Why God Does Not Exist

By: Alex J. Tavarez

Why God Doesn’t Exist: Table of Contents “19This then is how we know that we belong to the truth, and how we set our hearts at rest in his presence 20whenever our hearts condemn us. For God is greater than our hearts, and he knows everything. ............................................6

Why God Doesn’t Exist Intro A lot of people are always asking me why I’m an atheist – I tell them, well, there’s no reason to believe! This is my basic response every time someone asks me the question. I feel it’s a great summary of why I’m atheist, but isn’t completely accurate either. The theists (those who believe in a god, or gods) who hear the answer would disagree with my statement, or perhaps they would simply think that, well, there’s no positive reason to disbelieve God exists either. In other words, there are still a lot of things that remain un-answered. In order to answer the question fully and accurately, I must not caricature it, and must deliver not only a simple summary of why I don’t believe, but supply the theist with various refutations to those arguments which are seen to supply a reason to believe in God. In informal situations, I in fact go about caricaturing god, God, or Gods, and mostly Christianity, through analogizing them to things which no one in society would believe so fervently or even consider believing beyond it being absurd. But here I seek to be more elaborate and direct.

What is a god? Before I start talking about my atheism, I must first make clear in what way I am an atheist – I must be clear in what I mean by “disbelieving in a god or gods.” To do this, I must define what exactly I am disbelieving, and I will simply leave it at the following:

By: Alex J. Tavarez A god or goddess is a deity, or any other entity, that exhibits consciousness and of which the universe or a thing is somehow ontologically/causally/teleologically dependent on. Meaning it is a conscious being on which all of the universe’s existence and/or purpose/meaning is dependent on (but not in a solipsistic manner, as this conscious being could be the object and not solely the self) as an efficient cause and/or in an extrinsic manner. This is a broad definition of “god” and may include any being that is corporeal, or immaterial, or anything of the sort. I usually assume the god to be external from either the universe or the experiential world. Thus Jehovah is a god, and so is Allah, etcetera. I think this definition is sufficient and need not be broader, otherwise, it would apply to things which I do agree already exist – like toenails. But perhaps it should be narrower – I am not sure of this. But I’ll suffice with this definition.

TheoSemantic Trick Now what do I mean by “theosemantics” here? Well, I am referring to the semantics of “god” or “goddess.” I have seen many arguments that equivocate, and use the word “God” to refer to something by which atheists, and actually, religionists, would not identify as God. These arguments, to my understanding, are simply a play on semantics and reference, used for the convenience of theists and their God. The reason these things don’t work is because the atheist and the theist result in talking about two different things, though the theist tries to claim that he has proven a God exist when he may have only managed to prove something else which is not what the atheists is arguing against. These arguments also disregard the fact that the language spoken doesn’t matter, only what is referenced – but when using a word whose definition, or signifiers, is rather ambiguous, it becomes easy to switch the object of reference without being entirely too sure it has been switched, at least by the observer. An example of this trick through semantics would be the following: Nails are used to join pieces of wood together. You have nails on your hand. Therefore, we do have a surplus of nails.

The only difference is that the semantic trick is obvious because the definitions of the word “nail” in the argument above are precise, where in a TheoSemantic Trick it’s quite the contrary: Something that is finite needs a cause.

By: Alex J. Tavarez The universe is finite. The universe needs a cause. To stop regress, the cause of the universe must be infinite. This infinite cause is God.

Now, the argument above is not necessarily a TheoSemantic Trick because one could say that the connector “is” in the conclusion is not equating “God” and “infinite cause,” but rather making one a fulfillment of the other, id est “God fulfills the condition of being an infinite first cause”; however, suppose it were defining/equating God with infinite cause: it would be establishing the infinite cause, which the argument concludes necessary in order to stop causal regression and explain the origins of the universe, to be the definition of God, when an infinite cause is not necessarily what the atheist is arguing against. The God the atheist is arguing against may as well not be that which the argument says to be called God. The biggest flaw of the TheoSemantic Trick can be illustrated through replacing “God” with any other unbelievable artifice: Something that is finite needs a cause. The universe is finite. The universe needs a cause. To stop regress, the cause of the universe must be infinite. This infinite cause is the Unicorn.

I am doing a semantic trick if I am equating the Unicorn and infinite cause as full definitions of each other, because when another person talks about Unicorns they speak of pink sissy horses with horny horns, not an infinite cause. Therefore this doesn’t prove anything. It’s like calling my toenails Unicorns and then claiming that therefore unicorns exist. However, in the argument above, I may not be saying that a Unicorn is an infinite cause, but that Unicorns can fulfill the condition of an infinite cause. If I am, then I am no longer conducting a semantic trick, not just because of consensus between those arguing as to what they mean by “Unicorn,” but also because it conforms to the larger social setting in which the arguers are taking place. Both theists and atheists have to keep the TheoSemantic Trick in mind so they do not fall to arguments of equivocation. I have already taken a precaution to

By: Alex J. Tavarez the TheoSemantic Trick by supplying the definition of “god” I’ll be working with here, and that I usually work with, as an atheist.

The Judeao-Christian God: Why He Just Must Not Exist Since it was the Judeo-Christian God (the God of the Jews and the God of Christians) which I first started doubting and whose doubt led me to atheism, I’m going to start this with this god. This God is the most famous of the United States, which is why I address this god specifically the most. There are a couple of things wrong with this god, basically: omnipotence (which means being all-powerful), omnipotence vs. omniscience (omniscience means being all-knowing), omniscience vs. free will, and omnibenevolence (meaning all-benevolent, or all-good, or all-charitable) vs. suffering/evil. The problem of omnipotence can be easily illustrated through the following question: can God make a rock he cannot carry? Or, alternatively: can God do anything illogical? This question supposes that omnipotence is necessarily illogical – and that therefore to be omnipotent is to be impossible because it would be to be illogical, thus false/invalid. Because of this, the Judeo-Christian God is so claimed to be logically impossible. If God can make a rock he can’t carry, he can’t carry the rock, so he can’t do everything, and thus is not omnipotent. If God can’t make a rock he can’t carry, he still can’t do everything, and thus is not omnipotent. I would say the argument just said is completely sensible; however, whether or not theists (theists are people who believe in a god, or several gods) agree with the argument being sensible, some theists choose to point to a logical omnipotence, where God can do everything that is logical – which to me isn’t really omnipotence at all, because God can only do everything that is logical, but let us just assume, pretend, that the Judeo-Christian God has this logical omnipotence. Their still remains the problem between omnipotence and omniscience. The omnipotence can be completely logical, internally, yet be completely incompatible with omniscience due to what both logical omnipotence and omniscience imply. How are omnipotence and omniscience logically incompatible in other words, how can a thing have those two characteristics at the same time? Well, if you are omnipotent, it means that you are able to do anything (and if it is “logical omnipotence,” [which I doubt is actually omnipotence at all] then it means you can do anything as long as it is not illogical), and if you are omniscient it means you know everything. If you can do anything that is not illogical, then a great example would be changing your mind – that is not illogical. However, if you know everything and have infinite knowledge, then it is impossible for you to be mistaken, because then you are able to know whether or not your mistaken, and you’re able to know whether or not your knowledge of your knowledge about being mistaken is not mistaken, and you’re able to know whether that knowledge about not being

