125-128.docx

BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC. vs Ando G.R. No. 195669 Facts: The petitioner BUCCI filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against herein respondents. The recovery of ownership case of parcel of land subject in the unlawful detainer case, and yet another parcel of land, denominated simply as Lot 3-C. On October 13, 1997, the RTC of Mandaue City rendered its judgment in the recovery of ownership case against therein plaintiffs UCCPI and MBC and in favor of therein defendant BUCCI. On November 19, 1997, both the MBC and the UCCPI filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but their motion was denied by Order of March 10, 2005.8 Meanwhile, the MTCC issued an Order dismissing the unlawful detainer case with prejudice for BUCCI’s failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. BUCCI appealed to the RTC. RTC upheld the decision of the MTCC. Respondents appealed to CA, which held that the MTCC and the RTC correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case. Issue: WON the CA erred in upholding the MTCC and RTC’s decision. Ruling: The CA thus erred in holding that, „[a]n adjudication in respondents recovery of ownership case would constitute an adjudication of petitioner BUCCIÊs unlawful detainer case, such that the court handling the latter case would be bound thereby and could not render a contrary ruling in the issue of physical or material possession In a summary action of ejectment, even the lawful owner of a parcel of land can be ousted or evicted therefrom by a lessee or tenant who holds a better or superior right to the material or physical (or de facto) possession thereof by virtue of a valid lease or leasehold right thereto .

Union Bank vs Phil. Rabbit Bus Liner G.R. No. 205951 Facts: Petitioner Union Bank is the owner of two parcels of land, with improvements. Respondent Phil. Rabbit Bus Liner was the former owner of the lots but it lost the same by foreclosure to petitioner; nonetheless, respondent continued to occupy the same. On November 8, 2001, petitioner and respondent executed a Contract to sell covering the property. The contract to sell stipulated, among others, that all payments required under this Contract to Sell shall be made by the buyer without need of notice, demand, or any other act or deed, at the principal office address of the seller and that should respondent fail to fully comply with the agreement or in case the contract is canceled or rescinded, all its installment payments, shall also be forfeited by way of penalty and liquidated damages and applied as rentals for its use and possession of the property without need for any judicial action. Respondent failed to fully pay the stipulated price in the contract to sell. Notice of Demand of payment was sent. Petitioner sent another letter-demand to vacate. On May 26, 2005, petitioner filed an ejectment case against respondent before the MTCC. MTCC issued Decision dismissing lack of jurisdiction. It held that petitioners’ case is one for rescission and enforcement of the stipulations in the contract to sell. Petitioners appealed to RTC which dismissed the appeal. Issue: WON the case is one for ejectment. Ruling: Yes. It must have escaped the attention of the MTCC, the RTC, and the CA that an ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or deprivations of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is as well available against one who withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right of possession under an express or implied contract, such as a contract to sell.

Quilo vs Bajao G.R. No. 186199 Facts: The present case stemmed from an Ejectment Complaint5 filed by respondent Bajao against Saclag, Jr., Fulong, Bertos, Saclag hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant in the MeTC of Manila, praying that the defendants vacate and demolish the subject property located at Sta. Ana, Manila. After trial, the MeTC ruled in favor of Bajao. Aggrieved, the defendants elevated the case to the RTC. On 13 September 1999, the RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC which has become final and executory due to defendants failure to elevate the case to the CA, via a petition for review under Rule 41. The CA’s Resolution denying defendants appeal was issue. The defendants Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in the CA’s Resolution. By virtue of the Entry of Judgment, Bajao filed a Motion for Execution. MeTC granted the Motion for Execution and issued a Writ of Execution. Petitioners herein, received a Notice to Pay/Vacate and Demolish Premises from the MeTC, directing them to vacate the property and remove their houses therein by virtue of the Writ of Execution. Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Recall of the Notice to Pay/Vacate and Demolish Premises on 5 March 2008 based on the following grounds: (1) the Writ was issued beyond the lapse of the 5-year period within which to execute a judgment based on;and (2) for issuing the Writ of Execution on them, who are not parties to the ejectment case. MeTC denied the motion. Issue: WON the MeTC correct in denying the Motion to Quash. Ruling: Yes. The petitioners are bound by the Decision of the MeTC. Just as importantly, petitioners cannot be considered as strangers to the ejectment case. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that judgments cannot be enforced on parties who are strangers to the case. To enforce a judgment against those who were not parties to the case would be violative of the constitutional right to due process. We have, however, pronounced that this rule is not without exceptions. Ejectment judgments may bind one who has not been summoned or impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a colessee; or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. This factual issue was resolved by the MeTC.

Medina vs Asistio Jr. G.R. No. 75450 Facts: Petitioners are residents of Marulas-A, which is owned by the Philippine National Railways (PNR). They claim to be long-time legitimate tenants and sub-tenants of the PNR. In August of 1980, fire hit Marulas-A which rendered a number of families homeless, petitioners included. Subsequently, petitioners started reconstructing their dwellings. The said constructions were allegedly authorized by respondent Asistio, in his capacity as Mayor of Caloocan City. In February 1982, PNR sold the lot in question to the City Government of Caloocan. Having learned of the sale of the lots, petitioners, sent a letter-petition to respondent Asistio anent their impending eviction from the premises and asked that they be allowed to continue to occupy the same. Petitioners again sent another letter addressed to respondent Asistio this time expressing their willingness to purchase the property sold by the PNR at a reasonable price pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1517 (proclaiming urban land reform in the Philippines and providing for the implementing machinery thereof). Subsequently, petitioners received a Paunawa sa Paglilipat sent by respondent Asistio through the City Architect. The parties failed to reach a compromise so that on February 1, 1985, respondent City Engineer Uson delivered a final notice to petitioners requiring them to remove and demolish their respective houses. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: WON Court ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITION IS BEREFT OF SUBSTANCE AND DEVOID OF MERIT BECAUSE IT ALLEGES THAT EXCEPT FOR PETITIONER MEDINA, ALL THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGITIMATE TENANTS BUT SQUATTERS WHO BUILT THEIR HOUSES NEAR AND ALONG THE RAILROAD TRACKS. Ruling: While it is true that Marulas-A is a priority development area under Proclamation 1967 (1980), petitioners’ alleged right of first refusal and the consequent prerogative to stay thereon never existed in the absence of contract over the disputed land. Based on the afore-quoted provision, only legitimate tenants may be extended the protective mantle of the decree cited to the exclusion of all others. Since, the petitioners do not have contracts with the PNR to qualify them as legitimate tenants, the protection afforded therein cannot be rightfully invoked. Consequently, petitioners cannot also be granted the right of first refusal to purchase the property involved.