What Really Bothers Put In

No. 20

June 10, 2007

What Really Bothers Putin? Noam Ophir Recent months have witnessed a series of threatening statements from Moscow. In February, the commander of Russian strategic missile forces said that if Poland and the Czech Republic allowed the deployment of an American anti-missile defense system on their territory, the Russian strategic missile force would be able to hit those sites. And in June, President Vladimir Putin threatened that the reaction to such a deployment might be the retargeting of nuclear missiles at European objectives, something that has not been done since the mid-1990s. What precisely do the Russians fear? In their words, the deployment of a defensive system in Eastern Europe would also enable the United States to intercept Russian missiles. The Russians claim that the balance of nuclear deterrence is what produced stability, both during the Cold War and afterward. Do the Russians truly have cause for concern about the American defensive system? To a large extent, the answer would seem to be negative. The system under consideration is meant to deal with a single missile or, at most, a limited barrage of a few missiles. It will not be capable of dealing with the hundreds of missiles that Russia is able to launch. Moreover, most of Russia’s existing missiles are equipped with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and deception means. The American system is not planned to deal with such advanced missiles. Indeed, the system has thus far repeatedly failed in tests to intercept a solitary missile with far simpler characteristics. One of the central Russian claims is that continuing American deployment of an American defensive system will produce a new nuclear arms race. To restore their deterrent, the Russians argue that they will have to acquire new missiles equipped with means to overcome the defenses. However, even the current generations of Russian missiles are already able to deal with the proposed defenses, and that is even more true of the next-generation missiles being portrayed as the direct response to planned missile defenses (notwithstanding the fact that the Russians began development on these new missiles in the mid-1990s). In fact, the real reason for the development of the new generation of missiles is not the American defensive system but rather the Russian desire to modernize its aging fleet of nuclear missiles (in 1

contrast to the Americans, who have undertaken no new development work since they began to deploy the last models in 1990). If the American defense system has little if any effect of Russia’s deterrent capabilities, why does the proposal provoke such harsh responses? The answer lies not in the nuclear realm but rather in what appears to be crude and ongoing American damage to other Russian national interests. This compounded by American actions seen in Russia as blows to Russian prestige. The admission of Eastern European state to NATO, America’s unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (which restricted the deployment of defensive systems), the overt criticism of Putin’s actions to undermine Russian democracy and the stationing of American forces in countries bordering Russia are the most blatant examples of what Russia sees as damage to its interests. What was initially presented as the temporary deployment of U.S. forces in places like Uzbekistan after the events of September 11, 2001 is not viewed by Russia as an attempt get a foothold in Russia’s sphere of influence. That is why the stationing of a few hundred American specialists in Eastern Europe, ostensibly to operate the defensive systems, is seen by Russia as “the straw that breaks the camel’s back.” Some perspective on this matter might be gained by imagining the American response to the stationing of Russian troops in Canada, Mexico or Latin America. The Russians apparently find it difficult to communicate their real distress. Criticism of American moves is seen in the West as evidence of Russian weakness or a longing for the “good old days” of the Cold War. But the issue of missile defenses provides them with a convenient and effective platform with which to seek international recognition of the need to take Russians interest into account. Missile defenses are actually an object of considerable criticism in the United States itself and in Europe. Thus, by focusing their criticism on American moves in this sphere, the Russians actually gain more legitimacy and greater understanding. Besides, just touching on the sensitive point of nuclear weapons raises the issue to the top of the agenda. Not all the Russian declarations can be dismissed as mere rhetoric. Even if their argument against missile defenses is mostly pretext, there is still a risk of escalation that neither side really desires. The Russian return to Cold War rhetoric and the responses in the United States do raise the level of tension. And ongoing tension, along with Russian counter-measures like hinting at the possibility of abandoning the INF Treaty on the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe, do have the potential to restart a real arms race. This might be forestalled if the Americans are more attentive to Russian distress. That does not mean that the U.S. needs to refrain from any action that provokes Russian objections, but it does point to the need to be aware of the impact of those actions on Russian interests and to coordinate more closely with the Russian government. However, that coordination can also take the form of a package deal. The fact that the issue of missile defenses seems so neuralgic for the Russians, even if only for propaganda purposes, can serve as a lever to persuade Russia to become more active in opposing the Iranian nuclear project. In other words, the U.S. could

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try to reach an understanding with Russia according to which American plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe could to be delayed or canceled in return for active Russian measures to prevent the nuclearization of Iran: readiness to adopt more severe sanctions, more intensive measures against Russian companies helping Iran, an unequivocal declaratory policy, etc. Given that the declared purpose of the plan to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe is to provide a response to the threat of Iranian missiles, such an AmericanRussian understanding might well remove the principal justification for that plan. INSS Insight is published through the generosity of Sari and Israel Roizman, Philadelphia

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