By: Alex J. Tavarez mistaken in your knowledge about being mistaken in that knowledge is mistaken, and it goes on and on. You would also know whether you would be wrong in the future, and if you know that, then that means you would already know what is actually true. This is why it’s called, alternatively, infinite knowledge. This is also why infinite knowledge implies infallibility (infallibility means not able to make mistakes). So, if God is omnipotent, or if he has logical omnipotence, he is able to change his mind, and if he is omniscient, he is infallible. But if God is infallible, how is he able to change his mind? If God can change his mind, he is not omniscient (and is, consequentially, fallible [fallible is the opposite of infallible]), and if God can’t change his mind, he is not omnipotent, and not logically omnipotent either for that matter. A theist who believes in the “logical omnipotence” “interpretation” of omnipotence could argue that logical omnipotence not only necessitates internal consistency, but also logical adjustment to circumstances, and that, therefore, if one can’t be omniscient while being able to change one’s mind, logical omnipotence would “adjust” to that. In other words, logical omnipotence would allow for God to do anything and everything as long as it doesn’t involve being incompatible to something else, thus meaning as long as it doesn’t allow for changing one’s mind if one is omniscient. But if you define this as “omnipotence,” then everything is omnipotent, even humans, because humans can do anything and everything as long as what they do is not incompatible (logically inconsistent) with, or contradicts, their circumstances and their nature. If this is so, God’s power or ability to do “everything” is no special thing at all. Again, this is why, to me, the argument theists use of “logical omnipotence” in order to make up for the impossibility of omnipotence and thus the possibility of an omnipotent thing (like the Judeo-Christian God) is simply a semantic trick, and is not omnipotence at all. Plus, by saying God has “logical omnipotence,” you’re directly contradicting the Judeo-Christian God, which is your very own God if you’re a Christian or Jewish theist, because the Judeo-Christian God is not “logically omnipotent” by definition – he is omnipotent, and his potency is a special potency that other things don’t have. So when you use the argument of “logical omnipotence” when I say omnipotence and omniscience is incompatible, or that omnipotence is essentially illogical, then I’ve basically won and have disproved the existence of your Judeo-Christian God, because your argument can’t apply to support the Judeao-Christian God, since he is not defined by logical omnipotence in Christian philosophy. So the Judeao-Christian God can’t exist by definition. You might be compelled to say that that is not the Judeao-Christian God’s definition, out of pure desperation, and so that I am not arguing against the Judeao-Christian God. But I do persist that I am speaking of the Judeo-Christian God, and that omnipotence and omniscience are two of his essential and defining characteristics: the Bible, in fact, says the Judeao-Christian God has the trait of omniscience.

By: Alex J. Tavarez “19This then is how we know that we belong to the truth, and how we set our hearts at rest in his presence 20whenever our hearts condemn us. For God is greater than our hearts, and he knows everything. 21

Dear friends, if our hearts do not condemn us, we have confidence before God” 1 John 3:19-21 Anyone claiming to be Christian or Jewish that says otherwise isn’t Christian or Jewish. Even if you were to be correct (which you’re not), it wouldn’t matter: the point, then, that would remain is that a god who is omnipotent cannot exist, and that a god who is both omnipotent/”logically omnipotent” while also being omniscient cannot exist. I feel as though Judeo-Christian theists try to maintain at least some form of theism, not necessarily Judeo-Christian, by constantly changing the characteristics/attributes of a god; when they do so, they do so only to defend themselves, and don’t actually show how this new characteristic or attribute they use for defense is an actual characteristic/attribute of a hypothetically-existent god, or of an actual existent god that they also need to provide proof for. In other words, it’s an excuse – it doesn’t prove or justify anything because there’s no reason provided for these new characteristics/attributes, and is simply defensive. It’s like if I were to tell you Santa’s too fat to fit through a chimney, cannot carry all the gifts for those who have been nice, that deer cannot fly, that Santa Claus started from a political cartoon, and therefore is not real, and then you proceed to change these characteristics/attributes and tell me that, well, then: Santa is super-slim, only carries a few gifts to people while parents provide the rest, that Santa quietly rides with his deer on the ground, and that Santa Claus bares absolutely no resemblance to that political cartoon I’m talking about that started the stories because he actually wears Gothic clothing – you still haven’t proven anything, because what you just described isn’t Santa Claus, and you haven’t provided a reason for me to believe that a guy like that exists either. When you do these things, it’s called an ad hoc. At least that’s what I would call it. Some theists claim that, instead of “logical omnipotence,” God is omnipotent as long as he cannot limit his omnipotence. But it can be argued that if God were omnipotent in this way, his omnipotence would still be illogical because it would still result in illogical abilities that do not particularly limit his omnipotence like the “Can God create a rock he can’t carry?” question implies. Another problem with this claim, though, is that omnipotence that cannot limit itself is not omnipotence at all (as omnipotence is defined as all-power), and if it could, it would then still be selfcontradictory. Because of this, omnipotence still remains logically impossible. And so the Judeo-Christian God remains impossible. But that’s not even the only reason why the Judeo-Christian God just must not exist. Another reason, that I consider to be a little softer than my previous reason, is the existence of suffering in the face of an omnibenevolent god such as the Judeo-Christian one. “Omnibenevolence” – “Omni” means all, while

By: Alex J. Tavarez “Benevolence” means of good will, and compassion. And “omnibenevolent” therefore means: “all- good-willing” or “all-compassionate.” I am not sure if the belief of God as omnibenevolent is essential of Judaism and/or Christianity, but most Christians and Jews do claim that God is omnibenevolent. The problem of evil addresses how there can be immorality in a world where a God exists. If what God says is right because it is right, and not because He says it, then why does God let things that are fundamentally evil in life continue to exist? A theist might say that it is a form of challenge in order to strengthen us, but why does god need the existence of evil to strengthen us? Does the world being good somehow leave out any challenges to work on? Not necessarily, if we’re speaking of a moral/ethical good. It could then be said that God made free will, which inevitably led to the rise of evil as a possibility in the human social realm. If this is true, and if God is retributive, he would punish those who are bad, and reward those who are good in the world. He does not do this in the world, for good things happen to bad people, and vice versa. Therefore, because of this, it is evident that God is not omnibenevolent, as an omnibenevolent God is a good-willing God; if He is indifferent, he is not good-willing. Thus, the Judeo-Christian God (who is omnibenevolent) cannot exist. Some theists, though, say that there cannot be good without evil – they are correct, but only up to an extent. Yes, evil and good cannot exist without each other, but they forgot to add one key thing: potential. Good cannot potentially exist without the existence of evil, and evil cannot potentially exist without the existence of good. However, just because evil must exist to make the good potentially existent doesn’t mean good cannot exist without evil existing in actuality, since good’s existence only implies a potential existence of evil that will not necessarily turn into an actuality. Which means: God could make the world solely good in actuality, while disallowing the actualization of evil in the world (evil could be [potential], but God says it won’t be [disallowing evil’s actualization]). But he hasn’t, since evil has been seen to have been actualized in the world. This would not be so of a God who is not indifferent to such matters, but omnibenevolent. Thus, any omnibenevolent God would not exist. And, as you can see, omnibenevolent gods would be more engaged with the world and human affairs, which are often referred to as personal gods. Some people would say that God says certain things are right because whatever he says to be right is automatically right: whoever says this, therefore, must condone mass murder (God killed all the firstborn), and/or would kill and rape for God. A person who believes this needs serious psychiatric help, and seems to ignore that “morality” and “ethics” are human categories, just like language is also human and is what we use to create, claim, categorize, and rationalize – if all of this is human, it is not necessarily from God. And if all of this is human, it is naturally human to come up with morals – and if you do anything anyone tells you, you have no morals as a human, because you do not manage to independently distinguish one action from another in terms of being right or wrong

