq will never achieve effective governance, the rule of law, economic reconstruction, or political reconciliation. Even with a "surge" of U.S. troops, neither Baghdad nor the rest of Iraq can be secured without significant support from Iraqi security forces, including the military and police. The effort to create Iraqi military, security, and police forces has been more successful than Iraqi political and economic efforts, but it has not achieved the level of success the United States initially anticipated. The impressive numerical growth of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) masks serious problems in the way the United States and its allies have approached force development. The demands of rapidly creating a large force in the midst of an insurgency and sectarian conflict have been complicated by the lack of preexisting U.S. plans for ISF development, limited resources, and the grindingly slow U.S. responses to the changing security situation. The task has been further complicated by corrupt and/or incompetent Iraqi governance and by sectarian and ethnic politics and feuding. All of these problems have affected the loyalty, discipline, training, desertion rates, and combat effectiveness of the Iraqi Army and police forces. Iraqi Force Development: Conditions for Success, Consequences of Failure presents a detailed analysis of the entire ISF development effort and its strengths and weaknesses by force element. It covers the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, the Iraqi Army, National Police, regular police, Department of Border Enforcement, Special Forces, Facilities Protection Force, Provincial Security Force, Air Force, and Navy. It addresses progress in developing operational capabilities, the major problems in unclassified U.S. reporting on the effort, and near-term and longer-term limitations on what can and cannot be done. A comprehensive analysis of major ISF field operations from summer 2006 through August 2007 is included

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***Iraq Disad*** 1. Solar power allows the army to sustain its mission in Iraq Adam Fenderson and Bart Anderson; 3-12-06; “US army: peak oil and the army’s future” Energy Bulletin http://www.energybulletin.net/node/13737 “The days of inexpensive, convenient, abundant energy sources are quickly drawing to a close,” according to a recently released US Army strategic report. The report posits that a peak in global oil production looks likely to be imminent, with wide reaching implications for the US Army and society in general. The report was sent to Energy Bulletin by a reader, and does not appear to be available elsewhere on the internet. However it is marked as unclassified and approved for public release. The report, Energy Trends and Their Implications for U.S. Army Installations (PDF &ndash 1.2mb), was conducted by the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and is dated September 2005. Author Eileen Westervelt, PE, CEM, is a mechanical engineer at the Engineer Research and Development Center (US Army Corps of Engineers) in Champaign, Ill. Author Donald Fournier is a senior research specialist at the University of Illinois’ Building Research Council and has worked with the Corps in the past. Westervelt and Fournier give special credence to the work of independent energy experts, such as the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO) and the Oil Depletion Analysis Center (ODAC). They seem to place very little credibility on the more optimistic oil production forecasts of the international energy agencies. They reproduce ASPO graphs and quote ASPO member Jean Laherrere on why the US Geological Survey (USGS) future oil availability estimates are clearly overly optimistic: The USGS estimate implies a five-fold increase in discovery rate and reserve addition, for which no evidence is presented. Such an improvement in performance is in fact utterly implausible, given the great technological achievements of the industry over the past twenty years, the worldwide search, and the deliberate effort to find the largest remaining prospects. The authors warn that in order to sustain its mission, “the Army must insulate itself from the economic and logistical energy-related problems coming in the near to mid future. This requires a transition to modern, secure, and efficient energy systems, and to building technologies that are safe and environmental friendly.” The best energy options they conclude are “energy efficiency and renewable sources.” However, "currently, there is no viable substitute for petroleum." They do not expect that any transition will be easy: “energy consumption is indispensable to our standard of living and a necessity for the Army to carry out its mission. However, current trends are not sustainable. The impact of excessive, unsustainable energy consumption may undermine the very culture and activities it supports. There is no perfect energy source; all are used at a cost.” The report includes what looks like a solid overview of the pros and cons of all major renewable and non-renewable energy options. They consider problems associated with hydrogen, shale oil, biofuels and tar sands. On nuclear energy they note that "our current throw-away nuclear cycle uses up the world reserve of low-cost uranium in about 20 years." They hold more hope for certain solar technologies and wind turbines, however, "renewables tend to be a more local or regional commodity and except for a few instances, not necessarily a global resource that is traded between nations." Overall this is surprisingly green sounding advice, and one might think out of left field for one of the most environmentally destructive and energy consuming institutions on the