11 Director Of Lands V Iac And Espartinez.docx

Director of Lands v IAC and Espartinez GR No. 70825, 11 Mar 1991 Paras, J

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Private respondent Isidro Espartinez filed an application for registration of the subject lot located in Albay on 17 May 1972 alleging that he acquired it by purchase from Sotera Llacer, invoking Sec. 48 of CA No 141, as amended by RA No. 1942, should LRA be not applicable; The lower court issued a general default order given that only Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry had appeared during the initial hearing; Thereafter, one Perpetua Llarena appeared with the fiscal and she required to file her oppsition but she failed to do so within the period set by the court but it commissioned the latter to receive evidence on 12 Dec 1972; However, on the same day, SolGen appeared and filed his opposition to the application for registration alleging: 

that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the subject lot not having acquired by means of any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish government or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent laws;

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that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application;

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That Espartinez may not avail of the provisions of Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act for failure to fulfill the requisites prescribed therein; and

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that the parcel of land involved is part of the public domain and therefore, not subject to private appropriation.

Subsequently, 17 oppositors, claiming to be farmer-settlers, filed a motion to lift the order of general default and opposition to the application for registration; Meanwhile, Espartinez filed a MTD opposition contending that private oppositors were, with one exception, mere homestead applicants who were barred by prior judgments in Civil Case No. 2976, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute, and in Court Agrarian Relations (CAR) Case No. 523 wherein the Court of Agrarian Relations declared Sotera Llacer as the owner of the lot and the oppositors as her tenants. On 30 Jan 1978, lower court ruled in favor of Espatinez based on the following facts: 

On 28 Mar 1885, the subject land was adjudicated to Faustino Llacer as evidenced in the entry of Manila Gazette;

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It was then adjudicated to then minor Sotera Llacer through a CFI order as heir of Faustino;

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In CAR Case, Sotera and her husband were also declared as landholders;

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On 26 Nov 1969, said lot was sold to Espartinez in consideration of P8,500;

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Espartinez declared the property for taxation purposes and paid as well as secured a survey plan and technical description;

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He also planted sugra cane and coconuts and raised cattle and carabaos;

Oppositor public officials appealed but IAC affirmed lower court’s decision; 

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The entry on Manila Gazette was considered by the court as possessory information title

Hence, this petition filed by the Dir of Lands and Forestry Development through teh SolGen contending that IAC committed errors in: (a) granting the application of confirming the title of Espartinez notwithstanding the fact that he had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he has a registerable title to the property subject of the application, and (b) agreeing with the lower court’s decision which directed the registration of subject parcel of land even in the absence of proof that the same is alienable and disposable and despite private respondent’s failure to adduce in evidence certain.

ISSUE: Whether IAC is correct in considering the entry on Manila Gazette (Exhibit L) as a possessory information title, which was described as “a copy of a certification issued by the Chief of the division of Archives of the Bureau of Public Libraries of an excerpt of an entry appearing on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila of the year 1885 regarding some resolution(s) issued and published pursuant to a certain decree dated October 28, 1869.”

RULING: No, IAC erred because such is neither a document, deed or title evidencing ownership over the subject Lot.

Exhibit L is neither a document, deed or title evidencing ownership over the Lot. The entry does not even contain an accurate description of the lot setting forth its metes and bounds on which its identification may be based. Moreover, while the entry states that Faustino Llacer had been adjudicated an 80-hectare parcel of land, it does not state by what reason such adjudication was made.

Granting that there was indeed an adjudication or grant of the land to Llacer, still the same cannot be considered as a possessory information title which has been converted into a registration of ownership in the absence of proof that Llacer had complied with the requirements set forth in Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

Thus, Exhibit L not being either a titulo de informacion posesoria or a title by composicion con el estado, it did not establish the right of ownership of Espartinez’ predecessors-in-interest.

Notes:

The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership (Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals). The survey plan, which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around 103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit L, is not even admissible in evidence because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands.

Neither may the decision in the intestate proceedings for the estate of Faustino Llacer be invoked by Espartinez. As earlier stated, Llacer had, in the very beginning, no transmissible rights over the property. The other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523, were not land registration cases and therefore, ownership of the property was not definitively passed upon.

Espartinez’ reliance on Sec.48 of CA 141 was also misplaced. Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 has, under the ruling in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the end in view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws (Director of Lands vs. Funtilar), considering the foregoing discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23 hectares larger than that indicated in Exhibit L from which Espartinez claim of ownership sprung, the ruling in the Heirs of Amunategui case must be given strict application. Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever possession he might have had, and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals citing Adorable v. Director of Lands; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz; Director of Lands v. Abanzadao and Republic v. Court of Appeals) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain.

Dissenting (Menlencio-Herrera): Isidro Espartinez should be held entitled to have his imperfect title confirmed in his favor.

In the last analysis, the subject property had already acquired a private character in view of the length of time Applicant’s predecessors-ininterest, added to his own, had possessed the land in question. And as has been held, a judicial confirmation proceeding should, at most, be limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the character and length of time required by law as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested. It is the dictum of the law itself, that the possessor shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. No proof is admissible to overcome that conclusive presumption. In sum, legal and equity considerations demand that Applicant’s possession, of the character and length of time required by statute, in this case, now over a century, be conclusively deemed to have earned for him the right to confirmation of his imperfect title.