"weg Der Vernichtung". Minsk, September 1, 1941

www.ordnungspolizei.org MASSIMO ARICO

“WEG DER VERNICHTUNG” Minsk, September 1, 1941

Fragezeichen auf Fragenzeichen gab es, ohne daß der Berg von Schuld kleiner wurde. Was übrigblieb, müssen ganze Serien schlechter Gewissen, nicht nur schlechter Gedächtnisse sein. From an article of the Rheinische Merkur, 1963

INTRODUCTION Daumanstrasse, Schirokaja-Strasse, Masyukovshchina, Drosdy, Puschkin-Kaserne, Maly Trostenez…… As of July 1941 the names of these roads, villages and places, all located in the urban area of Minsk or in its immediate vicinity, began to appear more and more frequently in the reports issued by the units that had been tasked with securing their areas or managing their facilities: usually, regular Wehrmacht units or, even, Wacht or Landesschutzen-Bataillone or detachments of the Sichereitspolizei 1. Wikimedia – Bundesarchiv – Aerial view of Minsk, 1941

And this happened we are talking about temporary camps, compulsory work sites, POW camps, jails and extermination centers, that formed a unique concentrationary network, in which tens thousands of civilians, prisoners of war, communists and servants of the former Soviet administation had been locked up, since the days following the entrance in Minsk of the first German troops, on 28 June 1941 2. And obviously and rightfully, the Jewish ghetto soon became a part of such a repressive and destructive universe.

I. PREAMBLES The decision to estabilish the Jewish ghetto of Minsk was taken autonomously at the initiative of the local Feldkommandatur 812 (Oberstleutnant Karl Schlegelhofer), by order issued on 19 July 1941, that is, just a few weeks before the shifting of powers, in Western Belorussia including Minsk, from the Wehrmacht Military Administration, to the civil rule of the Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube (31 August). According Schlegelhofer, all the Jews still living in Minsk – about 85.000 peoples – had to move to a slum area, North-West of the town close to the old Jewish cemetery, within five days from the issuing of the order 3. At the same time, the Judenrat was established and tasked with the registration of the expected residents or, at least, those who had survived the first decimation

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of the alleged communists and “intellectuals” and of the so-called anti-German elements, carried out in the internment camp of Drosdy, towards the beginning of July 4. Consequently, whether since that moment the executions perpetrated in Minsk during the early weeks of July had had a somewhat “improvised” and uncoordinated charachter, or determined by specific conditions, well, after the establishment of the ghetto the result was obtained to concentrate a whole category of potential victims (the Jews), within the circumscribed boundaries of a real “free-fire zone”: in July 1941 the city of Minsk became the focal point (Schwehrpunkt) of the persecutory activities, selection and annihilation policies, perpetrated in Belorussia by the EGB 5, in close cooperation with the Ordnungspolizei units, kindly offered by the HSSPF Erich von dem Bach; among these there was the Polizei-Bataillon 322, two companies of which, had just entered the town. Wikimedia – Bundesarchiv – Jews in Minsk, 1941

After which, thanks to the shifting of powers to the Civil Administration, the various police bodies were able to define – once and for all – their own specific jurisdictions as far as the ideological and annihilation war was concerned: a jurisdiction that, previously and until that moment, had been shared – even efficaciously – with the Wehrmacht security units. It has been clearly ascertained in fact that, apart from rare exceptions 6, most of the genocidal actions perpetrated in Belorussia during July and August 1941 – as well as in the subsequent months – were carried out through the coordinated use of both the Sichereits- and the Ordnungspolizei units: and this happened also thanks to the direct intervention of the highest SS and Police authorities, that in in that stage were fully engaged with frequent inspections to the units. Infact, as in Bialystok and Brest Litowsk had already happened on 12 and 13 July, and as it would have occurred in Mogilev on 19 October, even in Minsk the intervention of a upper authority (Daluege in this case), had a direct relation with the subsequent implementation of a slaughter: a slaughter that, as we will see later, in no way was “justified” by any military or security logic, but conversely it followed a tout-court genocidal perspective, and that just for this reason, probably required a further outer “encouragment”. And this “encouragment” punctually arrived on 29 August , with the meeting in Minsk between the Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Kurt Daluege and the HSSPF von dem Bach, following which, the next day, an order was dispatched to Gottlieb Nagel, the commander of the Polizei-Bataillon 322, concerning the preparation of a Jewish action in the ghetto, in coordination with the SSObersturmbannführer Hans-Hermann Koch of the EGB 7: an action that – once informed the commanders of the companies 1/322 and 3/322 – was launched on 31 August 1941.