By: Alex J. Tavarez when offered to you as something for you to do. Thus, ironically, if whatever God says is right because God said it, then people wouldn’t have a conscience, which is what you as a Christian claim we do have. Some Christians even go as far as to say that it is the devil that causes the evil in the world, and therefore that God is not responsible for it. If so, then explain to me this: “11 This is how you are to eat it: with your cloak tucked into your belt, your sandals on your feet and your staff in your hand. Eat it in haste; it is the LORD's Passover. 12

‘On that same night I will pass through Egypt and strike down every firstborn— both men and animals—and I will bring judgment on all the gods of Egypt. I am the LORD. 13 The blood will be a sign for you on the houses where you are; and when I see the blood, I will pass over you. No destructive plague will touch you when I strike Egypt.’” Exodus 12:11-13 You might say that God has the right to destroy what he consequently is responsible for being existent (the firstborns), but would you say a parent would be able to kill his 13-year-old son simply because he was responsible for his creation in some way, if God didn’t exist? Explain to me how God used Job as a play-toy to play with Satan, and how He made it so those who have nothing to do with what Adam and Eve did, suffer for their sin. Plus, even if the devil were the only perpetrator of evil, God still holds responsibility for this evil by being the creator and the motivator of the devil to tempt people. If He is omniscient, he would’ve known that one of his angels, Lucifer, would’ve fallen and become Satan, to tempt people into evil. Yet he sat back and let it happen, even though he is omnipotent. And this is if God were able to be omniscient and omnipotent, which is what Christians claim, even though I have already shown why I think that being both omniscient and omnipotent is impossible. This is why it is impossible for the Judeo-Christian God who Jews and Christians claim to be omnibenevolent to exist. There’s also what I call the Problem of Suffering, which is very similar to the Problem of Evil, but not the same. The problem of suffering asks how can there be suffering in the world if there’s an omnibenevolent God. Theists, again, might respond that it is to challenge us, but suffering isn’t needed to be challenged: one can have difficulty achieving a certain goal without having to be suffering through it. It could be said that suffering is the challenge itself, and that the goal is happiness: but what’s the point of this if God could grant this happiness to us? You could respond that it is because then we wouldn’t have to work for it – the point of working for something is to achieve it. If you’ve already achieved it, there’s no need to employ a means to achieve it. So I don’t see why God needs to cause us to suffer, and how “giving us challenges” makes him need to cause us to suffer – thus, this doesn’t really explain why God chose to let us suffer. Again, theists will try to

By: Alex J. Tavarez say that we suffer because of free will, but free will could exist without having the consequence of suffering upon the human mind. They might further say that without suffering, such as guilt, humans wouldn’t be able to identify what is evil (even though they haven’t even yet explained how and why an omnibenevolent God would allow evil to happen). But if God is omnipotent, this wouldn’t be true. Again, as you can see, the Judeo-Christian God, who is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscient, and allows evil/suffering, simply cannot exist. And there’s even more problems! Omniscience cannot allow free will to be possible, because omniscience leading to God’s infallibility leading to God’s 100% certain knowledge would imply that human action is deterministic. This means that all human action is planned, not necessarily by God, but just planned and determined by things 100%. This means that humans aren’t really free to make choices, because their choices were already planned and determined. They cannot fall out of this plan or determined path because then it wouldn’t be determinism. Because omniscience implies this determinism, it also implies that free will cannot exist. So if God is omniscient, free will wouldn’t be possible. But the Judeo-Christian God is omniscient and created free will, according to Judeo-Christianity, and so because this isn’t possible, the Judeo-Christian God is impossible. There’s also the fact that if a thing is perfect, it does not have flaws – if it does not have flaws, it cannot make things with flaws, because to do that assumes a flaw in the creator. It could be said that the universe ahs various flaws, and thus that the Judeo-Christian God cannot exist, as he is supposed to be perfect. The Judeo-Christian God, therefore, just must not exist, because of his inconsistency and impossibility as summarized in the problems aforementioned, being: omnipotence, omnipotence vs. omniscience, omniscience vs. free will, omnibenevolence vs. God’s Biblical immorality, and omnipotence-omniscienceomnibenevolence vs. the existence of evil. Thus, the Judeo-Christian God is the only god I just know doesn’t exist, which would include the Muslim God, and the Mormon God. Most other gods I do not know do not exist, but disbelieve to exist. In the following sections, the capitalized word “God” will not be referring specifically to a Judeo-Christian God but any god, gods, or goddesses – as the following arguments are not solely used in support of one religion or denomination.

The Ontological Argument The ontological argument is any argument that has God’s greatness or perfection somehow in its premises (a premise is a proposition that tries to support its conclusion), and has its conclusion as God’s existence. The argument basically goes like this: God is the greatest thing there is; nothing else can be greater than God; God exists in the understanding; it is greater to exist in reality than just in the understanding; therefore, God exists. The argument can also be formed in this way:

By: Alex J. Tavarez God is the greatest thing there is; nothing else can be greater than God; it is greater to be necessary in existence than to be contingent (i.e. not needed); therefore, God necessarily exists. There’s a big problem with this – it assumes that existence is a part of the essence of God. But what essence does is that it simply describes a concept, or reduces it into basic necessities of the concept in order to identify it with a real thing. Thus, when one says the essence of a thing, then it is only if that thing exists that the essence would apply to it; the necessary judgments of propositions that describe an objects essence as applying to it have nothing to do with the object’s real existence. For example: if you say “a triangle has 3 sides” (i.e. describing an object’s essence as applying to itself), the proposition is and may be necessarily true (i.e. one may make a judgment of that proposition), without that triangle having to exist. The existence of things precedes their essence, while the essence of things is used to form other essences and identify those things in existence. So when you say “a triangle has 3 sides,” you are really also saying “if a triangle exists, it has 3 sides,” not that it exists. So if you say God’s essence is his being existent, then what you are saying is: “if God exists, then God is necessarily existent.” So you would be saying that God has to exist if and only if he exists. But then if he doesn’t exist, he wouldn’t have to exist, because he would necessarily exist only if he existed. So when the ontological argument states that God is the greatest thing by essence, and that therefore, by essence he must exist, what it is saying is that “if God exist, then God is necessarily existent; therefore, God exists.” Because of this, the ontological argument is flawed: it has not shown that the condition of his existence is true, which is what needs to be true in order for him to be necessarily existent, which is what they must show if they assume his essence as being existent or necessarily existent. In other words, they haven’t shown how God is really existent, because by saying his essence is to be existent, they are just saying that his existence is what is used to identify him in his real existence (which is something in the understanding), not proving his real existence (his existence in reality). So then that means that you aren’t proving he exists by making his essence his existence – as you haven’t actually shown God really exists by saying that his essence is his existence. This is true of any other thing: if I define Santa Claus as the greatest thing ever, and say existence is greater than non-existence, it doesn’t follow from that that he exist; I’m simply saying his essence is existence, which does not show that he is really existent, because his “essence of being existent” is only used to identify him as really existent, not prove his real existence. “God as being the greatest” or “having the essence of being existent” remains in the understanding and doesn’t identify anything in reality. There’s also the fact that a self-contradiction arises if the subject of something is affirmed while its predicate (the thing expressed which makes the subject what it is) is denied, or vice versa (for example, “Triangles don’t have 3 sides” would be self-contradictory because its subject is affirmed [“triangles”] while