planet. And yet the report does not seem to be at odds with the Army's new Energy Strategy which sets out five major initiatives: Eliminate energy waste in existing facilities Increase energy efficiency in new construction and renovations Reduce dependence on fossil fuels Conserve water resources Improve energy security (See: hqda-energypolicy.pnl.gov/programs/plan.asp) Westervelt and Fournier assert that changes must be made with urgency. However they express concerns that "we have a large and robust energy system with tremendous inertia, both from a policy perspective and a great resistance to change." In light of this, “the Army needs to present its perspective to higher authorities and be prepared to proceed regardless of the national measures that are taken.” Westervelt and Fournier suggest "it is time to think strategically about energy and how the Army should respond to the global and national energy picture. A path of enlightened self-interest is encouraged." As we approach Peak Oil, what is ecologically sound and what is perceived to be to in an institution's practical benefit might tend to converge, at least in some respects - even those of an institution such as the US Army.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank 2. Iraqis oppose US occupation MOHAMMAD KHATAMI, Former Iranian president, JANUARY 16, 2007 Washington Post, Unjust Iraq Occupation Has Led to Dangerous 'Fire' in Region http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/mohammad_khatami/2007/01/in_view_of_escalating_public.html In view of escalating public protests against the current war-mongering policies of the United States in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, and the sternly unequivocal position adopted by the U.S. Congress against continued occupation of Iraq, it was natural to expect the mitigation of crises and a move to secure the long-term interests of the US in this critical region. There is no doubt that toppling the despotic and tyrannical regime of Saddam has brought contentment to the people of Iraq and in the region at large. That regime had massacred thousands of noble Iraqis, foisted two devastating wars onto our region, and left behind a long record of criminal behavior marked with its deployment of weapons of mass destruction and engagement in chemical warfare. Not least, Iran, which had withstood harshest of atrocities in the hands of the despotic and predatory regime of Saddam, found satisfaction in witnessing its downfall. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the US occupation of Iraq has intensified crises by turning Iraq into a hotbed of tension, violence and destruction. First and foremost this has cost the Iraqis, and then the American people, who are held to shoulder the conflict's heavy burden.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank 3. Middle East Instability will happen Cetron, Marvin J.; Davies, Owen. Writers for The Futurist. 9/1/07 “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that a Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts” There is more to come. After all, this is the most volatile region in the world. Sunnis and Shi'ites have carried on an intermittent religious and ethnic power struggle there for some 1,400 years. Worse, after World War I the victors deliberately broke the Middle East into artificial states that could never be stable, and thus could not easily be united under the banner of Pan Arabism. As Sesh Velamoor of the Foundation For the Future points out, if the West is unhappy with conditions in the Middle East, it has itself largely to blame. But the important point is that mere instability soon could break down into general chaos. Here is one possible course of events: Hezbollah's current protests in Lebanon and the government's reactive crackdown may result in a larger war. Saudi Arabia could intervene here, too, as it has been actively supporting the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. At the same time, Hezbollah and Hamas, in the Occupied Territories, will be encouraged to expand their struggle against Israel. In Egypt, the banned but still powerful Muslim Brotherhood would be encouraged to resume the battle for a fundamentalist Islamic state, endangering Western access to the Suez Canal. Extremists from distant reaches of the Muslim world will flood into the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, a land of Sunni Arabs, and Iran, the home of Persian Shi'ites, already on opposite sides in Iraq, might expand their conflict to do battle across the Persian Gulf, with fallout in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. One way or another, it all spins out of control. Everyone in the Middle East fights everyone else for decades.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank 4. American withdrawal from Iraq solves Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January/February 2005, Council on Foreign Relations “Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement” http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0512luttwak.pdf Given allthat has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for the United States is disengagement. This would call for the careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from much of the country—while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempt to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the U.S. withdrawal is carried out, and this would give Washington a great deal of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests. The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in order to obtain concessions from others, nor can it make transparently conflicting promises about the country’s future to different parties. But once it has declared its firm commitment to withdraw—or perhaps, given the widespread conviction that the United States entered Iraq to exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an evacuation have begun—the calculus of other parties will change. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the U.S. hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq’s neighbors are too shortsighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the withdrawal should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more expose. States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than is the United States itself Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement

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Extension - Air Force k2 sustaining war Increased air force capabilities allows the air force to sustain the Iraq effort Guy Raz - Nieman Fellow at Harvard University; 10-10-07; “Air Force Plays Smaller Role in Iraq” NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15126640 Over the past four years, the Department of the Air Force has been feeling the heat over its comparatively limited role in Iraq. While the Army and the Marines are now awash in extra funds, the Air Force faces severe cutbacks. The Air Force is the second-largest service branch, accounting for about one-quarter of all active-duty military. But airmen make up only about 5 percent of the total troop presence in Iraq. And the numbers have prompted Pentagon bean counters to shift Air Force money away to the other service branches. Because airmen, on average, serve four-month tours of duty (compared with the average Army tour of 15 months), the high rate of turnover can often lead to administrative blunders. One Army officer privately complained that when the new airmen come in every few weeks, it is "hellish, especially when you're trying to coordinate with your Air Force counterparts." The Air Force has received the message. Top officials are now quietly considering whether to extend Air Force tours of duty from four to six months. "One of the things we're going to have to look at is how long we're going to be able to sustain this effort," said Air Force General Burt Field. "And what's the right tour length in order to sustain this effort over time." The Army will soon run out of manpower to sustain the large-scale occupation of Iraq. And so the Air Force, with its 340,000-strong active duty component, may begin to fill some of that shortfall.

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Extension – Iraqis oppose Iraq Iraqis oppose US occupation Tom Hayden; 10-11-05; “What Iraqis Really Think About Occupation” The Nation, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051024/hayden The lack of critical media coverage at the beginning of the Iraq War is widely acknowledged. But the media's failure to cover Iraqi voices of opposition is arguably a greater default. The mainstream media convey the impression that there are two categories of Iraqis--the handful of fanatical jihadist terrorists and the majority who showed their yearning to be free during January's election. In this paradigm, our troops are seen as defending, even cultivating, a nascent democracy. Not surprisingly, a Fox News poll in February revealed that 53 percent of Americans believed the Iraqis wanted our troops to stay while only 35 percent thought the Iraqis wanted us to leave. To a public fed this distorted narrative and nothing more, the actual facts may be too jarring to believe. There has been little or no coverage of these realities: §  A majority of Iraqis in polls favor US military withdrawal and an end of the occupation. At the time of January's election, 69 percent of Shiites and 82 percent of Sunnis favored "near-term withdrawal." Surveys done for the Coalition Provisional Authority in June 2004 showed that a 55 percent majority "would feel safer if US troops left immediately." §  A recent summary of numerous Iraqi surveys, by the independent Project on Defense Alternatives in Cambridge, Massachusetts, concluded that a majority of Iraqis "oppose the US presence in Iraq, and those who strongly oppose it greatly outnumber those who strongly support it." The PDA report went on to say that "the fact that [these surveys] have played little role in the public discourse on the Iraqi mission imperils US policy and contributes to the present impasse." §  The only Iraqis who strongly support the US occupation are the Kurds, less than 20 percent of the population whose semiautonomous status is protected by the United States, and who are represented disproportionately in the Iraqi regime. By backing the Kurds and southern Shiites, the United States is intervening in a sectarian civil war. The US-trained Iraqi security forces are dominated by Kurdish and Shiite militias. §  In mid-September of this year, the eighteen-member National Sovereignty Committee in the US-sponsored Iraqi parliament issued a unanimous report calling for the end of occupation. §  In June, more than 100 members of the same parliament, or more than one-third, signed a letter calling for "the departure of the occupation." They criticized their regime for bypassing parliament in obtaining an extension of authority from the United Nations Security Council. §  In January, US intelligence agencies warned in a "grim tone" that the newly elected Iraqi regime would demand a timetable for US withdrawal, which indeed was the platform of the winning Shiite party. After the election, nothing came of the worry. The winners simply abandoned the campaign pledge that helped elect them. §  In June, the former electricity minister of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Aihim Al-Sammarae, created an organization to begin dialogue with eleven insurgent groups. The London Times reported that high-ranking US military officials joined one round of talks. §  In 2004, twenty Iraqi political parties formed a National Foundation Congress to become a public voice for withdrawal. In May 2005 it held a second Congress, releasing a three-point platform demanding a withdrawal timetable, an interim international peacekeeping force, and internationally supervised elections. Virtually none of these realities have been reported in the American media, with the exception of articles by Nancy Youssef of Knight-Ridder.