II. AUSTRIA FELIX That which was called to perpetrate the first “reduction” of the ghetto of Minsk was an Austrian battalion with German cadres, formed in Vienna-Kagran on 15 April 1941, from a threecompanies training unit, that since its entry in the Soviet territory – between 5 and 6 July 1941 – had had the opportunity to show its genocidal tendencies, carrying out the second massacre of the Jewish community of Bialystok (12 July) 8. This was the structure of the battalion in August 1941: Bataillon-Stab: Maj. Gottlieb Nagel, Adj. Oltn. Josef Uhl; 3

Kraftfahrzeugstaffel: Hptm. Frömsdorf; Nachrichtenzug; 1/322: Hptm. Reinhold Jörke; 2/322: Hptm. Sigfried Binz (since July 1941); 3/322: Oltn. Gerhard Riebel. The events that happened in the subsequent hours, retraces a well-experimented plot, with monotonous analogy. On 31 July, while the personnel of the 3/322 was engaged in the cordoning of the ghetto, the policemen of the 1/322, together with officers of the Sipo and a NSKK company, carried out a door-to-door rounding up of the Jews between 15 and 60 years, which often with lashes and sticks 9 were pushed up to a square, previously bombed – probably the inner courtyard of the prison of Minsk – where most of the women with the childrens, were soon separated from their men, and later ordered to back home: the exception was a group of 64 women that, apparently, would have been caught, within their homes, without the yellow star. After which, about 700 Jews remained under surveillance in the prison of Minsk, where they spent their last night 10. Fair use Yad Vashem Archives – www.yadvashem.org – Jews in Minsk, 1943

That same evening, coming from Bereza Kartuska, also the 2/322 arrived in Minsk, so much so that it was assigned, the following day, to reinforce the depleted ranks of the battalion, that had been weakened by an unusually high percentage of sick (79, about 16% of the total 11). According to what was verified by the Court of Friburg during the proceeding against Uhl, Riebel and Hülsemann, towards evening of August 31, the battalion Adjutant Uhl was tasked by Nagel to proceed with the organization of two firing squads, to be used the next day, to which, replying to the objections raised by the same Uhl, Nagel explained of having complied with the orders of Montua, the commander of the Polizei-Regiment “Mitte, who, in his turn, would have transmitted him a command issued from the above. Consequently, according to this logic, none of them would have been considered responsible for what would have happened in the subsequent hours 12. The following day, 1 September, after having slept in the open courtyard of the prison, many of the Jews arrested the day before begun to be loaded onto the trucks of the Kraftfahrzeugstaffel, that shuttled towards a semi marshland area, not far from the town, where previously, some common graves had been dug. At the same time, the remaining victims, to which a further group of about 200 Jews had been added 13 – probably arrested some days before, and detained in the same jail – were aligned and forced to march towards their fate. Apart from the firing squads, in waiting for them, there were also officers of the Sichereitspolizei and some officers of the Battalion-Stab, among which Nagel and Uhl, the latter expecially quite reluctant and distressed 14. As the the trucks reached the common graves – three at least and large enough to contain some hundreds of corpses – the victims were pushed in small groups, along a speciallyprepared slope of soil, up to the bottom of the trench, where the firing squad was in wait. In order to speed up the operations, the truck approached the edge of the pits in reverse, so that the victims could be unloaded directly onto the slope. The procedures were carried out 4

among shouting and confusion and especially one of the platoon leaders of the 3/322, the Oberleutnant Rasche – who was well-known for his anti Semitism – would have regularly beaten the victims with blows of the stick, in order to encourage them to enter the pits 15. At that point, the victims were ordered to lie down, face to the ground, while behind them, the firing squad pointed the rifles to neck. After which, the platoon leader gave the order of fire.

Fair use Yad Vashem Archives – www.yadvashem.org The establishment of ghetto 20.7.1941