By: Alex J. Tavarez the predicate is denied [“have 3 sides” is denied]). I am not claiming that this is what the ontological argument is doing, but that denying God exists does not result in a self-contradiction, since a self-contradiction requires the subject to be affirmed while the predicate denied or vice versa. To say that “God is nonexistent” is therefore not a self-contradiction even when God’s essence is being existent, since when we say something is nonexistent we are denying both the subject and its predicate as being represented in reality (or “reality’s existences”). Thus, even were the essence of God his being existent, his existence can and could be denied, as well as affirmed. So, the ontological argument ends up amounting to nothing. The ontological argument becomes null and irrelevant to the “Does God exist?” discourse. Also, if we define something as being existent, then saying that it is “therefore existent” is redundant, since we are simply repeating ourselves. And because of this, we are not making a judgment of God’s existence in reality and joining it to our conceptual definition of God as being existent. As you can see, “existence” (if when we say “existence” we are referring to something’s existence in reality) can’t really be an essence, or predicate, then, because it doesn’t say anything about the thing or the subject, but the correspondence of an object in reality with a concept (a subject plus its predicate). The reason we say a horse exists and a unicorn does not, is not because the horse is defined as existing or has the essence of existence while the unicorn is not defined as such or have such an essence, but because there are objects in reality corresponding to the concept of a horse while there are currently none corresponding to the concept of a unicorn. If necessary existence is a predicate, even though plain existence isn’t, then you have yet to prove that God is necessarily existent. You might say that he is necessarily existent because he is the greatest thing, and necessary existence is greater than contingent (not-needed) existence. But what do you mean by “he is the greatest thing”? If this is his essence, then if I say the greatest thing in the world is the moon, then you’re saying God is consequently a moon. But if this is not his essence, then you’re making the judgment that God is the greatest thing. There’s a problem with this, though: you can only describe an object as the greatest if it exists and can be compared to other things that exist. You are assuming God is great, and then that he exists – when it is when he exists that he becomes greatest. In other words, when you say God is greatest, you are speaking of him conceptually in comparison with other things as concepts – a conceptual comparison is not a comparison with those things in reality, as, if existence is greater than nonexistence, things in reality may be greater than God because God is only greater than those things conceptually, and so God may not actually exist in reality. But, why are we assuming existence is greater than non-existence in the ontological argument in the first place?

By: Alex J. Tavarez There’s a different version of the ontological argument that states that whatever is possible occurs in different dimensions or universes in existence, and that since God is something possible (which I have shown the Judeo-Christian God is not, but let us suppose he is), he must therefore exist in one of these universes where the potential of God to exist is actualized, and therefore God exists. There are at least two or three problems with this version of the argument: first, you have to prove that it is true that other universes exist which actualize possibilities of this universe. Unfortunately, this statement is quite un-founded. Second, it is also possible for God to not exist, and therefore, he must not exist in at least one existent universe that makes up for the possibility of his non-existence. But then, this would result in a contradiction (God exists and doesn’t exist) unless there were one universe without God and one with it. If this is so, then our universe doesn’t necessarily have a God, and so you haven’t proven that God exists to us. If you say this is proof that he exists to us, then you are saying that his existence in another universe does not just apply to that universe, but to ours. But if this is so, so does his non-existence in another universe apply to ours, which makes it end up being self-contradictory.

The Cosmological Argument The cosmological argument is another argument used by theists to try to prove that God, or a god, exists. This argument basically says that the universe needs a cause, and with a ton of other premises, comes, somehow, to the conclusion that a God exists. There are several versions of this argument. Here they are: Argument 1: 1. Everything has a cause. 2. (From premise 1) The universe has a cause. 3. God fulfills this need of a cause. 4. Therefore, God exists. Argument 2: 1. All contingent things (a contingent thing is something whose existence is not necessary) have a cause. 2. The cause or explanation for this contingent thing must ultimately go all the way back to something that is not contingent, but necessary. 3. Therefore, a necessary being exists, and this being is assumed to be God. Argument 3:

By: Alex J. Tavarez 1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence. 2. The universe began to exist. 3. Therefore, the universe was caused. 4. There have not been provided [or, alternatively, cannot be provided] any scientific efficient causes. 5. Therefore, the cause must be “personal” [meaning a “conscious” or “concerned” or “supernatural” entity].

What’s wrong with these arguments for God’s existence? Well, Argument 1 is a non-sequitur: it does not follow that, because the universe must have a cause (and thus has one), that this cause is God. There are still many possibilities as to what this cause might be – as to what exactly does fulfill this causal function. I could easily use this version of the cosmological argument to justify the existence of a Giant Flying Spaghetti monster that made the world with his saucy delicious noode-ly appendages. This argument is flawed, and can’t justify the existence of anything. It doesn’t prove anything. The first premise of this argument is also objectionable: things that are necessary wouldn’t need a cause because the nature of that thing’s existence would explain its being existent, without having to refer to efficient causes. This means that not everything needs a cause. There’s also the possibility that even contingent things don’t need a cause. I will (or have) addressed this in the metaphysics section of the site, under: Causality. A short summary of that would be: contingent things do not logically need a cause, for that thing’s existence is sufficient to itself, though not making itself necessary, and so causal explanations are un-necessary; contingent things can also not be caused, which is different from saying that it was caused even if by nothing – it is a logical possibility for a non-caused universe to exist, while nothing causing X is logically impossible. The jump from something being contingent to it being necessarily caused efficiently seems rather big, as it is not inductive or abductive in reasoning, and is therefore deductive – which, at its most basic, would make it a syllogistic argument. But syllogistic arguments have two premises, not one – so, there’s a hidden premise in this judgment, and though I don’t know what it is, I suspect it is the key premise that needs to be justified, or this hidden premise or the statement “contingent things need a cause” that need to be shown to be axiomatic/self-evident through analytic analysis. Which it hasn’t. You might claim it to be inductive, as a prediction from our everyday “observances” of things having causes, but this prediction couldn’t apply in this case, as it would be in turn committing the fallacy of composition. It also would be, as said, a prediction