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Impact – Root of all Middle East problems U.S. occupation is the root cause of all Iraq problems BBC News; 6-28-05; “Iraq: How long should US troops stay?” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/4626173.stm US (and allied) troops should be withdrawn immediately. All opinion polls on the subject that I am aware of show that the majority of Iraqis want them to go, and the winning party in the election campaigned on a promise to establish a timetable for them to leave - then promptly reneged on this commitment once the election was over. As for those saying the US troops should stay to "clear up the mess they made" or similar, such naiveté is almost unbelievable: the invasion was aimed at establishing permanent military bases and control of Iraq's economy, as most in Iraq and neighbouring countries clearly perceive; the US troops are the root of the problem, and cannot be part of the solution. Nick Gotts, Aberdeen, Scotland They US should leave immediately. The longer they stay the more unstable Iraq will become. An insurgency of this type is impossible to fight. The US are equipped for open warfare and not for this type of guerrilla warfare. Leaving will not cause a civil war- it is already underway. Unfortunately this war has condemned Iraq to many years of instability and suffering that would not have occurred has a peaceful so006Cution been sought. Lessons that should have been learned in Vietnam have not been learned at all. Insistence on staying will only send more bodies home.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Iraq Pullout Good - Stability American withdrawal and diplomacy would stabilize Iraq Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January/February 2005, Council on Foreign Relations “Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement” http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0512luttwak.pdf Given allthat has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for the United States is disengagement. This would call for the careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from much of the country—while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempt to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the U.S. withdrawal is carried out, and this would give Washington a great deal of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests. The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in order to obtain concessions from others, nor can it make transparently conflicting promises about the country’s future to different parties. But once it has declared its firm commitment to withdraw—or perhaps, given the widespread conviction that the United States entered Iraq to exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an evacuation have begun—the calculus of other parties will change. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the U.S. hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq’s neighbors are too shortsighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the withdrawal should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more expose. States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of U.S. diplomacy. The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography that alone ensures all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than is the United States itself Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement

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Pullout Good - Terrorism Pullout would save billions of dollars and stop al-Qaida effectively United Press International July 3, 2008, “Obama: Troop safety key to Iraq pullout” http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/07/03/Obama_Troop_safety_key_to_Iraq_pullout/UPI-69211215125404/ FARGO, N.D., July 3 (UPI) -- Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., rejected claims Thursday that he has changed his position on withdrawing U.S. combat troops from Iraq. Reacting to media reports -- including a report Thursday in The Washington Post (NYSE:WPO) -- suggesting he had backtracked on a promise to withdraw combat troops within 16 months of taking office, Obama told reporters in Fargo, N.D., what he is saying now is no different from what he said on the subject during the Democratic primary campaign. "I have always said, and again you can take a look at the language, that as commander in chief I would always reserve the right to do what's best in America's national interests," Obama said in the second of two news conferences in Fargo Thursday. "And if it turned out, for example, that we had to in certain months slow the pace because of the safety of American troops in terms of getting combat troops out, of course we would take that into account." Obama said he intends to withdraw combat troops in 16 months "at a pace of one to two brigades per month." Maintaining a longterm occupation in Iraq would be a "strategic error," Obama said, because conditions are worsening in Afghanistan, alQaida has regrouped in Iraq and the Iraq war is costing $10 billion to $12 billion each month "that we desperately need here at home."