Overall, 914 executions were perpetrated by the Polizei-Bataillon 322, the 64 women included. According to the KTB of the 3/322, the policemen of this company killed 330 of these victims, among which there were 40 women 16. All the others were obviously murdered by the 1/322. In parallel with this action, carried out by the PolizeiBataillon 322, another slaughter would have been perpetrated in the same hours in the ghetto of Minsk, or maybe some day later, by hand of the EK 8 – supported by the Feldgendarmerie and, possibly, even by Ordnungspolizei personnel attached to the kommando – with further 2.278 victims 17. Hereafter we propose the testimony of the Ltn. Friedrich Soier, former commander of the second platoon of the 3/322, released on 19 October 1965 before the Department 18 of the Austrian Ministry of Interiors, and transmitted to the ZStL, which was investigating the case 18. Rather more meaningful and credible appears, the testimony of this officer, compared to the reluctant statements released by his former German comrades: and this because since 1957, the repression of the Nazi crimes in Austria had been closed de facto, and although the statute of limitations for murder had been formally abolished in 1965, this measure did not had any practical effect. According to Soier: “First of all, all around the ghetto a line of policemen was deployed, mainly formed with personnel of the battalion. After which, details of the SD and police officers – includyng myself – entered the ghetto and ordered the Jews to leave their homes. Those who not obedyed voluntarily were obliged to leave by force. The Jews were pushed up to a square, previouly targeted by bombing [probably the inner courtyard of the prison of Minsk, A/N]. Among them there were not only men, but even women and children. I don’t remenber exactly who, was tasked with the surveillance of the Jews gathered in the square. In any case, immediately after the rounding-up, our company was uploaded onto the trucks and we were sent back to our quarters. All night long the Jews remained in the square. Then the next morning, when we returned to the square, most of the women and the children, had been already released. At that point, about 1.000 Jews had remained in wait in the square, of both sexes, but especially men. Our company had just 3 or 4 truck, so as, as much Jews as possible were loaded onto each of it, together with a few policemen: our comrades had to guard at the prisoners, and then, they were used to form the execution squads. After which, we travelled out of Minsk just for some miles, and then we arrived to an open field North of the highway. There was a slightly hilly terrain where, previously, three graves had been dug, 10 or 15 meters in lenght, 2 m in width and about 2.5 m deep. Also high officers of the SS were present at the killing field. The graves I had above mentioned, had been planned or dug by men that, clearly, were already experienced in the slaughter of large masses of victims. The trenches in fact, had a 5

side that sloped to the bottom, so that the Jews were not obliged to jump inside from the edge, but they could run along the ramp, directly towards the bottom of the pit. The trucks approached the graves in reverse, and once they were close enough to the edge, the Jews were forced to get off. In each of the pits, there were 12 policemen of the firing squad. The Jews had to run towards them in groups of 12, so that each policeman had a victim in front of him. The Jews were clothed, and then were ordered to lie down, face to the ground. In the trench in which I were, the command of fire was given by the Oltn. Rasche, who ordered: 1 – 2, Fire! Then, a unique round of bullets was shot. At a certain point, I was ordered by the Oltn. Ri. – but I cannot exclude that he was the Oltn. Rasche – to finish the wounded with a deathblow. I think this happened in three cases, when I saw the Jews that, although mortally hurt by the squad, had not been killed on the blow. Then, when Rasche was called out of the trench, I was ordered by the Oltn. Ri. to take command of the firing squad in that pit, a thing which I did, by giving twice the order of fire. Finally, Ltn. Busche arrived to replace me. Wikimedia – Bundesarchiv – The prison of Minsk

That day, 350 Jews, of both sexes, but mainly men, were killed in the three common graves in which the firing squads of our company had been committed. I would to emphasize that, during the executions, no unnecessary acts of cruelty were perpetrated. After the first group, the trucks came back to the square for taking other victims. How many time the lorries travelled back and forth, this I don’t remember, but I do not think this happened so many times. Although they were present on the killing field, none of the SS-men took part in the executions.

Hereafter we propose an excerpt of the KTB of the 3/Polizei-Bataillon 322 19. 31.8.1941 15.00 Durchfüehrung einer Judenaktion im Ghetto der Stadt Minsk. Die 9.Kompanie [3/322, A/N] übernahm die äussere Absperrung, während die 7 Kompanie [1/322, A/N], NSKK Kompanie und der SD, die durchsuchung vornahmen. Es wurden alle Juden im Alter von 15 bis 60 Jahren festgenommen. Darüber hinaus alle Jüdinnen, die nicht den vorgeschriebenen gelben Fleck and ihren Bekleidung trugen. Ingesamt wurden festgenommen und ins Polizei Gefängnis überführt: 916 Juden beiderlei Geschlechts. 1.9.1941 5.30 Durchführung der Execution der am Vortage festgenommen Juden etwa 10 km ostwärts Minsk, nördlich der Autobahn Minsk-Smolensk-Moskau. Es wurden 3 Executionskommandos gestellt. Das Kommando der 9 Kompanie [3/322 NdA] erschoss ingesamt 330 Juden (davon 40 Jüdinnen).