By: Alex J. Tavarez applying to those contingent things we haven’t necessarily yet shown a cause for, and so would in no way prove that a cause is necessary for contingent things. So, besides the first premise of Argument 1 being objectionable, so is the first premise of Argument 2 objectionable. But even if that premise be true, the second one can also be objected to: could there not be an infinite regress or amount of causes? I do not see how this is impossible; however, infinity does seem like a very difficult concept to grasp, and that compels me to speculate that infinity may be impossible. But I do not have any justification to say so, so far. And even if we assume both of these premises are true, the only thing those premises would lead to is the conclusion that a necessary being or object must exist – not that God exists. God could possibly fulfill this role, but according to the definition of a god from which we began this discourse, the argument’s conclusion that a necessary being is needed to make up for the necessitated efficient cause of contingent things is not a sufficient condition as to say this thing is God or equivalent to Him. Thus, the assumption that this necessary cause/being/object is God is completely unfounded and has no basis. Some say that a conscious being/object best explains the contingent thing which is the universe; however, I do not see how it is the best explanation. Both un-conscious and conscious objects are equally able to account for the universe. Argument 3’s first premise is objectionable, as it has the same problem as did the first premise of Argument 2: why must something that began to exist have a cause? If the universe can possibly pop out of existence because of its contingency, so might it be able to begin without a cause. The initiative of a cause is not what makes the beginning of the effect, rather, it is the beginning of the cause and the beginning of the effect that allow them to exist and then relate to each other through this causal relationship. It is the beginning of a thing, and the beginning of another thing that allow them to exist and be associated to each other causally. If nothing exists outside of that thing, and that thing began, an efficient cause cannot be assigned to it. Thus, it is possible for a thing to begin and yet have no cause. Also, the universe is space-time, so there cannot be anything outside of the universe because there would be no space in which it would reside and no time in which we could inquire of it as cause of the universe. There is also the fact that the conclusion does not follow from premise 4: it is a non-sequitur. The lack of scientific efficient causes for the universe does not in any way support the probability and does not in any way show the favorability of a personal efficient cause to account for the universe’s existence. Scientists don’t just select possible efficient causes as true because of a lack of truth in other causes – scientists don’t assume any of these as true if they are not proven true. The same is true in any other epistemic journey: one cannot say one option is better than the other when none of the options have any direct justification for each other that make them more or less improbable. Thus, you cannot say that because there are no scientific efficient causes there must be a “personal” efficient cause instead. Why? Because there

By: Alex J. Tavarez have been no “personal” efficient causes justified to be true either – you can’t use the lack of justification you have for such a conclusion as its justification by saying something else hasn’t made any claim justified to be true. And, again, there doesn’t need to be an efficient cause either, so a “personal” efficient cause is not the only alternative to scientific efficient causes: Argument 3 is therefore assuming a false dichotomy right through the process of coming to its conclusion.

Pascal’s Wager Pascal’s wager is a wager for God’s existence originally made by Blaise Pascal. Pascal’s Wager basically states that it is better to believe in God than to disbelieve him. It says this because it claims that belief may result in infinite bliss or, if God doesn’t exist, no significant loss, and that disbelief would result in either hellfire or no loss. The problem with this argument: it ignores the probability of these options being true and therefore the probability that one of the results of these options will come about and be fulfilled. The way probability is shown is by using the limited information/data/conditions you do have and what outcome they most account for. The thing is, though, that the probability of God existing or not existing is equal, as God’s existence has no amount of data which directly supports it, and God’s nonexistence, by virtue of the nature of non-existence, cannot have any supporting data. This lack of data makes both options equal. If both options are equally probable, the wager cannot be based upon probability. Because both of these options and their corresponding results are equally probable, they must be chosen by another criterion: a non-pragmatic criterion, one that is epistemic. This criteria is the burden of proof, which, since the burden of proof is on the positive claim, because of the nature of the negative claim, the lack of proof for the positive makes a default fall-back on the negative or rather perhaps the skepticism of the positive: God doesn’t exist (the negative claim), or rather perhaps the disbelief in God’s existence (skepticism of the positive claim that God exists). What Pascal’s Wager ignores is the fact that pragmatics and epistemology can be very related through probability and result-based decision making also being related. Plus, if you accept Pascal’s Wager, that in turn does not lead you to belief in God’s existence, as belief is an epistemic stance that needs epistemic reasons and belief by definition can arguably said to not be able to be based on pragmatics. So, in other words, you would remain an atheist pretending to be a theist. Thus, if it is true that such a God that gives such a reward and such a punishment exists, you would still receive punishment as, by believing through will-power, you do not actually believe – it is no longer really belief. There are also a couple of other flaws: Pascal’s Wager assumes there are only two options. People may refine it, and say that the only options actually deal with those God’s which reward infinite bliss for belief and hellfire for non- or disbelief.

By: Alex J. Tavarez They say this because options outside of that are irrelevant due to their insignificant consequences. But it remains that if there are many possible gods who may share this similarity, not believing in any one of them will result in hellfire. So, there’s the problem of choosing the correct God. Then again, one could say that people need not believe in any specific God while disbelieving others, but simply believe in a generic God that gives hellfire and rewards with infinite bliss – this is still a problem, because believing in a God that solely gives hellfire and rewards infinite bliss would still result in denying similar Gods. Also, the more Gods there possibly could be, the more likely it is that the specific God you believe in is mistaken. So, this also results in any of these Gods being true being very unlikely. Thus, the likelier truth becomes the non-existence of each of those Gods, and thus the hypothetical result of atheism if such a rewarding/punishing God exists becomes null as a reason for theism (belief in God, a god, or goddesses).

Miracles Don’t Prove God’s Existence I’ve heard and seen many theists, particularly Christians of the monotheistic religions, point to miracles (a violation or interruption in physical/natural laws of the universe) as a form of affirmation or support for their belief in God’s existence. Miracles, however, don’t prove God’s existence: to say that a miracle happened, and therefore God exists, is almost like saying a miracle happened, and therefore ghosts exist. This shows how absurd the notion that miracles somehow point to the divine is. You might ask me, then, how would you explain miracles? Well, who says I have to? The point is that a random guess in order to explain the genesis of something does not make it so that that something proves that random guess’s veracity. So, while we guess these things, we must also admit ignorance as to what truly is the origin of miracles. But my view on miracles is, so far, that a violation of the laws of nature is completely possible; the laws of nature are not the same as the laws of logic. While a violation of logic is completely impossible, the laws of nature are conditional and based on consistent experience. In other words, we generalize from previous experience to present and future experience. So, the laws of nature are able to be “violated,” though it’s not really a violation: a miracle is more like new information and data that is introduced and that may require a change in our view or formation of the laws of nature. The laws of nature come from observation of nature and so when nature contradicts the laws of nature, the laws of nature must be changed. Laws of nature abide to nature, not vice versa. This is why it is completely possible for “miracles” to happen. Miracles, then, are possible conceivable independent occurrences, and they do not need to have any “origin,” as they are simply part of the organic function of the universe, which humans can’t ever fully grasp as fixed. To see more on miracles

By: Alex J. Tavarez as interruptions of the laws of nature, please visit the Metaphysics section of the site.

