Viii And Ix.docx

1.

City v. NAWASA, 107 Phil 1112

Petitioners: THE CITY OF CEBU Respondents: THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY Doctrine: the term "public works for public service" must be interpreted, following the principle of ejusdem generis, in the concept of the preceding words "provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters and promenades" — under Article 424 of the New Civil Code — which are used freely by all, without distinction. Hence, if the public works is not for such free public service, it is not within the purview of the first paragraph, but of the second paragraph of Article 424, and, consequently, patrimonial in character. A municipal water system designed to supply water to the inhabitants for profit is a corporate function of the municipality. Hence, the Osmenñ a Waterworks System, which is open to the public only upon payment of rental, is a patrimonial property of the City of Cebu, and not one for public use Facts:

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The Philippine Legislature authorized the Municipality of Cebu to incur indebtedness and issue bonds for: o providing funds for the construction of sewer and drainage facilities o to secure a sufficient supply of water and necessary buildings for primary schools o and for other purposes

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the Municipality of Cebu floated bond issue and invested part of the proceeds of the sale thereof in the construction of a waterworks system to supply water to its inhabitants o The system came to be known as the Osmenñ a Waterworks System (in honor of a Cebuano, former President Sergio Osmenñ a, Sr.) The city of Cebu then came into existence absorbing the municipality of Cebu o The Municipal Board was granted the power to maintain the waterworks for the purposes of supplying water to the inhabitants The Municipal Board of the City of Cebuú has been running and operating the Osmenñ a Waterworks System. o But later, the Public Service Commission granted the City a certificate of public convenience to operate and maintain the Osmena Waterworks System On 1955, NAWASA was created as a public corporation which shall have jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory now embraced by the Metropolitan Water District o as well as all areas now served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines including those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Sections of the Bureau of Public Works Defendant was also given the power 'to acquire, purchase, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber, and otherwise dispose of real and personal property including rights and franchises within the Philippines, as authorized by the purposes for which the Authority was created and reasonably and necessarily required for the transaction of the lawful business of the same unless otherwise provided in this Act', and to exercise the right of eminent domain for the purpose for which the Authority was created, in the manner provided for by law for condemnation proceedings by the national, provincial, and municipal governments It was also provided that 'all existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in cities, municipalities and municipal districts, including springs and other water sources, as well as the water-works and sewerage bonds, sinking funds, and all indebtedness in general of the said Metropolitan Water District, and government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems are transferred to the National Waterworks and

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Sewerage Authority, and the Board is hereby authorized and directed to receive and assume all such assets and liabilities or on behalf of the said Authority, and in turn to pledge such assets as security for the payment of waterworks and sewerage bonded debt' and that the net book value of the properties and assets of the Metropolitan Water District and of government owned waterworks and sewerage systems in cities, municipalities, or municipal districts, and other government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems shall be received by the Authority in payment for an equal value of the assets of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority  Petitioner alleges that the NAWASA Charter deprived Cebu city of its right to property without due process and filed for an action for declaratory relief o To prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), , from taking over the ownership, control, supervision, and jurisdiction over the Osmenñ a Waterworks System  NAWASA contends that Congress had the power to create the same and that the Water System was public property and therefore within the control of Congress o Granting that it was patrimonial property, there was proper compensation provided in the NAWASA Charter  LC declared the NAWASA Charter unconstitutional "in so far as it vests in defendant authority (NAWASA) ownership over the Osmenñ a Waterworks System without just compensation as required by the Constitution  Respondents contend that the waterworks involved herein is not a patrimonial property of the City of Cebu but one for public use and, therefore, falls within the control of the legislature Issue: WON the Osmena Waterworks System is a patrimonial property which the NAWASA Charter deprived the City of the Right to due process? - YES Ratio:  Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1383 (NAWASA CHARTER) provides that "the net book value of the properties and assets of the Metropolitan Water District and of government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in cities, municipalities of municipal districts, and other government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems shall be received by the Authority in payment for an equal value of the assets of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority" o All that is provided in Section 8 is that NAWASA acquires all the assets and liabilities of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the country. o It is an equal value of these unliquidated assets and liabilities that is supposed to be given to plaintiff-appellee as payment of its System. o Such, certainly, is not a compensation that satisfies the Constitutional provisions.  The flaw in appellant's contention that the System is a public works for public service is due to an apparent misapprehension that because the System serves the public in a manner of speaking, it is, but that token alone, necessarily for public service.  The contention overlooks the fact that only those of the general public who pay the required rental or charge authorized and collected by the System, do make use of the water. In other words, the System serves all who pay the charges. It is open to the public (in this sense, it is public service), but upon the payment only of a certain rental (which makes it proprietary.) Article 424 of the New Civil Code o Art. 424. Property for public use, in the province, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. o All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws

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Thus, the term "public works for public service'' must be interpreted, following the principle of ejusdem generis, in the concept of the preceding words "provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters and promenades'' which are used freely by all, without distinction. o Hence, if the public works is not for such free public service, it is not within the purview of the first paragraph, but of the second paragraph of Article 424, and, consequently, patrimonial in character. o as already held by this Court, a municipal water system designed to supply water to the inhabitants for profit is a corporate function of the municipality the transfer of ownership of the Osmenñ a Waterworks System to another governmental agency is an invalid exercise of the police power of the State, because while the power to enact laws intended to promote public order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society is inherent in every sovereign state such power is not without limitations, notable among which is the constitutional prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. No exercise of the police power can disregard the constitutional guarantees in respect to the taking of private property, due process and equal protection of the laws and it should to override the demands of natural justice Appellant also urges recognition of the right of the National Government (through the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority) to acquire the Osmenñ a Waterworks System by eminent domain o This, we find to be equally untenable, for one of the essential requisites to the lawful exercise of this right is the payment to the owner of the condemned property of just compensation to be ascertained according to law Needless to state in this respect, that it is precisely for this reason, that is, lack of provision regarding effective payment of just compensation, that Republic Act No. 1383 was declared violative of the Constitution, in the case of City of Baguio vs. National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority

Dispositive: Wherefore, and finding no reason to depart from the established jurisprudence on the matter, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered.|. 2.

Prov. Of Zambo. V. City, supra (repeated case)

Petitioners: Province of Zamboanga del Norte Respondents: City of Zamboanga, Secretary of Finance, Commission of Internal Revenue Doctrine: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. On the other hand, if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Facts: (copied old case)  Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the municipality of Zamboanga Province used to be the provincial capital of the Zamboanga province.  Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the municipality into Zamboanga City.

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CA 39 provides that buildings and properties which province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.

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The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individual by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and in 1948, RA 286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province. In 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. RA 711 approved dividing the province of Zamboanga (del Norte and del Sur). The assets and obligations of the old province were divided equitably between the two. The Auditor General apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct province of Zamboanga (Norte – 54,89% Sur – 45.61%) of the P1,294,244. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244, the total value of the lots and buildings in question, or P704, 220.05 payable by Zamboanga City. In 1959, the Executive Secretary issued a ruling that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner of the properties mentioned in CA 39 and is entitled to the price thereof payable by Zamboanga City. Cabinet resolution revoked this ruling conveying all 50 lots and buildings to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. The Secretary of Finance authorized the CIR to deduct 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for 3 quarters of fiscal year. The deductions aggregating 57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the 705,220,05 due it. However, RA 3039 amended the CA 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are transferred, FREE OF CHARGE, in favor of the City of Zamboanga. Secretary of finance ordered CIR to return to Zamboanga City the 57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. P43,030.11 of P57,373.46 has already been returned. Zamboanga del Norte assailed the constitutionality of 3039.

Issue/s:

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W/N RA 3039 is constitutional - YES

Ratio:

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The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. On the other hand, if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted. Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be

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considered public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. However, Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. The 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.

Additional Notes:  The lower courts used the Civil code classification of properties which is a general law. The SC used the Law of Municipal Corporation which is a special law. Under the Civil Code: "ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. "All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as follows: (1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030,11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter, and (2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.

3.

Noble v. City, 67 Phil 1

Petitioners: VICENTE NOBLE, Respondents:CITY OF MANILA, Doctrine: Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price. Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state and as a limitation upon private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to human progress and to the development of the general welfare of the community. Facts:

Based on a contract made on October 18, 1926, Jose Syquia constructed on a piece of land of the City of Manila, a school building, containing twenty compartments, pursuant to the specifications imposed by the city. The contract contains the following two clauses: Mr. Syquia shall lease the building to the City, after the construction thereof, for a period of not more than three years, at a monthly rental of P600, payable within the first five days of every month following. The City shall buy the building from Mr. Syquia within three years from the occupancy thereof for P46,600.lawphil.net On April 13, 1927 this contract was amended in part by the following clauses: (c) That the contractor shall lease the building to the City of Manila for a period of not more than three (3) years and for a monthly rent of not more than P30 per room: Provided, however, That the City of Manila, in turn, shall lease to the contractor for the same period of not more than three years, the land of the City on which the building is to be constructed, for the nominal price of one peso a month; and (d) That the City of Manila shall buy the school building within the said period of three (3) years according to the price stipulated in the contract: Provided, however, That, if at the end of three years, the City of Manila, for any reason, shall be unable to pay the stipulated sales price, the contract of lease of the land and of the building Annex shall be deemed extended for the same period, and so on successively. With the conformity of the city all the rights of Syquia flowing from his contract with the city, were fully transferred, first, to Sandoval, and, thereafter, to Noble. After the construction of the building, the City of Manila occupied it in accordance with the contract, paying its monthly rental of P600. Then mayor of the city, Tomas Earnshaw, proposed to Vicente Noble that, in order to comply with the rules of accounting then existing, the contract be amended in the sense that, the lease be made renewable every year, instead of every three years. The City of Manila failed to pay the stipulated rent so Vicente Noble, filed the complaint wherein he asks that the city be ordered to purchase the building for the price of P46,600, and to pay the rentals at the rate of P600 a month until the purchase of the building is effected and the price thereof paid. In this answer, the defendant City of Manila prayed that the lease of the building by the city be rescinded and set aside and that the same be expropriated. the court, ordered, that, upon the deposit of the amount of P46,000 by the defendant, the latter take immediate possession of the building for the purpose of the expropriation In a motion for reconsideration, the court rendered its decision declaring that the City of Manila has no right to expropriate the building and that it should comply with the terms of the contract of October 18, 1926, and to pay to the plaintiff, for the price of the building, the sum of P46,000, plus the rentals thereof, until the final and absolute conveyance of the building is made, with legal interest on the rentals due an unpaid. Issue: W/N the City of Manila has has the right to expropriate the building-NO Ratio: We conclude that, despite the amendment of the original contract, the obligation of the city to purchase the building was kept alive, although not necessarily within the first three years of its occupancy. The defendant itself has acknowledged this obligation, wherein it was stated that the lease was renewable from year to year until the leased building is purchased pursuant to the original contract.

The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the building, as we have interpreted it, is in force, not having been revoked by the parties or by judicial decision. This being the case, the city being bound to buy the building at an agreed price, under a valid and subsisting contract, and the plaintiff being agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as sought by the defendant, is baseless. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price. There being in the present case a valid and subsisting contract, between the owner of the building and the city, for the purchase thereof at an agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation.

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Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state and as a limitation upon private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to human progress and to the development of the general welfare of the community. In the circumstances of the present case, however, the expropriation would depart from its own purposes and turn out to be an instrument to repudiate compliance with obligations legally and validly contracted.

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It is said that the contract should be rescinded as unfair and against morals, not because it was so when it was entered into, but because after what has already been paid by way of rentals for the lease, if the sale is now made, the same would be excessively favorable to the plaintiff and prejudicial to the defendant.

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But if this state of things is the result of too much delay in effecting the purchase, this is attributable to the defendant itself, for it was up to it entirely to make the purchase at any time since the contract was entered into. As the defendant has abandoned the lease, we concur in the conclusion of the court that it is bound, under its contract with the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff, to purchase the building for P46,600 and that it is not entitled to the expropriation proceedings. This conclusion resolves the other errors assigned on his appeal. Dispositive:Wherefore, we affirm the appealed judgment, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered 4. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 Petitioners: Rafael Salas Respondents: Hon. Hilarion Jarencio and Mayor Villegas Doctrine: The subdivision of the land does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property.

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f. Issue: 1. Ratio: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

CFI Manila, as a land registration court, declared City of Manila as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 1., Block 557 containing an area of 9,689 sqm. The register of deeds issued an OCT in the name of the City. City of Manila sold portions of the land in favor Pura Villanueva, and as a consequence, the OCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued in favor of Villanueva. TCT 22547 which covers the residue of Lot 1 measuring 7490 sqm was issued in the name of Manila. The Municipal board of manila presided by Villegas adopted a resolution requesting the President of the Philippinesto considere the feasibility of declaring the property under TCT 22547 as patrimonial property for the purpose of reselling those lots to the actual occupants. The resolution was submitted to the President and to Congress.

House Bill 191 was filed in House of Rep. seeking to declare the property in question as patrimonial property, with an explanatory note saying: 1. The land is not used as a public communal property. 2. The Municipal board adopted a resolution requesting for the converting the property into a patrimonial property. The bill was sent to the senate and was passed into law (RA 4118). 1. Land is converted into disposable or alienable land. 2. Under the disposal of the Land Tenure Administration. 3. Subdivided into small lots not exceeding 120 sqm each. To implement said law, Deputy Governor Yap of Land Authority (succeeded Land Tenure Administration) addressed a letter to Villegas, furnishing him with a copy of the proposed subdivision plan for the resale of the lots. Villegas acknowledged the receipt of the subdiision plan and interposed no objection to the implementation of RA 4118. Land AUhtority requested the City Treasurer of Manila to surrender and deliver to the former the owner’s duplicate of the TCT to obtain title thereto in the name of the Land Authority. The request was granted, and a new TCT was issued in the name of Land Authority. However, due to reasons which do not appear in the record, Manila made a complete turnabout when Mayor Villegas brought an action for injunction against Land Authority from further implementing RA 4118 because it is unconstitutional. RTC rendered a decision declaring RA 4118 unconstitutional because it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process and payment of just compensation. Whether RA 4118 is valid - YES To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law must be clear and unequivocal. RA 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the constitution and the government program of land for the landless. The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its proprietary capacity. Its title should be deemed to held in trust for the state as the land constituting part of Manila was granted by the sovereign upon its creation. The City of Manila recognized the title of the state over the land when by its resolution, the municipal board, presided by Villegas requested the president to convert the land as patrimonial property. The request is a blatant recognition of the fact that the land belongs to the state and was simply granted in usufruct to the City for municipal purposes. RA 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the state and to make it available for disposition by the national government. The subdivision of the land does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents. Without costs. 5.

Luzurriaga v Dir., 24 P 203

Petitioners: Municipality of Luzurriaga Respondents: THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO Doctrine: Where a municipality has used land from time immemorial for recognized public

purposes based upon a public necessity were formerly recognized by the Government as a basis for a grant of land of land to a municipality, a grant from the State in favor of the municipality will be presumed. Facts: This case is a consolidation of proceedings numberd in land Court 5830 and 5829, to register said lands located in Barrio Bungao, municipality of Luzuriaga, Negros Oriental. While the Municipaility of Luzariaga was only organized under the laws in 1901, it had existed as a municipality under the Spanish regime from time immemorial under the name of Nueva Valencia. The parcel of land in Case no. 5829 was obtained by the municipality by exchange with Mariano Ymbo in 1907. Ymbo obtained the land by purchase for Marcino Los Banñ os and her sister, who had acquired it through inheritance from their parents. Since then, the municipality and its predecessors have occupied and administered the land as owners from almost 30 years. The land is enclosed by a barb wire fence, and is used as a municipal cemetery at present. The land involved in case No. 5830 adjoins the land in 5829. At present, the municipality public market and a cockpit are located. However, the Government opposed this and stated that said land is a land of the State and in order to show good title, it is necessary to prove that the State expressly granted it to the municipality since it does not appear that the land had ever been occupied as a public school. Also, since the land is a public square, it cannot be registered. Despite the opposition, the Land Court registered the title to the lands to the municipality of Luzuriaga. Hence, the appeal.

Respondents: Chinese Community of Manila (Comunidad de Chinos de Manila) Doctrine: Since the cemetery in the city is a public cemetery already devoted to a public use, the city cannot condemn a portion of the same for a public street. The rule is a property that has already been devoted to a public use may not be taken for another public use. (doctrine in Martin) Facts:

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Issue: Whether or not land in case 5830 should be granted to the municipality of Luzuriaga? Held: Yes. The Court ruled that since the municipality has used the land for so many years for recognized public purposes, which have for their basis a public necessity, undisturbed and unchallenged, a grant in its favor will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. We do not believe that either of these contentions is sound. The municipality having used this land for so many years for recognized public purposes, which have for their basis a public necessity, undisturbed and unchallenged, a grant in its favor will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. iWhen the municipality has used the land for the purposes spec ied from time immemorial, a grant from the state in favor of the municipality will be presumed. The land, however, to be susceptible of that presumption must have been used for recognized public purposes, based upon a public necessity in relation to which the Government was wont to grant lands to municipalities in former times in order that the municipality may rely upon a presumed grant from the State in its favor, the land concerning which the grant is to be presumed must have been used by the municipality for the ipurposes specied in said quotations, namely, to meet a public necessity, and therefore must be land which would have been originally granted by the State for such purposes. In other words, the lands susceptible of this presumption cannot be agricultural or communal lands; they must be lands which the municipality itself can be exclusively own, i.e., they must be lands used to meet a public necessity. . There is at least one other purpose which may be considered to be based upon a public necessity for which the State could have granted, and died grant, lands to the municipalities, namely, for public market. In many parts of the Islands, formerly as now, municipal markets were, and are, in a very real sense public necessities. While, from the strict standpoint of necessity, there is undoubtedly a difference between a courthouse, for example, and a municipal market, still it is one of degree rather than of kind; and where it appears, as in this case, that a public market was a necessity of the municipality, that the land has been the site of such market for time our of mind, and is still dedicated to such use, the presumption of a grant from State arises. Dispositive: We think that the decision of the court below was well founded and therefore affirm it, without special finding as the costs. 6.

City v. Chinese Comm., 40 Phil 349

Petitioners: City of Manila

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The City of Manila filed a petition in the CFI of Manila, praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, particularly the extension of Rizal Avenue. In the second paragraph of the petition, it was alleged: o That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in Binondo xxx” The Chinese Community, the defendants in the petition, answered the petition: (only pertinent parts of the Answer) o That it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes o That existing streets and roads furnished ample means of communication for the public o That the lands in question had been used by it for cemetery purposes for the Chinese people o That if the expropriation would be carried out, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, require the expenditure of a large sum of money to transfer them to new sites and create irreparable loss and injury Tambunting, another defendant, added that the land had become quasi-public property of a benevolent association, dedicated and used for the burial of the dead CFI: there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land

Issue: WoN the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation by a city - YES Ratio:

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It is not questioned that the City of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes (Charter of the City). No procedure for expropriation can be found in the City’s charter, so the procedure under Act No. 190 should be the guide. o The complaint for expropriation should state with certainty the right of condemnation. o The Act also provides that there should be trial once the court finds that the right exists, the appointment of commissioners, and appeal to the Supreme Court. City: contends that if the court shall find that the right to expropriate exists i.e. some law authorizes it to expropriate, then courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation. It cannot be denied that if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation.

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If, upon the other hand, the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, We think that the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction to make inquiry and to her proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right, some law must exist conferring the power upon it. Courts should not be limited to merely examining statutes to find out whether the municipality has the right to expropriate. Courts must not only find that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with law In the present case, there are two conditions imposed: that the land must be private and the purpose must be public. o If the court finds that neither exists, it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact. When the legislature conferred upon the courts the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions. The legislative may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature unless it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must be understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to declare that any and every purpose which the legislative might happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to be so, irrespective of the purpose in question and of its manifestly private character. The right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity, and the taking must be limited by such necessity. If the courts can inquire into the question whether a public use exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that they can examine into the question of the necessity. The record does not show conclusively that the City has definitely decided that there exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the complaint. o The Exhibits clearly indicate that the municipal board believed at one time that other land might be used for the proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the dead. o Furthermore, the cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority in an order of a Spanish Governor-General. o It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property.  If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the City must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living, and while it is a matter of public knowledge that in the process of time sepulchres may become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversed by streets and daily trod by the feet of millions of men, yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of the places of the dead should not

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be made unless and until it is fully established that there exists an eminent necessity therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchres and the places of the burial of the dead are still within the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be violated. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.

Dispositive: For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. 7.

City v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil 663

Petitioners: THE CITY OF MANILA Respondents: THE ARELLANO LAW COLLEGES, INC. Doctrine: To authorize a grantee’s condemnation of any particular land by the power of eminent domain, a necessity for the proposed uses and purposes for such taking must exist. For such foundation of eminent domain is a genuine necessity which must be of a public character. The ascertainment of such necessity must precede or accompany the taking of the land. It cannot come after. Such necessity only speaks of reasonable/practical necessity that would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience to the condemning party and property owner. Facts:

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This present action seeks to condemn the City of Manila’s purchase and expropriation of several parcels of land (Arellano College’s lands with an area of 7,270 square meters), under the power of Section 1 of RA 267, situated on Legarda Street, Manila City. This was to provide homes to a few families (i think this is what the case was about). Section 1 of RA 267, provides that cities/municipalities can contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corp, the PNB, and/or any other entity at a maximum interest rate of 8% per year for purchasing/expropriating homesites within their jurisdiction and for reselling them to their residents. o The court below ruled that such provision merely empowers cities to purchase, but not to expropriate lands for subdivision and resale.

Issue:

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Whether or not necessity exists for the expropriation of the subject land to be valid? NO, such necessity does not exist.

Ratio:

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The Court held that the court below erred. RA 267 does indeed empower cities to expropriate and purchase lands for homesites, as “expropriating” can only mean one thing. However, such expropriation is subject to jurisprudential limitations. Jurisprudence (Guido v Rural Progress Administration and Commonwealth of the Philippines v De Borja) has provided that expropriation of large states and lands that embrace a whole town or a large section of it, bears a direct relation to the public welfare. This is because of the land’s size, the number of people benefited, and the extent of social/economic reform secured by the condemnation.

o o o o 

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The land in the expropriation in question is merely ⅓ of the land sought to be taken in the Guido case and ⅔ of the land involved in the De Borja case. Arellano College is in a highly commercial part of the city. Its occupants are not bona fide tenants. The land was bought in order to become a university site.