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Iraq pullout solves terrorism AFP Jul 16, 2008 “Obama to direct US firepower at Al-Qaeda, not Iraq” http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jpGCbPMizTHKhaPVe-2hEBGstpYA WASHINGTON (AFP) — White House hopeful Barack Obama promised to switch the "single-minded" US focus on Iraq to Al-Qaeda havens in tribal Pakistan, as he laid out a sweeping new blueprint for US foreign policy. But his Republican rival John McCain snapped back, "I know how to win wars," as the debate hit new levels of intensity Tuesday ahead of Obama's crucial audition for the job of US commander-in-chief in the Middle East and Europe next week. Obama renewed his vow to get most US combat troops out of Iraq within 16 months of taking office, promised to strike at Al-Qaeda in Pakistan if Islamabad would not, to secure loose nuclear weapons and battle climate change. Iraq is not going to be a perfect place, and we don't have unlimited resources to try to make it one," Obama said in the speech in Washington. "I will give our military a new mission on my first day in office: ending this war," Obama said. After more than five years at war in Iraq, more than 4,000 US troop deaths, and with tens of thousands of Iraqis killed, Obama said it was time to refocus US policy on the region which spawned the September 11 attacks in 2001. "As should have been apparent to President (George W.) Bush and Senator McCain -- the central front in the war on terror is not Iraq, and it never was," Obama said in his speech. "Al-Qaeda has an expanding base in Pakistan that is probably no farther from their old Afghan sanctuary than a train ride from Washington to Philadelphia," Obama said in excerpts released by his campaign. "We cannot tolerate a terrorist sanctuary, and as president I won't," he said. "We must make it clear that if Pakistan cannot or will not act, we will take out high-level terrorist targets like (Osama) bin Laden if we have them in our sights." McCain rejected Obama's argument, saying he had been "wrong" to originally oppose the US "surge" escalation strategy, would squander its gains with a troop withdrawal and was guilty of "bluster" over Pakistan. Today we know Senator Obama was wrong. The surge has succeeded and because of its success, the next president will inherit a situation in Iraq in which America's enemies are on the run," McCain said in Albuquerque, New Mexico. "Senator Obama will tell you we can't win in Afghanistan without losing in Iraq," McCain said, though he added that the "status quo" in Afghanistan was not acceptable.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank Withdrawal key to fighting terrorism CBS News; 7-20-08; “Obama: Now is the Time for Iraq Withdrawal” Face the Nation, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/20/ftn/main4275864.shtml Obama: "For at least a year now, I have called for two additional brigades, perhaps three," he said. "I think it's very important that we unify command more effectively to coordinate our military activities. But military alone is not going to be enough. "The Afghan government needs to do more. But we have to understand that the situation is precarious and urgent here in Afghanistan. And I believe this has to be our central focus, the central front, on our battle against terrorism." Logan: "Why does it have to be the central focus? What is so critical to U.S. interests here?" Obama: "This is where they can plan attacks. They have sanctuary here. They are gathering huge amounts of money as a consequence of the drug trade in the region. And so that global network is centered in this area. And I think one of the biggest mistakes we've made strategically after 9/11 was to fail to finish the job here, focus our attention here. We got distracted by Iraq. "And despite what the Bush Administration has argued, I don't think there's any doubt that we were distracted from our efforts not only to hunt down al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but also to rebuild this country so that people have confidence that we were to here to stay over the long haul, that we were going to rebuild roads, provide electricity, improve the quality of life for people. And now we have a chance, I think, to correct some of those areas. "There's starting to be a broad consensus that it's time for us to withdraw some of our combat troops out of Iraq, deploy them here in Afghanistan. And I think we have to seize that opportunity. Now's the time for us to do it. "I think what's important for us to do is to begin planning for those brigades now. If we wait until the next administration, it could be a year before we get those additional troops on the ground here in Afghanistan. And I think that would be a mistake. I think the situation is getting urgent enough that we've got to start doing something now. "The United States has to take a regional approach to the