III. KEINE VERANTWORTUNG ZU UEBERNEHMEN As far as the judicial path of the Polizei-Bataillon 322 is concerned, a good reference work is the article written in 1986, 25 years after the facts, by Alfred Aedtner, former Kriminalhauptkommissar and member of the Sonderkommission of the ZStL, published on the weekly magazine "Der Spiegel", and to which you can refer for in-depth examination 20. Hereafter, we propose a limited summary 21. Maj. Gottlieb Nagel: 6

Born in Württemberg in 1892, volunteer of war in 1914, police service in 1920, member of the NSDAP since 1 May 1933, SS-Sturmbannführer since 1 December 1940. Commander of the Polizei-Ausbildungs-Bataillon "Wien-Kagran" since February 1941 and of the Polizei-Bataillon 322 until August 1942. Prisoner of war, he was subjected to de-nazification in 1948 and was finally dismissed from service. After the war he lived in Stuttgart. Passed away in November 1978. Oltn. Josef Uhl 22: Born at Gaggenau, Baden, in 1909. Member of the NSDAP and enrolled in the SS. Police service since 1930, police officer (Ltn.) since 1939, Adjutant of the Polizei-Ausbildungs-Bataillon "WienKagran"/Polizei-Bataillon 322 from 1940 to March 1942, after which he requested - and obtained - of being transferred to a police school. Back in service after 1946 as Personalreferent at the Ministry of Interiors of Baden, and later, chef of the Personalabteilung of the Landespolizeidirektion Südbaden. After the war he lived in Friburg. Hptm. Reinhold Jörke: Member of the NSDAP. Polizeihauptmeister since 1 May 1933. Enrolled in the SS. Commander of the 1/322. Having socialist tendencies, he had been described as "SPD-Bonzen", in a report produced by the 35 SS-Allgemeine-Standarte (Kassel) 23. Passed away some years after the war, before the beginning of the Friburg trial. Hptm. Sigfried Binz: Born in 1898. Member of the NSDAP. Against him, in Spring 1933 a proceeding was opened by the NSDAP-Kreisgericht Berlin-Spandau, for having fraudulently self-declared his militancy in the NSDAP, as "alter Kämpfer" predated to 1928. Enrolled in the SS since Autumn 1939. From July 1941, commander of the 2/33, in replacement of Hermann Lippmann. Passed away some years after the war, before the beginning of the Friburg trial. Oltn. Gerhard Riebel 24: Born in Darmstadt. Member of the Allgemeine-SS since 30 April 1933. Trasferred to the SS-VT in April 1939. Volunteer in the ordinary military service. Graduated at the SS-Junker-Schule in 1938 with the rank of SS-Obersturmfüher. Trasferred in regular service to the Schutzpolizei in 1939 at the age of 24, with the rank of Oberleutnant. Commander of the 3/322. After the war he liveed in Darmstadt and remained in police service as Steuerinspektor at Bensheim an der Bergstrasse (Darmstadt, Hesse). The Zentralestelle Ludwigsburg

The first traces about a possible involvement of the PolizeiBataillon 322 in war crime and mass murders, emerged in 1958 during the investigations of the Bavarian LKA against Erich von dem Bach, that led to the hearing, as ordinary witnesses, of several former policemen of the battalion. Consequently, in 1960 those early clues were transmitted for competence - by virtue of the residence in Stuttgart of the main suspect, namely the former battalion commander Gottlieb Nagel - to the LKA of Baden-Württemberg, that through the Sonderkommission der ZSTL (folder ZStL 202 AR-Z 52/59), requested to the Public Prosecutor of Stuttgart, the opening of the preliminary investigations, as well as the issuing of arrest warrants for Nagel and the Battalion Adjutant Uhl. Both the arrests were carried out on 6 October 1960, while further investigations followed (ZStL 202 ARZ 650/61), as soon as new witnesses (about one hundred), were summoned to the hearings. In this way, between February 1961 and February 1962, the arrests of Gehrard Riebel and Gerd Hülsemann were executed, the latter, former platoon leader of the 1/322 and still in service as 7

Polizeiobermeister at the Kreispolizeibehoerde Siegen 25. After which, even among may difficulties and reticences, in May 1962 the request for indictment was formalized to the Court of Stuttgart by the Public Prosecutor of Stuttgart, versus Nagel, Uhl, Riebel and Hülsemann. At that point however, the defence attorney of Nagel requested the intervention of the First Instance Chamber at the Court of Stuttgart (Schwurgericht), which removed the position of Nagel, because of alleged health reasons. In this way, having missed the main defendant, the whole proceeding was transferred, for competence, to the Public Prosecutor of Friburg, as this was the city of residence of the second main defendat, that is Uhl. Finally, after a new series of investigations by this prosecutor - due to retractations, amendments and gaps in the memory of the witnesses - a new request of indictment was issued in February 1963 against the three remaining defendants (LG Freiburg, 1 Ks (AK) 1/63), even though extremely weakened compared to that of Stuttgart, and requesting inexplicably mild penalities: 5 years for Rieble, 3 years for Hülsemann and acquittal for Uhl, with further reductions related to the periods of preventive detentions. Nevetheless, although scarcely significant, also these requests were rejected on 12 July 1963 by the Court of Friburg, that issued a ruling of complete acquittal, based on the questionable legal principle of the Befehlsnotstand. Analogously, in Januar 1965 even the appeal, presented by the Public Prosecutor of Friburg, was rejected with the same motivations by the Bundesgerichtshof, with the sentence BHG - 1 StT 498/63 of 14.1.1964. Wikimedia – Bundesarchiv – von dem Bach in Minsk, 1943