The National Government cannot confer upon its instrumentalities authority which the National Government itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run higher than its source. o To authorize a grantee’s condemnation of any particular land by the power of eminent domain, a necessity for the proposed uses and purposes for such taking must exist. For such foundation of eminent domain is a genuine necessity which must be of a public character. The ascertainment of such necessity must precede or accompany the taking of the land. It cannot come after.  Such necessity only speaks of reasonable/practical necessity that would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience to the condemning party and property owner. In this case, the necessity for such condemnation has not been shown. o The land in question cost the owner P140,000. o The people for whose benefit the condemnation is being done are so poor that they cannot afford to meet this high price.  “Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and more suited to the occupants' needs and means, if really they only want to own their own homes, are aplenty elsewhere.” o While some people might benefit from the expropriation, the university’s development, which had 9,000 students enrolled at the time, would be sacrificed.  “Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of young men and young women for useful citizenship and for service to the government and the community, a task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake.”

Dispositive: The order of the Court of First Instance of Manila is affirmed without costs. 8.

Bishop v. Aparri, 43 Phil 835

Petitioners: Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao Respondents: Municipality of Aparri Doctrine: The general rule is that while a municipality cannot obtain title to public land by mere prescription as against the Sovereign, nevertheless, in those cases where the property has been applied to a use which might have been the legitimate basis of a Government grant under the Spanish regime, an ancient grant will not be presumed in favor of the municipality, where, where occupation and use has continued for a sufficient length of time to give rise to the presumption of a grant. This doctrine not applicable to a case like this where it affirmatively appears that the parcel in question ceased to be a part of the public domain and acquired the character of privately owned property more than a hundred years ago. Facts:

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This is an appeal brought forth by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao to reverse a judgment of the CFI of Cagayan in land registration proceeding No. 59 G.L.R.O. denying the right of the petitioner to have a parcel of land, situated in the municipality of Aparri, under their name Municipality of Aparri opposed the motion on the ground that the property belongs to the municipality since it was in its possession as owner for 20 years The trial judge sustained the opposition on the ground that according to the proof the municipality had been in adverse possession at the time this proceeding was begun for more than 10 years and therefore acquired title to the land thru prescription under section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Issue: W/N the land in question is owned by the municipality - No Ratio:  The general rule is that while a municipality cannot obtain title to public land by mere prescription as against the Sovereign, nevertheless, in those cases where the property has been applied to a use which might have been the legitimate basis of a Government grant under the Spanish regime, an ancient grant will not be presumed in favor of the municipality, where, where occupation and use has continued for a sufficient length of time to give rise to the presumption of a grant. This doctrine not applicable to a case like this where it affirmatively appears that the parcel in question ceased to be a part of the public domain and acquired the character of privately owned property more than a hundred years ago. Acquisitive prescription is undoubtedly a lawful source of title and a municipality can acquire property by that means to the same extent as any other way, as for example by purchase, donation, or the exercise of the right of eminent domain; and for all legitimate municipal purposes, municipalities can acquire and hold real and personal property to the same extent as any other person or entity known to law (Adm. Code, sec. 2165). In the case before us, the parcel in question has been continuously used as a wharf of landing place for a municipal ferry for more than the period required to confer title is vested in the municipality; and the property is held by it in the character of patrimonial estate. In this connection it is unnecessary to inquire whether the use to which this property has been put was such a use as would have justified the presumption of an ancient grant, because our decision does not proceed upon the presumption of such a grant, the question not being one between the municipality and the higher political entity, the Insular Government, but between the municipality and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao. Dispositive: From what has been said it follows that the motion to rehear is not well founded, and the same is accordingly denied. 9.

Masikip v. City, 479 SCRA 391

Petitioners: LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP Respondents: THE CITY OF PASIG, HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 165 and THE COURT OF APPEALS Doctrine: Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist. Facts:

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Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive. Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents” and subsequently filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation.

Issue: Was the City of Pasig able to establish “genuine necessity”? Ratio:

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The Court holds that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. A scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig, docketed as SCA No. 873, is ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 10. Antonio v. Geronimo, 476 SCRA 240, 348-349 Petitioners: Danilo Antonio Ambrocio et al (too many) Respondents: Hon. Isagani Geronimo (MTC judge) Doctrine: In expropriation, it must follow the requisites for it to be effective. (See ratio) Facts:

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The Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, Rizal passed a resolution authorizing Municipal Mayor Daniel Garcia to acquire through expropriation or purchase, a land situated at Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal, for public purposes/socialized housing. The land was allegedly owned by private respondent, Alexander Catolos, in which the petitioners were refusing to vacate even after demand of private respondent.Prior to the resolution, private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of demolition which the lower court granted and after partial demolition took place, private respondent filed an urgent ex parte motion seeking the full implementation of the writ of demolition which the respondent judge granted.

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A resolution for expropriation by an LGU cannot suspend the writ of execution and demolition in an ejectment case. The Sangguniang Bayan, being a local legislative body, may exercise the power to expropriate private properties, subject to the following requisites, all of which must concur: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, instead it were resolutions. An LGU cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.

An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.  An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members Dispositive: Petition is dismissed 11. Lagcao v. Labra, 440 SCRA 279, 284 Petitioners: Diosdado Lagcao, Doroteo Lagcao and Urusula Lagcao, Respondents: Judge Generosa Labra Doctrine: LGUs do not have unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain. The exercise of such power is limited by due process and equal protection and just compensation For an ordinance to be valid it (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable Facts:

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Issue: WON A RESOLUTION FOR EXPROPRIATION BY AN LGU CAN SUSPEND THE WRIT OF EXECUTION AND DEMOLITION IN AN EJECTMENT CASE. NOOOOOoooooo

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Ratio:

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In 1964 the province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu Of these was Lot 1029. In 1965 petitioners purchased lot 1029 on installment basis The province tried to annul the sale, which promoted the petitioners to sue the province for specific performance and damages On July 9, 1986, the Province of Cebu was ordered to execute final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992 the CA affirmed the decision. The province of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over the lot . A tct was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao Petitioners tried to take possession but discovered that it was occupied by squatters

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o o o

Petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings. MTCC rendered a decision ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. The RTC affirmed the decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition However, prior to the demolition order being implemented, the Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote to letters to the MTCC requesting deferment of the demolition on the ground that the city was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the request the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days During the suspension period the Sangguniang Panglungsod passed a resolution identifying Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site Ordinance 1843 was enacted authorizing the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 Lagcao filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of ordinance 1843 for being unconstitutional The trial court dismissed the complaint Upon appeal Lacao argues that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.

Issue: WON the expropriation contravenes the constitution and applicable laws? Yes

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Ratio:

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Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can only exercise it when it is expressly authorized by the legislature By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160 o SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws However, LGUs do not have unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain The exercise of such power is limited by due process and equal protection and just compensation The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioner’s property as the site of a socialized housing project. RA 7279 provides an order of priority in acquiring land for socialized house and the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority. It may only be resorted to when other modes are exhausted as well. o SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: o (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

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(b) Alienable lands of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; o (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and o (f) Privately-owned lands. o Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied). o SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. − The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied). The city did not strictly comply with sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279 Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. When Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the city was looking for a relocation site, the city instead suddenly enacted ordinance 1843. It was trickery and bad faith. For an ordinance to be valid it (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable The court summarizes the constitutional infirmity:

first, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;  second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;  third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and  fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002 decision of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 12. Jesus is Lord v. Pasig, 466 SCRA 235

o

Petitioners: Respondents: Doctrine: Facts:

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Municipality of Pasig decided to acquire 51 sqm out of the 1791 sqm property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho (Ching Cuancos) abutting ER Santos Street o Municipality needed an access road from E Santos St (a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market) to Bgy. Sto Tomas (where 60 t0 70 houses, mostly made out of light materials) were located. Road had to be at least 3m in width so that fire trucks could pass through. Also, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approve an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The Ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer. Municipality filed a complaint against Ching Cuancos for expropriation of the property under RA 7160 (LGC). o Municipality alleged that it notified the Ching Cuancos, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. A photocopy of the letter addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco was appended to the complant. o Municipality deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. o Upon motion, RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. o Nov 26 1993: Municipality caused the annotation of notice of lis pendens of the TCT of the subject lot under the name of Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation (JILCSFI) o Municipality thereafter constructed a cemented road (named Damayan Street) with a width of 3m. Ching Cuanco et al answered that they had sold the property to JILSCFI in Feb 1993. JILSCFI then moved to become a defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted. In its answerinintervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: o The plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. o The property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it. o It also filed a crossclaim against Ching Cuancos for reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated. I o In its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff (municipality) was not the real partyin-interest RTC: issued an Order in favor of plaintiff, holding that: (1) there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of RA7160, Sec. 19; and (2) that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid. CA affirmed the RTC Order. JILCSFI filed an MR, which was denied for lack of merit. In the instant petition, JILSCFI now argues that:

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Issue: 1. 2. Ratio: 1.

the law explicitly requires that a valid and definite offer be made to the owner of the property and that such offer was not accepted. In this case, there was no evidence to show that such offer has been made either to the previous owner or JILSCFI, the present owner.  the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes, notifying Lorenzo Ching Cuanco of the respondent’s intention to construct a road on its property, cannot be considered because the trial court did not admit it in evidence.  assuming that such letter is admissible in evidence, it would not prove that the offer has been made to the previous owner because mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase  the offer should be made to the proper party, that is, to the owner of the property. It noted that the records in this case show that as of February 1993, it was already the owner of the property. Assuming, therefore, that there was an offer to purchase the property, the same should have been addressed to the petitioner, as present owner  the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed since its exercise is necessarily in derogation of the right to property ownership. All the requirements of the enabling law must therefore, be strictly complied with. Compliance with such requirements cannot be presumed but must be proved by the local government exercising the power. o the local government should, likewise, comply with the requirements for an easement of rightofway; hence, the road must be established at a point least prejudicial to the owner of the property. o If the property is already devoted to or intended to be devoted to another public use, its expropriation should not be allowed For its part, municipality avers that: o the CA already squarely resolved the issues raised in this petition, and the petitioner failed to show valid and compelling reason to reverse the CA’s findings. Moreover, it is not the function of the Supreme Court to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over again o the Ching Cuancos were deemed to have admitted that an offer to purchase has been made and that they refused to accept such offer considering their failure to specifically deny such allegation in the complaint. In light of such admission, the exclusion of the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes ,therefore, is no longer significant. W/N Municipality complied with the requirement of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint (under Sec. 19 of the LGC)NO WON JILSCFI’s property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the Municipality- YES Eminent domain is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor because it is a derogation of private rights. It is the condemnor who has the burden of proving all the requisites have been complied with. 4 requisites: (1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. (2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. (3) There is

payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. (4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. The letter was not a valid and definite offer because the letter was not addressed to all registered owners and it only manifested intent, instead of a definite offer to buy, on the part of the Municipality. Notice of lis pendens and declarations in whereas clauses of an Ordinance do not constitute substantial compliance.

of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted Facts:

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The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of the property to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. The law is designed to give the owner the opportunity to sell his land w/o the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, must be made. A single bona fide offer will suffice. The offer must be made to the registered owners. As applied: a. Letter to Lorenzo— Since the pty was co-owned, the Municipality sh have made the offer to ALL the Ching Cuancos, not merely to Lorenzo. Also, the letter contained no definite offer, it merely expressed the Municipality’s intent to acquire the pty. b. Notice of lis pendens— While it deemed a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an action, there is no legal basis to claim that this constitutes substantial compliance with the requisite offer. Moreover, it was annotated long after the complaint has been filed in the RTC. c. Whereas clauses in the Ordinance—also not substantial compliance, there still has be competent evidence that indeed, there was a definite an valid offer to all co-owners. 2. We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus: It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that: . . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . for “whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.” The Court likened this to the expropriation of Felix Manalo’s birthplace. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of INC than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of party, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. Dispositive: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof. 13. Saguitan v. Mandaluyong City, 328 SCRA 137

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The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a Resolution authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan in Mandaluyong. The purpose of expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Mayor Abalos wrote Suguitan a letter offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. So, the city filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance with law. RTC denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss. RTC: issued an order allowing the City to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property. The City assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the RTC. Petitioner asserts that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of the LGC, and not by means of a mere resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that pursuant to Art 36, Rule VI of the IRR of the LGC, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the RTC.

Issue: WON the City of Mandaluyong validly expropriated the property of Saguitan through a resolution? NO. Ratio:

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Petitioners: Heirs of Alberto Saguitan Respondents: City of Mandaluyong Doctrine: (Modes of Acquisition)

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The courts have to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the LGUs in their exercise of eminent domain:

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1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit

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The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, that such power may be validly delegated to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. Please see Sec. 19 of the LGC in the notes. Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is directly exercised by the national legislature. READ DOCTRINE. In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

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We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.

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Ordinance

Resolution

It is a law.

Merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion.

General and permanent in character.

Temporary in nature.

Requires a third reading to be enacted.

Not required.

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In Municipality of Paranaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation: o Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998 decision of Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Notes: Sec. 19. LGC: A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; xxx xxx xxx 14. Province of Camarines Sur v. CA 222 SCRA 173 Petitioners: PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN Doctrine: LGUs need not secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Facts:

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The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the province, through its Governor filed two separate cases for expropriation against San Joaquin. The judge resolved the case in favor of the province and ordered it to take possession of the property. Aggrieved, San Joaquin appealed the matter and asked that: (a) the resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void and (b) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation.

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The CA held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

Issue: Whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform. NO. Ratio: MODE OF ACQUISITION USED IN THIS CASE: EXPROPRIATION  Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". o Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. o Moreover, as held in Sumulong v. Guerrero: Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare.  The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry.  It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

NO REQUIREMENT TO OBTAIN PRIOR APPROVAL FROM DAR  Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.  The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads: Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the

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reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation. The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found above cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. This is a wrong interpretation of the law. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

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The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents. 15. Moday v. CA 268 SCRA 586 Petitioners: PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN Doctrine: Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan is without authority to disapprove the resolution issued by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the municipal mayor to exercise the power of eminent domain.

Issue: Whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? YES. Ratio:

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Facts:

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The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed a resolution authorizing the municipal mayor to Initiate the petition for expropriation of a One hectare portion of a lot along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the site of Bunawan Farmers Center and other government sports facilities. In due time, the resolution was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.

The complaint was later amended to include the registered owners, Percival Moday's parents, Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party defendants. Public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property. Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial Court granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (l) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied hence, petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, but the same was dismissed by respondent appellate court. The Court of Appeals held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete. The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her July 2, 1991 Order and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and from further constructing any building on the land subject of this petition.

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The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states: o "Section 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose." What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed

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in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property. As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan. The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available properties available for the same purpose”. The accusations of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday, et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on December 8, 1993 is LIFTED. 16. Mun. Paranaque v. VM Realty, 292 SCRA 678 Petitioners: Respondents: Doctrine: Facts: Issue: Ratio: Dispositive: 17. Filstream v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 716 Petitioners: Filstream International Incorporated Respondents:CA etc. Facts:

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Filstream is an owner of adjacent parcels of Land in Manila. It filed an ejectment suit against private respondents on the grounds of termination of lease contract and non-payment of rentals. MTC ruled in favor of Filstream. RTC affirmed. CA affirmed. It became final and executory It appeared however during the pendency of ejectment proceedings, private respondents filed an annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream It was during this time that City of Manila (Mayor Lim) initiate through an ordinance the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase or other legal means. Another ordinance stated the approval of expropriation of lands owned by Filstream Said lands were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to Land Use Development program of Manila Manila filed for expropriation and Filstream filed a Motion to dismiss Meanwhile, when the ejectment suit decision became final, writ of execution was issued as a notice to vacate to private respondents. Manila moved to squash for the private respondents as it is now the present possessor of the property pursuant to the program

Issue: WON City of Manila can exercise the power of eminent domain? YES Ratio:  Despite the finality in favor of Filstream, the City of Manila ha an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction for public use as expressed in LGC  SECTION 19. Eminent Domain A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, that the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. (DOCTRINE)  The City of Manila has the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila  The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposed of urban land reform and housing in Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10 of which specifically provide as follows:  Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:  (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;  (b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

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(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

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(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (f) Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.  Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted (not proven that other modes were exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court  But the Court held that there was a violation of right to due process of Filstream because City of Manila did not comply with the requirements under section 10 based on the records Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. In G.R. 125218, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36904 dated March 18, 1996 and May 20, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 128077, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43101 dated January 28, 1997 and February 18, 1997 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Quezon City v. Ericta 122 SCRA 90 Petitioners: City Govt of QC and City Council of QC Respondents: Judge Vicente Ericta, of CFI Rizal and Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. Doctrine: The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, nor does it include the power to confiscate. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of a private cemetery for charity and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safe, or general welfare of the people.

o

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Ordinance No. 6118 “Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance, and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of QC and Providing Penalties for the Violation Thereof” o Sec. 9. At least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities…  Not enforced for several years 7 years after the enactment - QC Council passed a resolution o “RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.” QC Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino that Sec. 9 would be enforced.

QC: taking of Himlayang’s property is a valid exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use (burial ground of paupers) o QC Charter has a general welfare clause. Himlayang: taking or confiscation of property is obvious as the ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use. o General welfare clause is not available here since it refers to promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.  If an owner is deprived of his property outright under police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is summarily destroyed in order to promote general welfare.

Issue: W/N Sec. 9 is a valid exercise of police power - NO Ratio:

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Facts:

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Himlayang reacted by filing with the CFI for declaratory relief, prohibition, and mandamus with WPI to annul Sec. 9, being contrary to the Const., QC Charter, Local Autonomy Act, and Revised Admin Code. Both parties agreed to the rendition of judgment on the pleadings since the question was purely legal. o CFI: Sec. 9 - void

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QC Charter - no provision justifying the ordinance except the provision granting the power “to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised…” o The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, nor does it include the power to confiscate.  The ordinance not only confiscates, but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery as Sec. 13 provides for conviction and revocation/cancellation of permit for violation. Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. o Not involve the taking or confiscation of property, except where there is a necessity to confiscate private property to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare  Sec. 9 is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation deprives a person of his private property without due process, and more than that, without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of a private cemetery for charity and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safe, or general welfare of the people. o Ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area of a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the city.  Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. QC relied solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers, and not on any express provision of law as statutory basis. o The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Ordinance was passed after Himlayang had incorporated. o The sequestration of 6% cannot be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by Himlayang when it accepted the permit.

Dispositive: Petition is dismissed. 18. City of Angeles v. CA, 261 SCRA 90

o

Petitioners: THE CITY OF ANGELES, Hon. ANTONIO ABAD SANTOS, in his capacity as MAYOR of Angeles City, and the SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF THE CITY OF ANGELES Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Doctrine:

3.

Facts:

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Issue: 1. 2. 3. Ratio: 1.

2.

Timog Silangan Devt. Corporation donated 5% of the gross area of its medium-density subdivision in favor of City of Angeles. This donation is pursuant to PD 1216 which requires the subdivision developer to donate a portion of its subdivision to the city or municipality where it is located. This donated property is to be devoted for non-buildable open spaces (parks, playgrounds) for the benefit of the public, and outside the commerce of men. Under PD 1216, Timog Silangan is obliged to donate 7% of its property to City of Angeles since its subdivision is considered as medium-density. In the Deed of Donation, Timog Silangan imposed the condition that the city government should construct a sports complex thereon. Failure to observe this condition will cause the donor to revoke said donation and recover the donated property with its improvements thereon. City of Angeles constructed a drug rehabilitation facility instead. Timog Silangan sued for revocation of the donation. According to the City of Angeles, since the donor is mandated by law to donate a portion of its subdivision to the city or municipality concerned, it has no right to impose the condition to construct a sports complex thereon. It cannot prescribe any condition as to the use of the area donated because the use of the open spaces is already governed by PD 1216. Therefore, said condition is deemed not written.

4.

Said sports complex could only be built if Timog Silangan donated more than 7% of its gross area to the city government.  The donation is valid and subsisting, except for the condition to construct a sports complex on the donated land. The condition was considered void.  The SC ordered the demolition of the drug rehabilitation facility and to devote such property for parks, playgrounds or other recreational use. Timog Silangan and the City of Angeles are considered in pari delicto because: o Timog Silangan donated less than that required by law, and for agreeing to construct a sports complex on such non-buildable area. o City of Angeles constructed a drug rehabilitation center on such non-buildable area. Since the condition to construct a sports complex on the donated land is contrary to law, revocation of the donation and the recovery of the property cannot be done because: o There was no valid stipulation that was breached; and o The donated property was considered by PD 1216 as property beyond the commerce of men and property of public dominion.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (1) Petitioners are hereby ENJOINED perpetually from operating the drug rehabilitation center or any other such facility on the donated open space. (2) Petitioner City of Angeles is ORDERED to undertake the demolition and removal of said drug rehabilitation center within a period of three (3) months from finality of this Decision, and thereafter, to devote the said open space for public use as a park, playground or other recreational use. (3) The Amended Deed of Donation dated November 26, 1984 is hereby declared valid and subsisting, except that the stipulations or conditions therein concerning the construction of the Sports Center or Complex are hereby declared void and as if not imposed, and therefore of no force and effect. No costs.

W/N the donor can impose conditions on the said donation. - YES. W/N the condition is valid. - NO. W/N TImog Silangan revoke the donation for the breach committed by City of Angeles. NO.

SO ORDERED. 19. City v. Hon. Besana, G.R. 178967, Feb. 12, 2010 Petitioners: City of Iloilo

YES. The general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on a donation so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible. o Conditions may be imposed so long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. o The special law involved does not provide that donations made by the subdivision in favor of the city or municipality should be unconditional. NO. Timog Silangan is mandated by PD 1216 to donate 7% of its subdivision to the city government to be designated as non-buildable open spaces (for parks and playgrounds), but it donated only 5% of its area. o As there is actually a deficiency in the area donated, the whole property should be reserved for said parks and playgrounds; the sports complex cannot be constructed thereon.

Respondents: HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, Doctrine: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Facts:



After successful expropriation proceedings of a land to be used for a school site, City of Iloilo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited the amount of ₱40,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank-Iloilo Branch.