problem. Just as we can't be myopic and focus only on Iraq, we also can't think that we can solve the security problems here in Afghanistan without engaging the Pakistan government." Logan: "And how do you compel Pakistan to act?" Obama: "Well, you know, I think that the U.S. government provides an awful lot of aid to Pakistan, provides a lot of military support to Pakistan. And to send a clear message to Pakistan that this is important, to them as well as to us, I think that message has not been sent." Logan: "Under what circumstances would you authorize unilateral U.S. action against targets inside tribal areas?" Obama: "What I've said is that if we had actionable intelligence against high-value al-Qaeda targets, and the Pakistani government was unwilling to go after those targets, that we should. My hope is that it doesn't come to that - that in fact, the Pakistan government would recognize that if we had Osama bin Laden in our sights that we should fire or we should capture him." Logan: "Isn't that the case now? I mean, do you really think that if U.S. forces had Osama bin Laden in their sights and the Pakistanis said 'No,' that they wouldn't fire or wouldn't go after him?" Obama: "I think actually this is current doctrine. There was some dispute when I said this last August. Both the administration and some of my opponents suggested, 'Well, you know, you shouldn't go around saying that.' But I don't think there's any doubt that that should be our policy." Logan: "But [not going after him] is the current policy." Obama: "I believe it is the current policy." Logan: "So there's no change, then?" Obama: "I don't think there's going to be a change there. I think that in order for us to be successful, it's not going to be enough just to engage in the occasional shot fired. We've got training camps that are growing and multiplying." Logan: "Would you take out all those training camps?" Obama: "Well, I think that what we would like to see the Pakistani government take out those training camps." Logan: "And if they won't?" Obama: "Well, I think that we've got to work with them so they will." Logan: "Would you consider unilateral U.S. action?" Obama: "I will push Pakistan very hard to make sure that we go after those training camps. I think it's absolutely vital to the security interests for both the United States and Pakistan."

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Iraq Pullout Bad – Ethnic Cleansing Sudden withdrawal would cause ethnic cleansing in the Middle East Niall Ferguson, Professor of History Harvard College, May 24, 2005 NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/3138 No one should wish for an overhasty American withdrawal from Iraq. It would be the prelude to a bloodbath of ethnic cleansing and sectarian violence, with inevitable spillovers into and interventions from neighboring countries. Rather, it is time to acknowledge just how thinly stretched American forces in Iraq are and to address the problem: whether by finding new allies (send Condoleezza Rice to New Delhi?); radically expanding the accelerated citizenship program for immigrants who join the army; or lowering the (historically high) educational requirements demanded by military recruiters.

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Iraq Pullout Bad – Heg decrease Pulling out of Iraq decreases heg James A. Phillips, Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, June 23, 2005 The Heritage Foundation “Firm and Patient Realism Needed in Iraq” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iraq/wm770.cfm Devised according to considerations in Washington rather than the situation on the ground in Iraq, a pullout would send a dangerous signal of weakness and fecklessness to our allies and enemies in Iraq and elsewhere. Iraqi government forces would be demoralized and could begin to hedge their bets by making deals with, or even defecting to, the insurgency. Insurgent groups would be emboldened to redouble their efforts against Americans to strengthen their claim to a military victory and attract more recruits. Many Iraqis who have been sitting on the fence, particularly in Sunni Arab areas, would have little choice but to support the insurgents in order to insure themselves against reprisal. A sudden American exit also would undercut efforts to increase international support for the Iraqi government, just when it appears to be gaining momentum. Yesterday, an international conference in Brussels, attended by more than 70 countries, yielded new pledges of political and economic support for the transitional Iraqi government formed after the elections in January. Another conference aimed at mobilizing additional foreign aid for Iraq is scheduled for July. It would be tragic if America cuts and runs from Iraq just as the European Union and other countries belatedly show some willingness to step up their efforts to support Iraq’s embryonic democracy.