But the judicial path, however, was not yet over. The discovering in the archives of Prague in January 1965, of the War Diary of the PolizeiBataillon 322, with all its unquestionable contents, gave the ZStL another chance for the reopening of the proceedings, by mean of the folder ZStL 202 AR-Z 6/65, that requested to the prosecutor having jurisdiction - in this case that of Darmstadt, the city of residence of Gerhard Riebel, now risen to the role of main defendant the opening of the preliminary investigations. In 1966, with the folder LG Darmstad 2 Js 376/65, the request of Ludwigsburg was upheld by Darmstadt, that proceeded with the investigations against Riebel and other 19 policemen - who, until that moment, had been considered ordinary witnesses - and, one more time, versus Uhl, charged with three further indictment of murder. In this case the investigations lasted for about six years. Then, the ultimate word was sentenced by the Court of Darmstadt through the final verdicts dated 2 February 1972, 27 April 1972 and 2 October 1972, that based again on the Befehlsnotstand or the Putativenotstand, finally aquitted all the defendants and buried for the second time the about 10-11.000 victims 9.000 of which were Jews - assassinated by the Polizei-Bataillon 322 during its service on the Eastern front.

IV. CONSIDERATIONS

Compared to many other slaughter that already were, or would be soon perpetrated in Soviet Union, that of Minsk of 1 September 1941 was of a comparatively reduced magnitude: 914 victims, 93% of which males aged between 15 and 60 - that is, of a category potentially able to produce a menace - in addition to a small group of women, arrested because supposedly found without the Judensterne - and then guilty (of misdemeanor, btw), according to the rules of the occupiers: all of this might suggest a kind of selective slaughter, somehow based on

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expendable pretexts and, therefore, scarcely contaminated by ideological and/or racial motivations. Nevertheless, in spite of any appearance, what emerges beyond a glance just a bit less than superficial, is a real genocidal context, that produced a comparatively limited number of victims just because it had been plotted with times and tools rather reduced, and also probably because, so it has been decided, but that, not for these reasons, should be considered less than heinous or worse, in some way justified. It is worthwhile to highlight some fundamental facets. 1) First of all, the context in which, the slaughter was perpetrated, was not inci-dental, but directly connected with the presence in town of several leaders of the SS and Police (and not only): in fact, in addition to Daluege and von dem Bach, also General von Schenckendorff, the Generalkommissar Kube and the BdO "Ostland" Jedicke were present at the ceremony for the shifting of powers from the military to the civil authorities 26. And it's a given that, in summer 1941, a contemporary presence of "prominenten" in a same area - even though charachterized by different degrees of ideological approach - produced , more often than not, brutal slaughter of the Jewish population. In a certain sense, this was a way for fixing the points of no return, real "cornerstones of the genocide", around which to develop, in ways, times and with varying degrees of virulence and in coherence with the local circumstances, the subsequent stages of the annihilation. As far as the city of Minsk is concerned, it was the main Soviet town taken by the German troops until that moment, and it numbered a large Jewish community, of which it would not been so easy "to get rid" (nor, perhaps, even convenient - during that very first stage, at least), also because the potential victims were immersed within a large non-Jewish majority, partly hostile, partly doubtful and partly favourable to the new rulers. Time, as consequence, was needed to arrive to the complete annihilation, as well as pondered choices. But in any case, a signal was necessary, to anyone able to understand it. In short, time was needed for oiling the mechanism of the destruction and, possibily, for phisically filling the room of those who would have been exterminated. 2) The second point is directly connected with the first. Demonstrated as it has been demonstrated, the relation "presence of authorities/implementation of genocidal events", it remains to determine what, and to whom, the signals transmitted by the authorities were addressed. Well, we can probably state that the main recipients of the message were not the detachments that had formed the first genocidal wave - that is the Einsatzgruppen - since they had already proven to get by on their own resources, without whatsoever outer encouragement, and also, of having well-present the goals and the limits of their actions. Conversely, it is plausible that instead, it had been necessary to call, to their own responsibilities 27 all those units and structures choosen to form the second genocidal wave namely, the police troops and specific units of the Waffen-SS, as well as the local auxiliaries and some Wehrmacht security units, if necessary: in short, a large group of units well able to furnish that large mass of apprentices of the destruction, that physiologically were lacking to the Einsatzgruppen, but that instead, were indispensable for transferring the idea of the Genocide from theory to reality. With the direct intervention of the leaders, the beginning of the strategy of annihilation was therefore pointed to those would have been tasked to perpetrate it (at least until the introductions of more rational methods of destructions). And in this sense, the above mentioned relation end by becoming a real syllogism: A. the presence of authorities B. the execution of genocidal events C. the authorities gave the go-ahead with the Genocide 3) The alleged necessity to proceed with the destruction of the so-called intellectuals - often speciously considered a potential source of danger - carried out on the basis of omnipresent (?) black lists, is totally groundless in the case of the slaughter of Minsk of September 1, 1941: and this because the whole Jewish intellighenzia of Minsk had been already exterminated, as confirmed by the EM 32 of July 24, 1941 28. And even admitting a furtuitous survival of several alleged intellectuals, or subjects compromised with the former Soviet regime, well, the German auhorities could not be aware of this for sure, since they were persuaded of having done a careful investigation of the suspects (EM 21 of July 13, 1941). All of this, of course, unless they 9