 

 

 



City of Iloilo claimed that it was entitled to the immediate possession of the Subject Property, citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1533, after it had deposited an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation. Javellana, the owner of the land, filed an Opposition to the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession arguing that: o the city already had a vast tract of land where its existing school site was located o the deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject Property’s tax valuation was grossly inadequate. A Writ of Possession was issued in the City’s favor, and the City was able to take physical possession of the properties sometime in the middle of 1985. Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the ₱40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he discovered that no such deposit was ever made. o He thus demanded his just compensation as well as interest. It bears emphasis that City of Iloilo could not present any evidence to prove that any payment was actually made to private respondent. On April 2, 2003, Javellana filed a Complaint against City of Iloilo for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages o that since he had not been compensated for the property, the City’s possession was illegal, and he was entitled to recovery of possession of his lots. o that the fair market value of the Subject Property should be reckoned from the date when the court orders the condemnation of the property, and not the date of actual taking, since petitioner’s possession of the property was questionable City of Iloilo claims that o the computation should be made as of September 18, 1981, the date when the expropriation complaint was filed o Javellana could no longer bring an action for recovery since the Subject Property was already taken for public use o He could only demand for the payment of just compensation

Issue: WHETHER City of Iloilo is liable for damages - YAS WHETHER just compensation is to be ascertained at the time of the filing of the complaint ALSO YAS Ratio: 1st Issue

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 

City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking Javellana’s property without payment of just compensation o non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lot o Javellana slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother to check with the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the City. a government agency’s prolonged occupation of private property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment. o This is based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking

2nd Issue

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just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.  Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint  When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.  Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint."  Here, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 14052 and Civil Case No. 03-27571 dated December 12, 2003, June 15, 2004, and March 9, 2005 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 is DIRECTED to immediately determine the just compensation due to private respondent Elpidio T. Javellana based on the fair market value of the Subject Property at the time Civil Case No. 14052 was filed, or on September 18, 1981 with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of filing until full payment is made. The City of Iloilo is ORDERED to pay private respondent the amount of ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED. 20. Ortega v. City of Cebu, 602 SCRA 601, 607-608 Petitioners: Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega Respondents: City of Cebu Doctrine: Government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious consideration of public policy. Facts: 1. 2.

b. b.

b.

Spouses Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Hipodromo, Cebu. ½ of the land was occupied by squatters. 1. The Spouses then filed an ejectment case against the squatters in the MTCC of Cebu. 2. The MTCC ruled in favor of the Spouses. This became final and executory. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu enacted an Ordinance. 1. Giving authority to the Mayor to expropriate ½ portion of the land which was occupied by squatters. Pursuant to the Ordinance, the City of Cebu filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain in the RTC. 1. The RTC issued an Order. 1. Declaring that [Cebu City] has the lawful right to take the property, for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just compensation ii. The RTC issued another Order. 1. Ordering the City of Cebu to pay the Spouses 31,416,000 Pesos as just compensation. ii. The RTC Orders became final and executory. [Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Withdrawal of the Case,

i.

b. b.

Contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just compensation to be paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way beyond the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. ii. The motion was denied by the [RTC]. The RTC then ordered the service of Notice of Garnishment to the Philippine Postal Bank. i. Garnishing Cebu City’s bank deposit in the Bank. Cebu City argued that the garnishment of [Cebu City’s] bank account with Philippine Postal Bank was illegal, because government funds and properties may not be seized under writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason of public policy.

2.

ii. iii.

Issue: 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.--NO. 2. Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot covered by City Ordinance No. 1519.--NO.

Ratio: 1.

b.

In re: RTCs denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings. 1. Expropriation proceedings speak of 2 stages: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. This ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation [or order of expropriation] declaring that the plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; and 2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. ii. An order by the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation. 1. As applied to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings. ii. Cebu City is adamant, however, that it should be allowed to withdraw its complaint as the just compensation fixed by the RTC is too high, and the intended expropriation of the Spouses Ortegas property is dependent on whether Cebu City would have sufficient funds to pay for the same. 1. The City is wrong. The determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative. In re: whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot i. Government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious consideration of public policy. 1. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.

iv.

The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. The proper remedy of [the Spouses Ortega] is to file a mandamus case against [CebuCity] in order to compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact an appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of [the Spouses Ortegas] claim. In Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, x x x where the Municipality of Makati enacted an ordinance appropriating certain sum of money as payment for the land the municipality expropriated, chargeable to Account No. S/A 265537154-3 deposited in PNB Buendia Branch, the Supreme Court held that the trial court has no authority to garnish the Municipalitys other bank account (Account No. S/A 263-530850-7) in order to cover the deficiency in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, even if both accounts are in the same branch of the PNB. While the Sangguniang Panglungsod of petitioner enacted Ordinance No. 1519 appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment of just compensation for the expropriated land, such ordinance cannot be considered as a source of authority for the [RTC] to garnish [Cebu Citys] bank account with Philippine Postal Bank, which was already appropriated for another purpose. [Cebu Citys] account with Philippine Postal Bank was not specifically opened for the payment of just compensation nor was it specifically appropriated by Ordinance No. 1519 for such purpose. 1. Said account, therefore, is exempt from garnishment.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 181562-63 and 181583-84 are hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 80187 and 00147 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 21. Eusebio v. Luis, 603 SCRA 576, 584 Petitioners: HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, LORNA A. BERNARDO, VICTOR ENDRIGA, and the CITY OF PASIG Respondents: JOVITO M. LUIS, LIDINILA LUIS SANTOS, ANGELITA CAGALINGAN, ROMEO M. LUIS, and VIRGINIA LUIS-BELLESTEROS Doctrine: Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lot. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation, to be determined based on the value of the property at the time of its taking. Facts: Respondents Luis, et al are the registered owners of a parcel of landin Pasig. Said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City.  note: the taking of the property was without the benefit of expropriation proceedings 2. In 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed a Resolution authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per square meter. Luis et al requested the Appraisal Committee to consider P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land. Thus, Luis et al filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damagesbefore the RTC against petitioners. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decisionin favor of Luis et al.

1. 2. 3.

It declared illegal and unjust the actions of petitioners in taking respondents’ property without the benefit of an expropriation proceedings. ordered the return of the property with payment of reasonable rentals. In case it can no longer be returned, pay the reasonable value at P5,000.00 per square meter with payment of reasonable rental for its use.  note: the just compensation was based on the price paid for properties in the same location, taken by the city government only sometime in the year 1994, even though the property was taken sometime in 1980

Issue: 1. WON the action for payment of just compensation had prescribed; --- NO 2. WON respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government in the 1980’s and, in the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just compensation to respondents be determined --- NOT entitled to regain possession (barred by estoppel) BUT still entitled to payment of just compensation and damages for the taking of the property without expropriation proceedings. Payment of just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the time of the taking in 1980s. Ratio: 1. Prescription Issue Petitioners must be disabused of their belief that respondents’ action for recovery of their property, which had been taken for public use, or to claim just compensation therefor is already barred by prescription.  Where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. 2. Possession Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lot. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.  In a previous case (Forform v PNR), the Court held that because the landowner did not act to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a very long period of time and even negotiated with the PNR as to how much it should be paid as just compensation, said landowner is deemed to have waived its right and is estopped from questioning the power of the PNR to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990’s) and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that "when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for compensation." 9 It is likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents’ property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation. 3. Amount of Compensation and how it is determined Amount determined by RTC must be strike down for being contrary to established rules and jurisprudence. The trial court should have fixed just compensation for the property at its value as of the time of taking in 1980, but there is nothing on record showing the value of the property at that time. The trial court, therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the subject land on the price paid for properties in the same location, taken by the city government only sometime in the year 1994. First: trial by commissioner

Even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the subject property.  "trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all."  although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners’ findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court’s own estimation of the property’s value only if: 1. the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them; 2. where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence; or 3. where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Second: time as to when just compensation should be fixed It is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.  Ratio: the value thereof may be enchanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions.  The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. 4. Damages In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for damages to respondents. The illegal occupation of the owner’s property for a very long period of time surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment Note however, that the award of interest renders unwarranted the grant of back rentals as extended by the courts below.  The indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with a property owner’s right to be paid legal interest on the value of the property, for if the condemnor is to pay the compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment of such compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property; and, hence, there is no basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking. 5. Mayor and officials NOT personally and severally liable There is a dearth of evidence which would show that said petitioners were already city government officials in 1980 or that they had any involvement whatsoever in the illegal taking of respondents’ property. Thus, any liability to respondents is the sole responsibility of the City of Pasig. Dispositive: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2003 is MODIFIED to read as follows: 1. The valuation of just compensation and award of back rentals made by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155 in Civil Case No. 65937 are hereby SET ASIDE. The

City of Pasig, represented by its duly-authorized officials, is DIRECTED to institute the appropriate expropriation action over the subject parcel of land within fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, for the proper determination of just compensation due to respondents, with interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. 2. The City of Pasig is ORDERED to pay respondents the amounts of ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

No costs. 22. Villanueva v. Castaneda 154 SCRA 142

Petitioners: FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO Respondents: HON. MARIANO CASTANÑ EDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga Doctrine: A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and hence cannot be the object of lease or any other contractual undertaking. Facts:

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A talipapa is found in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls. Petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. o That the disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts they had entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the original occupants were concerned o And that contracts were entered into later with them and the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in 1971 for which they saw they are paying daily fees. Respondents deny such claim and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. o That since the fees were collected daily, the leases, assuming their validity, could be terminated at will, or any day o The claimed rentals indicated that the period of the leases was from day to day A temporary restraining order was issued at petitioners’ behest.

Issue: W/N the municipality is bound by the lease contracts - NO. Ratio:

   

The original classification of the land is for a public plaza, therefore, it is public land. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. Petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Respondent Macalino, as officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor, had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando. The Court feels that it would have been far more amiable if the petitioners themselves, recognizing their own civic duty, had at the outset desisted from their original stance and withdrawn in good grace from the disputed area to permit its peaceful restoration as a

public plaza and parking place for the benefit of the whole municipality. In the words of the SC: o They owed this little sacrifice to the community in general which has suffered all these many years because of their intransigence. Regrettably, they have refused to recognize that in the truly democratic society, the interests of the few should yield to those of the greater number in deference to the principles that the welfare of the people is the supreme law and overriding purpose. We do not see any altruism here. o The traditional ties of sharing are absent here. What we find, sad to say, is a cynical disdaining of the spirit of "bayanihan," a selfish rejection of the cordial virtues of "pakikisama " and "pagbibigayan" which are the hallmarks of our people. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision dated July 19, 1982, and the order-dated August 5, 1982, are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order dated August 9, 1982, is LIFTED. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against the petitioners. 23. Espiritu v. Mun. Council, 102 Phil 886 Petitioners: VICTORIANA ESPIRITU, JORGE ROBLES, JOSEFINA DE VERA, FAUSTINO QINTIVES, LEONOR BRIONES, EVANGELINA PATACSIL, TEOFILO ANCHETA and BRIGIDA MANGONON Respondents: THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MUNICIPAL MAYOR and THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF POZORRUBIO, PANGASINAN Doctrine: The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties FACTS 1. During the last world war, the market building of the town of Pozzurobio was destroyed and so the market vendors began constructing temporary stalls and even small residences on a portion of the plaza. The Municipal treasurer collected from the stall owners fees at the rate of .25 cents/sqm per month. When the market building was rehabilitated, the stall owners refused to transfer to the market place. 2. Several civic organizations like Women's club etc asked for the removal of the stalls because the portion of the plaza occupied was supposed to be developed into a children's park. The Municipal Council of Pozzurobio issued an ordinance ordering the stall owners to remove their buildings but they refused. Stall owners filed an action for prohibition and the case eventually reached the SC. ISSUE: Are the stalls considered nuisance?-- YES RATIO: 1. The trial court found that the fee of P.25 per square meter collected by the Municipal Treasurer, was not for the rent of the portion of the public plaza occupied by the market stalls, as claimed by appellants, but rather the market stall fees charges on all market vendors in a public market; and that there was absolutely no contract or agreement between the appellants on one side and the municipality on the other, about renting of the Plaza to the former. There is reason to believe that the occupation of the plaza and the construction of temporary buildings thereon by appellants mostly for market, even residence purposes, was merely tolerated by the municipality, because of the destruction of the public market during the war, but the trouble is that appellants, even after the

rehabilitation of the old market, refused to transfer to said market place, perhaps to save the trouble and expense of transferring their buildings, or possibly to continue enjoying the benefits from the strategic position of their stalls at the plaza. There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. While in case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private individuals, as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when the emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free from encumbrances or illegal private constructions. DISPOSITIVE:In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. With costs against appellants. 24. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO Petitioners: BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC., and JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC., Respondents:THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, Doctrine:The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It considered all squatters of public land in the City of Baguio as bona-fide occupants of their respective lots. Being unquestionably a public land, no disposition thereof could be made by the City of Baguio without prior legislative authority.

In carrying out its social re-adjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Ordinance 386 is hereby rendered nullified and without force and effect. 25. Rodriguez v. City, 107 Phil 293 Petitioners: AURORA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. Respondents: CITY OF CABANATUAN Doctrine: Where a municipal council by resolution grants to the municipal mayor authority to enter into a contract of lease of certain portion of the municipal land with private individuals, on condition that the municipal council may, by ordinance, increase or decrease the rental should conditions warrant the same, the burden of proof is on the municipality to prove that the conditions warrants an, increase in rental in order that the ordinance passed by it raising the rental may have binding effect on the contract of lease. Facts:



Facts: Citizens filed with the CFI, praying that the Baguio ordinance be declared as invalid and illegal ab initio Ordinance states: All squatters be given all the necessary and needed protection... in that the lots occupied by said squatters be awarded to them by direct sale through Presidential Proclamation Issue: W/N ordinance is Valid - no

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

Ratio: The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It considered all squatters of public land in the City of Baguio as bona-fide occupants of their respective lots Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. Such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government. Squatter’s areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. In the instant case, the land occupied by the squatters are portions of watersheds, reservations, scattered portions of the public domain within the Baguio townsite. Being unquestionably a public land, no disposition thereof could be made by the City of Baguio without prior legislative authority. Nor could the enactment of the Ordinance be justified by stating that "this Ordinance is primarily designed to extend a helping hand to the numerous landless city residents



Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before the CFI of Nueva Ecija o Seeking to declare Ordinance No. 12, series of 1956, null and void on the ground that it impairs the contract of lease entered into between them covering portions of land facing the public market belonging to the City of Cabanatuan Defendant’s defense: o Said ordinance does not have the effect of impairing any contractual obligation because the contract of lease mentioned in the complaint is null and void for having been executed by the mayor in excess of his authority TC Ruling: o Held that Ordinance No. 12, insofar as it raises the rental of the portions of land covered by the contract of lease entered into between the parties, has no binding effect upon said contract for it will be a violation of a contractual obligation o Dismissed defendant's counterclaim without pronouncement as to costs Defendant took the case to the Court of Appeals o But the CA certified the case to the SC on the ground that only questions of law are involved

Antecedents:  Prior to January 4, 1950 — Lot 1511 of the Cadastral Survey of Cabanatuan belonging to the City of Cabanatuan was leased to several persons  January 4, 1950 — Aurora Rodriguez, et al., plaintiffs herein, wrote a letter to the Municipal Council of Cabanatuan requesting that the mayor be authorized to enter into a contract of lease with them o Regarding portions of said lot which were already occupied by them for a period of not exceeding 10 years

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o

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With an option to renew for a like period at the same rate per square meter they were then paying — which was P0.30 per square meter considering that the present month to month lease they have leaves them no security of tenure Acting on this request the municipal council approved Resolution No. 2 o Granting the municipal mayor the requisite authority to enter into the contract in accordance with the conditions stated in the petition o Provided that the municipal council may, by ordinance, increase or decrease the rental should conditions warrant said increase or decrease Pursuant to said resolution, the City of Cabanatuan entered into separate contracts of lease with the plaintiffs o Covering different portions of the lot wherein the lessees agreed to pay a rental at the rate of P0.30 per square meter per month o This was the rate which plaintiffs paid until April, 1956, when the Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City approved Ordinance No. 12 raising the rental from P0.01 per square meter a day to P0.03 per square meter a day Considering this ordinance violative of their contracts of lease, plaintiffs instituted the present action In the contract of lease entered into between plaintiffs and defendant, one of the stipulations agreed upon is as follows o “That the rate of rental stipulated under paragraph 2 may be increased or decreased should the Municipal Council find it advisable to effect such increase or decrease and the party of the second part is willing to pay such new rental as fixed by the Municipal Council on condition that any decrease or increase in the rate of rental shall be within fifty (50%) per cent of the present rate agreed upon.” Appellee's contention: o In view of this limitation in the rate of rental that may be decreased or increased, appellant cannot now impose a rate beyond the limit fixed, otherwise it will be violative of the contract. Appellant’s contention: o Limitation is ineffective because it is in excess of the authority conferred upon the mayor by Resolution No. 2 which provides that only the municipal council may by ordinance increase or decrease such rental if conditions should warrant, which conditions cannot be limited by the mayor TC: o Important question to determine was whether the increase in the rental in accordance with Ordinance No. 12 was warranted by the conditions then prevailing at the time it was adopted by the Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City o Under Resolution No. 2 of Cabanatuan City, the Municipal Board may by ordinance increase or decrease the rental should "conditions warrant such increase or decrease." o Under the terms of the resolution which had been accepted by the lessees, the Municipal Council may increase or decrease the rental only when the conditions warrant such increase or decrease. o The resolution does not reserve to the Municipal Board the absolute power to raise or decrease the rental at its whim and caprice.  The conditions must warrant the increase. o Municipal Council should not have the absolute power and authority to increase the rental  If it had, such reservation will be void for it leaves the fulfillment of the contract to one party

To give that authority to the Municipal Board, assuming it to be valid would subject the lessees to the mercies of the Municipal Board

Issue: W/N the increase in the rental in accordance with Ordinance No. 12 was warranted by the conditions then prevailing at the time it was adopted by the Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City Ratio:

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The Municipal Council under Resolution 2 could increase or decrease the rental during the period of the lease only when the conditions warrant. o The authority is dependent upon the fulfillment of this condition. What these conditions which would warrant the increase or decrease of the rental are, do not appear from Resolution No. 2. o But it may be presumed that the conditions which should warrant the increase of the rental would be the rise in the value of real property, increased volume of business, and such other circumstances which would show that the lease has been profitable to the lessee. In raising the rental to three times the rental agreed upon in the contract of lease in Section 2 of Ordinance No. 12, Municipal Board had acted arbitrarily. o Nothing in Ordinance No. 12 appears to show that the conditions warrant the raising of the rental as authorized in Resolution No. 2, and no evidence had been presented by the defendant that the condition warranted such increase of the rental from P0.01 per square meter a day to P0.03 per square meter a day, or three times the rental agreed upon. On the contrary, it is admitted that the lot of Samahang Magsasaka which is adjacent to Lot 1511 of the defendant City of Cabanatuan charges the same rate of P0.01 per square meter a day as is now charged to the present lessees by the defendant City of Cabanatuan. o It is true that the City of Cabanatuan charges a rental of P0.05 per square meter a day on the market lots which is on the opposite side of the street. o But this alone does not prove that the conditions warrant the raising of the rental on Lot 1511. Conditions in the market site are different from conditions existing on the lot in question even if they are on the same street.  A market is a place where people converge especially during market hours. People who go to the market would not take the trouble of crossing the street and making their purchases on the other side.  What they can purchase in the market site they would purchase there. o And moreover, the right or authority of the defendant to charge a rental on the market site is different from its authority to raise the rental under the contract of lease entered into by the plaintiffs.  The authority of the defendant to raise the rental is subject to the limitation that the condition should warrant the raise. The burden is upon the defendant to prove that the conditions warrant such a raise. o This it had not done. o On the contrary, if one is to judge from the rental charged by the Samahang Magsasaka, the conditions did not warrant the raising of the rental. Even if we give emphasis to Resolution No. 2 which served as the basis of the authority exercised by the Mayor of Cabanatuan in entering into said contract as appellant wants to have it, we would find that the increase in the rental embodied in Ordinance No. 12 would still appear arbitrary. o As the trial court said, defendant has not adduced any proof justifying the increase of the rental by 300%.

o o o o

Note that said resolution expressly provides that the municipal council may authorize the increase only when existing conditions would warrant. The exercise of such authority is therefore predicated upon a condition which in this case was not complied with. This being a matter which is evidentiary in character, we are not now justified in disturbing the appreciation of the situation made by the trial court for failure of appellant to adduce the necessary evidence. We are therefore persuaded to affirm, as we hereby do, the decision of the trial court.

Dispositive: Wherefore, the decision is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. 26. Cebu v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 Petitioners: CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., Respondents: HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES and JOSE L. ESPELETA Doctrine: Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

Petitioners: CEFERINO ESTEBAN, GERONIMO CASTRO, ANDREA G. GALINDEZ, MARIA B. RONQUILLO, ISABEL ALEJO, ANACLETO MARANAN, FELIPE GARCIA, ELEONOR P. VELAYO, HERMOGENES G. DOMINGO, ALICIA GUZMAN, RITA EVANGELISTA, MARTA BAYAN, PABLO NICOLAS, AMBROSIO TIONGSON, FEDERICO AGUSTIN, CELESTINA DE GUZMAN, VICENTE MENDOZA, ROSALINDA SANTIAGO, MARIA MARANAN, and OTHERS Respondents: CITY OF CABANATUAN Doctrine: When a municipal corporation fixes the fees for the use of its properties, such as public markets, it does not assert governmental authority, or wield the police power or the power of taxation. It exercises merely a proprietary function, and, like any private owner, it is, in the absence of any constitutional or statutory limitation, free to charge such sums as it may deem best, regardless of the reasonableness of the amount fixed, for the prospective lessees are free to enter into the corresponding contract of lease, if they are agreeable to its terms, or, otherwise, not to enter into such contract. Facts:

Facts:

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Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title. 27. Esteban v. City, 108 Phil 374

On December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2755, authorized the Acting City Mayor to sell the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. The lot was awarded to Cebu Oxygen being the highest bidder. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, Cebu Oxygen processed the registration of the land. In 1974, however, the assistant provincial fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered, being a public road intended for public use, is considered part of the public dominion and therefore outside the commerce of man.

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Issue: WON a declared abandoned road may be the object of a common contract? Yes.