The Teleological Argument The teleological argument is an argument that states that the supposed design, purpose, or complexity of the universe can only be explained by the existence of a designer or creator (which also implies that this being has intent, and thus consciousness – a conscious being by which the universe is extrinsic to, and therefore claims that it can only be explained through god). This argument is flawed, because it assumes that design and purpose is something observed simply in the world – something which we acquire from mere observance of the universe. I disagree with this. “Order” is a human concept that is logically valid and can be used to describe or classify the universe but is not seen in the universe. “Order” is not empirically verifiable because it is not found in the world; they are given to the world by humans. “Order” results from the interaction of the subject with the object, and is not an intrinsic thing observed from the object. So, because order is not of the universe, but to the universe, one cannot use “order” to promote the existence of a creator or designer. There’s also the fact that the subject, the human, can only see order in those things which he has categorized and organized through symbolic representation and logical reasoning in thought. If the human has not done this, or is unable to do this, the object of his inquiry, to him, seems disordered and to have no sign of design – he cannot see purpose if the ends of something seems inconceivable or unfavorable. The appearance of “order” in the universe is therefore a completely subjective phenomena corresponding with the human ordering of the universe. The order of the universe thus does not need any explanation through an efficient cause, since the order of the universe has its origins in us. Things that lack knowledge can be said not to be able to achieve an end unless guided by an intelligent hand; however, the “end” of things, just as they are imagined by the painter unto his painting, is imagined to those natural things which lack knowledge. A thing that lacks knowledge to achieve a goal doesn’t need an intelligent guidance, because that thing does not have a goal due to its lack of intelligence to assign one, and therefore no need for guidance – we do have this intelligence to assign goals, though, and so we are the ones who assign it a goal and say it has one. In other words, one could say things that lack knowledge have goals and achieve them, but this goal is not personal to that thing which lacks the knowledge to achieve the goal. Thus, this thing needs not assistance in achieving something which it cannot conceive a means to achieve and of which it cannot conceive the end of that means. Complexity also does not imply design, as a series of small random/unguided occurrences, when enlarged, and looked at collectively, can seem very complex.

By: Alex J. Tavarez Also, to explain a complex piece, it would require a much more complex origin – but since the argument from teleology assumes that complexity requires design, this would lead to an absurd infinite regress (in other words, every designer you come up with will need a designer) that would be easily discarded of as epistemologically insignificant (not important in terms of knowledge or belief or truth) through the method of Occam’s Razor (where un-necessary explanations or amounts of explanation are discarded off as useless to address). There’s also the fact that we get our idea of “design” through nature. In order to call something designed, we must compare to something natural. Nature, therefore, provides the basis by which we can judge something as designed. We can only judge things as design insofar as we can distinguish characteristics of that thing which is called design and that which is natural. Thus, to claim that nature was designed is to completely destroy the basis of comparison that we must use to identify design. By saying nature is designed, which is the basis on which we judge design, you’re destroying the concept of design and thus can’t apply it any more, or, rather, it could be said, you are broadening the concept of design to an extent in which it becomes null or meaningless.

The Transcendental Argument The transcendental argument basically states that logic, morality, the sciences, and etcetera, cannot make sense or are not justified unless God is assumed to exist or that his existence is true. They also claim that logic and morality and etcetera are not created by God, but are a reflection of God’s nature – id est, they are part of God’s nature. And, that, because of this, without God, one cannot consistently establish any of these things. However, I disagree with this, by stating that this is simply a way to explain away why there can be these absolute and objective truths despite their dependence on God as subject, and does not in any way show how God is needed to assume these things. The point is that logic and morality don’t need to be dependent on God’s existence, whether or not God’s nature is conceptually defined as logic, morality, and the sciences. One could still assert logic, morality, and the sciences while denying God because they can be independent of him while remaining stable and consistent, just like God can remain stable and consistent and fixed in his nature as having logic, morality, and the science as part of his nature. Logic is a self-sustaining and closed system, and also the guiding system for figuring out things included in all other topics, like morality, and the sciences. Thus, logic can be independent and doesn’t need to have a basis on God, and neither do other subjects/topics, as they are encompassed by logic in their understanding.

By: Alex J. Tavarez Proponents of this argument have yet to show how exactly an atheistic system would remain inconsistent unless it summons the existence of God.

The Christological Argument(s) The Christological argument basically tries to prove God’s existence through the nature of Christ. A particular version of it is one that states that, based on Christ’s wisdom and character; it is likely that whatever he says is correct. Christ said God exists; therefore, it is likely that it is true that God exists. The flaw with this version of the argument is that it is essentially an appeal to authority, on matters of principle, and by disregard of the actual claim itself. Wisdom and character do not point to the impossibility of getting something wrong, but rather point to the likeliness of getting it right. But, this still isn’t proof that it isn’t true – Jesus had shown no proof, and this actually makes his claim not able to be backed up. The summons of an authority on certain claims is only valid if that authority also has provided a form of proof for a claim, many other authorities support him, and his logic is sound. The proof part of the authorization is much more significant than the other three criterions. Jesus didn’t show proof, he did not show any of his logic that is able to be evaluated, and he wasn’t even an authority or authoritative source outside of theology (so relying on him for judging whether god exists would end up being circular reasoning, for we would already be assuming theology, in which he is an authoritative source, is true), which already goes by the assumption of God’s existence. The three criterion I presented don’t actually even support the veracity of a claim itself (except for the proof criterion, which is the first one, though not necessarily the authoritative account or anecdote of the proof if it is empirical), but simply makes the claim able to be relied on – it is pragmatic support for its use in an argument or in a practice, not empiric or logical support for its veracity. Another version of the argument, one which C.S. Lewis came up with, says that Jesus claimed to be God, and that he was a wise and moral teacher. C.S. Lewis than goes on to say that Jesus either lied, is deluded, or really is God. As a wise moral teacher, Jesus did not lie and was not deluded. Thus, Jesus was God, and therefore, God exists. The problem with this version of the argument is that it assumes there are only three options: Jesus lied, is deluded, or is telling the truth – there’s also the possibility that he was simply mistaken. Also, judging Jesus as moral and wise comes from observances and evaluations of his behavior – so, the behavior you’ve seen from him so far points to him being wise and moral, but perhaps there is behavior that is unknown that may have been otherwise from wise and/or moral. So, the options of deceit and/or delusion are still available as being true.

The Argument from Beauty/Love Beauty. The argument from beauty basically says that there are compelling reasons to believe that beauty is transcending its physical manifestations, that

By: Alex J. Tavarez reductionist materialism asserts that nothing can transcend its physical manifestations, that beauty is a quality of God that transcends physical manifestations, and that thus that theism is more plausible than materialism. So, basically, beauty is transcendent, and God having beauty as a transcendent being, makes it so that God’s existence is more possible than materialist assertions. The problem with this argument is the first premise: what are these compelling reasons supporting the transcendence of beauty? There’s also the fact that just because beauty may transcend, this does in no way prove or justify belief in God, even if it is more plausible than materialism as the conclusion validly says. But, the first premise: some theists have supplied this claim of beauty transcending physical manifestations with many reasons. Some of these reasons: beauty is assumed to have an objective existence when spoken of, and can have no coherence being spoken about if it is assumed otherwise; beauty can be found in things which have no evolutionary advantage; there is a great intuition that beauty does transcend its physical manifestations. The first reason is false, as ordinary language is not a great guide as to these things – besides, is there any real difference between how we talk about subjective and objective experiences? Both of these can be spoken of imprecisely and inaccurately. Beauty is not something observed directly on or of the object, rather something observed to the object: the sense of beauty is in the observer, regardless of its association with the object in itself as being simultaneously experienced and the sense of beauty focused. The sense of transcendent beauty is also found in the subject, and it, as an intuition, therefore, is not sufficient to support such a claim of transcendence. The subject, however, is a transcendent thing, and therefore, his experiences (such as of beauty and of love) also constitute as transcendent (if by transcendent you mean exceeding physical limits, extensions, or manifestations) – I will admit that. So, I agree that beauty (and love) be transcendent, but this does not in any way show how materialism is implausible, neither how reductionist materialism is implausible, compared to theism. Materialism could still be true despite the existence of transcendent things, and reductionist materialism is not invalidated by transcendent existence, as transcendent existences can still be translated to the level of materialism through logical association (if you’re defining transcendence as “beyond physical manifestation”).