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Iraq Pullout Bad – Civil War American presence in Iraq prevents civil war between Sunnis and Shiites Reuel Marc Gerecht, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 01/15/2007, The Weekly Standard Volume 012, Issue 17, “The Consequences of Failure in Iraq” http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/147ltxge.asp The miracle in Iraq is that the Iraqi government, feeble and sectarian as it is, hasn't given up trying to play by the rules and hasn't forsaken completely its imperfect constitution. The presence and power of Americans is undoubtedly the primary reason the worst hasn't happened. But only the blind, deaf, dumb, or politically malicious cannot see that the Iraqis themselves, especially the Shia, are still trying desperately to avoid the abyss. Having seen, then, that there is still sufficient political hope on the Iraqi horizon, let us return to the matter of what will likely happen in Mesopotamia and the Middle East if the United States departs. Certainly the most damning consequence of failure in Iraq is the likelihood that an American withdrawal would provoke a take-no-prisoners civil war between the Sunni and Shiite Arabs, which could easily reach genocidal intensity. The historical parallel to have in mind is the battle between subcontinent Hindus and Muslims that came with the independence of India. Although of differing faiths, the pre-1947 Hindus and Muslims were often indistinguishable culturally, linguistically, and physically. Yet they "ethnically cleansed" their respective new nations, India and Pakistan, with exuberance. Somewhere between 500,000 and one million Muslims and Hindus perished, tens of thousands of women were raped, and more than ten million people were forced to flee their homes. This level of barbarism, scaled down to Iraq's population, could quickly happen in Mesopotamia, long before American forces could withdraw from the country. (And it's worth recalling that few British officials anticipated the communal ferocity that came with the end of the Raj.)

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Pullout Bad – Genocide Iraq pullout leads to genocide Hilary Leila Krieger; 6-3-08; “McCain: Iraq troop pullout bad for Israel” The Jerusalem Post http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1212041458247&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull Presumptive Republican nominee Sen. John McCain used his time at the podium at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee on Monday to launch a withering attack on Democratic rival Barack Obama's Iran policy. A presidential summit with Iranian leaders, which McCain implied that Obama supports, would produce an "earful of anti-Semitic rants" from the Holocaust-denying Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as well as harm to Iranian dissidents and the strengthening of hardliners. McCain, who called for tough sanctions against Iran, earned his most enthusiastic ovation for another statement referencing the Holocaust: "When we join in saying 'never again,' this is not a wish, a request, or a plea to the enemies of Israel. It is a promise that the United States and Israel will honor, against any enemy who cares to test us." He also received rousing applause for his lambasting of the idea of that the US isn't dealing effectively with Iran because it isn't meeting with its leaders. "The idea that they now seek nuclear weapons because we refuse to engage in presidentiallevel talks is a serious misreading of history," McCain said to rousing applause. "We hear talk of a meeting with the Iranian leadership offered up as if it were some sudden inspiration, a bold new idea that somehow nobody has ever though of before," he said, recalling several overtures recent US leaders had made to Iran with little to show for it. Obama will address the AIPAC Policy Conference on Wednesday morning, when he hopes that Tuesday's final Democratic primaries, in South Dakota and Montana, will have given him a definitive edge in securing the party nomination over Hillary Clinton, who is also scheduled to speak to AIPAC then. In the past, Obama has expressed a willingness to meet with Iran's leaders without preconditions in an effort to use diplomacy to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, a position McCain has used to try to portray his competitor as naive and inexperienced. But the Obama campaign quickly pushed back against the attack, arguing that McCain has inflexibly pursued policies that endanger America and Israel. "John McCain stubbornly insists on continuing a dangerous and failed foreign policy that has clearly made the United