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Ratio:

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From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed, this court said: o So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. The Revised Charter of Cebu empowers it to close any city road, street or alley. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. Since the portion of the city street subject of petitioner’s application of registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

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Nineteen (19) plaintiffs who are holders of stalls in the market site of the City of Cabanatuan, claiming to act on their behalf and that of other stallholders belonging to their class, prayed the CFI of Nueva Ecija to "enjoin the City of Cabanatuan and all its high officials from enforcing, or acting on, Ordinance No. 12, series of 1956, pending this lawsuit; to allow the plaintiffs to continue paying the defendant their rentals at the old or usual rates; to declare said ordinance null and void for being ultra vires and unconstitutional. The City of Cabanatuan is the owner of a block located in the heart of the City used as a market site. It is bounded by Paco Roman, Melencio, and Sanciangco Streets and Burgos Avenue. This is leased to stallholders by the City. For several years prior to the approval of Ordinance No. 12 by the Municipal Board of the City of Cabanatuan, plaintiffs had been occupying as lessees, stalls on Melencio and Sanciangco streets. On March 21, 1956, the Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City passed and approved Ordinance No. 12, series of 1956, raising the rentals. The validity of this ordinance is challenged by the plaintiffs as unreasonable and confiscatory and, therefore, null and void.

Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 12 is valid? - YES Ratio:

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Plaintiffs contest the legality of the ordinance in question upon the ground that the rates therein fixed are unreasonable. This claim is, in turn, predicated upon the theory that a municipal ordinance, to be valid, "must relate to a subject within the scope of the corporation; it must be in harmony with the constitution, the laws and treaties of the state, the municipal charter and the general principles of common law and equity, it must be reasonable in its terms; and it must be enacted in good faith, in the public interest alone.” The foregoing statement must be qualified. It is, more or less, an expression of the rule governing the validity of municipal ordinance enacted in the exercise of the police power, under which most, but not all, ordinances as well as laws, fall.

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Certain exactions, imposable under an authority other than police power, are not subject, however, to qualification as to the amount chargeable, unless the Constitution or the pertinent laws provide otherwise. For instance, the rates of taxes, whether national or municipal, need not be reasonable, in the absence of such constitutional or statutory limitation. Similarly, when a municipal corporation fixes the fees for the use of its properties, such as public markets, it does not wield the police power, or even the power of taxation. Neither does it assert governmental authority. It exercises merely a proprietary function. And, like any private owner, it is - in the absence of the aforementioned limitation, which does not exist in the Charter of Cabanatuan City — free to charge such sums as it may deem best, regardless of the reasonableness of the amount fixed, for the prospective lessees are free to enter into the corresponding contract of lease, if they are agreeable to the terms thereof, or, otherwise, not enter into such contract.

Dispositive: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiffsappellants. It is so ordered. 28. Ros v. DAR 468 SCRA 471, 483-484 Petitioners:JOSE LUIS ROS, ANDONI F. ABOITIZ, XAVIER ABOITIZ, ROBERTO E. ABOITIZ, ENRIQUE ABOITIZ, MATTHIAS G. MENDEZONA, CEBU INDUSTRIAL PARK DEVELOPERS, INC. and FBM ABOITIZ MARINE, INC. Respondents: Doctrine:The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657. Facts:

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Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. On 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved Balambans land use plan and adopted en toto Balambans Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of Resolution No. 836-95 and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively. As part of their preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government certifications. Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a letter from Mr.Llames, Director of DAR Regional Office, informing him that the DAR was disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and desist from further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil and criminal liabilities. Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the RTC for Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, RTC, ruled that it is the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.

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CA affirmed the dismissal of RTC.

Issue: (a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (the LGC) has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR; XXX (c & d)(third and fourth issues which may be summed up into) whether or not an injunction is the appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining petitioners in developing the subject land Ratio: FIRST ISSUE :  After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion.  Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance No. 101 of Balamban, Cebu, which reclassified the subject lands, was passed on 25 March 1992, and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu, which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April 1995, long after Rep. Act No. 6657 has taken effect. Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:  SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. XXXX  (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.  The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657.  It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. THIRD AND FORTH ISSUE: NO SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program. Dispositive:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666 dated 02 December 1997 affirming the order dated 12 August 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T590 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

29. Pasong Bayabas v. CA 429 SCRA 109 Petitioners: PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents: Court of Appeals Doctrine: The municipality is empowered to issue zoning classification of land pursuant to its exercise of police power, as granted by the LGC. Facts:

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Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land in Carmona, Cavite Title was issued to and in the name of LDC’s successor, Credito Asiatic Incorporated (CAI) LDC/CAI developed 75 hectares of the property into residential and industrial estate, where industrial and low cost housing project called the Tamanli Housing Project would be established. LDC applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona for an ordinance approving the zoning and subdivision of the property. The subdivision plan was referred to the National Planning Commission, as mandated by Administrative Order No. 152. This was approved. CAI embarked on the development of the housing project in three phases.

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The project was registered with the National Housing Authority (NHA) The Property was subdivided into 728 residential lots. Separate title was issued for each. Although the Municipal Council of Carmona already approved the conversion of the property into a residential area, CAI still filed an application with the Office of the Minister of Agrarian Reform or the conversion of the property from Agricultural to residential. The application was granted In 1987, CAI decided to continue with the development of its project but this was stymied by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer or TRO and Injunction. In that case, the plaintiffs, claiming to be actual tillers of the land, alleged that they had previously reached an agreements with the respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession of their farmholdings in exchange of rental fee of P400 a year per hectare. However, notwithstanding such, the defendant ordered the bulldozing of the property In an answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess and cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement which eventually led to all of the other plaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI. They executed quitclaims and waivers over the portions of the property. With this settlement, CAI continued its development of the rest of the Hakone Housing Project. However, CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed before the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they are farmers who have occupied a parcel of public agricultural land adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River. They request DAR to order an official survey the aforesaid agricultural land Pending the request, petitioners and 20 others banded and formed a group called Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association (PBFAI) The president of PBFAI filed a petition for compulsory coverage of the portion of the CAI Project under CARL Pending the resolution of the PBFAI petition, CAI decided to continue again with its project.

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The survey (Petition by PBFAI) was completed on Oct. 9, 1995 but CAI caused the bulldozing and other development activities on Oct 14 and 15 that resulted in the destruction of plants and trees. PBFAI then filed a complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) The Provincial Adjudicator issued a TRO. In its answer, CAI denied the claims of the plaintiffs and averred that it never consented to the cultivation of the property nor to the erection of plaintiffs’ houses For their part, plaintiffs said the conversion earlier secured was made prior to the enactment of CARL. But upon the passage of the said law, the reclassification of agricultural land included the subject property and that the Agrarian Reform Minister did not have the authority to exempt the property from the coverage of the law After due hearing, PARAD resolved the case in favor of CAI on the ground that the present case was barred by res judicata. However, PARAD said it had no jurisdiction to decide whether the property was covered by CARL or not. While the case was on appeal, several members of PBFAI executed quitclaims in favor of CAI. Notwithstanding this development, DARAB reversed the PARAD decision declaring the subject property covered by CARL. On appeal, the CA reversed the DARAB decision saying the land was exempted because it had 18% slope and that the Municipality of Carmona already reclassified the lad as residential.

Issue: is the subject property covered by CARL? – NO. Ratio:  Long before the CARL took effect, the property has already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land.  In issuing a location clearance, a development permit, a certificate of inspection over the housing project, and a license to sell the subdivision lots in favor of LDC/CAI pursuant to its charter, the HSRC, now HLURB, approved and confirmed the reclassification and conversion of the land made by the Municipal Council of Carmona and Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella.  As ruled in Natalia Realty vs DAR, the municipality is empowered to issue zoning classification of land in an exercise of its police power  The failure of CAI to complete the housing project before the set date, even if true, did not have the effect of reverting the property as agricultural land Dispositive: IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The complaint of the petitioner PBFAI in DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 is DISMISSED. The counterclaim of the private respondent for damages in DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 is, likewise, DISMISSED. The thirty-seven (37) members of the petitioner PBFAI and all those occupying the property subject of the complaint in DARAB Case No. CA-0285-95 in their behalf are ORDERED to vacate the landholding. 30. Fortich v. Corona, 298 SCRA 678 Petitioners: HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Respondents: HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Doctrine: BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmerbeneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers. Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory. Facts:

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Issue: 1. 2. 3.

This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by respondents and the applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of the April 24, 1998 Decision nullifying the so-called "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President and denying the applicants' Motion For Leave To Intervene. The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same office as final and executory in its Order dated June 23, 1997 after the respondents DAR's motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied in the same order for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. In their instant motion, the respondents contend that o the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997 "is not a void resolution as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling," hence, "(t)he March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President could not as yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification." o DAR's failure to file on time the motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was "excusable:" o "The manner of service of the copy of the March 29, 1996 decision also made it impossible for DAR to file its motion for reconsideration on time. The copy was received by the Records Section of the DAR, then referred to the Office of the Secretary and then to the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance. By the time it was forwarded to the litigation office of the DAR, the period to file the motion for reconsideration had already lapsed. The respondents further stressed that OP should have resolved "the (DAR's) motion for reconsideration on the merits in the interest of substantial justice," instead of simply denying the same for having been filed late, adding that "technicalities and procedural lapses" should be "subordinated to the established merits of the case." The movants complain that the case was decided by us on the basis of a "technicality," and, this has been the rallying cry of some newspaper columnists who insists that we resolve this case not on mere "technical" grounds. WON the “win-win” resolution has become final--YES WON the OP should have resolved DAR’s motion for reconsideration on the merits in the interest of substantial justice--YES but respondents have not shown a justifiable relaxation of the rules WON the case should be decided on the basis of technical grounds or substantial grounds--SUBSTANTIAL

Ratio: 1.

The said denial of the DAR's motion for reconsideration was in accordance with Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, which mandates that "decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period."  The late filing by the DAR of its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is not excusable.  The respondents' explanation that the DAR's office procedure after receiving the copy of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision "made it impossible for DAR to file its motion for reconsideration on time" since the said decision had to be referred to the different departments of the DAR, cannot be considered a valid justification. There is nothing wrong with referring the decision to the departments concerned for the preparation of the motion for reconsideration, but in doing so, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. o In other words, the DAR must develop a system of procedure that would enable it to comply with the reglementary period for filing said motion. o The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body. 2. Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice.  While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.  In the instant case, we cannot grant respondents the relief prayed for since they have not shown a justifiable for a relaxation of the rules. As we have discussed earlier, the DAR/s late filing of its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was not justified. 3. A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.  In the instant case, several fatal violations of the law were committed, namely: (1) the DAR filed its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision way beyond reglementary period; (2) after the said motion for reconsideration was denied for having been filed late, the March 29, 1996 Decision was declared final and executory, but the DAR still filed a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by the rules; (3) despite this, the second motion for reconsideration was entertained by herein respondent, then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, and on the basis thereof, issued the "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, substantially modifying the March 29, 1996 Decision which had long become final and executory; and (4) the reopening of the same case through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "winwin" resolution was in flagrant infringement of the doctrine of res judicata.  These grave breaches of the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.

Issue: WON DAR AO 01-02, as amended violates the local autonomy of local government units? - NO Whether the DAR Secretary gravely abused his discretion in issuing the various administrative orders. NO. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998 Decision of this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are hereby DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED. 31. Chamber v. Secretary 621 SCRA 295, 309

Ratio:

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 Petitioners: CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) Respondents: THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM Doctrine: The act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for nonagricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes. Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.

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Facts:

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The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 07-97 entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. On March 1999, DAR Secretary issued a Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses, it covers the following: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses. The DAR Secretary issued more administrative orders namely: DAR AO No. 01-02 entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. It covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use. Further amendments particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities were also made. Memorandum No. 88 was also issued in which it temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. The petitioner contends that the said AOs requiring a conversion process caused an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

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The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June 1988 is specious. The DAR’s express power over land use conversion provided for under Section 65 of RA. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are the only instances that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in RA 6657 which every landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. It should logically follow, therefore, from the said department’s express duty and function to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by the DAR. A mere reclassification of lands does not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes. DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands. It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still undergo conversion process. The act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes. For reclassified agricultural lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose to which they are intended there is still a need to change the current use thereof through the process of conversion. The authority to do so is vested in the DAR, which is mandated to preserve and maintain agricultural lands with increased productivity. Thus, notwithstanding the reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses, they must still undergo conversion before they can be used for other purposes. Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of

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Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.

Gregorio died. Virgilio and Hilaria administered the agricultural land. They sold it to Dr. Deleste for P16k. It was notarized and registered. A new tax declaration was issued in the name of Dr. Deleste. Dr. Deleste also paid for the tax arrears.

It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. Based on jurisprudence,only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to such use without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the CARP. More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Hence, they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority of the DAR. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion.

When Hilaria (wife) died, Gregorio’s brother, Juan, was appointed as special administrator of the estate. Noel subsequently replaced Juan

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

32. Heirs v. Land Bank G.R. No. 169913 June 8, 2011 Petitioners: HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE, namely: JOSEFA DELESTE, JOSE RAY DELESTE, RAUL HECTOR DELESTE, and RUBEN ALEX DELESTE Respondents: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), as represented by its Manager, LAND VALUATION OFFICE OF LBP COTABATO CITY; THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR REGION 12 OF COTABATO CITY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGION X CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, represented by MCMILLAN LUCMAN, in his capacity as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of DAR Lanao del Norte; LIZA BALBERONA, in her capacity as DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO); REYNALDO BAGUIO, in his capacity as the Register of Deeds of Iligan City as nominal party; the emancipation patent holders: FELIPE D. MANREAL, CUSTUDIO M. RICO, HEIRS OF DOMINGO V. RICO, HEIRS OF ABDON T. MANREAL, MACARIO M. VELORIA, ALICIA B. MANREAL, PABLO RICO, SALVACION MANREAL, HEIRS OF TRANQUILIANA MANREAL, HEIRS OF ANGELA VELORIA, HEIRS OF NECIFURO CABALUNA, HEIRS OF CLEMENTE RICO, HEIRS OF MANTILLANO OBISO, HEIRS OF HERCULANO BALORIO, and TITO BALER Doctrine: Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code provides that municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations; local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands, and is not subject to DAR approval Facts: Sps. Nanaman owned a parcel of agricultural land. Sps. Nanaman were childless, but Gregorio (husband) had a son named Virgilio. Virgilio was raised by the couple. Gregorio also had two other daughters, Esperanza and Caridad.

Noel filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of the title over the property. The SC eventually ruled that the property was part of the conjugal property of the Spouses and Hilaria could only sell her share in the property to Deleste. Thus, Deleste and the estate of Gregorio were held as coowners. When such case was pending, PD 27 was issued for Land Reform. The property became subject of such, however, only the Heirs of Gregorio were identified as landowners. Only they received the notices and processes relative to the coverage. The City of Iligan passed a Zoning Ordinance reclassifying the subject property as commercial or residential. DAR issued the Certificates of Land Transfer in favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the land. The Certificates were later on registered The City of Iligan filed a complaint with the RTC for the expropriation of a portion of the subject property. It was granted. Since the real owner of the expropriated portion is undetermined because it has not yet been partitioned, the just compensation therefor was deposited with DPB. The Heirs of Deleste filed with DARAB a petition seeking to nullify the emancipation patents of the private respondent. PARAD ruled in favor of the Hers of Deleste, because they were denied of due process. However, this was reversed by the DARAB. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of DARAB. Issue: WoN the Zoning Ordinance took out the property from the coverage of PD27 - YES. Ratio: Local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands, as provided by RA 2264. City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. There was no need for HLURB approval because HLURB did not exist at the time the Ordinance was passed. HLURB’s predecessor was not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. Local governments were required to submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for review and ratification. In this case, by the Minister of Human Settlements. Since at the time of effectivity of RA 6657, the subject property is not agricultural, it is beyond the ambit of CARP. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs October 28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents. 33. Villegas v. Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 Petitioners: MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS Respondents: HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA Doctrine: An ordinance of a municipality that fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action and expresses no purpose to be attained with the effect of conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity that is per se lawful Facts:

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The Municipal board of Manila passed Ordinance no. 6537 which was signed by Mayor Villegas. The ordinance prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 EXCEPT persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Any violation of the ordinance will be punished by imprisonment or fine. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, an employee in Manila, filed a petition with the CFI of Manila for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order and to declare the ordinance as null and void. He claims that: 1. As a revenue measure- the ordinance is discriminatory and in violation of uniformity of taxation. 2. As a police power measure- it makes no distinction as to useful and non-useful occupation and that the 50.00 fee for the permit is out of proportion to the cost of registration. Moreover, the ordinance does not provide any standard to guide/limit the action of the mayor 3. It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable as it only applies to aliens resulting to a deprivation their life, liberty and property in violation of due process and equal protection of the law. The RTC held that the ordinance was null and void. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON the ordinance is void? Yes Held:

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The ordinance is actually a revenue measure. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. Thus, It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. The requirement of a fee of 50.00 is unreasonable as it is charged to all. It does not consider valid substantial differences in the situation of the aliens required to pay it. It does not take into account whether the employee is casual or permanent, part time or full time or a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Although the equal protection clause

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allows classification, such classification must be based on real and substantial differences with a reasonable relation to the subject matter of the legislation. The ordinance conferred an arbitrary or unrestricted power to the Mayor as it did not give any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in his discretion. To require a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. Even if the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Dispositive: aWHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby armed, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED 34. The Learning Child Inc, et al. v. Ayala Alabang G.R. 134269 Petitioners: THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO Respondents: AYALA ALABANG VILLAGEASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA, MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC Doctrine: Contracts Clause; Limitations on the use of land imposed by contract yield to reasonable exercise of police power and, hence, zoning ordinances are superior to contractual restrictions on the use of property. SUMMARY: The case is 3 consolidated petitions for review on certiorari concerning the operation of The Learning Child, a preparatory AND grade school located in Ayala Alabang Village. AAVA filed an injunction case against TLC and the spouses Alfonso for violating the Deed of Restrictions which limits the use of the lot to a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school. The Supreme Court held that AAVA’s and ALI’s insistence on (1) the enforcement of the Deed of Restriction or (2) the obtainment of the approval of the affected residents for any modification of the Deed of Restrictions is reasonable absent any interest or zoning purpose asserted by the Municipality contrary to that of the subdivision developer in declaring the subject property as institutional Deed of Restrictions

Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance No. 81-01

Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39

Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94179

“USE AND OCCUPANCY – The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles.”

Classified Ayala Alabang Village for zoning purposes as a low-density residential area, thereby limiting the use of the subject property to the establishment or operation of a nursery and kindergarten school, which should not exceed two classrooms.

Reclassified the subject property as “institutional”

Corrected a typographical error in the description of a parcel of land under the heading “Institutional Zone” in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39 , adjusting the description “Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang” to “Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang”

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Issue: 1. 2. 3.

Facts:

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Sale of Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang – Ayala Land Inc. (ALI) sold this parcel of land to spouses Yuson. They then sold it to spouses Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated on the TCT which expressly provides that, “the property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school.” ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang Village to the association of homeowners, the AAVA. Establishment of TLC and Expansion – In 1989, the spouses opened on the same lot The Learning Child Pre-school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In 1991, it was expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the Holy Cross. AAVA Protest – The AAVA filed with the RTC of Makati an action for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by the defendant spouses of the Deed of Restrictions. RTC of Makati – Rendered a Decision in favour of AAVA, emphasizing that the restrictions were in reality an easement which an owner of a real estate may validly impose under Article 688 of the Civil Code. Motion for Reconsideration – TLC alleged that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 which reclassified the subject property as “institutional,” there ceased to be legal basis for the RTC to uphold the Deed of Restrictions. RTC agreed and set aside its earlier Decision. Citing Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co., it decreed that while the non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power by the municipality. CA – Upon appeal by the AAVA, it set aside the Resolution of the RTC and reinstated the previous decision in favour of AAVA. TLC and spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration from this Decision but was denied. Motion to Intervene – Aquino, et al., students of TLC, alleging that they are minor children who suffer from various learning disabilities and behavioural disorders benefiting from TLC’s full-inclusion program, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and their own Motion for Reconsideration with the CA. The CA denied their Motions for being proscribed by Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Zoning Ordinance Case – In the meantime, the Municipality of Muntinlupa passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typo on abovementioned Ordinance No. 9139, effectively placing Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V (herein subject lot) under the “Institutional Zone.” o HLURB – According to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), the Resolution was not a mere correction of a typo but an actual rezoning of the

4. Ratio: 1.

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property into an institutional area and would require the conduct of public hearings. o Office of the President – The Office of the President set aside this conclusion of the HLURB and declared Resolution No. 94-179 as a valid corrective issuance. It further held that the Deed of Restrictions had lost its force and effect in view of the passage of Ordinance No. 91-39. CA – The CA upheld the validity of Resolution No. 94-179 but held that the Office of the President erred; that Ordinance No. 91-39 did not have the effect of nullifying the Deed of Restrictions inasmuch as there is no conflict between the two WON the CA is correct in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94179 -- YES, being a mere corrective issuance, it is not invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing as AAVA contends. WON the CA is correct in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94179 -- YES, being a mere corrective issuance, it is not invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing as AAVA WON Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected by Muntinlupa Resolution No. 91-179, has the effect of nullifying the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions on the subject property -- NO, there is a way to harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions WON AAVA is estopped from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions -- NO YES, being a mere corrective issuance, it is not invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing as AAVA contends 1. Both the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang Village show that the subject lot is classified as “institutional.” The official zoning map is an indispensable and integral part of a zoning ordinance, without which said ordinance would be considered void. 2. It is clear that there was a typo and the Court is merely affirming the correction made by the same entity which committed the error. 3. The authority of the HLURB is subordinate to that of the Office of the President and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. MOOT, since their motion was filed in 1998, Aquino, et al., would no longer be in grade school at this time. 1. For the sake of argument, the Court finds no reversible error in CA’s denial of their Motion. The motion was filed three months after the CA had already rendered its Decision. 2. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure clearly imports that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the instant case, when even the CA had rendered its own Decision on appeal. NO, there is a way to harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions 1. TLC and spouses Alfonso: Reclassification of properties is a valid exercise of the state’s police power, with which contractual obligations should be reconciled. 2. AAVA: Even where the exercise of police power is valid, the same does not operate to automatically negate all other legal relationships in existence since the better policy is to reconcile the conflicting rights. 3. Review of jurisprudence: 1. Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co: The Court, in upholding the exercise of police power attendant in the reclassification of the subject property therein over the Deed of Restrictions over the same property, took into consideration the prevailing conditions in the area. “Resolution was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.”

2.