The use of “transcendent” or “transcendental” by some theists, I would say, is rather vague or imprecise. “Transcendent” or “transcendental” would mean beyond a certain domain, but what domain is this? Luckily in this argument it was clarified, but in others, it remains vague. Some theists have replaced the first premise with the premise: there are compelling reasons to believe that the level of beauty of the universe is greater than it would be under materialism. Again, beauty is a subjective and projected

By: Alex J. Tavarez quality that says nothing about the object; thus, one cannot use it to speak of the object objectively – the universe wouldn’t be either less or more beautiful under materialism or without it. The universe is not either, objectively, and the term “beauty” is only a subjective projection. Love. The argument from love is basically the same as that of the argument of beauty, and the reasons submitted by theists to support its primary premise, only that love replaces beauty. As I have already refuted the argument of beauty, I refute the argument of love in the exact same way: love is an occurrence of the subject/self, which is one of the things, if not the only thing, that is immaterial and yet objectively existent by realization and acknowledgment of the subject and that is “transcendent.” I plan to explain this further in the Metaphysics section of the site. Love and beauty are objectively existent to the extent that they are in the subject who objectively exists [they are ontologically objective], but the love and beauty do not have an existence outside of the subject and don’t have a subjectless objective existence, and thus cannot be seen as epistemologically objective [epistemic objectivity would be that the knowledge claim is one of the object rather than of the subject and to the object], which is what I assume people mean when they say “objective existence.” Love and beauty can still maintain their value without having to have a subject-less objective existence. When we speak of things, we usually speak of them at the subject-less objective level of existence, and this is the only way in which we can make judgments of objects themselves. So, you cannot say that beauty and love are part of the universe – well, you can, but you must understand that it is not ontologically so at the subject-less objective level of existence, and thus cannot apply when speaking of the universe with epistemic objectivity.

The Argument from Morality/Consciousness Morality. The argument from morality simply takes the form of questioning how objective morals exist, or how moral sentences can be cognitive without the existence of God, and goes on to conclude that there is a God in order for us to support the existence of objective morals (morals that are true regardless of the subject). But this is self-contradictory, as, by assuming God exists, one is making the truth of morals come from a conscious being – the consciousness of a being, and therefore the subject, while claiming that it is this subject that gives the morals their epistemic objectivity. Thus, morals would remain as epistemologically subjective as they were from the start. Proponents of this argument also claim that in an atheistic world-view, morals could not be objective or transcendent. But they are assuming that morals are transcendent in the first place, which I say is a half-truth, if this “transcendence” means “beyond physical manifestations.” They are beyond physical manifestations,

By: Alex J. Tavarez but they have totally nothing to do with the pure physical world, and instead have to do with the social world or the world of the individual to the social – this is what they address, though prescriptively. Morality is epistemologically objective, though restrained by concepts not found in the world, but articulated from the world to the ideal. Morality is epistemologically objective because it is knowledge of the object, though it is through the subject and his concepts which are not found in reality (but remain rational and logical) – for example, the concept of “ought to.” A more accurate way of describing morality would be that it’s a type of epistemic objectivity that requires “subjectful” concepts not found in the world but derived from it, and thus logical and rational. Therefore, when one speaks of morality, its truths are automatically restrained and independent of the subject beyond its need of the subject in order for the rational concepts therein to be recognized or actualized in order to address the world in this way (unlike “love” and “beauty” who are concepts not derived from reality or who make logical connections between things in ontological subject-less objective existence, but that simply references the subject’s experience). Judgment is collaboration between the subject and the object, while Truth is the result of that collaboration, and that Truth is (epistemologically) objective as long as the subject references the object and examines its parts and other relevant objects, and (epistemologically) subjective so long as the subject is referencing things in himself and examining its parts and relation to other relevant objects. Consciousness. The argument from consciousness simply states that the nonphysical mind exists, and goes on to say that a scientific explanation for consciousness’ or this mind’s origins/function cannot be provided scientifically, and that it must therefore have a “personal” explanation for mind is therefore preferable. If there is a personal explanation, it assumes theism. There are problems with this argument: the first premise assumes a mind/body dualism, which I am not sure is correct, which is merely ontological, not epistemic (in other words, the problem is one of being, rather than one of knowledge – we may already know how to explain or reduce the mind to the body [thus, mind-body problem is already epistemologically solved], but they are still two separate beings who are independent in the world [ontologically], though not in judgment [epistemologically]), thus dualism is not in any way a problem that needs an explanation or solution if it is simply an ontological truth, and it is epistemologically irrelevant as the connection can be rationally drawn. When you ask someone to explain or solve something, your already involving him in the act of judgment and in judgment both are connected through the rational act of the subject. To have ontological judgment you must judge, but purely to get to know of “in-the-world” (e.g. there is mind and body in the world – the mind acknowledges itself as existent prior to acknowledging the other or the body in the world), not “about-the-world” (e.g. body causes mind in X way, or mind corresponds body in X way [though not in the world], and therefore the body is sufficiently explanatory of

By: Alex J. Tavarez the mind). The second premise must be somehow demonstrated. The conclusion assumes that theism is the only option left, and that there must be an explanation, when theism and science may as well both fail to account for the mind-body “problem” fully. Yeah, mind is transcendent – what’s the “problem” with this?

The Argument from Degree The argument from degree states that things have properties from a greater to a lesser extent, that if an object has a property has a property to a lesser extent, there is an object holding this property to the maximally greatest extent, so there is an entity with infinite properties, hence God exists. However, comparative analysis of things can take a conceptual form, and not be comparative of things in reality, or things in-the-world. Thus, the greatest heat, or cold, for example, would be limited to the line of things which do already exist. One cannot claim something which is defined as maximally great in reality if it has not yet existed in reality – one can only describe such a thing conceptually if you are comparing it to other things in reality at the same level of conceptualization. Thus, the existence of comparatives does not require the existence of a conceptualized object holding the superlative form of a property, but merely may apply to a thing already existent. One cannot infer from a thing’s properties in comparison to others to its existence, but only vice versa. Also, even if they could, these “properties,” being able to be objects themselves at once, could be superlative on their own without having another object to hold them, and therefore, the conclusion of the argument becomes a non-sequitur.

The Argument from Desire: All Objects of Human Desire Exist The argument from desire basically states that all human desires are directed toward an already existent object, that there is a natural desire for the divine, and thus that it exists, if not in this world, in another. Again, one can desire for a conceptual thing to be truly existence, which either is derived from the world, though not existent in it, utilizes a bunch of existent things in a certain association as to create a new non-existent object, or utilizing other concepts. For example, the unicorn, though not existent, is desired, but it would be impossible for it to be desired, it is agreed, if the things the unicorn essentially comprises of were not existent in reality or derived from it or were not concepts themselves further broken down to units found in reality or derived from it.