had wanted to take the place of God, paraphrasing the Genesis and destroying fifthy innocents, just to find out a single culprit 29. 4) The Jewish population of Minsk could not reasonably represent, during that stage at least, any immediate and concrete menace for the occupiers. The fact that the Jewish ghetto had been already established, greatly facilitated the control over those that, rightly or wrong, could be considered potentially hostile. And although a wall was never raised around the perimeter of the ghetto, but "just" a fence and watchtowers with sentries, the fact of having all the eggs in the same baske", and what is more, well identified by unequivocal marks, erased the inconvenience of having wandering Jews scattered in the rears. Under this point of view, at least, the security problem had been solved once and for all.

V. EPITAPHS These are some significant statements of policemen, former members of the Polizei-Bataillon 322, released during the hearings before the investigators. Testimony by Gerhard Riebel to the ZStL AR-Z 52/59 30: ”Ich erinnere mich eines Besuches von "I remember an inspection of General Daluege General der Polizei Daluege bei mir im at the POW camp of Bialystok, in which I was Gefangenlager in Bialystok, bei dem ich um serving together with my front unit, and a eine Verwendung bei einem Fronttruppenteil question I made him, about the use and the nachsuchte und mit der Begrünung, dass ich tasks to which my battalion had been mit dem Einsatz und Aufgabengebiet, wie er assigned, that were in contradiction with my meinem Bataillon zugewiesen sei, mit meinem feeling of soldier. soldatischen Empfinden im Widerspruch As reply I received a rebuke, that made me stände. clear about what Daluege categorically Als Entgegnung musste ich eine Rüge in expected by all his officers and soldiers, that Empfang nehmen, dergestalt, dass mir is, the unconditioned obedience to the orders, Daluege kategorisch erklärte, dass er von to which we were bounded by the oath of seinen Offizieren und Polizeisoldaten erwartet, allegiance." dass sie die ihnen übertragenen Befehle bedingungslos ausführten, an die sie sich durch ihren Eid gebunden fühlten”. Testimony by Josef Uhl to the ZStL AR-Z 52/59 31: ”Als Beamter und Staatsdiener war ich zu "As public official and State servant, I had unbe-dingten Gehorsam und z. Treue been educated to the unconditioned gegenüber Regie-rung und Verfassung obedience towards the Governement and the erzogen. Schliesslich hatten wir alle einen Constitution. Moreover, all of us had taken the Diensteid geleistet, dar uns verpflichtete. Ich oath of allegiance. As a consequence, I could kannte demgemäss nicht anderes, als den recognize nothing else except the obedience Anordnungen und Befehlen der jeweiligen to the orders and to the authority of the Regierung zu gehorchen. Deshalb habe ich Government. That is why, I have never try to auch nicht versucht, mich um die Ausführung avoid my duty, nor, even less, to refuse the von Befehlen, insbesondere um die Mirwirkung implementation of an order, also when this beziehungsweise Anwesenheit bei implied my presence or participation to the Erschiessungen zu druecken, zu umgehen executions." oder schliesslich regelrecht zu verweigern”. Testimony by A.S. to the ZStL AR-Z 6/65 32: ”Er (Jörcke) machte uns eindringlichst darauf aufmerksam, dass die Befehle hundertprozentig und bedingungslos zu erfuellen seien, weil jede Befehlsverweigerung unnachsichtlich nach sich ziehe, dass der Mann vor das SS- und Polizeigericht gestellt werde, wo er zweifellos mit der

"He (Jörcke), has sharply drawn our attention about the fact that any order, entirely and without any objection, had to be executed and that, anyone had preferred to disobey, then, he would have been sent before the SS- und Polizeigericht and sentenced to death without any doubt.”