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NO

i. ii.

iii. iv. Dispositive:

Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court: The Court denied the applicability of reclassification. “This is not to suggest that a zoning ordinance cannot affect existing legal relationships for it is settled that it can legally do so, being an exercise of police power. As such, it is superior to the impairment clauses. xxx The zoning ordinance in question, while valid as a police measure, was not intended to affect existing rights protected by the impairment clause. It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and to preserve both instead of nullifying one against the other.” 3. Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association: The Court allowed the operation of the Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of Restrictions, but not without examining the surrounding area like in Ortigas. SC: The subject property, though declared as an institutional lot, nevertheless lies within a residential subdivision and is surrounded by residential lots. TLC’s student population had swelled to 350 students. The greater traffic will affect adjacent property owners’ enjoyment and use of their own properties. AAVA’s insistence on the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions is thus reasonable. Also, the Municipality of Muntinlupa did not appear to have any special justification for declaring the subject lot as an institutional property. TLC and Spouses Alfonso: AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own acts However, TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the gravity of AAVA’s acts so as to bar the latter from insisting compliance. Circumstances around the enumerated acts of AAVA also show that there was no intention on the part of AAVA to abrogate the Deed of Restrictions nor to waive its right to have said restrictions enforced Finally, a thorough examination of the records of the case shows that AAVA consistently insisted upon compliance with the Deed of Restrictions

WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows: 1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2) the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child Schools grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted. 2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated July 2, 1998, insofar as it dismissed the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso, Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby AFFIRMED 3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which upheld the validity of a Mandaluyong Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 35. Negros Occidental II Electric v. Dumaguete, 155 SCRA 421

Petitioners: Respondents: Doctrine: Facts: Issue: Ratio: Dispositive: 36. Mascunana v. Mun. Board, 79 SCRA 399 Petitioners: ANGEL MASCUÑANA Respondents: THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF TALISAY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, LEON T. TREYES, ULPIANA INSON, GONZALO ORDANIEL and FLORENTINO GARGALLANO Doctrine: A municipal ordinance is not the same as a resolution of the municipal council. Legislative acts passed by the municipal council in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances (Sec. 2227, Revised Administrative Code). Where the municipality closed that part of a municipal street, which ran between the public market and the plaintiff’s property, and the said adjoining property owner was admittedly damaged by such action, he was entitled to recover the amount of the damage by virtue of section 2246. The municipality’s contention that it was not liable for damages because it acted in the exercise of its police power and for the public welfare was not sustained.

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The municipal council of Talisay, Negros Occidental issued Resolution No. 59 declaring a piece of land as municipal property closed to vehicular traffic. The land was situated near the intersection of Burgos and Rizal Streets and adjacent to the bank of the Minuluan. Among those adjacent lots are Lot No. 80 owned by Angel Mascunñ ana and Lots 81-A, 81-B and 81-C registered in the names of his children, Angeles M. Verdeflor, Angel, Jr. and Manuel. Angel Mascunñ ana alleged that the piece of land in question is the terminus or extension of Burgos Street. Mascunñ ana and his daughter, Angeles, in a letter, informed the mayor of Talisay that portion of Burgos Street was occupied by squatters. He asked the mayor to take the necessary steps to clear the area of squatters so that the public could use that part of Burgos Street. The mayor took up Mascunñ ana’s request with the municipal council. The council indorsed Mascunñ ana’s letter to the municipal treasurer. The treasurer found that the alleged portion or extension of Burgos Street mentioned in Mascunñ ana’s letter is the property of the municipality of Talisay. The treasurer was not certain as to whether the said land had been used as a street, or had been withdrawn from that use or had been abandoned or had never been designated for public use. To determine the "character" of the said land, he suggested that the matter be referred to the municipal attorney for further study. The acting provincial fiscal, rendered the opinion that "Burgos Street is a municipal street and under the law is a property devoted for public use" and is outside the commerce of man; that there was no record to show that portion of Burgos Street in question had been withdrawn from public use by the municipal council, and that nonuser alone would not destroy its public_nature. The members of the municipal council of Talisay concluded that there was no valid reason for opening it to vehicular traffic. The council passed the aforementioned Resolution No. 59.

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In a letter, the acting provincial fiscal informed the municipal council of Talisay that the closure of a municipal street is governed by section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code which authorizes a municipal council to close a municipal road, street, alley, park or square, after indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby, and to use or convey for any lawful purpose such property withdrawn from public servitude. The fiscal advised that any resolution approving the closure of the street should be accompanied with the following data required in a circular of the Executive Bureau: (I) the recommendation of the district engineer; (2) certified copies of documents executed by owners of lots adjacent to the street to be closed waiving all claims for damages to their respective properties, and (3) a statement of the provincial fiscal as to the sufficiency of the documents submitted. The provincial fiscal rendered an opinion upholding the validity of the municipal council’s Resolution No. 59 and stating that the council may dispose of the land in question, as its patrimonial property, in any manner which it may deem proper. And that portion of land cannot be even considered as part of Burgos Street nor (may) it be properly called a thoroughfare. So, the requirement of Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code need not be complied with. The provincial board approved the municipal council’s Resolution No. 59. Mascunñ ana and his daughter Angeles filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the provincial board, the municipal council and the four occupants of the area in question, a petition wherein they prayed that Resolution No. 59 of the municipal council and Resolution No. 1035 of the provincial board be declared void. They also prayed for other equitable relief. They further alleged that Resolution No. 59 is void because there was no compliance with the three requisites, prescribed in section 161 of the Compilation of Provincial Circulars of the Executive Bureau, for the closure of municipal streets as authorized in section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. The provincial board in its answer alleged that section 2246 cannot be invoked because the disputed portion is not a part of Burgos Street. The petitioners in their opposition contended that their action might be treated as an action for prohibition wherein they seek to enjoin the enforcement of Resolution No. 59. The lower court summarily dismissed the petition it in a minute order. Mascunñ ana and Angeles M. Verdeflor appealed.

ISSUE: 1. W/N an action to declare void Resolution No. 59 of the municipal council is not an action for declaratory relief because section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court refers to an ordinance and not to a resolution, but rather an ordinary action for the enforcement of section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code and for the opening to vehicular traffic of the disputed area.–YES 2. W/N If the disputed area is proven to have been a part of Burgos Street, and if its closure to vehicular traffic, as effectuated under Resolution No. 59, is held to be illegal, petitioner Verdeflor might claim damages –YES 3. W/N the trial should have tried the case on the merits and should not have summarily dismissed the petition it in a minute order—YES RULING: ISSUE #1: 1. A municipal ordinance is not the same as a resolution of the municipal council. Legislative acts passed by the municipal council in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances (Sec. 2227, Revised Administrative Code). 2. A resolution is less solemn and formal than an ordinance. It "is an act of a special or temporary character, not prescribing a permanent rule of government, but is merely

3.

declaratory of the will or opinion of a municipal corporation in a given matter, and in the nature of a ministerial or administrative act, and is not a law" (62 C.J.S. 786-7). In reality, petitioners’ action is not for declaratory relief but is an ordinary action for the enforcement of section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code and for the opening to vehicular traffic of the disputed area.That section reads as follows: "SEC. 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. — With the prior authorization of the Department Head, a municipal council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or place aforesaid, or any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed."cralaw virtua1aw library

ISSUE #2: 1. As stated on pages 9 to 11 of their brief, petitioners’ contention is that Resolution No. 59 is void because the municipal council did not observe the requisites delineated in section 161 of the Compilation of Provincial Circulars which requisites were prescribed by the Executive Bureau for the implementation of section 2246. 2. If the disputed area is proven to have been a part of Burgos Street, as the cadastral map seems to indicate, and if its closure to vehicular traffic, as effectuated under Resolution No. 59, is held to be illegal, petitioner Verdeflor might claim damages. 3. Thus, in Abella v. Municipality of Naga, 90 Phil. 385, it was held that where the municipality closed that part of a municipal street, which ran between the public market and the plaintiff’s property, and the said adjoining property owner was admittedly damaged by such action, he was entitled to recover the amount of the damage by virtue of section 2246. The municipality’s contention that it was not liable for damages because it acted in the exercise of its police power and for the public welfare was not sustained. (Compare with Unson v. Lacson and Genato Commercial Corp., 100 Phil. 695 and 112 Phil. 752, regarding the lease of a part of a Manila street to a private firm which was declared void). 4. Mascunñ ana’s letter to the mayor shows petitioners’ cause of action. In that better, he requested the mayor to clear the disputed area of squatters because their constructions are prejudicial to the public in general and, in particular, to petitioner Verdeflor as owner of Lot 81-A. 5. From petitioners’ viewpoint, they have reason to complain of a delict or wrong caused by the closure of the disputed area to vehicular traffic due to the acts of the private respondents in occupying that area and to the act of the public respondents in giving to that closure a semblance of legality by means of their resolutions which have been questioned by the petitioners in this case. 6. The finding of the fiscal and other provincial officials during their ocular inspection that the disputed area is not a part of Burgos Street because it is not passable at all strengthens petitioners’ cause of action that the resolution declaring it closed to vehicular traffic should be voiced and that the area should be cleared of squatters so that it could be used by the public. If, as revealed in the cadastral map, the disputed area was originally a part of Burgos Street, then the constructions of the four private respondents on said area, which obstruct and interfere with the free passage of the street, may possibly be characterized as a nuisance which can be abated summarily (Arts. 694 and 695, Civil Code; Letter of Instruction No. 19, dated October 2, 1972, 68 O. G. 7962; Sitchon v. Aquino, 98 Phil. 458). ISSUE #3: 1. The trial court in disposing of the case in a minute order gave the impression that it had ignored or cavalierly treated petitioners’ contentions. 2. It is true that there is no rule requiring a trial court to make findings of fact and law in an order of dismissal. The constitutional requirement of making findings of fact and law applies only to decisions. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that a trial court’s

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order dismissing a complaint or petition is appealable like a final judgment. Therefore, for the satisfaction of the losing party and to assist the appellate court in resolving the appeal, the trial court should take some pains to reason out its order of dismissal and should not merely incorporate therein, by reference, the motion to dismiss. We should not be understood as having prejudged this case in favor of the petitionersappellants. What is being underscored is that the ends of justice would be better served by holding in this case a trial on the merits if no amicable settlement is arrived at during the pre-trial or if there is no agreed statement of facts. The legal points raised by the petitioners should be resolved in a decision on the merits of the case.

Dispositive:WHEREFORE, the trial court’s minute order of dismissal is reversed and set aside with costs against the private Respondents-Appellees.

37. Favis v. City, supra

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Lower courts (CFI Baguio) held that the resolutions were valid. Issues: 1. 2.

1.

Facts:

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On April 1957, Antonio Favis bought a parcel of land with about 1,000 sq. m. from the Assumption Convent Inc. The lot is bounded on the southwest by Lot 2-E-3-B-3-B-1 (proposed road), owned by Assumption Convent, Inc. The proposed road lot (Lot 2-E-3-B-B1) was donated by Assumption to the City of Baguio for road purposes. Antonio Favis uses this road as his means of egress and ingress from his residence to a public street called Lapu-Lapu Street. Lapu-Lapu street is a portion of a big tract of land registered in the name of the City, known as Baguio Market Subdivision. It is 8 meters wide and it abruptly ends as it meets portions of two lots. The road opening at the connecting point of the Lapu-Lapu street and the donated lot is 2.5 meters. Lot 25 is the Northern most part of the Market Subdivision and is approximately 400 meters. Resolution No. 115, Series of 1947, of the City Council of Baguio leased this Lot 25 to Shell for a ten-year period renewable for another ten years. Shell constructed thereon a service station of about 335 square meters. Resolution No. 132 authorized the Mayor to lease to Shell 2 parcels of land Lot 25 and the donated lot. Shell filed an application with the Office of the City Engineer of Baguio for a building permit for the construction of a new and bigger gasoline station on the leased premises. Said office, in a letter to the City Council thru the City Mayor dated June 30, 1961, noted that the leased "[1] to 'B' which consists of 100 square meters is exactly within the road right-of-way of Lapu-Lapu Street," is for public use, and may not be leased. Antonio Favis sent a letter-protest against the additional lease made in favor of Shell. He claimed that it would diminish the width of Lapu-Lapu Street to five meters only, that it would destroy the symmetry of the said street thus making it look very ugly, and that the City was bereft of authority to lease any portion of its public streets in favor of anyone. Resolution No. 215, amending Resolution No. 132, Series of 1961, by converting that "portion of Lapu-Lapu Street lying southeast from Lot B of the sketch plan prepared

Is closing of the street without an ordinance is valid - YESSIR May the City of Baguio may close down a street - YESSIR

Ratio:

Petitioners: Antonio Favis Respondents: City of Baguio Doctrine: Even where the statute or municipal charter requires the municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution is passed in the manner and with the statutory formality required in the enactment of an ordinance, it will be binding and effective as an ordinance

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March 10, 1961 by Private Land Surveyor Perfecto B. Espiritu, beginning at this portion's intersection with Dagohoy Street, into an alley 5.00 meters wide (4 m. now in actual use); declaring for this purpose, that said Lot B shall not be a part of this alley. Antonio Favis then instituted a petition annulling the lease contract between the City and shell.

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It has been held that "even where the statute or municipal charter requires the municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution is passed in the manner and with the statutory formality required in the enactment of an ordinance, it will be binding and effective as an ordinance." Such resolution may operate regardless of the name by which it is called. Resolutions No. 132 and 215, Series of 1961, were unanimously approved with all the councilors present and voting, carried the seal of the city council, were signed by the City Vice-Mayor, the Presiding Officer, approved by the City Mayor, and attested by the City Secretary. With the presumption of validity of the resolution and the other presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, the embattled resolutions are just as good as ordinances and have the same force. In subsection (L) of Section 2558 of the Review Administrative Code (Baguio Charter) it states that: -“(L) To provide for laying out, opening, extending, widening, straightening, closing up, constructing, or regulating, in whole or in part, any public plaza, square, street, sidewalk, trail, park, waterworks, or water remains, or any cemetery, sewer, sewer connection or connections, either on, in, or upon public or private property;” Hence, the City is explicitly allowed by its own charter to close up streets. The Court held that the City in closing up a portion of the Lapu-Lapu street is well within the powers granted to it. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary and the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.

Dispositive: For the reasons given, the appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio declaring valid Resolution No. 132, Series of 1961, and Resolution No. 215, Series of 1961, both of the City Council of Baguio, and ordering the dismissal of the complaint as well as the counterclaim, is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff-appellant. 38. Malonzo v. Zamora 323 SCRA 875 Petitioners: REYNALDO O. MALONZO, in his capacity as City Mayor of Caloocan, OSCAR MALAPITAN, in his capacity as Vice Mayor of Caloocan, CHITO ABEL, BENJAMIN MANLAPIG, EDGAR ERICE, DENNIS PADILLA, ZALDY DOLARTE, LUIS TITO VALERA, SUSAN PUNZALAN, and HENRY CAMAYO, in thier capacities as Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan

Respondents: RONALDO B. ZAMORA, in his capcaity as Executive Secretary, RONALDO V. PUNO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the DILG, and EDUARDO TIBOR.

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Doctrine: Capital outlay cannot be approriated for the payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings (even if cancelled) for another purpose until such original purpose has been fully complied with. Facts:

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In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan passed ORDINANCE NO. 0168, S. 1994, authorizing the City Mayor to initiate proceedings for the exprorpriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, registered in the name of CLT Realty (CLT). The expropriation of the lot was appropriated the amount of Php35,997,975.00 (later increased to Php39,352,047.75). It turned out, however, that the Maysilo Estate straddled the City of Caloocan and Malabon, prompting CLT to file a special civil action against the Caloocan and Malabon restraining them from assessing and collecting real property taxes. After failing to conclude a voluntary sale of the questioned Lot, the City Legal Officer recommended to the City Mayor that, in view of the pending resolution of the abovementioned case, the exprorpriation of the Lot be cancelled and/or abandoned. In the meantime, Vice Mayor Malapitan wrote to Mayor Malonzo requesting for the repair and renovation of the office of councilors, and the hiring of personnel in support of the councilors. Malonzo acted on the letter and endorsed the same to the City Treasurer, which in turn manifested through a memorandum that since the expropriation has been discontinued, the appropriation for the expropriation can be reverted for use in the supplemental budget, stating further that he certifies it for its reversion since it is not yet obligated, and available for re-approriation in the supplemental budget. Pursuant to the certification by the City Treasurer, the Sanggunian passed Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998, appropriating the amount of Php39,343,028.00 as its supplemental budget. Alleging that the petitioners conspired to violate provisions of the Local Government Code in enacting the latter Ordinance, a certain Eduardo Tibor filed an administrative complaint against the petitioners before the Office of the President (OP). Later, a certain Teotimo de Guzman Gajudo filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of the Ordinance in question. The OP rendered judgment finding the petitioners guilty of misconduct in allowing for the passage of the Ordinance without following the required Procedure (as to be discussed later) and meted out the penalty of suspension for three months. The petitioners assail the OP’s Order before the Supreme Court. To support their petition, petitioners contend that on account of the filing of an action for interpleader by CLT, the expropriation proceedings had to be suspended pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between Malabon and Caloocan City. Due to his dispute, the P50 million appropriation for the expropriation of properties under current operating expenses had not been obligated and no security deposit was forthcoming. It was not at the time a continuing appropriation. This unavoidable discontinuance of the purpose for which the appropriation was made effectively converted the earlier expropriation of P39,352,047.75 into savings as defined by law. They argue further that there is no truth in the allegation that Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 was passed without complying with Sections 50 and 52 of the Local Government Code requiring that on the first regular session following the election of its members and within 90 days thereafter, the Sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules of procedure. According to them, the minutes of the session held on July 2, 1998

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would reveal that the matter of adoption or updating of the house rules was taken up and that the council arrived at a decision to create an ad hoc committee to study the rules. The OSG, representing the respondents, asserted further that the filing on August 6, 1997 of an interpleader case by CLT which owns Lot 26 should not be considered as an unavoidable discontinuance that automatically converted the appropriated amount into savings which could be used for supplemental budget. Since the said amount was not transformed into savings and, hence, no funds were actually available, then the passage of Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 which realigned the said amount on a supplemental budget violated Section 321 of the Code requiring an ordinance providing for a supplemental budget to be supported by funds actually available as certified by the local treasurer or by new revenue sources. Petitioners were likewise faulted for violating Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring the Sangguniang Panlungsod to adopt or update its existing rules of procedure within the first 90 days following the election of its members. The Sanggunian allegedly conducted three readings of Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 in one day and on the first day of its session (July 2, 1998) without the Sanggunian having first organized itself and adopted its rules of procedure. It was only on July 23, 1998 that the Sanggunian adopted its internal rules of procedure.

Issue: W/N petitioners validly re-approriated the amount as stated in the subject Ordinances and followed the correct procedure in adopting Ordinance No. 0254, s. 1998. - YES. Ratio:

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The OP erred when it stated that the original appropriation for the Lot 26 is considered as capital outlay is considered as continuing appropriation and thus cannot be reverted to the treasury for reappropriation o First, The Court held that the OP misappropriated the facts when it considered the case of the petitioners. The OP found that the petitioners breached Section 332 of the Local Government Code when it realigned the appropriated amount of Php39,352,047.75 when it passed the Ordinance authorizing the supplemental budget.  Based on the Sec. 322, the OP reached the determination that Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 could not have lawfully realigned the amount of Php39,352,047.75 which was previously appropriated for the expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate since such appropriation was in the nature of a capital outlay until fully spent, reverted; or the project for which it is earmarked is completed.  However, the Court saw that the amount of the supplemental budget (Php39,343,028.00) was DIFFERENT from the appropriation allocated for the expropriation of the lot. o The question, however, is not whether the appropriation of P39,352,047.75 could fall under the definitions of continuing appropriation and capital outlays, considering that such amount was NOT the subject of the realignment made by Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. Rather, the issue is whether petitioners are liable for their actions in regard to said ordinance which actually realigned a position of the P50 million which was simply denominated in a general manner as Expropriation of Properties and classified under Current Operating Expenditures in the 1998 Annual Budget of Caloocan City. o Clearly, these are two distinct amounts separate from each other. That this is the case has likewise been clarified in the pleadings and during the oral argument where petitioners adequately explained that the P50 million was NOT appropriated for the purpose of purchasing Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate but rather for expenses incidental to expropriation such as relocation of squatters,

o

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appraissal fee, expenses for publication, mobilization fees, and expenses for preliminary studies The appropriation of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997 (the Ordinance that increased the amount ot be used for expropriation) is, we believe, still a subsisting appropriation that has never been lumped together with other funds to arrive at the sum of P50 million allocated in the 1998 budget. No less than respondents themselves argued, citing Sections 321 and 322 in relation to Section 306 (d) and (e) of the Code, that realignment shall not be allowed when what is involved are continuing appropriations or capital outlays. But this argument becomes clearly inapplicable in view of our disquisition above that the realignment being complained of had nothing to do with the P39,352,047.75 appropriation for the purchase of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate which is clearly the one that is classifiable as a capital outlay or a continuing appropriation. The realignment, as we have earlier discussed, pertained to the P50 million which was classified as Current Operating Expenditures. Having been determined as such by the local council upon which legislative discretion is granted, then the statutory proscription does not, therefore, apply and respondents cannot insist that it should.

The Sanggunian of Caloocan correctly followed procedure in enacting the Ordinances. o As to the alleged violation of Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring the adoption of house rules and the organization of the council, we believe that the same hardly merits even cursory consideration. We cannot infer the mandate of the Code that no other business may be transacted on the first regular session except to take up the matter of adopting or updating rules.All that the law requires is that on the first regular session the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules or procedure. There is nothing in the language thereof that restricts the matters to be taken up during the first regular session merely to the adoption or updating of the house rules. If it were the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local council to such matters, then it would have done so in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is no such intent.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 98-H-8520 dated March 15, 1999 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, respondents, their subordinates, agents, representatives, and successorsin-interest are permanently enjoined from enforcing or causing the execution in any manner of the aforesaid decision against herein petitioners. 39. Zamora v. Caballero, 419 SCRA 384, 392 Petitioners: MANUEL E. ZAMORA Respondents: GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO, ANESIO M. RANARIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, MARIANO KINTANAR, in his capacity as Provincial Auditor, CARMEN R. RASUL, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, ROLANDO L. OSORIO, BELINDA G. APAWAN, ARMANDO L. SERAS, RUWEL PETER S. GONZAGA, ARMANDO C. CODILLA, RAUL B. BASAÑES, GRACIANO C. ARAFOL, JR., Doctrine: Facts:

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Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley (the Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum.