States and Israel less secure," Obama spokesman Hari Sevugan said. "He promises sanctions that the Bush administration has been unable to persuade the (United Nations) Security Council to deliver." In his AIPAC speech, McCain called for tough sanctions, outside the UN if necessary, particularly against the Central Bank of Iran, and restrict Iran's import of refined petroleum products. McCain also criticized Obama by name for his support of troop withdrawals from Iraq, arguing that would jeopardize Israel's security and lead to civil war and genocide. To applause, McCain declared, "We must not let this happen." Sevugan countered that McCain "promises to continue a war in Iraq that has emboldened Iran and strengthened its hand." MK Ephraim Sneh warned the AIPAC audience that a year from now, Iran would be on the verge of completing a nuclear weapon - and that Israel was preparing to face that challenge alone. "There will be a government in Israel which will not allow it to happen," he declared, and added, "Our assumption is that we may face the problem alone." Sneh continued, "if we are alone, we will have to act alone." He did not specify what action Israel was contemplating, though there has been speculation as to whether Israel is planning a military attack. Iraq was the focus on some controversy at last year's AIPAC conference, when some members of the audience booed Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the US House of Representatives, when she spoke about the problems created by the war in Iraq. This year, before McCain took the podium to open the three-day conference, Bernice Manocherian, the immediate past president of AIPAC, urged members of the audience to be on their best behavior. Addressing the more than 7,000 conference participants, including 1,200 students from 363 colleges, she told them, "We will treat all of the speakers with respect and dignity, remembering that they are all our friends." Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will be speaking at the conference, and could come under criticism for his efforts to engage the Palestinians and Syrians. Opposition leader Binyamin Netanyahu (Likud), who was in town to attend the conference, spoke to both Democratic contenders. When Obama informed Netanyahu that he was considering visiting Israel this summer, Netanyahu told him he should visit Sderot.

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Iraq DDI 2008 CM Alex Blank

Pullout Bad - ME Chaos Withdrawal leads to Middle East collapse Nancy A. Youssef, staff writer, August 12, 2007 McClatchy Newspapers “Iraq pullout could create chaos” http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/18861.html WASHINGTON — U.S. troops could withdraw from Iraq within months, but if Iraq's government remains politically deadlocked, it probably would collapse and the nation would descend into chaos, a war game organized by the U.S. Army concluded earlier this month. The war gamers, following a scenario created by their Army hosts, determined that U.S. troops would secure the exit route to Kuwait through largely Shiite Muslim southern Iraq and face little fighting as they drove their equipment out. Any attacks, the panel judged, would be "harassment attacks," likely by a few Sunni members of al Qaida in Iraq who wanted to attack American troops one last time. "Why would they stop us? They have been telling us to leave," said one participant who requested anonymity to speak freely about the war game. Once U.S. troops left, however, the chaos in Iraq would escalate. Shiite militias would drive Baghdad's Sunni population into Iraq's western Anbar province, which is almost exclusively Sunni, the war gamers concluded. There would be a power struggle within Anbar among tribes backed by outside Sunni Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Syria. Rival Shiite factions would fight one another to control much of the rest of the country, and Iran presumably would back one side, although the gamers couldn't assess how overt Iranian interference would be. Turkey would consider entering Iraq from the north to thwart the Kurds, who desire independence and claim some of Turkey as part of their homeland. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's government would be unable to control the country. Indeed, the gamers concluded, his government could collapse unless Iran threw its support behind it. "The mess we would leave behind would be awful," the participant said. "The ethnic cleansing is happening now. Once we're gone, absent a political solution that would allow the Iraqi Army to go into action, all of that will be accelerated."

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