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Todesstrafe zu rechnen habe.” Although indicative of a rather common attitude, or maybe of mere judicial defensive strategy, also the alleged obligation to obey is nothig but misleading. Infact, the inconsistency and speciousness of these and other statements - and even of the same Befehlsnotstand - has been demontrated by Adalbert Rückerl, the director of the ZStL, in his book "NS-Verbrechen vor der Gericht", from which we learn that there is not a single documented case where a policeman has been sentenced to jail or to death for having refused to kill a Jew 33. Conversely, there are some cases of disobedience to the orders, that received nothing more an immediate verbal reaction: one in particular the resolute refusal, opposed to Jeckeln by Maj. Heinrich Hannibal, to put the Polizei-Bataillon 303 at his disposal for the slaughter of Vinnitsa, of 19 September 1941 34. At this point, everything that has been said so far, confirms to us that, regardless the magnitude, the slaughter of Minsk was a genocide, ideological and racial. Just a few hours were needed and a handful of policemen, to proceed with the murdering of 914 civilian Jews. Much more time and much more resources would have been necessary to perpetrate the genocide of the Jewish people. But that day in Minsk, on September 1, 1941, a step had been moved. The path of destruction had been traced.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aedtner, Alfred: An Ort und Stelle eschossen. Der Kriminalist Alfred Aedtner über die Massenmorde des Polizeibataillons 322. In Der Spiegel, 44/1986. Angrick, Andrej/Voigt, Martina/Ammerschubert, Silke/Klein, Peter: “Da hätte man schon ein Tagebuch führen müssen”. Das Polizeibataillon 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich der Heeresgruppe Mitte während des Sommers und Herbst 1941. Berlin, 1994. Quoted AVAK. Breitman, Richard: Official Secrets. What the Nazis planned, what the British and Americans knew. New York, 1998. Curilla, Wolfgang: Die Deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weissrussland, 1941-1944. Paderborn, 2006. Gerlach, Christian: Kalkulierte Morde: die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941-1944. Hamburg, 1999.Kohl, Paul: Der Krieg der deutschen Wehrmacht und der Polizei 1941-1944. Sowjetische Überlebende berichten. Frankfurt am Main, 1995. Klee, Ernst/Dressen, Willi/Riess, Volker: “Schöne Zeiten”. Judenmord aus der Sicht der Täter ung Gaffer. Frankfurt on Main, 1988. Klemp, Stefan: “Nicht Ermittelt”. Polizeibataillone und die Nachkriegsjustiz. Ein Handbuch. Essen, 2005. Kwiet, Konrad: From the Diary of a Killing Unit. Providence, 1993 Langerbein, Helmuth: Hitler’s death squads. The Logic of Mass Murder. College Station, 2003. Lichtenstein, Heiner: Himmlers grüne Helfer. Die Schutz- und Ordnungspolizei im “Dritten Reich”. Cologne, 1990. Longerich, Peter: Politik der Vernichtung. Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung. Munich, 1998. Mallmann, Klaus-Michael/Riess, Volker/Pyta, Wolfram: Deutscher Osten 1939 –1945. Der Weltanschauungskrieg in Photo und Texten. Stuttgart, 2003. Westermann, Edward B.: Hitler’s Police Bataillons. Einforcing Racial War in the East. Lawrence, 2005. Westberg, Lennart: Zwei Polizistenschicksale im Zweiten Weltkrieg – Befehlsverweigerung und Widerstand. In Archiv für Polizeigeschichte 3/1991.