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On February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro sent a written notice of a special session on February 7, 2001. Upon the request of Governor Jose R. Caballero, however, the scheduled special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without the benefit of a written notice. On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to, among other things, allow the Governor to deliver his State of the Province Address. As only seven members of the fourteen-member Sanggunian were present, no resolution was considered. On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 07 authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the province, enter into a construction contract (Contract) with Allado Construction Company, Inc. (the Allado Company) for the completion of Phase II of the construction of the capitol building. During the same session, the Sanggunian accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto. While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the session on February 26, 2001, the Journal of the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 showed that a total of thirteen members attended it Petitioner: challenged the validity of the acts of the Sanggunian on February 26, 2001, alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated the presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian nonetheless "conducted official business without a quorum" as only seven of its fourteen members were actually present when the irrevocable letter of resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, and the motions to declare the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and to authorize the Governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado Company were approved. Petitioner additionally alleged that when the vote respecting Resolution No. 05 was taken, only the remaining six members voted for the adoption thereof, the then presiding officer Board Member Rolando Osorio not having cast his vote; that when Resolution No. 07 was taken up, however, then presiding officer Osorio, relinquished his seat to Board Member Graciano Arafol after the six members present unanimously voted on the said resolution in the affirmative, following which Osorio cast his vote as a member also in the affirmative, thereby authorizing the Governor to enter into the Contract with Allado Company; and that Board Member Arafol thereafter relinquished his seat as presiding officer to Board Member Osorio who once again assumed the duties of a presiding officer. Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of the special session of February 8, 2001 for lack of quorum, there being only seven members of the Sanggunian in attendance, and for lack of written notice sent to all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the special session in accordance with Section 52 (d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Respondents: contended that since Board Member Sotto was in the United States at the time the questioned acts were executed and resolutions adopted, the actual number of Board Members then in the country was thirteen which should be the basis of the determination of a quorum.Issue:

Ratio:

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there is nothing on record, save for respondents' allegation, to show that Board Member Sotto was out of the country and to thereby conclude that she was outside the coercive power of the Sanggunian when the February 8 and 26, 2001 sessions were held. In fact it is undisputed that the leave form filed by said Board Member before the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) did not mention that she was going out of the country. Petitioner's contention that the trial court cannot take judicial notice of Board Member Sotto's whereabouts is thus well taken. On this score, the instant case is outside the application of the doctrine in Avelino.

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A court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or those which are capable of unquestionable determination or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. With respect to disputed facts, however, the court must receive evidence thereof, with notice to the parties "Quorum" is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. "Majority," when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states that "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum," Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the "majority of all members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified" shall constitute a quorum. The difference in the wordings of the constitution and the LGC is not merely "a matter of style and writing" as respondents would argue, but is actually a matter of "meaning and intention." The qualification in the LGC that the majority be based on those "elected and qualified" was meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed. And, while the intent of the legislature in qualifying the quorum requirement was to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed and have assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when, after all the members of the sanggunian have assumed office, one or some of its members file for leave. What should be important then is the concurrence of election to and qualification for the office. And election to, and qualification as member of, a local legislative body are not altered by the simple expedient of filing a leave of absence. The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence of a quorum on the total number of members of the Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that a majority may, for reasons of political affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is already addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority of sanggunian members present when there is no quorum. A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that they may not only represent the interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And all such acts cannot be given binding force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during an unauthorized session. Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum when her letter of irrevocable resignation was noted by the Sanggunian. For the same reason, Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no legal effect. Even assuming arguendo that there were indeed thirteen members present during the questioned February 26, 2001 session, Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under state of calamity is still null and void because the motion for its approval was approved by only six members. When there are thirteen members present at a session, the vote of only six members can not, at any instance, be deemed to be in compliance with Section 107(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC which requires the concurrence of the approval by the majority of the members present and the existence of a quorum in order to validly enact a resolution. The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the construction contract is also deemed not approved in accordance with the law even if it received seven affirmative votes, which is already the majority of thirteen, due to the defect in the seventh vote. For as priorly stated, as the Journal confirms, after all six members voted in the affirmative,

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Board Member Osorio, as acting presiding officer, relinquished his seat to Board Member Arafol and thereafter cast his vote as a member in favor of granting authority to the Governor. While acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may not, at the same time, be allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member including that of voting even when there is no tie to break. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes of the presiding officer could not have greater power than that possessed by the latter who can vote only in case of a tie. Lastly, for a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a construction contract to be valid, the vote of the majority of all members of the Sanggunian, and not only of those present during the session, is required in accordance with Section 468 of the LGC in relation to Article 107 of its Implementing Rules. Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the Acting Presiding Officer, Resolution No. 07 is still invalid. Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 of its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen members in the Sanggunian, the approval of eight members is required to authorize the governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado Company since it involves the creation of liability for payment on the part of the local government unit.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley dated April 24, 2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley approved on February 26, 2001, declaring the entire Province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and granting authority to the Provincial Governor to enter into a general construction agreement, respectively, are hereby declared null and void. AIDTHC SO ORDERED. 40. Reyes v. CA, 320 SCRA 486, 494 Petitioners: ANTONIO Z. REYES, ELISEO P. OCAMPO and EDITHA ARCIAGA-SANTOS|| Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FRANKLIN DRILON and MAYOR JINGGOY ESTRADA (JOSE EJERCITO) OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA Doctrine:We find Figuerres instructive. Petitioners have not proved in the case before us that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan failed to conduct the required public hearings before the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101. Although the Sanggunian had the control of records or the better means of proof regarding the facts alleged, petitioners are not relieved from the burden of proving their averments. Proof that public hearings were not held falls on petitioners' shoulders. For failing to discharge that burden, their petition was properly dismissed. In any event, for the purpose of securing certainty where doubt would be intolerable, it is a general rule that the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute or ordinance may not be impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony either of individual officers and members, or of strangers who may be interested in nullifying legislative action. This rule supplements the presumption in favor of the regularity of official conduct which we have upheld repeatedly, absent a clear showing to the contrary. Facts:

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San Juan implemented several tax ordinances: o 87 An ordinance imposing a municipal tax of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross receipt on business of printing and publication o 91 An ordinance imposing a transfer tax equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the total consideration on the sale, donation, barter or any

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other mode of transferring ownership or title of real property situated in San Juan, Metro Manila, or its fair market value, whichever is higher o 95 An ordinance imposing fifty percent (50%) of one percent of (1%) for social housing tax on the assessed value of all real estate property in San Juan, Metro Manila in excess of P50,000.00 value as provided in the New Urban Land Reform Law, also known as R.A. 7279. o 100 An ordinance imposing new rates of business taxes of the Municipality of San Juan Metro Manila o 101 An ordinance levying an annual "Ad Valorem" tax on real property and an additional tax accruing to the special education fund (SEF) Petitioners Reyes, Ocampo and Arciaga-Santos filed an appeal with DOJ assailing the constitutionality of the ordinances for having been promulgated without previous public hearings o EFFECT: Deprivation of property without due process of law OJ Secretary dismissed for being filed out of time o CA affirmed the DOJ Ruling

Petitioner now contends that in the absence of public hearing, the ordinances are invalid and therefore no prescriptive period could lapse  Respondent on the other hand cites Sec. 187 of RA 7160 o That any question on the constitutionality of any tax ordinance or revenue may be raised on appeal within 30 days to the SOJ o This appeal shall not suspend the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein Issue:  WON the validity of ordinances be assailed through parol evidence? – NO. Ratio:  As stated in the case of Figuerres v. CA: o There is indeed a requirement of prior public hearing prior to the enactment of ordinances o But if the petitioner cannot prove that there was no public hearing, and the municipality alleges otherwise, the former cannot prevail o There is a presumption of constitutionality and legality of an ordinance

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   

GR: the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute or ordinance may not be impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony either of individual officers and members, or of strangers who may be interested in nullifying legislative action The constitutionality of an act of Congress will not be passed upon by the Court unless at the first opportunity that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case, and is necessary to a determination of the case, particularly where the issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. The constitutional validity of a statutory provision should not be entertained by the Court where it was not specifically raised below, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Moreover, given the circumstances in this case, we find no genuine necessity to dwell on the issue of constitutional invalidity of Section 187 in relation to issue of valid enactment of the subject ordinances, as shown in the foregoing discussion. Suffice it now to say that, having resolved the first and second issues, we find no grave abuse of discretion nor reversible error in the decision of the respondent appellate court. There are three periods to comply when asking for redress before a competent court o 30 days from effectivity- appeal must be filed with the SOJ o 30 days- allowed time to go to court upon decision of the SOJ o 60 days inaction by SOJ- proceed to seek relief from court



These periods are set to prevent delays and enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions o Especially true in tax cases which is for the delivery of basic services to the public Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. LLpr SO ORDERED.

41. Drilon v. Lim, supra (repeated case) Petitioners: HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE Respondents: MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA Doctrine: There is a distinction between control and supervision. The first is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the second is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. Sec. 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Facts: (copied from previous case)  Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code: Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.



Pursuant thereto, Secretary of Justice Drilon had (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.



Judge Palattao of the RTC of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, he declared Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution

and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President only the power of supervision over local governments.



The procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita.



The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved, but this omission does not affect its validity considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.

The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.

Issue/s:





W/N Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional – YES

Ratio:

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







 

The lower court was hasty in invalidating the provision. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. There is a distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." Sec. 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. That was an act not of control, but of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Additional Notes:



The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to costs. 42. Delos Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, 281 SCRA 631 Petitioners: MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES, Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Doctrine: the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. Facts: Petitioner, along with two others, was charged with the crime of falsification of a public document, specifically Resolution No. 57-S-92 of the Municipal Council of Mariveles, Bataan. The complaint alleged that the resolution, appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for the payment of the terminal leave of two municipal employees, was anomalous for not having been approved by the said Council, as the minutes of the proceedings therein made no reference to the supposed approval thereof. It contended that its seeming passage was carried out by petitioner in connivance with Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Member Jesse Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for Reinvestigation. Thus petitioner filed this instant petition for certiorari. Issue: W/N the final step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his signature, is purely a ministerial act-NO Ratio: On September 18, 1995, the Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioner. The order of respondent Sandiganbayan must be sustained.

In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner argues that the deliberations undertaken and the consequent passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature. He adds that as local chief executive, he has neither the official custody of nor the duty to prepare said resolution; hence, he could not have taken advantage of his official position in committing the crime of falsification as defined and punished under Article 171[6] of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in the approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his signature, is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article 109(b) of the Local Government Code outlines the veto power of the Local Chief Executive which provides: Article 109 (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. x x x. Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated December 29, 1994, and May 24, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 18, 1995, is hereby LIFTED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 21073 for arraignment and trial. SO ORDERED. 43. Homeowners v. Municipal Board, 24 SCRA 856 Petitioners: Homeowners’ Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Vicente Rufino Respondents: Municipal Board of Manila and Mayor Antonio Villegas Doctrine: Facts: 1. 2.

The Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear, therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well. It must be stressed that the Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes taken during the session of the Sangguniang Bayan held last July 27, 1992, which petitioner regards as inconclusive evidence of what actually transpired therein.

b.

In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the session of the Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved the subject resolution knowing fully well that the subject matter treated therein was neither taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session. Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court, without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand. With regard to the joint affidavit of some members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the actual passage and approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92, the Court finds the same to have been belatedly submitted as a last minute attempt to bolster petitioners position, and, therefore, could not in any way aid the latters cause.

Petitioner brought this action to nullify Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 of the City of Manila. The Ordinance reads as follows: ( i shortened it already) 1. Sec. 1. Lessors/Sublessors of lands primarily devoted to residential purposes are prohibited from increasing the rental to an amount in excess of the proportion in the increase of the assessed value of the land. 2. Sec. 2. Lessors/Sublessors of buildings primarily devoted to residential purposes are prohibited from increasing the rentals in excess of 10% per annum of the assessed value of the building leased and of the land on which the building stands. 3. Sec. 3. Ordinance shall apply to contracts of lease or sublease existing upon its approval. 4. Any person violating the ordinance shall be punished by a fine not less than 100 but not more than 200 and imprisonment for not less than 1 month but not more than 6 months. CFI declared the ordinance as ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio. 1. Lower court struck down the ordinance on the ground that the power to declare a state of emergency exclusively pertains to Congress. 2. There’s no longer any state of emergency which may justify the regulation of house rentals 3. Ordinance is an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of private properties and encroaches on the property rights of its owners. 4. Power to regulate business of leasing lands and buildings doesnt include the authority to prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance. 5. Ordinance is not sanctioned by the General Welfare clause.

Issue: Whether the ordinance is invalid - YES Ratio: 1.

2. 3.

Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioners counsel are best taken up in the trial on the merits. 4.

The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. Such exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation, or restriction demanded by the regard, respect and obedience due to the prescriptions of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of such power must be reasonable. Individual rights may be affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest. If the demands brought about by a state of emergency, the interference upon individual rights must be co-terminous with the exercise thereof. Since emergency is temporary in character, so must the regulations promulgated therefor be, for the effect cannot remain in existence upon the removal of its cause. As a consequence a law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means to tide over a critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a "definite" period of time, the

length of which must be "reasonable", in relation to the nature and duration of the crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. It is so ordered. The Court feels that it would have been far more amiable if the petitioners themselves, recognizing their own civic duty, had at the outset desisted from their original stance and withdrawn in good grace from the disputed area to permit its peaceful restoration as a public plaza and parking place for the benefit of the whole municipality. They owned this little sacrifice to the community in general which has suffered all these many years because of their intransigence. Regrettably, they have refused to recognize that in the truly democratic society, the interests of the few should yield to those of the greater number in deference to the principles that the welfare of the people is the supreme law and overriding purpose. We do not see any altruism here. The traditional ties of sharing are absent here. What we find, sad to say, is a cynical disdaining of the spirit of "bayanihan," a selfish rejection of the cordial virtues of "pakikisama " and "pagbibigayan" which are the hallmarks of our people. 44. Viray v. Caloocan, 20 SCRA 291 Petitioners: Policarpio Viray, et al Respondents: City of Caloocan, et al Doctrine: An ordinance imposing a cadaver transfer fee which is distinct from the burial permit fee, is void. It is not sanctioned by the power of the municipal board to regulate the use of cemeteries. Also, the provision of the Local Autonomy Act, empowering cities and municipalities to impose license fees and taxes on persons engaged in any occupation or business or exercising privileges does not sanction the levy of a cadaver transfer fee. The transfer and burial of a cadaver is not an occupation or business or the exercise of a privilege Facts: On September 18, 1962, the Municipal Board of Caloocan City enacted Ordinance No. 94 which imposed an entrance fee on cadavers coming from places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Caloocan, sought to be buried in private cemeteries within the City of Caloocan. The ordinance impose entrance fees, such as: P 5.00 if the deceased is below 14 years old and P 10.00 if 14 years old or above. Macario Asistio, the Mayor of the City of Caloocan, approved Ordinance No. 94 on September 22, 1962, and on March 8, 1963, Policarpio Viray and Antonio Cajote paid Php 5.00 each, and Leopoldo Prieto paid Php 10.00 for the burial of their respective relatives at the La Loma Cemetery (private cemetery within the City of Caloocan). Amado Oliveros, the Treasurer of the City of Caloocan, through his deputy, collected the entrance fees from the mentioned Viray and others. Subsquently, VIray and others demanded from the City Treasurer the refund of the corresponding entrance fees by means of a formal letter of demand. However, despite the demand, the City Treasurer refused to refund the entrance fees. Hence, Viray and others filed a case against the city government, its Mayo and treasurer in the CFI of Caloocan, contesting the legality of the ordinance on the ground that it was a revenue measure beyond the taxing authority of the city to enact. Thus, they prayed that the ordinance be declared ultra vires and void, and that the fees they paid be returned to them. The CFI of Caloocan dismissed the case on the ground that the oridnance was authorized under the charter of the City of Caloocan (RA 3278) and other pertinent laws. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 94, series of 1962, and the collection of the entrance fees are valid? Ratio: NO. Although the ordinance which regulates the "exhumation and/or transfer of corpses" from other burial grounds to those located in the City of Caloocan is within the legislative power of the said city, the imposition of the transfer fees under Ordinance No. 94, on the "interment of dead relatives," was not justified.

The disputed ordinance speaks of 2 kinds of fees: one, in connection with the exhumation of the remains of a dead person, and the other which is imposed whenever a cadaver is sought to be buried in that city coming from other places. Taken in its entirety, it is clear that what is being regulated through this ordinance is not the burying of the mortal remains of a person, but the exhumation and transfer of a cadaver. In other words, the term "transfer" used in the ordinance does not refer to the conducting or conveying of an unburied dead body from the funeral parlor or vigil site—to the burial grounds. Rather, the transfer permit mentioned in the ordinance is required whenever a cadaver, previously interred in a burial place, is removed therefrom for transfer to a private cemetery in Caloocan. The permit called for under the ordinance is not for the “burying of the dead” because a separate "burial permit" is also being issued by defendant the City of Caloocan. It is also noteworthy that while Ordinance No. 94 refers to a "transfer permit", the amounts being collected were receipted for as "entrance fees," giving rise to the presumption that the City of Caloocan must have been aware that the imposition of such transfer fees was indeed unauthorized. The defense of the City of Caloocan regarding taxation and police power for the said imposition of fees also cannot be justified.While Sec. 2 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) confers on chartered cities and municipalities the "authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business by requiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council," the mere burying of a cadaver in a private cemetery does not constitute either an occupation or business or the exercise of privileges that would justify the imposition of taxes (within the terms and intent of RA 2264). The defense of imposition of fees due to the involvement of the assignment of police officers to ensure that the funeral procession is orderly as well as re-rerouting of city traffic cannot be justified because the Ordinance collects the said fees solely in the case of cadavers coming from places outside the territory of Caloocan City for burial in private cemeteries within the City, when other corpses coming from within the city (to be buried on public or private cemeteries) also require such police resources and traffic regulation. This is then a clear case of the ordinance discriminating against private cemeteries, in violation of the equal protection clause. DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the questioned portion of Ordinance No. 94, series of 1962 of the City of Caloocan, is declared ultra vires and void. Costs against the respondents. So ordered. 45. Pp. v. Esguerra, 81 Phil 33 Petitioners: People of the Philippines Respondents: Timoteo Esguerra et. al. Doctrine: An ordinance cannot prohibit a subject matter which the law provides can only be regulated; otherwise, it is void. Facts: 1.

Esguerra et. al, defendants in these twelve cases were each charged with violation of municipal ordinance No. 4, series 1944, enacted by the municipal council of Tacloban, Leyte, which provides the following: SEC. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, association, or firm, to manufacture, distill, produce, cure, sell, barter, offer or give or dispose of in favor of another, possess or to have under control any intoxicating liquor, drink or beverage, locally manufactured, distilled, produced or cured wine, whiskey, gin, brandy and other drink containing liquor including tuba. SEC. 2. All permits and licenses issued for the manufacture, production or establishment or distilleries and sale of tuba, wine, whiskey, and other alcoholic beverages, are hereby revoked and cancelled.

SEC. 3. Any person, association or firm, who violates the provisions of this ordinance, shall be punished upon conviction by competent court, by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than two hundred pesos and imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than six months. xxx 2.

2.

2.

2. 2.

The informations filed against Timoteo Esguerra and against Teofilo Decatoria charged that each of them did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, barter, convey, offer, give, or dispose of whisky or intoxicating liquor to or in favor of soldiers of the United States Army, which wine or intoxicating liquor the accused had then in their possession and under their custody and control without any legal authority to do so. The informations against Jose Chan, Felix Labordo, and Pilar E. Pascual, and against the defendants in other seven (7) separate cases, charged the defendants with having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, had in their possession and under their control and custody "tuba" or intoxicating liquor without any legal authority to do so. Esguerra et. al. moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that the ordinance No. 4, series 1944 was null and void, because the municipal council of Tacloban, Leyte, had no power to enact it. a. The lower court declared the ordinance in question null and void. The People of the Philippines, appealed from the decision of the lower court in the twelve cases, and all of them are now before us on appeal. People: the ordinance at bar was enacted by virtue of the police power of the municipality of Tacloban conferred by the general welfare clause and is therefore valid.

Dispositive: In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders or resolutions of the lower court dismissing the informations in the above entitled cases, are affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. 46. Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 Petitioners: CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL Respondents: COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch II, and the CITY OF BUTUAN Doctrine: Police power requires that the public interest requires the interference with private rights and the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for such purpose and not duly oppressive upon people. There must be a public necessity which demands the need for proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by such ordinance. Such discretion to determine what the public interest requires is vested with the legislature. The legislature cannot, under the guise of protecting public interest, arbitrarily interfere with such private businesses or impose unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. Facts:

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Issue: WoN the ordinance is void - YES Ratio: 1. 2.

3.

b. c. d.

 The ordinance is null and void. Under the general welfare clause, section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, a municipal council may enact such ordinances, not repugnant to law, as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, etc., of the inhabitants of the municipality. The ordinestebanance in question prohibiting the selling, giving away and dispensing of liquor is repugnant to section 2242 (g) of the same Revised Administrative Code. Hence, the Municipal council of Tacloban had no power under said to enact the ordinance under consideration. 1. Section 2242(g) "to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating malt, vinous, mixed or fermented liquors at retail" The word "regulate" means and includes the power to control, to govern and to restrain; and can not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit.” Since the municipality of Tacloban is empowered only to regulate, it cannot prohibit the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors, for that which is prohibited or does not legally exist can not be regulated. The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, 1. Therefore, it cannot be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. 2. To hold that, under the general power granted by section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes power to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.

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The Municipal board of Butuan City enacted Ordinance #460 which penalizes anyone, who sells tickets to “any movie… other public exhibitions, games, contests, or performances,” to require kids aged 7-12 to pay full payment of the tickets. Instead, they should be charged at half-price. This is because some parents complained that paying the full price for children is too financially burdensome. The petitioners, who are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, assail this ordinance as unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable. o They argue that the ordinance is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power, because it was not within the Municipal Board’s power to enact such. They base their contention on Section 15 (n) of Butuan City’s charter which provides that the Municipal Board has the legislative power to regulate and fix the amount of the license fees of theaters/theatrical performances/cinematographs/public exhibitions/all other performances/places of amusements. o Such ordinance, according to them, is unfair, unjust, and confiscatory as a restraint of trade, violating their right as persons to enter into contracts, considering that theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices. The respondent Butuan City justifies the ordinance’s enactment with Section 15 (nn) of Butuan City’s charter, which provides their general welfare clause, which grants the city the power to enact all ordinances necessary for the safety/promotion of morality and good order/comfort/convenience of the city.