The Witness Argument/Argument from Religious Experience The argument from religious experience has under it the presupposition that certain experiences validate or are contacts with spiritual realms of reality or spiritual realities. It states that because classical theism states that God endows humans with the power to have these religious experiences, theism is true or probable.

By: Alex J. Tavarez The problem with this argument is the first premise – we have many experiences, but to term them “religious” is already presupposing that they are somehow personal accounts of the truths of their religion. Most of these “religious experiences” can be psychologically, medically, or socially explained, and explained in many other ways – ontologically, the existence of these experiences are sufficient for their own existence and do not need any divine attribute or anything else in order to be understood. Music, I personally believe, can provide similar “religious” experiences as do some Churches. Thus, though classical theism could work as an explanation, it is not a necessary one, and one must first show God existent and having this connection to these particular experiences, not assume they are true simply because it is possible. There’s also the fact that with which religion these religious experiences correspond with, is yet not clear, and if clear, vary amongst people of different socio-religious circumstances.

The Argument of Fideism: “But You’ve Just Got to Believe! Have Faith!” As a rationalist, with empirical fervor, and an epistemological foundationalist who believes in the self-sustenance of logic, faith is a pitiful action to take when confronted with a proposition. Pragmatics is a nice position to take in terms of acting on the proposition. But no faith, nay. Faith is for the gullible. If you make a claim of the world, make sure you therefore demonstrate it of the world, otherwise you can’t say it is of the world, and therefore is no longer knowledge of the world – neither is it knowledge of the subject, as the concept of God does not reference something in the subject. It is therefore completely irrational to take such claims, for example, of God’s existence, on faith. Doing so is not, therefore, out of the Truth, but out of personal power to pretend and suspend disbelief as to the claim. Am I ever asked to have faith in the Easter Bunny, Santa Claus, Thor? Then I don’t see how it is any different to take faith that the concept of “God” corresponds to reality. Good look believing God is existent in reality while disregarding reality in relation to the claim that God exists altogether. You can’t assume X about something without at all looking at that something. You would probably understand my stance more once the Epistemology section of the site is elaborated.

Other Worthless Stupid Arguments by Theists Why is there something instead of nothing? If I summon a God as a cause for this (something), he is himself something, and thus is part of the something which you are already wondering the cause of. So by saying God is the cause, or anything for that matter, I am not really answering the question adequately. If you say he is actually part of nothing, since “no-thing” is the negation of a concept, then you are negating God’s existence – you’re saying he doesn’t exist. If you said he’s part of

By: Alex J. Tavarez nothing, thank you for agreeing! Why do you assume that nothing is default, and that something needs a mover in order to begin in the first place? How can so many people be wrong? Because people can be stupid – reference to how many people believed in the flat-earth theory, believed the sun rotated around the earth, etcetera. You cannot say anything about God, because you can only understand him if you believe! It’s not that I don’t understand him; it’s just that he doesn’t make any sense. And, if I believe in Him already, wouldn’t that break the whole point of trying to understand or find out whether he does or does not exist? You might say that you don’t need to find that out ever, but in order to already believe in him, I must find it out – otherwise, my reliance on the belief is essentially non-intellectual and therefore not knowledge or belief. Atheists are arrogant. And are also apparently on the right track. I think theists are much more arrogant, because many atheists actually say “God probably doesn’t exist,” while theists have just claimed “God exists.” I say “God probably doesn’t exist” unless it’s the Judeo-Christian God; if it’s the Judeo-Christian God, I just say “God doesn’t exist.” You are being deceived by Satan. Yes, outline your disapproval of us through another concept that has no real existence. You cannot know that God does not exist. Yes, but you can sure disbelieve He exists also! Hitler, Stalin, etcetera, were atheists. What’s your point? How can you live a good life if you’re an atheist? So you’re saying because I don’t have the cage of Jesus and the shackles of hellfire, I cannot be a good person? I think you should see a psychiatrist soon for your psychological projection. How is there meaning in life if there is no God? How is there meaning in life if there was? The meaning of life is subjective to a certain extent, and it’s “meaning” need not be an extrinsic value. Atheists don’t exist. Hmmmm…nope, I’m here. No one, even those who claim to be, is really an atheist. And you are not a theist. Subconsciously/unconsciously, you are a theist. Right, and subconsciously/unconsciously, you are a pineapple! A pine apple! It just is true that he exists. Circular reasoning: it just isn’t. Lets prove how Johnny is actually a criminal: he is.

By: Alex J. Tavarez [Cite bible scripture] You know, if I don’t believe God exists, how the hell is the source of the statement going to change it? These scriptures, specifically the Bible and Mormon scriptures have been edited like hell, and some Christian doctrine has absolutely no basis on the Bible because it ignores socio-historical contexts of the Bible, its endless editing, and poor translation. Parts of the original Bible have also been omitted – so our current Bible is some arbitrarily defined “Truth,” practices upheld in the past by the church dropped because of societal pressure, and doctrines changed due to social climate and others made to gain support. That Bible quote is out of context. Then put it in context! And then show me how that context in any way somehow changes that particular parts meaning at all. And, I do usually put things in context (usually two sentences – one before, one after, the particular text addressed; don’t raise the goalpost and tell me you need the whole friggin’ chapter – might as well buy the Bible). Usually when theists say this, they don’t offer any explanation. Oh, it’s symbolic. Usually the events that are said to be symbolic by theist somehow are also said by theists to have spiritual effects (for example, Genesis’ Adam and Eve leading to original sin, even though the story was just symbolic), when, if it is a symbol, it wouldn’t have any – only, perhaps, that which it symbolized could, especially if an actual historical event. You can’t prove God doesn’t exist! I don’t need to, and it is not what I am doing – I am simply justifying skepticism towards God’s existence (i.e. “soft” atheism) because of the lack of proof He does exist, not saying that he actually doesn’t, if you can tell the difference. You can’t prove something doesn’t existence, because you can only test it by continuously searching for it until it is found – but if it is not found, perhaps you need to search more, and if you find him, then you were wrong. Because then the search would be infinite, which makes it impossible to humanly fulfill, and because the only way the search is done, humanly, is if the theory of the thing’s non-existence is disproven by the justification of its existence. Thus, the only way the claim of non-existence can be contested is by the claimer of existence proving his claim of existence. Thus, the burden of proof is on the positive claim (in this case, the claim of existence), and the negative claim (in this case, the claim of non-existence) remains default. So, as an atheist, hard or soft, I can easily argue that the burden of proof is on the theist, and I don’t need to prove anything, simply refute arguments attempting to prove the theist’s position. Also, the Judeo-Christian God, being self-contradictory in properties, has already been disproved in existence in such a way as to be said to have been proven non-existent. Just shut up already, you dirty atheist! Dirty? Go to Church to the _________ priest in your local town with your children so he can stick his ____ in your children’s mouths in order so that they get all _________ and want to come and get it a second time. You filled in the blanks, not me! What I really meant was (you sicko): Go to Church to the holy priest in your local town with your children so he can stick his

By: Alex J. Tavarez Eucharist in your children’s mouths in order so that they get all spiritual and want to come and get it a second time.