FOOTNOTES 1

Kohl, pages 78 and 91, Gerlach, pages 506-508. 11

2

A number of camps, for POW, transit and extermination (Maly Trostenez), were or would been established in the area of Minsk: in addition to those already mentioned, there were the detention centers of Kolasstrasse and Logoisker-Strasse, the Stalag 352, the Güterbanhof and the aviation camp. 3 Gerlach, pages 523-524, Kohl, pages 246-247. 4 Towards the beginning of July, the whole male population of Minsk, aged between 15 (or 18) and 45 (or 50) had been deported to the POW camp of Drodsy, about 5 km north of the town, for being submitted to an ideological screening, during which among the Jews – both the civilians and the POWs – about 3.000 people were selected: so-called “intellectuals”, professionals and elements of alleged Communist faith, or members of the former Soviet apparatus. Epstein, pages 80-81. Then, the selected prisoners were transferred to a quarry and executed by a kommando of the EGB, of the GFP and probably, of the EG zbV (TK “Bonifer”). Curilla, pages 463-464, Gerlach, pages 507-507. See the EM 21 of 13 July 1941, in which is reported the establishing of the camp, and the clearing of 1.050 Jews, after careful investigations. Then, according to the EM 32 of 24 July, the whole Jewish intellighenzia of Minsk, had been cleared: this report was preceded (22 July), by a despatch by Nebe to the Heeresgruppe “Mitte”, according to which, in Minsk gibt es keine jüdische Intelligenz mehr. Gerlach, page 509. The camp of Drosdy was emptied within 19 July, after the transferring to West of the prisoners of war, and the freeing of most of the Belorussian civilians and the Jews that survived the selection. The remainder inmates – some thousands of civilian, including many non-Jews – were transferred to the camp of Masyukovshchina (Stalag 352). 5 Gerlach, page 549. 6 The slaughter of Bialystok of 27 June 1941, exclusively perpetrated by a police battalions, was one of these exceptions. See our previous article. 7 AVAK, page 342, Longerich, page 370. Gerlach, page 228, identifies Koch as a commander of the SK 7c (formerly, VK “Moskau”) of the EGB. Actually, it is not clear what, the role of Koch was, in July 1941: nevertheless, whether he was tasked to coordinate the action in the ghetto of Minsk, it is plausible that he was the referent at the section IV.B 4 of the Stab/EGB, or maybe an officer at the SK 7b. Manfred Ziedler, Der Minsker Kriegsverbrechen Prozess vom Januar 1946, page 228, identifies him as “an officer of a Sonderkommando of the EGB”. 8 This slaughter, that followed that of the Synagogue perpetrated on 27 June by the PolizeiBataillon 309, will be examined in a future article. 9 Curilla, page 556. LG Friburg I AK 1/63 of 12.7.1963. 10 Breitman, page 50, Curilla, page 555, Klee/Dressen/Riess, page 28, Klemp, page 291. 11 AVAK, page 342, Breitman, page 50. 12 Curilla, page 556, Langerbein, page 141. 13 Breitman, page 50. 14 Langerbein, page 141. Uhl would have urged Nagel to leave the scene of the massacre, but he was allowed only after thirty minutes had passed. LG Friburg I AK 1/63 del 12.7.1963. 15 Curilla, page 556, Langerbein, page 141. 16 Klee/Dressen/Riess, pages 28-29. KTB 3/322, 1.9.41. Curilla, page 557. 17 EM 92 of 23 Septembe 1941, page 39, Curilla, page 557, Longerich, pages 370, 683. It is not clear whether in this total of 2.278 victims, also the 914 of September 1 were enclosed: it is plausible however, that being this action been perpetrated solely by the Ordnungspolizei, the total reported in the EM 92 is the number of victims produced by the EK 8 during its own specific action. 18 In ZStL: 202 AR-Z 6/65 Bd. II, Bl. 391ff of 19.19.1965. AVAK, page 379. As far as the executions are concerned, Longerich, page 683, quotes also the testimony of another policeman, Alois Fisher, releaset to the ZStL on 27.10.1965. 19 Klee/Dressen/Riess, pages 28-29. 20 Alfred Aedtner “An Ort und Stelle erschossen”. Der Spiegel 44/1986, pages 76-99. 21 AVAK, pagg. 362-366. See also Klemp, pages 292-294, who resume the judicial aspects of Aedtner’s article. 22 About Uhl see Lichtenstein, pages 60-61. 23 AVAK, pages 353, 382. Report by 35 SS-Standarte to SS-Abschnitt XI-XVIII of 24 March 1933. 24 About Riebel see Lichtenstein, page 61. 25 After having served 4 years in Soviet captivity, after his release Hülsemann continued his police duty at the Ministry of the Interiors of Nordrhein-Westfalen. Lichtenstein, page 61. 26 Gerlach, page 568. 27 See, for example the speech of Gen.Maj. Retzlaff, IdO “Wien”, on the eve of the departure from Vienna of the Polizei-Bataillon 322 (6 June 1941): " ... daß sich jeder vom Bataillon bewußt 12

sein soll, den slawischen Völkern gegenüber als Herrenmensch aufzutreten und zu zeigen, daß er Deutscher sei". Aedtner, page 89. See also Westermann, page 2, Curilla, page 546, Kwiet, pages 78-79, Breitman, page 45. 28 See note nr. 4. 29 Genesis 18, 22-32. 30 AVAK, pag. 353. 31 AVAK, pag. 354. 32 AVAK, pag. 356. 33 Aedtner, page 85, Westermann, page 236, Kwiet, page 87. 34 Klemp, pages 54-57, Westberg, page 81, Curilla, page 935. Maj. Hannibal reached the apex of his military career with the rank of SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei, as commander of a police kampfgruppe in Eastern Prussia, in 1945. He passed away in Hamburg in 1971, at the age of 82. This article is taken from my web site www.ordnungspolizei.org All rights reserved ©.

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