Issue:

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Whether or not Ordinance #460 was a constitutional exercise of police power? NO, it was not a valid exercise of police power nor was it constitutional, as it infringes on the owners’ property rights.

Ratio:

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It is settled in our jurisdiction that the operation of theaters, cinemas, and other places of public exhibition are subject to the municipal council’s regulatory authority in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. o However, in In re Gilchrist, 181 N.Y.S. 245,110 Misc. Rep. 362, a New York case, it provided that an ordinance which regulates the selling of admission tickets to

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public exhibitions/performances by the cities’ power under the General City Law (general welfare clause) was considered not within the scope of the powers implied in their charters.  The power of regulation of public exhibitions/amusement places within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any authority to interfere with the admission prices of such places. Butuan City, now realizing that it has no authority to enact Ordinance #640 in its regulatory power under Section 15 (nn), now invokes its delegated police power under the general welfare clause to justify the ordinance’s enactment. o Police power requires that the public interest requires the interference with private rights and the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for such purpose and not duly oppressive upon people. There must be a public necessity which demands the need for proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by such ordinance. Such discretion to determine what the public interest requires is vested with the legislature.  The legislature cannot, under the guise of protecting public interest, arbitrarily interfere with such private businesses or impose unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. The ordinance in question is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. Police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. o In this case, no such relation exists. It can be seen that the ordinance’s aims are obviously helpful to ease the burdens of parents, but such price reduction would be damaging to the petitioners, who are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. They’re even penalized for failure to comply with it! o The children aren’t even economically exploited as they are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.  With such ordinance in effect, cinemas might even be discouraged from showing wholesome movies for general patronage in order to avoid compliance with the ordinance.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory. 47. Manila v. Laguio, supra

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They reiterate that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. o Further aver that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit heir operation The City of Manila on the other hand claims that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power as provided by the LGC o Emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City

Issue: W/N the Ordinance is valid - NO Ratio:

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The assailed ordinance is null and void For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU, but must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law Apart from this, it must conform to the following substantive requirements: o Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; o Must not be unfair or oppressive; o Must not be partial or discriminatory; o Must not prohibit but may regulate trade; o Must be general and consistent with public policy; o Must not be unreasonable The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching is subordinate to constitutional limitations thereon It is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. 48. Primicias v. Urdaneta, 93 SCRA 462 Petitioners: THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, ET AL. Respondents: JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS Doctrine: Ordinance must be in accordance with the law Facts:

Petitioners: City of Manila Respondents: Judge Perfecto Laguio Doctrine:

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Facts:

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Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Saind ordinance prohibits establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which had been notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment.

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Juan Augusto B. Primicias, plaintiff-appellee, was in his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a truck." Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance

Issue: W/N the ordinance is valid. NOoooooooooo Ratio:

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Municipality of Urdaneta Pangasinan contends that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on Section 53, par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended Revised Motor Vehicle Law. In so arguing, Urdaneta fails to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council.

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By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law, Urdaneta is in error in contending that "a later enactment of the law relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law." An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not contravene . . . the statute," The ordinance "must give way."

o

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Ordinance must be in accordance with Land Transportation and Traffic Code The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that "no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act." In this case, however, there is no showing that the marking of the streets and areas falling under Section 1, par. (a), Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, was done with the approval of the Land Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this very ground alone, the Ordinance becomes invalid. Since it lacks the requirement imposed by Section 38, the provincial, city, or municipal board or council is enjoined under Section 62 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code from "enacting or enforcing any ordinance or resolution in conflict with the provisions of this Act."

Dispositive: In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. SO ORDERED. 49. Batangas CATV v. CA, 439 SCRA 326

The sole agency of the government which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC, and that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation. CA reversed the RTC decision. o Although the Certificate of Authority to operate a CATV System is granted by the NTC pursuant to Executive Order No. 205, this does not preclude the Sanggunian from regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under the powers vested upon it by the Local Government Code of 1983. o Section 177 (now Section 457 paragraph 3 (ii) of Republic Act 7160) provides The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or profession being carried on and exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the city, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringement on the taxing and regulatory powers of the city government. o The regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided in the Local Government Code. The fixing of service rates is lawful under the General Welfare Clause. o Resolution No. 210 which granted the permit to construct, install and operate a CATV system in Batangas City provided that in case of violation by the grantee of the terms and conditions/ requirements specifically provided therein, the City shall have the right to withdraw the franchise. o Appellee increased the service rates from P88 to P180.00 without the approval of appellant. Such act breached Resolution No. 210 which gives appellant the right to withdraw the permit granted to appellee.

Petitioners: BATANGAS CATV, INC. Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR

Issue: W/N a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction – NO!

Doctrine: Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid.

Ratio:

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Facts:

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In July 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sanggunian, pursuant to Resolution No. 210. Petitioner then filed a petition for injunction with RTC-Batangas City. o It alleged that respondent Sanggunian has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under EO No. 205, the NTC has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. o the enactment of Resolution No. 210 violates the States deregulation policy as set forth by the NTC Memorandum dated August 25, 1989.

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It has been more than two decades now since our national government, through the NTC, assumed regulatory power over the CATV industry. Changes in the political arena did not alter the trend. Instead, subsequent presidential issuances further reinforced the NTCs power. Significantly, President Marcos and President Aquino, in the exercise of their legislative power, issued P.D. No. 1512, E.O. No. 546 and E.O. No. 205. Hence, they have the force and effect of statutes or laws passed by Congress. That the regulatory power stays with the NTC is also clear from President Ramos E.O. No. 436 mandating that the regulation and supervision of the CATV industry shall remain vested solely in the NTC. In light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies. But nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs of their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the regulatory power shall be vested solely in the NTC, it pertains to the regulatory power over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence, such as, the: (1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of certificates of authority, (3) establishment of areas of operation, (4) examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial qualifications of applicant operators, (5) granting of permits for the use of frequencies, (6) regulation of ownership and operation, (7) adjudication of issues arising from its functions, and (8) other similar matters. Within these areas, the NTC reigns supreme as it possesses the exclusive power to regulate -- a power comprising varied acts, such as to fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws.

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There is no dispute that respondent Sanggunian, like other local legislative bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983. That it continues to possess such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No. 7160. The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures and the parcelling of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. This is the same regulation that it exercises over all private enterprises within its territory. But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. Respondents strayed from the well-recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry. Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. o An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. (United States vs. Abendan) o ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. (De la Cruz vs. Paraz) The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436 insofar as it permits respondent Sanggunian to usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators. The fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs exclusive domain. In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. o Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State. A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation. (Keller vs. State) It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the

NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 12, 1999 as well as its Resolution dated May 26, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52461, are hereby REVERSED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254 is AFFIRMED. 50. Villarena v. COA, 408 SCRA 455 Petitioners: Atty. Rudy Villarea Respondents: Commission on Audit Doctrine: (Under Test of Validity) A general law does not operate to modify or repeal a special law unless it has been so expressly provided. Any apparent inconsistency should be reconciled by regarding the prohibition stated in RA 6758 as an exception or limitation to the authority of local legislative bodies under the LGC. Facts:

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Issue: 1.

2.

Ratio: 1&2

Atty. Villarea is became a City Auditor when Marikina became a city on December 6, 1996. Pursuant to the LGC of 1991, the legislative body of Marikina passed ordinances which approved the budget allocations for Marikina for calendar years 1995-1997. Allotted in each of these were allowances and benefits granted to COA personnel assigned to Marikina, including petitioner. A Special Audit Team (SAT) was constituted by the COA to conduct an examination of the cash and accounts of the City. In the course of the audit, the SAT learned of the allowances given to COA personnel by Marikina and it declared these to have been received in violation of Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and for Other Purposes (see notes), COA Memorandum 89-584. The SAT’s Confidential Report recommended that the COA personnel should be ordered to stop receiving additional fringe benefits, honoraria, allowances and other forms of compensation from Marikina and to refund all those previously received. Because of the Report, petitioner was charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and/or violation of office rules and regulations. In his Answer, petitioner averred that he received the benefits fully believing that Section 18 of RA 6758 and COA Memorandum 89-584 have been repealed and/or superseded by the Local Government Code which authorizes local government units to give additional compensation to national government officials. COA Decision found petitioner guilty of neglect of duty, simple misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. He was fined and was ordered to refund the sums he received in the amount of P227,092.50. WON Atty. Villarea validly received his allowances by virtue of the ordinances enacted by the legislative council of the City of Marikina, under the authority provided for by the LGC, particularly in Sec. 447 and 458? NO. (see notes; he considered himself under the classification of national government official) WON the LGC repealed the COA Memorandum through its repealing clause Sec. 534 (f)? NO. (notes)

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The OSG, points out that RA 6758 is a special law while the LGC is a general law, the SC agrees. SEE DOCTRINE. It is significant to note that petitioner cited only paragraph (f) of the LGC section on repeal and left out the other provisions that meticulously enumerate specific laws or parts thereof that were repealed or modified. Implied repeals are not lightly presumed. The rule is that instead of placing one law against another, in a destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile the statutes. Accordingly, in case of a conflict between RA 6758 and the LGC, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other, but, if possible, to give effect to both by harmonizing the two. In the case at bar, the two statutes can easily be harmonized. Under the LGC, local legislative bodies may provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials stationed or assigned to their municipality or city. This authority, however, is limited, as it does not include the grant of benefits that runs in conflict with other statutes, such as RA 6758. The exception stated in these laws must be read together with the LGC, so as to make both the Code and these laws equally effective and mutually complementary. By allocating a portion of the local budget for financial assistance to the auditing office of Marikina City, the legislative council of Marikina acted in excess of its powers under the LGC. Consequently the ordinances which grant these allowances, insofar as these contravene the prohibition contained in Republic Act No. 6758, are declared invalid.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, this Court affirms COA Decision No. 2000-266 finding petitioner guilty of neglect of duty, simple misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and ordering him to pay a fine equivalent to one month and one days salary, and to refund the amount he received without authority from the City of Marikina. The amount to be refunded, however, will have to be recomputed by the COA in conformity with this decision. Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED.

Notes: (read the emphasized parts) Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 provides the following: SECTION 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel and of Other Agencies. In order to preserve the independence and integrity of the Commission on Audit (COA), its officials and employees are prohibited from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, local government unit, and governmentowned and controlled corporations, and government financial institution, except those compensation paid directly by the COA out of its appropriations and contributions. xxxxxx

LGC SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: xxxxxx

(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city; xxxxxx SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed. (b)(c)(d)(e) enumeration of other specific laws that were repealed by the LGC. (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. 51. Zoomzat v. People of the Philippines, 451 SCRA 226 Petitioners: Zoomzat Inc Respondents:People of the Philippines, Rodriguez etc. Doctrine: It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Facts:

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Zoomzat alleged that the Sanggunian Panglungsod of Gingoog City passed resolution which express the willingness of the city to allow Zoomzat to install and operate a cable TV system so it applied for mayor’s permit but it was not acted upon Respondents enacted an ordinance which granted a franchise to Gingoog Spacelink Cable TV, Inc. Zoomzat filed a complaint in Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019 by the respondents gave unwarranted benefits Graft Investigation Officer recommended indictment but it was reversed by Special Prosecution Officer. Sandiganbayan approved the reversal Petitioner assails the findings of Special Prosecutor that under Executive Order No. 205, it is the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and not the local government unit, that has the power and authority to allow or disallow the operation of cable television. Petitioner argues that while the NTC has the authority to grant the franchise to operate a cable television, this power is not exclusive because under the Local Government Code, the city council also has the power to grant permits, licenses and franchises in aid of the local government units regulatory or revenue raising powers.

Issue: WON NTC only has the authority to grant certificates of authority to cable television operators and issue the necessary IRR? YES Ratio:

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Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC could grant certificates of authority to cable television operators and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Likewise, Executive Order No. 436, vests with the NTC the regulation and supervision of cable television industry in the Philippines. There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments. Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons, associations, partnerships,

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corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area. It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires. But the LGU despite the EOs can exercise their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of LGC. It can regulate operation of cable television but only when it encroaches on public properties (public streets, rights of ways) No right conferred to Spacelink. The grant of Sangguniang Panlungsod was ultra vires. There is no more ground for violation of RA 3019 as petitioner is not prejudiced.

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Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 17, 1998, approving the withdrawal of the Information against the respondents and the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 22026, for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, and the Resolution dated September 9, 1998, denying reconsideration thereof, are AFFIRMED 52. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, 576 SCRA 416, 431-432 Petitioners: White Light Corp., Titanium Corp., and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Devt Corp. Respondents: City of Manila, represented by Mayor Alfredo Lim Doctrine: The desirability of the ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Ordinance penalizing establishments with wash-up rates is an invalid exercise of police power since it violates the fundamental rights to liberty and to privacy.

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Issue: W/N the ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power - YES Ratio:

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Facts:

City of Manila enacted Manila City Ordinance No. 7774. o “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila”  Sec. 4. Short-time admission - admission and charging of room rate for less than 12 hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same.  Sec. 5. Penalty Clause - P5k or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both Malate Tourist Devt Corp (MDTC), as owner of Victoria Court in Malate, filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for WPI/TRO. o Petitioners WLC, TC, and SMTC intervened as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. o MDTC withdrew. RTC issued a TRO and a WPI to desist from enforcing the ordinance. o During pre-trial, petitioners agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as it involved a purely legal question. RTC - ordinance is void; made WPI permanent o Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Const. o Cited Const. provisions encouraging private enterprises, and the incentive to needed investment, and the right to operate economic enterprises o The illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay.

City - LGC provides the power “to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.” o Revised Manila Charter - "to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.” CA - reversed o Ordinance did not violate right to privacy or freedom of movement as it only penalizes owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. o Lawful subject - to curb immoral activities, to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike o Lawful means - the establishments are still allowed to operate

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Goal of the ordinance certainly falls within the ambit of police power. o But, the desirability of the ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Strict scrutiny was applied - fundamental rights to liberty and to privacy were involved (see notes) Right to liberty defined by Justice Malcolm - "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." o Included: rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation  Legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed. Right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe v. Mutuc, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. o Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. o Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. o There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day.  Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes.  In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels.  Any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex

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or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. Lacking the lawful means, the ordinance must be struck down. o The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. o Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. o So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.  These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. o Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. o Drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. o And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.

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Dispositive: Petition is granted… Notes:

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Standards of judicial review for validity of an ordinance on substantive due process: o strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process  compelling state interest (not merely substantial govt interest) and on the absence of less restrictive means  Regulation of fundamental freedoms - speech, gender, race, suffrage, judicial access, interstate travel o rational basis standard of review for economic legislation, equal protection challenges o heightened or immediate scrutiny - classifications on gender and legitimacy 53. Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, 172

Issue: 1.

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Respondents: GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, et. al.

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Doctrine: Marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

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Facts:

W/N the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional. – NO.

Ratio:

Petitioners: ALFREDO TANO, et. al.

One of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of: o Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF" o Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa and, o Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS” The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

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The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

ticket, not only in the interest of preventing fraud insofar as municipal taxes are concerned, but also in accordance with public health, public safety and the general welfare

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED. 54. Samson v. City, 60 SCRA 267

6.

Petitioners: Elisa Samson and Angel Gavilan Respondents: Mayor of Bacolod and City Council of Bacolod Doctrine: The burden of demonstrating the alleged nullity of an ordinance rests on the party assailing its infirmity, there being a presumption of its validity . Facts: 1.

2.

3.

The City of Bacolod enacted an Ordinance o Making it unlawful for any proprietor, lessee, or operator of an amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission ticket. A complaint was filed by Samson and Gavilan, who were movie operators. o Alleging that the Ordinance was contrary to the due process clause of the Constitution. The RTC declared the Ordinance null and void. o The RTC however relied merely on the memoranda presented by Samson and Gavilan o No evidence was required to be presented in the RTC.

Issue: WoN the RTC erred in ruling for the invalidity of an Ordinance without the reception of evidence. --YES.

1.

The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

2.

The burden of demonstrating the alleged nullity of an ordinance rests on the party assailing its infirmity, there being a presumption of its validity.

3.

There being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here.

4.

The Municipality, as is seen from the quotation of the general municipal law, has the right to enact ordinances relating to sanitation and the public health. The ordinance as set out above seems to us to be an enactment clearly within the purview of the statute authorizing it, and, while very general in its terms, it contains no provision which of itself is against the fundamental law or act of the Legislature or is oppressive or unreasonable. Unreasonable persons may try to apply it in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree or under unreasonable conditions, but in and of itself the ordinance discloses none of the defects which have been alleged against it.

5.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 22, 1967, declaring null and void Bacolod City Ordinance No. 1074, series of 1967, is hereby reversed and set aside. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court on June 30, 1967, is likewise set aside and declared to be bereft of any force or effect. Costs against plaintiffs. 55. Pp. v. Cheng, 65 Phil 625 Petitioners: People Respondents: Wong Cheng (@ Wong Chun) Doctrine: The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board. Facts:

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Ratio:

insofar as movie houses and other places of amusement are concerned, 23 the least doubt cannot be entertained as to the validity of a measure prohibiting a proprietor, lessee or operator of an amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission

The statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket of admission, and who is not, at the time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. . . . Such a regulation, in itself just, is likewise promotive of peace and good order among those who attend places of public entertainment and amusement. It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the state's inherent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right secured by the Constitution.

Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. A demurrer was filed which alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. This was granted and the case was dismissed.

Issue: WHETHER the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like smoking opium, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters - YAS Ratio:

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Two fundamental rules o the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory o the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of these two rules, it is the English rule that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction,

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and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. o Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order. But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.

Dispositive: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered 56. U.S v. Chantiengco, 25 Phil 89

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Section 33 of Act No. 1147 prohibits the slaughtering of large cattle at the municipal slaughtering house for human consumption or for food without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer. Article 41 of Ordinance No. 12 of the municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union, prohibits the slaughtering of the large cattle within said municipality, even though the object should be for sale, without the permit of the president of the municipal board of health.

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Issue: WON the Municipal Ordinance is valid --- YES Ratio: A municipality, under proper charter authority, may adopt ordinances upon subject already covered by the general law, so long as the ordinance is not repugnant nor in conflict with such general law. The ordinance and general law are not repugnant simply because they are adopted for the same general purpose. The mere fact that a municipality, for the purpose of protecting the health of its people, requires a permit from the president of the municipal board of health for the slaughtering of large cattle, does not contravene nor is it repugnant to the provisions of the general law of the State requiring, for the purposes mentioned in the general law, a permit from the municipal treasurer for the slaughtering of large cattle. The purposes of the two laws are distinct. Many instance might be given showing that an inhabitant of a municipality, before he can do a particularly thing or engage in particular class of business, should secure two permits, one from the municipality and another from the State.

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Petitioners: THE UNITED STATES Respondents: CHAN TIENCO Doctrine: A municipality, under proper charter authority, may adopt ordinances upon subjects already covered by the general law of the state, so long as the ordinance is not repugnant nor in conflict with such general law. Facts: A complaint was filed against Chan Tienco charging him with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 12 issued by the municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union  Violation: slaughtering a bovine animal, without the permission or approval of the president of the municipal board of health CFI found him guilty, and sentenced to a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. His appeal is predicated on the alleged invalidity and unconstitutionality of the Ordinance. He argues that inasmuch as section 33 of Act No. 1147 provides a punishment for slaughtering large cattle without a permit, the municipal ordinance covering the same subject is illegal and unconstitutional.

In granting a permit to slaughter, the president of the municipal board of health examines into the question of the effect upon the health of the people of the community. The municipal treasurer, in granting a permit, examines into entirely different questions. He examines into the question of the identity of the animal, its ownership, etc. The president of the municipal board of health, in granting his permit, examines into the question only of the physical condition of the animal — whether it is in a physical condition to be used as food. Both laws are highly important for the welfare of the people of the municipality. One goes to protect the people in their property rights, and the other goes to protect the people in their health and comfort.

A violation of either law is therefore, a distinct offense from a violation of the other.

Dispositive: Having reached the conclusion that the ordinance is valid, the defendant admitting his guilt under the proof, it is hereby ordered, for the foregoing reasons, that the appeal be dismissed, and that the cause be returned to the court from whence it came with direction that the sentence of the lower court be executed. It is so ordered, with costs. 57. U.S v. Espiritusanto, 23 Phil 610 Petitioners: THE UNITED STATES Respondents: ISIDORO ESPIRITUSANTO Doctrine: Municipal council does not exceed its authority by enacting a municipal ordinance prohibiting gambling and particular acts related to it provided that it kept strictly within the powers conferred upon it by its organic law and the general laws that deal with gambling. Facts:

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Espiritusanto was sentenced to the payment of a fine of P50, to subsidiary imprisonment and the costs for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1910, enacted by the municipal council of Malabon, Rizal Accused was found to be engaged, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, in collecting wagers for the gambling game known as jueteng, the tickets necessary for conducting the same having been seized in his possession. Defendant's counsel appealed from this judgment on the ground that said ordinance was unconstitutional. The Ordinance in question strictly prohibits the game of jueteng within the limits of the said pueblo and prescribes the penalties to be imposed for its violation; it further provides: o That any person who shall collect money for wagers on the said game, or who shall keep, make, or prepare any list of numbers, or representative signs thereof, for use in such game, shall be deemed to be a collector of jueteng, and bankers o Those who directly conduct the game, receive from the collectors the tickets or other contrivances, and are found in possession of the tambiolos or other articles used for the purpose of conducting the said game; o Those who keep or maintain jueteng games shall be deemed to be keepers or maintainers of gambling houses, in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of Act No. 1757.

1. Manuel Opulencia is the owner of Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage. The ice plant was searched by the Batangas City Police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant. 2. An Information was filed for violation of CITY ORDINANCE. The case was dismissed because of prescription. 3. Fourteen days later, the fiscal filed before the CFI another information for violation of art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code (theft of electric power). 4. Opulencia moved to quash the second information on the ground of double jeopardy. Motion to quash granted. MR denied. Fiscal on behalf of People filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus. People argues that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas while the second case is for theft of electric power which are two different offenses. ISSUE: Is there double jeopardy?-- YES

Issue: W/N municipal ordinance no.1 is unconstitutional - NO.

RATIO:

Ratio:

1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

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Municipal council acted within their powers conferred upon it by the Municipal Code and in accordance with Act No. 1757, since the game of jueteng, as one of chance absolutely prohibited by the latter, is not susceptible of regulation, but must be prosecuted and completely suppressed in order to avoid repetitions of the great and far-reaching social and moral evils it has been producing in the towns of the islands of the PH. it is undeniable that the said municipal council did not exceed its authority and kept strictly within the powers conferred upon it by its organic law and the general laws that deal with gambling The ordinance is not a general law, but is merely a regulation of a local nature, and one perfectly valid and effective, provided it is in harmony with the general laws in force in the Islands

Dispositive: For the foregoing reasons we deem it proper to affirm and do hereby affirm the judgment from, with the costs against the appellant. 58. Pp. v. Relova, 148 SCRA 292, Petitioners: People of the Philippines Respondents: THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA Doctrine: The constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.

FACTS

2. People is correct in its argument that the unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. However, the the basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. 3. The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence.

4. In the present case, since the same acts constitute the offense punished under the ordinance and the RPC, there is double jeopardy. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated above. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 59. Yap v. Lutero, 105 Phil 1307 [unreported] Petitioners: (Can’t find the original online ) Respondents: Doctrine: If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Facts: Manuel Yap was criminally charged in MTC with violation of an Iloilo ordinance for reckless driving. (CASE 1) Three months later, Yap was again criminally charged in the same Court, this time with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. (CASE 2) The information charged him with violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law committed by driving and operating an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap averred that Case 2 placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. This was denied by the judge. Meanwhile, the first court had acquitted Yap (in Case 1) Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in CFI to set aside the order of the judge in Case 2. CFI granted it. Issue: W/N there was double jeopardy - yes Ratio: The issue in the case is whether or not, under the information in Case 2, Yap could be convicted of the same act charged in Case 1, in which he has already been acquitted. The information in Case 1 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place therein stated, Yap had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and without reasonable caution" an automobile described in said information. Upon the other hand, the information in Case 2, similarly states that, on the same date and in the same place, Yap drove and operated the aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992) and existing city ordinances." Thus, if the theories mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence, Yap could be convicted in Case 2 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in Case 1, unless he pleaded double jeopardy. Since he pleaded double Jeopardy, therefore, that CFI has not erred.

The Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case. The offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law are derived from the same act or sets of acts — that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The additional technical element of serious physical injuries is a consequence that occurred in the same occasion that the accused operated the automobile (recklessly). Still, the moral element of negligence permeated the act Dispositive: 60. Rivera v. Villegas, 5 SCRA 359 Petitioners: GONZALO SANTOS RIVERA, FRANCIS P. YUSECO,ERIBERTO A. REMIGIO,VICENTE G. CRUZ,PABLO V. OCAMPO, APOLONIO GENER, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO, ALFREDO R. GOMEZ, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, and FRANCISCO VARONA, JR. Respondents: ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board of Manila Doctrine: The Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila possesses in the Municipal Board no more than the prerogatives and authority of a “Presiding Officer” as such and those specified by law (to vote in case of tie, and to sign all ordinances or resolutions and measures directing the payment of money or creating liability enacted or adopted by the board). Facts (MAIN)  Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila involving purely questions of law.  11 petitioners herein are members of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila. o Respondent Antonio J. Villegas was, on the dates material to this case, the ViceMayor of said City and presiding officer of the aforementioned Board.  Alleged in their petition

o

o

o

o

PARAGRAPH 6: March 1960 — The respondent, then present (acts of which are purely ministerial on his part), proceeded to address the same members of the Board  He did this during the regular session of the Municipal Board of Manila  In connection with a deliberation of the members of said Board in voting upon a measure then under discussion  Instead of determining the result of the voting and announcing the same to the members of the Municipal Board  Giving his opinion on the matter under discussion, and otherwise performing acts properly belonging to the members of the Municipal Board respondent, among other things, stating:  "The Chair should not be interrupted because LIKE ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE BOARD, HE HAS THE RIGHT TO SPEAK"  “the Chair holds the view that he has a right to speak as that is one of the freedoms granted us by our Constitution xxx He is not a simple servant of this Body. He is in fact the administrative and legislative head of this Body.” PARAGRAPH 7: March 25, 1960 — The herein respondent caused to be inserted in the body of the approved Resolution, statements and matters, not authorized nor deliberated upon by the members of the Municipal Board who supposedly passed the same  Upon a Resolution submitted by 16 members of the Municipal Board to request the President of the Philippines to order the Honorable Secretary of Public Works and Communications to suspend, recall or repeal the set of rules and regulations  Promulgated by virtue of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 548  Approved on February 9, 1956  Adopted by said Body on same date Said acts and utterances of respondent are "without and/or in excess of his powers" as presiding officer of said Board  Despite petitioners' admonitions to the contrary, respondent persist in performing said acts, thereby unnecessarily delaying and hampering the deliberation of said Board, to the prejudice and damage of the interest and welfare of the people of Manila  There is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to desist in actively participating in the discussions of matters before said Board and giving his opinion and remarks thereon, other than to preside over the sessions of the Board, calling it to order, recognizing members desirous of speaking and performing acts incident to these duties.  Respondent admitted some allegations of the petition, denied other allegations thereof, stated what acts were performed by him and maintained his right to do so.  Lower court rendered judgment for respondent.

 Hence, this appeal

MR denied

Issue: W/N the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila possesses in the Municipal Board no more than the prerogatives and authority of a “Presiding Officer” Ratio:

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Petitioners maintain that the Vice-Mayor of the City and shall consist of the Vice-Mayor as the presiding of but merely its presiding officer, like the Vice-President of the United States, who is ex-officio president of the Senate of the United States, but not a member thereof, and, hence, devoid of the powers and attributes of the latter, except to vote in case of tie. Section 13 of the Revised Charter of Manila, as amended by Republic Act No. 1571, reads, in part: o “The Municipal Board shall be the legislative body of the City and shall consist of the Vice-Mayor as the presiding officer, and five elective members from each representative district who shall hold office for four years. The Vice-Mayor shall have no right to vote except in case of a tie. . . . The presiding officer shall sign all ordinances, or resolutions and measures directing the payment of money or creating liability enacted or adopted by the board. . . .” The language of this provision is clear and explicit. o The Municipal Board of Manila "shall consist of the Vice-Mayor as the presiding officer and five (5) elective members from each" of its representative districts. o The Vice-mayor of Manila forms part, therefore, of said Board  Unlike the Vice-President of the United States  Not a constituent element of its Senate — the same being exclusively "composed of two (2) senators from each State . . ." — although he is "President of the Senate"  And "shall have no vote, unless" its members "be equally divided" (Article I, Section 2, Constitution of the United States)  And unlike the President of the Senate of the Philippines in relation to our Commission on Appointments  Consists only of "twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives", and, accordingly, does not include the President of the Senate  Except insofar as he is its "Chairman ex-officio", and, as such, may vote "in case of tie", and may call the Commission to meet, while the Congress is in session, to discharge such powers and functions as are conferred by the Constitution upon said Commission (Article VI, Sections 12 and 13, Constitution of the Philippines).  The lower court opined that the present case is at parity with that of Bagasao vs. Tumangan o The Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City -- the charter of which provides that "the Municipal Board shall be the legislative body of the city and shall be composed of the Vice-Mayor, who shall be the presiding officer, and two (2) councilors who shall be elected from each district" — is, not only the presiding officer of said Board, but, also, a member thereof, with the right to vote on any proposed ordinance, resolution or motion even though there is no tie. o Finding in effect, that said provision of the charter of Cabanatuan City is identical to that of the City of Manila, the lower court concluded in this case that "respondent is a member of the Municipal Board, with all the rights and privileges" of the latter "(except as to salary) subject to the limitation that he cannot vote except in case of a tie".

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o o o

The Vice-Mayor of Manila is not identically situated as the Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City, except insofar as each forms part of the respective municipal board and presides the same. The former is an integral part of the Municipal Board of Manila, but only "as the presiding officer" thereof. Hence, unlike the Vice-Mayor of Cabanatuan City, that of Manila does not have either the status of a regular member of its municipal board, or the powers and attributes of a municipal councilor. In short, the Vice-Mayor of Manila possesses in the Municipal Board of Manila no more than the prerogatives and authority of a "presiding officer" as such, and those specified by law (to vote in case of tie, and to sign all ordinances or resolutions and measures directing the payment of money or creating liability enacted or adopted by the Board).

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified accordingly, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

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Issue: W/N respondent had authority to act as he did Lower Court Ruling:  Respondent has the power to "preside over the sessions" of the Municipal Board and the position of presiding officer implies direction, control or regulation over the deliberations of the Board  Section 1-A-1(e) of Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Municipal Board: o The presiding officer "shall assist in expediting business"

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This case is weird it has a diff. ruling for the PARAGRAPH 6 allegation and PARAGRAPH 7 allegation? But I’m not sure if need pa to, but just in case, I placed everything here below. Sorry for how weird the formatting of this digest is. PARAGRAPH 6 Facts:  Session prior to March 8, 1960 — the Municipal Board adopted a Liberal Party-sponsored resolution requesting the City Engineer to prepare estimates for the asphalting and/or cementing with curbs and gutters all the unasphalted streets of the city.  Session of March 8 — Nacionalista councilor Maceda presented a MR of the approval of the said resolution  Respondent as presiding officer ruled, on a point of order raised by Liberal Party councilor Isidro, that the motion for reconsideration was out of order o According to respondent, the resolution had already been implemented and the matter was already in the hands of the City Engineer  Nacionalista councilor Maceda appealed the ruling of respondent to the Board

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While respondent was obtaining the decision of the Board on the appeal of Nacionalista councilor Maceda by counting raised hands and after counting 11 votes in favor, Liberal Party councilor Quintos asked for nominal voting. Respondent granted the request for nominal voting relying on section 17 of the Charter and section 6(e) and 6(g) of Rule VII of the Rules of the Board. o Nacionalista councilor Remigio in turn raised a point of order, objecting to nominal voting because voting by raised hands had already begun. o Respondent overruled the point of order, because the purpose of nominal voting was to record the names of those in favor, those against and those abstaining. An appeal from this last ruling was then made by Nacionalista councilor Maceda o During the nominal voting, the Nacionalista councilors gave their votes and explained their votes by arising many charges against respondent as presiding officer for allegedly violating the Rules of the Board and favoring the Liberal Party minority As respondent was about to answer these accusations and innuendos, he was interrupted by Nacionalista councilor Ocampo who even walked out of the session, followed by the other Nacionalista councilors prompting a recess

When session was resumed, respondent again attempted to answer the charges against him o But he was again rudely interrupted by Nacionalista councilor Maceda who questioned respondent's right to speak, leading to adjournment Thus was respondent's right to speak come to be questioned

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Robert's Rules of Order: o "If at any time, the chairman rises to state a point of order, or give information, or otherwise speak, within his privilege, a member speaking must take his seat till the chairman has been heard first. When called to order by the chair, the member must sit down until the question of order is decided." o ". . . Whenever the presiding officer decides a question of order, he has the right, without leaving his chair, to state the reasons for his decision . . ." In view of the foregoing, the right of respondent Presiding Officer to state his reasons for his ruling as happened here is undeniable.

SC Ruling:

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Owing to the recent demise of the Mayor of Manila and the ascent to said office of the Vice-Mayor, respondent herein, the issues herein have thereby become moot. o This notwithstanding, the Court deems it best to pass upon said issues in the interest of public policy and welfare. The SC is fully in accord with the LC ruling. o The right of a presiding officer to state the reasons for his rulings as such is too obvious to require demonstration.

PARAGRAPH 7 Facts:  March 18, 1960 — Nacionalista councilor Gatmaitan submitted a motion co-authored by the 19 other councilors, for the adoption of a resolution requesting the Mayor of Manila to suspend the enforcement of Commonwealth Act No. 548 o Respondent as presiding officer stated that the Mayor of Manila could not suspend the enforcement of a duly enacted law and that the motion, should therefore be modified o Liberal Party councilor Isidro likewise submitted a written motion proposing the adoption of a resolution requesting the mayor to order the Manila Police Department to hold in abeyance or suspend the enforcement of the traffic rules and regulations allegedly promulgated under Commonwealth Act No. 548 o The Nacionalista majority floorleader then moved to consolidate the proposal of Nacionalista councilor Gatmaitan as proposed to be modified by respondent and the proposal of Liberal Party councilor Isidro. This motion was adopted.  March 22, 1960 — 13 councilors headed by Liberal Party councilor Isidro submitted a motion that the Board adopt "a resolution requesting the Honorable Secretary of Public Works & Communications to suspend, recall or repeal certain regulations promulgated by

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virtue of Sec. 1 of CA 548 which prohibits animal-drawn vehicles to pass through streets, plaza and bridges in the City of Manila". o There being no objection, this motion was declared by respondent as approved There being no adopted worded resolution, respondent framed the following resolution based on the records Respondent drafted and authenticated resolution Exhibit 6-B

Lower Court Ruling:  It is clear that resolution Exhibit 6-B duly interpreted the will of the Municipal Board as can be gleaned from the reasons given by the members as per minutes of March 18, 22 and 25, 1960.  The reasons which were incorporated in the corresponding resolution were based mainly on the statements of Councilor Manuel Isidro during the session of the Board on March 22, 1960 as well as on the motions Exhibits 6 & 3-F.  The right and duty of respondent to frame the questioned resolutions may be gleaned from his duty as presiding officer to authenticate, whenever necessary, all orders, acts, and proceedings of the Board, declaring its wills and obeying its commands  ". . . It is his (presiding officer's) duty to declare the will of the body over which he presides, ascertained by rules previously adopted, or, in the absence of such rules, by other methods not repugnant to the due and orderly procedure of a deliberative body" (37 Am. Jur. 672). 61. Velasco v. Blas, 115 SCRA 540

Issue: W/N Resolution No. 68 of the Provincial Board of Cavite is ultra vires because it is beyond the powers granted to the board by Sec. 2233 of the Revised Administrative Code? YES Ratio: Sec. 2233 of the Revised Administrative Code Sec. 2233. Provincial board to pass on legality of municipal proceedings. — “…If the board should in any case find that any resolution, ordinance, or order, as aforesaid, is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or mayor making the same, it shall declare such resolution, ordinance, or order invalid, entering its action upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such action shall be to annul the resolution, ordinance, or order in question, subject to action by the Secretary of the Interior as hereinafter provided."

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Petitioners: VIRGILIO S. VELAZCO and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CAVITE Respondents: EMILIA S. BLAS, CONRADO SAYAS and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH IV, TAGAYTAY CITY Doctrine: The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same

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Facts:

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Resolution No. 3, of the Municipal Council of Silang, Cavite, authorized Emilia S. Blas to operate a cinema. Because the cinema would be near the medical clinic of Dr. Velazco, the resolution expressly prohibited the installation and use of any loudspeaker or any similar device. After receiving official advice of the resolution, Blas started construction of the cinema. However, the Provincial Board of Cavite, upon representations made by Dr. Velazco, approved Resolution No. 68 which declared Resolution No. 3 null and void on the ground that it was contrary to the provisions of R.A. No. 1224. And because Blas continued with the construction of the cinema notwithstanding the action of the Provincial Board, it passed Resolution No. 80 advising the Mayor of Silang to stop the construction. He did not succeed so Dr. Velazco filed an action in the trial court to declare the operation of the cinema illegal and to stop its construction because (1) the noise produced by the construction was harmful to the patients of the clinic and (2) the operation of the cinema contravenes the provisions of R.A. No. 1224. After holding that the operation of the cinema does not contravene R.A. No. 1224, and that the noise from the construction was not a nuisance, the trial court dismissed the complaint.

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We agree with the trial court that the resolution of the Provincial Board in question suffers from a fatal legal infirmity. For it is manifest that the municipal council has the power to authorize and regulate the operation of cinemas, not by virtue of R.A. No. 1224 but pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by Chapter 57, Article IX of the Revised Administrative Code. Upon the other hand, the only power granted to the provincial board by Sec. 2233 of the same Code is to declare a municipal council issuance void on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the municipal council to issue. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. The provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president. The law does not require the approval of the Provincial Board for the validity of municipal ordinances or resolutions. It only authorizes the Board to declare them invalid if in excess of its powers. Having declared the action of the Board null and void, therefore, the Court does not have to declare the municipal council resolution valid. It is valid by operation of law. On a purely legal point of view, the courts are vested with the power to determine the validity of municipal proceedings despite a previous determination by the provincial board.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No special pronouncement as to costs. 62. Manantan v. Luna, supra|| G.R. No. L-2337 || February 26, 1949 Petitioners: JULIAN SEGUNDO MANANTAN, MARIA A. VDA. DE TALAVERA, BEATRIZ TALAVERA MORALES, accompanied by her husband JESUS MORALES, and DELFIN B. FLORES Respondents:THE MUNICIPALITY OF LUNA, LA UNION, JOSE N. ANCHETA, Mayor, JOSE A. NUVAL, AMBROSIO ARIBON, HILARIO NAZAL, ROMUALDO MULATO, EULOGIO CASEN CATALINA RESURRECCION, councilors, and TIMOTEO SANTAROMANA Doctrine:the only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution invalid is when such resolution is beyond the powers conferred upon the council making the same

Facts:

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On 1945, the municipal council of Luna, Province of La Union, passed its Resolution No. 32, for the purpose of offering at public auction on 1946, a lease of the privilege to catch "banñ gus" fry within certain section of the municipal waters. The pertinent part off the resolution reads: RESOLVED FURTHER, That said lease should be paid in cash by the successful bidder and that the minimum bid is hereby fixed to the minimum price of One thousand pesos (P1,000) for one year, beginning January 1, 1946 up to and including December 31, 1949 that said lease can be extended for a period of from one to four years, to be paid in cash or by yearly installments as this council may deem it profitable for the best interest of the government of this municipality. Acting on the authority granted in said resolution the municipal treasurer issued the necessary notices for the auction wherein it was stated, among other things that the fishing privilege in question would be leased to the highest bidder ranging from P1,000 and up together with a deposit of 10 per cent of the amount so offered for the period of one year from January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946." with the further statement that "Bids for more than one year but not more than four years can be offered. Prospective bidders may see the Municipal Secretary about the conditions of the lease for more than one year. Bid was conducted. In official confirmation of this declaration the municipal council passed Resolution No. 37, series of 1946, granting to Julian Segundo Manantan and his associates the fishing privilege in question and authorizing the municipal mayor to execute the corresponding contract of lease. After paying the P1,000 corresponding to the first year of the lease, the lessees began catching "bangus" fry within the fishery zone in question. But on July 20, 1946, the municipal council, now composed of a new set councilors headed by a new mayor, passed, Resolution No. 2, series requesting the Provincial Board of La Union to annul Resolution No. 32, series of 1945, and the fishing privilege granted thereunder to Julian Segundo Manantan and his partners, and the request having been granted, the said council, on December 22, 1946, approved Resolution No. 23 fishing privilege for the year 1947 at the minimum auction, Julian Segundo Manantan, later joined by his partners, commenced the present suit in the Court of First Instance of La Union to have the last-mentioned resolution declared void and the municipal council enjoined from carrying out the auction. The municipal council, however, went ahead with the auction and awarded the lease for the fishing privileges in question to Timoteo Santaromana,. But the petitioners succeeded in having a writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 11, 1947, against the municipality, the municipal mayor, the municipal councilors, and Timoteo Santaromana, enjoining them and their agents from preventing the petitioners form enjoining their privilege under the lease. Court of First Instance decided in favor of the respondents, holding Resolution No. 37, series of 1946, and the fishery lease contract granted thereunder to the petitioners to null and void, and in consequence upholding the validity of the lease contract granted to Timoteo Santaromana and requiring the petitioners to account for the value of the "banñ gus" fry caught by them from the date of the issuance of the preliminary injunction, less reasonable expenses.

Issue:Whether or not the lower court erred in holding Resolution No. 37 to be null and void, and in not declaring Resolution No. 23 null and void as violative of the constitutional provision prohibiting the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts.--NO Ratio:

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The learned trial judge rightly held that Resolution No. 32 (the one authorizing the first auction) was not invalidated by the fact that it was disapproved by the provincial board, since "the only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal

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resolution invalid is when such resolution is beyond the powers conferred upon the council making the same", and there is no question that Resolution No. 32 is within the powers granted to municipal councils by the Fishery Law (section 67, Act No. 4003 as amended by Com. Act. No. 471). His Honor, however, was in error in taking the view that Resolution No. 37 and the lease contract granted under it were null and void on the ground that when the municipal council by said resolution "accepted the four-year if proposal of petitioners and declared them to be the best and highest bidders for the 1946- 1949 fishing privilege, the municipal council in effect awarded to the petitioners the four fishing privilege without the intended benefits of public auction, in violation of section 69 of Act No. 4003, the Fishery Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471." We don't think this assumption is justified by the terms of the resolution. It is true that the resolution fixes the minimum price for the lease at P1,000 for one year "beginning January 1, 1946, up to and including December 31, 1949." But nowhere does it say that the lease was to be for one year only. On the contrary, it expressly provides that the lease "can be extended for a period of from one to four years," thus indicating an intention not to limit the duration of the lease to one year. In accord with that intention, the municipal treasurer, in announcing the public auction, inserted in the notice a provision that "bids for more than one year but not more than four years can be offered," and the same municipal council which passed the resolution (No. 32) confirmed that intention by entertaining and accepting in its Resolution No. 37 the petitioners' bid for four years. As that part of the notice issued by the municipal treasurer which calls for bids for a longer period than one year but not more than four years is in accord with the real intent of Resolution No. 32, as that intention was subsequently confirmed in Resolution No. 37 of the same municipal council, the said notice can not be deemed to be unauthorized and void, so that it is erro to hold that he grant of the fishing privilege to the petitioners was null and void for lack of a valid notice of the public auction. It results that the contract of lease entered into under the authority of Resolution No. 37 between the petitioners and the municipal government of Luna is a valid and binding contract and as such it is protected by the Constitution and can not, therefore, be impaired by a subsequent resolution which sets in it aside and grants the fishing privilege to another party.

DISPOSITIVE : Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is revolved and another one shall be entered declaring the contract entered into between the municipal government of Luna, Province of La Union and Julian Segundo Manantan and his associates under the authority of Resolutions No. 32, series f 1945 and No. 37, series of 1946, to be valid; and Resolution No. 27, series of 1946, and the contract entered into thereunder between the same municipal government and Timoteo Santaromana to be void as violative of the constitutional provision against the impairment of the obligation of contracts. With costs against the appellees. 63. Guzman v. Taytay, 65 Phil 340 Petitioners: Respondents: Doctrine: Facts: Issue: Ratio: Dispositive: