The Brahmavadin
Series.
THE SKI-BHASHYA.
PUBLISHED BY M. C.
ALA The
S "
I
NGA
PP E R
UMA
Bra h mavadiu" Pr e ss,
TRIFLJCANE, MADRAS.
L,
B. A.
TH
VEDArtTA-SUT-RAS WITH THE
SRI-SHASHYA OF
Translated
into
English
BY
RANGACHARYA,
M.
M.A.,
AND M. B.
VARADARAJA AIYANQAR,
VOLUME
,
THE
"
a
/.
r a s
BRAHMAVIDIN
:
"
PRESS.
1899. (
AH Rights
B.A., B.L.
Reserved.
)
THIb VOLUME
IS
DEDICATED TO
The Right Honourable Professor
by
F.
Max
Mullen,
the
TRANSLATORS in grateful recognition of his valuable services rendered
to the cause of Sanskrit Literature.
2052105
PREF
is
the
THIS posed
first
CE.
of the three volume? in which
to bring out an English translation
it is
of
pro-
Rama,
nujacharya's Sri-Bhashya, his well-known commentary on the Vedanta-Sfitras of Badarayana. The Veddnta of India
has
now fully established its
title to
occupy a prominent place
of philosophy
known
to the
among
the various
world
and one aspect of it commonly called the Adwaita-
;
systems
Vedanta has long been familiar to European scholars, and has even met with fair recognition at their hands. Ramanujacharya's Sri tthdshya,
is
dwaita aspect thereof, and
it
an exposition of the Visishtdwell deserves to be quite as
known and appreciated as the Adwaita-Veddnta of Sankaracharya. The Visishtddwaitins represent a school widely
of Veddntic thought, of which Sankaracharya himself has taken cognisance in his writings, and there is evidence to shew that it must have come down in the form of an un-
broken tradition from very ancient times. The Bhagavaand Pancharatras, who have obviously played a very im-
tas
portant part in the history of Hindu religion, are in all probability the original system-makers of this school,
which appears to be as old as the Upamshads themselves. The Upamshads and the Bagavadgitd teach both jttana and bhakti that is, they teach that both wisdom and ;
worship are capable of forming the means for the attainment of salvation. All along in 'our history some seekers
and salvation may be seen to have relied more wisdom than upon worship, while others have relied upon
after truth
This division in
more upon worship than upon wisdom. thought
religious
is
human
belong to the latter
class.
two
of
truly representative
innate tendencies in
dissimilar
nature, and the Bhagavatas
How
far the
Vi'sishtadwaita
school interprets the Upamshads and the Bagava,dgita aright is thus a question to which each earnest student of the Veddnta has to find his
own
The
answer.
discussion
volume of the various Veddntic problems dealt with is so full and so well expressive of the fundamental conin this
clusions
embodied
volume a
in
rl-8k­a that
the
characteristic
gives the
it
completeness, in spite of its being work. It is therefore expected
only a part of the whoie
that students of Indian philosophy and find this
volume
to be interesting
and
Hindu
religion will
instructive.
For the purposes of this translation we have consulted of the Sri-Bhdshya the Madras edition in printed Telugu characters, the Benares edition in Devanagari characters, and the incomplete Calcutta edition, also in three editions
Devanagari characters and published by the Asiatic Society We have found the Madras edition the most accurate
among
these,
lation.
The
tative
We
and have accordingly followed style of the Srl-Bkdshya
and controversial, and
it is
intelligible
The
in
our trans-
severely argumen-
make
without any
faithfulness to the original.
it
also technical
have, however, tried our best to
smooth and
is
and
terse.
the translation
way
sacrificing its
additions and alterations
needed to make the English rendering
full and accurate are enclosed within curved brackets and the references to the various quotations and authorities cited in the work
all
;
are generally given within square brackets, a few of these references being also given in foot-notes. Foot-notes have
been sparingly given, and only thought they were absolutely
in places
where
it
was
necessary for the elucidation
Ill
and proper understanding of the text of the translation. With the object of enabling the readers to make out the varieasily the nature and the relations between ous
parts
of
the
closely
arguments to be
reasoned
this volume, we have given in the beginning an analytical outline of the contents of the volume. A table showing our system of transliteration and a list
found in
containing the abbreviations used by us are given at the end of the volume. The word dtman is used in Sanskrit to
denote the
Brahman
as
well as the jiva
;
hence
it
has been translated as Self where it denotes the former and as self where it denotes the latter ; and the pronouns
who and which have been more or
form of karma, and its plural given as karmas, as these forms seem to have be-
been uniformly used is
less indiscriminately
The word karman has
used in relation to both of them.
come
fairly
in the
current in
The
English.
printing
work has
had to be done somewhat hurriedly, and a few errors have unavoidably crept in. The more serious ones among them are pointed out and corrected in a list of errata appended hereto.
We
do not know
of the Sri-B flashy a
is
all
how that
our English rendering should be, but we have
far
it
spared no pains to make it as good as we can. We are well aware that it is capable of much improvement and ;
yet
it
may
not perhaps
be too
much
to hope that our
attempt to present faithfully in English the thoughts of one of India's great teachers and religious reformers will be productive of some good in the way of helping on the world's appreciation of India's philosophic integrity and religious earnestness.
NOVEMBER,
MADRAS.
1899. ) )
M.
M.
R.
V. B.
CONTENTS. CHAPTER PART
I.
I.
PAGE. 1.
Analytical outline of contents
...
2.
Adhikarana
...
I.
...
i-lxxv. i.
3-
H
257.
4.
III
264.
5-
IV
284.
6.
V
328.
8.
VI VII
400.
9.
VIII
7-
10.
IX.
n.
346.
409. ...
...
417.
X.
...
...
419.
XI.
...
...
425.
13.
List of Abbreviations
...
...
437.
14.
Table of Transliteration
...
439.
15.
Addenda
...
441.
12.
,,
et Corrigenda.
AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTENTS OF VOLUME |.
In the Introduction to his
Veddntadipa Ramanuja summarises the teachings of the Vedanta to the following effect
Of the
:
three ultimate entities
the intelligent individual soul non-intelligent matter
Soul of the universe, vidual soul.
The
matter, soul and
;
is
is
known to philosophy,
essentially different from
and God, who forms the Supreme absolutely different from the indi-
essential differences thus existing
God
and natural.
are intrinsic
between
God,
who
the same as the Supreme Brahman, is the cause of the universe and the universe, which is made up of matter is
;
produced by Him. Matter and soul form the body of God and this body is capable of existing in a subtle as well as in a gross condition. God with
and
soul, is the effect
;
body constitutes the universe in its causal condiand with His gross body He forms the created
his subtle
tion
;
universe
The
itself.
thereby makes
it
and
individual soul enters into matter
live
;
and
similarly
God
enters
into
matter and soul and gives them their powers and their The universe without God is exactly peculiar characters. analogous to matter without soul
know
it, all
things are
;
what they
and
in the
world as
are, because
God
we has
penetrated into them and rules and guides them all from within, so much so that all things are representative of
Him and The
all
words denote
Him
in the
main.
chapter of the VedantaSiitras of Badarayana deals, says Ramanuja, with the question of what constitutes the cause of the world and first
part
of the
first
;
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
ii
commentary on the aphorisms making up that first part. They are intended to demonstrate that the Prakriti (non-ego) and the Purusha (ego) volume contains
this
his
of the Saftkhyas do not constitute the cause of the world, but that the cause thereof is the omniscient and omnipot-
God Himself who
ent of
all
is
wholly pure and abundantly
Those aphorisms are
auspicious qualities. Then therefore the enquiry into the
1.
(The Brahman
2.
whom
that) from
is
full
as follow:-
Brahman. (proceed) the
creation, &c., of this (universe).
(That the
3.
Brahman
is
the cause of the creation,
&c., of the universe, follows altogether from the scripture ), because the scripture forms the source (of the knowledge relating to
Him). That (viz. the
4.
fact that the
scripture forms alto-
gether the source of the knowledge relating to the Brahman] results, however, from (His constituting) the true
purport (of the scripture). Because the activity imported by the root iksh 5. predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world), that which is not (to see
i.
to
e.
think]
is
revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the pradhana) is not (the Sat or the Existence which is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to the cause of the world). 6.
If
it
iksh, to see)
be said that
-is
cannot be so
;
it
who
is
maintained that)
(here) figurative,
(it is
because there
the word
mentioned in the context). Because (also) it 7. he
the import of the root
(viz.
is
firmly devoted to
is
Atman
it
(or Self
taught (in the context) that
That
(viz.
the Sat) obtains
final release. 8.
that
Because also
it (viz.
what
is
it is
not declared
(in
the context)
denoted by the word Sat or Existence)
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
iii
deserves to be discarded. 9.
Because
(also) there
would then be the contradic-
tion of the proposition (enunciated in the context). 10.
Because
(also) there is
(mentioned
the withdrawal (of the individual (/. e. into the Sat}.
in the context)
self) into
its
own
cause
Because there has to be a similarity of import (between the passage under reference and the other pas11.
sages relating to the cause of the creation, &c., of the world). 12.
in
Because also
it is
revealed
(in
the very LTpanishad in other
which the passage under discussion occurs, and
Upanishads, that the Supreme Self
is
the cause of the
universe).
denoted by the word Anandamaya (is the Brahman); because there is, (in the context), the which culminate in various of bliss repetition (of grades 13.
the
That which
Anandamaya 14.
affix
It
(may at)
may
is
or the Highest Bliss). be said that owing to there being the
significant of modification (the
Anandamaya)
not (the Brahman}\ but it is not (right to say) so; because that (affix mayat) signifies abundance. is
15.
Because also
(in the context) to
He
(the
Anandamaya)
declared
is
be the cause of that (which forms the
of the individual souls). 1 6. (Because) also that same Being, who the words of the mantra (in the context),
bliss
by
(there to be the
denoted
is is
declared
Anandamaya).
He who is other (than the Brahman) is not (that who is denoted by the words of the mantra), because
17.
Being (in
such a case) there would be inappropriateness. 1 8. Because also there is (in the context) the decla-
ration of difference
Brahman}.
(between the individual
self
and the
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
iv
Because also His will
19.
creation), the
it is
in
itself
the cause of
Him
in the act not needed (by needed by the individual self).
pradhdna
of creation just as
(is
is
(Because) also it (viz. the scripture) declares (that) his (/. e. the individual self's) acquisition of that (bliss takes place when he is) in (association with) this 20.
(Anandamaya).
He
21.
the eye
e. the Person) who is within (the Sun and (/. the Brahman], because His attributes are dethe context).
is
clared (in 22.
And He
different
is
(from the Sun and other
dividual selves), because., also there difference (between the
Brahman on
is
in-
the declaration of
the one hand, and
the Sun and other individual selves on the other). That which is denoted by the word Akasa 23.
(is
the
Brahman}, because His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context in relation to what is denoted by that word). 24.
For that same reason (which has been given in by the word
the case of the Akdsa), He who is denoted Prdna (also in the context is the Brahman}. 25.
That which
is
denoted by the vrordjyotis (is the is the mention of (His) feet (in a
Brahman), because there connected context).
be said that, on account of the metre (known as the gdyatrl] being mentioned (in the context, the Light 26.
If
it
or Jyotis described above is) not (the Brahman), it is not (right to say) so because the teaching (here) relates to the concentration of the mind (on the Brahman) conceived as ;
that
same (gdyatri)
:
indeed the scripture declares
it
ac-
cordingly. 27.
Because also
it is
appropriate only thus to deand other objects form the
clare that (intelligent) beings
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE o? CONTENTS,
v
feet (of the Gayatri).
be said that, on account of there being a
If it
28.
text,
between the (two) teachings (given in the conwhat is denoted by the wordjyotis or Light) is not
(the
Brahman),
even
in
difference
cannot be (right to say) so
it
both those (teachings) there contradictory (of each other).
That which
29.
other such words
is
is
because
nothing that
is
denoted by Prdna (Indra and
the Brahman], because
is
;
it is
so under-
stood in the sequel.
be said that, oir account of the speaker (Indra) declaring himself (to be the object of worship, what is denoted by the words Indra and Prdna is) not (the If
30.
Brahman,
it
it
replied that
is
it
cannot be
so);
because
here (in this context) the mention of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self. there
is
And
the teaching (in the context) is, as in the case of Vamadeva, in accordance with the view found in 31.
the scripture. If
32.
it
be said that, on account of the characteris-
of the individual self and of the principal vital air (bein the context) there is no (reference to the
tics
ing mentioned
Brahman
here at
all, it is
replied that)
it
cannot be (right
to say) so ; because the worship (of the Brahman} has a threefold nature ; because (elsewhere) this (threefold nature of
His worship)
is
taken
for
granted
;
and because here
in the present context also) that
(same kind of worreferred be to. appropriately ship,) may In accordance with the general fashion of Indian (/. e.
writers, in
Ramanuja begins
praise
of
God,
his
wherein
Srl-Bhdshya with a stanza he
lays particular
stress
on man's duty of love and devotion to God, preferring love and devotion even to the
this
wisdom of the understand-
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE O$ CONTENTS.
Vi
ing.
Then
ancient
in
another stanza he speaks of the traditionally of the teachings contained in the
character
Veddnta-Sutras, and gratefully recognises the value of the rendered by early teachers in preserving and on those teachings, in accordance with which he handing services
himself undertakes to interpret the Veddnta-Sutras. (Vide page i). After declaring that his own explanation of the
accordance with the interpretation given by ancient teachers ', such as Bodhayana, Dramida, Taiika,
Sutras '
is
in
commences the discussion of the meaning of the " Then therefore the first aphorism enquiry into the Brahman" The words of the Sutra are taken into consideration one after another, and their meaning and &c., he
grammar are both clearly explained (pp. 2 to 4). He then gives what is called the Vakyartha of the Sutra, this Vdkydrtha being the
full
meaning that
is
conveyed by the
In keeping with the division of the revealed scripture of the Hindus into the Karmakdnda and i\\Qjfidnakdnda, there are two systems of aphoristic
sentence as a whole.
philosophic enquiry known as the Karma-mlmdmsd and the Brahma-mlmdmsd. The former of these is what may
be called a philosophy of sacrificial rites, and the latter is a philosophy that deals with the metaphysical foundations of the universe.
Karmakdnda
The
or the
Jttanakdnda or the
historical
relation
between the
Old Testament of the Vedas and the Testament thereof is one of
New
antecedence and sequence.
And
here this
first
aphorism
interpreted to mean that, immediately after acquiring the knowledge of the philosophy of Vcdic sacrificial rites,
is
the study of the philosophy of the Brahman has to be begun, for the reason that ritualistic works yield only
small and unenduring results while the 'knowledge' of the Brahman gives rise to immortality and eternal free-
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. dom. tion,
Bodhayana and on
is
Vll
quoted in support of this interpreta-
his authority the
two Mimdmsds are declared
Since every Indian to form parts of one science (page 5). learn the as well as the is to Karmakdnda Arya enjoined
Jildnakdnda of the Vedas,
Karma-mimdmsd
of the
to this view
it is
it
is
be argued that the study In answer quite superfluous.
may
pointed out that, in that injunction, learning
the Vedas means nothing more than merely learning them by heart, and that such learning is efficacious in making them serve better whatever purpose they are intended to.
and
serve,
also in giving rise to a
prima facie impression
that ritualistic works yield insignificant and impermanent results while there is a mention made in the Upanishads
of
attainment
the
to 8).
Then Veddntic
tibility
of
everlasting
immortality (pp. 6 show the destruc-
texts are quoted to
of the results of mere ritualistic works and the
indestructible character of the results
arising
from the
knowledge of the Brahman, and it is concluded that the study of the Karma-mlmdmsd must precede the study of the
Brahma-mlmdmsd
8 to 10).
("pp.
Having thus stated his view of what meaning the word then conveys in this first aphorism, Ramanuja states the objections against his view with the object of meeting
them
so as to justify his
own
interpretation.
A
statement
of objections that is given with an intention to meet them and the objection against Ramais called a Purvapaksha ;
nuja's interpretation of the word then here is known as the ' Laghu-purvapaksha or the small objection ', in as much '
a 'great objection coming later on as against his interpretation of the word therefore. In this ' small
as there
is
'
objection
the
opinions of
Saiikara
and Bhaskara
are
shown
to contradict each other, and Sankara's opinion regarding the meaning of the word then is summarised thus :
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Vlll
The cause of the bondage
(of the soul)
is
merely the
perception of distinctions, which is based on unreality and has its origin in the avidyd (or ignorance) that veils
the true nature
of the
Brahman
this
;
itself
bondage
it is desolely by reason of its unreality the stroyed to the very roots by means of knowledge is derived that (the bondage) knowledge (so) destroys
is
unreal
;
;
out of (scriptural) passages such as "That thou art" &c.; works are of no use in causing the origination of such knowledge in its own true nature, or in producing the
knowledge that is so derived out of such passages, but the use of works consists only in (producing) the desire to know (the Brahman}] and the use of works effect of this
to be found in causing the increase of sattva or the quaan increase resulting from the destruction lity of goodness
is
of rajas and
tamas
of passion and darkness respectively, which form the roots of sin and this use of works, therefore, having in view only or the
qualities
;
it
the scripture--" Brahmanas desire to Hence, on account of the uselessness of the
declared in
is
know, &c."
knowledge of works, the aforesaid fourfold means alone has to be stated to be the necessary antecedent of the enquiry into the
Then the
'
Brahman
follows
what
is
(pp. 10 to 15.).
called the
'
small conclusion
that
is
Laghn-siddhdnta or
the answer to the
'
small
In this answer it is pointed out that it is not the mere knowledge of what the scripture says that tends to the removal of ignorance and the attainment o f immor-
objection'.
but that devotion, meditation and worship alone can produce such a result. It is here shown how a purely intellectual realisation of the truth cannot eradicate the tality,
innate tendencies towards error, and ledge
is
how
the word know-
frequently enough used in the scriptures to
mean
-
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONSENTS.
ix
the same things as devotion, meditation or worship. Tanka quoted in support of this view and in support of the
is
contention that the innate tendency towards error can be cured only by work and worship. It is further shown that the fourfold mental and moral equipment, which, according to Sankara, ought to precede the study of the Vedanta t
can be acquired only with the help of devotion, meditation and worship, and that ritualistic elements such as the UdgilJia, &c., are also referred to in the Vedanta for the reason that they are helpful to meditation and to the acquisition of the needed mental and moral equipment
mentioned above (pp. 15 to
27.).
The meaning conveyed by the word
therefore
is
then
taken into consideration, and the Mahd-prtrvapaksha or the great objection against the view of Ramanuja, as fully
'
f
by the followers of Sankara, is fairly fully stated (pp. The main question dealt with in this Purvapaksha naturally bears upon what it is that forms the cause for leading us to enquire into the Brahman, and why it is that
given
27 to 53.).
the enquiry into the Brahman has to be begun and conducted and the opinion of the Adwaitin on this question is given to the effect that the study of the Vedanta has to ;
be undertaken to remove the avidyd or ignorance that is at the root of the world's manifestation of variety, so as to attain the
knowledge of the oneness of the
Brahman, who and
is,
free (p. 53.). '
1
great
objection
self
with the
nature, eternal, pure, self-luminous
by The various points mentioned in this The unqualified are the following :
Brahman
other things are only assumed to exist in Him, and are therefore unreal (pp. 27absolute
30.). is
knowledge
is
of
B
is
real
;
all
that which, being grounded upon what liable to be stultified by means of the
Unreality
perceived,
alone
is
things
as
they
.are
;
and the world of
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. phenomena is based upon ignorance or avidya, and is hence such an unreality (pp. 30-32.). Knowledge destroys this ignorance which forms the foundation of our world-perception ; and the knowledge which so destroys ignorance and the consequent bondage of unreality is the knowledge that the self or the alman of the individual is one with the
Brahman (pp. 32-33.). Scriptural authority is all along aptly quoted in support of every one of these points. It is then shewn how, when there is conflict between scripture and perception, the former is of stronger authority
absolute
and
capable of stultifying the latter (pp. 33-35.). There being scriptural passages which deal with the one absolute Brahman and those which deal with the phenomenal is
world of variety and distinctions, it is shown how the former passages are of stronger authority than the latter,
and how
it is
even possible
for
some portions of the
ture to stultify other portions thereof (pp. 35-37.)'
scrip-
Then The '
the meaning of the definitive scriptural sentence Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity is discussed '
from the Adwaitic stand-point, and
shown how that
it is
Brahman
sentence defines the absolute attributeless is
essentially in
sion of the
Himself (pp.
meaning of
37-42.).
So
as
He
far it is a discus-
scriptural passages.
After this the
At is argued out on independent lines. out that brought perception apprehends only pure and unqualified existence, and that the distinction between
Adwaitic position first it is
things neither belongs to their essential nature nor constiIt is tutes any attribute of existence in itself (pp. 42-44.). then pointed out that all external objects are invariably
apprehended as compounded of existence and experience, that in all perceptive cognitions existence alone unvaryof things ingly persists, while the differentiating peculiarities are seen to vary from thing to thing, and that therefore pure
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. unqualified existence alone this
is
and
real,
compounded experience too
that, in as
xi
much
as
persists like existence in all
perceptive cognitions, experience also constitutes the reality
and has to be the same as existence itself (pp. 44-46.). And the experience which thus constitutes the reality is thereafter declared to
own
knowability as well as of the realisation that
knowable
(pp. 46-48.).
ence or what of
be so self-evident as to be the cause of
is
Then
it is
shown that
otherwise called consciousness
is
this experi-
is,
on account
,
nature, eternal, unoriginated, immodiundifferentiated, and that it is the same entity
self-evident
its
fiable
and
as the
alman
or the self (pp. 49-51.).
Finally the question
of personality is taken up for consideration, and it that the alman or the self is not the same as the in as
it
:
its
much
as the idea of
knowership
is
argued
knowen
in relation to the self
the result of the limitation imposed upon the intelligent principle of consciousness by the material principle is
known
of egoity
self-experience
is
as ahankdra,
possible
and
even
in
when
as
much
there
is
as again
no
no-
of egoity, as during dreamless sleep, swoon, &c. It further argued that the internal self is a mere witness,
tion is
and as such must be different from the knower which is the same as the ego or the thing '!'; and it is then shown that this limitation of personality cannot be an attribute of the self which is pure and undifferentiated
and that in the beatific state of final release free from the limitation of personality, even as it
intelligence,
the self
is
found to be so free in the condition of dreamless sleep. The one intelligent and undifferentiated principle of conis
"
shown
to be
the only reality, it is arrived at that the reason for undertaking the study of the sciousness being thus
Vcdanta wise
is
to understand the nature of this reality, other-
known
as the
Brahman, and to
realise that everything
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Xli
any manner whatsoever different from it wholly unreal (pp. 51 to 53.) The Mahd-purvapaksha which
the
in
is
is
or
'
'
here brought to an end. great objection Then begins the Mahd-siddhdnta or the great conclusion of Ramanuja and his school regarding the meanis
'
'
ing of the
word
therefore
in
the
first
The
aphorism.
meaning conveyed by this word is thus expressed (p. 242.) " Mere ritualistic works yield Ramanuja's own words small and results. On the other hand, only transitory in
:
such works as
constitute
the worship of the Highest
Person, and are performed without attachment to results and ever-enduring result in the form yield an infinite of that experience of the real nature of the Brahman is caused by the origination of the knowledge which
which
the same as steady meditation or worship. Both these cannot become known without a knowledge of the true nature of works. Without such knowledge there can be
is
no
mere ritualistic works as they ordinarily and no subsequent adoption of them in the form
rejection of
are,
pointed out above. Therefore, for this very reason, the enquiry into the Brahman has necessarily to be conducted." This conclusion
is
arrived at only after meeting fully all
the points raised against
they are with
it
it
in the
'
great objection
'.
met one by one in the following order. To is shown that one's own experience, logical
ence, revelation,
and
and
And start infer-
definite as well as indefinite percep-
the other accepted criteria of truth prove only such things as are qualified by attributes, and that there is really no means of proving the thing which is absolute and
tion,
all
unqualified. In this connection the nature of wJhat definite
and
also
of what
is
is
called
called indefinite perception
distinctly explained, and the view which maintains that there is both difference and non-difference between a is
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. thing and
qualifying attribute
its
shown
is
to be
xiii
wrong
Next the
(pp. 53-60.). position that perception must apprehend pure unqualified existence, in as much as it cannot have differentiation for its object and in as much as
it is difficult
to define differentiation,
and
sideration
criticised
perception does
;
and
it
is
is
taken into con-
argued in reply that
distinctions, that distinctions
apprehend
difference, not only beapprehended tween one qualified thing and another, but also between the distinguishing attributes themselves, and that there-
so
fore
to
the
establish
the apprehension of particularity has necessarily admitted in connection with every state of con-
be
sciousness.
things, stitute
further
is
cannot
naturally
perceive
It
the
perceive
the
only
and
shown that the
that
unqualified
of
configurations
the
which
existence,
attributes
of
these
configurations that congenera and at the same time denote
it
logical
pure
senses,
is
whatever forms the distinction between things (pp. 60-64.). Then it is pointed out how it is erroneous to hold that jars
and other such
specific objects are
unreal, the reason for
they do not persist before conperceptions, and how again it is not
their unreality being that
sciousness in possible
all
for experience or consciousness to
as the one unqualified
be the same
and absolute existence
(pp. 64-65.).
Afterwards the self-luminous character of experience properly explained, and it is shown how experience does not cease to be experience when it becomes capable of being itself experienced (pp. 65-67.). The contention that experience or consciousness has the character
is
of an unoriginated entity is then contradicted. It is argued that the absence of what is called the antecedent nonexistence of experience does not prove character, because there
is
no
rule
its
unoriginated
which binds experience
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XIV
to deal only with such objects as aie existent at the same time with itself; and accordingly memory, logical inference,
and yogic perception are shown to relate to which things belong to a different time from that of their revelation
own
existence or duration (pp. 67-69.,). The reasoning involved in the supposition, that the antecedent non-exist-
ence of consciousness
is
not at
made
all
out by perception,
then pointed out to be untenable and it is shown that perceptual consciousness is conditioned by time, and that is
;
none of our cognising
states of consciousness can be eternal
or objectless (pp. 69-71.).
Even during
sleep, trance,
and
conditions of intoxication, consciousness cannot be absolute
and altogether
objectless, as there
is
no
recollection
what-
soever of our having at any time had any experience of such consciousness. In all its states consciousness is associated with the idea of the ego, particular objects;
eternal (pp. 71-72.).
of consciousness
is
And
is
definite
and
relates to
cannot be unoriginated and then the immodifiable character
and hence
it
contended against, and
it is
shown that
The position cannot be undifferentiated (pp. 72-74.). that consciousness can have no qualifying attributes is
it
next
disproved (pp.
whether consciousness
and
74-75.). is
Afterwards the question is taken up
the same as the self
and
explained that consciousness cannot indeed be the same as the conscious for consideration
subject,
and that
criticism,
this conscious
it
subject
is
is
permanent while
the attribute of consciousness
belonging to that subject be originated and destroyed and then it is demonstrated that the idea of an unfounded and object-
is
liable to
less consciousness
;
being the same as the self
ed by cognition, and that
in
is
contradict-
consequence pure experience
or absolute consciousness alone cannot be the highest reality (pp.
75-77-)
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XV
After this the discussion of the problem of the soul's personality is commenced from the stand-point of Rama-
and
nuja,
it
is
at
first
pointed out that what consti-
tutes the subjective self or the soul of the individual
the ego which
than
nothing other
is
here
called
is
the
'
thoit' or the objective thing '/'; similarly the thing world forms the content of the notion of the non-
ego
;
such being the case,
known be the
identical
?
how
(pp.
self, then, like the self,
it
can the knower and the
77-79.)-
must be
If the thing
intelligent
'
'
I
is
and have
same time intelligence to constitute its essence and T may be it is explained and illustrated how the thing both intelligence and intelligent at the same time. Then at the
scriptural
;
and other authorities are quoted to shew that
the self-luminous self
is
always the knower, but that
it
is
never mere luminousness (pp. 79-81.). Consciousness is like luminosity, and must necessarily belong to a luminous self this self is the intelligent thing T, and the luminosity ;
or intelligibility of consciousness itself is due to its association with the self which is undoubtedly the knowing ego (pp. 81-83.).
Having thus shown that
intelligence forms
the essence as well as an attribute of the thing that the idea of knowership
view of the Adwaitin
T, the is
fal-
sely superimposed upon the undiffereritiated and intelligent principle of consciousness by ignorance or avidyd is next
contended against. It is first shown that the knowership of the ego cannot be due to illusion, for the reason that
T and
knowership are both separately and simultaneously cognised, unlike the mother-of-pearl and the silver superimposed thereon. It is next shewn that this the thing
its
knowership of the ego cannot be said to be due to the
common error of mistaking the body
for the self (pp. 83-84.).
does this knowership belong to the material principle
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xvi
of egoity
known
as ahankara, in as
much
as subjectivity
can in no way belong to objective matter. The knowerimmodifiable nature, shipofthe self does not contradict its
and need not therefore be supposed to be due to modifiable matter in any form (pp. 84-87.). / Ahankara or the material principle of egoity cannot be supposed to have as a result acquired the attribute of knowership either of the reflection of the self's intelligence thereon, or
as
contact with the knowing self (pp. Moreover, this supposed illusion of know-
a result of
87-88.).
its
ership cannot be due to the material
being
the revealer of immaterial
much
as the relation of the revealer
between any two things cannot exist
is
when there Xor is it
between them.
is
of egoity
principle
consciousness, in
and the
as
revealed
mutually exchangeable and
any incompatibility
appropriate to hold
in nature
that ahah-
kdra reveals consciousness at the same time that consciousness reveals ahankara
because
;
it is
not possible to under-
stand what this revelation of the self through ahankara may mean, in as much as the self is not within the province of the senses and nothing can therefore serve as the
means
of bringing it into relation with them (pp. 88-90.). Nor again can the idea of the ego be^due to the material principle of egoity,
on the score that
this principle
and
this idea
derived therefrom are useful in removing whatever obstruction there is for our knowing the self. Indeed in no sense can there be a revelation of immaterial consciousness
by means of the material principle of egoity (pp. 91-92.). Then it is argued that the nature of revealers is not to reveal the revealable thing as though selves, itself
and
it
is
finally
forms the thing
the knower (pp.
'
it
were within them-
concluded that the subjective self which is in no way other than
'
I
93-94.)-
The
idea of the
ego which
is
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XV11
thus intrinsically associated with the self does not get disit even in deep sleep because at the time of
sociated from
;
waking, the self shines forth in one and the same continuous form of the thing I ', even when we feel that, while asleep, '
we knew
nothing at
all,
ourselves (pp. 94-96.).
and that we did not know even
The
position that the self
is
a mere
explained not to mean that it is a witness only of ignorance; for, to be a witness is certainly the same as to witness
is
be a direct knower, and even in sleep and other such states the self is luminous and shines forth as the ego (pp. 96-97.). In the final state of beatific release also the self continues to persist as the
thing T; scripture also declares that it does so persist, and God Himself is revealed to us as a disThe material principle known tinct Person (pp. 97-100.). as ahaftkara
to
make up
is
indeed included
our bodies
;
and
among
it is
called
the things that go by that name be-
forms the cause of the imposition of the idea of the ego upon the body. This false idea of the ego is subject to stultification, while the ego-hood of the self is real cause
it
and incapable of being stultified. Therefore the thing which is the knower, is alone the self (pp. 100-101.).
'
I
',
The next of the
point taken up for consideration is the position Prtrvapakshin that, when there is conflict between
and perception, the former
of stronger authority as a criterion of truth, for the reason that the latter is grounded upon error. It is here shown that it is not possible
scripture
is
make
out definitely what that misguiding cause is which makes perception false and erroneous; it is shown that
to
whatever makes perception erroneous must necessarily tend to make the scripture also erroneous, and that the scripture
which is thus based upon error cannot certainly stultify perIt cannot be proved that, unlike perception, the ception. scripture
is
incapable of being misled by an}* cruise of error
C
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Xviii
and the phenomenal knowsuch as avidya for instance from the scripture is in no way different from ledge derived ;
the phenomenal knowledge obtained through perception. Nor can it be maintained that the teaching of perception is stultified by the teaching which is given in the scripture, while
this
latter
is
teaching
not so
stultified
by the
former, and that in consequence the scripture is not false and erroneous for, error is error even when it continues unstultified (pp. 101-105.). There are certain analogies general;
ly given to shew that the scripture, which, being based upon avidya or ignorance, is unreal, may form the means for the
attainment of the highest reality known as the Brahman ; and these analogies are all one after another pointed out to be not at all suited to the case
as
much
sult is
under consideration, in
seen that in every one of them a real rederived from a real cause. When auspicious and as
it
is
inauspicious dreams give rise to good and bad results in life, the dreams are indeed as really existent as the results they give rise to. When magic, medicinal herbs, incantations, &c., give rise to illusions which cause fear, love and other the illusions are as real as the emotions emotions,
themselves. snake-bite
Death and
may
result
of poisoning
real as the death.
The
as real as the thing
itself.
;
from
here
reflected
the
image
a
suspicion
suspicion
of
is
of as
a
thing is Dreams are real even in the ab-
sence of the reality of the objects corresponding to them, in as much as what is required to make anything the object and the basis of any cognition is merely the manifestation of that thing to consciousness in some manner or
other (pp. 105-107.). Even in the case of the apprehension of the sounds of letters by means of the corresponding written signs, there is no cognition of the real by means of the unreal. When things are cognised by means
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xix
of sketches and pictures, there is at the basis of the cognition a real similarity between the things and their represen-
The apprehension of Brahman by means of the
the real
tations.
sound
differentiated
known
numerous phonetic Although the unreality of the
of
its
be due to
its
as
absolute
and phenomenal be proved on
unreal
teachings of the scripture cannot the analogy of the apprehension
and
also
of
the absolute un-
Sphota with
differentiations
scripture
absolute non-existence,
is
it is
the or
help
nadas.
not such as difficult to
may arrive
knowledge of the noumenal reality by means of the phenomenal teachings of the scripture. Nothing that is unreal can ever give rise to the knowledge of that which is at the
real (pp. 107-110.).
After this the proper meaning of various passages in
the Upanishads is taken into consideration, and it is shewn that their Adwaitic interpretation is not accurate and allow-
The passages
able.
first
taken into consideration are
"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning", " from the Qihdndogya- Upanishad And that is the ^
higher knowledge known", from the
man
is
by which that
Indestructible
Being
is
Mimdaka-L rpanis/md,-and "The Brah-
Existence, Knowledge, Infinity", from the Taittiand it is proved that these do not relate ;
riy a- Upanishad
to the absolute
and unqualified Brahman, and that the
grammatical equation to be found in the last passage is intended to establish that one and the same thing, namely, the (pp.
Brahman 1
10- 1
1
is
2.).
by more than one attribute Does the statement that the Brahman is
characterised
one only without a second mean that the Brahman is not associated with a second thing even in the form of a It is shewn that it does not mean such a thing, quality ?
and that the
scriptural passages
which speak of the Brah-
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xx
man
as unqualified only declare that
He
qualities appertaining to material nature.
is
from the
free
There are also
many passages which speak of the Brahman as qualified* and these declare that He is intrinsically possessed of all the auspicious and divine qualities. And His possessing the not contradicted by the non-possession of the qualities that appertain to material nature (pp. 1 1 2ii 6.). The Ananda-valll of the Taittirlya-Upanishad divine qualities
is
Brahman
to be possessed of qualities, and in doing so agrees with passages in the dihdndogya- Upanishad', and the Kena- Upanishad (II. 3.) does not declare that the
teaches the
Brahman
forms no object of knowledge, in as much as this Upanishad has to agree in meaning with the Taittirlya-
Upanishad and the Mnndaka- Upanishad wherein it is declared that the Brahman has to be known and is capable of being
known
The passage
(pp. 116-119.).
Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad
"
Thou
shalt not
in
the
see
the
seer of the sight, nor think the thinker of the thought
"-
next shown not to negative the seer and the knower as and then the statedistinct from sight and knowledge
is
;
ment
Brahman is Brahman is indeed
that the
that the I2i.).
Finally
it
is
interpreted to mean the Blissful Being (pp. 119bliss
is
pointed out that the Upanishadic
passages which negative distinctions do not contradict those other passages which postulate distinctions, in as
much as the world which is Brahman for its Self and has oneness of nature
Vcdanta-Sulras
;
is
and
full
in
of distinctions has the
consequence an organic
shewn that the author of the of this same opinion (pp. 121-
it is
also
124.).
The
question,
whether the Smritis and the Puranas
teach the attributeless
Brahman
and the only
next examined
reality,
is
to be pure intelligence and at in detail ;
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXI
commencement passages are quoted from the Bhagavadglta and the Vishnu- Purana to show that the the very
Highest Brahman is full of all auspicious qualities and from all evil, and that the world which is the mani-
free
festation of
His glory
124-129.).
Then the passages
is
as real as
He
relied
is
Himself
real
(pp.
upon by the Adwai-
prove their peculiar monistic position are all interpreted in full accordance with their respective contexts and in obedience to all the accepted rules of interpretation, tins to
.
and
it is
concluded that in
all
the sastraic works there
no establishment of that thing which no establishment
is
is
devoid of attributes, to the
of illusoriness in regard
total-
ity of perceivable objects, and no negation of the natural differences between the individual soul and non-intelligent
matter and the Lord (pp. 129-156.). Incidentally it is how it is out to necessary pointed amplify and support the
meanings of Vedic and Veddntic passages by means of the Itihdsas and the Pnrdnas, and how among these latter the Vishnu-Purdna is highly authoritative (pp. 134-135.).
The statement found to the effect that
'
Vishnu-Purdna
'
(II. 14. 31.), is
shewn to
'
which postulates a difference kind between one individual soul and another, but not
negative only that in
in the
dualists see things wrongly,'
that other tion
'
dualism
dualism
'
which believes
between the ultimate
entities
in the natural distinc-
known
as God, soul,
and matter (pp. 142-144.). In accordance with this view a few more Purdnic passages are explained and the conclusion is arrived at that, in the same way in which there ;
between the body and the indiviessential identity between one self, individual self and another, and that similarly there is no essential identity between the individual selves and the is
no
essential identity
dual
there
Supreme
Self.
is
also
no
That there
is
no substantial unity between
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xxii
the individual selves and the Supreme Self is further confirmed by references to Upanishadic passages and to aphorAt last the isms in the Veddnta-Sntras (pp. 144-148.) question of what the sastras say regarding the nature of the individual self in the beatific condition of final freedom discussed clearly, and it established that in that condition the released individual
from is
association with matter
all
is
does not become identical in essence with the Supreme Self, but that it only acquires most of the auspicious and
self
divine qualities of the Supreme Self ; and it is shewn that the Brahman whom the individual self is said to attain in
the state of moksha
is
not mere attributeless intelligence,
that, on the contrary, He is full of goodness, power, and glory, and that the individual self becomes one with Him
the reason that he attains the highest degree of equality with Him and is free from the bondage of karma
then
for
(pp. 148-156.).
Now begins
the criticism of that theory of the Adwaiwhich a beginninglessly old ignorance as avidya or mdyd is held to be at the root of our '
tins according to
known
'
perception of the differentiated phenomenal world, and according to which also such an avidya has necessarily to be admitted on the authority of the scripture and has to be
understood to be a certain something which is neither a Seven difficulpositive entity nor a negative non-entity. pointed out to be in the way of this theory being first of these is called Asray&nupapatti, and deals with the difficulty of finding something for this
ties are
true.
The
'
'
ignorance
to reside in. In as
individual self
much
as the self-hood of the
it is argued that cannot reside in the self and thus individual avidya the rise to illusion for which it is held to be responsigive And in as much as the Brahman has the essential ble.
this
is itself
projected
by avidya,
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. nature of self-luminous intelligence,
it is
xxiii
shewn that on no '
'
supposition can the ttrahman be the seat of ignorance. This supposed avidyd therefore can have no abode to reside in (pp.
The next
156-161.).
theory of
mdyd by
difficulty in the
way
of the
'
'
that this supposed ignorance cannot, its upholders, conceal the Brahman whose
is
as maintained
essential nature consists entirely of luminosity
;
for,
the
concealment of such a luminosity must mean nothing other than the destruction of the essential nature of the Brahman Himself.
(page
1
This difficulty
The
6 1.).
is
known
third difficulty
is
as
Tirodhdndnupapatti
called Swarupdnupapatti
and deals with the
essential nature of this avidyd. As a thing at all, it must either have the nature of a reality or the nature of an unreality. But it is not admitted to be a reality ; and it cannot be an unreality,
long as
for,
as
it is
as
long
a
real misguiding error, different from
Brahman Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain this theory of illusion (pp. 161The fourth difficulty in the way of this theory 162.). the
of
illusion
is
called
and points out how
it is
the Anirvachaniyatwdnupapatti, not possible for the illusion-pro-
ducing avidyd to be incapable of definition either as an entity or as a non-entity. All cognitions relate to entities or non-entities
;
and
if it
be held that the object of a cogan entity
nition has neither the positive characteristics of
nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions (pp. 162163.)
Naturally the next question that
whether there is
is
any means by which
is
here discussed
brought within the range of our cognition
shewn that there
is
this curious avidyd ;
and
it
is
no means of proof by which such an can arrived at and established, This difficulty be avidyd is
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXIV
of the theory of maya is spoken of as Pramananupapatti ; and its discussion is started with the plau-
in the
way
'
supposition that the ignorance known as avidyd is capable of being directly experienced and has thus the nature of such a positive entity as cannot be contradicted '
sible
principle of intelligence, and that it is therefore quite consistent with reason to realise that this
by the witnessing avidya
definitively associated with the thing
is
T.
And
it
shewn here
supposititiously that it is possible to establish by logical inference also that there is an ignorance or avidya which does not mean a mere negation
is
further
'
'
of knowledge but 163-167.).
(pp.
one
is
These
after another.
a positive entity of some sort suppositions are then replied to
itself
It is
first
shewn
that, so far as the
concerned, there can be no difference between the ignorance that is a mere relation to the intelligent internal self
is
'
non-existence of knowledge and the other supposed ignorance' which has the nature of a positive entity (pp. 167It
168.).
ignorant;
what
then argued that in the cognition
is
I
do not know myself, nor do
I
know
'I
am
another'
experienced is only that ignorance which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge (pp. 168-169.). It is
next shown that the Brahman can have no experience of any kind of avidya, and that, if it be a positive entity, there can be no removal of it by means of any knowledge is
(pp.
169-171.).
'
The Brahman cannot be a
witness of
it is impossible for Him, whose essenabsolute self-experience, to acquire the character of a witness without the concealment of His own true
ignorance nature
tial
nature.
';
because
is
And the Brahman, who who is pure
out attributes, and
at all be concealed
cealment of the
without parts and withluminosity itself, cannot
is
171-172.).
This supposed con-
Brahman by means
of ignorance cannot
(pp.
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXV
manifestation of His altogether luminous and self-evident nature. In as much as it is
even
an
be
indistinct
possible for us to have an illusion without a really existing
to be imposed upon, and without a positive misguiding cause for that illusion to be produced, the world-illusion does not necessarily prove a positive 'ignobasis for
it
rance' (pp. 172-174.). Accordingly the avidyd of the Adwaitins cannot be proved by perception. It cannot be
because the sylloproved by logical inference either gism that is intended to prove this positive 'ignorance' is ;
also seen to prove the other unacceptable ignorance,
and
because also the illustrative example found in the body oj is defective. Moreover, there are faultless coun-
the syllogism
ter-syllogistic
of the
statements which go to shew that every one
Ad wait ins predications about his avidyd is wrong and The
untenable.
predication, that this
positive avidyd
is
capable of being removed by knowledge, cannot be maintained on the analogy of fear and other such positive emo-
soon as it is known that they are because the positive emotion here is ; not destroyed by a subsequent stultifying knowledge, but disappears of itself on account of its own transitoriness. Therefore the logical process of inference also cannot estabtions disappearing as
due to a
lish
that
entity
false
cause
'
f
ignorance
(pp.
which has the nature of a positive
174-179.).
taken into consideration
in relation
with the
five
is
next
theories
known
to Indian philosophy. Things bemanifest to consciousness through perception, and
of perception
come
The hypothesis of mdyd
their manifestation
to
the reality or
of
it
may either correspond completely may not. Thus all the five theories
perception get reduced into two
that according to which perception presents to consciousness the thing as it is, and that again according to which perception presents tp
D
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXVI
the
consciousness
thing
as
the former which
theories
is
it
not.
is
realistic
is
Of
these
shewn
two
to be
on the authority of tradition and scriptural teachand illusion and its stultification are accounted
true ing,
by means of the
belief that
every thing in the universe has the characteristics of every other thing therein for
Scriptural and traditional authority is even dream-perceptions are realistic. that to quoted prove (pp. 179-186.).
Then
number of exceptions apparently contradicting
a
this
theory of perception such exceptions as the yellow appearance of white things to the jaundiced eye, the realistic
circle
of
fire
produced by the rotation of a fire-brand,
show that all perceptions The objects corare undoubtedly realistic (pp. 186-191.). responding to all perceptions are real only some percepare
<&c.,
all
explained so as to
;
tions are experienced
by
certain particular persons only
and
only for a short length of time, while others are experienced by all generally and have a longer duration. last
These
latter stultify
monly understood
stand in need of a positive avidya (pp. 191-192.). shewn next that the scriptural authorities relied upon
not at It is
;
the former, as stultification is comand a true theory of perception does
all
Ad wait ins to prove that there is an avidya, which cannot be described either as an entity or as a non -entity, are all to be explained otherwise, and do not therefore by the
in any way such an avidya (pp. 192-197.). and the Puranas are also shewn to give no
tend to establish
The
Itihasas
support to the theory of maya, in as much as all such passages in them as seem to lend any support to this theory
when
properly considered, to be interpreted otherwise (pp. 197-210.). The sixth difficulty in the way of this theory of the
have,
world being an
illusion
produced by mava
is
then fully
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS, and
it
This difficulty
is
discussed,
goes by the
xxvii
name
of Nivartakdnup&paUt. in relation to the idea that the cessation
of avidya or 'ignorance' takes place solely by means of the knowledge which has the attributeless Brahman for its
and
pointed out here that there are many scriptural passages, which do not teach the Brahman to be attributeless and unqualified, but teach on the conobject
;
it is
at
first
He is possessed of attributes and qualities. shewn that the grammatical equations found in the sentence That thou art' and in other similar sentences do not denote the oneness of any attributeless thing, trary that
Then
it is
'
in as
much
as every grammatical equation has to denote
a thing which, while being only one, is capable of existing two forms. It cannot be established that the gramma-
in
equation in 'That thou art' is intended to give rise it simto the stultification of any illusion due to avidya tical
;
ply shows the Brahman to be capable of existing different
modes
or forms.
On
the scriptural passages be The universe (pp. 210-214.).
all
Brahman
is
declare that
the
all
Soul,
and
this
in
two
supposition alone can
harmoniously
interpreted the body of which the Vcdantic passages clearly
is
things have acquired the character of being
things and of being expressible by .means of words, only by reason of their having been entered into by the indivi-
dual selves which are, in their turn, entered into by the Thus the totality of all as forming their Self.
Brahman
the intelligent and the non-intelligent beings becomes the same as the Brahman on account of the relation of the
body and the
soul existing
between them
(pp. 214-217).
A
grammatical equation can denote neither an absolute idennor an absolute and discrete dissimilarity betity
tween the things mentioned therein. Hence those who maintain that there is only one attributeless -thing in the
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xxviii
whole universe, those who maintain that there i* both difference and non-difference at the same time between
Brahman and those who maintain
the
individual
that
there
the
between the individual all
souls
also
absolute difference
is
and
Brahman
the
will
sameness of the
find that such teachings regarding the
Brahman with
and
souls,
the individual soul as are found in the
aimless and meaningless (pp. 217-219.). However, to those who maintain that the whole world
Vcddnta are
all
forms the body of the
Brahman
all
those
Veddntic teach-
which declare that the Brahman Himself constitutes
ings,
the whole world, are sure to appear as appropriate expla-
Grammatical equations can and do out the attributive character of material adjuncts point and the equation that a man is an individual self cannot
nations of the truth.
;
have a merely figurative human body has to form in dual
self.
And
the
significance, in as this case a
mode
as the
of the indivi-
word which denotes a mode of the
dividual self denotes the individual self also.
the words god,
much
man, &c., include the
The
in-
Accordingly
individual self in
selves form the body and hence Highest Self, possess the character of being His modes. Thus all the words which de-
their
import.
individual
of the
note
individual
their
import.
matically
selves
include the Highest Self also in
Consequently equated with the
all
things
Brahman
may
be gram-
(pp.
219-224.).
is then more fully explained and supported. All non-intelligent things constitute the objects of enjoyment, the intelligent things are the enjoyers thereof, and
This position
the
Brahman
distinct
is
their
Supreme Ruler
from one another
;
in nature, as
therefore they are
may
be made out
from various passages in the Upanishads and the Bhagavad-Glla (pp. 224-227,). Both the intelligent and the 11011-
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xxix
form the body of the Brahman and have no separate existence from Him they are in consequence Since in this way the intelligent subject to His control. intelligent things
;
and the non-intelligent things are seen to be the modes of the Highest Person, it is easy enough to understand how the scriptures teach that He Himself exists in the form of the world in
its
tion of effect.
Although the non-intelligent thing, the inteland the Brahman are distinct from one
ligent thing,
condition of cause as well as in
its
condi-
another in nature, the world must accordingly have the for its material cause and the Brahman who
Brahman
;
thus enters into the production of an effect retains, nevertheless, His own immodifiable nature quite unaffected, in as
much
as there
is
and need be no transformation of His
nature in the process of producing the effect. Such being the case, the statement that He is attributeless means that He is free from all evil qualities, and the statement that
He
possesses the nature of intelligence
means that He
i.s
self-luminous and can be described only as intelligence in The manifoldness of things which is negatived in essence.
the Vcddnta
only -such manifoldness as
is
is
due to the
non-realisation of that oneness of the universe which results
from the
fact
of the
Brahman
Only when interpreted thus can
forming the Soul thereof.
the apparently conflictbe seen to ing scriptural passages agree with one another and the theory of maya which imposes ignorance on the all
;
Brahman
is
therefore unfounded
;
and similarly the theory
which subjects the Brahman to limiting conditions is also unfounded. The Highest Person is the one embodied Being,
and matter and
He
is
Himself
matter. buteless
soul constitute
all
Thus God, soul and
His embodiment.
the three real entities
Consequently the knowledge which has an attrifor its object is impossible and cannot
Brahman
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXX
be the complete knowledge of truth and obviously such an impossible knowledge of the oneness of the attributeless ;
Brahman cannot be
the remover of the avidyd postulated
the Adwaitins (pp. 227-238.).
by
The
last
difficulty
pointed out by Ramanuja
in the
of this theory of maya is called Nivnltyanupapalti'; and it points that the ignorance postulated by the Adwai'
way
'
'
tins
has to be irremovable.
The
individual soul's
bondage determined by karma and is a concrete It cannot therefore be removed by any abstract reality. knowledge. Divine worship and divine grace can alone cause the freedom of the soul, and to know God is to seek '
'
of ignorance
is
According to the Adwaitins the differentiations
salvation.
of the knower, the knowledge, and the known thing are all unreal and even that knowledge which is capable of ;
removing avidyd has to be unreal and has to stand in need of another real removing knowledge. Xor indeed can that knowledge which forms the essential '
'
nature of the birth
over unreal
Brahman
constitute
the knowledge, the
means the destruction of avidyd. Morethe knower of this knowledge cannot be the of which
and superimposed individual
self;
nor can
that
knower be the Brahman, unless such knowership belongs to Him by nature and is not unreal. No knower will ever destroy himself as knower by means of the knowledge he knows, and the knowership of the Brahman cannot itself be equivalent to avidyd. For all these reasons the removal of the Adwaitins hypothetical 'ignorance' is quite impossible (pp. 238-241.).
Thus the Mahd-siddhdnta it is
concluded that, as mere
is
brought to a close
ritualistic
;
and
works yield only
small and transitory results, the enquiry into the Brahman has necessarily to be conducted so that we may know how
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. we
are to worship
Him and
thereby attain
XXxi
Him and Im-
mortality (pp. 241-242.),
Then comes forward another saka,
who
says that the enquiry into the
not be conducted at
much
is
Mimdm-
Brahman need
as such
an enquiry expected of it. His called the Adhikarana-pftrvapaksha, and is in as
all,
cannot produce the result which objection
objector, the
is
largely based upon linguistic thought and reasoning.
He
says that the true signification of a word is always to denote an action, and the import of the Vedas consists in
the actions they prescribe.
The Vcdanla cannot be
them and cannot teach the Brahman,
itative like
authorfor the
reason that the meaning of the word Brahman is independently established otherwise than as an inference from actions.
The
listening
to
physical expression of the emotions caused by spoken .sentences cannot enable us to
the meanings of words, in as much as many Neither the things may give rise to similar emotions. of a nor to other words its relation word, etymology tletermine
in
sentence
a
ing
can
independently
methods
enable us of
action
all
of interpreting
to
words
ascertain
because
;
its
mean-
both these
are
obviously dependent upon action. Moreover, mere verbal statements cannot produce any kind of practical conviction and activity,
and
volition alone
is
the cause of
all
voluntary activity. Therefore that which induces voluntary activity has to be the thing that is expressed by words, and thus it is but proper that action forms the thing which is to be learnt from the Vcdas. The Brahman is neither an action nor anything that
is
definitely related to
of such a
an action
Brahman cannot
give
;
rise
and the knowledge to any infinite and
eternal result in the shape of immortality.
On
the other
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXxil
ritualistic works themselves are declared in the Vedas to be capable of yielding eternal and indestructible
hand,
meritorious results.
man need
not at
The answer and
siddJuinta,
all
Therefore the enquiry into the Brahbe undertaken (pp. 242-246).
to this objection is called Adhikaranait leads us to the conclusion that the
Brahman
has necessarily to be conlinguistic argument of the Pfirvapakskm is here met by pointing out distinctly that the relation between words and their meanings is not primarily made out the
enquiry into
The
ducted.
by means of any utterance
inference from the actions to which the
words generally does give
of
rise.
Certain
things have somehow acquired certain names, and the relation between such things and their names is dependent
upon usage and is of itself naturally established without the help of any inference. The use of language is taught to children by their elders and which words denote which ;
tilings
is
distinctly
and frequently enough pointed out to
thus they learn to associate the words with the things. The meaning of words is primariit may in some rare ly made out only in this fashion the
young
learners
;
;
made
out also with the help of gestures. Therefore the rule that the meaning of words is only to denote
cases be
not binding (pp. 246-247). Even if the Vedas denote only actions, all such actions are seen to relate to actions
is
the worship of the
Brahman
so that thereby
He may
be
attained; and hence the knowledge of the true nature of the Brahman and His attributes is helpful to actions, and the
Vcdanta which deals with the
Brahman
Even
accordingly (pp. 248-249). the ox', the significance of words '
action
tion
';
for, this
<
'
action
of the speaker, and
has to be studied
in sentences like is
l
Bring not to be inferred from
has to be aimed at by the voliall activity proceeds from the
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXX111
dependence of the accomplishment of desire upon effort. Volitional desire has to be expressed by means of language before
it is
worked out
cannot be the thing desired, and it being defined as that which volition
and
which
volition
(pp.
249-252.).
commandments action
that
is
into
and
into 'action';
is
is
Even
not also capable of
is
the
also
this 'action' itself
accomplished principal
object
by of
when we take Vcdic we find that the
consideration
denoted by the verb in them is not the object nor is to be accomplished by obeying them ;
this object
the
that
produced by performing Apurva by the verb of command. It must be some desirable and pleasing object like Swarga or it must be the avoidance of pain. A commandment is no is
the action denoted
pleasure in in the
and is not anywhere described as such and the mandatory passages found in the
itself,
Vedas
;
Vedas relate only to such actions as are indicated by the verbs that give the command. Therefore commandments are not obeyed and worked out merely for themselves. Sacrifices
and other such works, enjoined by the
scripture
and denoted by the verbal roots in the scriptural commandments, have all the character of constituting the worship of the Highest Person who is the internal ruler of all gods ; and the result aimed at by those works flows to us altogether from that Highest Person
Himself (pp. 252-
The knowledge of the meaning and nature of 255.). Swarga is necessary on the part of him who performs the Jyotishtoma sacrifice, in as much as Sivarga is the object to be attained and the sacrifice is the means the Vcddntic Brahman is the Similarly 1 be to attained by man, and Vcdic works' highest object are only the means to attain Him. The statement therefor.
that
the
Qlidturmasya
E
sacrifice
yields
indestructible
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXXIV results
many
not
is
to
be
understood
explicit statements in the
literally,
as there are
scripture to the effect
that the results derived from the performance of ritualistic works as works are unimportant and unenduring. Accordingly
of '
concluded that, although the meaning and nature are self-established and underived from any
it is
Brahman
study of the Vedanta which teaches such a has necessarily to be commenced and conducted
action', the
Brahman
(pp. 255-256.).
The
discussion of the one aphorism making is thus brought to a close.
up the
Jijnasadlukarana
t
Like the first, the second aphorism also makes up a whole Adhikarana, the object of which is to point out
Avhat that
Brahman
really
who
is
is
stated to be the
object of all Veddntic study and investigation. The aphor" The Brahman is that from whom itself runs thus
ism
:
proceed the creation, &c., of this universe." After explaining the grammar and the meaning of the words in the aphorism, the question whether it gives any admissible definition of the Brahman is taken up for consideration ;
and the position of the Purvapakshin that
does not give This aphorism is based
any such definition is first stated. on a passage in the Taittiriyopanishad
Brahman
it
(III.
i. i.)
wherein
declared to be the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer of the world and the question is wheth-
the
is
;
.
er these characteristics of creation,
to define Him.
The
&c., are
competent
characteristics of universal creation,
preservation and destruction cannot define the Brahman Brahman may be a common noun, and because ;
'because
more than one may thus denote more than one Brahman as in the instance " The ox is also these attributes being
1
that which
is
broken-horned, hornless and fully horned,
'
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS,
xxxv
Xor can
the attributes of creation, c., give rise to any accidental characterisation of the Brahman, in as much as accidental characterisations denote onl}* such things as have already been definitively characterised in some form
all
or other, and in as
that there
man
is
any
much
as
quite independently
the aphorism.
not possible to establish
it is
Brah-
definitive characterisation of the
Therefore
it
of the passage referred to in is not possible to know the
Brahman by means of any definition (pp. To these objections it is replied that
257-259.).
the characteris-
of universal creation, &c., mentioned in this aphorism are well suited to give us an accidental characterisation of tics
the Brahman, and suited also Brahman. It is not right is
not at
all
acteristics
known
teaches us that
He
to say that the
Brahman
to us otherwise than through the char-
universal
of
to give a definition of the
is
&c.;
creation,
a Being
who
etymology
characterised
is
itself
by Su-
preme Greatness and Growth and
in the Upanishadic pasHe is spoken of as a well known Bereference under sage His greatness is really due to the fact of His being ing. both the instrumental and the material cause of the universe,
and the Brahman who
is
known
to be
all this
may
well be
denoted by the characteristics of universal creation, &c. These characteristics of universal creation, (pp. 259-261.).
Brahman, in as much they need not denote more than one Brahman. In
&c., are also capable of defining the as
the definition of the ox given above,
all
the three defining
attributes are seen to conflict with each other
;
and thus
they tend to denote more than one ox. In the given definition of the Brahman there is no such contradiction
between the creation, different
attributes, for
the reason that the world's
and destruction
preservation, The attributes times.
of
take
universal
place at creation,
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXXVi
&c., define the
and the
universe, is-
Brahman
the only cause of the "
scriptural passage
Existence, Knowledge,
The Brahman
denotes His essen-
Infinity"
be different from that of
nature to
tial
to be
all
other things
;
and indeed there is no fallacy of reciprocal dependence between these two ways of knowing the Brahman. Thus the attributes of universal creation, &c., do dethe Brahman, and He is quite capable of being understood by means of a definition (pp. 261-263."). Consequently the Brahman cannot be a mere attributeless
fine
etymology gives Him the characteristics of Greatand Growth, this aphorism defines Him as the Cause
Being ness
;
of the Universe, and other aphorisms
endow Him with
the
These aphorisms and the scriptural passages on which they are based do not constitute any authority for holding the opinion that the Brahman is an
power of 'seeing', &c.
altogether attributeiess Being. larities
Logic deals with the simi-
in the distribution of attributes
among
entities,
and cannot of course prove an attributeless thing. Finally, it is not possible to interpret this aphorism to mean that the
Brahman
is
the cause of the illusion of
phenomena
;
because this illusion has to be based upon avidya, and the Brahman cannot be identical with it, but has to be a witness thereof. To be such a witness implies that He has the character of homogeneous luminosity, whereby He ceases to be attributeless; and to deprive Him of this characteristic attribute of luminosity
is
to convert
Him
into
nothingness (pp. 263-264.).
The third Adhikarana also contains only one aphorism which runs thus "That the Brahman is th& cause of the :
creation, &c., of the universe, follows altogether from the because the scripture forms the source of the scripture ;
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXXV11
knowledge relating'to Him." The aim of this aphorism is to shew that the Brahman, as defined in the previous
made out only by means of the Vedanla, no other means of knowing Him. The meaning of the aphorism is as usual explained and then the question it relates to is taken up for discussion. Against aphorism, can be
and that there
is
the above-mentioned view of the Vcddntin that the scripture alone forms the source of all our knowledge relating to the
Brahman, the Mlmamsakas, the Naiyydyikas, and
Vaiscshikas are the prominent orthodox objectors and the position of the Mlmdmsaka is given at first, after the
;
stating, however,'the general objection that the
Brahman
is capable of being made out by other means of proof than the scripture, and that the scripture has in consequence no
special
meaning or authority
in this matter.
saka agrees with the Vcddntin so
far as
The Mlmdm-
the revelational
authority of the scripture is concerned, but holds that the scripture is an inviolable authority in relation to ritualistic 'works' also. Therefore he naturally contends that the
Brahman cannot be proved
either
by perception, or by
ference. External perception, internal perception,
perception are
all
Brahman; audit
is
in-
zndyogic
shown
to be incapable of proving the next pointed out that neither deduction
nor induction can establish the
Brahman
(pp. 265-267.).
Here the Naiyydyika comes forward and says that the world is seen to be made up of component parts, and is thus a produced effect. Whatever is a produced effect necessarily implies a
an agent
is
the
competent producing agent, and such
Brahman. Moreover, the world
that
is
pro-
duced out of non-intelligent matter cannot but be subject to the control of a single intelligent being, who has to be the
Brahman
He
capable of being proved by logic (page 267.). At this point the Mimdmsaka in this case.
Accordingly
is
XXXViii
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE
OI-'
CONTENTS.
Naiyydyika and points out that certain material bodies are not produced by those who control or
joins issue with the
enjoy them, that certain other material bodies, when their stand parts are seen to be organically put together, do not
need of any and that there
in
intelligent agent to control their working, is
no reason shown why
in the case of the
world the controlling intelligent being has to be only one, also to be other than the individual selves whose
and has
existence
is
admitted on both
sides.
Then the argument
that every produced effect implies a competent agent to produce it, and that the world is such a produced effect
and in the course of the criticism it is distinctthat this kind of design argument necessarily shewn ly makes the world appear too much like a man-made thing and makes the Brahman Himself become too much like a human being, while there is really no impossibility in the is
criticised
way
;
of the individual selves themselves satisfying the deHere a warning is given that
mands of this argument. from this
it
should not be understood that the
Mlmdmsaka
of opinion that logic is of no use whatsoever in acquirHis opinion is ing a true knowledge of the Brahman. that logic is useful in understanding the sdstras aright, and is
that apart from the sdstras there
which God can be proved
(pp.
is
really
no means by
267-271.). And now the the Mlmdmsaka to shew
Vaiscshika intervenes as against that God is capable of being proved solely by means of the process of logical inference. The material world is
made up of constituent parts ; it is inert and gross, and is nevertheless set in motion and has a definite form ; therefore cannot but be a produced effect. To infer a producing agent from the fact of there being a produced effect is
it
never unjustifiable not even when we do not know the producibility of the effect and the productive competency
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXXIX
of the agent. Both these are rightly inferred from the nature of the effect itself. Thus we arrive at God. The distri-
bution of pleasure and pain to individuals in accordance with the merit and demerit .of their karmas cannot take place of
itself.
Hence
a Person
ing skilfully the fruits of various karmas themselves
who
karmas
in
capable of awardaccordance with the
is
is also to be necessarily postunot right to hold that the individual selves themselves are the producing agents of the world and the distributors of the fruits of karmas, as their power and
lated.
It
is
knowledge are seen to be inadequate to serve such a purpose, and as the inferred cause must in every way be competent to produce the observed
effect.
Nor
is it
right
argument proves the inferred creator of the world to be too human and to be thus devoid to maintain that this design
of the qualities of omniscience and the lordship of
all
Non-omniscience and non-lordship do not affect the producibility of things and if they are not found in association with the producing Creator, surely there is nothing wrong in it. This design argument does not fail things.
;
God has no material body human which agents have bodies. The will way is based on His mind is alone the active of God which agent in creation and His mind is eternal and unassociateven on account of the fact that in
the
in
;
ed with matter.
Accordingly
God can be
conclusively
proved by logic. However, it cannot be proved that He is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world, in as is
much
as that
which forms the material cause
seen to be extremely different from that which forms the
instrumental cause (pp. 271-277.). This position of the Vaiseshika final disposal,
defective in
and
many
it is
shewn that
ways.
is
then taken up for
his design
The world and
its
argument
is
various parts
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xl
are,
no doubt, produced effects but there is really nothing above to prove that they were creatAll the one agent at one particular time. by ;
in the logic given
ed
things in
the world do
not
a
the character of
possess
and
a single agent being single produced On the score that to be their be Creator. cannot proved individual souls cannot be the creators of our wonderful effect,
world,
and
assume
many
the
of
act
on
the
score
individual
creation,
that
to have been
souls
it
is
inappropriate to
is
it
not
right
to
agents in argue that
there must be only one Creator of the world. Through the highly increased influence of their adrishta, individual souls can
and do produce certain particular created
effects.
The conceptions of the simultaneous origination of all things and the simultaneous destruction of all things do not deserve to occupy the position of proved truth ; and a single person
who
is
nowhere known to
capable of creating
exist,
all
and cannot be
unless logical inference can
make
things at once
is
logically inferred,
the improbable probable
and the impossible possible. And scripture also contradicts the idea that all produced things have only one producing agent.
by
the
God
is
not subject to karma, and '
'
qualities
of saliva,
rajas,
is
not actuated
and tamas
;
He
can
creation nor produce creation. without a material body and is devoid of all perceivable and an agent who produces activity through mere desire is unperceived and is hence unin-
therefore neither desire
Further,
He
is
;
ferrible. Consequently, the Brahman who is the Highest Person can be proved only by the sastras and it is not opposed to reason, as shall be shewn later on, that He is ;
the material cause as well as the instrumental cause of the
whole universe, although there are portions cannot be proved to be
made up
in
it
which
of constituent parts. Thus
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xli
the scriptural passage on which this aphorism is based is amply authoritative and abundantly full of import, in as
much
as the
Brahman
cannot,
by any other means of
proof, be cognised as the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer of the world (pp. 277-284.).
The made up
fourth Adhikarana also is, like the previous three, of only one aphorism; and it runs thus "That, viz. the fact that the scripture forms altogether the source of the knowledge relating to the Brahman, results, however, ture."
:
from His constituting the true purport of the scripNow, although the Brahman cannot be cognised
by any means of proof other than the sdstras, is He after This is the question all really established by the sdstras ? which is discussed under this aphorism. After interpreting the words of the aphorism, some passages from certain Upanishads are quoted to shew that to teach the Brahman is the only aim of the sdstras; and then it is formally stated that, although
He does not import any activity or He alone constitutes the true pur-
cessation from activity,
port of the
ward with finality
in
Here the Mlmdmsaka comes forobjection that all sentences have their
Veddnta. his
some
utility
or other,
either
as
relating to
voluntary activity or cessation from activity, or as relating knowledge that no sentence is thus capable of importing things, the ideas corresponding to which are already to
;
and that consequently the Veddnta cannot establish the Brahman, the idea corresponding to naturally established
whom
;
already naturally established (pp. 284-287.). This objection is answered by the NishprapaficJiikarana-niyoga-vddin who holds that the Upanishads give us is
the commandment to non-phenomenalise the Brahman, and that therefore they relate to action and have their
F
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Xlii
finality
in utility.
Even
if
Brahman
the
is
self-evident,
His being made the object of an nothing wrong 'action' so that He may be realised in the non-phenomenal form (pp. 287-288). The Mlmdmsaka contends against this there
in
is
and says that all those, who maintain like him that the syntactical meaning of sentences is a commandment, must also be prepared to distinctly point out like him, in
view
also,
every case under consideration, the commandment, the attribute of the person to
whom
commandment
the
is
direct-
ed, the special object of the commandment, the manner of carrying out the commandment, the details of procedure
to be adopted in carrying
carry
it
out.
it
with Vedic commandments ance
of
out,
and the person who is to do this in connection
It is fully possible to
ritualistic
commandment commandment
all
works.
of which enjoin the performThere is, for instance, the
bearing upon the Jyotishtoma sacrifice this is to be found in the Yajiirveda ; the ;
attribute of the person to
whom
the
commandment
is
the desire to attain Sioarga ; the_special object of the commandment is the Jyotishtoma sacrifice ; the
directed
is
yajamdna or the sacrificer is the performer thereof and manner of performing it and the details of procedure ;
the
to be adopted in so performing
down
it
are
all distinctly
laid
works relating thereto. But in the case of the supposed Vedantic commandment enjoining the in authoritative
non-phenomenalisation of the Brahman,
it is
not possible
to specify any attribute as that which has necessarily to belong to the person to whom the commandment is possible to know in this case what the of the commandment is, in as much as this special object special and immediate object of the commandment has to
directed
;
nor
is it
be different from the the Jyotishtoma
final
aim
thereof, in the
sacrifice is different
way
in
which
from Swarga. Further,
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. supposed Vcdantic
this
and absurd carrying sdstras.
and the
;
commandment cannot but be
details of procedure to
useless
be adopted in
out are indeed nowhere to be found in the
it
Vedanta gives no
Therefore the
enjoining
xliii
the
non-phenomenalisation of
commandment the Brahman
(pp. 288-293.).
his
Then the Dhyana-myoga-vadin comes forward with objection against the contention of the Mlmamsaka,
and declares that the Vedanta
is
authoritative in teaching
Brahman by means
us the true nature of the
of the injunc-
upon His meditation. The Dhydna-niyogavddm is he who, while agreeing with the Mlmdmsakain holding that the scripture cannot be of any authority in
tion bearing
relation to anything the idea corresponding to
which
is
already naturally established, maintains at the same time that the Vedanta is nevertheless authoritative in relation to the
Brahman,
in as
much
as
gives a
it
enjoining the meditation of which
He
commandment
forms the object.
commandment
This
enjoining meditation implies the thing to be meditated upon, and that thing is no other than the
Brahman,\\\\QSQ real nature also is described in the Vedanta. The Brahman alone is real while all else that is different
from
Him
tion
between
alone soul
unreal.
Accordingly,
distinction
the reality the same as
is
is
man.
is
;
final
becoming
The achievement
there
Him
contradiclatter
beatific release of the
identified with the
of this identification
ble without the help of that meditation relates to
is
and non-distinction, the
and the
its
when
is
Brah-
not possi-
which entirely
(pp. 293-295.).
Here the Adwaitin begins to oppose the Dhydna-niyogavddin^hd says that the freedom of the soul from the bondavidyd can and does result merely from the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences,
age
of
AfcALYficAL oufLiKE OF CONTENTS.
xliv
and that the
final beatific release
of the soul must be such
as cannot be accomplished under an injunction, in as much as any possible fresh accomplishment of it will certainly
imply that
it
is
Final release or
non-eternal.
moksha
is
the same as the unembodied condition of the soul, and this
unembodied condition is its essential nature and is hence and uncreatable. To accomplish anything anew
eternal
must mean
either
its
origination, or attainment, or modifi-
and it is not possible to predicate in of these things regard to moksha. The knowledge any of the syntactical meaning of sentences does not therefore cation, or refinement
;
produce moksha, but only removes the obstructions which are in
its
way.
Final release follows immediately after
the knowledge of the Brahman is acquired, and does not stand in need of anything that has to be produced by obeying a commandment given in the sdstras. The sdslras declare all phenomenal distinctions to be unreal and to be
manufactured by avidya, and the commandment enjoining meditation is useful only in helping us to understand well the
meaning of scriptural sentences. Immediately knowledge of truth is acquired, the bondage of unreality must necessarily give way; and to be released from this bondage, one need not wait even till the falling off of the body. It has thus to be made out that moksha is not a
syntactical after the
by obeying the commandand that the Brahman is not
thing that can be accomplished
ment
relating to meditation,
hence implied in that commandment
;
indeed
He
inde-
is
pendently taught and known (pp. 295-301.). This contention of the Adwaitin is next met by the He says that the phenomenal Dhydna-niyoga-vadin. is of the a concrete reality and is actually soul bondage perceived to be such.
kind
is
Mere
wholly incompetent to
abstract
remove
knowledge of any bondage and
this
;
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xiv
the knowledge derived from the scripture is no exception in this matter and cannot destroy the sensory perception,
Moreover, meditation can-
of differentiated phenomena.
not be the means of knowing the syntactical meaning of has to be scriptural sentences, in as much as the Brahman
known
before
He
meditated upon
can be
nor can
;
it
produce the knowledge which relates to the oneness of the self with the non-phenomenal Brahman, because it has pre-suppose many phenomenal entities. If it were possible to destroy the bondage of avidyd merely by the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentencitself to
commandment
enjoining meditation would become The bondage of phenomenal unreality canpurposeless. and it follows as a matter not, however, be so destroyed of course thatftvanmukti, or the soul's release from such a es,
the
;
bondage even while
in
is
it
the embodied condition,
The
idea ofjivanmukti altogether impossible. and is opposed to scripture ; it is discarded
is
is
illogical,
by a great teacher like Apastamba. Accordingly, bondage comes to an end only after death and by means of that injunction which relates to meditation and which produces the direct knowledge of the Brahman. What is accomplished under
this injunction relating to
but
itself,
release
;
it
is
meditation
is
not
final
release
the removal of the obstructions to final
therefore this injunction cannot give a non-eternal
character to moksha.
mind
;
the
mind
Obeying this injunction purifies the so purified realises the Brahman directly;
nothing in the scripture to shew that He cannot be made an object of meditation. Therefore the
and there
is
bondage of phenomenal unreality comes to an end only by obeying the commandment which enjoins meditation and the final result of which
Brahman
(pp. 302-309.).
is
the direct realisation of the
ANALYTICAL OUTLlNt OF CONTENTS.
xlvi
At
this point the
Dhydna-niyoga-vadin anticipates the
objection of the Bheddbhedavadins, according to
there
is
no contradiction between
and the Brahman tinction and non-distinction
is
distinction,
at
distinction
whom
and non-
thus the seat of both disthe same time.
Every
object that we perceive is suggestive of similarity as well as of diversity. When a thing is realised as the cause of another thing, there is the realisation of similarity
them
between
or non-distinction
;
for
instance,
when
clay is made out to be the cause of a pot, we see that there is non-distinction between the clay and the pot. Similarly, when a thing is realised as representative of a genus, there
the realisation of non-distinction between that thing and the other things belonging to that genus. On the other hand, when a thing is realised independently in its condi-
is
tion as an effect or in its condition as a particular individual,
there
is
the realisation of distinction between
Thus
things.
it is
thing as the seat of
it
and other
nothing uncommon to realise the same both distinction and non-distinction at
the same time. is
In every process of recognition also there the realisation of both distinction and non-distinction in
one and the same thing (pp. 309-31 1.). It cannot be maintained, however, that the commonly current superim-
relation to
position of the idea of the self
there
is
on the body indicates that
both distinction and non-distinction between the
body and the self because it is the unstultified idea alone which everywhere proves things. The idea of the serpent ;
and cannot prove any non-distinction as really existing between the serpent and the rope. Similarly the idea of the self arrived falsely perceived in a rope
is
soon
stultified,
body is stultified, and cannot prove any non-distinction between the self and the body. Accord-
at in relation to the
ingly,
the individual self
is
not absolutely distinct from the
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Brahman
;
and there
it is
both distinct and non-distinct from
xlvii
Him
;
ample scriptural authority to prove this (pp. In the state of final beatific release the indivi-
is
311-314.).
dual self has to be absolutely identical with the Brahman and non-distinction alone is thus natural, while the distinc-
;
tion of the individual selves from the
from each other
is
Brahman
as well as
The karma
due to limiting conditions.
of the individual self gives rise to these limiting conditions, and they in their turn give rise to karma. The stream is
thus kept up ; and according as the Brahman is or is not subject to these limiting conditions, He is realised to be distinct or non-distinct
ether
is,
for
example,
from the individual
self.
The
spatial
from the ether
distinct or non-distinct
pot according as it is or is not limited by the walls of the containing pot (pp. 314-317.). The position of the Bhcddbhedavddin so stated is then
in a
attacked by the Dhydna-niyoga-vadin.
The
idea of non-
contradiction between distinction and non-distinction
is
shown to be illogical and untenable, and it is pointed out that in every perception it is realised that a particular thing is of a particular nature. Here the characterising thing is the genus and the characterised thing is the particular individual. ised
as
belonging to
therefore
Brahman. and
The
individual self
the genus
be both distinct Non-distinction
distinction
is
and is
is
not, however, real-
Brahman, and cannot non-distinct
from
the
based upon the sdstras
due to avidyd, which being unreal,
is
;
in-
It is inconceivable capable of tainting the Brahman. how the supposed limiting conditions really do limit the
Brahman who is only one and indivisible and homogeneThe individual self cannot be a bit of the Brahman ous. cut off from
Him by
such a part of the
limiting conditions
Brahman
as
is
;
not cut off
it
cannot be
from
Him and
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
xlviii
is still
the
associated with limiting conditions
Brahman Himself in
nor can
it
be
essence, though subject to limiting
be the limiting condition Thus non-distinction between the Brahman and
conditions itself.
;
;
nor finally can
it
alone the reality, and the Vcddnta is authoritative in relation to the essential nature of the
the individual self
is
Brahman, in as much as the knowledge thereof is needed complement to the injunction relating to meditation
as a
(pp. 3I7-323-)-
Now
the
Mimdmsaka comes
forward to meet finally
the 'Dhydna-niyoga-vddin and maintains that, although the knowledge of the essential nature of the Brahman is need-
ed as a complement to the injunction bearing upon meditation, there is indeed nothing to show that Veddntic passages import anything that
is
really existent.
In connection
commandment enjoining the realisation of the Brahman as a Name, we find that the completion of meditation is possible even when its object is a mere with the
mental concept corresponding to which there not be any external entity. The Vcddnta utility in
activity
;
is
reality of the
it is
Brahman,
corresponding to the word established and
incapable of establishing the much as an object of medi-
known
and
in as
Brahman
is
much
as the idea
already naturally
(pp. 323-325.).
at last the Veddntin
comes forward and proves
Mimdmsaka, and points out Veddnta which teaches that Brahman, who is
his case as against the
the
highest object of attainment for
have
may
devoid of
in as
tation need not always be real,
a.s
or
the form of inducing activity or cessation from and even when it is granted that it induces the
activity of meditation,
And
may
its finality
only
relate to activity
in
utility.
and
all,
that
the
cannot be said not to
Such scriptural passages may, on
cessation from activity
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. the
other hand, be said not to
utility
;
because they give
knowledge which can be
know
know
ment
in
merely to that kind of only so long as there But Vcddntic passages en-
rise
that individual souls acquire unlimited and
the time otmoksha, and enable us also continue for ever in the enjoyof such bliss. Therefore there is really no end to
unsurpassed to
finality
utilised
are desirable objects to attain.
able us to
have their
xlix
bliss at
that they
the utility of the knowledge produced by the Veddnta. To know this invitingly attractive and worthy nature of the
human
to be impelled to seek the utility of the Veddnta. This utility cannot indeed be well based merely on such an abstract conception of the Brahman as has no reality to
highest object of
it
so as to find
it
pursuit
and herein
;
is
is
correspond to it. If it be shewn that the Ifpanishads do not teach the real existence of the Brahman, then, although they may give rise to the conceptual knowledge of the Brahman, they can have no finality in utility. Therefore the
Brahman
the Veddnta
The
is
fifth
really existent, and the chief end of to teach us to know Him (pp. 325-328.). is
AdJiikarana consists of eight aphorisms, fifth and ending with the twelfth.
commencing with the
The
object of this
Adhikarana
is
to establish that
what
is
declared to be the cause of universal creation, &c., in the Veddnta is not Prakriti or primordial matter with all the potentialities assigned to
it
by the Sdnkhyas
but that
it
that omniscient and omnipotent Being who has been denoted by the name of Brahman. The cause of the world
is
spoken of as Sat in .the CJihdndogya-Upanishad and the word Sat means Existence. Does this word Existence is
y
denote the Pradhdna or Prakriti of the Sdrikhyas, or the Brahman ? The doubt arises that it denote
does
G
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
1
denote the Pradhana in as much as, whatever and whatever general nature thereof exist in the thing condition of a cause, that same thing and that same it
may
^
nature thereof have to exist also in the condition of an
much as the world which is a produced hence made up of the qualities of saliva, rajas and tamas cannot therefore have the non-material 'quaeffect,
effect
and
and
lity-less'
in as
is
Brahman
If the undifferentiated
for its cause.
Pradhana- is not taken to be the cause of the world,
it
is
impossible to understand thing, all
scripture
;
how, by knowing a certain single things become known, as it is declared in the and it is impossible also to understand why the
statement relating to the cause of the world is, as given in the C/ihandogya- Upanishad, in the form of a proposition and an illustration. In reply to such a supposition it is pointed out in the first of the eight aphorisms of this Adhikarana that the Existence spoken of as the cause of
the world cannot be the Pradhana, because the activity of seeing and thinking is predicated in relation to it.
no doubt that the cause has necessarily to be in and the Highest Pernatural conformity with the effect son who owns all the intelligent and the non-intelligent There
is
;
things in their subtle state as His body is certainly in natural conformity with all produced effects, as taught in
the Upanishads and as maintained by the Sfitrakara himThe passage dealing with the cause of the world in self. the Qhhandogy a- Upanishad is not really in the form of a and syllogism, as the middle term is altogether wanting }
;
surely cannot be that that passage mentions the logically inferrible Pradhana to be the cause of the world
hence
it
The second aphorism in the Adhikarana intended to show that the activity of 'seeing predicated in relation to the Sat which forms the cause of the worlcl (pp. 329-334.).
'
is
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
li
not to be interpreted figuratively, in as much as that is spoken of as the Atman. The teaching in the Qihandogya-Upanishad (VI. 8. 7.) has in view the world is
Sat
which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, and points out that the Sat is the Atman or the Self thereof and surely the non-intelligent Pradhdna cannot ;
be the intelligent Atman. The omniscient Brahman alone can be the world's Atman, and can also see and think
The
(pp. 334-336.).
third aphorism of the
gives another reason \\~hy the Sat that
is
A dh ikarana
mentioned to be
the cause of the world cannot be the material
and that reason
Pradhdna,
taught in the context that he who is firmly devoted to that Sal obtains final release as a result of his devotion. What one worships here on is
earth determines
the
Pradhdna
is
that
it is
what one
attains finally
not to obtain moksha, but
and to
;
it is
attain
to get into
Indeed the Vcddnta is not so the bondage of samsdra. unkind as to impel us to get into this bondage (pp. 336The fourth aphorism here assigns another 337.). reason
why
that reason
the causal Sat cannot be the is
that Svetaketu, in the
who was
matter
;
for,
if
;
and
desirous of attain-
context that he
taught ing moksha, as the Sat, which certainly cannot is
Pradhdna
mean
is
that he
he were the same as the
the same
was mere
Pradhdna, he
could obtain no moksha, and the idea of his being the
same
as the Sat
would deserve to be discarded.
But
it is
not taught that it is to be so discarded (page 337.). The next aphorism gives the fifth reason why the causal Sat is not the Pradhdna; and in it it is pointed out that, if
the Sat were the Pradhdna, there would then be the
contradiction of the proposition enunciated in the context to the effect that, by knowing a certain single thing, all things
become known.
This arises out of the fact that
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ill
non-intelligent matter cannot give rise to the intelligent individual souls, and cannot be their cause ; and hence,
by knowing it, all things cannot become known (page The next aphorism is based on a passage in the 338.). Qihdndogya-Upanishad (VI. 8. i.), in which it is declared that a
while
that
and Sal
is
is
union with the Sat, and withdraws into his own cause
asleep
also
in
is
sleeping person
he
absorbed into his
the cause into which
vidual self withdraws
;
its
own
Here the
cause.
namely, the
effect,
indi-
and the non-intelligent Pradhana
does not deserve to be the cause of the individual
self.
Until final release takes place the individual self is associated with names and forms in moksha and at the time ;
embraced by the Brahman and gives names and forms. It is thus that he withdraws into up his own cause, and the Sal has therefore to be the Brahman of deep sleep he
is
The next aphorism maintains that the world cannot be the Pradhana because the
(pp. 339-341.)-
cause of the
,
Sal which is mentioned here as the cause must have the same meaning as whatever is elsewhere in the scripture declared to be the world's cause. In a
passages the Lord of All
is
number of
scriptural
taught to be the cause of the
world, and this causal Sal cannot therefore be other than the Lord (pp.
341-342.).
The
aphorism of the
last
Adhikarana says that more than all it is actually revealed in the Qihdndogya and other Upanishads that the Supreme Self is the cause of the universe, and that the causal Sal cannot
at
than that
and
is
all
Supreme
also the
the Veddnta. of this
mean
in Self,
any thing other
consequence
who
is
the
Highest Person
Brahman
that has to be enquired into in In conclusion it is pointed out at the end
Adhikarana that the import of
against the position of the
A dwaitins,
it
as
a whole
according to
is
which
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. Brahman
the
a
is
mere
attributeless
liii
and
intelligence
Here the Brahman is declared to be associatluminosity. -with the real attribute of 'seeing', and His character
ed
thinking
The
cannot therefore be unreal.
as a witness
Brahman must
'seeing'
and
be an intelligent being, and to be
an intelligent being is to possess the quality of intelligence. To be devoid of this attribute of intelligence is to be the
same
as the non-intelligent
Brahman
is
Pradhdna, which surely the way in which the Brahman
In the same
not.
cannot be attributeless, He cannot also be mere luminosity or intelligence. Indeed luminosity or intelligence is that
which makes
itself
cognising mind
and other things
and a thing which
;
to be realised
fit is
devoid of
all
by a attri-
butes cannot possess this capacity. To grant that the Brahman has such a capacity is the same as to admit that
He
none other than the all-powerful, all-knowing, and and an attributeless entity cannot but be a all-good God is
;
mere nothing that
is
totally unrealisable (pp. 342-346.).
The sixth Adhikarana is \\\z,Anandamayadhikarana, and contains also eight aphorisms from the thirteenth to the twentieth. The object of the last Adhikarana, known as the Jkshatyadhikarana,
is
to prove that the
declared to be the cause of the world
Brahman
not the same as
is
Pradhdna of the Sdnkhyas ; and the Anandamayddhiharana shews that that Brahman is different from the in-
the
dividual sell also.
This Adhikarana
is
based on the Anan-
davalll of the Taittirlya-Upanishad, and the
here runs thus:
damaya
is
the
"That which
is
first aphorism denoted by the word Anan-
Brahman; because
there
is,
in the context,
the repetition of various grades of bliss which culminate in the Anandama\a or the Highest Bliss." Here the
doubt
arises
whether
this
Anandamaya
is
the Highest Self
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
liv
who
commonly known as thejlva, or whether the Anandamaya is the jlva himself. It can be made out from the context in the Taittlis
different
from the individual
self
Upamshad that the Anandamaya denotes the Brahman who is the cause of the world and whether this Brahman is different from the jlva or not has therefore to rlya-
;
be determined by making out what the Anandamaya means. According to the Saitkhyas the association of the individual self with matter is the cause of all creation, and individual selves
may
accumulate the merit of karma to
such an extent as even to become presiding deities at the commencement of what is called a creating kalpa or cycle.
Hence they
are the Purvapakshins here, and hold that the is the individual self. They say that since the
Anandamaya Anandamaya
declared in the Taittirlya-
is
Upamshad
to
be associated with an embodiment, it cannot be anything other than the individual self. Again, the fact that what is
declared to be the cause of the world
is,
in scriptural
passages, grammatically equated with the individual self, is evidence to them that the individual self itself is the cause of
The
the world. final object
individual self can
of attainment
much
matter, in as
is
'see'
and think
;
and
its
freedom from association with
as such freedom
matter and ignorance constitutes
from the bondage of its
essential nature
and
With the
object of pointing out this essential of the individual nature self, the Taittiriya-Upanishad its bliss.
says that the
Anandamaya
different
is
from the
different
life
inside
from the body it
(prdnamaya), (annamaya), from the mind within (manomaya], and different The even from the understanding therein (vijndnamayd}. different
thus the innermost entity in the body, same as the individual self (pp. 3^6-350.).
Anandamaya and
is
the
is
Here the Adwaitin
steps in with his interpretation of the
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTEXTS.
According to him the Anandamaya is from the Brahman who is the seat of
Anandamaya. not different
satisfaction
pleasure,
joy,
Iv
and
all
bliss,
of which
are
described to be His constituent parts. The Brahman is of such a nature as distinguishes Him from all other things,
He
is
the innermost essence of
all
and
is
called the
Atman.
The
idea intended to be conveyed by the Adzvaitin is that the individual self is not essentially different from the Brah-
man who is altogether one this secondless
is
only without a second, and that the Anandamaya. The Adzvaitin
Being then meets a possible objection to the effect that the Anandamaya may not be the Brahman, but may be something else;
and he
shews that the Anandamaya must not only mean the Brahman, but also must indicate that the Brahman is extremely different from pain, even as He is distinctly
The differthings other than Himself. entiation of the individual selves from the Brahman and from
different
all
from each other difference
is
due to avid yd; otherwise there
between the
and that of the Brahman.
self
is
no
essential nature of the individual
Viewed
in relation
to
its
essential nature the individual self deserves to be called
the it
Anandamaya
quite as
much
as the
Brahman
does
;
and
context to interpret the Anandaindividual self which is not in essence
appropriate in the
is
maya
that
as
different
from the
Brahman
(pp. 350-353.).
Thus both the SaAkhyas and the Adtvaitins maintain,
own
respective ways, that the Anandamaya is nothing other than the individual self. At this point it is shewn that the aphorism quoted above indicates clearly in their
that the
Anandamava must mean other than the
distinctly
assigned there
is
for
a
this
is
that,
the
individual in
graded repetition
Brahman, who is The reason self.
the Taittiriya-Upanishad, of several kinds of bliss,
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ivi
an order
which
succeeding bliss is a hundred fold of the bliss preceding it, so as to reach that bliss which forms the summit of an unsurpassable condition.
ill
This
in
eiich
not possible to the individual self, and denotes therefore the Brahman who alone can be its last bliss is
Accordingly this Upanishad declares the Anandamaya to be different from the vijfianamaya, which latter has necessarily to mean the same as the individual self. abode.
The word vijftanamaya cannot mean mere understanding that is found in ;
for, if it it
be so interpreted, the
would be meaningless
the knower or the individual "
intellect or
self.
;
it
affix
may at
really
means
It is true "
that in the
the word performs the sacrifice but it has to be borne in vijttana stands for vijildnamaya mind that words which denote the essential attributes of
passage
The
vijftdna
;
things are often used so as to denote those things themselves besides, there are grammatical rules according to which the word vijilana has to mean an intelligent agent but not mere intelligence. The vijilana that performs the ;
indeed an agent, which the mere intellect or understanding can never be and this same vijfldna is also sacrifice
is
;
own
body as its home. The Madhyandinas and the Kanvas have two separate recensions of the Brihaddsaid to
a
ranyaka- Upanisliad. In the recension of the latter there particular passage (III.
occurs;
and
the former
in the
it is
7. 22.)
in
which the word
is
a
vijftdna
in the recension of
corresponding passage found that the word dtman
is
used instead of
the word vijfldna. This decides that the vijndna which is used in the place of the vijfidnamaya can be nothing other than the individual self, and the word vijfidnamaya itself
very appropriately denotes the individual self. Therefore the Anandamaya, which is positively declared to be different from the vijfidnamaya, cannot denote the individual
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. but must denote the
self,
Brahman who
is
Ivii
other than the
individual self (pp. 354-358.).
Then
this other position of the
Purvapakshins
that,
because the Being, who is declared to be the cause world, is, in a numbe. 1(of scriptural passages, seen to be grammatically
equated with the individual self, the Anandamaya has to be the S5
The individual self is, no doubt, but that being cannot have the power of creating, preserving, and destroying the world in accordance with his own will. The scripture and the Sutrakara deration and criticism.
an intelligent being
;
are both agreed on this point, essentially different
and the individual
self is
from the Brahman. The grammatical
equation between the Brahman and the individual self cannot denote that both of them are essentially the same ;
indeed impossible for the all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good Brahman to be essentially the same as the
it
is
ignorant, weak,
and impure individual
maintained reasonably appropriate it is
only when
taken to be
false
;
Nor can
self.
it
be
that a grammatical equation
is
two equated things
in
either of the for, in
the case of the
Brahman and
the individual self equated with each other, it is not easy to decide to which of them such a falsity belongs. Of course the
Brahman
is
not unreal.
The
individual self
on the supposition that the Brahman appears individual self
but this would
may
be
so,
falsely as the
owing to the superimposition of avidyd
make
the
Brahman
;
contradict Himself.
This supposition cannot be forced on us to make the grammatical equations in the scripture significant ; for, inappropriate and opposed to reason should not be assumed even for the purpose of making the scripture ap-
what
is
propriate. This supposed association of the Brahman with evil cannot at all be a reality; and if it be held that His
H
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Iviii
attributeless character frees it
Him
frees
Him
from such an association,
also from His association with
and indeed makes
and
auspicious, there remains nothing that
ing the
The
Brahman.
certain single
all
is
all
to be
all
that
is
good
things unreal so that
known through know-
by knowing a become does not known, things proposition that,
thing, surely denote that all things are unreal. be held that the unreality of all things
Against cannot is due to the fact
of their being modifications of the one real thing which
is
attributeless intelligence. Theattributelessnessofthe.5ra#-
man is itself contradicted by tion
'
That thou
'
art
the scripture
;
and
in the
equa-
neither the That nor the thou can
denote an attributeless thing, unless indeed both these
words are interpreted figuratively (pp. 358-366.). This difficulty of having to interpret both the words in a grammatical equation figuratively cannot be got over by maintaining that the purpose of a grammatical equation at all to denote
any
attributes, but
is
is
not
merely to denote the
oneness of the thing referred to therein because the function of a grammatical equation is to predicate in relation ;
to a thing, either affirmatively or negatively,
by means of
certain words that that same thing, which has already a particular form denoted by some words, is also possessed
of a certain other form.
Only when one of the two
attri-
butes mentioned in a grammatical equation contradicts the other, is it right to interpret figuratively either of the two
words denoting those
attributes, in as
much
as the
gram-
matical equation has to denote only one thing as characterised by two consistent attributes. Nor again can it be
maintained that the words of a grammatical equation cannot import oneness in relation to the things they denote,
on the ground that the thing correlated to any one attribute is distinct from the thing which is correlated to any other attri-
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
lix
would be so, provided only that the mere correlaof a thing to two attributes is opposed to the oneness of
bute. This tion
that thing. Such is not always the case when the two attributes are contradictory, then they can not meet in one and the same thing. Many consistent attributes may ;
and do meet
in
one and the same thing
grammatical equations become
;
thus
it
is
that
and thus again external perceived objects can be maintained (pp. 366-371.). That the words in a grammatical equation have all the power of denoting a
it is
that the perdurability of
significant,
all
which is characterised by many attributes, is shewn to be borne out by Jaimini in his Mimfimsd aphorisms and the Vcdic commandment "With the red, tawney-eyed heifer, one year old, let him purchase the
single thing,
further
;
" >is discussed soma plant fully from the stand-point of Jaimini. The conclusion here arrived at and illustrated is
particular sentence forming a grammatical a equation, thing, which is characterised by one attribute or two attributes or many attributes, is denoted by certain
that, in
any
words used
agreement either with the kdraka that it is case-affixes or with the nominative case-affix
particular
in
;
made out by means
of the grammatical equation that the characterised so thing by all the attributes is only one and that this one thing is associated with the action deno;
ted
by the verb forming the predicate of the
sentence.
Two
minor objections against this conclusion are then disposed of, namely, that, in a grammatical equation in which is mentioned, a word denoting a quality as denotes that a not but qualified thing merely quality by that quality, and that, as the purchase of the soma plant is completely concluded with the exchange of the
a substance
one year old
heifer, its redness, has
this transaction of
purchase
no necessary
(pp. 371-377.)'
relation to
k
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. In
accordance with the conclusion so
arrived
at
regarding the import of a grammatical equation, the scrip'
That thou art is interpreted shew how, by means of the word thou also,
tural
.sentence
'
'
Highest Self alone that ruler of all
so as to
'
it
is
the
denoted as forming the internal individual selves. This interpretation is supis
ported by means of the teaching given in the scripture reThe garding the differentiation of names and forms.
Brahman
wishing to become manifold created the world. All the individual souls in the world entered, each acits karma, into such material embodiments were most suited to them. Then the Brahman Him-
cording to as
self
entered into these souls so as to become their internal
Thus
ruler.
that
all things have become things, and words denote the Highest Self as assosignificant with non-intelligent matter and the intelligent
all
ciated
it is
that
individual self (pp. 377-379.)-
Scriptural authority
is
then
quoted to prove that the whole world accordthe body of the Brahman, and that He Himforms ingly and it is thence arrived self constitutes the Self thereof sufficiently
;
at that all things
form modes of the Highest
Self,
and that
words denoting non-intelligent material things as well as words denoting intelligent individual selves finally import the Highest Self Himself. Therefore in the sentence the grammatical equation of the word That thou art '
'
'
That
'
with the word ' thou
',
which
also thus denotes the
has certainly a primary and natural significHighest ance and there is no need at all to adopt here any figuraSelf,
;
any kind whatever. As long as the embodiment of a thing may happen to be one of
tive interpretation of
material
not right to hold that it is only words denoting generic and other qualities that can be grammatically with words denoting substances. In the case of equated
its
modes,
it is
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ixi
thing which can exist as the mode of another thing, the existence, persistence, and realisation of that thing are invariably associated with this other thing. According!}-,
a
the words which usually denote such things as are such modes denote also the things which are characterised by
The
those modes.
material characteristics of the
not taint the embodied individual soul
;
body do the
similarly
weaknesses and deficiencies of individual souls do not affect the
Brahman who
cal equation
'
is
That thou
their Soul. '
word That '
the
art
In the grammati'
denotes, Self as the the therefore, Highest all-knowing, all-powerand the word ' thou ful, and all-good cause of the world '
;
also denotes that
same Supreme
body an embodied individual it
which Self
This interpretation
grammatical equation is quite absolutely faultless ; denotes at the same time that the individual self
of this
and
Self as having for His
self.
is
is
a
mode and hence an
attribute of the Highest
very reason different from the Highest to denote this Highest therefore it can neither denote the independent for that
The word Anandamaya has
Self.
Self; individual self of the Sdtikhyas, nor that other individual self of
the Adwaitins which
Supreme
is
in essence identical
with the
Self (pp. 379-383)-
The contention
of
the Purvapakshins word denoting the
grammatical equation of the
that
the
Brahman
with words denoting individual selves is calculated to prove the Anandamaya to be the same as the individual selfthus finally disposed of that, since the Anandamaya
is
;
and is
their other contention
declared in the scripture
to be associated with an embodiment, it cannot be anything other than the individual self is then taken up for disposal.
It
is
no doubt true that the Anandamaya
declared to be the embodied self of the vijft&namaya
;
is
but
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ixii
the series consisting of the annamaya t the prdnamaya, the manomaya, the vijndnamaya and the Anandamaya, the embodied self of that
it
is
also declared that, in
which succeeds
the same as the embodied self of that
is
which precedes and the Brahman who is the cause of the world is spoken of in this Taittiriya- Upanishad itself ;
whole
as the Self of the
over
it is
series of created beings.
distinctly stated in the
More-
Subdla- Upanishad that
the constituent principles of the universe form the body of the Highest Self. Therefore it is this Highest Self all
Himself
who
forms the embodied Self of the annamaya,
the prdnamaya, the manomaya and the vijndnamaya ; and the Anandamaya is Himself the embodied Self of Himself.
Thus the Supreme is
Self also has
the unconditioned and ever
This
is
the reason
Brahman
is
alone
blissful
Embodied
Self.
;
the sdstra which deals with the
to worthy persons by the name of the Embodied Being.' Consequently the
known
'Science of the
Anandamaya tinct
why
He
an embodiment
is
the Highest
from the individual
Self,
and
is
undoubtedly
dis-
self (pp. 383-386.).
In the next aphorism another objection against the above interpretation of the Anandamaya is answered. In
word Anandamaya there is the affix known as mayat. According to Sanskrit grammar this affix generally signifies
the
modification, although
it
may
occasionally denote abun-
dance as well. In the context the
affix mayat is uniformly used so as to signify modification. Therefore the word Anandamaya cannot be interpreted to mean any thing that is immodifiable. Even if it be granted that the mayat here
denotes abundance, there is the difficulty that an abundance of bliss implies at least a modicum of misery.
Therefore to misery
it is
the modifiable individual self
that
is
who
is
subject
denoted by the word Anandamaya.
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ixiii
Such is the position of the Pilrvapakshin, and it is counteracted by this aphorism which says that the may at here signifies only abundance. In the giaded repetition of the various kinds of
bliss,
be that which
the highest unsurpassable bliss happens to is attributed to the Anandamaya and the ;
Anandamaya must therefore mean the immodifiable and ever blissful Brahman. In the context the affix mayat cannot be uniformly interpreted to mean modification, in as much as the \vordprdnamaya has to be interpreted to mean the same thing as the word prdna means, or to mean that which has the activity of the prdna
in
common to use the affix mayat in the it is
to use
it
abundance.
It is as
sense of abundance as
in the sense of modification.
An
abundance of
does not necessarily imply a modicum of misery ; on the other hand it only implies the negation of the smallness of bliss. The scripture says distinctly that the Brahmanis
bliss
The unsurpassably to the Brahman implies belonging large also the smallness of the bliss belonging to others ; and it wholly
free
from
amount of
sin
and from misery.
bliss
not right to hold that the individual self is a modification of bliss, in as much as the knowledge and the bliss of is
the individual self are only in a state of contraction when Therefore also the Anandain the condition of samsdra.
maya as the
is
different
Supreme
from the individual
Self.
cause of
self, in
as
says that the
much
as
He
cannot be the same as he 390-391.).
that that same
is
the same
Anandamaya
is
bliss to all individual selves.
The
and
(pp. 386-390.).
The next aphorism the individual
self
who receives
is
not
declared to be the
The bliss
source of bliss
therefrom (pp.
Adhikarana says denoted by the words of
fourth aphorism in the
Brahman, who
the mantra which begins with
Knowledge, Infinity/
is
is
'The Brahman
spoken of as the
is
Existence,
Anandamaya,
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ixiv
and that therefore the Anandamaya cannot be the indiviThe Brahman is the object to be attained by self.
dual
who
the worshipper, and the object of worship cannot be the same as the worshipper (pp. 391The next aphorism gives another reason why the 392.).
the individual self
is
Anandamaya cannot be that there
is
Anandamaya It is
the individual self
;
and that
is
inappropriateness in supposing that the is any thing other than the Supreme Self.
be maintained by a Purvapakshin that, although it true that a worshipper's object of attainment is necessa-
may
from the worshipper himself, here the Brahman, denoted by the words of the mantra referred to above,
rily different
not a different thing from the individual self. The mantra is intended to teach that the Brahman and the is
individual self are both one
of
them have the same
and the same, and that both and
essential nature of attributeless
undifferentiated intelligence.
Therefore the
Anandamaya self. The
denotes only this essential nature of the individual
inappropiiateness in maintaining a position like this is that unconditioned omniscience will have to be attributed self, which has no omniscience at all in bound condition of samsara. Even the released indi-
to the individual its
vidual self cannot have such unconditioned omniscience as
can
'see'
and think
in
many
ways, so as to create the world
thereby, and make the Brahman manifold. Accordingly the
Anandamaya has preme
speech that
mean
to denote the
Brahman, who
is
the Su-
and is other than the individual self. That and mind cannot grasp the Brahman does not
Self
He
is
really attributeless, in spite of the scrip-
ture attributing to
Him
innumerable auspicious qualities
it
only means that speech and mind cannot prove Him.
is
said that the unsurpassable Bliss of the
be known, and that to know
it is
;
It
Brahman may
to cease to have
any
fear
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
l.KV
Thus the Brahman described in the mantra has characteristics which are other than those that constitute the essential nature of the individual self; and Irom anywhere.
Anandamaya cannot
the
same
again for this
individual
ad
is
different
from the
self, for the reason that the Taittiriya-Upanish-
itself declares
that the
Brahman,
the
individual
self
is
There
(pp. 396-397.).
different is
again
another reason given in the next aphorism to shew the Anandamaya cannot be the individual self.
Brahman merely
He
the
The next
as the individual self (pp. 392-396.).
aphorism says that the Anandamaya
from
reason be
;
matter in the course of His
intelligent
The
and there arises creation and need of any association with non-
wills,
does not stand in
why
But no individual
willing such a
capable of engagin can do so without ever creation ing being in assoThe last reason with matter (page 397.). ciation creation.
why
self that is
Anandamaya cannot be
the
the
individual
self
aphorism of the adhikarana. Since the bliss of the individual self is the result of that is
given in the last
self's
association with
the
Anandamaya, the bliss-giver That the Brah-
cannot be the same as the bliss-receiver.
the supreme home of bliss and that He is Bliss Himself, so that without Him none can have any bliss of
man
is
any kind, j'lva,
tity
;
is
amply borne out by
scriptural authority.
The
not taught to be such an enand therefore the conclusion of the Adhikarana is
or the individual
that the
self, is
Brahman, who has been made out
to be a differ-
ent entity from the pradhdna or non-intelligent matter, is also a different entity from the jiva or individual self (pp. 398-399.).
The seventh adhikarana \
is
called
Aniar adhikarana,
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ixvi
and
consists only of
two aphorisms.
This and the follow-
ing four adhikaranas, belonging to the first part of the first chapter of the Vedanta-Si'itras, are intended to establish
that the
Brahman
is
different
from certain particular
non-intelligent entities,as also from the Sun, Prajapati,Indra
and other such individual selves, who have attained godhood and are in possession of peculiarly valuable merit due to their respective karmas. The first aphorism of the Antaradhikarana says that the Person, who is declared in the scripture to be within the Sun and within the eye, is
Brahman
the
Himself, in as much as such attributes as Brahman are seen to be applied to that Sankhyas are again the Pftrvapakshins here,
belong only to the Person.
The
person is declared to be, like an individual self, associated with a body ; and they contend that individual selves themselves may, through the accu-
and point out that
this
mulated merit of their karmas, acquire omniscience, omnipotence, and all the other sovereignties which are attributed to the Brahman, and that there need be nothing called the Supreme Self as distinct from the individual self. According to them it is only a highly meritorious individual self the person within the Sun and within the eye (pp. In answer to the Sdtikhyas it is first pointed 400-402.).
that
is
out that "This same above-mentioned Person all sins,"
all is,
and that to be so
free
from sin
is
is
risen
above
to be free from
subjection to the influence of karma. No individual self by nature, free from the influence of karma ; and the
Brahman's freedom from the
influence of
karma
is
indeed
all the auspicious qualities and sovereignties that are attributed to Him as being natural to Him. To
the basis of
possess these things thus, it is altogether impossible for any individual self. Therefore the Person within the eye
and within the Sun cannot be an individual
self.
That
this
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ixvil
declared to be associated with a body does not prove that He must, in consequence, be only an individual self; because it is possible for Him who wills the
Person
is
truth to will His
own
association with a body.
Indeed between His essential nature, incompatibility which is free from the influence of karma, and His association with a material body, which is always controlled by there
is
karma but then His body need not at ;
all
be material. That,
He often with the .object assumes suitable divine forms, that nevertheless He is free from the qualities belonging essentially to material Prakriof favouring His worshippers,
and that the body which is at any time assumed by is immaterial and divine, are all capable of being well established by means of the scriptures. Consequently, He ti,
Him
who
abides within the brilliant orb of the Sun and within
the Highest Self Himself, who is different from the Sun and other individual selves (pp. 403-408.). Then the eye
is
the other aphorism in the adhikarana draws attention to the fact that the scriptures themselves have declared this
Highest Self to be different from the sun-god and other such and in proof of this, passages are quoted
individual selves
;
from the Brihaddranyaka-Upanishad and from the SnbdlaUpanishad and finally the adhikarana is brought to an end with the conclusion that the Supreme Self is altogether
from
different
all
the individual selves from the four-faced
Brahma downwards The
(pp. 408-409.).
is
Chhdndogya-Upanishad
much
as His
mentioned
At ma n,
contains only one aphorism denoted by the word Akd'sa in the
Aka'sddhikarana
which says that what
(I.
9. .1.)
is
the
Brahman,
in as
peculiar characteristics are, in the context,
in relation to
what is denoted by that word.
Sat,
and such other words have already been shewn to
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. who is the cause
of the world and the and divine auspicious qualities sovereignties. Here, it is pointed out that the word Akasa is also used, in the passage referred to above, to denote that same Brah-
denote the Brahman,
home
of
all
man. The Pfirvapakshin here contends that the word dkdsa must be interpreted to mean nothing other than the material element of akasa or ether. No one has any right
word so
to interpret a
other than
its
as to
make
it
have a meaning which
usual significance; and,
when
it is
is
said in the
scriptures that all beings are born out of the akasa, what is meant to be taught is that the whole world has been evolved out of the material element known as ether. The qualities of
(
seeing
',
thinking, and willing are attributed The word sat
to the cause of the world only figuratively.
also means the material element known as dkdsa, and the word at man also may legitimately be interpreted to mean the same thing. That dkdsa is sometimes pointed out to be
a produced the world
;
effect,
does not go against its being the cause of it is capable of existing both in the
because
unevolved and the evolved conditions.
This view agrees also with other statements in the scripture regarding the
dkdsa
;
therefore the
Brahman
is
not other than the well
known element contention
which
this
it
of akasa (pp. 409-413.). Against this is argued that the Upanishadic passage on
aphorism
is
based assigns to Akd'sa such
attri-
butes as cannot appropriately belong to the element ether. This element cannot be the cause of all things, in as much as the intelligent individual self cannot be born out of
cannot be greater than all things, because to be greater than all things is to be unconditioned nor can it be the best refuge, as long as it is merely that non-intelligent matter;
it
;
which deserves to be discarded and the attainment of which forms no desirable aim of life. It is
non-intelligent thing
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
IxJX
not right to say that the word dkdsa cannot be interpreted mean anything other than the well known material
to
element ether
;
for, in
the context, that
word
is
used so as
The
been already described.
to denote a thing that has
and in as much as He thing so described is the Brahman the of possesses illuminating things, He is very power The forced adoption of an called Akdsa. appropriately ;
interpretation that
reasonable.
against the context that the word dtman
is
It is true
is is
in
no way
occasionally
used so as to denote a non-intelligent thing, but the general rule is that it has to denote an intelligent entity and ;
the scripture ascribes to what forms the cause of the world such attributes as belong only to an intelligent being. It is
thus a settled conclusion that the omniscient, omnipoBrahman alone is denoted by
tent and omnipenetrative the word Akdsa in the
The Prdnddhikarana
context referred to above (pp.
a short one containing only one aphorism, which says that the word Prdna also is used in the CJihdndogya-Upanishad to denote the Brahman. Here is
prdna cannot mean merely life or vital air, in as much as it is used to denote a thing that has been otherwise described,
and
into
in as
much
as
it
which the world
world comes.
is
Seeing that
we cannot
characterised to be an entity
enters
and
out
most things
interpret this causal
of
which the
are dependent
Prdna
to
upon
/i/e,
life.
Stocks and stones and the essence of the
mean
intelli-
gent individual self are all pervaded by the Brahman, and are thus dependent upon the Brahman ; but there is no Therefore the life or physical vitality in them.
word Prdna all-knowing,
also
denotes, like
all-powerful,
and
the
word Akasa, that
all-good
Brahman who
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ixx
alone can be the cause of the universe and be
home
final
its
of refuge (pp. 417-418.).
There are four aphorisms in the Jyotir-adhikarana, and they are intended to show that the word Jyotis and the
word Gdyatrl
are both used in the
to denote the
Brahman who
is
Qihdndogya- Upanishad
the cause of the world.
It
be held that the word Jyotis means the oridinary
may
light that counteracts darkness, in as
much
as
no
particular
characteristics specially belonging to the
Highest Self are association with the thing de-
mentioned here as being in noted by that word. This Jyotis is also mentioned to be the same as the digestive heat of the stomach, and even
quite capable of being characterised by great splendour. The ordinary well known light itself is
ordinary light
is
Brahman which
forms the resplendent cause of the world. Against this view the first aphorism in this adhikarana says ihatjyolis or 'Light' here denotes the Hightherefore the
est
Person Himself, as there
connected context. foot
;
His three immortal
This means that of His
power
is
the mention of His feet in a "All beings
feet are in the
make up His one
Highest Heaven."
created beings indicate only a quarter and greatness and glory, while the remaining all
three fourths are not at
is
It is said
made
manifest in our visible universe
are in the Highest Heaven, and this 'Light' said to shine beyond that Highest Heaven. When it is all.
They
'
'
taught that this Highest Person conceived as Light has to be meditated upon as forming the digestive heat of the stomach, it does not prove that Jyotis cannot denote the
Brahman.
In the Bhagavad-gltd the Lord has actually Himself to this digestive heat (pp. compared 419-421.). The mention of the feet here is also in relation to the Gdyatrl}
which again
is
declared
in
the CJj.handog\a- Upanishad
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
Ixxi
Brahman and
to form the cause of all things. The second aphorism of this Adhikarana says that this word Gdyatrl does not mean the Vedic metre known by
to be the
that name, but denotes
Brahman
the
Himself.
It
is
taught that one of the ways of meditating on Him is to conceive Him as the Gdyatrl metre, which has four feet even To use words which ordinarias He has His four feet. ly denote metres
in
some other
common, and the word viraj
Therefore
dogya-Upanishad.
who
is
special sense
not un-
is
same Chhanalso means the
so used in this
Gdyatrl
the cause of the world (pp. 421-423.). Supreme The next aphorism gives another reason why the word Gdyatrl has here to be understood to mean the Highest Self
is
As
Person Himself.
in the case of the
so in the case of the Gdyatrl also,
it is
all beings make Therefore again the word Gdyatrl must denote
has four feet and that four feet.
the
Brahman Himself
'Light'
Highest Person, pointed out that it up only one of these
mentioned above
(pp. is
423-424.).
The
Jyotis or
said to shine beyond the
and the three immortal
feet
Highest
of the
Heaven, Highest Person are taught to be in the Highest Heaven. In the former statement the Highest Heaven indicates a boundary, while in the latter it indicates a position of locar tion.
The
last
aphorism of this adhikarana says that, is no incompatibility here to vitiate the
nevertheless, there
that Jyotis really means the Highest Person. That Highest Person in the Highest Heaven, who is possessed of unsurpassable splendour, is Himself the Light conclusion
which is
resplendent beyond the Highest Heaven. There scriptural authority for this way of harmonising the is
above two statements. Consequently it is quite faultless to say that it is that Supreme Person Himself who is denoted by the word Jyotis or 'Light' (pp. 424-425.),
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
XXll
The eleventh Adhiharana
is
known
as the Indraprd-
n&dhikarana, and consists of four aphorisms. This adhikarana is mainly based on passages to be found in the KauIn one of
shUaki-Brdhmana-Upanishad.
them
Pratar-
dana, the son of Divodasa, is said to have gone to the abode of Indra and there to have been told by him to choose a
boon. himself
On may
Pratardana saying that on his behalf Indra choose such a boon as is most beneficial to
" Indeed I am the man, Indra is declared to have said Prdna and the Omniscient Self. Worship and meditate on me as life, as immortality." Here Indra is seen to designate himself as Prdna and to affirm that he is himself a worthy object of worship and meditation. Here the doubt naturally arises whether this Indra who calls himself Prdna is merely the individual self known as the god Indra, or
whether he
who
other than any indiThe first aphorism of the Adhikarana mainvidual self. tains that the words Indra and Prdna denote the Supreme is
the Supreme Self
much
is
on that supposition alone the sequel becomes appropriate, wherein it is said that this Prdna is the Omniscient Self who is blissful, undecaying and immortal, Self, in as
as
(pp. 425-427.).
makes it
The context of the passage quoted above
quite clear that
er therein,
and as
if for
it is
who is the
speak-
identification
he also
the god Indra
recognition and
himself here as the slayer of Tvashtra and when he says that he himself is a worthy object of worship and meditation, it cannot be that the word Indra denotes any thing calls
;
The second aphorism other than the god of that name. here gives the reply to this objection, and says that it cannot be
so,
because there
is
in
the context the mention of a
multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self. The Kaushitaki-Brdhmana-Upanishad says that Prdna is the
support of the whole universe that
is
made up of intelligent
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. and
This
things.
non-intelligent
Ixxiii
of
quality
being
the support of all things can be appropriate!)' attributed is the Internal Ruler only to the Highest Self who of all things. To be the worthy object of such worship as leads
to
peller
release
final
of
all
and immortality,
activities,
be the Lord of immortal, are
be
to
and to be
all,
the
to
be
the imof
support
all,
to
undecaying and
blissful,
attributes belonging to the Inner Self
all
;
and they are ascribed to Indra and Prana. Therefore the words Indra and Prana denote the Supreme Self Himself
How can Indra presume that he is here (pp. 427-430.). The the possessor of all these attributes of the Inner Self? aphorism here gives the answer to this question. That Indra looked upon himself as the Highest Self is in accordance with the teaching given in the saslras, and in
third
Vamadeva is and saw the Brahman.
accordance with what
he realised
is
Highest person the universe
is
him
have done when 1
After realising that the the Internal Ruler of all things, and that
His body, Prahlada
declared that he was existed in
said to
all
is
also said to
things himself and that
(pp. 430-432.).
The
all
have
things
characteristics of the
individual self and of the principal vital air are mentioned clearly in the context wherein the
words Indra and Prana
occur. Therefore these words cannot denote the Brahman, who is different from the intelligent individual selves and
from non-intelligent matter, and world.
The
last
who
is
also the cause of the
aphorism of this adhiharana gives, however,
the reply to this supposition, by pointing out that it is allowable to worship and meditate on the Brahman in three
ways, that those three ways of worship and meditation are assumed to be proper in the context here, and that one of those three
ways
man may
be worshipped J
is
actually adopted therein. in
His essential
The Brahunembodied
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS. nature, or
and
He may
be worshipped as an embodied being He may be conceived and meditat;
in this latter case
ed upon either as an individual
Wherever
self or as
particular individual selves
rial objects
a material object
and particular mate-
are found so described in the scripture as to be
in association
with the peculiarly characteristic attributes Self, or wherever the words denoting those
of the Supreme
and material objects are seen to be grammatically equated with words denoting the Supreme Self, in all such cases what is intended to be taught is the
individual selves
worship and meditation of the Brahman as forming the Inner Self of all those intelligent and non-intelligent enAccordingly the words Indra and Prana also denote the Supreme Self (pp. 432-435.). Thus ends the commentary on the first part of the
tities.
chapter of the Vedanta-Siitras. The first Adhikarana establishes the need for the study of the Veddnta and first
points out the purpose of such a study. The second gives a definition of the Brahman. The third points out that this definition
The
has altogether to be based on the scripture.
fourth says that the scripture accordingly forms the only
source from which a knowledge of the Brahman is to be derived, in as much as the Brahman is the one thing which
throughout aims at teaching. These four Adhikarana^ contain only one aphorism each, and together they denote it
the
need
The
fifth
and the main object of Vcddntic studies. Adhikarana establishes that the Brahman, who
has been defined to be the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the whole universe, is other than the purely material Pradhdna of the Sdfikhyas. Thus the Veddnta does not believe in what may be called the omni-
potence of matter, and there are eight aphorisms given to sh,ew that matter cannot be the creator of the world. Then
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS.
K'XV
the eight aphorisms of the sixth Adhikarana demonstrate that, according to the teaching given in the Upanishads, the
cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the world is not only not matter, but it is not also any
one of the individual souls existing in the universe. is the Highest Person is the Creator
Brahman who
He
is
distinct
from matter and
distinct
from
soul.
The ;
and
Then
the remaining five Adhikaranas shew that it is only this Brahman who is mentioned as the Person within the Sun
and the eye, and who is denoted in various contexts in the Upanishads by the words Ahasa, Prana, Jyotis, Gayatrl
and Indra-and-Prdna.
Accordingly it is proved that the Prakriti and the Purusha of the SfitikhyaS do not constitute the cause of the world, but that the cause thereof
who
is
the omniscient and omnipotent wholly pure and abundantly full of is
qualities.
God Himself all
auspicious
SRT-BHASHYA. CHAPTER. PART
May my
I.
I.
understanding assume the form ofloving deBrahman who is the Home of
votion to that Highest
LakshmT,
x
whom
and to of
struction, &.C.,
all
the creation, preservation, de-
the worlds
is
(mere play, whose main )
resolve consists in the protection of ho?ts of multiform
subordinate beings, and who is specially seen to shine forth in what constitutes the head* of the IViftfx. the fair-minded god-like ones of the earth drink the daily speech-nectar of the son of Parasara
May
in
milky ocean of the Upanishads, and quickens such souls as have lost hold of their life in God through the excessive flaming forth of the fire of sawsara* (may they drink in that nectar) which has been carefully preserved by ancient teachers and has (hitherto been held at a distance (from us )
all
)
on account of the mutual
thought, and which
by means i.
Lakshml
is
the
name
of the god-
dess of fortune, mercy and beauty. She is otherwise known as Sri, and is re-
garded wife
the "
of
in
Vishnu or
Hrisrfa
l>oth
Hindu Mythology
Taitt.
Tlr. tf
in
are
as the
Narayana. the
Lakshni'sctia
Lakshml, and
j>er?onified.
conflict of
many
schools of
now
brought within the reach (of of (our) appropriate words. is
HrT
In
passage patnyau,"'
or
spoken of
modesty a<
tho
all
)
wives of Vishnu. J.
The
Cpaxisiiiiiis
are
upon as forming the head Jos, and are also known
looked
of the
I'f-
as the IV-
dJnia. :.
Samsarx mean? the
mundane
circuit
of
existence consisting of fre-
quent births and frequent deaths ami all their
consequences.
SRI-BHASHYA.
2
[Chap.
L
Part.
L
Ancient teachers (such as Dramidacharya and others) abridged that extensive commentary on the Brahma-Suwas composed by the venerable Bodhayana. *
tras* which
In accordance with their opinion, the words of the sfilras (i. e.
aphorisms) are (here) explained.
ADHIKARANA.
I.
Jijftdsddhikarana.
Sutra
I.
Atha to Brahmajijnasa.
Then therefore the enquiry
into the
Brahman.
Here the word then is used in the sense of coming immediately after the word therefore is used in the sense ;
that that (enquiry) which has been concluded (viz. the enquiry into the Karma-kdnda* ) is the reason (for under-
With him who has (first) taking the present enquiry). studied and learnt the Vedas with all their limbs 7 and head, and who, through realizing that the mere knowledge of (ritualistic) works gives small and transitory results, has
the desire for final release born in desire for that
him
(with him), the
knowledge of the Brahman, which
ductive of infinite and eternal results,
is,
is
pro-
indeed, of subse-
quent origin.
Brahmano jijildsd 4.
Brahma-Sutras
is
another
for the Veddnta-Sutras of
Brah majijnasa. name
Badarayana.
Accordingly, Bodhayana is called the Vrittikara or the author of the 5.
~
\\itti.
6.
The Karma-kanda
is
that section
7.
Brahmanas, the
In the same
way
Upanishads are looked
in
which the
upon
as
the
head of the Vedas, the science of Siks/id or phonetics, which deals with the proper pronunciation and euphony of grammar, metrics, Xirukta
words,
which includes the
which deals with the etymology and
Brahmanas and such
portions of the Aranyakas as deal
proper meaning of Vedic words, astrouomy, and Kalpa or the code of litur-
with rituals and their performance.
of the Vedas. gy, form the six limbs
of Vedic scriptures
Manlras,
the
Adhik.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/. Silt, i.]
genitive of the
word Brahman^ has
3.
(here) the objective sig-
with the special rule " The genitive followed by a word having a krit* affix is used to denote the agent or the object." [Pdnini. II. 3. 65.]. Even nificance, in accordance
the genitive is taken as expressing relation in general", the objective significance (of the genitive) is well esta-
if
know requires an obmade out by the direct
blished (here), because the desire to
Yet again, because what
ject.
denotative Pdnini. II.
tained
(of the
power 3.
is
65.)
is
accordance with
in
genitive
more acceptable than what
is
ob-
by a process of inference (in accordance with Pdnini. where the genitive is declared to be capable of - the has to relation in
II. 3. 50.,
genitive (here)
general)
expressing
be understood
in the objective significance.
be supposed that because there
is
prescribed specially for particular words
It
"
the rule is
should not
The
genitive
not to be com-
[Pdnini. II. 2. 10. Vdrtika.'], this genitive in the objective significance, (being one such), is prohibited from being compounded (with other words); for, there is " The the rule of counter-exception (to this), viz. genitive, with a krit following, is to be compounded." [Pdnini. II.
pounded"
2.
9.
Vdrtika.~\
By the word Brahman is denoted the Highest Person who is, by nature, devoid of all evil, and is possessed of hosts of auspicious qualities, which are innumerable and unsur-
passed in excellence. For, everywhere (/. c. in all contexts) the word Brahman is seen to derive its meaning from the See Paitini
8.
Whenever
III.
I.
93. Kridatih.
a rule affecting a root ob-
tains scope for its operation, then the affix
which
a.
A'ril is
from
a
than verbal personal affixes such as
here.
mi,
si, tt,
is
called a A'ril.
Generally,
affix
And
used to form nouns a word ending with
a A'rit affix (A'ridanta)
applied to that root in accordance with that rule, and is other it'
an
roots.
A'rit.
bal
y.
The woi d
noun and
is
See rCinini.
is
also called
Jijflasa
is
a vei-
taken to be a
II. 3. 50.
A'rit
SRI-I3HASHYA.
4
association of bnhativa,
L
\Chap.
L
Part.
the thing is, by nature as it) ; well as by qualities, unsurpassed in excellence, that is its 10 And He (who possesses primary and natural meaning i.
c.
(with
greatness,
and whatever greatness
denoted by
.
such greatness)
is
alone
the"
Hence the word
Lord of All.
primarily used to signify Him alone. In cases on account of the association of a small modicum of where, that quality, other things than He are meant (by the word
Brahman
is
Brahman], it is
must be used
it
in
a secondary sense
improper to postulate a variety of
meanings
;
because
(for
as
it),
improper) in the case also of the word Bhagaval For the sake of attaining immortality, He alone has to be 1
(it is
*
.
and to be known by (all) those who are afflicted Hence, the Lord of All is in-
desired
with the three miseries 12
deed the
Brahman
.
\vho forms the object of (our present)
enquiry.
Jijnasa
is
desire has for 10.
its
meanings
power is
it
is
held
words to denote
of
of three kinds, vis. de-
and purportive. purportive signification of words by some maintained to be different
notative,
the fact of such or
men
possessing more of
the
'three miseries' are
the
the
less
godly
qualities
Divine Lord.
The
12.
figurative
The
three kinds of miseries
is
Adhyatmika
from the suggestive signification, and accordingly the power of words is also said
to
prakasdi chapters, 11.
See Kavya-
be fourfold. II.
&
It
is,
frequently enough as
however,
the
used
a term of re-
spect in association with the
names
of
great and holy men, such as Vyasa,
Bodhayana, &c.
It is
to
one's
i.
self,
e.
known
those which are due
the Adhidaivika, those
that arise out of deities
supernatural
as the
origin,
or are
of
and the Adhi-
bhautika, those that arise out of natur-
III.
The word Bhagavat means
Divine Lord.
(every)
basis the thing to be desired, here, that
In Indian literature
that the
As
the desire to know.
(literally)
held that in
all
such cases the applicability of the word as a term of respect is due to
al
causes and beings.
fever
and other such
desire,
For example, diseases, anger,
and other such passions form
the misery
known
as the Adhyatmika.
Thunder, storm, lightning, &c., produce the Adhidah-ika misery. The Adlribhaulika
misery
ghosts, devils, &c.
results
from
Adhik.
I.
SRI-BHASHYA.
Sut. /.]
very knowledge (of the Brahman], which ed,
is
5 is
the thing desir-
enjoined.
What
is
said
is
this
:
As the
works learnt
(ritualistic)
Mimdmsd
from the earlier part of the
capable of and as the
are
producing only small and transitory results, knowledge of the Brahman, conclusively dealt with in the latter part
capable of producing infinite and for this reason alone, immediately
is
(thereof),
indestructible results,
antecedent knowledge of works, the Brahman has to be desired and known. Says the Vrittikdra (Bodhaafter the
"
yana) therefore
:
The
know
to
desire
the
Brahman
comes immediately after the acquisition of the knowledge of (ritualistic) works is completed." Moreover, he says, in the following manner, that between the Karma-mlmdmsd and the BraJima-mlmdmsd there
is
a sdslraic
scienti-
(/. e.
unity (whereby the antecedence of the Karma-ml" This is Mimdmsd of the Embodied implied) c. of the Brahman) is composed so as to be one with
fic)
mdmsd (/.
:
that of Jaimini
(/. c.
the
Karma-mlmdmsd) which
consists
of sixteen specific chapters and so there is the establishment of sdstraic unity between them." Hence the differ;
ence between the Pilrva-mimdmsd and the
Uttara-mi-
mdmsd is due to the difference in the subject-matter taken up to be propounded, like the difference between the first six and the second six chapters (of the Pfirva-mlmdmsd), between one chapter and another Mimdmsds). The Mlmdmsd-sdstra (as a
as also like the difference (of either of the
whole), beginning with
"
Then
"
riharma**, ending
(i.
with"
c.
duty)
There
is
{Pur.
hus the characteristics
Mini.
I.
i.
i.]
;
and
non-return, according to scripture
13. D/iaftna or duty is defined in the Purva-mlmSmsJl to be " that thing
which
therefore the enquiry into
of a
;
commandment." Chodanalakshanortho dharmah. [Jaimini's /';*-;/// wjwj.
1. 1.
2.].
SRI-BHASHYA.
6
there
IV.
is
4.
[Chap.
Part.
/.
non-return, according to scripture "--[ Vcd. Snt. 22.], has a certain order of sequence (in the treat-
ment of
its
subject) in accordance with the peculiarity of
the topics dealt with (therein). Accordingly, by the statement
dhydya) has to be learnt" reception, syllables
by means of
known
Swddhydya, "
asked,
I.
is
"
\Taitt. Ar.
The Veda (Swd-
II. 15.],
the mental
oral recitation, of the collection of
as the Veda,
enjoined in the
Of what nature
is
denoted by the word very beginning. And if it be
which
is
that learning through oral reci-
we reply as the The requirements (for learning follows Vedas) are " A Brahmana of means of this viz. enjoined by passage, eight years of age should be initiated (as a Vedic student) and how
tation
is it
to be gone through ?"
:
and be taught (to repeat the Vedas) "[Sat. Br. ?] as also by means of the teaching about special preparatory and purificatory ceremonies and restrictions (as to time, ;
such as are laid
place, food, &c.)
among
down
in this passage
"
Having, according to scriptural injuncpreparations to begin (to learn the Vedas) either (on the full moon day) in the month of Srdvana (/'. e. others, viz.
made
tions,
July-August) or (on the fitted
Vedas
Thus
moon
day) in the month of
August-September), and having be(therefor), a Brahmana should learn the
Praushthapada
come
full
for four
(/. c.
months and a
half."
\Manu. IV.
95.].
understood that learning the Vedas turns out to be the mental reception of a collection of syllables, and it is
consists in their recitation
by the teacher followed by the
after-recitation (of the pupil),
who
is in
the habit of observ-
preparatory and purificatory ceremonies and initiated by a teacher born restrictions, of noble lineage, accustomed to pious observances, possess-
ing special
and who has been
ed of spiritual
qualities,
and also having a thorough know-
Adhik.
I.
SRi-BHASHYA.
Snt. /.]
7
ledge of the Vcdas. Learning the Vcdas is, moreover, a a refinement or an exaltation of excellence) (/. c.
samskara
Vedas, since it is seen that Swadhydya forms the object (of such a samskara) in the passage /The Veda has to be learnt." \Taitt. Ar. II. 15.]. Samsrelation to the
in
refinement or exaltation of excellence), it is well known, is the means of qualifying (a thing) for the fulfilment of other objects (than those for which it is suited
kara
(/. c.
And
without that samskara). to be worthy of samskara
(/. c.
proper for the Vcdas of getting their excellence it
is
exalted), because (when so qualified) they enable us to know (the nature of) duty, wealth, desire and final release,
which form the fourfold objects of human pursuit
;
and
know
also) the means of accomplishing them. And again (they are worthy of such samskcira), because, in the way of a mere silent repetition (of prayers),
(they enable us to
they form, even as they are verbally, the means of accomplishing those (objects of human pursuit). Thus the cS:c.,
injunction as to learning the Vedas finally
comes to mean a
mere mental reception of a collection of syllables, after * and (reciting) certain mantras (obeying) certain regula1
tions.
Because the Vcdas, as learnt by oral recitation,
(/.
are,
of
own
nature, seen to give us knowledge of purposeful fruit-giving) things, the person who has learnt the
their c.
Vcdas perceives, in the first instance, those purposeful (fruitgiving) things which are disclosed to him by the Vedas so learnt
the 14.
mean
;
'
hearing
A ;i
his own Mimamsd
and then betakes himself, of
'
Mantra sacred
('/.
is
c.
the study
interpreted
formula
thought which protect the thereof from all danger.
and
of the
to
properly, a
its
ed to a deity, and
thinker It
)
is,
possess
powers.
hymn
mystic
accord, to
which
is
of
or prayer address-
and
is
supposed
to
supernatural
SRI-BHASHYA.
8
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
the nature of an enquiry into Vedic texts, having for its result the determination of the special character and mode of those (purposeful and fruit-giving) things. There (/. c. in the Vedas),
after the true nature of the injunctions re-
garding works has been ascertained, he observes the insignificant and impermanent character of the result of works.
And
then because, from the passages of the Upanishads which are a part, of the Vedas learnt by oral recitation, a
prima facie mental impression about an infinite and permanent result in the form of immortality arises, he therefore becomes qualified for the study of the Mlmdmsd of the Embodied (the Mlmdmsd} which is such an enquiry into Vcddntic texts as results in the determination of the nature
of that (immortality).
Accordingly, Vcddntic texts declare the destructibility of the results of mere works and the indestructible character of the results arising
man:
from the knowledge of the Brah-
world obtained by works perishes there, the world obtained by merit perishes."
"Just as the
here, so also,
i. "To him that (world obtained 6.]. indeed comes to an end." [Brih. Up. III. 8. 10.]. by works) " It is not reached by the non-eternal (works)." [Kat/i.
[C/ihdnd. Up. VIII.
Up. of
II.
'
10.].
sacrifices."
Frail, indeed, are these floats in
the form
"
I. 2. 7.]. Having examined by works, let a Brdhmana acquire freedom from all desires. The changeless is not (gained) the to know by changeable that, let him approach, with
[Mnnd. Up.
the worlds obtained
;
hand, a preceptor who is learned in the Vedas and has a sure footing in the Brahman. To him (/. e. to such a pupil) who, with restrained senses and fuel in
fully tranquilled
mind, has thus appoached him (7. e. the perceptor), that wise man (the Guru) should speak of that knowledge of the
Brahman by which
the ever-existent and indestructible
Adhik.
I.
Siil.
SRi-BHASHYA.
/.]
9
&
Person (Puritsha) is known." [Muni. Up. I. 2. 12 13.]. Should speak of has (here) the same meaning as should "
teach. est."
He who knows Up.
[Taitt.
again
who
II.
the
i.
Brahman
"He
i.].
s ies that One."
?
[
].
attains the
Highcomes not to death
"He who sees
(that
One) does not see Death." [Qihand. Up. VII. 26. 2.]. " He (who knows the Brahman) becomes free." [Qtihand. "
He who knows Him thus becomes Up. VII. 25. 2.]. immortal here. There is no other path for the attainment of final release."
[Taitt.
Ar.
III. 12.7.].
"
Knowing the
and the Impeller (/. e. the Brahman) to be separate, and being therefore blessed by Him, he attains immortality". [Svct. Up. I. 6.]. To the same effect there individual self
are also other texts.
may, however, be said that Swarga (the celestial world of enjoyment) and other such results of works, the destructibility of Sioarga and -of such other things, and imIt
worship of the Brahman are (all) undoubtedly made out merely by learning the Vcdas with their limbs;. and that (therefore) he, who mortality
( having
the result
as
of the
so learnt the Vedas)
desirous of obtaining final at once betake himself to the enquiry into the
may Brahman immediately
release,
is
afterwards.
What
for the (alleged) necessity of the (previous)
then
is
the reason
enquiry into (ritu-
If so asked we reply "Let ? alistic) duty (dhanna) him not enter on the study of the MlmAmsd of the Embodied also, since, by merely learning the Vcdas with their
"
however,
tion (of all"
sentence
is
only when it
at
first
become known."
It may be again said, there arises a prima facie noTrue, certainly those things mentioned above) ; still, as a
limbs, all things
capable of definitely importing a true meaning supported by logic, this notion, even though
it is
sight aprears of
2
itself,
does not transcend doubt
SRI-BHASHYA.
io
and wrong apprehension.
Hence
[Chap.
I.
L
Fart.
to determine that (true
meaning), an enquiry into Veda
itlc
passages has to be
(we rejoin)-" You
please see to it that the enquiry into (ritualistic) duty also has to be undertaken for that very same reason."
undertaken."
If so,
be said again (by the Ptlrvapakshin, 5 or the objector) as follows Whatever the enquiry into the Brahman invariably desiderates, that very thing should
But
it
'
may
:
be stated to be the antecedent subject of enquiry (here). The enquiry into the Brahman does not desiderate the enr quiry into (ritulistic) dut) (dharma), becuuse in the case of him who has learnt the Veda/ita, although he may
have (previously) obtained no knowledge of (ritualistic) works, the enquiry into the meaning of Vedantic passages. In this same ( Vcddnta) quite possible and appropriate. are discussed those uf.d :anas or forms of worship which are is
based upon the Udgitha (/. e. the sacred syllable Om), c., and are in themselves a part of fritua.isticj works. If it
be held that one
who
has not obtained the knowledge of works is incapable of performing them ('/. e. of going through those forms of worship), then, whoever thinks so is ignorant of the import of the Science of the Embodied. In this science,
of the
it is
aimed to propound the knowledge of the oneness
Atman
(i. e.
of the Self), for the purpose of destroying
that false knowledge, which is the source of all (kinds of) misery to him/vvho is sunk in the ocean of the sorrows which arise out of the
ence), that
samsara (or the
circuit of
mundane
exist-
made up
of biitli, old age, death, &c., and have for their cause the perception of the various distinctions is
which are due to the beginningless avidya, (or ignorance). 1$.
who
This objector is
is
the Adwaitin
of opinion that the
Karma-
kdnda need not be studied as the
necessary preliminary to the study of the Jndna-kandu or the Ved-
ata.
Adhik.
Snt. /.]
I.
SRI-BHASHYA.
it
the knowledge of works, which depends upon of distinctions, any use to such a person ? On the contrary it is positively unfavourable (to him). Moreover, the dis-
How,
then,
is
cussion of the Udgitha, &c., really forms a part of (the study of) works and yet as it (viz. that discussion) is closely allied ;
to
what
constitutes knowledge,
ducted here
(in
the Vcdn>ita).
it is
also (incidentally) con-
Indeed,
it (/. c.
the conduct
of that discussion here) is i.ot due to any direct relationship (of antecedence and sequence). Hence, whatever is desiderated by what forms the principal subject of this science --that very thing has to be mentioned as its antecedent. (The Bhd" True skarlyas may, however, here interpose and say) but the knowledge of works alone is what is desiderated ;
because
declared that final release (or moksha) reHe (the sults from knowledge that is added to works.
by
it,
it is
Sfitra-kdrd) also says
' :
There
is
need of
all
(works), be-
cause there are scriptural statements enjoining sacrifices, &c.; just as (the harness is needed) in the case of the horse.'
[
Ved, Snt. III.
4.
26.].
Moreover, when the desi-
derate \ works are not (themselves-) made out, it is not possible to know the distinction, as to with which (of them) there is to be the cumulative association (of knowledge \
and
as to
with which
it
is
not to be.
Hence that
(viz.
karma) alone is the antecedent (subject of enquiry)." This view (we mention) is not proper, because the cessation of ignorance (or oiavidyd) is due soie.y to the knowledge of the Brahman, who is pure intelligence and hostile to all characterising attributes. In reality, final re.ei.se is merely the cessation o. ignorance. can works which are subject to endless distinctions arising from the peculiarities due
How
to tiie various conditions ana stages of iLe, (arising) from the ojjects which tlie^e have in view and from the means o/ accomplishing them, as also Irom the man her of
SRI-BHASHYA.
12
[C/w/.
/.
Part.
L
can such works) become the accomplishing them (how means for the destruction of ignorance, which(destruction) other than the cessation of the percepis, by nature, nothing tion of all distinctions ? Scriptural texts also say that works are an obstruction to final release, inasmuch as their results are of a transitory nature ; and (they further say) that know" To him that of final release. ledge O alone forms the means comes to an end." [Brih. (world obtained by works) indeed " obtained by works perUp. III. 8. 10.]. Just as the world ishes here, so also, perishes."
\hhand.
there,
the world obtained
Up. VIII. 1.6.].
"
by merit
He who knows
the
"He
Brahman attains the Highest." [Taitt. Up. i.]. who knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman indeed." II. i.
[Muni. Up.
" After
III. 2. 9.].
transcends death."
[Svet.
knowing
III. 8.].
Up.
To
Him the
alone, one
same
effect
there are also other texts.
has been observed that vidya (or the knowledge of the Brahman) is dependent upon karma, such as Besides,
sacrifice,
it
&c.
from
this fact,
words of the
is (by nature) hostile to the Brahma-mim&nsa)\ principal subject (of as well as from a careful consideration of the
Now,
what forms the
it
(viz.
karma)
scriptural passages (enjoining
karma}, it follows
that, through previously purifying the internal organ (or the mind), it (viz. karma) is useful in producing the desire to
know
Brahman), but not in producing the fruit (in the fnoksha resulting from the knowledge of the Brahman)\ and it is therefore that the word vividishanti (which means they desire to know) is mentioned in the scriptural form
(the
Oi
passage (under reference,
Brahmana \Erih.
viz.
Tame tarn VeddnuvacJiancna
vividishanti yajiljna dd:iena tapasana'sakena.)
Up. IV.
4.
22.].
The
scripture itself declares in
the following manner that after the desire to know (the Brahman) has come into existence, tranquil'ity, &c., consti-
Adhik.
I.
tute the inborn
"
SRI-BHASHYA.
Snt. /.]
means
for the
13
evolution of knowledge
:
Tranquilled in mind, with the senses restrained, having
given up desires, resigned and patient, and absorbed in abstract meditation, let a man see the Self in the self." \_Brih.
know
Up. IV. (the
23.].
4.
Brahman)
is
Therefore, after the desire to thus born in one, whose sins have
been destroyed by means of works done in hundreds of previous births without attachment to any particular result, (one's) avidya (or ignorance)
is
removed by means of the
knowledge derived from such passages as the following " Existence alone, my dear child, this was among other* in the beginning, one only without a second." \_Qihilnd. Up. :
VI.
2. i.]
finity."
:
"The Brahman
[Taitt.
Up.
is
II. i. i.]
:
Existence, Knowledge, In" He is without parts,
He
is without actions and tranquil." [Svet. Up. VI. 19.]: " This dtman (the self) is the Brahman." [Brih. Up. II. " That thou IV. art."
19.
5.
VI.
&
4.
5.]*:
[Qihdnd. Up.
8. 7.]. '
'Hearing' (sravana), 'reflection' (manand) and steady meditation' (nididhyasana) are useful for the purpose of
knowing the meaning of (scriptural) sentences. 'Hearing' is to receive ideas which are supported by logic from a preceptor who has perceived the truth that Veddntlc passages declare the knowledge of the oneness of the Self. .'Reflection' is
rationally to fix in one's self that, in a certain particular
way
alone, the idea thus taught
by the teacher
is
true.
'
the incessant contemplation of this idea for the purpose of destroying that beginningless very innate impression (raiand) of distinctions which is hostile '
Steady meditation
is
to this (knowledge of the oreness ot the Self). The knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences 16.
Vide also Mil/id
Up.
I. 2.
SRl-BHASHYA.
14
Part.^I.
I.
[Chap.
removes the ignorance for avidyd) of him whose innate impression of distinctions has been removed by hearing &c.; and so whatever is desiderated by that hearing which is '
',
'
'
of this nature, should be ta ed to be the necessary antecedent (of the enquiry into the Brahman). And that (which is so desiderated) is this fourfold means, namely, (i) the .
discrimination between
the eternal
things, (2) tranquillity of the
and an abundance of other
J
7
and the non-eternal
mind, restraint of the senres,
means, (3) the
(similar)
re-
nunciation of the enjoyment of the fruits (o" actions) here and hereafter, (4) and the desire for final release because ;
without this (four old mean*) to
know
Brahman)
(the
it is
impossible for the desire
Fro:n the
to co.ne into existence.
very nature of the subject itself, this alone is made out to be the ne:e>sary antecedent (here). Wnat has bec.i said is this That the cause of the bon:
dage (of the soul)
which
is
is merely the perception of distinctions, based on unreality and has its origin in the avidyd
(or ignorance) that veils the true nature of the Brahman ; that the bondage itself is unreal ; that solely by reason of it-*
inre-ility
it is
destroyed to the very roots only by means
of knowledge
that the knowledge th.it (so) destroys (the ; is derived cut of bondage) (scriptunv) passages such as "That thou art" [Qihand. Up. VI. 8. 7.], &c. that ;
works are of no use in
knowledge
effect oi this
its
in
own
causing the origination of such true nature, or in producing the
knowledge mat
pas
is
of
so derived
works
out of such
consists
only
in
(proaiuing) the desire to know (the Brahman) and that it (viz. the use of works) is to be found in causing the ;
17.
are
d .13
:
i
These
uparati,
ires,
other or
similar
cessation
means
from
or resignation
titiksha i
all
and
patience, ity,
s.imiil.idna
and sraddha or
or
faith,
equanim-
L
Adhik. increase
Srtt.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
of saliva
(/'.
c.
15
the quality of goodness)
crease) resulting from the destruction of rajas
(an in-
and tamas
the qualities of passion and darkness respectively) which form the roots of sin and that, therefore, having in (or
;
view (only) ture)
IV.
-
-"
this use (of works),
Brlhmanas
4. 22.].
Hence,
to
desire .on
it is
declared (in the scrip-
know &c."
Up.
\_Brih.
account of the uselessness of the
knowledge of works, the aforesaid fourfold means alone has to be stated to be the necessary antecedent (of the enquiry into the Brahman).
Regarding
is said (in reply) as follows that the cessation of ignorance in itself
this (view) it
The statement constitutes final
release,
:
and that
it
results solely
from
the knowledge of the Brahman is admitted (by us). It has (however) to be discriminated, of what form that knowledge
is
which
it is
desired to enjoin,
by means of Vedantic whether
passages, for the
what
is
purpose of removing ignorance to be learnt fro n n. scriptural sentence
is
merely
the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of that s-ente:ic3, or whether it is knowledge which is based thereon
and
}.-
the sume as worship.
It is surely
not the knowled
;e
arising out of (the syntax of) sentences, because such
(knoweven with-
ledge) results logically from the sentence itself, out an injunction (enjoining that knowledge), and because also the
much
removal of ignorance does not result from just so Moreover, it should not be urged that, when
alone.
the innate impression (vaiand) of distinctions remains unremoved, the Vedantic sentence does not give rise to that
knowledge which if it (viz.
is
destructive of ignorance
such knowledge)
nothing wrong does not cease
if,
all
come
;
that even
into existence (thus),
it is
at once, the perception of distinctions
for all, as in
the analogous case of the pertwo moons even when the
sistence of the perception of
1
SRI-BHASHYA.
6
(real)
though
moon
oneness of the it (/. e.
is
{Chap.
known
;
I.
Part.
/.
and that even
the innate impression of distinctions) has
not ceased to be, since its roots have (already) been cut, because it is impossible it is powerless to bind (the self) for knowledge not to come into existence when the neces:
sary materials for it are available ; and because even where there is the wrong innate impression, it is seen that the
(such impressions) results from the teaching of trustworthy preceptors, and from the bases of logical inference, &c. It is not possible for you to say
knowledge which
when
stultifies
the knowledge of the meaning of Vcddntic passages, the perception of distinctions continues to be, owing to the existence of a small vestige of the that even
there
is
beginningless innate impression (of distinctions); because this innate impression, itself forming the means for the
production of the perception of distinctions, is of the nature of an unreality, and is (therefore) removed at once by the If, even after the origination of genesis of true knowledge. removal of that (innate impression) no be there knowledge, can be there is then which unreal, nothing el 'e to remove c
it
;
and therefore there
will
innate impression (yawna^. distinctions its
roots cut
which
and
results
still
never be the removal of this
To
say, that the perception of
from such innate impressions has
continues to exist,
is
childish talk.
In
the case of the perception of two moons (when there is only one in reality) and in the case of other such things,
even though the
stultifier (of such a perception) is near at hand, the persistence of the false perception is not contrabecause the really existing darkness dictory to reason and such other misguiding things, forming the cause of ;
(such) false perception, are not (thereby) destroyed, owing to the fact that they are not injuriously affected by (true) knowledge. But the effects in the form of fear, &c., (due
.drf/Vi
SKI-BH4SHYA.
/. Sfil. /,]
17
to such a false perception of a^serpent in a real rope, &c.) disappear, when they are put an end to by powerful means
of true knowledge (such as the verbal testimony of a trustworthy person, and so on). Moreover, the genesis of knowledge can never take place in those who hold that that genesis of knowledge results from the removal of the fit*-
nate impression of distinctions. The innate impression of distinctions is beyond measure, (in strength), by reason of bat the mental its accumulation, from beginningless time ;
conception which is hostile to it (/, c. to the innate imp res r don of distinctions) is weak therefore the removal of that ;
(innate impression of distinctions or y&iana)
is.
.not possible
by means of this (hostile mental conception or bhiijanS'). Hence that knowledge alone which is different from the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences, and u imported by words such as dhyiina (meditation), ufawna (worship), &c., is what it is desired to enjoin by means of '
'
Vedii:itic passages.,
To
that "
same
effect
the
are
(following)
scriptural
Having discovered (Him), let him practise know\Vjfllya prajftii.n kurvita* Brih. Up* IV. 4. ledge," " 2i.,]. Having discovered (Him), let him know." [Ann-. " VIII. 12. texts
:
t)/.fyj!
v:j.t:!3t:.~'J%k.iuJ^Up.
tho Self as the Qoi."
6.].
Meditate on
[jOm'iti eva dttmlnam dhyayatha. V
-".Having perceived That, one w [Ni.ch.iyya tan mrityumu-, ^ kh.ii 'pramiicjyate. Ka^'CU'p.lll. 15.]. Let him worship the self aloiie as the object "to be^attained." [Atmjnam
Muni.
Up.. II,
2.
6,J,''
'
freed from the jaws'of'death."
evx lokani upX$ita*~BiA. Up. I. 4. 15,]. " Veril}-, my dear one, the,Sglf has to; be scan, h|ts,.|p :be Jieard, has to .
be
reflected
upon,
has- to-be steadily .-meditate;! upon;'-'
^Af;n3'i<3 are srotavyo mantavyo 'hididhy(l:itavyCih:~-B'rifa " Up* II, } 5-}- , K'rJlA3 /^Q 'be s blight "after^He'.ll^' txi -^3
'R!-BHASHYA.
rs
{Chap.
Part.
I.
L
and known." [Soiweihtavyassavijififal^Iiernd. Up. VIII. 7. i.]. To this same effect there are also other similar scriptural passages. The.-e (passages) specially desired
tavyah.
have to import the same meaning as nididhyfistfayyaA, 8 accordingly, on account of the knowledge of the
&c.
}
;
syntactical
meaning of (scriptural) sentences being helpful to
dhyXna for meditation), the passages F//#.//rt pra, ft.l'n kurvita, Anuvidya vija-ia'i and others, (drst) re-affirm (the need for) that (knowledge) by means of (the words) anu-jidya a.ndvij'fl.iya, and then they enioin dhydna by means of pra-'fll n kurvita and vijdnfi'i. Srotavyah also gives a restatement (of the need for knowing the syntactical meaning of sentences) because the need for 'sravaiKt '
(or
hearing
')
from the
arises of itself
who has learnt the Vedas with jects, S2es that
tact that a person, a view to attain desirable ob-
the Vedas are capable of affording instruction and then betakes himself,
in regard to such desirable objects,
of his
own
'
'
of the Vedas for hearing definitely ascertaining what those objects are. ManiavycJt also means (such) a restatement, because manana (of accord, to the
the mind what
reflection) serves the purpose of fixing in
has (already) been heard.' Therefore, it is dhytim for meditation) alone that is enjoined (here). Says (the Sutra'
ktird]
also"
?o taught."
Frequent repetition
(is
\_Ved. Snt. IV. i, r.].
to be practised), as
it is
vedana
Therefore, this
for knowledge), which it is desired to enjoin as a means of obtaining final release, bas to be understood in the
I?.
The meanings
words used
of the Sanscrit
in the context here are
foMcf^s-.Hijid.hy.lsitmvych^.i-^ to
teidi'y meditate.! upon
having Jictn-creJ
;
a
U
anitvidya=
(Iliij rel="nofollow">,
having understood (Him); vijtn&i =let him know prajil'tm kurvtta= ;
let
him
practise
has to be
'
knowledge
hear
' 1
j
;
iro.'avycft
Adhik.
L SuL
sen*e of up.l
SRI-BHASHYA.
i.]
'.ana (or
worship (npa
://)
if
For knowledge
worship).
and
'(vidi)
arc seen to be used, the one for the other,
beginning and the conclusion of Vedantic passages such' as the following: "Let him worship (up'dsHa) the mind as the Brahman, {^hdnd. Up.\\\. 18. i.]; He, in the
who knows (veda) thus, shines and warms up through fame, greatness and spiritual glory." \Qihand. Up. III. 18. 6.]. "
A,
indeed, he
is
not
Let him worship
all
he does not
this,
(iip5iita\
Him as the
know
(veda).
self itself." \_Brih.
"
He who is the knower of that Brahand that (Brahman) whom he knows (yastad veda), (yatsa veda) both these have been explained to you by me. \QjhH:id. Up. IV. i. 4.]; Reverend sir, that deity Up.
I. 4. 7.].
And
min
whic'i
you worship
me."
[2hhdnd. Up. IV.
(up.lsse),
commend
that deity unto
2. 2.].
Further, dhyana (or meditation) is of the form of a succession of memories (or remembrances), which is unbroken like
a stream of oil. For, firm 'memory of final release in this passage,
is
viz.
declared to be a
means
"The memory becomes
finn when such memory is obtained, there is the loosening of all knots." [Qihand. Up. VII. 26. 2.]. And such memory is of the same form as direct perception, because it (viz. " When the above passage) has to agree in meaning with ;
He who
the highest and lowest
is
the heart actions (or
is
broken, doubts
karma}
perish."
are
is
all
seen, the knot of shattered,
{Muni. Up.
and
II. 2. 8.].
his
This
being the case, it is decided by means of this passage viz. " The Self, my dear one, has to be seen, &c," \_Brih. Up. that steady meditation (nididhyfaana) has the II. 4. 5.]
Moreover, memory has the character of direct perception, because it is (simply) an intc.isific.ition (of the process) of mental concep:-ame character as direct perception.
tion.
Sfif-IVHASHVA. '
All thii ttas been well explained f'
lie says":
Vedana
(or
mentioned
knowledge)
I.
[Chap.
'
by the
is
w/J
Part.
L
V
;rtwtf
(or worship),
the scriptures as to refer to that." It has thereby been explained that the vedana (or knbwledge) which is enjoined in "all the Upanishads, as the
nnce it
is
so
means of attaining
in
same
final release, is (the
as)
nfaiana
(or worship). After stating the position of an opponent to the effect that religious contemplation has to be gone
through only once, scripture
is
for,
by so doing, the intention of the
fully carried out, as in the case of praya^a'-*
xnd other such
sacrificial offerings, it is finally
determined
" From by him (z. c. the Vatyahii-a), in the passage the word npd;ana y \t is conclusively established (that vcda~ na or knowledge means upft lana or worship)" that vedana frequently repeated is the means of final release. In the " passage 'Ufntana (or worship) is the same as firm me-
mory, as
it is
seen so to be, and as
" it
Hcriptiures
is
it
is
so declared in the
explained by him that that very same
vedana (or knowledge), which
of the form of ufasana (Or worship), has the character of firm memory. Such memory i- declared to be the same as seeing ; and (for it) to possess is
the same as to have the character of
the nature of seeing
is
direct perception.
Scripture thus specifies the memory proved to possess the character of
which has
been
direct perception,
" This Self
and to be the means of
final release
:
not reached either by reflection (pravcchana which means manana\ or by steady meditation (medka or 19.
is
The Vakyakara who
cntly quoted
is
by Ra nanuja
frequin
SrJ-Bkdtfya & Vedartha-saiigraAa as Tanka.
known ;o.
Pray^as
are the fore-o.Tcrings,
as opyoi:,} to Aituy'i
ed more
is
.
or the after-
Thes? praya^a offerings them cannot be offer-
offerings.
and others
his
.
like
than once in any one partiVid^ Pur. Mini. XI.
cular sacrifice. I.
29 to 37.
A dhik
it
S'RiiBH :\ s IIY A.
I. S'ti. i .]
.
"
'
ndldhya -and)',' 01 by largely he'aring'^tnV scriptures. Wno;iiso3vef 'He chooses, "by" him alone is "He readied. To him, this Self reveals Hi* own form." "[Muni. Lfp.'Ul. 2. 3.]. By means; of this passage it is"(first) stated 'that mere '
1
'hearing/ reflection arid steady meditation form ^"means for the attainment of the Self, and then it iij" "declared that 1
whomsoever eJ.
indeed
it.. is
For,
worthy
this Self chooses,
by Kim alone
To whomsoever He
to be chosen.
is
He
reach-
the dearest 'one 'that' becomes is
unsirrpassing-
ly dear, he alone is the dearest to Him. It is "stated by the Lord Himself, in the following manner, that 'the 'Lord Himself, of His own accord, so acts as 'to "cause His dearest
one to
attain Himself
"To
:
who
those
areldesirous of ''an
eternal union with
Me, and, accordingly, worship Me, I 'give with love that faculty of understanding' by wm'cTi" they come unto Me." [B. G. X. i'b.1; He has al.^o'said--^ Indeed, I
am and
u
inexpressibly deuf to him who has knowledge of he is dear to Me." [B. G. VII. 17.].
Me,
Hferi^what'is memory' of the'fdrm of direct perception is of itself ine"xpressibly."de
i.4
this
:
He
alone; to -'whom this
'
*
memory Self;
(he alone)
is
fit
be chosen by the "Highest
"to
and so, by him alone is "the Highest Self attainable. Firm memory of this same diameter is denoted by the
word bhakti
because the 'word' bncffit is synowith upaiana (vvorship)V For this Very "reason, nymous it is declared by the Sriitis** and'the^wni^ "as 'follows : :
(devotion)
"Knowing Him
alone, one fransceiids ''death!" \Sv
--
21.
The
bruits
and the
Sni'itis to-
work,
Aether form the scripture of the HinSruti means Vedic revelation; lus. .ind Smriti. ordinarily trical
luv-txjokb.
means.the me-
But
here,'
m'thib
-
-
all
--
'^-'
:;;i;:::'.
->':
j$
;?.
>
Smjriti is so used^ as 16 signify
except
Scripture, .
-
;
is referr.ed
-Sn.rid.
Vedic 'portion of
tfre'
Hindu
and to
under
the
name, of
SRI BHASHYA.
22 III. 8 .X :
"
He who
There,
liere.
relent."
[Ta\tt.
A
.
Part.
I.
2.
knows Him becomes immortal
thus
no other path
is
[Chap.
lor the
III. 12. 7;].-'-
attainment of
" It
final
not posible to through the practice of is
Me,, with the help of the '-facias, religious austerity, through the giving of free
sacrifices, in
same manner
the
in
gifts, or through which you have seen Me
O
Arjuna, destroyer of foes, it is possible really to know, to see, and to enter into Me, such as I am now, (now).
by means of bhakti." [B. G. XI. 53 & 54]. "That Highest Person, O 't on of Pritru, is attainable ex[B. G. VIII. 22]. &c., &c. clusively by bJiakti" exclusively
It
will. be.
demonstrated
later
on
in
connection with
"There is need of all (works), le(the sutra which, says) cau.-e there are scriptural statements enjoining sacrifices &c.; just as (there
horse" fices,
is
the need of the harness) in the case of the that works such as sacri26.]
[Vc'd. Sfti. III. 4.
&c,
fornrthe means of attaining the firm memory of No doubt, the sacrifices, &c., referred
the aforesaid character.
to in the scriptural passage "(Brihmanas) desire to know 6:c"~ [Br'.h. Up. IV. 4. 22.] are of use in originating (in us)
the
de.-ircj.
to
know
dana (knqwledge)
(the
as
Brahman}. is
But
yet, since such vc-
of the form of meditation, and
is
practised- every day, and acquires increased excellence through repeated practice, and is continued up to the time of departure from this li.e is of itself the means of attain-
ing the Brahman ; for the production oi' that (vedana}, all the works appertaining to the dsramas (or the various stages of life) have to be gone through as long as life lasts. He (the SMra+feFra) also says (the same thing) in the following and
other aphorisms "(Meditation has all along in the meanwhile to be gone through) up to the time of death, for it is BO declared in the scripture "[Fed. 5/v/. IV. i. 12.] "But :
:
22.
Vide also
r&
SamA. .TXX".
iS.
ar.c!
TiUt. .?r."m. 13.
I.
.
'Adhik.
Sfd.
I.
the Agnihotra,
ducing that
SKI-DHASHYA,
i."\
2-3
(have to be performed) polely for providyd or knowledge), because it is so stated c.<
(viz.
"
in the scripture
[
Ved. Sut, IV.
i.
16.]
:
and "(Works
have also to be performed) because of their helpfulners (in
the production of knowledge)." \_Vcd.Sfit. III. 4. 33.]. The Vdk\akd:-a also says in the following manner
that firm
memory
other such
the outcome of discrimination and
is
qualities
"That
:
(viz.
firm
memory) TesulU
wholly from tvircka) discrimination, (vimoka) freec.om, (abhyaia) practice, (kri\a) work, (kalydia) attsp; iciousr.es?, (anavasdia) absence of weakness, and (anuddharsha) absence of excessive merriment
and because also there
;
because
only so
it is
pcfc*ible,
scriptural authority to that effect." He also explain* the true nature of discrimination , c,, thus: "Discrimination means fherej the purification of
the
body by
is
means of the food which
either because of
its
own
is
not
nature, or because of
its
impure, source,
or because of ?my (other) sf ecial cause." The scriptural " When the food is authority for thte; is pure, the mind internal the becomes when c. the mind organ) pure, (/. i.
"
pure, thera
Freedom
is
is
firm
[^Julnd. Up. VII. 26.
memory."
the absence of clinging to desires."
tural authority for this
is" Tranquilled
in
The
mind,
2.].
scrip-
let
him
worship (the Brahman}!' [2&ka;id. Up. III. 14. i.]. "Practice means the worshipping of (God) the Home of Goodness again and again."
The
scriptural authority quoted by the Bhd^hyahdra (i. c. the Commentator Dramidacharya) in support of this is here taken from the Smr:t: ".Always
with the mind fixed on His form, &c."
[B. G. VJII. 6.\ the performance of the five great sacrifice:-, &c., according to one's; abilities." The scriptural auth'ojity
11
Work means
for this i
is" He who per lorms
the best of tha.'C
\vcjkc in the right 'manrer
who know
the
E
24
Up.
III..
t,-4
:
"
also
:
]
Bralwanas
by red; ing the Vedas by ,
IV.
to
22,].
Auspiciojusness .consists
.liberality,
know Him
by giving
austerities associated with, fasting."
" 4.-
mercy,
iri
gifts,
["ZfrvA.
by Up.
truth, uprightness,
harmlessnes?, and in not coveting an-
other;*, property-"
"
sacrifices,,
t
religious
desire
The
...
scriptural authority for this
He .4$
and-." To. thefli, alone comes
thi.s
f^^^.t^r*
"/
[l\fiind.
Up*
fruitipn of the *'>
l6 ']v
"
IIJ.
i.
is
5.],
Brahman
Weakness
is
qlthe mind, due to the melancholy which is born QUt;O,fl-bievuntQwardness of time and place, and the recol,Us opposite is. the. absence lectioi^ QfrSptTowful things, &c. ss
" This X^^'cript^ral authority lor this is who is one attained devoid of not 4Q: be. by strength/'
of weakness." Self is
[Mitnl. -Up. III. -2>4.].' "Excessive merriment is the gladness derived from the opposites.of those (qualities which give rise to; mw$cllfi /./ c* -weakness).;; ancl the opposite of that .
(gladness)
-is
the absence pf excessive merriment."
That
is
to say , excessive joy ?.!so is obstructive (to the p. reduction of The scriptural authority the- knowledge of the Brahman). for this
is" Tran.quijled
mind, with the senses restrain-
in
ed, &c.' [Brih Up. IV. 4. 23.]. What is said is this that to-' him, who is thus given to observe, scriptural regulations, the^ genesis of knowledge comes: altogether through .
the per foTmance of works enjoined in. connection with the To the same; effect (various) ti'sramas (or stages, of life). " is another, scriptural passage Vid\ti;ii ch.widytim cha yas :
tadvdobhay.am'$3hal avidyayd mrityum tlrh\l vidyay.~t[h. Up. il.] Here what is denoted b/
inritJtritisnJitc."
vcrk which is enjoined inand the dsramas ayidyQyd
the.wx)rd avidyais the tioa:. with "the. castes,
byrmeans:of. -work
;..
conr.ecrnean.sv
mritytvn .denotes the effects of tho wlticlr b -ob^trj^liv^ to the goKesL; af.-kn^.vlel^e ^ j-at>w-prk ;
Adhik.
Sl.
I.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
25
vidyayd means, by means of the knowledge (of the Brahman} amritam denotes the Brahman; and (asnute) means, he attains. [.=He who knows tirtvd
means, having destroyed
;
;
both vidyd (knowledge) and avidyd (work) together,
first
destroys by means of (present) avidyd (or work,) the effects of the past work (or karma) which is obstructive to the genesis of knowledge, and then attains the Brahman]. The avidyd
which
is
said to be the
means of destroying the
past karma is other than vidyd, and is the work (karma) which is enjoined by the
"
the
Brahman
as the object in view, he also relied
scriptural)
knowledge
(of
upon
(the
works) and performed numerous
order that he might destroy the effects of past
sacrifices, in
karma by means of (present) avidyd (or work)." 12.].
To:
scriptures.
is
:
same as
Having the knowledge of the
that effect
this passage
of
effects
Work which
is
obstructive to
knowledge
is
[
V.P.Vl.
6.
of the form
of merit and demerit. Both these are denoted by the word papa (sin), as they produce undesirable results, in consequ-
ence of their obstructiveness to the origination of the knowledge of the Brahman. Its (viz. sin's) obstructiveness to (such) knowledge is by way of the increase of rajas and tamas (passion and darkness), which act as obstructions topure unmixed sattva (goodness) that forms the means of That papa (or sin) producing (that same) knowledge. is
obstructive to the origination of knowledge, is underfrom the scriptural passage " He of Himself in-,
stood
duces him,
work which
whom He is
wishes to lead downwards, to do \Kaush. Up. III. 9.] It is de-
not good."
by the Lord Himself in the following and other passages that rajas and lamas veil true knowledge and that sattva is the means of (acquiring) true knowledge clared
:
"
Knowledge
results
from sattva."
therefore, to give rise
4
[Z?.
G. XIV. 17],
And
to the genesis of knowledge, sinful
SRi-BHASHYA.
26
work (karma) has to be destroyed.
[Chap.
I.
Part. I.
Its destruction results
from duty (dharmd) performed without attachment to re" 2 sults. To that effect is this scriptural statement 3 By
means of duty (dharma) he gets rid of papa (or sin)." \M. Nar. 22. i.]. Thus that knowledge which is the means of attaining the Brahman desiderates all the works enjoined in connection with the various
dsramas
(or stages of life).
Hence, as the knowledge of the true nature of the works so desiderated, and also the knowledge of the small and impermanent character of the results of mere works, are (both) conclusively dealt with in the
Karma-mlmamsd
(Mimamsa) alone has to be mentioned as the necessary antecedent of the enquiry into- the Brahman, Moreover, the discrimination of the eternal and the that
non-eternal
things*-,
&c., do not
come
into existence without
'
the hearing of the (whole of the) Mimamsa because, without coming to a decision regarding the particulars bear'
;
ing on the fruits (of works), on the
means
(of performing
modus
operandi, and on the persons qualified it is difficult to understand the true them), (to perform nature of works, their results, the permanence or imper-
them), on the
manence
thereof,
and the eternity of the
self,
and such
other things. That these also (viz, the discrimination of the eternal and the non-eternal things, &c.,) form the means (for acquiring the knowledge of the Brahman}, is understood
from their prescribed auxiliary use and their prescribed auxiliary use is learnt from scriptural passages, from the ;
bases of logical inference, &c. This (use of works) has to be made out from the third chapter (of the Pftrvamimdmsd.) The worship of the Udgitha, &c., although it (merely) serves the purpose of adding to 23.
The
above
is
Concordance
to
reference given
according to Jacob's
the
works, really stands Upanishads.
in.
Adhlk.
1.
Silt.
/.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
27
need of the knowledge of the Brahman, because it (viz. that worship) has to assume the form of the contempla-
Brahman, and so has to be discussed here Brahma-mlmdmsd) alone. And those works
tion of the in the (viz.
(i.
e.
also
the worship and meditation of the Udgltha, &c.), perresults, produce the know-
formed without attachment to
ledge of the Brahman ; and because they thus come to resemble that (knowledge) in character, they are very approAnd it is agreed on all priately dealt with here alone. hands that they (viz. the meditation of the Udgltha and
other such meditations) depend upon the knowledge of the true nature of (ritualistic) works.
What
they (the Purvapakshms^
further say
is
things
the objectors)
or
as follows:
The Brahman hostile
*
alone,
who
is
pure intelligence and
all other to all characterising attributes, is real than Him, such as the varied distinctions of the ;
knower and the known and the knowledge
arising there-
from, &c., are merely assumed to exist in Him and are : because, by means of the following and other
unreal
passages which are devoted to the of the true nature of the principal subject (of the
sdstraic
teaching
BrahmaBrahman alone who is pure
mlmdmsa), it is declared that the intelligence and devoid of attributes is
unreal
" Existence alone,
:
my
is real,
2. i.]
which
" ;
that
And
all else
dear child, this was in the
beginning, one only without a second."
VI.
and that
[Ckhdnd.
Up.
the higher knowledge (vidyd] by Indestructible Being is known that ( Bethat
is
is invisible, which cannot be seized, which has no family (or which has no name), which has no colour, no That which has no hands and no feet, and eyes, no ears
ing)
which
:
24.
ors
These Purvapakshins or objectare
the Adwailins
known
also
as the Maya-radius.
SRI-BHASHYA.
28
That which the wise
[Chap.
see as the source of
all
I.
Part.
beings,
is
L
the
eternal, the omnipresent, the all-pervading, the extremely subtle, and the imperishable One." [Mund. Up. I. r. 6.]
"The Brahman
;
II.
Up.
[Taitt.
i.
"
i.]
Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."
"He
;
and without
actions, tranquil,
Up. VI.
is
He who
is
without parts, without without taint." [Svet.
fault,
of opinion (that that
Brahman) known he who is of opinion he does not know (that that Brahman] is known to him (Him) (because) to those who know well, (He) is unknown to those who do not know well, (He) is known." "Thou shalt not see the seer of the [Ken. Up. II. 3.] is
19.];
unknown
is
him (He)
to
is
;
:
;
;
sight nor think the thinker of the thought." III. 4. 2.];
" i.]
;
That which "
5. 7.]
"The Brahman
;
He who
There sees
-obtains death 19.
&
is
is all
bliss."
is
this
is
this Self."
nothing here that
this
Kath. Up. IV.
is
[Brih. Up.
Up.
III. 6.
[Brih. Up. IV.
many and
as
world,
(mrityii)
[Taitt.
varied.
were
though varied, from death." [Brih. Up. IV. 4.
10.]
;
it
"But where-
there
is
duality,
were, there one sees another but where to one all this becomes the Self, there who shall see whom by what,
:as it
;
and who
shall
14.
IV,
4.
(mere) clay "
know which by what 5.
15..];
name having
is
alone the
its
?"
[Brih.
origin
in
speech
;
II.
Up'.
"Modification (i.e.
vikdra) that it is
is
all
[Qihdnd. Up. VI. i. 4.]; For whenever he perceives in Him even the smallest reality."
distinction, then, indeed, there
Up.
II. 7. i.]
" ;
is
fear for him."
Not even on account
[Taitt.
of the peculiarity of
situation can the twofold characteristics (viz. positive negative) belong to the Highest, for
and
everywhere (That is taught to be without distinctions)." [Ved. Sut. III. 2. u.]; " But it (/. e. the world of dreams) is altogether a mere illusion, on account of its being of an unmanifest nature."
Adhik.
Silt.
I.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
Ved. Sut. III.
2.
vanished, which
3.];
"That
29
which
in
pure existence, which
is
have
difference!* is
beyond the
sphere of speech, which is self-knowing That is the Intelli[F. P. VI. 7. 53.]; gence, called Brahman by name." " is of the nature to Him alone who in (I
bow)
reality
of Intelligence and
is
absolutely pure
and who, nevertheless,
butes),
(/.
exists, in
e.
devoid of all
attri-
consequence of (our)
the form of material objects." [F. P. I. 2. 6.] "O Lord of the universe! Thou alone art the only reality, and there is none other." [F. P. I. 4. 38.]; " This which illusive vision, in ;
appears embodied belongs to Thee who art of the nature of and those who are not Yogins (i. e. those Intelligence ;
who
are ignorant) look upon illusive perception, as though
this
world
men
look upon
things,
is
of it
on account of
it, it
the nature of as though
it
and are tossed to and
(their)
formed the world. Intelligence.
All
Ignorant
were made up of material fro
in
a flood of illusions.
Those who know what is knowledge, Highest Lord and whose minds are pure, look upon the whole world as being made up of Intelligence and as consisting of !
L 4. 39 to 41.]; "Although He own body and in that of all others,
Yourself." [F. P.
found
in one's
is
to be
Intelli-
gence, which is one and simple, indeed, constitutes His reality. Dualists see things wrongly." [F. P. II. 14. 31.]; "O, thou the best of kings, if there were any other like me or an}' other unlike me, then alone would it be proper to
say that such an one is me and such an one is not me. [F. P. II. 13. 90.]; "It is, in consequence of the difierence due to the holes in a flute, that the distinctions named 1
shadja,
&c., (corresponding to the pitch the
name
of the
25. Shadja note of the gamut and corresponds to the symbol do in do, re, mi, fa, sol, which are jrjven in Indian ta, si, is
music thus
:
sa, ri, ga,
first
ma, pa. da,
ni.
The seven the
notes
following
'
of the sound) of the scale
names
hare
Sanskiit
in
w
sfiadia, rishabka. gandhara, panchanta, dan'ata, nnhddha.
:
SR! : BHASHYA,
30
is
it
" 14. 32.]
Part.
I.
without distinction; the case with the Highest Self." [V. P. II.
result to the air,
just so
L
[Chap.
He
;
which pervades
is
myself, and
all
He
is
and
yourself,
all this
is the same as the Self. Give up the illusion of distinctions. Thus taught by him, that great king saw the High-
and gave up
est Reality
" 24.]
;
When
distinctions."
[F
P.
the knowledge, which gives
II. 16.
23
&
rise to distinc-
undergone complete destruction, (then) who will create the unreal difference between the self and the Brahtions, has
man?' [F. P. VI. the individual
7.
self,
96.];
I
"O
Gudakesa 2 *,
in the
form of
exist within the heart of all beings."
" O \B. G. X. 20.] ; Bharata, know Me also as the knower of the body (/. e. as the individual self) in all bodies." [/?. G. " There XIII. moveable or does not exist
any being, [5. G. X.
2.];
immoveable, which Unreality perceived,
is
is
is
without Me."
that, which, being
liable to
be
stultified
39.].
grounded upon what
is
by means of the know-
ledge of things as they actually are; as, for instance, it can be made out in the case of the (falsely perceived) serpent, &c.,
having for their foundation a (real) rope, &c. The assumption of the existence of that (serpent) there (i. e. in the
due to something wrong that misguides us. Similarly, owing to a certain something that misguides us, all this world which is made up of the distinctions of gods, animals, rope)
is
men,immoveable things, &c.,is assumed to exist in the HighBrahman whose essence is pure Intelligence and it (viz.
est
;
the world) is liable to be injuriously affected ledge of the true nature of the Brahman as
by the knowis, and has
He
therefore the character of unreality. And that something which so misguides us is the beginningless ignorance (avidya) 26. Guddke'sa
is
Arjuna. Vide also
XI.
7. Literally it
one of the names of B.G.I. 24., II. 9. & means one who has
conquered
sleep, or
profusion of hair.
one who
has a
Adhik.
which
I,
Sill.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/,]
3.1
the cause of the varied and wonderful superimpositions that veil the true nature (of the Brahman), and is is
(itself) unfit
to be described either as existence or as non-
existence.
From the following and other passages it Brahman Himself, who is devoid of attri-
is-
evident that the butes and
pure Intelligence, has His true nature veiled by the beginningless ignorance which is unfit to be describis
ed either as existence or as non-existence, and He thereby " For perceives the manifoldness existing within Himself :
the creatures) are drawn away (from the Brahmeans of ignorance (awitaavidyd^)" \Qjhdnd. man) by VIII. "Those who are (dependent on them3. 2.]; Up. (i. e.
they
have ignorance
selves)
;
their desires
remain
unfulfilled."
\Qihdnd. Up. VIII. 3, iJ; "Then there was neither existence nor non-existence, there was darkness (lamas =avidya)\ at 129.
first,
&
i
Intelligence
3.]
;
V.
X.
then that Prakriti (Nature)
is
was
"Know
27
veiled
by darkness." [R.
mayd, and the great Lord, the Mdyin (i. e. the possessor of the mayo)" \Svet. Up. IV. 10.]; "Indra (/. e. the Highest Lord)
is
known
to
assume
many
forms through the power
of illusions (mayo)" \_Brih. Up.ll.$. 19.]; is difficult to transcend." [B. G. VII. 14.];
"My
mdya
"When
the
individual soul, that has been asleep under the influence of
(then he
the beginningless mayd, wakes up,
Unborn One)."
[Mdnd. Up.
knows the
II. 21.].
" Bethe same effect are the following passages cause the Lord is of the nature of Intelligence, therefore He
To
:
has the All for His form.
But
He
is
no material
thing.
Know
then that the distinctions of mountain, ocean, land, are indeed born out of Him and are the outcome of the &c., display of illusion in Intelligence. But when, after all the effects of 27.
works are destroyed, there remains Intelligence
Vide also
Taitt.
Br.
II. 8. 9.
SRI-BHASHYA.
32
own
alone in Its
true form, pure
[Chap.
L
Part.
and devoid of evil, then
1.
in-
deed cease to exist those fruits of the tree of illusion (saftkalpa avidyd} which form the distinctions of things in things." [ V, " P. II. 12. 39. Therefore, at no time and in no place, 40.] ;
&
can there be any group of things other than Intelligence, thou, twice-born one. The One Intelligence is appre-
hended
in
many
ways, by those whose minds are variously
constituted on account of the variety of their
The
which
Intelligence
is
own
actions.
pure, devoid of evil, devoid of
all greed, &c., is one the Highest and the Highest Lord He is Vasudeva, other than whom there is nothing. Thus have 1 told you of what is real existence, and how Intelligence
sorrow and
is
free
and always one,
is
real
this,
and
is
all else
which
from contact with
;
unreal
and
I
have told you also that
phenomenally realised well for practical purindeed that on which the world is dependent". [ V.
poses,
is
P.
12.43 to 45']
II.
;
is
The
following and other scriptural passages speak of the destruction of ignorance (avidyd}, by means of the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the Brahman,
who
devoid of characterising attributes and is pure In" He comes not to Death (mntyu) who sees telligence is
:
that One".
?
[
];
"He who
sees that
One does
not see Death". [Qhhdnd. Up. VII. 26. 2.]; " For, indeed, when he obtains fearless support in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefinable, homeless, then he obtains fearlessness." [Taitt. Up. II. 7. i.]; " When He who is the est
and lowest
is
broken, doubts are
highbeheld, then the knot of the heart is all
shattered,
and
his
karmas
perish."
"He who knows the Brahman be[Mund. Up. II. 2. 8.] comes the Brahman indeed." \Mund. Up. III. 2. 9.]: " He who thus knows Him transcends death (mntyu avidyd} there is no other path for the attainment of final ;
;
Adhik.
SRI-BHASHYA.
I. Sfit. /.]
release."
III. 8.];
Up.
[Svct.
33
&c. Here aviciyd (ignorance)
word
mrityu, as in this speech of Sanatfalse that say perception is death (mrityu}, sujata and I also say that right perception is always immortality."
is
denoted, by "
I
:
V. 41.4.].
[M.Bh. "
the
The Brahman
gence), Infinity"
is
Knowledge
Existence,
[Taitt.
Up.
II. i. i.],
Intelli-
(or
"The Brahman
is
Knowledge, [Brih. Up. 111.9.28.], these and other such probative passages (in the Vcddnta} conclusively establish the essential nature of the Brahman to be free from atBliss"
and the knowledge, that this (Brahman} is identwith the (individual) self, results logically from the following and other scriptural passages: "And he who
tributes
;
ical
worships another deity, thinking that that (deity) is one, and he another, he does not know." [Brili. Up. I. 4. " He is ..Let him worship not all this.. 10.]; (the self) Him as the self itself." \Brili. Up. I. 4. 7.]; "That thou
[Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.]; "Reverend deity, I am ? ] reverend "Therefore deity, thou art me." [ you,
art."
;
whatever (deity)
I
am,
am
that
is,
that
is
that (deity), and whatever that
I."
[Ail.
Sfttra-kara} also says the very
they
and they (it
the
(viz.
(viz.
as such)."
yakdra
Ar.
II.
2.
(The But
4. 6.].
same thing thus
" :
Jabalas) worship (the Lord) as the self, the scriptural texts) make us comprehend
[Vcd.
also says
Silt.
IV.
"The Lord
as nothing other than the
self,
i.
3.] is
to
Similarly, the
be
Vdk-
comprehended
since everything
is
assum-
Thus by means of this knowledge of the oneness of the self and the Brahman, the de-
ed to exist
in
Him."
struction of the
bondage of unreality and of its cause comes on quite appropriately. However, it may be asked how is that cessation of all distinctions, which is contrary to perception, accomplish-
SRI-BHASHYA.
34
7.
[Chap.
Par I. L
ed by the knowledge that is derived out of the scripture ? or, how, (for instance), by means of the knowledge 1
This
is
a rope, not a serpent
serpent-perception effected
',
is
the destruction of the
(the destruction) that
has to
is actually perceived ? Here (/. e., in of the serpent falsely perceived in the rope) contradiction between two perceptions ; there,
what
contradict
the instance there
is
however, (the contradiction lies) between perception (on the one hand) and the scripture based upon perceptions (on the other). Under these circumstances, when there is
two equally strong things, how can them the relation of the stultified and
contradiction between
there be between
the stultifier? If it be said in reply that it (viz. the relation of the stultified and the stultifier) results from the
the thing stultified) being produced by a misguiding cause, and the latter (i. c. the stultifier) not being so (produced)/ then, this same (contention) fact of the
is
former
(/. e.
equally applicable to the case of scripture and percepWhat is said is this The cause of the rela-
tion also.
:
tion of the stultified
and the
neither similar-
stultifier is
ity, nor dependence, nor independence (in respect of any two things) because it is not possible to stultify (for ;
instance), the direct perceptual
knowledge, (of the
single-
by means of the inference
ness of the flame in a lamp)
28
regarding the (constantly) changing character of flames. In this case, the oneness of the flame is undoubtedly made out 28.
The body
regard as
to
follows
this :
of the
the
syllogism in
inference
is
rartyavayavavind'situ
of
ment, because
Madhyakshanaparampa-
ravartinl jicalapratikshanam utpatttiindsarati,
moment
its
extinction)
it
.
lit
flame
moment
of
its
ment of
its
extinction.
:
portion of the
same way in which the seen to do so during the first
wick, in the
The flame burning during the successive moments intermediate (between the moment of its birth and to say
born
also shares the de-
structibility of the
prathamacharamakshanaj-unllavat. That is
is
and extinguished from moment to mo-
given
is
birth
and the
la?t
mo-
Adhik.
SRI-BHASHYA.
I. Sat. /.]
35
by means of direct perception. Such being the case, when is contradiction between two means of knowledge,
there
then, that one happens to be the stultified, the logical rewhich it is possible to realise otherwise, while
sult of
that other happens to be the stultifier, (the logical result of) which cannot be otherwise established, and is, moreover, singular
and undoubted.
the stultified and the
That
stultifier
is
this
is
the relation of
established in
all cases.
but proper that the cessation of that bondage, which is of the form of varied superimpositions resulting from direct perception, &c., which allow room Therefore,
it
is
errors, does take place by means of the of the oneness of the self with the Brahman, knowledge who is unmixed Intelligence, destitute of attributes, eternal,
for
possible
and self-luminous (the knowledge) that results from the scripture which, being in accordance with the tradition that is beginningless, endless and unbropure, free, intelligent,
ken, does not admit of the smallest error, and is (as a means of knowledge) singular and undoubted (in value). But in regard to direct perception, which apprehends the
world of distinctions resulting from varied superimpositions, the defect (or misguiding cause) known as avidyd (or ignorance), which mainly consists of the beginninglessly old innate impression of distinctions, is admissible and has its scope.
possibly result to those scriptures (or sastras) also, which are free from all defects on account of their being in accord with the beginn-
However,
stultification
may
ingless, endless,
and unbroken
with distinctions
in such passages
sirous of
Swarga
;
because they deal who is de-
as" Let him
(or the celestial world of enjoyments)
perform the Jyotishtoina 29.
tradition
Vide Taitt. Sam'i. VII.
4.
i
sacrifice." to 12.
-
9
Yes
;
and the sastra
and Pur. Mini. IV.
4.
39 to 41,
SRI-BHASHYA.
36
that deals with final release
is
[Chap.
L
Part.
I.
of singular and undoubted
the sdstra dealing with distinctstultified is thereby, in the same way in ions) certainly which the sdstraic injunction 3 (imposing a penance) for
authority; there fore,
it (viz.
an
earlier disconnection (between the officiating priests connected together in a chain in the performance of the Prdtassavana sacrifice) is stultified (by the injunction relating to the later disconnection), when an earlier and a
do take
later disconnection
In
Veddnlic passages also this same rule holds good in respect of those injunctions which relate to the worship of the qualified Brahplace.
man, because the Supreme Brahman
is
devoid of attributes
(and has, therefore, to be realised after the qualified Brah-
man
known). it may be asked, how there can be the stultification of the following and other sdstraic statements which are inis
But
tended to teach the essential nature of the
who
understands
In the sacrifice
30.
and who knows
all
known
us the
Brahman
all"
for distribution
among
ing priests) move one behind the other, taking hold of each other's girdle.
formed over again.
behind, the Pratihartn takes
hold of
the Prastotri similarly,
the
Udgaln takes hold of the Pratihartn similarly,
the
Brahma
priest
takes
hold of the Udgdtn in the same manner,
of
and the the
Yajamdna takes hold
Brahma,
While
If
I.
,the priests).
and then the whole thing
yu from
He
\Muitd. Up.
Pratassavana, five Kitwiks (or official-
The /V<w/0/r/ takes hold of the /I ay/war-
" :
is
to be per-
the Pratiharlr 1
disconnect himself from the Prastotri, then the expiation prescribed therefor
is,
that all the
sacrificer
and
property of the should be distributed then
there.
If
both the Udgatri and themselves
the Prastotri disconnect
from the chain of
priests,
one after
another,in the same sacrificial act,then
so
the expiation prescribed in the case of
moving, if the Udgdtn disconnect himself from the Prastotri, then the expia-
has alone to be gone through, but not
priest.
lion prescribed therefor sacrifice so interrupted
is,
that the
has to be com-
pletcd, -without, however, distributing
the dakshind (or the
money intended
him who disconnects himself later on
the expiation prescribed of the
earlier
Pur. Mini. VI.
in
the case
disconnection. 5.
49 to
jb.
Vide
Adhik. i. 9.
and
SRI-BHASHYA.
Sru. i.]
I.
"His supreme
II. 2. 7.];
37
pcnver.is revealed, in-
deed, as varied, natural, and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action." [Svef. Up. VI. 8.]; "He who desires
the truth and i.
5.];
He who wills the truth"
If so asked,
c.
\Qhhdnd. Up. VIII. answer that it (viz. such stul-
we
from the power of the passages relating
tification) results
(Brahman). What is
to the non-qualified
said
is
this
The
:
" That which
following and other similar passages, viz. is neither gross, nor atomic, nor short, nor long"
Up.
Infinity."
out
"The Brahman
III. 8. 8.],
[Tailt.
Up.
II.
attributes, without
declare that
i.
changeable, and devoid of (declare that
He
i.],
taint"
Brahman
the
is
is
all
[A.
r
M.
J\ tlr.
Intelligence,
attributes
:
7.],
31
eternally unothers
while
There being (thus) a
is) qualified.
\Brih.
Existence, Knowledge, "That which is with-
conflict
between (these) two kinds of passages, it is nothing wrong if, according to that very rule which is applicable to the disconnection (in the 'chain of priests), the passages relating to the non-qualified (Brahman) are found to be more powerful, for the reason that these (latter) desiderate the (predication of) qualities,
and have, therefore, to come into which relate to the qualified
operation after (the passages
Brahman). But if it be
said that in the
passage
Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" declared to be the attributes of the it is
not so
;
Brahman,
grammatically equated. in describing that
which
butes, oneness in the
31.
it is
replied
because there has to be oneness in the
meaning (of these words) due to the
it) is
The Brahman
knowledge, &c., are
is
that
"
If is
meaning
(of the
not opposed to reason, then, See also Adh, up.
6B.
fact of their being
be
(again) said that even characterised by many attriit
(it
words used to describe has to be said that)
SRI-BHASHYA.
38
whoever
is
[Chap.
(so) ignorant of the denotative
I.
Part.
L
power of words is
beloved (foolish like sheep which, being fit for sacrifices, are) of the gods. Oneness in meaning implies that all the words When(in a grammatical equation) denote the same thing. ever a thing that
is
characterised
by
attributes
is
described
(in words), then, the difference in meaning between those (various characterising) words, in accordance with the
difference in the characterising attributes
unavoidable
;
and therefore (such) oneness
(they denote), is in meaning does
not result (here). If, however, it does result even as against this, then all the words cannot but have a synonimity in meaning, in as much as they have (all) to denote one and the same characterless thing. But listen attentively how there can be no (such) synonimity even when they import
one and the same thing. It is settled that (in a grammatical equation) there is oneness of import, and hence it is that the one particular thing (mentioned therein) has the power of being denoted by the opposite of what is contra-
meaning of the several words (used in that that all the words (in a equation). have grammatical equation) (their own) meanings, and have oneness of import, and are not synonymous. What is dictory to the
It follows, therefore,
said
is
He
this:
The Brahman, who has of a
to be understood
nature which
is the opposite other of all things All things, which (than Himself). are fthusj by nature opposed to Him, are, in the result,
as
really
negatived ledge,
the
and
by
these
infinity}.
Brahman
three
words
Of these,
the
(viz.
word
existence,
know-
existence refers to
as being other than that thing, which,
on
being subject to modifications, is unreal ; knowledge refers (to the same Brahman} as being
account of the word
is,
is
its
other than that thing, which is, by nature, non-intelligent, and the luminosity of which is dependent upon other things ;
Adliik,
L
SRI-BHASHYA,
Snt. /.]
and the word
infinity refers (also to
than that which
is
limited
by time, by
39
Him) space,
definite character as a thing.
sion
(of all that
forms no
or
thereof, but means the
negative
any other such
is
its
own
that thing) attribute
characterising
Brahman Himself who
thing other (than Himself). Just as, in or
and by
this logical exclu-
Moreover, not a thing from what
is
positive
as being other
thing, the logical
not any the case of whiteness is
exclusion of
it,
from
blackness or any other such thing, gives the true nature of that particular thing itself (viz. whiteness or any other such thing), but forms no new characterising property (of that whiteness or any other such thing); so also, these three words, by indicating that the one particular thing (mentioned in the given grammatical equation) is oppos-
ed
by nature
abundantly
full
to
all
things
different
from
of meaning, have one and the
itself,
are
same import,
has been desynonymous. monstrated that the Brahman, which is one only, is self-luminous and is free from all characterising attriand(yet) are not
Therefore,
it
butes.
when
the meaning of this sentence is thus propounded, that there will be agreement in sense between " it and the Existence following passage among others dear in this was the alone, my child, beginning, one only, It is
only
:
without a second." [C/ihdnd. Up.\l.2. i.]. The passages indeed all these beings are born "\_Taitt. Up.
"Whence
"
Existence alone,
my
dear child, this was in " the beginning." Indeed the [Qhhand. Up. VI. 2. i.]; Self, this one only, was in the beginning." [Ail. Up. I. i.] these and other similar passages define the Brahman as III.
i.i.];
the cause of the world ; and His essential nature is here described to the effect that " The Brahman is Existence,
Knowledge,
Infinity."
Under these circumstances,
in
ac-
SRI-BHASHYA.
40
rules
cordance with the
truthfulness of all that
is
2
which enforces
said
Part.
I.
[Chap.
faith
7.
the
(in
about any one the Brahman Himself,
thing) in all
the recensions of the Vedas, who is without a second and excludes it is
and
similars
(all)
dissimilars, that
(from Himself) made out
to be
is
Him i;o be the passages which characterise cause (of the world). That essential nature, which is (here) intended to be propounded, and belongs to the Brahman,
in all the
without a second and
pointed out to be the cause of the world, has (therefore) to be explained so as not to
who
is
is
contradict this (aforesaid characterisation).
The
.scriptural
text relating to His being without a second does not admit the existence of any second thing even in the form of a
Otherwise, there will be a contradiction also of " untainted" and statement which says (He is)
quality.
the " devoid of attributes," &c. Therefore, this passage which defines (the Brahman} denotes only That which is indivisible It
and homogeneous. may however be said that there sense
figurative) '
in
Knowledge,' &c., since, 32.
by
losing their
This rule termed the Sarra'sd-
The
as follows:
rituals
and
new-moon
are mentioned
be explained
may
kltdpratyayanyaya
known
as the
full-moon sacrifices in
several
recensions
Vedas such as Kdthaka,
of the
nva,
Mddhyandina,
Kach
of these
an indicative 33 (or
is
the use of the words
TaittirTya,
Kd&c.
recensions mentions
sacrifices in
'
Existence,'
own proper mean-
accordance with any
re-
cension, because the essential nature of those
same
sacrifices
has
'to
the
be
throughout.
Consequently, the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices
are not different in the different
re-
censions of the Vedas.
all
the
statements
Similarly,
made about any one
only a few of the characteristics of
particular thing in all the recensions of
and those that are
the Vedas have to be taken together
any one of them are not mentioned in the others. Never-
as really characterising that particular
those sacrifices,
mentioned all
theless,
in
all
tioned in
the
all
characteristics
men-
the recensions have to
be put together in performing those
thing in each
Mlm. 33.
recension. Vide
II. 4. 8 to 32.
Vide supra
\i.
4.
note
10.
Pftr.
Adhik.
1.
Silt.
SRI-BHISHYA.
/.]
41
which excludes they express the nature of that thing This is nothing wrong, the opposite of what they denote. because the purportive power (of words) is stronger than
ings,
their denotative power.
It
is
on
surely agreed
all
hands
to be found
that the purpose of a grammatical equation Again, it may be said solely in (its) oneness (of import.) that all the words (in a sentence) are not commonly seen is
Such use is to be used in a figurative sense. What of it ? not seen in the case of even a single word, when, (in adopting the purely denotative sense of the words), there is no contradiction of the purport of the sentence. After it has been determined that such and such is the main purport of a group of words, which are used together (in a sentence), then, for the purpose of removing any contradiction
(which the purely denotative sense of the words may give that (purport), (to adopt) the figura-
rise to) in relation to
tive interpretation in relation to two, or three, or all
(the
no way wrong, just as (it is not wrong to do words), in relation to any one (word). This is so admitted by so) those who take their stand on the sastras. Those 34 (all) is
in
who maintain
that the syntactical meaning of sentences
is
to be finally found in action, acknowledge that all the words that are found in the sentences of ordinary language possess the figurative significance ; because (according to them) the mandatory and other verbal forms such as the I in &<;.,
35 are primarily used so as to signify the produc-
tion of the
(new unperceivable
These are the Prdbhakaras a school of Mimfimsakas who hold the position that words have a meaning 34.
only in so far as they express actions er are associated with actions in one way or another. Lin is the verbal form of the 35. potential mood, and it is also used in the sense of the imperative mood. This apuri'a is otherwise called 36. aftf ishta
by the followers
of Jiumini,
principle) aprirva*
It is
said to be a
Q .
The
new and
invisible something, representing either an imperceptible afterstate of a work performed in obedience to a commandinent, or the state immediately antecedent to the production of the result
of that work. In either case, this new principle is of itself held to be enough to produce the good or the bad resuits of works.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
42
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
known by verbs is (only) figuratively made other forms. And by means of (their) mandatory and from verbs) dedifferent those other words, which (being note their own meanings which are dependent upon action, action signified
have also their primary sense undoubtedly in producing the hence to declare that principle apurva and unperceivable
;
like verbs is (to make they are (also) significant of action is nothing them) altogether figurative. Therefore, there
wrong
in (adopting) the figurative interpretation of even all
the words (in a sentence), if it is to serve the purpose of counteracting the contradiction of the purport of sentences. Therefore the Vcdanta is undoubtedly expressive of all
these conclusions, and
is,
in
consequence, unquestion-
ably authoritative.
has been stated (above) that, in the event of there being a conflict (of the sdstras) with perception, &c., the sdstras are more powerful. It is only when there
Moreover,
it
any (such) conflict, that the higher authoritativeness (of the sdstras) has to be asserted. But there is -no (such) conflict noticeable at all, because perception (also) apprehends the Brahman who is devoid of attributes and is pure
is
how
can be said that perception apprehends pure existence, seeing that it has for its
existence. It
be asked,
may
objects a variety of things, as
it
when
(it is
perceived) that ajar
exists, that a cloth exists, and so on.
If (in perception) there be no apprehension of distinctions, then all perceptions will relate to only one object, and will, accordingly, be the cause of only one realisation, as in the case of the
knowledge which
is,
from a continuous stream (of simino doubt,) true and it shall be ex-
amined here accordingly.
How are existence and its differen-
lar perceptions).
tiation
results
(This
made out when
;
it is
realised that a jar exists
?
Both
these realisations cannot indeed have perception for their
Adhik.
I.
Silt.
/.]
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
43
because they result from knowledge born at different and because also perceptual knowledge lasts only for a moment. Therefore, it has to be ascertained whether basis
;
times,
that which forms the object of perception is the (essential) nature of things or (their apparent) differentiation. Since the
apprehension of differentiation very naturally pre-supposes the apprehension of the essential nature of things, and also (pre-supposes) the
remembrance of the
correlatives of that
(differentiation), for this very reason it has necessarily to be admitted that sense-perception has the essential nature of things for its object and so, differentiation is not ;
apprehended by means of sense-perception. the realisation of distinctions
is
altogether
Therefore,
based
upon
error.
Again, that something which is known as differentiation not capable of being defined by those who know the science of logic. Indeed, differentiation does not constitute the is
Otherwise, when the essential nature of a thing is perceived, then, in the same way in which there results the realisation of that essential nature, essential nature of things.
there will have to result (also) the realisation of the distinctions differentiating
it
one thing
is
alisation that
ates the
remembrance of
not be urged that, even
from
all
The
other things.
re-
different (from another) desider-
correlatives
;
therefore,
it
should
when
the essential nature of things is apprehended, there happens to be no realisation of distinctions, for want of the remembrance, at that very time, of the correlatives of that (differentiation)
;
for,
surely,
it
is
not allowable, on the part of him who holds that differentiation is not at all distinct from the essential nature of things, to posit that (before realising differentiation) it is necessary to know the connected correlatives ; because,
(according
to him) the essential nature of things and its differentiation have both the character of not being different from that
SRI-BHISHYA.
44 essential nature.
And
if
there
is
[C//o/ rel="nofollow">. /.
Part.
L
no need to know any
correlatives in the case of the realisation of the essential
nature of things, so also must
it
be
in
the case of the re-
And
the statement that a jar is different (from other things), must then be, like the statement that the hand is the hand, an identical proposialisation of differentiation.
admitted identity between the jar and
tion (affirming the its
differentiation
Nor
is
from other things). a qualifying attribute.
(differentiation)
If
it
have the character of a qualifying attribute, then it has necessarily to be accepted that it (viz., this qualifying attribute)
is
distinct
from that essential nature of things
Otherwise, it (viz. differentiation) will certainly be the same as the essential nature of things. If it be granted that there is a distinction (between
(which
is
qualified
by
it).
the essential nature of things and its differentiating attributes), then in regard to this differentiation (which has
been hypothetically taken to be a qualifying attribute), its own character as a differentiation forms its qualifying attri-
and in regard to this also, (it being again different from the essential nature of things, its own character as a differentiation fonns its qualifying attribute, and so on) thus (arises) a regressus in infinitum. Moreover, (if it be bute,
;
held that differentiation
a qualifying attribute), then, there be the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence there will then result the apprehension of (individual) is
will also for,
;
when
the apprehension of things as characterised by (their) generic and other (such) qualities, and there will (similarly) arise the apprehension of things differentiation
there
is
as characterised
when
there
is
differentiation.
by (their) generic and other (such) qualities (merely) the apprehension of (individual)
Therefore, differentiation being difficult of definition, perception brings to light pure existence alone.
Adhik.
L
Si'tt.
SRI-BHASHYA.
i.]
45
Again, from the instances such as a jar exists, a cloth a jar is experienced, and a cloth is experienced, is seen that all external objects are invariably
exists, it
apprehended as compounded of existence
Now,
ence.
in
all
existence
cognitions,
and alone
experiis
seen
the reality ; and persist the differentiating attributes (which are specific of jars, cloths, &c.,) are all unreal, on account of their having to always, and so
to
be
(one after another)
(falsely perceived)
That
is
alone
it
excluded,
is
as,
for
example,
the
serpent in a (real) rope (is excluded). is the (real) entity and forms the
to say, the rope
all the false perceptions) ; and the crack in the earth, stream of snake, (falsely perceived) are all in as much as they are all liable water, &c., unreal,
persistent basis
(of
to be excluded one after another.
To
be objected thus:
In the case of the (falsec., in a (real) rope, the snake, &c., are ly perceived) snake, of an unreal nature, because (the perception in regard to this
it
may
the actual reality of their basis, such as the rope, &c., through making out that but not it (viz. the thing perceived) is a rope but no snake because those (perceptions) are one after another excluded.
them)
is
stultified
by
knowing
;
And
the reality of the rope, &c.,
is
not due to their persist-
due to their remaining unstultified (even by the knowledge of what forms their basic reality). But, in the present instance, how can there be unreality in regard ence
all
along, but
is
to jars, &c., the perceptions
whereof are not
(so) stultified ?
This objection is thus answered The logical excluto be ascertained has of what nature that it sion well, :
(exclusion)
is.
Is
it,
(for
example, of the nature
of)
the
non-existence of cloth, &c., in the cognition that a jar exIf so, it must be concluded that the stultification of ists ? (the cognition of) cloth,
c.,
results
from
this (cognition)
SRI-BHASHYA.
46
[Chap.
1.
L
Part.
Hence logical exclusion is such a negathat a jar exists. tion of (the cognition of) objects as is based upon (such a) And this kind of (exclusion) establishes the stultification. which are (so) excluded. unreality of those objects existence
alone, being
unstultified,
persists all
Pure
along, like
the rope (for example, in the falsely perceived instances of the snake, the crack in the earth, &c., referred to above). is unreal. Therefore, all that is other than pure existence
And
the
syllogistic
statement (here)
is
as
follows
:
continues to persist all along, Existence is real, like the rope, &c., in the instances of the rope-serpent, &c., are unreal, because they (above referred to). Jars, &c., are (all one after another) excluded, like the (falsely per-
because
ceived) snake, &c., that
Such being the
&c.
have
case,
tinues to persist all along, (viz.
is
experience) It
it
only experience, which con-
that constitutes reality, and
existence
may, however, be
for their basis the (real) rope,
it is
it
itself.
said again that pure existence,
being the object of experience,
is
different
from
so,because (all such) differentiation has already
it.
been
It is
not
set aside,
and as being diffisame reason, the idea that
as not forming the content of perception,
And
cult of definition.
for this
existence forms the
object of experience can not be in agreement with any authoritative position in logic. There-
the same as experience. And this (experiself-evident, (simply) because it has the nature of an
fore existence
ence)
is
is
experience. If it have any other proof (than itself), then, there will be room to characterise it as no experience, in the
same way in which
and such other things
(are not expernot possible to posit the necessity of one experience for (making out) another experience, because it
ience). Further,
(viz. its
it is
capable of becoming evident merely by existence. Indeed, experience, while it exists, is not
experience)
own
jars
is
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sul. /.]
I.
47
found to be incapable of becoming evident
like jars,
&c.,
(which are incapable of becoming evident simply because be they exist). Otherwise, (/.. if experience be found to its evident of existence), simply through becoming incapable it
have to be acknowledged that it has its knowabidependent upon something other than itself.
will
lity
Then perhaps you hold
that has
an experience
case of
Even in the (actually) come into
as follows:
merely the object (of that experience) is that brought to light, as (for instance) when a jar is because no one, who knows that a certain experienced existence,
it
is
;
is
particular thing
a jar, also experiences at that very same
time experience-in-itself, which forms no object (of experience) and is not of the nature of what may be (externally) pointed to by the word this. Therefore, in the same way in which contact with the eye and other similar senses is '
the cause of the production of the knowability of jars and other external objects, an (external) entity alone forms the
cause of the production of that same knowability in relation to experience.
Immediately afterwards, (that is, after an object) experience is inferred from the logical perceiving basis of distinct knowability which is momentarily associa-
ted with that object. If that be perience,
which
to be
?
may
be said that ex-
intelligence, acquires the nature of
Surely,
it
non-
the nature of this intelligence cannot be the invariable associa-
What, then,
intelligence.
known
is
so, it
is
knowability with its own existence, because (such knowability) is found to exist (also) in association with pleasures, &c. Indeed, pleasures, &c., while they
tion
of
exist, are
never unfelt.
Therefore, experience-in-itself
is
not experienced by itself, on account of the impossibility of such a thing (taking place), in the same way in which (it is impossible) for the finger-tip, which feels
all
other things by
SRI-BHISHYA.
48
touch, to perceive itself
by touching
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
itself.
thus replied): That knowability this, (To which, like colour, &c., forms a property of objects, and is all
it
is
other than experience, is not (at all) known to exist; moreover, it is not proper to assume (the existence of) a
property called knowability, when it is possible to realise all things by means of that experience alone which is ad-
mitted by both (sides) contention) of him
who
for these reasons all this
(above simply the foolish display of the intelligence has not himself understood the peculiar nature of ;
is
experience. Consequently, experience is not made out by means of inference, and is not also made evident by any
other means of knowledge. ience,
which proves
all
But, on the contrary, experthings, proves itself, and the
statement here
is
that in respect of which
its
sj'llogistic
and the thing
as follows
own
realisation thereof are (both)
else;
because
it
(viz.
:
Experience
is
characteristic property
independent of any
experience) forms, through
association (with another thing), the means of having that property and that realisation in connnection with that its
other thing; whatever is, by its own association (with another thing), the means of giving rise to a characterising property and its realisation in that other thing, that is seen to be independent of all other things in the matter of that (property) and that (realisation) in reference to itself.
For instance, there is the case of colour, &c., in &c. Colour, &c., while producing by
relation to visibility,
means of their own association, visibility, &c., and such other things, are not themselves
in the earth
dependent upon
the association of colour, &c., for the production of visibility, &c., in relation to themselves. Therefore, experience is itself the cause of its own knowability as well as of the realisatoin that it is knowable,
Adhik.
I.
Si'fl.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
49
This same experience which is self-luminous is also 3 7 non-existence and other eternal, because antecedent non-existences are absent (in relation to
And
it.)
such
absence (of non-existence) certainly results from the selfevident nature (of experience.) Indeed, it is not possible
make
to
out the
experience,either
'
antecedent non-existence' of self-evident
by
itself,or
by other means. Experience
if it have to cause the knowledge of its own 'non-existence' does not, as a matter of fact, cause such knowledge, while
existent.
it is itself
While
it
is
simply because
existent, '
there will (otherwise) be contradiction, its non-existence' cannot exist. And so, how can it cause the knowledge of
own
its
it
ent,
'
non-existence'
(viz. experience)
'
non-existence').
when not exist-
Similarly, even
?
does not cause the knowledge (of its can experience, being itself non-
How
become the means of proving its own 'non-existNor is it possible to know it (viz. non-existence ')
existent, '
ence
(
?
by other means, because experience is not the object of anything other than itself. The means of proof, that can '
prove the
antecedent non-existence
Non-existence (or abhara) is 37. of four kinds viz. pragabhava, pradli-
wamsai&dva, anvonyabhdva, and atyantabhzva. Prdgabhava or antecedent
but
is
'
of this
For
example, when a pot or any other such thing is destroyed, this particular
non-existence comes
non-existence exists antecedently to
and thereafter
the production of an effect such as a pot that is, the pot is non-existent
nydbhdva
;
ex-
(viz.
incapable of having an end.
into
being
persists for ever.
Anyo-
mutual
or
means that
in
non-existence
any one thing there
is
when
produced. Thus, this non-
the non-existence of another, as
beginning
incapable of having a but capable of having
coincides with what
generally
known
an
Pradhwamsdbhava
as 'difference.' Atyantdbhdv a or
abso-
before
it is
existence
is
end.
is
the
non-existence consequent on the destruction of a that is
is,
thing such as a pot
the pot
destroyed.
existence
is
is
So
non-existent after this particular
;
it
non-
capable of having an origin
7
it is
said that a pot
lute non-existence
not a cloth. This
is is
is
that kind of non-
existence which negates the existence of a thing at all times.
the horns of a at all times,
For instance,
hare are non-existent
SRI-BHASHYA.
50
perience), has to prove such
'
Part.
I.
[Chap.
1.
'
non-existence
after
making
out objectively what experience really is. It is not possible to know its non-existence by other means, because it is '
'
self-evident,
definitely as
Hence, there
'
cannot be said that experience is originated, as the absence of 'antecedent non-existence' in rela-
it
is
tion to
and is not therefore capable of being perceived an external object, so as to say This it is.
it.
it
Therefore,
has also none of those other
modifications 38 of the produced thing,
which are invariably
This un-originated experiwith origination. admit of any manifoldness (or variation)
associated
does not
ence
itself, because, in relation to it, there is the realisof what is contradictory to the predication (of such manifoldness /. e. the realisation of non-origination). Indeed, that which is not originated has never been
within
ation
seen to be
manifold
(or
More-
varied in character).
and such other things, are (themselves) of being capable experienced (/. e. of becoming the of objects experience), and cannot, therefore, be the qualifying attributes of experience, in the same way in which over, distinction
colour and such other things are not (such attributes). Therefore, as experience is of the nature of experience alone, nothing else that is capable of being experienced can be its qualifying attribute.
devoid of
is
not, for
the
intelligent
follows ////'
Therefore, and also because
nature, that
very thing
These modifications aie stated
to be six in :
same reason,
distinctions, for that
it
has
basis,
(as consciousness).
38.
For whatever reason consciousness
a knowing subject called the dtnmn (or which is different from its own essential nature
its
self),
all
number and are given
as
'Shad bharai'ikai'a bhavan-
Varshyayanih jay ate
mil ft' varddhate
asti viparina-
apakskiyatt rinalvailh"
Mr.
I.
I.
existence,
3.
I.
2.
has an
consciousness),
They
are
:
Origination,
modification, increase, de-
and
crease V. P.
(viz.
it
II,
destruction.
Vide also
L
.Adhik.
SRI-BHASHYA.
Sru. /.]
51
which possesses the character of being sell-luminous,
atman
constitutes the
(or the
which
is
and
logically excluded
itself
Non-intelligence also, what is not the self,
self).
invariably concomitant with
from consciousness, indeed, negatives (the view) that consciousness (itself) does not constitute the atman. is
It
may,however, be said that the
knower
the
not so;
is
it
(self's)
character of being '
by the cognition I know'* It from illusion, in the same way in which
established
is
results
the characteristics of silver are (illusorily perceived) in a bit of the mother-of-pearl. Because experience does not possess the property of being the subject of
which
it is itself
the knower
is
any predication, of
the object; therefore, this character of being
(simply) super-imposed (upon consciousness),
which, when one says I am a man,' the love of sell", due to the feeling that a thing is one's own, is (superimposed) upon the altogether external lump(of matter) in the
same way
'
in
is characterised by the generic and other properties of the thing called man. To be the knower is, in. fact, to be the same as the subject of the predication of knowing. And
that
it (viz.
this
intelligent
of egoity
is
known
the
third of
twenty-four material principles
that
go
world
to
make up
according to
The Purusha or
the
the
the soul
is
objective
which haps
the twenty-
from all the principle, differing material principles on account of its
egoity
is
The
notion of
here held to be due to the
association of this intelligent principic with matter or Prakrili.
Mahal
Sahkhyas.
fifth
intelligent character.
Prakriti
dial
the
Primer-
How can this become
3 9
as the ahaftkdra.
Ahahkara forms
39.
the
is subject to modification, is nonseated in the knot of the evolved principle
knower-ship)
and
is
is
or
also
held to give 'Great
the
known
rise to
Principle'
us Buadlri, per-
for the reason that the cognisa-
blity
of the external world by
Out
the
Purusha
is
Mahat
evolved the principle known which is a kind of
is
due
to
it.
of this
as Akahkara,
'mind-stuff' responsible for our sense of egoity
and
for the
the senses
and
the-
production of
mind,
c.
RI-BHA~SHYA.
2
[Chap.
L Part.
7,
possible in relation to the immodifiable witnessing principle,
the dtman, which is entirely made up of pure intelligence ? The quality of being the subject of a predication and other
such qualities do not form the attributes of the self, simply because they are, like colour and such other things, realis-
by means of
direct perception.
self-experience,
even when there
able is
is
seen that there
no notion of
egoity,
swoon, &c.; therefore, the
as during dreamless sleep,
does not
It is
self
within the sphere of the notion of egoity. If the property of being the subject of a predication as well as the property of being the object of the notion of egoity be fall
(both) admitted of the
self,
then, as in the case of the body,
(which possesses both these properties),
it
difficult to
is
avoid, (in relation to the self), the resulting attribution of non-intelligence, externality,
and non-self-hood, &c.
indeed, well-known among those,
who
established criteria of truth, that the
self,
It
is,
follow the well-
which
is
the en-
joyer of Sivarga and other similar fruits of the actions of the body, is different from the body, which falls within
the sphere of the notion of egoity, and is generally well to be the subject of predications. And, similarly, it has to be understood that the internal self, the witness,
known is
altogether different from the knower, which
is
the thing
T. Thus the
principle of egoity, which, though non-intellireveals the self to be the same as the immodifiable gent, experience, does reveal it as constituting its own basis.
The nature they
(/. e.
of revealers
is
to reveal the revealed, as though
the revealed things) were within themselves (/. c. Indeed, a mirror, a sheet of water, a mass
the revealers).
of matter, &c., (respectively) reveal a face, the orb of the moon, and the outline of a cow, &c,, as though these were (actually) within them. this
same
fact.
Do
The
illusion
not ask
how
'
I
know';
experience,
is
due to
which
is
Adhik.
L
Sfit.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
self-luminous, can be revealed ciple
ofegoity, which is
itself
by the
revealed
53 non-intelligent prin-
by that
(experience);
seen that the palm of the hand, which is revealed by a beam of the sun's rays, itself reveals them (at the same time). Indeed, the rays of the sun passing surely,
is
it
through the holes of a window are frequently seen to be-
come more
by means of
brilliant
(their contact
with) the them. In
palm of the hand, which is (itself) revealed by the cognition I know', for whatever reason, this knower, which is the thing T, forms ho real attribute of the self, '
which
is
the thing
pure intelligence T) does not find
and
for that
;
its
way
same
it
reason,
into the states of
(viz.
dream-
Indeed, here (in these states), by reason of the cessation of the super-imposition of the thing T, the self shines forth altogether in the form of less sleep
final release.
pure and natural experience. It is only in consequence of this fact that one who has risen from deep sleep observes
sometimes
'
I
did not
know even myself.
ness alone, which, in reality,
and
alternations,
which
is
is
Thus, conscious-
destitute of all distinctions
destitute of attributes
and
is
pure
intelligence, homogeneous and eternally unchangemanifests itself, through illusion, as wonderfully and able,
which
is
variedly manifold in the forms of the knower, the known, and knowledge. Therefore (the study of) the whole of the
Vcddnta has to be undertaken to remove the ignorance, which is at the root of this (manifestation), so as to attain the
knowledge of the oneness of the
Brahman who and
is,
by
with the
nature, eternal, pure, self-luminous
free.
This opinion of persons cial
self
qualities
who
which make one
Highest Person
who
is
taught
are devoid of those spe-
worth)'- of the choice of the
in the
Upanishads
of those
SRI-BHASHYA.
54
{Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
(person*) whose understanding is, in its entirety, tainted with the innate impression of beginninglessly ancient sins, and who are ignorant of the essential nature of words and
sentences and their correct meanings, and (are ignorant) also of such sound logical processes as enable (us) to pro-
ceed rightly (in our reasonings), and as are (at the same time) based upon perception and all other (well known) criteria of truth, (this opinion of such persons) is found-
ed upon that kind of unsubstantial and variedly fallacious reasoning which is not applicable to any other an alternative
similar case as
to be disregarded
by
all
those
;
and
who
that knowledge of truth, which tion
and
all
is
it
therefore
are
deserves
conversant with
based
upon percepother such criteria of truth as are supported by
logic.
And
out in the following manner Those, who maintain the view 4 that there is a thing which is devoid of attributes, cannot say what criterion there
is
this conies
to prove that thing
:
which
is
so devoid of attributes
;
the criteria of truth (that form the means of logical proof) deal (only) with such objects as possess attributes. And the convention that obtains in their own school, because,
that
all
the thing devoid of attributes) is established by experience, is counteracted by the fact of such ex-
it (viz.
one's
own
perience having, (nevertheless), the qualification of being witnessed by the dtman (or the self) ; because, all experience relates to objects which are qualified by some attri-
bute or other,
saw
as, for instance, in
the specific cognition
'
I
have to be demonstrated, by some specious or other, that an experience, while it is being exreasoning perienced, is without attributes, although it is (in fact) pos40.
this.
If
it
Vide supra pp. 27
et ; scq.
Ad/iik.
/.
Silt,
SRI-BHASHYA.
i.]
sessed of attributes,
it
55
can be so demonstrated only with
the help of such natural qualifying attributes as are peculiar to that (experience) itself, and are different from its own existence.
Therefore, even thus,
it
continues to be qualifi-
ed by means of its own qualifying attributes, which form the basis of such demonstration, which are different from its
own
these
existence,
and are
circumstances,
denied
in
by other
it
is
also peculiar to
only some
relation to a thing
attributes
which
is
of attributes can in no
way
Under
(already) qualified
therefore, the thing
;
itself.
attributes that are
which
is
devoid
be proved.
To consciousness,
indeed, belongs the quality of illumexternal inating objects as well as the quality of self-luminousness,
knower
perception becomes possible to the way of bringing external objects to the
because
(only) in the
light (of consciousness).
We will, in our own turn, explain,
with great clearness of judgment, that, (even)
during and of conditions intoxication, swoons, dreams, experience
There
undoubtedly, many attributes, in regard to experience, such as eternity, &c., which are also admitted by you (our opponent). And it is not is
altogether qualified.
are,
possible to declare that these also constitute the thing-in-itself (which is pure and simple) ; for, even if they are
taken to constitute the (attributeless) thing-in-itself, we find that there are conflicting views in regard to its various
modes, and every one tries to establish his own position by means of such of its modes as are approved of by him. Therefore, it has to be stated that that thing is certainly qualified
ed
by such
attributes as accord with the accept-
criteria of truth.
also possesses the (/. e. revelation) as are such of qualified by attriobjects power denoting only of words and sentences butes, because it is extant in the form
Verbal testimony
SRI-BHASHYA.
56
A
word
is,
in fact, the result of the
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
combination of roots
and terminations. There is difference between the meanof the termination, and it is thereing of the root and that fore unavoidable that words denote only such things as between are (by attributes). And the difference qualified
words binds us to a difference in (their) meaning. A sentto ence, which is a collection of words, gives expression of the the between relations meanings the peculiar existing words (therein), and is hence incapable of denoting Verbal testiof attributes. any object which is devoid means of authoritative no proving the mony is, therefore,
several
thing which
is
devoid of attributes.
Perception, which
is
differentiated into the divisions
has not the power of is without being the means to prove the thing which Definite perception has for its object only that attributes. of the indefinite
which that
is
and the
because
qualified,
are characterised
definite,
it
by many
generic and other properties. certainly relates to
relates
wholely to objects
things such as
(their)
Indefinite
perception also because all those qualified objects,
things which are experienced in it (viz. in indefinite perception) are found to be synthetically put together in definite perception.
Indefinite perception
to be the perception
of that which
is,
is
indeed,
known
devoid of some
particular attribute or other, but not (the perception) of that which is devoid of all attributes ; because the percep-
tion of such a thing
because also
duced
in
it is
is
not seen to occur at any time, and
impossible. association with
other, so as
Surely, all cognition is prodefining attribute or
some
to denote that a particular thing is of a The perception of anything is impossible
particular nature.
apart from the configuration of its characterising attributes, (in the same way in which it is not possible to perceive, for
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sut. /.]
I.
57
an ox) apart from the triangular
instance,
and such other things
(as
go to make up
face, the
its
dewlap,
configuration).
Hence, indefinite perception is the first outline-perception which are of the same kind and it
in relation to things is
;
said that the second
and the following outline-percep-
Here, in the first outlineperception, the generic properties of the ox and of such other objects (of perception) can not be made out to posstions are definite (perceptions).
ess (in relation to
ence.
The
sistence
is
them) the property of continued
possibility of
persist-
making out such continued
per-
to be found only in connection with the second
and the following outline-perceptions. The generic properties of the ox and of other similar objects of perception the configuration of the thing which is apthat these prehended in the first outline-perception (generic properties) possess the character of continued perconstitute
;
sistence,
is
conclusively
made
out in the second and follow-
ing outline-perceptions ; and so the second and following outline-perceptions are characterised as being definite. The outline-perception is characterised as being indefinite, because the continued persistence of such generic properfirst
ties
of the ox and of other similar objects of perception, as
constitute the configuration due, (for instance), to things like
the dewlap &c.,
is
not apprehended in that
first
outline-
perception, but not because there is (in it) no apprehension of the generic and other properties which together
go to make up a (perceptive) configuration. first
outline-perception,
it is
constitutes the thing which
Even
in the
only such a configuration, that
is
apprehended,so as to be able to
of a particular form ; for, the generic and other which constitute such a configuration, have no properties, characteristics other than those apprehended by the sens-
say that
es,
it is
and, further, the configurated cannot, as a matter of
SRi-BHXSHYA.
58 fact,
fore,
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
be apprehended apart from the configuration. Therethe configuration are just as the configurated and
always apprehended (together in perception), so also, in the second and following outline-perceptions, the generic other objects, are properties, such as those of the ox and of
always made out to possess the character of continued persistence (in relation to those objects). Consequently, they second and following outline-perceptions) une. the (/. doubtedly possess the character of being definite. Thus, perception can never have for its object the thing which is devoid of attributes.
For these same reasons, the theory which maintains (the thing perceived) to be distinct and non-distinct (at one and the same time) has also been throughout set at naught. In the cognition, ittham),
how
identity
of the
1
it
'This thing is of this nature' (Idam possible to get any idea regarding the
denoted by the words id am and ittham (which means of this Of these two, the concept denoted by the word
(which means nature)
is
concepts
this thing)
ittham refers, (for example), to the configuration characterised by the dewlap and such other things relating to the ox and the object possessing these characteristics is denoted by ;
the word idam. contradicted
which
identity of these
by perception even
itself.
two concepts
is
Accordingly, the thing,
in the
very beginning, perceivaltogether excluded (and is thus different) from other things. And this exclusion is due to the fact that a
ed, as all
is
Thus the
perceived,
is,
if it is
perception, which makes out a particular thing (such as an ox or any other object) to be of a particular nature, is in-
variably associated with a particular configuration (of attributes), such as that which is made up of the generic proIn all cases perties, &c., of the ox or of any other object.
wherein the relation of the qualifier and the qualified
is
Adhik.
L
SRi-BnlSHYA.
Sut. /.]
59
perceived, it is quite clear, by means of that perception itIt being self, that they are quite distinct from each other. so,
a stick, an ear-ring and other such objects, possessing
distinct configurations of their
own and
existing in
them-
may occasionally happen, however, to be here and there the characterising adjuncts of some other object (than themselves). But the generic properties of the ox and of
selves,
other such objects become cognisable things only by reason of their making up the configurations of (those) objects, and hence they form the attributes of substances.
In both these cases juncts, such as
(viz.
in the case of the separable ad-
sticks, ear-rings &c.,
and
in that
of the in-
separable attributes, such as the generic properties of the ox and of other similar objects), the relation of the qualifier is one and the same. And it is for this very because both and (/. e. separable inseparable adjuncts possess alike the power of qualifying things), that there re-
and the
qualified
reason
perception of the difference between them between the qualifier and the qualified). There is
sults also the (/. e.
much of peculiarity. Sticks and other separable adjuncts are capable of being perceived as existing separately ; whereas the generic properties of the ox, &c. ; however, this
are systematically incapable of
it (/. c.
of being perceived
as existing separately from the thing they qualify). Hence, the statement, that the differentiation of things is contra-
by perception, can be made only by ignoring the true character of perception. Indeed, it is agreed on all dicted
hands that the true character of perception is to denote that a particular thing is of a particular nature. All this has been
aphorism
the Sfitrakara in. the clearly enunciated by " It cannot be it is because true, impossible (for
contradictory attributes to exist at the
and the same thing."
[Vcd.
same time)
Sf/t. II, 2. 31.],
in
one
SRI-BHASHYA.
60
much
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
has thus qualified things for its objects, inference also, relating as it does to such objects as are qualified by the relations observed in
And,
as
in
as
perception
perception, &c, has to deal only with qualified things.
Even where there is difference of opinion as to the number of the various means of knowledge, all the means of knowledge, accepted by all, deal with this same (qualifiTherefore, by no means of knowledge can ed) thing. there be the establishment of the thing which is devoid of attributes. Whoever, while he is himself relying upon the natural qualifying attributes of a thing, declares that that very thing is devoid of attributes, he does not know the contradiction in terms to be found in his
when one
as
enunciates the barrenness
own
of
speech,
one's
own
mother. It
has been stated above 4
prehends pure existence, for its object
;
and that
it
T
that, because perception ap-
cannot
differentiation
have is
differentiation
difficult to define,
does not admit of any one of the-several alternatThis (opinion) ive views (in regard to its own nature). because
it
been driven away (as untrue), on the ground that perception has for its object only such things as are characalso has
by generic and other properties, and (also on the ground) that generic and other properties, by reason of desiderating their correlatives, form the means of realising the distinctions between themselves and the (distinctions terised
between the) things
(qualified
by them).
admitted by you, (our opponents),
What
has been
in the case of conscious-
ness and in the case of colour and other such qualities,
to
the effect that they, being the cause of particular realisations in regard to other objects (than themselves), are also
l.
Vide *//< pp. 42
&
43.
Adhik.
I.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
Sat. /.]
61
the cause of such realisations in regard to themselves, that certainly holds good in the case of differentiation also.Therefore, there is neither
the fallacy of regressus in infinitum
nor the fallacy of reciprocal dependence. 42 Even if perceptual knowledge last only for one moment, yet, during that very moment, the generic properties which, (for example), belong to the ox and other such objects, which are the same as the distinctions between those things and constitute
they are
their configurations,
there
is
nothing
else here
to be apprehended in
(all)
(/. e.
apprehended therefore, ;
in perception) that
any other
remains
moment.
Moreover, if perception apprehend pure unqualified existence, then there would result the contradiction of such (definite) cognitions as are realised in cloth exists.'
the instances,
If differentiation,
and
'A jar
which
is
exists'
and
'
A
a thing other than
and such pure existence, other attributes as go to make up the configurations of things, be not apprehended by perception, why does one who is in quest of
If
consists of generic properties
a horse turn
away
at the sight of a buffalo
?
pure existence alone be the object of all cognitions, why all the words which are associated with the objects
are not
remembered in each one of those cognitions ? Further, if the two states of consciousness, relating to a horse and to an elephant (respectively), have the same thing for their object, then (the apprehension of) whichever of them is perceived later on would merely be the of
all
those cognitions
apprehending of the already apprehended,and so there would be the absence of any difference (between them) therefore, ;
there would be nothing (here) to distinguish it (/. state of perceptive consciousness) from memory.
e.
the latter
If,
in
state of consciousness, the apprehension of particularity
42.
Vide
supi'a p. 44.
every is
ad-
SRI-BHASHYA.
62 mitted, then surely
will
it
[Chap.
I.
Part.
1.
have to be admitted that percep-
tion has qualified things for
its
object.
If all states of
same thing for their object, there then be the apprehension of all things by means of only
consciousness have the will
one state of consciousness, and, in consequence, there will have to be the non-existence of persons affected with blind&c.
ness, deafness,
Moreover, pure unqualified existence is not surely apprehended by the eye, because it apprehends colour, things possessing colour, and
such things as are characterised by inherent association with anything that has colour. Nor (is pure existence apprehended) by the sense of touch,
because
The
it
has for
its
sense of hearing
all
object things possessing tangibility.
and the other senses
also
have not
pure existence for their object, but have for their object the characterising attributes of sound, taste, and smell. Therefore, here
(/. e. in this world) there is nothing to be found which can apprehend existence-in-itself. If, solely by means of perception, there be the apprehension of pure
existence which
is
which also relates to
devoid of attributes, then, the scripture, it, will have to deal with a result already
by some other means of knowledge, and will what gives expression to a mere tautological repetition. And, for the same reason,
arrived at
therefore acquire the character of
there would also result cognisability
Brahman which
existence.
is
pure admitted that in such a case
(/.
c.
in
regard to the
You have yourself when the Brahman
becomes cognisable) non-intelligence, destructibility, &c., (would result to it also). Therefore, perception certainly has for
its
object only such things
differentiation
which
things and has for perties,
is
its
by by the configurations of their generic and other pro-
constituted basis
as are qualified
Adhik.
I.
There
Sftl.
/.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
63
nothing other than 'this perceptive configuration which is seen to be capable of giving rise to the impression and it is possible that several things are of only one form is
;
to realise the generic properties, such as those of an
and of other ation) alone.
ox
objects, merely by means of that (configurAnd again, even when it is held that the gener-
properties of things are distinct from their (corresponding) configurations, the perception of configuration has unavoidic
;
ably to be admitted. Therefore, this (perceptive) configuration alone constitutes the genus (in logic). Configuration is well known to be that which constitutes a thing's own peculiarity,
and so
it
has to be (severally) synthesised by percepBecause
tion in accordance with the thing that is perceived.
the realisation that one thing is different from another results solely by means of the apprehension of their (respective) generic qualities, and because no other thing than generic
observed (when such differentiation is perceived), and because also they (viz. the generic properties) are admitted as well by him who maintains that (differentiation) properties
is
is
distinct (from generic properties),
therefore
(/..
for all
these reasons), generic properties such as those of an ox
and of other
objects, alone constitute differentiation.
said that, if generic and other alone constitute differentiation, then, as soon as properties will be the realisation of are there they apprehended, It
may, however, be
in the same way in which they are themselves realised. True, differentiation too is so realised, through the realisation of the generic properties, (for in-
differentiation also,
stance), of the
ox and of other such
generic iproperties, different
from
all
such as
those
objects.
of an
Indeed, the ox,
&c.,
are
things other than themselves, because, as
soon as the generic properties such as those of an ox, &c., are apprehended, there results the removal of all other
SRI-BHISHYA.
(q
L
[Chap. I Part.
impressions of similarity as well as (the removal) of their realisation. Surely, the negation of non-differentiation results
wholly from the apprehension of distinctions. However, in the realisation This is different from that,' the declara'
tion
made '
(viz.
in regard to these '
this
lativesj;
and
'
mutually exclusive correlatives
that') desiderates (each of) those (corre-
therefore, said that the
it is,
from another
realisation that
one
is
dependent upon correlat-
The statement made above
43 to the effect that jars
thing
is
different
ives.
and other such
specific objects are unreal,
because they do
not persist before consciousness in all perceptions, this is an erroneous assumption on the part of one who has not rightly
considered the relation of the stultified
and the
stultifier, and the peculiar nature of the properties of logical exclusion and continued persistence (in regard to percep-
tions).
In
two cognitions
only when ;
of the stultified and the
the relation
fact,
stultifier arises
there
and then
(/.
e.
is
a contradiction between
when
it
arises),
there
is
Xow, certainly the exclusion of that which is stultified. in regard to (perceptions which relate to) jars, cloths, &c., there is no (mutual) contradiction at all (between them); because they are different from one another in point of time and place. If, when the existence of a thing (is to any particular place and any non-existence (also be perceived,) in relation to the same place and the same time, then there
perceived)
in relation
particular time,
is
its
contradiction.
And
in
such a case, that which
is
the
stronger (of the two) becomes the stultifier, and there arises the negation of the stultified. If a thing, which is
experienced as existing in relation to a certain time and a 4?.
Vide supra
p.
^.5,
Adhik.
I. Sul.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
65
perceived to be non-existent in relation to a different time and a different place, (then) there is no contradiction and so, how can there be the relation of the
certain place,
is
;
stultified
and the
stultifier in
such a case
?
Or,
how can
it
be said,that, what has been (already once) negatived in one instance, is (again) to be negatived in another instance ? the other hand, in the case of the rope-snake and other is the perception of (illusorily perceived) things, there their non-existence in that very place and that very time
On
(wherein they are also perceived to exist); therefore, there arise contradiction, stultification
and
logical exclusion.
The
(which is perceived in relation a and a to particular time), from a differparticular place ent place and a different time, is not thus seen to be in-
logical exclusion of a thing,
variably concomitant with unreality and therefore, merely to possess the quality of being logically excluded, (so as not to persist before consciousness in perception), does ;
not constitute the cause of unreality. existence (alone) is real, because it consciousness^,
is
in itself evident,
need of any means (such fore,
pure existence alone
hended
The statement is
persistent (before
and does not stand
as perception) to is
that
prove not the thing (which
it.
is
in
Thereappre-
in perception).
There
is
the relation of subject and object between
experience and any particular entity (which is experienced); thus the difference (between them) is established by pertherefore this ception, and is incapable of being stultified ;
(contention) also has been set at naught, namely, that experience itself is existence.
has been further 44 stated that experience possesses the quality of self-luminousness. This is true in the case It
44.
Vide
snprtt p.
4(1.
9
SRI-BHISHYA.
66
I.
[Chap.
Part.
I.
the knower, only at the time it brings But there is external objects to the light of consciousness. no rule to the effect that it is so at all times in the case of
of the
which
self,
is
all (persons) because the experience of others forms (to us) the object of such inferential knowledge as is based upon the acceptance and rejection (of things in accordance with ;
their
own
that one's
and also because it is seen even an object of becomes past experience when (one says) I had known'. If, in this
likes
own
and
dislikes)
;
'
knowledge, as way, it is not possible to say that experience it
is
also
wrong
the character of an experience
is
self-evident,
experienced, it loses because the character of
to declare that, ;
if
being no experience at all would thereby result to one's own past experiences and the experiences of others, on the
And if it be score that they are themselves experienced. not granted that the experiences of others can be made out (by us) by means of the process of inference, there would then
result the
non-apprehension of the relation
between words 'and
their
words.
only after making out by means of
meanings, in consequence of which there would arise the cessation of the use of all Further,
it is
inference that the teacher
an approach to him
is
is
made
possessed of knowledge, that (by the pupil); and this too
would thereby become impossible. (experience) ceases to possess the perience, merely
other experience.
because
it lasts, it is
by means of
which constitutes
its basis,
ence
its
character of an ex-
becomes the object of anThe character of an experience, indeed,
intelligible) solely
the fact of
cannot be that
it
consists in the fact that, while
in
It
(/'.
its
e.
own
luminous
(/.
e.
existence, to that
to the self)
;
or,
it
consists
being the means of proving (the existby means of its own existence.
of) its objects solely
Although these two ("characterisations of experience) are
Adhik.
I.
Sftt.
SRI-BHISHYA.
/.]
67
capable of being realised in an experience other than one's own, they do not (thereby) fall away, seeing that they are (at the same time) established by means of one's own experience
;
and so
this character of
disappear (in relation to
an experience does not
any experience, even though
it
And
becomes the object of another experience). jars, &c., certainly do not possess the character of an experience, (simply) because they are devoid of this (above-mentioned) nature (of an experience), but not because they are capSimilarly, when an experience of incapable being experienced, then it is difficult to avoid the result that it is not at all an experience because the flowers imagined to grow in the sky and other such
able of being experienced. is
;
imaginary objects, which are not capable of being experiencIf it be said that ed, constitute no experience (at all). the sky-flower and other (such purely imaginary) things are not experience, because they are non-existent, but not because they cannot be experienced, then let it be held that, in the case of jars
and other similar things
also,
it
is
not being opposed to 'non-intelligence' which binds them to the condition of their being no experience, but not the fact of their incapability to be experi-
.the fact of their
Should
enced.
it
be said that,
when an
able of being experienced, then, like jars it
experience is capand other objects,
would acquire the character of not being opposed to 'non-
intelligence,' then, surely, as in the case of the sky-flower
and other (imaginary) objects,there would certainly
result to
it (/. c. to experience), even when it is not capable of being experienced, the quality of not being opposed to 'non-intelli-
gence'.
Hence
it is
ridiculous to say that, if
capable of being experienced, then character of an experience. ence)
is
Again, the view in which origination
\*
it (viz. it
experi-
has not the
denied to
cpn.-
SRI-BHASHYA.
68 sciousness which
of
its
view
self-evident,
non-existence 4
antecedent
this
is
very much
is
[Chap.
L
Part.
L
on the score of the absence 8
and other non-existences,
like the presentation of a stick
purposes of guidance) to one who is blind by another who is born blind. It is not possible to speak of the absence (for
of (such) antecedent non-existence, on the ground that because it .there is nothing which can apprehend it ;
that antecedent non-existence)
(viz.
experience
same time that knowledge of no
rule
apprehended by be asked, how experience, at the exists, can give us the contradictory
If
itself. it
its
is
it
non-existence,
it is
replied that there
is
which binds experience to deal only with such
same time with itself; for and future occurrences, the But if (of experience at all).
objects as are existent at the
then there would
result, to past
quality of being
no objects
you say that the antecedent non-existence and other non-existences (in relation to an experience), while they are being made out, are, as a rule, found to exist simultaneously with that (experience),
you
it is
perceive this state of things in
asked
"Did
in return
any case ?"
Then
(/. c.
be possible so to perceive them), surely on account of that very perception, antecedent non-existence and other
if it
non-existences are proved to exist (in relation to experience). Thus there can be no denial of such antecedent nonexistence (in relation to experience). However, who is is insane that will say that a thing's antecedent non-existence is existent simultaneously with that there but
(thing)
itself?
Indeed, this
which
is
is
the natural condition of the perception that it has the power of appre-
born of the senses
hending the thing which +f.
Vide
supi\i p, 49,
is
existent simultaneously with
Adhik.
/.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
Sftl. /.]
but such
69
not also (the condition) of all kinds of knowledge and of all means of true knowledge ; because in the case of memory, inference, revelation, yogic** peritself,
ception,
is
and the
like,
it
observed that there
is
is
the
apprehension of the thing, the existence of which belongs to a time different (from that of their own existence).
Hence
no instrument of knowledge
also,
from what
is
to be discerned
by
it.
is
ever dissociated
The
relation of
an
instrument of knowledge, to the thing that is to be discerned by it, does not consist in the absence of the dissociaof that (instrument of knowledge) from the thing which exists at the same time with itself; but, on the tion
other hand, (such relation) consists in the negation of the unreality of that particular form of any particular thing which is discerned in association with any particular time, place,
and other such (determining) conditions.
Thus the
memory does not deal with external objects, because even when the external object (to which it refers)
position that
has disappeared,
memory
is
seen to continue,
this is also
set at naught.
The antecedent non-existmade out by perception because such (non-existence) does not exist. Nor is such (non-existence) made out by the other means of proof, It
may, however, be
ence of consciousness
is
said
:
not at
all
}
because (in relation to it) the basis of logical inference and the other limbs of syllogistic reasoning are absent. 46.
This
the perception which
is
peculiarly belongs to the Yogin, who,
by withdrawing the mind into itself and concentrating it on its own con-
to the conception in the
who
practises
that
those conceptions in the form of di-
means
The
results in Yoga
said to correspond
is
realisation that
mind
Yctdri'sl
of
him
bhiivanti
yatra s'ddhirbhavati tadri'si. There is, however, an opinion which maintains
ceptions, has succeeded in actualising
rect perceptions.
it.
Yogic
perception
of knowledge,
to realisations
otherwise.
is .a
separate
and gives
rise
which arc not possible
SRi-BHlSHYA.
7o
Indeed,there
is
to be found here
no such
Part. I.
I.
[Chap.
basis of inference as
antecedent non-existence invariably associated with the is not at all seen to deal also of consciousness. Revelation
is
with
it (/. c.
with such antecedent- non-existence). Hence,
the antecedent non-existence (of consciousness) cannot be is really no means of proving it. proved, because there the peculiar thus it is To If, abandoning :
replied
this,
nature (of consciousness), you support of the self-evident the means to prove that (nonrely upon the absence of then it would be well for you to stop the existence),
mind that that (same
discussion, bearing in
tence)
is
established
non-exist-
by the negative proof of non-cognition
relating to a necessarily associated thing.
Moreover, perceptual knowledge, which during the time that it exists, proves (the existence of) its objects, such as of their jars &c., is not seen to give rise to the knowledge times. Therefore, the existence of jars and such other objects during periods antecedent and subse-
existence at
all
quent (to their perception),
is
not
out (by means seen to be due to
made
of perception). Such non-cognition perceptual consciousness being conditioned is
by time.
If per-
ceptual consciousness, which has jars, &c., for its objects, is itself made out to be unconditioned by time, then, the objects of (that) consciousness, such as jars, &c., would also
appear to be unconditioned by time, and so would be eternal. If (this) consciousness which is self-evident be eternal, it should of so
made
itself
out.
appear to be so eternal.
Similarly,
if
But
it
the inferential and the
cognising states of consciousness are
made
is
not
other
out to be un-
by time, then they would make their objects also appear unconditioned by time ; and so all such objects would become eternal for every object has a nature which
conditioned
;
correspond^
to
the state of consciousness (that represents
Adhik.
L
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sut. /.]
71
Again, there is no objectless consciousness, in as much as such a thing is unknown. Indeed,the self-luminous nature it).
of consciousness has been demonstrated solely by means of the fact that perception brings external objects to the light of consciousness.
If consciousness
have not the power
of bringing external objects to light, there would result to it the absence of self-luminousness ; in consequence of this (absence of self-luminousness),
and
also in consequence
of the fact that experience is incapable of being experienced by any other experience, consciousness itself would become
mere nothing.
a
Further,
it
should not be stated that during sleep, 47
conditions of intoxication, swoons, &c., totally
absolute consciousness alone shines forth
;
objectless,
because such a
statement would be invalidated by the negative proof of non-cognition relating to a necessarily associated thing. If during these states also, experience is experienced, then, at the time of waking, there will have to be
no such
its
recollection.
But
thing. may, however, be said that it is not commonly seen that an object which has been experiencand therefore, how can the ed, is, as a rule, remembered
there
is
It
;
absence of recollection prove the non-existence of the (corresponding) experience ? It is stated (in reply to this) that, provided there are no such powerful causes as the dissolu:
tion of the body, &c.,
impressions,
which remove
uniform
then
all
innate mental
non-remembrance
establishes
only the non-existence of experience. Surely, the nonexistence of experience is not proved solely through the uniform absence of any remembrance thereof because it ;
is
ise
one
who
has just risen from sleep to realof introspective observation alone that all the by means
possible for
4".
Vide
an/n-a pp. 52
&
5?.
SRI-BHISHYA.
72
while he did not
know
sible to
even when
say that,
is
I.
Part.
I.
not posuniform the experience exists, due either to want of associa-
anything.
non-remembrance thereof
[Chap.
Moreover,
it is
tion with objects or to the destruction of the principle of egoity; because, the non-experience of some one thing (such as a jar) and the non-existence of another thing Csuch as a cloth;
do not constitute the causes of the non-remembrance
of some other experienced object (such as a wall). It will be explained presently that, in those states also
(namely, sleep, intoxication, swoon, &c), the idea of the ego continues to persist. It has, indeed, been stated already that, during sleep
and other similar
states, it is possible to
have such experience as is definite and relates to particular What has been so stated is really true. Indeed, objects. that (experience) is self-experience. And it will be established further on that that (self-experience) is definite
and
relates to particular objects. But, here, only such consci-
ousness as denied.
is
If
altogether objectless, and mere consciousness alone
not
is
because
so, experience, (we say) ed hereafter that it (viz. consciousness) it is
without a
is it
said to will
basis, is
be
self-
be explain-
is
dependent upon (some thing else as) its basis. Hence it cannot be said that, because experience, while it exists, does not establish its antecedent non-existence, (such) antecedent non-existence
is In explaining the possiblity of experidisproved. ence being experienced, its incapability to be proved otherwise (than by itself) has also been negatived. Therefore, the
non-origination of consciousness merely on the ground that there is no proof of antecedent non-existence and other nonexistences in relation to
What
48.
that is not supported by logic. has been stated 48 already to the effect that, on
Vide snbra
p.
50.
it
Adhik.
SRI-BHASHYA.
I. Sfit. /.]
73
account of there being no origination of consciousness, other modifications are also negatived in relation to it, that also unreasonable because such reasoning is too wide and
is
;
inconclusive, holding
In
existence also.
good
fact,
of antecedent non-
in the case
although
it
has no origination,
it
seen to be capable of destruction. If, (for the purpose of meeting this difficulty), this (proposition) is qualified is
by saying
it
(that
holds true only) in the case of entities^
then, indeed, (your) skilfulness in logical reasoning
becomes
quite manifest. Thus, for instance, the avidyd (or ignorance),
accepted by you, is mi-originated ; and it is, nevertheless, the seat of a variety of modifications, and is also put an end to after the origination of true knowledge. If
which
is
you say that
all
modifications are
its
unreal,
then,
is
there, according to you, any modification which has the nature of reality, so that this qualification (thus limiting
the scope of the proposition mentioned above) may become significant ? But this (kind of modification that has the nature of reality) is surely not acknowledged by you. 49 stated to the effect that Again, what has been already
experience does not admit of any differentiation in regard that 'also is unitself, on account of its being unborn, founded because the self which is undoubtedly unborn is to
:
seen to be differentiated from the body, the organs of sense,
and other such things
;
and
to be accepted that the self
also because is
different
it
has necessarily
from the admitted-
If you say that ly beginningless avidya (or ignorance). this differentiation is itself of the nature of unreality, (we ask), did you anywhere observe any differentiation which
has the nature of reality and of origination
49.
Vide supra
?
Indeed,
p. 50.
10
if
the necessary concomitant ignorance be not in reality is
SRI-BHASHYA.
74 distinct itself
from the
self,
may become
the
[Chap.
I.
Part. /
then, as a matter of fact, ignorance
In maintaining the distinctions objects as are realised in unstulti-
self.
between such perceivable
fied perceptions, the distinction between the perceptions themselves is established ; in the same way in which the
distinction
cutting
(is
between the various kinds of the process of between established) by means of the distinction
the things cut (accordingly). 30 already made to the effect Moreover, the statements is which altogether of the nature of conthat consciousness, is itself sciousness, can have no qualifying attribute that
capable of being objectively perceived by consciousness,and that such (attributes) cannot qualify consciousness merely
because they are objectively perceivable, both these also are not absolutely conclusive, because, in relation to it (viz. self-luconsciousness), there are the attributes of eternity, minousness, &c., which are well established by the authori-
knowledge, and are also admitted by yourselves (our opponents). Neither do these (attributes) constitute pure consciousness, because they are in their essential
tative criteria of
nature distinct (from consciousness). Indeed, consciousness is that which, solely by means of its own existence, makes intelligible to that
sists in
its own foundation, Self-luminousness con-
which constitutes
any external object whatsoever.
being luminous, in consequence of a thing's own exwhich constitutes that thing's own found-
istence, to that
ation
;
luminosity (or intelligibility)
common
to
all intelligent
and makes them
is
that (quality) which
and non-intelligent things
is
alike,
to be practically realised; eternity is, inexistence deed, through all time; unity is limitation by the
number one
50.
;
Vide supra
fit
&c., &c.
p. 50.
Even when these
(qualifying attri-
Adhik
SRI-BHASHYA.
1. Sut. i.]
75
butes) constitute the negation of non-intelligence and other such things (as have to be excluded from consciousness), then, even as such, they form the qualifying attributes of consciousness this reasoning
much
;
it
therefore,
is
inevitable that
becomes too wide (and inconclusive)
as
in
as they, nevertheless, continue to be the attributes of
consciousness.
for the reason that consciousness
If,
is
op-
posed to non-intelligence, and other such qualities, (merely) on account of their being different from its own essential nature, neither a negative nor a positive qualification can
be admitted in relation to severally negating those
nothing at
all. is
Then, provable,
consciousness provable (as existent) or not
(proof)
is,
and to what
it refers.
one, and be not in regard to is
no
If
some
it
do not belong to any
thing, then that (proof)
proof. Indeed, proving, like son-ship, belongs to
one and
is
in relation to
some thing
(the proving) belongs to the
that self
If you say that the has to be asked whose that
objects.
itself is consciousness, it
proof
is.
Was
it
(or person). If self,
not stated by you that
consciousness itself
wrong
If
'
and other (imaginary)
flower'
?
must be characterised as being possessed of attrinot, it becomes a mere nothing like the sky-
it
If
butes.
then, the (various) statements ("qualities) will have to import
it,
statement.
?
(we ask) it (viz.
it
some
be said
who
this
the self)
is
Yes, it was so stated ; only, it is a can be made out thus. How can
And this
that consciousness, which, by reason of its making a number of objects intelligible to a person, is related to those (objects)
and to that (person), experience that
What
is
said
is
the self?
that which, solely by existence, possesses the quality of making
this
means of its oWn
it is itself
:
Experience
is
a thing fit to be realized in relation to what constitutes the basis of that (experience) itself; it has other names, such as
.SRI-BHASHYA.
76
[Chap.
1.
Part.
1.
consciousness knowledge (jiland), comprehension (avagati*), like it always relates to an object and is the and (samvid), attribute of the experiencing self and again it a ;
:
particular
is
well
known
to
all
as possessing the qualification of being 'I know self, as when (one says),
witnessed by the ' a jar,' I understand this thing,' I am conscious of a cloth/ &c. Indeed, it is on account of its possessing this aforesaid '
in relation nature, that self-luminousness has been postulated This (experience) which relates to an to it even
by you.
object and
is
a particular attribute of the subject (of the
the quality of itself predication of knowing), cannot possess as (it being the subject (of any predication), quite as much
cannot possess) the quality of being the object (thereof). Accordingly, the ,permanent character of this subject (of the predication of knowing) is directly ascertained ; and origination, existence, and destruction, in relation to that attribute
which belongs to
this subject
and
is
ousness, are also ascertained to be true, in the
which they
called consci-
same way
in
are (so ascertained) in the case of pleasure, pain,
&c. The permanent character of this subject (of the prediis indeed established by that kind of per-
cation of knowing,)
ception which leads to the recognition of identity, as (when one says), "This is that very thing which was formerly experienced by me." Origination and other such things are also '
by the cognitions I know/ I. had known/ 'The knowledge which I, the knowestablished in regard to consciousness, '
er,
had,
self) ?
after
is
now
lost';
and where then
If consciousness,
which
moment, be admitted
is
is its
oneness (with the
thus destructible
to be the
self,
then
it
moment becomes
impossible indeed, to have the recognitive cognition "I saw (again) on the next day that (same thing) which was seen on
the previous day." Surely, there nitive cognition
is
no possibility of the recog-
by one person of any thing experienced by
Adhik.
I.
SRI-BHASHYA.
Sftt. /.]
77
another person. Again, when experience is admitted to be the self, and eternity too is predicated of it, then also there will similarly arise the absence of the cognition leading to recognition. Indeed, the cognition which leads to recogni' tion, as for instance (when one feels), I myself experienced
that establishes the experiencing sub-
this formerly also,'
ject to continue unchanged in antecedent
and subsequent
intervals of time, but 'does not prove pure unconditioned
experience. Surely, you also do not accept that experience is the same as the subject who experiences ; experience is merely experience (to you). It has already been stated (by us)
that that unfounded or objectless something which is called consciousness cannot exist, because there is absolutely no
knowledge (of such a thing). Thus the view, that that same consciousness, which is indeed admitted by both of us, is the self itself, is contradicted by and all the cognition ;
specious arguments, which were intended to demonstrate that such pure experience alone is the highest reality, have also
been thus completely refuted. It may however be said again thus:
of the ego to be found in the cognition 'I that which, (not being objective), is not
the word
'this,'
and which
is
In the idea
know
(this),'
denoted by
homogeneous luminosity and
that is the the thing denoted by self; now, the idea of the ego, resulting from the cogni' tion I know/ acquires, by reason of its being made luminous in that (intelligence) through the strength of that (inchit (or intelligence),
is
telligence), the characteristics of the thing 'thou'
and
(or of the
therefore, other than pure intelligence, non-ego) and means certainly the thing 'thou' (or the non-ego). It is not (right to say) so simply because, (in such a case), that ;
it is,
;
perceptual knowledge, in which, as when one says 'I know (a thing)/ there is (between the knowing and the knower)
SRI-BHASHYA.
78
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
the relation of an attribute to the possessor thereof, -that would itself be (thereby) contradicted. Moreover, " If the
T (or the ego)
not the self,there will be no subjectivity to the self. For, the subjective thing is distinguished from the objective thing by means of the idea of the ego. In-
thing
deed, he
is
who is desirous of final release Retakes to
ing' &c., (of the scriptures),
himself become devoid of
the 'hear-
with the intention that he
may
misery, the enjoyer of infinite If free. one holds that final release consists in bliss,and any the destruction of the thing (or of one's own personality), all
T
then such an one will surely get away from even the merest scent of the discussion bearing upon the topic of final release.
Xo one,who believes that,even after he
ceases to exist,there
some kind of consciousness which
other than himself,
is
will ever
is
make any attempt to attain
that (kind of consciousonly by being associated
It is ness as his goal after death) with the self, that this (consciousness) has
has
its
its
own existence,
own
character as consciousness, and its other qualifiWhen this association with the self is severed,
cations.
consciousness itself ceases to exist; in the same in the absence of the cutter
way in which,
and the object to be
cut, there
can be no cutting or any other such process. Hence it is ' settled that the thing I,' which is also the knower, is the
The scripture also says 'My dear one, by self. means of what is one to know the knower?' [Brih. Up. IV. /;///// also says 'Whoever knows this (bod}'), 5. 15.]. The him they call the kshctrajila.' [B. G. XIII. 2.]. The Sutra-kdra also says the same thing opening it with the The individual self is not (produced) as aphorisms there are no scriptural statements to that effect' \Ved. Srit. II. 3. 18.], and For that very reason, (the individual
subjective
'
'
sell) is
the knower.'
decided that the
self
[Ved. Silt. II. 3. 19.]. Therefore it is not pure and unqualified conscious.
is
Adhik.
SRI-BHASHYA.
Sal. /.]
I.
'
'
Indeed, the thing I notion of the ego the thing ness."
'
;
notion of the non-ego.
who
is
realised
when
of
is
79
itself established
thou
'
is
by the
the content of the
being so, to say that the knower, one says I know,' is the non-ego, is, It
'
moreover, a contradiction in terms, very statement My mother is barren.'
much
like
the
'
Again, this knower, the thing
'
I,'
has not
its
luminos-
else, because possesses Indeed, to be self-luminous is to possess the character of intelligence. Whatever, like the flame of
ity
it
dependent upon anything
self-luminousness.
a lamp, possesses the character of luminosity, that possesses its own light independently of anything else. For, surely,
the flame of a lamp and such other self-luminous things, seeing that they are made to shine out by means of the
power of their own
light,
can not possess nqn-lurnjnousness,
nor (can they possess) the character of having their luminWhat then are osity dependent upon anviliing else. ?
they
The flame
certainly shine by
of a lamp has the nature of light, and itself, and also makes other objects
shines of
means of
What
is
said
is
its
this
:
own radiance. One and the same
substance tejas
(or the material element of light and heat) exists, for instance, in the form of luminosity as well as in the form of that
which
is luminous. Though luminosity forms an attribute of the thing which is luminous, nevertheless, it is the substance tejas, and nothing else. It is not a quality like
whiteness, &c., because (unlike them) it can exist elsewhere what constitutes its basis, and because also it
also than in
itself the possessor of colour. As it is of a different nature from whiteness and other such qualities, and possess-
is
es the quality of luminosity,
it is
undoubtedly the substance
and nothing else. If a thing brings to light its own nature as well as other things, it is thereby said to possess
tejas
SRJ-BHASHYA.
8o
And
luminosity.
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
the practical realisation of this (luminosity)
as a quality necessarily results from its invariably having that (substance lejas) for its basis, and also from its forming a dependent constituent thereof. It is not that the compo-
nent parts of
of the substance tejas), becoming scattered and getting into motion, are spoken of as light; for, (under such a supposition), there would be the destrucits
tion of gems,
basis
(/.
e.
of the sun, and of
other
such luminous
bodies (through their mere shining). And in the case of the flame of a lamp also, there would at no time be the
perception of an united whole. Indeed, it is not possible say that lamp-flames, whose component parts have
to
the nature of becoming scattered, do invariably get collected together into a whole only to the extent of four
and then spread about, at the same time the same form, horizontally and upwards and down-
inches, rise up,
and
in
wards.
Hence,
possess
moment
produced and
are
luminosity because there
;
ed convergence of
and because they
ascertained, that lamp-flames
is
it
(/. e.
is,
every
(for their production), the order-
sufficient causes (such as wicks, oil, &c.,),
also,
on the destruction
of those (causes),
the flames) are themselves destroyed. That light
acquires greater brilliance, greater
own
destroyed
which
source,
is
warmth, &c., near
capable of being proved
same way
by
its
direct perception,
which, heat &c., are (seen to be greater in intensity) near fire, &c. In this same manner, the self, which is wholly of the nature of intelligence, is (also) characin the
terised
by the
in
attribute of intelligence.
Indeed, to possess the character
be self-luminous.
To
of intelligence is to that effect are the following and " Just as a solid lump of salt has
other scriptural texts neither inside, nor outside, and :
mass of taste, so also,
my
is
altogether one whole
dear one, he, this
self,
who
has
Adhik.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
I. .Sut. /.]
neither inside nor outside,
knowledge, and
is
Up. IV.
5.
\Brih.
81
altogether one whole mass of altogether made up of intelligence."
13.]:
is
"Here,
this
purusha becomes
&
14.]: "There is no [Brih. Up. IV. 3.9 of the of the knower." disappearance knowledge [Brih. " Then whoever feels 'I smell this', that Up. IV. 3. 30.]
self-luminous."
:
the
is
He
self."
Up. VIII.
\Qh1idnd.
12. 4.]:
"Who
is
the self?
that person who is luminous in the proximity of the prdnas and the heart, and wholly consists of knowledge." is
\Brih. Up. IV. 3. 7.] "He is, indeed, the s'eer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the thinker, the knower, the doer, and is :
the person who " means of
is
made up of intelligence."
[Pr. Up. IV.
9.]
:
what, my dear one, is one to know the By knower." [Brih. Up. IV. 5. 15.]: " This person (/. e. purusha) " Whoever sees (that One) sees not ? ] surely knows." [ :
death, nor disease, nor the state of sorrow." [Qt/iand. Up. VII. 26. 2.] "He is the Highest Person..; he (in His presence) :
does not mind this body which has had birth." [CJihdnd. " In sixteen all these VIII. 12. this same manner, 3.]: Up.
which belong to the seer and are dependent on the Purusha, meet their end after attaining the Purusha." [Pr. Up. VI. 5.]: "Different from this which consists of '
kalas*
mind
,
the inner self which consists of understanding." [Taitt.Up. II. 4. i.]. And the Sutra-kdra also says in the is
sequel-"For that very reason,' (the Sut. II. 3.
1
indeed the knower always,
is
51.
Vide Pr.
(1)
The
principal
(2) Faith,
God
Up,
VI.
4.
where
enumerated as follows:
these are
i.
e.
vital
air
Prdtta,
belief in the reality of
(Sraddha) (3) Ether, (4) Air,
(5)
Light,
(8)
Mind, '1(9)
self) is
8.]. Therefore, this self,
(6)
Water,
The II
ten
(7) Earth, fnth-iyas,
it is
the knower."
which
is
[
Ved.
self-luminous,
not mere luniinousness. Food, (11) Strength
(10)
and
of
body and
of the senses, (12) Austerities
penance,
hymns rificial
Tapas
(13)
or Mantras (14)
The sacred Works (sac-
and other) (15) Sivarga and
other such results of works
names
of Sivarga &c.
(i6J The
SRI-BHISHYA.
82
I.
[Chap.
Part.
I.
Luminosity, as in the case of the luminosity of lampflames and other similar objects, must necessarily belong to something, simply because it possesses the character of lumTherefore, consciousness in itself is not capable of becoming the self. Moreover, those that know the power inosity.
and import of words say that the words samvid (consciousness), anubhfiti (experience), jUana (knowledge), &c., are words implying relation. It is not seen either in ordinary language or in the scripture that the verbs to know, &c., all used without an object or without a subject.
are at
What
has been stated 3 2 to the effect that consciousness
possesses the quality of intelligence, in regard to that (statement), this has to be asked, namely, what it is that is meant by intelligence. If it be itself is
the
because
self,
it
the possession of that luminosity which is due to the mere fact of a thing's own existence, then, in replied that
it is
that case, such an explanation, being also applicable to the flame of a lamp, is too wide. If, as apart from consciousness,
of luminosity is not granted at all, there will then result the fallacies of inconclusiveness and contradicthis quality
tion. 53
Moreover, (the definition that intelligence means) the possession of that kind of existence which is invariably associated with luminosity (or
intelligibility),
that
has been already declared to be invalid, because it is too wide, being applicable also to the case of pleasures, &c. If it be said that pleasures and other such feelings, although in52.
53.
Vide supra pp. 50
&
cause,
51.
Inconclusiveness results,
cause, without
be-
knowing luminosity, as
apart from consciousness, any definition
of consciousness
idea of luminosity
is
in
which the
involved,
necessarily prove meaningless
must
and
in-
conclusive. Contradiction results, be-
toadmit
not
luminosity
apart from .consciousness, which itself
defined by
luminosity,
is
means
the
characteristic
is
of the idea of
same
that that luminosity
as
is
as
to admit
a peculiarly
attribute of the
con-
sciousness which has been taken to be attributeless.
.
Adflik.
L
Sut. I.]
SRl-BHlSHYA.
83
variably associated with luminosity, are like jars and other objects, made luminous (or intelligible) to a thing other
than themselves, and are, in consequence, non-intelligent, and thereby constitute the non-self (it is asked in return) ;
(
then, luminous to itself
Is intelligence,
It also
?'
luminous to another thing, the knower, which in the cognition 'I know'; in the same way is
happiness
luminous to a thing other than
is
is
always
the ego
which
(in
itself)
in the
am
Hence, the intelligence which cognition happy.' has the character of self-luminousness is not proved to '
I
exist in relation to consciousness. '
gent thing
I
',
own
fact of its
which
is
existence,
proved
Therefore that to
that alone
itself is
by
the
intelli-
the mere
self (or
the
atman}.
The luminosity of consciousness also
is
dependent upon
association with that (self).
Indeed, analogously to the case of pleasures and other such feelings, the intelligibility of consciousness to the self, which constitutes its its
own
and
basis,
the
self),
the
self.)
itself,
its
un-intelligibility to
other things (than
are (both) wholly due to that (association with
but
is
Therefore, the self is not pure consciousness undoubtedly the ego, the knower.
3 4 to the effect that, because Again, what has been urged no illusion is possible without a basis (for it to be imposed
upon), experience, which else less
and
is
is,
in truth,
unfounded
in
any thing
objectless, constitutes the reality, but, neverthe-
becomes manifest, through
as the
is
illusion, as
the
knower
;
just
made
out, (through illusion), mother-of-pearl to possess the characteristics of silver; this (view also) is If it were correct, then, the experiencing subincorrect. ject,
54.
namely, the ego, would; Vide supra
p. 51,
in
consequence of
its
being
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
4
equivalent to experience
(itself),
am
in the
(myself) experience';
[Chap.
L
Part.
'
appear in the form
same way
in
which
L I
silver
made out to be (illusorily perceived) things are which are placsubstances than the lustrous other nothing this same ed in front of us. But, here, experience, which is and other
separately cognised, qualifies some thing else, namely, the ego, just as a stick qualifies (or characterises) DevadatIt is indeed thus that there ta (when he is holding it.) itself
I experience.' Such being the case, I experience,' while showing the can the cognition ego to be qualified by experience, be declared to relate
arises the
'
cognition,
how
'
entirely to this
one
as
if
is
the
qualifying attribute,
may
the
that
say
namely,
cognition
experience,
'Devadatta
'
stick
of
possessor
a
stick
relates
merely
to
the
?
What
has been further stated 53 to the effect that the
being the knower is seen to come out only him who, thinking that he is stout and so on, mistakes the body for the self, and that this (knowership) is (self s) quality of
in relation
to
therefore unreal,
would then
this (also)
is
incorrect
;
because there
result unreality to experience also,
much only by him who
maintained by you to be the
self, in as
which
is
as (such
experience also) is cognisable possesses that (mistaken notion of the body being the self.) If it be said that there is no unreality in relation to experience, in as
much
as
truth
which
stultifies all
not contradicted by that knowledge of other things (than truth), then, in
it is
knower self's) quality of being the not also unreal, on account of the absence of that same
that case, certainly (the is
stultification.
Then again 55.
it
Vide supra pp. 51
has been said thus
&
52.
:
It is
not possible
Adhik.
L
SRI-BHASHYA.
Sut. /.]
85
to postulate, in the case of the self which does not admit
of modifications, the quality of being the knower, which the same as being the subject of the predication of know-
is
Thus, this quality of being the knower, which is of the nature of a modification and is non-intelligent, rests ing.
knot of the material principle of egoity which is capable of modifications and is itself a modification of in the
Hence, knowership does not be-
prakriti (i. e. nature). long to the self, but
belongs to this material principle of egoity, which constitutes an internal organ. Indeed, the quality of being the subject of predications and other such are
qualities,
colour and
all
attributes of perceivable objects, just as
If the such qualities are. quality of being the subject of predications and the quality of being denoted by the idea of the ego are (both) admitted in relation to the self, then, as in the case of the
body, so
other
also, in
the case of the
self,
there would result
objectivity, non-intelligence, &c. this material principle of because, ; an internal which constitutes organ (of the body), egoity is, like the body, possessed of non-selfhood, the character (to
it)
All this
non-selfhood, is
not right
of being a modification of the prakriti, perceivability, objectivity, the character of being utilised by other things than itself, and other similar characteristics; and because
the quality of being the knower has the peculiar character of belonging always to an intelligent thing. What is said is this Just as the body and other simialso,
:
lar
are,
objects
jectivity,
whatever
by means of
and other such is
their
perceivability,
characteristics, distinguished
characterised
ob-
from
by the opposites of these
(characthe quality of being the perceiver, subjectivity, and the like so also, the principle of egoity which is ot teristics), viz.
;
the nature of an internal organ, being
made up
of the same
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
86
substance (as the body),
is
\Chap.
1.
Part. I.
by those very cha-
distinguished
(of perceivability, &c.,) from that (which is by the other attributes of being the perceiver,
racteristics
characterised
Hence, the quality of being the knower does not,
&c).
the quality of being consciousness, belong to this principle of egoity, for the mere reason that, (if it did), there like
would thereby be the contradiction of its own nature. as the quality of being consciousness
which
Just
not admissible in re-
is
the object of that (consciousness), so also the quality of being the knower can not be admitted in relation to what constitutes the oblation to the principle of egoity,
ject of
(knowledge)
is
itself.
Moreover, the quality of being the knower is not of The quality of being the the nature of a modification. knower is, indeed, the same as the quality of being the seat of the attribute of intelligence
;
and
intelligence, being
the natural attribute of this eternal thing (itself)
And he
eternal.
(the Sutrakara)
(viz.
the
self), is
speaks of the
eternity of the self in the following aphorism and in others, "The self is not (a produced thing), as there are no scriptural statements to that effect."
"
the aphorism
[Ved.
Siit. II. 3. 18.].
For that very reason, (the
self)
is
In
the
knower." [Ved. Sut. II. 3. 19.], by mentoning the (self to be) knower he declares that it is natural for the self to be the seat of intelligence.
thing
wrong
It
has been stated that there
in the (self),
intelligence, being (at the
just as (there
is
which
is
itself
same time) the
nothing wrong)
objects, (although they are
in
made up
is
no-
of the nature of
seat of intelligence;
gems and other
simlar
of the material element
of heat and light), being themselves the seat of luminosity. will establish farther on that intelligence, which of itself
We is
unconditioned,
Hence,
in
is
capable of contraction and expansion. knower of the body (/. c. as the
the state of the
Adhik.
I.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sut. /.]
embodied individual
self),
it
exists,
87
owing to
its
past ac-
a contracted condition, (the contrac(or karmas), tion thereof) varying in degree in accordance with the
tions
in
nature of those particular actions ; and that (state of contraction or expansion) is regulated by means of the senses.
The statement about
intelligence)
is
the rising and the setting (of
made, having regard to
this aforesaid pass-
age of intelligence through the door- way of the senses. In the matter of this movement of the intelligence, there certquality of being an agent
ainly results (to the self) the
;
not natural (to it), being due to its karmas (or past actions); and so the self has undoubtedly an immodifiable nature. Knowership, which is of this aforebut that quality
is
said nature, belongs only to the self, whose essential character is intelligence ; and consequently, this knowership cannot possibly belong, at any time, to the non-intelli-
gent principle of egoity If,
egoity,
however,
whose
it
(/. c.
ahaftkard).
be said that,
1
in regard to this principle of
essential nature
is
non-intelligence, there
is
the possibility of (its acquiring) the quality of knowership, on account of its proximity to intelligence and the conse-
quent reflection (of return
what
is
qualities)
this reflection
therefrom, it is asked in of intelligence ? Does the
reflection of the principle of egoity fall or,
does the reflection of consciousness
upon consciousness, fall
upon the
princi-
It (viz. the reflection of the principle ple of egoity ? of egoity) does not fall upon consciousness, because knowerIt (viz. ship is not admissible in regard to consciousness.
the
reflection
of consciousness) does not
principle of egoity, because
it is
fall
upon the
impossible for that (princi-
ple of egoity), which is admittedly non-intelligent, ever to possess the quality of knowership, and because also both
(consciousness and the principle of egoity) are not capable
SRI-BHISHYA.
88
[Chap. I Part.
I.
of being perceived by the organ of sight. And surely, no reflection is seen to take place in relation to invisible objects.
Then again, it may be urged that the quality of being knower results from contact with intelligence, in the same way in which the heat in a lump of iron results from contact with fire. It cannot be so here, however be-
the
;
cause knowership is not admitted to be an intrinsic quality of consciousness; for that same reason, this quality of knowership cannot, from contact with it, result to the principle of egoity, nor can it be apprehended (in relation to that Since knowership cannot at all be prediprinciple). cated of the principle of egoity which is non-intelligent, there cannot, through contact with it, result to consciousness the quality of being the knower, nor can there arise
the apprehension of that (quality of being knower) in relation to consciousness. (thus)
What them
the
has been further stated 56 to the effect that both
consciousness and the material principle of egoity), do not, in reality, possess the quality of knowership, but that this material principle of egoity is the
of
(viz.
revealer of experience, and consequently reveals that experience as though it were within itself, in the way in
which mirrors and other such revealers do; not right priately
;
this (also)
is
dtman cannot approby the non-intelligent
because, the self-luminous
be held to be
revealed
principle of egoity.
This has been declared thus: "It does not stand to reason that the principle of egoity, whose nature consists in non-intelligent materiality, reveals the
dtman which does
56.
not
is
self-luminous, in the
stand to reason
Vide supra pp. 52
-
&
53.
to
same way
in
which
(it
hold that) a dead ember
Adhik.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
Snt. /.]
I.
89
37
Indeed, all things have their cognisability dependent upon self-luminous experience. It being so, those, who know the self, ridicule the idea that
(reveals)
the
sun."
\_A.
S.].
the non-intelligent principle of egoity, the luminosity of which is dependent on that (experience), reveals that same experience, the luminosity of which
(on the contrary), neither producible nor destructible, and itself forms the
means by which there
is
is,
Moreover, since things are cognised. between the nature of the material incompatibility all
principle of egoity and (the nature) of experience, and since also there will result to experience, (when it hap-
pens to be a thing revealed by ahafikdrd), the character of being no experience at all, there cannot be the relation of the revealer
and the revealed (between them).
The relation of the revealer and the revealed (between any two things) is mutually exchangeable, and cannot exist when there is any incompatThis has been stated thus
:
-"
nature (between them). If the self be capable of being revealed, it would, like a jar, (for instance), acquire, in consequence, the character of being no experience at ibility in
all."
[A. 5.]
not very appropriate (to hold), in regard to consciousness, that it is revealed by the principle of egoity, which is itself revealed by consciousness, just as a beam Again,
it is
of the sun's rays is revealed by the palm of the hand, which is itself revealed by that (very beam of rays); because, in this instance itself, there is really no revelation of the beam of the sun's rays by means of the palm of the hand. Surely, on account of their progress being obstructed by the palm of 57.
This stanza
occurs
in
the
.3/w*a
Ramanuja.
12
Much
of
Ra-
manuja's reasonings in ihe karana are based upon the writings of Yamunacharya, as it may be made out from a
study of his Siddhitraya*
SRI--BHASHYA.
QO
1.
\Chap.
become increased (through
the hand, the rays
Par 1.
1.
reflection
and scattering) and are themselves very clearly perceived; thus the palm of the hand cannot possess the character of a revealer (of the sun's rays), in as
much
them (thus). of what nature is that
as
it
simply
serves to increase
Yet again,
revelation
which
is
by the principle of egoity in relation to this self (or the atmwi), the essential nature of which is the same as effected
that of consciousness
cause
it
(viz.
It
?
the dtmmi)
is
is
not, surely, origination, be-
self-established,
and
con-
it is in
sequence impossible for it to be originated by any thing Xor does it (viz. such revelation) consist in making else. that
(self) intelligible,
same
as experience)
because
is
it (viz.
the self which
is
the
incapable of being experienced by
any other experience. And for this same reason there can be nothing that is of use as a means for experiencing that (self). It (viz. this sort of instrumental utility of a thing) is indeed of two kinds.
It consists either
in
serving as the
means which brings the object of knowledge
into relation
with the perceiving senses in the matter of the just as apprehension of generic qualities, one's own face, and such ;
the individual, the mirror, and such other things (respectively) form the means of bringing (those generic qualities, that face, and those other things) into relaother things
tion with the senses.
Or,
it
(viz.
consists in serving the purpose
found
in
one
who
is
desirous of acquiring
as tranquillity, self-restraint, (in the
such instrumental utility) of removing the impurity
knowledge and such other things ;
just are^
of removing the impurities of him who is desirous of true knowledge.auxiliary) to the science which is the means of knowing the supreme It is therefore de-
way
reality.
clared accordingly -"As it (viz. the ego) is not within the province of the senses, nothing can serve as the means :
L
Adhik.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
Sut. /.]
of bringing
it
91
into relation with them." 38
Moreover, even
if it
be allowed that experience
is
cap-
able of being experienced, it is not proper to say that the ego is useful as a means for experiencing that (experience).
Indeed, it (viz. such instrumental utility thereof) may consist in the removal of any obstruction to the origination of the experience which is thus capable of being experienced in the same way in which lamp-flames and other luminous ;
things serve, in relation to the organ of sight, as instruments for the
removal of the deep darkness which
is
an obstruc-
of the perception of colour and other qualities. But here (/'. e. in the case of experience or consciousness) there is no such removable obstruction. Surely, in the consciousness which is the same as the altion to the origination
man, there is not anything to be found which, while being an obstruction to the origination of the knowledge of that capable of being removed by the material If it be said that there is (the principle of egoity. obstruction offered by) ignorance (which has to be removis
(atman),
not right to entertain such an opinion, for the reason that it is not admissible to hold that ignorance (or avidyd) can be removed by the material it
ed),
replied that
is
principle of egoity
ignorance
58.
Only
is
the
first
half of the sioka
"
As
And
translated, it
(viz.
quoted above,
is
but the other half also
\vhen
Indeed, what removes
(or ahatlkara).
not anything other than knowledge. Moreover,
from the Htmasiddhi
the context.
is
it
pertinent to
is
the whole sloka,
thus
runs
the ego)
is
:
not within
the province of the senses,
nothing
ran serve as the means of bringing into relation \\ilh them.
The ego
it
is it-
self
the
knovver
and
therefore
this
(knower) cannot be purified by that (ego) itself." It is, in accordance with
Yamunacharya so Ramanuja argues out
this opinion of
ex-
pressed, that
the
impossibility of
anything proving a
helpful instrument, in
two
ways
either
mentioned above,
of the in
the
mailer of the realisation of the a/man.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
92
[Chap.
L
Part.
1.
not possible for ignorance to have consciousness for its basis for itself as basis, because it would then have the same knowledge has, and because also its objects would then be it is
the same as those of that (knowledge). Ignorance cannot exist in the witness who is pure unqualified consciousness,
and
is
free
from the condition of being the knower as well
as that of being the object (of knowledge).
Just as jars
and other similar objects cannot form the seat of ignorance, because they are not, even in the least, the seat of knowledge, so also pure unqualified consciousness cannot be the seat of ignorance, for the reason that it too is not the
Even if consciousness be taken to seat of knowledge. be the seat of ignorance, that same (consciousness), which is
(also)
cannot form the object of therefore the cessation of the ignorance which
taken to be the
knowledge
;
self,
cannot be brought about by means of knowledge. Knowledge, indeed, removes
is
found
in it (viz. in this consciousness)
always the ignorance which relates to in the case of the
its
own
objects, as
rope and other things (where the
false
knowledge of the snake,&c., in relation to the rope, &c., is removed by the true knowledge of the rope as rope). Hence, the ignorance which has consciousness for its basis can never be destroyed by any thing whatsoever. It will be stated further on that the true nature of this ignorance, which is not capable of being described either as an entity or as a non-entity, is altogether difficult of definition. And because this ignorance,
which
is
of the nature of the antecedent
non-existence of knowledge, is not an obstruction to the origination of knowledge, it cannot, through causing its own destruction, serve as an instrument for producing that
knowledge. Hence there can be no revelation of experience by the material principle of egoity in any manner whatsoever,
Adhik.
I.
Sfit.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
93
Moreover, the nature of revealers is not to reveal the it were within themselves be-
revealable thing as though cause such (a revelation)
;
not seen in the case of lampflames and such other self-luminous things, and because
also
is
knowledge, the instrument of knowledge, and
all
that
helps that (instrument of knowledge in the production of knowledge) are all of such a nature as is consistent
with the realisation of things as they fact
is
And
are.
this
the rule which declares that self-evident
proved by
Again, mirrors and other things things prove themselves. are not the revealers of faces and other objects, but (only ) form the means to produce that cause of erroneousness
which
bending back of the
(for instance) consists in the
ocular aura (to one's
appearances
own
And
face.)
it
being
from such a cause of
arise
so, all false
error.
But the
such things as are like the aloha' * ocular aura). Further, here, in the present (or the is not it instance, possible for the material principle of egoity to impose any such error upon the self-luminous revealers are (really)
The
consciousness.
logical
genus represents the typical
form of the individuals (that go to make it up); and it is it appears to be contained in the individuals,
therefore that
but not because
revealed by the individuals. Hence, to give rise to the apprehension of consciousness as abiding in the material principle of egoity, which forms an internal 59.
"^loka
it is
which has been transhit-
ed here as Ocular
Aura
is
a
kind of
influence, which, proceeding from the eye and falling upon external objects, is supposed to make them visible. According to this theory of vision, the eye sees only such objects as are
touched, as
it
ihe perception
were,
by
of the
its
own
dloka
;
images which
are due to reflection is supposed to be cauced by the mirror or any other reflecting surface
dloka his
bending back
this
man
sees
and, accordingly, a
own
face in a mirror, because the
eyes goes to the mirbent back, and finally re-
dloka from his ror, is there
turns and
falls
on his own
face,
SRi-BniSHYA.
94 organ, there
is,
{Chap.
I.
Part.
L
indeed, nothing which can serve as a means,
either in itself or through causing
quality of being the
knower
doe.s
an
error.
Thus the
not belong to the mate-
principle of egoity, nor is there any impression to the effect that it does. Therefore, the subjective self is
rial
the thing T, which is of itself made out to be the knower; but is not pure unqualified consciousness. It has also been stated already that, on the dis-
appearance of the idea of the ego, consciousness cannot acquire the subjectivity (of the self). Although, (during ' deep sleep), the thing I for the ego) does not, owing to '
being overpowered by the quality of darkness (or lamas), and owing also to the absence of the experience of external
its
and clearly manifest
objects, distinctly
itself, still,
because
the self shines forth (as before) in one and the same continat the time of waking, there is no disuous form of the
T
appearance of the idea of the ego even in deep sleep. to be stated that the experience
which
It
has
accepted by you does also shine forth in that very same form. As a matter of fact, no one, who has risen from sleep, introspectively is
simultaneously with the condition of sleep, any experience which is of the following form, namewhich is free from the ly, ".I who am (pure) consciousness
realises, as existing
notion of the ego, and the nature of which is hostile to all other tilings, have (all this while) remained as a witness of ignorance."
The
from sleep
risen
happily." tion, it is
sleep) the
introspective realisation of one who has "I have slept is, indeed, to the effect
By means made out
of this process of introspective realisathat even at that time (/. c. during which is the thing I ', possesses the quality '
self,
of being the enjoyer of happiness as well as the quality of being the knower. It should not be urged that the realisation
is
simply to the effect-"
I
so slept then as to feel
Adhik.
I.
Sftt.
SRI-BHISHYA.
/.]
happy now"; because that
95
realisation
is
not at
of such a
all
Moreover, (it may be said that) a person who has risen from sleep realises by introspection the very thing form.
which was experienced (by him) before, and then observes 'This was done by me'. 'This was experienced by me,' 'I said this'; and that, therefore, it is not right to think that the -quality of being the enjoyer of happiness cannot be consistently applied to the ego, on account of the
impermanent character of if it
be said
-'All
this
ego which
(in reply) that he also realises
this while (during
my
sleep) I
at all'
'What (follows) then '? means (here) the negation of
that
can not be
it
the
self.
But
by
knew
If it
(we ask)
is
introspection nothing at all,'
be said that 'nothing
all
things,
it is
replied '
so, for the reason that the thing
I/ the
knower, must continue to persist when one can say
'
I
knew,' (even though his knowledge relates to nothing). In fact, this negation here relates only to knowable objects. If the negation by means of the word 'nothing' here relates to the entire totality of things,
which
also,
then that experience
admitted by you (to be existent during will have to be denied. Now (it is held that) the sell is
7
sleep),
,
the knower, and constitutes the thing 'I' which is continuously existent even during sleep,is (first) introspect-
which
is
ively realised as the is
at
T
(or the ego);
and that that (ego)
then denied by means of the cognition this
Thus, nothing at all.'--- is all.'
'I
knew nothing 'I knew
same
introspective realisation
made
to prove the reality of that
know-
ledge which is, however, denied to exist at that time of I sleep), and (to prove) also the unreality of the thing '
',
which
is
the
knower and
is
continuously existent
;
and
let
such a thing as this be proved only to the gods (who do not reply to arguments and criticism). If
it
be said that when one observes
'I- did
not
know
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
96
'
also
I
is
Part. I.
I.
continued existence of the thing not then apprehended, it is replied that you the
even myself *
[Chap.
(in sleep)', the
pftrvapakshinsdo not know even the contradiction (thus arising) between your own experience and your own description (of it). Indeed, this experience and its description '
are to the effect
I
did not
know
If
myself.'
ed what
it
be ask-
it is that is negated in the word myself, it would be indeed a pertinent question put by you. It is thus answered. It is not the essential reality of the continued (
'
persistence of the thing
I
',
which
is
the knower, that
is '
denied (here). But (what is denied is) that the thing ( I which is, at the time of waking, made out to have been continuously existent, is characterised by caste, and the various stages of myself,'
life,
&c.
When
it is
said
'
I
did not
know
the real import (of that utterance) has to be The import of that particular portion
distinctly ascertained. '
'I
which
is
which
'
denoted by myself is the thing characterised by such peculiarities of caste &c.,
(of the sentence)
is
as are continuously applied to
it
of wake-
in the condition
The import of that (other) portion (of the sentI is the ego, which is well ence) which is denoted by known to exist in the condition of self-absorption as altogether consisting of indistinct self-experience. The form fulness.
'
of this experience
know even
is
'
indeed to this
effect, viz.
-myself, as being asleep,
'
I
did not
and as possessing a
particular nature.'
Moreover, your position 60 indeed is this, that, in deep To be a sleep, the self exists as the witness of ignorance. witness
is
certainly the
same
as to be a direct
and one who does not know cannot at character of a witness.
60.
Videwf^rap.
53.
knower
;
possess the In the scripture as well as in the all
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Snt. i.}
I.
knower alone that
97
spoken of as the Mere knowledge is not (the witness). The venewitness. " The word witness is an rable Panini also declares thus world,
the
it is
is
:
appellative term and means the person
who
directly sees."
\_Pdnini. .2.91.]. The word w if ness is used always in the sense of one who knows. And this aforesaid witness,
who
is
realised
the thing
known
'
'
I
;
when one
and
it
to exist then
'
says
being
so,
I
how
know/
is
undoubtedly can the thing I' be not '
during deep sleep) ? Therefore^ it is a settled conclusion that the thing 1', being luminous and so, even in to itself, shines forth invariably as the I (/.
c.
'
'
'
;
states, the self is luminous and undoubtedly shines forth as the ego. 6 to the effect that in the Again what has been stated
sleep and other such
'
state of final release the persist
this (also)
final release
is
would,
'
thing
'
does not continue to
I
not good. If it do not (so
in other words,
come
ciation of the destruction of the self.
T
no mere
is
attribute, so that,
essential entity
may
persist),
mean
then
the enun-
Moreover, the thing
even after
remain, as
removal of ignorance.
to
its
cessation, the
does in the case of the
it
On
'
the contrary, the thing I' is itself the self; and intelligence is its attribute ; because intelligence is, indeed, apprehended to be the attribute of the thing the cognitions f I know ', and ' Knowledge has come to me.' Further, he who considers the self to be afflicted
'
I' in
with the ddhydtmika*- and other miseries, saying sorrowful/ and in whom the desire for final release to the effect (of tranquilled
making him
feel)
and devoid of sorrow,
'How may
setting aside
'I is
am
born
become the whole of I
it may never occur again to me/ such a man alone strives for the attainment of that (release). Should
misery, so that
he,
however, come to think-' I shall be no more,
6l. v
Vide supra
p. 53.
62.
Vide supr*
p. 4. n.
if I utilise
12,
SRi-BniSHYA.
98
away
L
Part.
the attainment of release)/ he would flee from even the semblance of any discussion bearing
means
the
I.
{Chap.
(for
upon the topic of
final release
;
and then the whole science
want of scope), because there would be none at
treating of final release would, (through
become
unauthoritative,
having the needed qualification (for the attainment of It may be said that that mere luminousness final release).
all
alone,
which
is
by the word I remains in the but then of what use is it ? Xo one, '
indicated
state of final release
;
',
whose actions are based upon
right understanding, will final release) with the obtain (to his that even ego ceases to exist, knowledge though something which is mere luminousness remains. Therefore
ever
make any attempt
the thing
'
subjective
'
I
which
itself,
self.
And
final release, shines
made out to be the knower, is the
this subjective self,
indeed as the
Whatever
to itself
is
is
1
1',
even
because
luminous to
in the state of it is
itself,
luminous
that always
T.
Thus, for instance, the self, which is to the round of births and deaths, is admitted by subject both the contending parties to be possessed of such lumishines forth as the
Whatever does not shine forth as the T, that is itself, like jars and other similar objects, for
nousness.
not luminous to
This self in the state of
instance.
luminous to
itself.
Therefore
it (viz.
final
the
is
emancipation self)
shines forth
always as the 'I'. Ignorance, transmigration, &c., cannot be said to result to that (released self), in consequence of its
thus shining forth as the
T,
because they
(viz. ignor-
ance, transmigration-, &c.,) are opposed to the condition
of
-final
release,
and because
also,
the notion of the
'
'
I
is-
not the cause of ignorance and such other things. Ignorance, indeed, is either not to know a thing as it is, or to
know
it
what it
K
other than as
The
it is,
or to
know
it
as contrary to
essential nature of the self consists, indeed,
Adhik.
I.
Silt,
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
i.]
T; and
in being the
99
which
so the notion of the '!',
is
of
nature of the knowledge of the self itself, cannot cause ignorance and how can it cause the condition of the
;
transmigration
On
?
being opposed to
the contrary that (notion of the
it
(viz.
'
I '),
ignorance), certainly destroys indeed as the ' I even in '
it.
(The
subjective self shines
the state of final release), also because the experience of that self is seen to have been altogether in the form of the 'I', in
ignorance destro) ed r
realisation of the
who had their means of the direct by
ofVamadeva and
the case
others
in its entirety
Brahman as
constituting the Self of
all.
It
indeed, heard declared in the scripture to the following
is,
effect:
" After seeing this (Brahmaii), the sage I
experienced
Up. 1.4.
have become Manuandthe sun
"I alone exist and
Vamadeva
also." \Brih.
will exist."
\Alh. Up. not ignorant of any thing which is distinct (from Himself), and who is denoted altogether by the import of the word Sat (/. e. existence), I.
ID.];
The Highest Brahman, who
i.].
is
'
'
is
also (seen to be)
accustomed to the same usage (of per-
sonality) in the
"Indeed, following scriptural passages I (will enter) these three deities." \Qlhand. Up. VI. 3. 2.]; " May I become manifold and be born." [Qihdnd. Up. VI.
2.
[Ait.
"He
3.];
Up.
:
I.
i.].
thought
May
I
create
the
worlds."
Again that same (association of person-
Highest Brahman] may be seen in the " Because I transcend and other following passages also the destructible and am also superior to the indestructible, ality with the
:
therefore, I
world and the
Self,
O
am known
as the Highest Person, both in the " I am the scripture." \_B. G. XV. 18.] " It is not that I Gudakesa." \_B. G. X. 20] in
;
;
did never exist." [B. G. II. 12.]; as the end of the whole world." 63.
Vide supra
p.
30.
n,
26.
"
I
am
the source as well
L B. G. VII. {
6.].
I
am
the
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
loo
[Chap.
L
Part.
1.
source of all; everything goes forth from Me." [B. G. X. 8.] " I am their deliverer from the deadly ocean of the circuit " I am the seedof mundane existence." [B. G. XII. 7.]; " I know the past things." giving father." [B. G. XIV. 4.]; ;
[B. G. VII. 26.]. It ma}*,
however, be
how
asked" If
the
'
1'
constitute*
that the principle of egoity is self, then, be to declared by the Lord among the things that go to the
make up
is
it
the material embodiment
(or kshetra
individual self) as in the following passage
' :
of the
The
great
elements, the principle of egoity, the buddhi or the princithrown ple known as mahat, the prakriti (all these
together have been declared to make up this changeful material embodiment)' ?" \B. G. XIII. 5.]. It is thus said
In all declarations regarding (His) essenthe nature, teaching is given (by Him only in the first person) as 1', and the essential nature of the self is also (in
reply to this):
tial
'
very same form (viz. as the I' or the the true nature of the subjective self is surely ego); therefore, in the form of the 1'. It is, indeed, declared by the Lord
apprehended
in that
'
'
Himself that the principle of egoity, which is one of the various modifications of the prakriti, is included
among
the things that go to
And
make up
this material
embodiment.
the principle of egoity (or ahatikara) forms the cause of the imposition of the idea of the ego upon the body, which is other than the self. And again the etymology of this word ahaflkara means it
because
is
called
it
(which
the principle of egoity) is to be made out on the supposition that the affix termed chvi* 4 has become applicable here on
account of (our) assuming as really existing what does not so exist. Moreover, this same ahafikara, which (often) forms
64.
Vide Paniiti. V.
4. 50.
Varlikn.
Adhik.
7. Sat.
SRI-BHASHYA.
i.]
toi
the cause of disesteem in regard to men of position, and is otherwise named pride, is often declared in the scripture to be as
worthy of
rejection.
c3 Therefore such idea of egoity
not stultified by any thing is directly within the proitself. That other idea of egoity, which is
is
vince of the self
the province of the body, is certainly ignorance. the same effect it has been declared by the reverend
within
To
Parasara (also) "C thou, worthy son of thy family, listen the also to teaching regarding the true nature of ignorance :
the imposition of the idea of the self on that \_V. P. VI. 7. 10.] If mere consciousness alone constitute the self, then, the body which is not the as well.
which
self,
It is
is
no
self."
but which
would
(nevertheless), mistaken
is,
'
appear as the knower. the knower,
the
for the self,
mere consciousness, but not which is Therefore, the thing 1
illusorily appear as
self
is
which
',
has been taught "Thus, the knower shines forth as the I', because
alone the is
self.
It
:
'
can be so established by direct perception, and because
it
the aforesaid arguments and scriptural texts are applicable so to prove it, and because also ignorance cannot (really)
be is
with
associated this passage
senses, the
:
it."
"The
mind and
\_A.
vitality
To
S.~\
the
;
and
is
self-evident.
eternal, all-pervading, different in each body, itself."
\_A. S.]
To be
to be all-pervading
the inside of
all
same
effect
other than the body, the
self is
self-evident
is
It is
and happy
in
to be self-luminous
;
to possess the
power of getting into inanimate things by reason of its own is
extreme subtlety. It has been stated 66 that sense-perception, which embraces all distinctions, is grounded upon error and is, in conand that sequence, liable to give rise to false knowledge ;
65.
Vide B. C. XVI.
18.
M rel="nofollow">.
Vide
siifra \>\\ 33 to 35*
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
102 therefore
to
apt to be stultified by scripture.
it is
1.
[Chap.
Part
Here,
it
1.
has
be questioned what this error
is, grounded whereon, rise of to false knowledge. becomes giving capable perception
be replied that the beginninglessly old innate impression of distinctions itself is, indeed, the cause of error, then it is If it
asked whether
it
has been already ascertained elsewhere that
this innate impression of distinctions possesses, like 'dark07 ness', &c., the character of being the cause of (our) appre-
hending things as being other than what they really are. If it be said again that this is made out by that same (aforesaid)
scriptural
stultification
cannot be
(of perception),
it; is
replied
the reason that the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence would thereby result (in the following manner). When it is settled that scripture
that
it
gives rise to the
so, for
knowledge of that thing which
is
devoid
all attributes, then (alone) is it demonstrable that the innate impression of distinctions forms the misguiding cause of error (in relation to perception); and again, when the
of
innate impression of distinctions is proved to be of the nature of a misguiding cause of erroneous perception, then (alone) is it demonstrable that scripture gives rise to the
knowledge of that thing which
devoid of
is
all attributes.
Moreover, if, by being based upon the innate impression of distinctions, perception gives rise to such knowledge as is other than the reality, then scripture also, being similarly based thereon, would acquire the same character (of giving rise to false knowledge). It may be urged again that, based the although upon error, scripture forms the stultifier of perception, in
knowledge which apprehended 67.
Vide infra
this darkness is
as is
much
in perception, p. 104. n. 69..
explained
as
it
destructive
where
to be
the
and name
is
of is
the means of that all
the distinctions
therefore of stronger
also of an eye-disease,
Adhik.
1.
Sut. /.]
SRI-BH.ISHYA.
authority as a criterion'of truth;
not be
so,
because,
when
it is
103
if so, it is
known
based upon error, the idea that it on of truth can serve no purpose. is
that is
replied that it
it
can
(viz. scripture)
stronger as a criteri-
For, when the fear caused by the false perception of the snake in a real rope is found to exist in a man, that fear is not seen to cease even '
no snake, do not be afraid by he is labouring under an illusion. that knows another who That scripture is based upon error can, however, be thought he
after
is
told
'
This
is
because reflection, 68 of the c., consist in practically realising that knowledge oneness of the Brahman and the self, which is destructive
of only at the time of 'hearing'
of
it;
'
the distinctions apprehended at the time of hearing.' Again, by what means have you come to know what
all
the scripture is and how it is incapable of being erroneous, while perception is capable of being erroneous ? That selfevident experience (of yours) which is devoid of all attributes cannot, indeed, give rise to this knowledge, because it is wholly objectless and because also it can lend no special support Xor does sense -perception (give rise to to the scripture.
knowledge), because, being based upon error, it relates to what is other than the reality. The other means of proof
this
(such as inference, &c.,) being themselves based upon that (perception), cannot also (give rise to that knowledge).
Hence, on account of the unavailability of any means of proof to establish your own position, there can be no proof of the position accepted
by you. may, however, be said that we also have to make use of (such) means of proof and (such) objects of knowledge as appertain to the phenomenal world. But what is this which you call phenomenal ? If it be said that it is It
that which results from 68.
"
Reflection &c."
means
first
impressions,
reflection
and
is
then
and steady meditation,
made
[Chap. I Part.
I.
when examined by means
of
SRT-BHISHYA.
j04
out to be (really) otherwise
asked in reply, of what use appropriate reasoning, Even though it be accepted as a means of that can be. it cannot effect what a means of proof has to acproof, it
complish, because
it is
is
capable of being
itself stultified
by
appropriate reasoning.
be said that, although both scripture and perception are based upon ignorance, the objects of perception are found to be stultified by the scripture, while the it
Again
may
1
object of the scripture, namely, the Brahman, which is the only existence without a second, is not seen to be so stultified
subsequently; and that, in consequence, the Brahman alone, which is pure experience and devoid of all attributes, is the highest reality. To say so is wrong, because whatever is based upon error, even though it continues unstultified, can be demonstrated to possess the character of unreality.
What is
said
affected
is
this
by
All those
:
who do
men,
for instance,
who
are
know that they are themwho dwell in such mountain by timira, inaccessible to other men, and who are free
timira 6
,
not
selves so affected
caves as are
(>().
commonly means dark-
Titnira
and
ness,
used
here
is
to
denote
and invades the third coat of the
eye,
comes to be known as kdcha.
In
it
obviously a disease of the eye. In the Sabdakalpadruma of Raja Radha-
this disease the eye is
kanta Deva,
often coloured
ease
itself
cause to
it
it
is
said that this dis-
is
called
'
darkness,' be-
darkens vision.
Vabhata who
is
According
quoted here, this
disease affects the fourth coat of the
always directed
upwards, and the vision ;
is
hazy and
faces appear noseless,
single objects appear multiplied,
and
straight objects appear crooked, &c.,
&c.
When kdcha grows, it leads to On pages 16 & lO2,we have
blindness.
eye, obstructs vision in all directions,
translated timira as darkness, so that
and
it
finally causes blindness.
In this
may mean
either the ordinary dark-
said, that single objects
ness resulting from want of light, or
appear double or multiple, and that
the eye-disease known as aarkness, because both these act as misguiding causes of false perception.
disease,
short ,
it
is
objects appear Sic., Sic.
If
long and
vice
the disease grows
Adhik. from
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sut. /.]
I.
105
other causes of error in vision, such as the eye-disease kdrha, &c., have without distinction, the perception of two all
moons (when
there
is
only one
in reality),
as they are all
equally subject to that misguiding cause (of false perception) which is known as timira ; here, there is no apprehension of
any stultifier (of such a perception), and (yet) it cannot for that reason be other than false accordingly, the moon's duality, which forms the object of that (perception), is also ;
undoubtedly
Indeed, an error-producer
false.
is
that which
is
the cause of false knowledge. In this same manner, the knowledge of the Brahman, although free from the notion
has to be undoubtedly false and with it, its object, which is the BraJiman, (has also to be false); because that (knowledge) is (held to be) of any thing that
may
stultify
it,
;
based upon ignorance. And the forms of the sj'llogistic statement in this connection would be as follow (i). :
The Brahman which (between us) is knowledge which ignorance
;
(now) the unreal, because it is
subject of discussion is the object of the
in one who is possessed of the phenomenal world, (ii). example, because it is the object of knowfalse, is
produced
as, for
The Brahman
is
ledge (or experience); as, for example, the phenomenal world, (iii). The Brahman is unreal, because it is the object of that knowledge which causes ; as, for example, that same
is
produced by
false
phenomenal world.
should not be urged that the unreal perMoreover, ception of elephants and other objects arising in dreams do it
form the cause of the attainment of real good and evil (in life); and that it-is not opposed to reason to hold that, simiwhich, being based upon ignorance, is unreal, forms the means for the attainment of the object which is known as Brahman and constitutes the highest
larly, the scripture,
realit
:
because the conition arisin
in
dreams
is
not at
all
SRi-BHISHYA.
io6
[Chap.
I.
Part.L
Indeed, here (in dreams), there is unreality only in relation to the objects (perceived therein), because stultification is seen only in relation to them, but
of an unreal nature.
not in relation to the perception itself. Surely there is not " That born in any one the belief that will make him feel
was experienced by me during As a matter of fact, the idea of the form " The conscious state is
conscious state itself which
dreams
is
non-existent."
stultification
here
is
in
existent, but the objects (thereof) are non-existent."
That knowledge which consists of illusions, and is caused by the incantations (mantras} and medicinal herbs, &c., of the enchanter, is quite real and forms also the cause of love and fear because, in this case also, the knowledge (or the ;
conscious state so produced) remains unstultified. That perception of the snake, &c., which is imposed upon the rope, &c.,
and
is
produced by means of the misguiding
causes relating to the objects of perception and the perceiving senses, &c., that is also truly existent and forms the cause of fear and other emotions. The impression resulting
from the proximity of the snake to one's self, to the effect that one has been bitten (by it), even when not so bitten,
The idea giving rise to a real. of is also (false) suspicion poisoning certainly real, and forms the cause of death. The reflected appearance of the face, &c., this also
is
in water,
undoubtedly
a really existing thing, and forms the ascertaining the particular characteristics found in &c.,
is
the face which
is
means of
a really existing thing. The reality of these various states of consciousness is conclusively established, in as
much
as
they have an
origin,
and
the causes of actions which are determined
also
form
by motives.
be asked, how, even in the absence of the elephant and other objects (perceived in dreams), the forms of cogIf
it
nition
relating to
them can be
real,
we
reply that that
Adhik.
L
Sat. i.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
io;
not right because these forms of cognition merely require, as a rule, some object (whether it be (question itself)
is
;
depend upon, and to relate to. For, what required to make a thing the basis and the object of any
real or unreal) to is
merely the manifestation of that thing (to consciousness) and there certainly does exist such a maniis
cognition,
;
festation
under the
influence
of the misguiding
cause
However, (which is productive of such manifestation). that (thing which is so made manifest to consciousness), is, when stultified, conclusively proved to be unreal. And it has been already declared that that cognition which continues unstultified relates certainly to the reality. in the case
Further,
also of the
apprehension of the
by means of
(the corresponding) written real by means of the unof the is no cognition signs, there is really existent. To real, because the written sign itself
sounds of
letters
be objected that the sign is taken to be of the same nature as the sound, and is thus the cause of the
this, it
may
cognition of the sound here, but that
This
its
identity in nature
not so; because the unreal (or non-existent) nature of the identity (of the sign) with the sound cannot form the means (of producing such a
with the sound
is
unreal.
is
not seen, nor is it possible, that what does not exist, and is not cognisable, can form the
cognition).
means
Indeed,
it is
any thing). Again, it may be said that idea of the alphabetic sound on that the of the imposition (written sign) is the cause (of the apprehension of the sound (of proving
with the help of the sign). If it be so held, then, there would not be here, (as you contend), the cognition of the real by means of the unreal, simply because that (super-
Moreover, there would then result also the oneness of the means of proof with the
imposed) idea
is (itself)
real.
object to be proved, because both of
them
possess the
same
SRI-BHISHYA.
io8
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I-
character of being the cognition of alphabetic sound. And again, if a written sign forms the means (for the cognition of an alphabetic sound), by reason of its supposititious and unreal identity in nature with that sound, then it is easy enough for any one sign to be so supposititiously and un-
alphabetic sounds ; and thus there will have to result the cognition of all the
really identical in nature with all the
alphabetic sounds by looking at any one written sign of a letter. Then again, it may be said that, just as there is the convention of using ' Devadatta and other nominal '
words there
in is
which
is
relation to particular masses of matter, so also, the convention of associating a particular sound, perceivable by the ear, with a particular written
is perceivable by the eye ; and that, consea quently, particular written sign is the cause of the Well then, cognition of a particular alphabetic sound.
which
sign,
cognition of the real by means of the real, because both the written sign and the (phonetthere
ic)
in that case, the
is,
The
convention are of a real nature.
real wild
ox by means
cognition of the of the written outline of the wild ox
founded upon similarity, and this similarity
is
Again, there
even
unreal,
in the case
(known
sphota)
7
is
real
one undifferentiated sound
phonetic differentiations, the as
is itself real.
by means of the where, by means of particular
no cognition of the
is
seen to become the means of
apprehending a variety of meanings; because this one undifferentiated sound is revealed by numerous phonetic 70.
This
is
what
is
known
as the
Sphota of the grammarians, according to is
whom, '
all
the
this Sphota
which
is
eternal
the cause of the manifestation of
sounds,' and so they hold that all
things in the
world which
are
expressed by sounds are traceable to that one eternal sound.
mimamsa
Vedic sounds. 5
to 23.
Taitt.
Pitrva-
Vide Pur. Mini.
Vide also
Br.
The
also ascribes eternity to all
II. 2. 4. 2.
Manu.
I.
I.
31.
I.
&
Adhik.
I.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
Sul. i.]
109
nadas), and forms the cause of the of meanings, owing origin of the knowledge of a variety to the apprehension of its relation with various meanings, differentiations (or
according as they are severally revealed by the various to phonetic differentiations (thereof). It is not also proper hold that sound possesses (at all) the undifferentiated character of unity
because
;
ga and
the other phonetic
elements of language, which undoubtedly import meanings, do themselves constitute sound, in as much as they (alone)
by the ear. Therefore, by means of the
are perceived
it
to arrive at that
difficult
is
which
is
the real
which
scripture,
is false,
knowledge the object of
Brahman.
An objection may, however, be raised against this The scripture is not conclusion to the following effect in which the flowers imagined to false, in the same way :
grow
in the
sky (are
false)
;
because
it
is
made out
to be a
real entity (or sat) before the
knowledge of non-duality (is Indeed, it is only after the knowledge of the truth born). is born, that the scripture acquires the character of being untrue. And then it is that the scripture can not form the
means of knowing the Brahman, which and is devoid of all distinctions. When
is
pure intelligence however, does
it,
form such a means, then the scripture is really existent, for the reason that it is then made out to be so existent. To this objection,
it is
replied that
when it
it
cannot be so
the scripture does not really exist, to does exist is false. What (follows) then ?
;
make Then
because, out that (follows)
In consequence of the unreality of the knowledge produced by the unreal scripture, there will result unreal-
this
:
ity to the
Brahman
also
which forms the object of that
same way in which, owing to the fals(knowledge) ity of the knowledge of fire inferred by means of aqueous ;
in the
no
SRI-BHASHYA.
[Chap.
L
Part.
1.
vapour wrongly perceived to be smoke, the fire also which forms the object of that (inferential knowledge) is unreal. Moreover, the absence of any subsequent stultification (of
Brahman
the scriptural knowledge of the
after
it is
actual-
ly produced) is not also proved because such stultification of that (scriptural knowledge) is really to be found in the statement (of some 7 Buddhists) that nothingness alone ;
'
the reality.
is
based upon
If
it
illusion,
be
it is
by you that based upon illusion.
declared
-
that
said
replied that
that it
(statement) is has been already
knowledge) also is Indeed the absence of any such
this (scriptural
be found only in relation to that (statement that nothingness is alone the reality) We have now stultification is to
!
done with the
ridiculing of such ill-founded and fallacious
reasoning.
What
has been urged 7 2 -by t\\e Pfirvapakshins to the " Existence effect that Veddnta passages such as alone, my
dear child, this was in the beginning" [Qhhdnd. U'p. VI. 2. the are intended to that thing alone i and establish like, .] ,
which
is
devoid of attributes and this
intelligence,
(view also)
is
of proving the proposition
is
of the uniform nature of
incorrect 7 3
;
because in the
by knowing a certain things become known, it is declared that the Highest Brahman, which is denoted by the word
way
One Thing,
that,
all
Sal (or Existence), is the material cause of the world, the efficient cause of the world, is omniscient, omnipotent, wills the truth, pervades all, supports all, controls all,
is
and ties
71. rind
by innumerable other auspicious whole and that the world has that (Brahman)
is ;
characterised
These are the Madhyamikas quoted above is ;
the -statement
also mentioned in the Sdiikhya ristns of Kapila.
I.
44., for the
apho-
purpose
qualifor its
of refutation, 72. 73.
Vide supra p. 27. Vide Chhdnd. Up.
wherein this proposition
is
\'\.
\.
given.
3.
Adhik. Soul
I.
and
Si'tt.
HI
SRi-BHlSHYA.
/.]
that, in consequence, the context
(wherein the above scriptural passage occurs) proceeds to teach Svetaketu that he is of the same nature as the Brahman thus ;
described.
length in
Indeed, this subject the
is
discussed 74
Vedartha-sangraha
.
(by us) at In this work also
\Ved. Sut. II. i. 15.], in the section treating of the origin of the world, this (subject) will be discussed well with great clearness. In this passage also, namely, "And that is the
by which that
higher (knowledge)
Indestructible Being
(is
known)"-[3fj(rf. Up. I. i. 5], the evil qualities appertaining to matter (or praknti] are first negatived (in relation to the it is declared that the Highest Brahman innumerable possesses auspicious qualities such as eternity,
Brahman), and then
omnipresence, subtlety, all-pervasiveness, indestructibility, the quality of being the source of all, omniscience, and so on. " The Brahman By means of this passage also, namely, Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], that thing which is devoid of attributes is not arrived at, because the fact of their (/'. e. of Brahman, Existence, Knowis
ledge,
and
Infinity) being
understood to is
mean
characterised
grammatically equated has to be
the denotation of some one thing which
by more than one
attribute.
Indeed, (for words) to be grammatically equated is to import only one thing through a variety of significations. Regarding the use of these words so as to import only one thing, either by signifying those qualities which form the primary and natural
meaning of the words,
'
'
Knowledge ', &c., or the of is what opposite by denoting contrary to each of those particular qualities, a difference between their signiExistence,'
fications has necessarily to
74.
Vide pp. 20
safigraha,
edited
to 60, at
Vedartha-
Madras,
Teliigu characters, by Messrs
J.
in
Tirq-
be accepted.
Here, however,
malacharya and A. K. Yijayaraghavacharya.
H2
SRI-BHISHYA.
there
much
this
is
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
In one case, the words
of peculiarity.
have their primary and natural meaning and in the To be opposed other, they have a figurative significance. ;
what is ignorance, &c., does not surely constitute the essential nature of the entity Brahman; for, (if it did),
to
the true nature of (that) Brahman would be full}" made out by means of only one word, and the use of the other words
would, in consequence, be meaningless. Moreover, under such a circumstance, there will not be any grammatical equation between these words, for the (mere) reason that those words, all of which denote only one thing, cannot have a variety of significations. Furthermore, a variety of qualified conditions results to one and the same thing
from a variety of qualifying attributes, and consequently the words (in a grammatical equation) acquire a variety of meanings; and this is not incompatible with their being grammatically
words
is,
,equated,
an
because
equation
indeed, intended to establish that one
same thing
is
characterised
In fact, grammarians 7
3
by more than one
between
and the attribute.
declare that a grammatical equation
(between words) means that words having a variety of significations are used so as to import only one thing. It has been further urged by the Pi'irvapakshins to In the passage, " One only without Up. VI. 2. i.], the word advitlya without a second) does not admit of (the
the following effect a second" [Qhhand. :
(which means
associated with a second thing even in the form of a quality. Hence, according to the rule 70 which enforces faith in all the recensions of the Vcdas, it has to
Brahman) being
75.
Vide Kaiyyata's commentary on
Patanjali's dlinika
to
and
Panini
Maha-Bhashya,
\riddhy-
also the portion relating
I. 2.
42.
The
definition of a
grammatical equation as given by Kai-
yyata under Fdnini follows
:
r. 2.
42.,
runs as
Bhinnapraivittinimittayuk-
tasya anekasya labdasya ekasmin urthe irittis
76.
sdmdnadhikaranyam. Vide supra p. 40. & n.
32.
Adhik.
I.
Silt.
/.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
113
be admitted that the passages which relate to (the Brahman as) the cause of the world, are all intended to establish
that Thing which
without a second.
is
The
defini-
Brahman, which is characterised as the cause of the world, and is without a second, is given here to this tion of that
effect
\Tailt.
ty." it is
"The Brahman
:
is
II. i. i.].
Up.
intended to define,
Otherwise, there would
is
Existence, Knowledge, InfiniHence that Brahman, which certainly
devoid of attributes.
be the contradiction of
all
such
statements as (declare the Brahman to be) without attributes', 'without taint ', [Ad/i. Up. 68.], and so on. To hold so is not appropriate, because the word '
intended to establish the possession of wonpowers by the Brahman, who is the material cause
advitlya derful
is
of the universe, by pointing out that there is no other who is the ruler thereof and is different from Himself. Similarly, " the following among other passages, viz. It thought, may I
become manifold and be born;
It
created the element
makes known the pospowers (by the Brahman). If it be asked, how by the unqualified statement (that the Brahlejas." -\Q!ihand.
Up. VI.
2. 3.],
also
session of such wonderful
man is) advitlya for without a second,) the negation merely of any other cause (than the Brahman) is made out, (it is The Brahman, who is desirous of creatsaid thus in reply) :
the material cause of the world, as declared in the ing, " Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the passage beginning" [C/thand. Up. VI. 2. i.]. And in accordance is
with the very nature of the production of effects, some other cause (than the material one) is also then naturally thought of in the mind, and that, consequently, the word Indeed, if it advitlya negatives only that (other cause). essential that than the all be taken Brahman) things (other are negatived (by the use of that 1$
word
aduitiyq), eternity
SRi-BulSHYA.
H4 and
other
qualities
which are
[Chap.
accepted
Part.
I.
I.
by you, and
which you desire to establish (in regard to the Brahman], In the present instance, would also be thus negatived. the rule
which enforces
7 7
faith in all the recensions of the
results contrary to what you desire beother mentioned and in all omniscience qualities cause, Vedas in relation to what forms of the recensions the
Vedas produces
;
the cause of the world, have, (in accordance with that rule) to be brought together here.
Hence,
it is
understood, even
from the nature of the passages relating to (the Brahman as) the cause of the world, that it is the qualified thing alone
which
declared in the
is
passage
"The Brahman
is
Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." \_Taitt. Up. II. i. i.j. Moreover, there does not thus arise any contradiction of the passages which describe the Brahman as being free from attributes, because these passages such as,
without taint"
attributes
[Adh. Up.
"(He 68.],
is)
without
"(He
is)
without parts, without actions, tranquilled" [Svet. Up. VI. 19.], and others, deal with qualities which appertain to prakriti (i. c. nature), and which (therefore) deserve to be
any description of the Brahman). Those scriptural texts also, which maintain that the
rejected (in
Brahman is pure unqualified intelligence, declare that that Brahman has, fat the same time), the essential nature of intelligence. By this much (it is not essential nature of the
meant) that pure unqualified intelligence which is devoid because he who is the of attributes is alone the reality ;
knower can alone Indeed, alone
it
possess the essential nature of intelligence. has been already stated that it is proper for him
who
is
of the
essential nature of intelligence, to
be the seat of intelligence 77.
Vide supra
p. 40. n. 32.
;
analogously to the case of
Adhik.
1.
Silt.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
/.]
115
gems, of the sun, of lampflames, &c., (which, being themselves of the nature of the luminous element tejas, are also the seat of luminosity). Indeed, all the scriptural texts declare (in relation to the Brahmaii) that He is undoubtedly the knower.
The following and other
scriptural passages declare that
auspicious qualities, like the quality of being the knower, are natural to the Brahman who is Himself of the essential
nature of intelligence, and also that (the Brahman),
is
(at
the same time), destitute of all such qualities as deserve " He who understands all and who knows to be rejected :
all
VI.
VI
"
"[Mund. 2.
It thought" Up. I. i. 9.]; "This same deity thought"
3.];
"
He
3. 2.];
Up.
I.
thought
may
I
eternals, the Intelligent
among
the intelligent, who, though One,
of the " The
many"
(are)
\Kath. Up.V.-i^.
the worlds, of Lords,
and who has
the desires
Up. VI.
Svel.
13.];
that highest adorable God who is the ruler of who is the greatest Lord being the highest who is the highest Deity among deities,
is
the highest Protector among protectors. the body nor the senses and organs,
neither
and there
is
seen
His supreme power
and
&
fulfils
two unborn, the intelligent and the non-intelligent, the Lord and the non-lord" [Svct. Up. I. 9.]; "May
we know
He
U'p.
[Qihdnd. Up. " create the worlds [Ail.
"The Eternal among the
i.];
\Qihand.
neither His equal nor
His superior.
revealed, indeed, as varied, natural,
is
as consisting of knowledge, strength,
and action."-
" This Self is devoid of sin, is free \_Svet. Up. VI. 7 8.] from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from
&
hunger, free from truth."
;
thirst,
and
desires the truth
[Qthand. Up. VIII.
the portion beginning with
with 'free from thirst/ this
i. 5. '
VIII.
i
7.
devoid of sin (last)
and '
wills the 3.].
In
and ending
passage negatives
(in
SRI-BHISHYA.
ill relation to the
Brahman)
all evil
L
Part.
1.
and then
it
[Chap.
qualities
;
mentions the auspicious qualities of the Brahman by means of the expressions " desires the truth," and " wills the truth"; and in itself it (thus) discriminates between the meaning of the passages which deal with the Brahman
and that of passages which deal with the Therefore there is no contradiction
as unqualified
Brahman
as qualified.
between the passages which speak of the Brahman as quaand again as unqualified, and it can not hence be
lified
suspected in the least that either (of those two sets of passages) depends upon and relates to unreality. This scriptural passage (from the Taiitiriya-Upanishad, 78 viz. II. 8 9. Annvakas) begins by describing the auspi-
&
78.
The Atiuvakas
as follows
'' :
the wind blows the sun rises
;
here referred to run fear of
Him
through that
fear
'Through ;
and Indra (perform and Death runs as the is
nature
bliss
of)
of 'divine'
their duties),
unit
of the bliss of the
fifth.'
Now,
Let there
:
young man, noble and
be
well versed
a.
in
the Vet/as, very quick and active, firm
and strong, and earth is
full
let
the whole of this
of wealth belong to him, that
the unit of
human who
bliss,
and
like-
has a sure foot-
wise of the sage
has a sure
sage
who has a
Vedas and
who have worlds
is
bliss of the
acquired
bliss of
'human' Gandharvas, and
wise of the sage
who has
ing in the Vedas and sires.
the unit of the
One hundred
of 'human'
is
a sure foot-
free
from de-
limes that bliss
Gandharvas
the bliss of 'divine'
like-
is
the unit of
Gandharvab and
from
Pitris
long-enduring
the unit of the bliss of the
Devas born "Ajana,
One
from desires.
hundred times that
and
in
the world
(it is)
desires.
that bliss of the
known
as
likewise (the unit
of the bliss) of the sage
is
the
who
Fitris
sure footing in the
free
is
sure footing in the Vedas
bliss
that
is
have acquired long-enduring worlds, and (it is) likewise (the unit) of the
ledge of the Brahman), and is free from desires. One hundred times
human
from
Gandharvas
ing in the fWr/s, (and has the know-
that
free
times
is
One hundred
desires. bliss
an enquiry into (the
what follows
footing in the Vedas and
Him
through fear of
fire
who
likewise of the sage
who has and
One hundred Devas born
world known as Ajiina
is
is
a
free
times in
the
the unit of
the bliss of the gods known as Karma-devas who have become gods
(Devas) through (the performance of sacrificial) acts, and (it is) likewise (the unit) of the sage
who has
a sure
Adhik.
SRi-BnlsHYA.
Sul. i.]
I.
cious qualities of the
117
Brahwan,s'dymg "Through
fear of Him,
the wind blows"; then it speaks of the unsurpassable bliss of the kshetrajna (or the soul), in a regular order of increasing "That which is a hundred times, &c."; succession, saying
and then
it declares with very great regard the infinitude of the auspicious qualities of the Brahman, saying "Whoever knows the bliss of that Brahman, without being able
whom speech
to attain
returns with the mind, &c."
The passage which makes known the result of the worship of the Brahman, viz. Sosnutc sarvdn kdmdn saha
Brahmand
vipaschitd \_Taitt. Up. II. "i. i.], speaks also of the infinitude of the qualities possessed by the Highest Brahman who is intelligent. (The prose order of this sentence
runs thus)
samasnutc.
Vipaschitd Brahmand saha sarvdn kdmdn The word kdma is derived from the root ka m to
footing in the Vedas
and
from
free
is
bliss of
One hundred the gods known
deras
the unit of the bliss of the
desires.
is
(original) Devas fices
are offered)
and
fooling in the Vedas
bliss of the
unit of the
wise
(it
and
(original) bliss
of the
bliss of
Indra
who and
is
is
from
free
that is
and
the like-
a sure
free
from
times
that
is
the unit of the bliss
and likewise of the sage
has a sure footing in the is free
a sure
times
who has
One hundred
of Brihaspati
likewise
is)
Devas
footing in the Vedas and desires.
alone sacri-
of Indra,
sage
that
Karma-
who has
One hundred
desires.
as
(to whom
of the sage
(the unit)
times
from
desires.
red times that bliss
of
the unit of the bliss of likewise of the sage
Vedas
One hundBrihaspati
is
Prajapati and
who has
u suic
Vedas and
footing in the
bliss of Prajapati
of the
bliss
of the sage
is
from
times
that
the unit of the
is
Brahman, and likewise
who
the Vedas and
who
is free
One hundred
desires.
is
has a sure footing in free
He He who is
from desires.
in i\\z punis/ia
and
also in the sun, (both) are one
same Being. He who knows
and the
this, after
departing from this world, reaches the Self which consists of 'food,' reaches Self which
the
reaches
the
consists of vitality,
Self which
mind, reaches the sists
of understanding,
(finally) the bliss. is
consists
of
Self which con-
Self which
and reaches consists
of
Accordingly, the following sloka '
given
:
Whoever knows
the bliss
Brahman, without being able attain whom, speech returns with
of the to
the mijid, he need notfcur anything."'
SRI-BHISHYA.
iiS
Part.
1.
[Chap.
L
covet and means that which
is covetable, /. c. auspicious the passage accordingly) is that qualities. (of he (the successful worshipper) attains along with the (intelli-
The meaning
those (auspicious) qualities. The word to used) bring out prominently the (possession
Brahman
gent)
'
'
with
7 9
(is
all
of) qualities (by the
Brahman], as nection with the Dahara-vidyd 8 y that
(small
brought out in con-
it is
viz.
"What exists
within
space inside the heart), that has to be sought
That, between wor[Qi/iand. LTp. -VIII. i. i.]. its result, there is a similarity of nature, is proved " Of conclusively by the scriptural passage which says. whatever nature a man's worship is in this world, of that after."
ship and
same nature that man becomes Up.
If is
after death."
\_Ctih and.
III. 14. i.]. it
be said that by means of the passage
"
Brahman]
to
of opinion (that the
Brahman] is known " is unknown [Ken. Up.
is
unknown,
who know the Brahman
to those II. 3.],
He who him
well,
(the
(He)
declared
is
to form no object of knowledge, it is replied that in such a case there ought not to be any teaching to the effect that final release results from knowledge, as (it is found declared) " He who knows the Brahman in the following passages attains the Highest"- [Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1.], "He who knows :
the
Brahman becomes the Brahman indeed " The
III. 2. 9.].
Brahman
as non-existent, he
79.
Vide Pdnini.
So.
Dahara-vidyd
form
of
Brahman,
scriptural passage
II. 3. 19. is
that vidyd or
worshipping the Supreme which consists in medi-
"
becomes non-existent indeed. meditated upon is declared in the context to be the Self who is devoid of '
sin,
is
death,
free
from old age,
free
from
free
from sorrow,
free
from
Him as dwelling in the small etherial space within the heart.
hunger, free from
In connection with this
also
tating on
of worship, the
rii/ya or
form
Brahman who Jus
to be
\JMund. Up. the
Whoever knows
the truth
and
thirst,
and desires
wills the truth.'
M. Ndr. X.
7.
&
XI.
7.
Vide
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Snt. /.]
I.
Whoever knows the Brahman
119
as existent, him, therefore,
know as existing" -[Taitt. Up. II. 6. i.] speaks of the destruction of the self and the continuance of the self as they
from the non-existence and the
resulting (respectively)
ence of that knowledge the object of which
the
is
exist-
Brahman.
the scriptural texts enjoin only that knowledge which relates to the Brahman, for the purpose of attain-
Therefore
all
And
the knowledge (so enjoined) is of the nature of worship, and it has been already stated that the object of such worship is the Brahman who is possessed ing final release.
tain 9.
Him, speech
i.]
it
is
"
In the passage
of attributes.
Without being able to
returns with the
declared that the
mind
at-
"
Brahman and
Up.
II.
infinite,
is
[Taitt. is
possessed of innumerable attributes, incapable of being measured by speech and mind as possessing any definite magnitude and then it is said of those, who suppose is
;
that they have any definite knowledge of the Brahman to the effect that the Brahman is of such and such magnitude, that they
do not know the Brahman well and have
no correct opinion is is
immeasurable.
(of the
of opinion that (the
Brahman)
is
unknown."
Brahman], because the Brahman
known
unknown Brahman) to those who know is
sight,
him
well,
(the
(He)
is
'
contradiction in that very
by the Pfirvapakshins
that the
"(Thou shalt) not ^see) the seer of the
nor (think) the thinker of the thought." [Brih. Up. negatives the seer and the knower as distinct
III. 4. 2.],
8l.
He who
the statement about (the out and (the Brahman} be-
[Ken. Up.
same context. It has been stated 8
to
II. 3.],
Brahman) being rightly made ing well known would meet with
scriptural passage
"
Otherwise, in the passage
Vide supra
p. 28,
SRl-BHiSHYA.
120
from sight and knowledge. This (objection)
is
understanding that what the passage teaches
"Understand that
it is
Part,
I.
invalidated
by
I.
[Chap.
is
as follows :-
only fallacious reasoning which arrives knower has the essential nature
at the conclusion that the
of ignorance, on the ground that his quality of sentiency is of an accidental character and then, do not look upon, ;
and do not think
of,
who
the self as such
(in reality),
but look
the seer and the knower, as being also surely of the nature of sight and knowledge." Or the " Set aside the individual meaning of the passage is this self who is the seer of sight and the knower of knowledge
upon the
self,
is
:
and then worship the Highest within
all
beings."
Self alone
who
is
the Soul
Otherwise, there will be the contradicand other scriptural passages (relating " as the knower My dear one, by what
tion of the following
to the
Brahman)
means has one
to
:
know
the knower?"
[Brih.
Up.
II.
4. 14.].
What has been effect
8 2 urged -by the PftrvapakshinstQ the that from the passage "The Brahman is bliss."
[Taill.
Up.
III. 6. i.],
the essential nature of the
that
Brahman
met by saying
(made out to be) pure bliss, that this passage declares the essential nature of the Brahman, who is the seat of knowledge, to be knowledge
is
is
Indeed, that conscious state which is agreeable The meaning of the scriptural passage said to be bliss.
(itself). is
"The Brahman 28.], is
of bliss
is
alone the
intelligence, bliss
Brahman.
uniform homogeneity of nature which is advocated by you. that, in regard to this
83.
"-
[Brih. Up. III. 9. that that state of consciousness which is of the nature is
Vide supra
p. 28,
Hence,
also,
results
(in relation to the It
Brahman,
that
Brahman)
has been already stated the true nature of which
AdJuk.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sui. /.]
1.
121
is
intelligence itself, the quality of being the
is
undoubtedly established
knower
by hundreds of scriptural
also
texts.
same manner, by means of these distinct statements also "That is the unit of the bliss of the Brahman" [Taitt. Up. II. 8. 13.], and" Whoever knows the bliss of the In the
Brahman,
e.,"
Up. II. not mere
Brahman is To be the Knower
that) the
One.
it
Again,
tinctions (in
duality, as
" There
i.],
bliss,
(it
but
is
established
is
the blissful
is/indeed, to be the blissful One.
has been affirmed 83 that the negation of disregard to the Brahman] is asserted in various "
the following passages
in
ways
9.
[Taitt.
it
:
[Brih. Up. nothing here that is were,"-
But where there
II. 4. 14. tS:
IV.
5.
is
15.]
;
many and varied. He who sees this world, as though it were manifold, obtains death from death." -[Brih. Up, IV. 4. 19. & Kath. " But where to one all this becomes Up. IV. 10.] is
;
the
II.
[Brih. Up. invalidated
which
is
who
there
Self,
4.
when
14. it
IV.
whom by what
?"
This (objection) is 5. 15.]. out that the whole universe,
made Brahman and has that (Brahman) is one with (the Brahman Himself)
is
the effect of the
for its internal ruler, in as
see
shall
&
much
has that (Brahman] for its Self, and that contrary to that (oneness) is what is in those negatived (passages) but that other manifoldness of the Brahman which is His grounded as
it
the manifoldness
;
upon
to be born as "
accordance with the many, scriptural I become manifold and be born" May [Tail I.
passage
L"p. II. 6.
foldness) is
i.
is
&
Qihdnd. Up. VI.
83.
and which (manithe that by scripture, be said that, by reason of the 2. 3.],
(again) well established
not negatived.
negation
volition
in
If
it
of manifoldness,
Vide supra
p. 28.
all
this
(scriptural
authority)
SRI-BHISHYA.
122 relates to things is
not so
which are unreal; then
it is
after predicating in
because, such manifoldness as cannot be ;
Part.
/.
[Chap.
replied that
I.
it
relation to the
made out by perall the other means of proof, and as is difficult of and ception realisation, to say that that same thing (viz. manifoldness)
Brahman
is negatived (in relation to the Brahman)- -this matter for laughter.
is
indeed
has been stated 8 4 that in accordance with the passage For, whenever he perceives in Him even the smallest
It
"
then there
distinction, i.],
fear
man.
fear for
is
comes to him who
This
wrong
is
;
him
"
[Taitl.
sees manifoldness in
Up. II. 7. the Brah-
because the .continued meditation
of the manifoldness of that
(Brahman)
is
taught to be the
means of tranquillity in the following passage:
"Let a
man
meditate, having been tranquilled by the knowledge- -'All this indeed is the Brahman; all this is born in It, is absorbed into
It,
and
lives in It.'"
[Qihdnd. Up.
III. 14. i.].
Accord-
ingly, here (in this passage), tranquillity is taught to result from the continued meditation of the fact that it (viz. the
world) has that (Brahman} for its Self, in as much as the work of creation, preservation, and destruction proceed from Him in regard to the whole world. Therefore, the continued meditation of the fact that the world which is full of differentiations owing to the varieties of gods, animals, men, immoveable objects, and other things that are (all)
really existent
(therein),
has the
Brahman
for
its
Self,
forms the cause of tranquillity and is hence the cause of the attainment of fearlessness ; and so there can be no room ;
to suppose that
of any "
Then 84.
fear.
there
Vide supra
If so, is
such meditation) forms the cause may be asked, why it is declared
it (viz. it
fear for him." [Taitt.
p. 28.
-
Up.
II. 7. i.].
To this
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sut. /.]
I.
123
When that support in the Brahman replied thus " which, in the passage For, indeed, when he obtains fearless support in that which is invisible, incorporeal, it
is
:
\_Taitt. L7p.ll.
ness,
is
effect
obtains
fearlessness."-
declared to be the cause of fearless-
7. i.], is
To
interrupted, then there results fear.
declared by the great sages
it is
and other passages
" If
Vusudeva
the same
the following
in
not meditated upon for the short interval of a mnhilrta 83 or even
(at least)
lor
he
then
homeless,
indefinable,
:
is
a mere moment, that is loss, that is great weakness, 80 The is illusion, and that is unnatural activity." (word)
that
anlara (which is in the first passage quoted above) means breach of continuity in the meditation that has its support
Brahman, and
the
in
has been
It
"Not
ning with"
situation
85.
of a
A
[
Ved.
is
indeed
Silt. III. 2.
a period of 48 minutes,
i.e.
however used
It is
denote any short
to
86. This passage, in all probability,
occurs in more Pnraiia, and
than one
is
to be
following form in :
Sd
hcinih tat
kshaiiam vdapi
va
is
in
the
Garuda-Purd-
mahat chhidramsa
that
for is
"
he (the Stlirakdra) men-
1.],
S;.
'I
he passage from
the 7'aiftirf-
!], which, according to the Adivaitins, negatives \a-L~panishad [II.
7-
manifoldness in relation to the lirah-
23.]. "If
interval of a
Vasude-
inuhurtti
mere moment, that is great weakness, and that a.
blindness, dullness
is interpreted by them thus For whenever he perceives in Him even the smallest distinction, then, in:
"
deed, the
and dumbness."
there
is
word anlara
distinction.
fear for is
But
same word
ihis
\
not meditated upon (at least)
or even loss,
Vais/ntava
found
yat mu/uli-lain '\dsudevah na cjtint-
[CCXXX1V.
for the short
is
the
andhajadamiikata
yate\
8
man
space of time.
na
1
Mii/iiirla is one-thirtielli p;irt
day
interruption.
8S urged that, in the aphorism begineven on account of the peculiarity of
a day being equal to 24 hours.
cjia
its
continuity
Here
him."
understood to mean
Ramanuja takes mean brtach of
to
or interruption,
prets the passage thus
" :
and
inter-
For when-
ever he causes the smallest intermplion
on
in
the meditation that
Him, then indeed there
for
him."
88.
Vide supra
p. 28.
i.>
based
is
fear
SRi-BHASHYA.
124 tions the
not so
;
Brahman
[Chap.
dreams
"[
fed.
I
lie
This
I.
is
Brahman as being And it has been said
speaks of the
"
But
it
a mere
is
Sut, III. 2. 3.], the objects experienced in
also are declared to be
are different
Part.
to be devoid of all attributes.
because there
undoubtedly possessed of attributes. that in the aphorism beginning with illusion
L
mere
illusions, because they which are experienced in But therein, he (the Sulrakard} says the objects experienced in the wakeful
from the things
the wakeful state.
that they also, like state, possess the characteristics of reality. What has been asserted 89 to the effect that, in the
Smrilis and \\\ePurdnas also, pure intelligence alone, which devoid of attributes, is taught to be real while all else-
is is
that (again) unreal, " Whoever knows
is
incorrect.
Me
as the unborn, as the begin-
Lord of the world "- -[Z?. G. X. 3.]. "All beings abide in Me and I do not abide in them. And the beings do not also abide in Me. See my sovereign glory and power. The protector of all beings, ningless, as the great
I
do not abide
in
beings.
My
will
is
the producing
&
"I am [B. 4 5.]the source as well as the destruction of the whole world.
cause
of
all
O Dhananjaya this
G. IX.
beings."
;
(creation)
nothing else higher than Me. All strung on Me like a number of gems "I stand support[B. G. VII. 6 7.]. there
is
is
on a thread." ing the whole world by a small part (of my power)." [B. G. X. 42.]. "The Highest Person is another and He ;
is
called the Highest Self
who, having entered the three
worlds as the Imperishable Lord, supports (them). Because I transcend the destructible and am also superior to the indestructible, therefore
89.
Vide
sn/ira pp.
29
\
30,
am
I
celebrated in the world
Adhik.
and
Silt,
in the 1
cS:
I.
125
Vcdas as the Highest Person."
XV.
G.
[/?.
17.
"O
sage! He (\r/.. the Lord) transcends the (which forms the natural and material founda-
8.].
/m/T///
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
i.}
9
tion) of all beings, (transcends) all
its
91
modifications, 92 who
all
is the blemishes (arising out) of its qualities. He, the Self of all, has passed beyond all veils, 93 and by Him is pervaded all that is within the inside of the universe. He
of that nature which
characterised by all the auspicious a small part of His own powers, has, by qualities held up the whole creation He assumes at His will any
is
;
is
He
;
and worthy form, and He htfs accomplished the good of the whole world. He is the one collection of
desirable
know-
splendour, strength, sovereignty, great powers of ledge, excellent heroism, and other such qualities.
among the
high
highest,
and
in
Him, who
is
the Lord of the
is
higher and the lower, are never found the
He and
afflictions
all
He is the Lord in the other such undesirable things. individual form and also in the form of the totality ;
He He He
has an unmanifest nature and also a manifest nature. the Lord of
is
all,
the Seer of
all,
Knower
the
of
all.
powers, and is known as the highest possesses Lord. That, by means of which that Brahman who is devoid of all evil, pure, high, devoid of all blemishes all
and
is
This
90.
of one
is
form,
the Arvatla which
state of primordial
nature
niediately precedes
the
the the (jl
is
either
i.s
that
that
ini-
evolution of
various constituent elements of
These 'modifications' arc the con-
stituent principles of the universe such
the
Mahal or
A/iaiik,fi-ii
cgoity,
or attained
organs of activity,
and
gross elements
the 'great principle',
or
the
principle
of
the organs of perception, the
the
that
mind,
the
the subtle ele-
mcnts. 92.
These
are: fi) Sa/fra,
lity of goodness
universe.
as the
seen
lily of
passion
;
;
(2)
the quu-
Rajas, the qua-
(3) Tantas, the quali-
ty of darkness. 93.
These
ignorance,
'veils' arc:
(2)
impressions.' &c.
\'il>an
flj t
i
Karma
or
or
'innate
SRI-BHASHYA.
126 called
is
knowledge and
[V. P. VI.
5.
all
else
82 to 87.].
"O
(is
called)
I.
Part.
1.
ignorance."
Maitreya! The word denote the High-
used to
is
Bhagavat (Divine Lord,)
{Chap.
pure and is well known as the possessor of great sovereignty, and is the cause of all causThe syllable bha is associated with two meanings, es. est
Brahman who
vix.
that
He
He makes
is
all
materials ready (Tor creation), and
the upholder. Similarly, the meaning of the that syllable ga, O sage, is, that He is the leader (/. c. the preserver), the destroyer, and the creator. Bhaga (which is is
made up of these two syllables) tion to Him) of the (following)
is ,
an affirmation
six (qualities)
(in
rela-
in their en-
namely, sovereignty, heroism, renown, glory, knowledge and dispassion. The meaning of the syllable va is to the effect that all beings abide in Him, who is the Self of all beings and is also the Self of all, and that He (abides ) tirety,
in
beings and
all
is
therefore imperishable.
Knowledge,
power, strength, sovereignty, heroism, splendour all these are fully expressed by the word Bhagavat only evil (unSuch, desirable) qualities and other such things are not.
O
Maitreya, important word Bhagavat. (It is applied) to Vasudeva who is the Highest Brahman, and is not appliis
this
.cable to others.
Here, this word, denotes, by convention, a thing deserving of worship, and is not used in its secondary sense elsewhere, indeed, it is used in its secondary ;
O
[F. P. VI. 5. 72 to 77.]. "Wherever, king, these powers 94 are [established, there i-< another great Form of the Lord, which is different from His Universal
sense." all
Form, (34.
He, out of His own playfulness, causes that (Form
These are the three
path's
or
powers, viz. the Vishnu-'sakti which is the power of Vishnu and is the highct>t,
the
fCs/ulrajfla-iakti
or
the
power
of
the
the third power
individual is
self,
that which
is
and deno-
by the word avidya. or karma. Vide V. /'. VI. f. Oi to 70.
ted
Adhik.
Sul. /.]
1.'
SRi-BniSHYA.
127
of His) which is endowed with all power*, to become actively manifest under the names of gods, animals, and men. (intended) for the good of the worlds and is not produced by means of karma (/. c. the effect of works operating upon Him). The activity of that unknowable
That
(activity)
(Brahman)
[K
all-pervading and
is
P. VI.
Vishnu
is
manner, is, imdecaying and free from
of an irresistible nature."
"The
70 to 72.].
7.
in this
is
highest abode
stainless, eternal, all
evil."
called
all-pervading,
[F. P.
I.
22.
53.].
"The Supreme Self is high among those that are high and is the highest and is firmly established in the self (of all beings) and is devoid of the defining attributes of form, co;
lour,
&c.
He
is
free
from waste, destruction, modification,
growth, and birth and is capable of being spoken of absoBecause He abides everylutely as that which always is.
where and
all
Him, therefore He is called That Brahman is the highest, is
things abide in
Vasudeva by the learned.
eternal, unborn, indestructible, imperishable and is always of one nature, and is pure through the absence of evil. That alone is all this and is possessed of a manifest and an un-
manifest nature. Moreover, It exists in the form of Puriisha (or Person) as well as in the form of Time." [ V. P. I. 2. 10 to' 14.]. "The praknli (/. <>. nature) which has been
spoken of by me as possessing a manifest and an unman ifest nature, and the pnnisha (/. e. the self), are, both of them, absorbed into the Highest Self. And the Highest Self is the support of all, and is the Highest Lord. He is celebrated under the
name
of Vishnu in the
Vcdas and
in
the
Vedanta." \_V.P. VI. 4.39 CS: 40.]. "That Brahman has two forms, viz. the embodied and the unembodied. These
two possess
(respectively^ a destructible
ible nature,
and are found to
structible
that Highest
is
and an indestruct-
exist in all beings.
Brahman,
The
the destructible
indeis
the
128-
SRi-BnlSHYA.
whole of this world.
The whole
of this world
Part.
I.
\Chap.
7.
the mani-
is
power of the Supreme Brahman, in that which spreading light is (the manifestation) of
festation of the
same way the
located in "
fire
t
55
that
in
particular
The, power
57-]
known
a
as the kshelrajna**
similarly, the
spot."
of Vishnu (/.
is
[_V.
P.
the individual
c.
22.
I.
called the higher, self), is,
Another named avidva (igno-
lower (power).
rance) and karma is-said to be the third power, by which, O king, the all-pervading power known as the kshetrajila
completely enveloped. The power known as the kshetrajila acquires, on account of its being covered by that (avidyd :
is
or karma), circuit of
all
the ever-recurring miseries belonging to the
mundane
ferent degrees, 6 1 to 63.].
existence,
and
exists in all beings in dif-
O thou, protector of the
"O thou, the most
interrelated prakriti
earth."
[
V. P. VI.
intelligent one, the
and purusha
(/. c.
7.
mutually
nature and soul) are
encompassed by the power of Vishnu which pervades beings as their Self. That same power (of Vishnu) cause of their separation and interrelation
is
all
the Just
from a
mass of -water, the wind bears away hundreds of minute drops without itself being moistened (by as,
them), so also is that same power of Vishnu (related) to all that is of the nature si prakriti and puntsha" [T. P. II. 29 to 3 1.].
7.
"O
above-mentioned
is
thou, the best of sages, all this world undecaying, eternal and is subject to the
alternations of expansion
and contraction, birth and de-
[F. P. I. 22. 60.]. means of these and other such By passages, the Highest Brahman is (first of all) declared to be, by nature, free from
struction."
The name
95.
the
individual self goes
under
of kshetnijfia, because,
;hat condition,
it is
in
the knower of vhe
hhetra .
i.
which u
e.
is
of the material body, with
associated.
Adhik.
SRI-BH.ISHYA.
I. Sftt. /.]
even the smallest taint of all that nature which
is
characterised
and to be engaged, out of
by
129
is evil,
all
and to possess that
the auspicious qualities,
free sportiveness, in the creation,
preservation, destruction, inter-penetration, control, &c., of
the world
;
and then
all
the intelligent and non-intelligent all conditions
existences (in the universe), which exist in
and are undoubtedly real, are stated to be of the same form Brahman owing to their constituting His body, because the words sarlra] (embodiment), rftpa (form), tanu
as the
(bod}'), am'sa (part), sakti (power), vibhuti (glory), and the like, are used (in the above passages), and because also they are equated with 'That' (viz. the Brahman} and ;
then the intelligent thing glory of that (Brahman}, essential
nature, and
kshctrajiia
matter
;
owing to
and, (lastly),
of the kshctrajfia
it
(viz.
is
the
self),
said to exist (freely) in its
also (to exist)
in the
own
form of the
association with non-intelligent
its
laid
it is
(viz.
which forms the
the
down
self) is
that in the condition veiled
by the avidyd
(or ignorance) which is of the nature of meritorious and sinful actions, and that it has, in consequence, no unbroken
remembrance of
its
own
natural condition as intelligence,
but continuously thinks (of
itself) as existing in the form of things which possess a non-intelligent nature. Therefore, it is made out that the Brahman is possessed of attributes,
and that the world which is
undoubtedly
is
the manifestation of His glory
real also.
the passage -~" That in which differences have oc it is declared that vanished" the true [F./*. VI. /.~53.]> In
96.
Yida supra
p. 29,
where the trans-
lation of this passage, in
accordance
with the interpretation of the Adwaitins,
"
is
That
given in in
full
as
follows
:
which differences have va-
nished, which
is
pure existence, which
is
beyond the sphere of speech, which
is
self-knowing
gence. called
That
is
the Intelli-
Brahman by name."
SRl-Bn.vSHYA.
130
nature of the
self,
even when
L
[Chap.
Par/.
united with particular
it is
modifications of the prakriti, such as gods, men, &c., inexpressible
by words
tions in relation to
tinctions
and that
;
it,
like god,
because
it is
I.
c.,
which denote
distinc-
devoid of intrinsic
it is
is
'dis-
to be defined as wholly consisting
of intelligence and existence and is invisible (even) to the
;
and that
it is
self-knowing,
mind of one who has gone
through the practice of yoga (/. r. mental concentration and meditation). Therefore, from this (passage) the negation of the world does not follow.
we
arrived at,
reply that
If
it
is
asked, how this is In the context 97 thus: it
(wherein this passage occurs), yoga to bring about the
remedy mundane
be
is
stated to be the only of the circuit of
cessation
existence; then the constituent parts of the yoga mentioned up to pratyahara 08 and then with the intention of pointing out a good and worthy object for the purpose of accomplishing dharana** (or concentration),
are
;
two forms of the Highest Brahman i. c, Vishnu, which by the word power sakti are declared to consist of the divisions of the embodied and the unembodied. Then again the division called the embodied, that is the the
are denoted
kshetrajfta,
which
is
associated with non-intelligent matter
and is encircled by that ignorance (or avidyd) which is known as karma and forms the third power (of Vishnu), is affirmed to be bad and unworthy (for purposes of meditation) on account of its being connected with the three (undesirable) conceptions afterwards, the character of being a good and 1
:
97.
Vide
98.
Pratyahara means the withdraw-
V.
P. VI.
nl of the senses
7.
from external objects.
DharanT, means steady concentration of the mind on a particular 99.
object.
100. These conceptions are: (i)thc conception that we become the Brah-
man Himself; (2)
the conception that
we merely do the work (3) the conception that we become the Brahman and do the work. ;
Adhik.
I.
Stil.
worthy object
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
i.]
(to help concentration)
lation to the second division called the
131 is
denied (also) in re-
unembodied, which
is
devoid of ignorance, is separate from non-intelligent matter, and is altogether of the form of intelligence, on account of being an object worthy to be meditated upon only by accomplished yogiiis, and on account of its being incapable its
proving a support to the mind of a beginner in yoga, and also on account of its being devoid of uncaused intrinsic purity: (lastly), the embodied (universal) form (of the Brahoi
which
mati)
is
the seat of His three powers, viz. the higher
is this (above mentioned) unembodied (form the self), (other) lower power which is the (self's) embodied form called the kshctrajfta, and ignorance (or
power which
of the
avidya) which
is
of the nature of
karma and
is
known
as
power and which forms the cause of leading the which is of the nature of the higher power, to assume
the third self,
the condition of the kshetrajfia (this embodied form of the Brahman] which is peculiar to the Divine Lord, and is ascertained
by means of Vcddnta passages like"
sunlike lustre." \Svct.
Up.
III. 8.
&
B. G. VIII.
He
is
of
10> 9.]
declared to be the good and worthy object (for the accomplishment of dharana). In this context, the passage " That in which differences have vanished &c. " V. (this) is
[
VI.
7. 53.], is
P.
intended to show that the self which has the
pure unembodied nature is unfit to be a good and worthy object (for the accomplishment of dharana). According!}-, it
has been stated
(in
the same work, viz. VisJmu-Purana):
"O
king! That (unembodied -form of the Lord) is not fit to be meditated upon by one who begins the practice of yoga" [V. P. VI. 7. 55]. "The highest home which is the second (unembodied form) of
101.
Vide also
Taitt.
2r. III.
12. f.
Him who
is
called Vishnu
SRI-BHASHYA.
132
[Chap.
L
Part.
1.
Wherupon by yogins ever, O king, all the.se powers are established, there is another great Form of the Lord, which is different from His Universal Form". [V. P. VI. 7. 69 & 70.]. In the same manner, after stating that the (four-faced) is
fit
to
be meditated
Sanandana, and others who are beings inside the universe, are unfit to be good and worthy objects,
Brahma,
(to help concentration) owing to their being covered by means of ignorance (or avidya), the character of being (such a) good and worthy object is denied by the venerable Saunaka in- relation also to those bound souls in whom
knowledge is originated only later on by means of yoga, and who have (thus) realised their true nature, for the reason that they are themselves devoid of uncaused intrinsic It is stated (by Saunka) in the following and other purity. passages that the natural and peculiar form of Vishnu, who is the Highest Brahman, can alone be (such a) good and
worthy object cause
"Bethe accomplishment oidharana} of a from Brahma to things clump grass, that :
(for
all living
are within the world, are within the grasp of the ever chang-
ing circuit of mundane existence caused by karma, therefore, they are not helpful in meditation to those that
meditate.
Indeed, they are
all in
ignorance (or avidya} and
are subject to the ever-recurring succession of births and deaths. Those also in whom knowledge of truth is born later
on are not at
all
helpful in meditation.
Their knowledge
not natural to them, because it is derived from another source. Therefore that pure Brahman is, alone, by ~ CIV. 23 to 26] nature, full of (such) knowledge." [ V. DhS of truth
is
.
Consequently 102.
This
in this passage (viz. V.
Vishnu-Dharma forms a
of the Bfiaris/iyat-Puranx portion
and
is
P. VI.
7. 53.
said to have been taught
ka.
"That by S.iuna-
L
Adhik. in
Silt,
SRl-BHASHYA.
i.]
which differences have vanished
distinctions
is
",
133 &c.,) the negation of
not brought out.
in the passage "(I bow to Him alone) who in reals of the nature of ity intelligence," &c., \V. P. I. 2. 6.], is not established in relation to the whole aggreunreality gate of those objects which are distinct from intelligence, be-
Also
1
is
cause therein only this much prehension of the self, which
is
stated, viz. that the false ap-
is
of the nature of intelligence,
form of gods, men, and such other objects, is a mere Indeed, if it be said that the false apprehension oi
in the
illusion.
the mother-of-pearl as silver is an illusion, it does not follow that all the collection of silver in the world becomes the appearance of unity between and the world due to the fact of their being
There
thereby unreal. the
Brahman
is
grammatically equated (in the sdslras); and it may be urged that it is an illusion to apprehend, in consequence, the Brahman whose essential nature is Intelligence, in the form of things (other than Intelligence); and if it beheld when it is so urged, the whole collection of things in the world would acquire the character of falsity, (it is dethat
clared
in
reply
that (opinion)
that)
is
wrong
because,
;
Highest Brahman, who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all such evil things as ignothat Vishnu
who
rance and the qualities,
is
the
who
like,
and
in this saslra,
is
identified with all the auspicious
the owner of great sovereignty,
and
it is
in relation to
vision
is
Him.
103. This passage has been already
the stand-point
the Adwattint and effect
:
"(I
in reality
u
is
bow) to
of
to the following
Him
of the nature
alone of
taught
it will be presently of unity (between the
Moreover,
established, that the declaration
translated from
is
thus impossible to have any illusory
who
Intclli-
gence and devoid of
is
all
absolutely pure attributes),
(/. e.
and who,
nevertheless, exists in consequence of (our)
illusive vision
material objects.''
in
Vide
the form of supra, p. 29.
SRI-BHASHYA.
134
Brahman and
[Chap.
Part.
/.
1.
world) resulting from the fact of does not admit of .stultification and is their being equated, not opposed to reason. Therefore this passage also [viz. V.
P.
2.
I.
the
does not stultify the natural reality of
6.]
external objects. "
From Accordingly, from this scriptural passage, viz. whom all these beings are born, in whom, when born, they live, and whom they enter when they perish do thou ;
desire to III.
Up.
know i.
that well; that
i.], it
may
is
the
Brahman"
-[Taitt.
be concluded that the cause of the
the Brahman, but then we commandment, "The Veda should be amplified and supported by the Itihasas and the Pura4 because the Veda is afraid of him who has little nas, origin,
&c., of the world
is
;
learn from the sdstraic
'
[M.Bh. I. i. 264.], learning that he would do it wrong." that amplification and confirmation are necessarily to be effected with the help of the Itihasas and the Purdnas in to
relation
passage).
what
is
taught (here in the above scriptural support is indeed to elucidate
To amplify and
the meanings of the Vedic passages which are known to oneself by means of the sayings of those who know all the Vedas and their meanings, and who have, by the
power of their yoga, directly perceived the things constituting the truth of the Vedas. Amplification and
great
confirmation, indeed, have necessarily to be effected (in connection with the import of Vedic passages), because it is difficult to understand the meanings of all the passages
104,
An
Itihasa like the Jidrrtayatta
or the Maha.bha.rata. is
a.
work pur-
lion
of
form-possessing
and unconscious
conscious
bodies, genealogy of
known
porting to deal with ancient history.
the gods &c., periods of time
Purdiias are works which treat of the
as the Ma.mjuantaras, and the history
five topics, viz.
primordial creation or
evolution of matter, primordial crea-
of the dynasties of kings,
Adhik.
I.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sni. /.]
135
found in all the recensions of the Vedas by knowing only a small part thereof, and it is in consequence impossible to attain certainty without that (amplification and confirma.
Here
tion).
bow
to
c.
(/.
Him
in the context
who
alone)
Wherein the passage
in reality
is
"(I
of the nature of
"
occurs), Maitreya.'desires to get his own of the knowledge teachings of the Vedas amplified and hands of the reverend Parasara, who at the supported
Intelligence
was
in possession of that
knowledge of the reality of the he had obtained from Pulastya and which Highest Divinity Vasishtha as a boon bestowed upon him, and questioned (Parasara)
thus
" :
Again
I
wish to hear from you,
O
thou, the knower of religion and duty, how this world came into existence, and what will become of it again. O thou, glorious one, what does the world consist of? O thou, reverend one, whence (came) all this moveable and immoveable creation how and where was it hidden, and into what will it be absorbed?" [F.P.I, i. 4 & By means of these and other passages, the particular ;.]. ;
nature of the
Brahman, the
characteristics of the different
kinds of His glory, the nature of worshipping Him, the particular results (of such worship) are all here questioned
In the question regarding the particular nature of the Brahman, the efficient and material causes ( of the " Whence world) are enquired about in the query about.
(came)
all this
moveable and immoveable (creation)
(therefore), in the
"What
query
asked of what nature that world creation, preservation,
"And
does is
;
?"
consist of "--it
which
and destruction
the world
it
;
is
the object of and the reply to is
that (Brahman)." [-F! P. I. i. world with the Brahman) is the This sameness (of 31.]. due to the invariable association (of the world with the this
is
Brahman) on account
is
of His constituting the Self (there-
SkKBRvSHYA.
136
but
of) as its internal ruler;
is
Part.
I.
[Chap.
I.
not due to the oneness in
substance between the subject and the predicate (in the because proposition "And the world is that Brahman}" ;
the equation (between the world and the Brahman] in " And the world is that the passage (Brahman)" forms " What does it a. the world) the reply to the question (/. consist of
does
it
"
The
?
may at
affix
in
yanmavam
what
e.
(i.
consist of) 105 does not denote modification; other-
would
wise, this separate question
(relate to
what has
Xor
ready been asked and thus) be purposeless.
is it
al-
used
of importing that very thing itself which is word to which it is affixed, as in the case the denoted by of the word prdna-maya, ' c because the reply " And the in the sense
world
is
(Brahman)" -would be inappropriate
that
(in
such
a case). Indeed, in such a case, the reply should have been Vishnu Himself." 107 Hence that the world
"(And
is)
mayaf) imports only the abundance (of that thing which is denoted by the word to which it is attached). (Here) the affix may at is (used) in accordance with the (affix
which says ",The affix may at is (to be employed) wherever an abundance of a thing has to be expressed."
rule
105.
That
part,
of the sloka
contains the affix mavat
ch_i etat
1 06.
Here
i.e.
in
word prana-
mayat gives
word the power
of
very thing which
is
word priini
the
to
that
importing that denoted by the
itself; cf.
Pranamayam
itpasaiikramya.
Taitt.
Cp.
The equation between
man and
ties,
the Bra/i-
the world, contained in the
"
And
and
it
is
two different
that enti-
would become an identity mayat were to have no
When
significance.
make
world
the
posits
the affix
it
possible to
is
the affix mayaf signiikant, that
interpretation in which nificance, as
it
it
would do
supposition were
right,
loses all sigif
is.
the above
not held to
be correct according to the accepted rules
III. IO. 5.
107.
answer
Brahman" if
cfiaracjiaram.
rnaya, the affix
atmanam
:
brahman ya-
Yanmttyam hi jagat lah
which
as follows
is
of
literature.
interpretation
in '\'e
Adhik.
L
Sftt.
SRI-BHISHYA.
/.]
[Pdnini. V. 4. 21 J.
Certainly, the
body of that (Brahman) fore
it is
is
whole world being the
abundantly
full
of
Him. There-
"And
settled that the equation in the statement .
the world is that (Brahman}" " What does it consist of ?"
made
in reply to
the question
results from there being, betand the Brahman, the same relation as there between the body and the soul. Otherwise, all these
ween is
.137
the world
questions and answers sdstra which
is
would not be appropriate
admitted to be
ment of that thing which
is
in
the
devoted to the establish-
devoid of
all attributes
'and the
;
intended to be an explanation of that thing would also be thus inappropriate. Indeed, in such a case,
sdstra which
is
to the one question of the form illusion of the
this form, viz.
world
?"
there
" What
is
the
ba'sis
"Pure intelligence that
is
devoid of
in
all attri-
butes." If the equation (contained in the statement
the world
of the
would be only one answer
"And
that Brahman'} denote the unit}' of substance between the world and the Brahman, then the fact of His is
being the sole seat of myriads of auspicious qualities such as the quality of willing the truth, &c., as well as the fact of His being the opposite of all that is evil, would be stultified,and the Brahman would also become the seat of all evil. It
be established later on that the fact of (the Brahand the world) being equated denotes primarily
will
man
the same relation (between them) as there is between the soul and the body. Hence, by means of the passages " with commencing (The Supreme Self) is high among those that are high and is the Highest", &c., \_V.P. I. 2. 10.], (Parasara) proceeds to explain in extenso the idea briefly " The world came into existence conveyed in the stanza
from the will of Vishnu, and
altogether existent therethe cause of the preservation and destruction of this world, and the world is Himself." [F. P. I. i. 31.] ;
in.
He
is
IS
it is
SRI-BHISHYA.
I3 8
[Chap.
L
Part.
I.
and with that object in view, he first bows to the Divine Lord Vishnu,who is in His own natural form and is the Highest Brahman, by repeating the stanza commencing with " 108 and [V.P. I. 2. i.]; "(I bow) to the Immutable then again he bows to the same (Vishnu) who is existent in the form of the trinity made up of Brahma (the creator),
own
of His
incarnation (as Vishnu), and of Siva, and
(is
also
existent in the form of) prakriti (or nature), Time, ksheIrajfta (or the individual self), the aggregate creation and
the individual created beings. In that context, this stanza, which begins with- " (I bow to) Him (alone) who is in reality of the nature of intelligence," speaks of the nature of that Highest Self which entities this
known
is
which
stanza), the thing
form of the individual
in the
Therefore, here
as kshetrajftas. is
(/. e.
destitute of attributes
in is
not taught. If the sdstras relate to the establishment of that illu-
sion is
which
is
based upon the Brahman, whose nature intelligence devoid of attributes,
and simple)
(pure
then the objection-" How is it posssible for the Brahman who is without qualities, who is unknowable, pure and devoid of evil by nature, to be the agent in the acts of creation, &c.,
109
(of the world)?"
be inappropriate here
and
;
[V. P. 1.3. its
similarly
i.]
would
invalidation as
given in the following passage, would also be (inappropriate)" O thou, the best of ascetics, there are, in all
things,
powers which cannot be brought within the sphere of thinkable (or explicable) knowledge, and for that very same 108.
follows
The whole :
"(I
Vishnu who
of this stanza
is
as
bow) to the Immutable is
eternally
forms the Highest
Self,
pure and
who has
a
uniformly homogeneous nature and
is
the
'
'
conqueror
or,
in other words,
the possessor of all." 109.
The
et cetera
here implies pre-
servation and destruction in to the world.
relation
Adhik.
&e.
I.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
139
reason, those acts of creation, &c., constitute the inherent
powers of the Brahman,
(inexplicable)
the inherent power) of if that be the case (/. e.
ment of
[F. P.
fire." if
as heat (constitutes
I. 3. 2
&
3].
Indeed,
the sdstra relate to the establish-
illusion as aforesaid),
then the (above
mentioned)
objection (in regard to the sdstra declaring the thing that
devoid of attributes ), and
is
run thus
:
(i).
How
is
its
refutation
that the
it
would
(severally)
Brahman which
is
devoid of qualities becomes the agent in the acts of creation, &c ? (ii). The creation proceeding from the Brahman is not but
real,
really
is
manufactured by
to this effect
is
]
saliva,
karma
;
c., who and so, how
are is it
But the objection
illusion.
The work
who
with those
in association '
"
of creation, &c.,
possess the
possible for
who
is
of
bound by
Him who perfect,
seen
qualities
imperfect, and are
of the qualities of saliva, &c.,
is
is
devoid
who
not
is
bound by karma, and who cannot have any association with karma, (how is it possible for such a Person) to be the agent in the acts of creation, this objection also all
powers
in
the
able things and
And
&c ?
"
really to this effect
is
Brahman, who
is
distinct
the answer to
The union
from
of
all
perceivaltogether of the aforesaid nature, is
is
not incompatible with reason, in the .same way in which the association of the power of heat, &c., with fire, &c.,
which are
distinct
with reason). The statement
from water, &c., 1
'
J
,
&c.," [F. P. 1
10.
These are
ftajas, passion,
ill. This I.
4. 38.
I. 4.
is
:
38.],
"
Thou alone
Satlva, goodness,
and 7'awas, darkness. its
meaning according
to the Adwtutifts (vide p.
not incompatible
art the only reality,
does not also speak of the unreality
half of the stanza, V. P.
And,
(is
2(). sii/-a').
has been already given as follows "O Lord of the universe Thou alone :
!
art the
other."
only reality and there
is
none
SRI-J3HA.SHYA.
140
[Chap.
L
Part.L
of the whole (world), but (speaks only of) the unreality of that thing the existence of which is (held to bej independent of That (viz. the Brahmaii), the reason being that the
whole (world) has that (same Brahman} Parasara) declares again the
by which
greatness
Because
this
112 Thine." [ V. P. I. 4. 38. ]. pervaded this moveable and immoveable (creation) is is
is
(creation)
all
He (i.e.
for its Soul.
same thing thus " That moveable and immoveable
all
pervaded by Thee, therefore, all this has Thee for its Soul; and so there is nothing other than Thee. Hence, as being alone art the only reality. Hence all, Thou has been stated that what constitutes Thy great-
the Self of (also)
ness
it
Thy
is
omnipenetrativeness.
have been stated that it
(viz.
Otherwise
should
it
Thy omnipenetrativeness)
is
an
and the expressions 3
]
illusion; '
of the context wherein the Divine Lord's great boar incarnation is glorified as He is sportively lifting up the earth (from beneath the waters).
The whole world is, as if by its Thee who art of the nature of by
Thy body;
constitutes
means
the
pervaded
Soul,
intelligence,
who do
therefore those,
and
not pos-
of
perceiving (the world) as having out through illusory percepSoul, tion that this (world) is altogether made up of gods, sess
Thee men,
for its
and
other
make
such
things
;
Parasara,) says in this connection
112. This
stanza V. P. 113.
ed in
is I.
accordingly,
he
e.
"This which appears,
the second half of the
thus in the Sanskrit original:
4. 38.
m^rthah tvam eva ekah
These expressions are containV. P. I. 4. 38., which runs
(/.
j iga'ah pate
tava \
rya/>!anl elat
e>>liah
tta
Para-
anva/i asti
niahimft yena
chardfhnram.\
Adhik.
I.
SRi-BnlSHYA.
Snt. /.]
141
&c. [V.P. 1.4.39.]."*
To
perceive the world, which, in reality, has Thee for Soul, as made up of gods, men, and other such things
its
illusion in itself; but the perception which the individual souls, that have the nature of apprehends intelligence, as though the}" were made up of gods, men, is,
no doubt, an
and other such material configurations, accordingly, he (/. "All this (world)
c. is
"3
is
an
also
illusion;
connection
Parasara) says in this
of the nature of intelligence,
[V.P. 1.4.40.] Those who, on the other hand, are
&c."
and understand the self, the nature of which is intelligence, and whose minds are well purified by the acquisition of what gives rise to the experience that the whole (universe) has the Divine Lord for
its
Soul,
intelligent
they perceive that
has the characteristics of the body, being
world
all this
(itself)
made up of
such particular modifications oiprakriti (or nature) as gods, men, &c., and then look upon it as constituting Thy body,
and
as
having Thee, who art different from the body and hast
the essential nature of intelligence, for its Soul ingly, he (i.e. Parasara) says in this connection
who know what This stanza
114.
Adivaitins
the
is
understood by " This
is
as
knowledge, &c."
follows:
appears embodied belongs to
which
Thee who art of the nature of Intelligence and those who are not Yogins ;
(i.e.
those
upon
it,
who
are
ignorant)
on account of
perception, as though
look
(their) illusive it
formed the
Vide supra p. 29. 115. This stanza is interpreted by the Adwailins thus: "All this world
world."
is
of the nature of Intelligence. Igno-
rant
men
[
V.
P.I.
look upon
it
:
accord"
Those
4. 41.].'
as
though
16
it
were made up of material things, and are tossed to and fro in a flood of
Vide supra
illusions."
116. This stanza as
p. 29.
interpreted
by
\heAdwaitins has been already given as follows "Highest Lord! Those :
who know what
is
knowledge, and
whose minds are pure, look upon the whole world as being made up of Intelligence and as consisting of Yourself."
Vide supra
p. 29.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
142
Otherwise, repetition
;
[Chap.
L
Part.
I.
the stanzas, there would be a redundant the words (therein) would acquire a figurative
among
(or secondary) significance
;
there would be the contradic-
out by perception and the other means of knowledge), the contradiction of the context, and also the contradiction of the purport of this sdslraic tion of things (as
made
work. 117
"Although he
In this stanza also, namely,
found in one's
own body and
gence) which
one and simple, &c.,"
what
is
is
meant
is,
is
in that of all others, [
V.P.
to
be
(intelli-
II. 14.31.],'
'
8
that, while all the individual selves are
similar in nature for the reason that they solely consist of intelligence, the perception
of duality (or difference) in
relation to individual selves, as
though they
owing which are
(also),
to their association with certain material masses,
and are known the had nature of men, &c., gods, &c., (that
particular as gods,
modifications- of the prakriti
perception of difference) is unreal. The duality (or difference) found to exist in relation to masses of matter, and (the duality or difference) found to exist in relation to indivi-
The meaning
dual souls are not in fact denied (here).
is,
that the thing called the self, which exists in (association with) the varied and wonderful masses of matter known
men, &c., is all alike and to that same effect has been declared by the Lord (Himself) in the following and other similar passages: "The learned look alike
as gods,
;
it
The
117.
ed
is
the
sastra:c
work here mention-
Vishnu- Pur ana of Paras'ara
from which the above stanzas
[I. 4.
38 to 41.3 as well as others, are
all
quoted, as the references given above
show, 1 1
8.
Adwaitins
to be in
p. 29.
where the
made
of
all
to
quote this
:" Although
found in one's
that
which situtes
Vide supra
are
stanza as follows
He
is
own body and
others,
Intelligence
one and simple indeed conHis reality. Dualists see
is
things wrongly."
Adhik.
I.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sut. i.]
(or a
upon a dog and upon an outcast G. V. i8.];
119
alike
in
all
in the passage,
own body and in
[B.
the indi-
e.
(i.
(by nature) devoid of all evil and Accordingly, 19.]. [/?. G. V. beings."
vidual soul here) is
Chanddla)"
brahman
the
"Indeed,
143
is
"Although he
is
found
to be
one's
in
others, &c.," [V. P. II. 14. 31.], the distinction between one's self and that of another is also
distinctly
thing which
is
that of
all
mentioned as existing other than the body
relation to
in (viz.
the
the
individual
soul).
In this passage also which begins with " any other like me or any other unlike me
" If there were
[V. P. II. 13. the essential individual souls is not of 90.],' identity because it is not admissible to use the word para taught, (which means another like me) and the word any a (which 20
means another unlike me] in one and the same sense, as " If there were though the statement meant any one other
me
than
There
other than me."
(/.
c.
in that passage), the
word/ara (which means another) denotes the distinct from one's own self; and in as much
self
which
is
as that (self)
altogether of the nature of intelligence, the word anya (or different) means the negation of any other nature (to " If the self than that of What is said is this also
is
intelligence).
some
individual self other than
:
my own
ent nature from intelligence which 119.
follows
The whole
of this stanza
is
as
"
The learned look alike person who has an abundance
:
upon a of know ledge and humility, upon a Brahmana, a cow, an elephant, a dog, and an outcast." 120.
This sloka runs thus
Sanskrit original
:
in
the
Yadi anyah ash
parahkahapimattahpdrthh'Qsatttima
\
is
self
be of a
differ-
my nature, then, it is
tadd eshah ayam ay am cha any ah vaktum evam api ishyate.\ Vide supra p. 29. where the Adwaitins interpret it
as follows
of kings,
if
:
"Q there
them,
were
the
best
any other
like me, or any other unlike (or different from) me, then alone would it be
proper to say that such an one and such an one is not me,"
is
me
SRI-BHISHYA.
-J44
possible to mention erent nature.' But it
'
am
I
{Chap.
of this nature, he
not seen to be
is
so,
Part.
I.
is
of a
because
I.
diff-
all ("the
individual selves) are wholly of the nature of intelligence, and are therefore undoubtedly alike in nature."
In this passage also which begins with "It is in consequence of the difference due to the holes in a flute", - * what is declared is that the difference [V. P. II. 14.32],' of character in relation to the individual selves is not due to
their essential nature, but
(various) masses of matter
is
due to their having entered the as gods, c.; and it is not
known
(declared herein) that all the selves are one (in essence).
In
the illustrative example also, there is no substantial sameness between the particles of air which are associated with the several holes (of the flute), but there
is
only similarity of
nature (between them). Indeed, those (particles of air) are all of one character, because they possess the same aerial nature &C.,
;
--
1
and they have a variety of 'names 'such as shadja, because they pass out through a variety of holes.
In the case of the individual selves also, the variety of names, such as gods, &c., results in a similar way. The ,
things which form portions of the elemental substances fire, water, and earth are one in nature with those substances,
on account of their being themselves made up of those (but really) there can be no essenparticular substances ;
between them
c. between the part and the (/. whole). Thus it has necessarily to be accepted that the various particles of air are also distinct from each other in
tial
identity
essence, (though similar in nature). 121.
This stanza
is
on pp.
ing to the pitch of the sound) result
" It
to the air, which pervades all without
found
29
&
30. to the
is,
in
consequence of the difference due
following effect
:
to the holes in a flute, that the distinc-
tions
named Shadia
&c.,
(correspond-
distinction;
just
so
is
it
the case
with the Highest Self." 122.
Vide supra
n. 25. p. 29.
Adhik.
I.
Sill.
In the stanza 1
he
SRi-BHiSHYA.
/.] 2 3
with" He is myself and
which begins
yourself" [V. P.
is
recalls to
II.
16. 23
145
e.
&24.],he(/.
mind, by means of the word
Parasara)
'he', the aforesaid
character of intelligence belonging to
individual
all -the
selves; then concludes, from myself, yourself, &c., being (here) grammatically equated, that intelligence alone con-
denoted by myself your" Give he at last and says up that illusion of self, &c.; distinction between individual selves which is based upon stitutes the character of the things
the
distinction
of such
,
material forms
gods, &c."
as
which is to be taught from the body, it would
in relation to that (self)
Otherwise, here as being essentially different not be appropriate to point out those differentiations (in the
forms of
ment that
/, /,
thou, &c.,) that are .to be found in the state-
and
thou,
And
all this
have the essential nature of
not also possible for the words 7, thou, &c., to be the accidental indicators (of the nature of the self), because they are grammatically equated with what
the
self.
it is
constitutes the thing that has to be so indicated
by means
of accidental attributes; that
with
all this
is, (because they are equated) has the essential nature of the self. It is said
that he (viz. the person so taught) acted up to that teaching, and "gave up the idea of distinction after seeing the highest reality." If it be asked, how this conclusion (of ours)
is
arrived at,
(we reply) that
it is
arrived at because
the teaching has reference to the process of discrimination between the body and the soul. And that (teaching) begins 123.
This stanza runs
krit original
as follows
in :
the SansSalt a/iam
sa cjMj.vam sa cha sarvam etat atmasu-arfipam tyaja tt'na
sa
bhedamoham \
rajavaryah
tafyiija
itJniah
bhedam
paramarthadrishtih\ This stanza has been already trajislate.d on p. .30,
19
"
supra thus is
yourself
the
:
and
Self.
great
is
myself, and
Give up the
distinctions.
that
He
all this is
He
same
as
illusion
of
the
Thus taught by him, ;
king,
saw the Highest
Reality and gave up distinctions,"
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
146
[Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
"
Because the body which is characterised by head^ hand, &c., is distinct from the puntsha (i.-e. the self)" \V P. II. 13. 89.].' 2 *
thus
:
.
" When the knowledge stanza 123 beginning with which gives rise to distinctions", [F. P. VI. 7. 96.] is also not intended to establish the essential oneness in the
The
Xor
nature of individual selves.
it
(is
intended to estab-
the essential oneness) of the individual self and the The essential oneness of the indiviSupreme Self.
lish
negatived in the manner already stated. also no essential identity between the individual
dual selves
There
is
is
and the Supreme (there is no essential self
the
individual
Self,
identity)
To
self.
way in which between the body and
the same
in
indeed, are the fol-
this effect,
" Two birds, which lowing and other Veddntic passages similar and are attributes inseparable friends, cling possess :
same tree ; one of them eats the sweet pippala while the other shines in splendour without eating fruit, at all." \Mitnd. Up. III. i. i.]; "Those who know the
to the
Brahman, and who have worshipped the the trinachiketa
fire,
and
five fires
declare that there are the
two
also
that
->c
the reward of works in the world of good deeds, that they have entered into the cave (of the heart), in the 1
enjoy
transcendentally excellent ether of which they reside and are as
shadow and
sunlight."
who
has entered within, born, and is the Self of 124. is
The
latter half of this
hy
am T?"
which of these
this 125.
name
of
I
all."
sloka
i.]
;
"He
things that are In this At: III. [Taitt. 24.]. where
it is
all
given as follows
:
"When
the knowledge
which gives
to designate
distinctions has
undergone complete
:
destruction, (then),
This stanza has been already
translated while stating the
of the
l?p. III.
[Kath.
the ruler of
There-
to the following effect
fore
"
is
position
Adwat'tins.^Vide supra p. 30.
unreal
the self
who
difference
will
rise
create
between
and the "Brahmanl"
126. Literally, drink in.
to
the
Adhik.
L
sdstraic
work
SRi-l3HASkYA.
Sut. /.]
(also, viz.
147
the Vishnu-Purdna), the distinction and the Supreme Self) is declar-
the individual self
(betwen ed in the
" He (viz. following manner sage the Lord) transcends the praknli (wliich forms the natural and material foundation) of all beings, (transcends) all its
est,
all
the Self of
is
and by Him He is of that
all veils,
is
and
in
Him, who
pervaded
He
is
that
all
nature which
auspicious qualities....
the afflictions and
!
the blemishes (arising out) of all, has passed be-
all
He, who
the universe.
by
and
modifications,
its qualities.
yond
O
:
among
high
is
within
characterised
is
the high-
the Lord of the higher and the lower, other such undesirable things have no
is
all
"
Another (power) named karma and is said to be the third ignorance) avidya (or O the king, all-pervading power known as power by which, place."
V. P. VI.
[
the kshetrajfia
is
5.
83 to 85.]
-
7
completely enclosed."
&62.]: and (the same aphorisms
'
;
also, viz.
'
-
8 [
V. P. VI.
Madhyandina]
1
"And
is
sions Qt\\\QBn]iaddranyaka-(Jpa)iishad, viz. the
the
7. 6
taught) in the following both of them (i.e. both the recen-
difference
speak of
it (/. c.
Kdnmi and
of the individual
self) as
being different (from the internal Ruler who is the Highest)." [Ved. Sut. I. 2. 21.]; "And on account of the declaration of difference, (the
Supreme
Self is) different (from the indi-
vidual self)." [Ved. Sui. I. i. 22.] ; "(The Brahman is) indeed other than (the individual self), because of the (scriptural) declaration of difference (between them)." [ Ved. Sut. II. ic
i.
22.].
texts, viz.
Whom
self,
self
and
Who
"
Moreover, the following and other Veddnt-
He who
dwelling in the self, is within the the self does not know, Whose body is the internally rules the
&c)." [Mddh. Bnh. Up.
127.
Vide
supra, p. 125.
III. 7.
self.
22.];
(He
"He
is
is your Self embraced by
I2S. Vide mifra p. 133
SRI-BHASHYA.
148
the omniscient Self." [Brih. Up.
upon by the omniscient
[Chap.
4. 3. 21.];
I.
"He
Part.
L
ridden
is
[Bn'/i. Up. IV. 3. 35.], determine that the essential nature of the individual self Self."
and that of the Supreme Self are both of a mutually exclusive character. (For all these reasons there can be no substantial unity between
Supreme
the
individual self
and the
Self).
Moreover, in the case also of one who has been released from avidya by adopting the means (intended therefor), there cannot be essential unity with the Supreme Self, (which is incapable of being the seat of avidya or ignorance); because that which is capable of being the seat of ignorance can never acquire the character of what is (naturally unfit to be the seat thereof. To the same effect, it is taught )
" If the following passage it be held that the identity of the Highest Self with the individual self is the highest in
:
truth,
it
which
is
hold so); because any substance different from another cannot indeed acquire the
wrong
is
(to
character of that other substance."
[V. P.
II.
14. 27.].
Be-
stated in the BJiagavad-Gltd, that a released sides, soul attains only His character, (but not His essential na" ture) Depending upon this knowledge, those who attain sameness 129 of nature with are not born at the it
is
:
Myself
time of creation, and are not hurt at the time of dissolution." [B. G. XIV. 2.]. Here (/'. c. in the Vishnu-Pnrdna) also, "O there is the following passage to the same effect sage, that Brahman, by His own power, makes this :
worshipper, who is deserving of a change of state for the better, acquire His own nature in the same way in which a magnet makes the metal acquire its own magnetic
iJ<j.
The
idea
is
soul possesses the
Supreme
Self,
that the released
same nature as the
but does nut become
one Self.
in
substance with the Supreme
Adhik.
1.
SuL
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
149
7. 30.]. The word tltmabhdva (in this means His own nature. Surely, the thing which is stanza) attracted does not become identical with that which attracts. Says (the same thing the Sutrakara) also thus "Except
character." \V. P. VI. '
3
:
in the
matter of the activity relating to (the creation &c.,
of) the world, (the
all the powers Lord Himself forms) the topic of the contexts (wherein the above-mentioned activity is referred to), and because also (the individual
released souls possess
belonging to the Lord), because (the
not mentioned (therein)." \Ved. SuL IV. 4. 17.]; on account of the characteristic of equality (between
souls) are
"
And
the individual confined to
and the Supreme
self
enjoyment "-\_Ved.
Si'tt.
Self)
IV.
4.
being solely
"And
21.];
on account of (the Brahman) being taught to be that which to be approached by the released (souls.)" [ Ved. Sut.
is
The
I. 3. 2.].
"
Except
in the
Vritti also (of
Bodhayana)
states
thus --
it
:
matter of the activity relating to the creation
of the world, (the released soul)is equal to the Highest Light (/. c. to the Brahman}." And the commentator Dramida also says " On account .'of close association with the Deity, he who is devoid of the body (/. e. the released soul)
may become capable of enjoying all desirable
objects like the
Deity Himself." (To the same effect) are also the following
and other
scriptural texts
having known
after
the
:
"Those who depart from here, and also His eternal and
Self
auspicious qualities, for them there is free all the worlds." \Qihdnd. Up. VIII.i. 6.]
knows the Brahman
"He
i.i.];
130.
thus:
brahma
The
attains the Highest."
movement ;
"He who
[7a///.
Up.
attains, with the intelligent Brahman,
stanza quoted above runs
^tmalhavam dliydyinam
nayati entim nnine \
tul
vik&ryam
iitHianah
yathii\
laklyH
in
loliain
ak
all
II.
the
I
SRi-feHiSHYA.
5o
[Chap.
L
Part.
"He
c.
L
the
II. i. i.] ; (/. auspicious qualities." [Taitt. Up. of consists which Self that reached released self), having
and moving about in all these worlds, enjoying whatever things he likes, and assuming whatever form he likes, Hd, vnhd, vftha, vft)." singing this saman. (sits down about there." [Ckhdnd. moves "He 10. III. 5.]; [Taitt. Up. He. Having obis indeed "Bliss 12. 3.]; Up. VIII. tained this very Bliss, he becomes blissful." [Taitt. Up. II. bliss
"
Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, so also the wise man, freed from 7. i.]
;
who is higher "Then the 2.8.];
form, reaches that Divine Person
name and
than the highest."
[Mund. Up.
III.
wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untaintthe Brahed, attains the highest degree of equality (with
man)"
[Mund. Up.
III. 1.3.].
"
Bliss and In the following and other aphorisms other qualities (have to be assumed in all the vidyds} ^ 31 because the possessor (of those qualities happens to be the
same Brahman
in all the vidyds)."
[Ved. Sfit. III. 3. 1 1.]; not differ in their redo the vidyds) they (viz. choice is freedom of [ Vcd. (in regard to them)." sults,there it is stated by the Sntrakara himself that Snt. III. 3. 57.], " Because
the qualified Brahman alone is the object of worship in all the vidyds relating to the Supreme Being, that the result (of all such meditations or forms of worship) is of one and the
same
nature,
131.
The
and
that, therefore, there
Vidyas are forms of vvor-
For example, the
ship.
danavidya.
ped
as
the
the universe.
is
taught to be worshipself-existent Soul of
Similarly the Prahir-
is
freedom of choice
a form of worship taught by Indra in Kaush. Up.
to Pratardana
Sad-vidyd
taught to Svetaketu in Chhand. Up. VI. is that form of worship in which the 'Brahman
is
The Daharavidya
III.
form of worship
man ^
is
residing
in
is
another
which the Bra/i-
taught to be worshipped as -null within the etherial
space of the heart. CJihand, Up. VIII.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
Adhik.LSui.i.]
151
By the Vakya-kara (Taaka) also, " That (object to be attained) is what is possessed (of qualities), because worship relates to that which
in regard to the vidyds. in the passage
it is
possesses qualities"
stated that the qualified
Brah-
man alone worthy of being the object of worship, and that there is freedom of choice in regard to the is
vidyds (relating to the attainment of the Brahman). This is also similarly explained by the commentator (Dramidachar" Even when one is 3 ya) in the passage beginning with 1
bent upon meditating on (the Brahman as) pure existence." This passage " He who knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman indeed." \_Mimd. Up. III. 2. 9.], has import the same thing as the following and other "Freed from name and form, he reaches the passages:
to
Divine Person
who is higher than
the highest." \Mund. Up. III. 2. 8.]; "Being untainted, he attains the highest degree of equality (with the Brahmaii}'.' [Mttnd. Up. III. i. 3.]; " reached the Having Highest Light (/. e. the Brahman) he the released soul) manifests himself in his own true therefore, here also, [Qthand. Up. VIII. 3. 4.)
(/. e.
form." one,
;
who
is
prakriti (or nature) resulting
name and form that belong to and who is destitute of the distinctions
freed from the
from that (name and that form),
the same character as the also
This passage
is
quoted
full in
the Vedartha-sahgraha of
ntija
and
it
no,
sntrjntto
gnn.tm
said to possess
he
(then) solely of the nature of intelligence. Moreover,
is
132.
Brahman,
is
for the reason that
runs
thus
in
Rama-
Yadyapi
:
nirbhugnadan'atam gxnv-
manasftnudkavet tathapyantar-
gunameva
devatiim
sagunaira
deratd
meaning
is:
bhajata
iti
tatrafli
Its
prilfiyatf.
Even when one
is
bent
upon meditating on the T$rqhman as
pure existence, one should not steudiin
ly
pursue
a
collection
one's
own mind merely
of qualities as unassoci-
ated with the Deity
;
even then, one
Deity alone which is possessed of qualities, and so, in such a case also, that deity alone which is worships that
possessed of qualities
is
attained,
SRI-BHISHYA.
152
I.
[Chap.
Part.
I.
thing possesses the same nature as another, then the experession that this thing is the same as that other has a real and natural significance, 133 as, in the instance,
when one
" This (thing) here
an ox." Here also
is
"
(i.e.
the Vishnii-
in
O king,
that which leads (us) to the object of (our) attainment (viz. the Brahman] is knowledge. Similarly, what has to be led (unto the Brahman] is Puranci) in the passage
whom
the individual self in
all
the bhdvanas* 34 are extin-
it is (first) declared that, by \V. P. VI. 7. 93.], meditating on the Highest Brahman, the individual self,
guished."
who
Highest Brahman, freed from all the bhafrom the three. 35 bhavanas, namely, karma-
like the
is,
1
vands, that
is,
bhdvand, brahma-bhdvand and nbhava-bhdvand, becomes worthy to be led (unto the Brahman] then in the pas;
"O,
sage
thou, the twice-born one, the kshctrajila (or the
individual self)
is
and knowledge
final release),
at his disposal.
Vide supra
133.
for
conceptions
indulging
logy, a fi/idvand
kdra
i.
p. 4. n.
is
the mind-substance.
wrong conceptions referred to above are: (i). The conception that
in
wrong
In Indian psycho-
spoken of as a sams-
an innate tendency. Memory (smriti) and bhdvand (conception) are both
and curiously
classed
as samskdras,
enough
elasticity (sthitiathdpaka) also
spoken of as a samskdra the idea being that, just as the elasticity of
is
;
bodies
is
The
final
the innate
as an innate impression or
e.
is
10.
regarding the ultimate
nature of things.
means (for obtaining the means which is thus
After accomplishing the end, namely,
mean here
134. Bhai'anas
tendencies
the owner of the
no more than a tendency
three lihava-
tiasor
we merely do
and
Brahman, that,
the work, (2) the con-
we wholly become
that
ception
the
(3)
on the other hand,
work and
also
as
we do
the-
become the Bra/iman.
seems to be held here it is
the
conception
wrong
It
that, in religion,
to rely solely
upon the
performance of prescribed duties, as to believe in the possibility of our attaining the
identity
in
essence
with
impressed upon the particles of those
because the perfection of the individual indeed constitutes
memory and conception
the true goal of every true religion.
bodies.so also,
are innate tendencies impressed
upon
Supreme
135.
Self;
Vide nn. 100.
&
134., supra.
Adhik.
I.
release,
it (/. e.
Sut. i.}
means, having it is
7. 94.],
SRI-BHISHYA.
153
that knowledge) will cease to operate as a fully
performed
its
functions."
which
stated that the means,
is
[V. P. VI. in the form
of the meditation of the Highest Brahman, ceases to operate as a means, after having fully performed its function in
the its
way of causing, to the individual self, the attainment of own nature which is free from all the bhavands and ;
then
it is
practised
then at
said that, in consequence, meditation should be till
the accomplishment of the end in view
;
and
the essential nature of the released self is thus 136 " described in the following passage Having then attained the state which corresponds to the nature of that last
:
'
{Brahman}, he (viz. the released self) becomes ent from the Highest Self, and distinctions (in
non-differ-
'
relation to
him) are the products of his ignorance." [V. P. VI. 7. 95.]. (Here) the word tadbhdva means the bhava of the BrahHis nature
(but it does) not (import) the substantial unity (between individual self and the Supreme Self); because, if it did, the second word bhava, in
man, that
is,
;
the expression tadbhdvabhdvamdpannah, would be of no use, and because also there would then arise the contra-
Whatever constitutes
diction of the teaching given before.
the condition wherein the all
Brahman is completely free from
the bhavanas, the attainment of that
is
the attainment of
the state corresponding to the nature of that {Brahman). When one has (thus) attained that state, then one becomes 'noo-different' free
from the Supreme
Self,
from difference. This (individual
that is, one becomes self),
by reason of its
possessing the nature of intelligence, is itself of the same character as the Supreme Self, and hence its difference from
136.
This passage
original
:
is
as follows in the
Tadbhav ibhavamapanws
?0
ta-
adsau
paramatmana
\
bhavatyabhedt
bheaa'scjka tasyajilanakrito bhavet\
SRI-BHISHYA.
154
Him
consists
in
its
[Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
having the form of gods and other
The
(material embodiments).
association of this (individual
self) with such (an embodiment) results from the ignorance which is of the nature of karma, but is not due to its own
When karma, which has the nature of the root of all distinctions in the form and forms ignorance of gods, &c., is destroyed by means of the meditation of essential nature.
the Highest Brahman, then that distinction of gods, &c., ceases to be, owing to the cessation of the cause thereof;
and accordingly, he
the released soul) does not differ
(/. e.
(from the Brahman}. It is thus stated in this passage: "But the distinction of one individual self (from other simi-
which are
lar selves)
all
of the same nature results from the
external covering of karma. to them)
relation
&c., (in
When
the distinction of gods, ceases to exist, the covering
altogether ceases to exist, and indeed he alone remains.'' V. P. II. 14. 33.]. The same thing is explained elsewhere " thus When I
knowledge which produces
:
distinctions has
who
will create the undergone complete destruction, (then) unreal difference between the self and the Brahman?' [V. 87
(Here) the word vibheda means various kinds of distinctions, such as those which are found in the (varied) forms of gods, animals, men and immoveable things.
P. VI.
96.].'
7.
This same thing
is
fourfold
distinction
ledge."
[
7
J
.
Dh.
by Saunaka
stated also
C. 20.].
is
also thus:
"This
false
know-
dependent upon
The meaning
is this:
Ignorance,
otherwise called karma, forms, in regard to the individual self which is of the nature of intelligence, the cause of the various kinds of distinctions, such as gods, &c.; and when it is totally destroyed by means of the meditation 137.
the
This stanza
original:
as follows
is
Vibhedajanake
n
\
in
jilane
atmapo brah-
mano bhedam yati\
asantam
Vide supra
p.
kah
30.
karish-
Adhik.
Brahman, then who
of the Highest ceive,
SRI-BHASHYA.
I. Sat. /.]
between the individual
is
155 there that will per-
self and the
Highest Brahman,
the distinction that consists injiaving the forms of gods, &c., which owing to the non-existence of the cause thereof, has itself
In this very work itself (/. e. in " has indeed been stated that An-
become non-existent
?
Vishnu-Purana) it other (power) named avidyd and karma (forms the third 188 In the power of the Brahman}" \V. P. VI. 7. 6i.].
the
passage
"And know
also the kshetrajfta (or the individual
[B. G. XIII. 2.], and in others, the declaration of oneness (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) is based on the (Brah-
same
self) to be the
man)
as Myself."
constituting the Self of
all in
the form of their internal
ruler. Otherwise, there would arise the contradiction of " The the following and other passages destructible is (made all is created and it stated that beings, up of) :
the indestructible
from these 17.].
is
the eternally unchangeable. Different Highest Person." [B. G. XV. 16
&
the
is
In this very
work
(viz.
the Bhagavad-Glta),
it is
by the Lord Himself that He is the Self in the form of their internal ruler, as for instance,
explicitly stated
of
all
the passage " O Arjuna, the Lord exists in the region of the heart of all beings." [B. G. XVIII. 61.], and also " And I am in the passage also seated in the heart of The same thing is also declared all." [B. G. XV. 15.]. "O in the passage Gudakesa, I am that Self who is established in the interior of all beings." [B. G. X. 20.]. 39 in
1
In
fact, (here),
the word bhuta denotes the body which Because He is the Self of all, for
includes the self also.
that very reason,
things constitute His body ; and hence their separate existence is negatived in the passage 138.
Vide supra
all
p. 128.
139. This passage
is
as follows in
the
original:
A/itim
sarvaMiitasayasthitak.
t
guddkcla
SRI-BHASHYA.
156
L
[Chap.
Part.
L
"That exists [not which is without (Me)." \B. G. X. 39.]. This passage contains the summary of the Lord's sovereign glories, and has therefore to be understood to possess such a significance (as has been given above). Next to this, it "Whatever thing is full of glory, or of wealth, or is stated of power, know thou that particular thing to proceed from [B. G. X. 41.], and "I stand splendour." world by a small part (of supporting the whole power)." 1 4 there [B. G. X. 42.]. Therefore, in all the sastraic works, a part of
My
My
is
no establishment of that thing which
butes, nor
is
is
devoid of
attri-
there the establishment of illusoriness in regard
to the totality of perceivable objects, nor also
is
there the
negation of the natural difference between the individual self, non-intelligent matter, and the Lord. It
has been also declared 141
by the Purvapakshins
to
the following effect: The whole universe, with its infinite distinctions in the form of the ruler and the ruled and the like, is
the result of the superimposition of error on an attriand self-luminous thing. And that error is the be-
buteless
ginningless ignorance (or avidya) which .cannot be defined either as existent or as non-existent, and which, (neverthe-
the cause of those varied and wonderful illusory proAnd that jections that conceal the true nature of things. less) is
avidya has necessarily to be admitted, because there is the "For following among other scriptural texts (to prove it): 140.
The
saslras are
works of religious
authority and include four different
kinds of them, Sruti,
known by
Smriti, Itihdsa
the
and
names of
Pu.ra.na
the order of their importance. Srutt
in is
and is made up of the Vedas and the Upanishads, &c. Sni^iti embo-
revelation
dies tradition
and the sacred
laws.
Itihdsa
deals
with
ancient history,
and the Puranas are semi-historical works containing also myths and legends which are intended to illustrate important principles of religion and conduct. 141. Vide
s/ra
pp. 27, 30,
&
31.
Adhik.
L
SRI-BHASHYA.
Sal. /.]
157
the creatures) are drawn away (from the Brahof ignorance." means [C&hdnd. Up. VIII. 3. 2.]; man) by there would because also (otherwise) result in regard to
they
the
(/.
c.
Brahman
individual
the impossibility of His being one with the is learnt from self, in accordance with what
the grammatical equation found in the passage "That thou art" 4 2 and in others like it. That (avidyd) again is no real in relation to it there is no illusion and no because entity, J
And
stultification (of illusion).
because
non-entity either,
and no
nifestation
Therefore those that (or ignorance)
of looking at
that avidyd) is not a it) there is no ma-
(viz.
]
stultification (of manifestation)
.
43
know
different
is
it
(in relation to
the truth hold that this avidyd from both these alternative ways
it.
This (view)
improper. Indeed, residing in what, does it (viz. avidyd) produce illusion ? Surely, (it does) not (produce illusion), itself residing in the individual self; because the is
self-hood (of the individual self)
142.
Vide Chhand. Up.
VI. 10. 13. 3;
143. of
VI.
VI. ir. 3; VI. 12.
3;
VI.
14. 3.
The way
any notion
is
VI. in
made out to be
stultified,
In
the
is
and
a snake.
snake in
given
which
is
that
never the
never really perceived.
passage above, avidyd i.e. is said to be neither an
ignorance, entity
nor a non-entity neither an rope, nor a non-entity
entity like a
like the horns of a hare.
The
being an entity,
either
means that the
perception of the real entity
non-entity
3.
rope,
projected by avidyd
is
capable
of being
perceived as a rope, or as something other than the rope, for instance, as
object
formula: Sannabadhyate,
asannaprattyate, which
altogether
is
;
VI.
VI. 16.
15. 3;
which the
a real entity or a non-entity in this brief
4
9.
3;
is itself
is
the rope
This the
of the
perception
rope
is
an
illusion
capable of being stultified,and is thus an object of illusion
as well as of the stultification of that illusion.
The horns
non-existent, are
of a hare, being
of course
incapable
of being perceived. Nevertheless, they
are manifest to the mind, in as
much
as they constitute the object of a notion
corresponding to them, and also of the stultification
of
the
contents of that notion.
reality of
the
SRi-lBHASHYA.
158
(or ignorance). Neither (does
ing in the
Brahman
it
because
;
self-luminous intelligence, and
\_Chap.
L
fart.
1.
produce illusion), itself residhas the essential nature of
He
thus opposed to avidyd (or Moreover, it is admitted (by you) that it (viz. ignorance). " If is ignorance, which destroyed by knowledge. avidyd} of and removable has the nature is by knowledge, unreality is
Highest Brahman who has the nature of then who is there that is competent to be its intelligence, remover ? If it be said that to know the Brahman to be
may
veil the
(pure) intelligence
is
what
(really)
removes ignorance, (we
such knowledge) also cannot, like the Brahman, certainly be the remover of avidyd (or ignorance); be-
say) that
cause,
it (viz.
it (viz.
luminous
that knowledge)
e. intelligible). (/.
nition that the
Brahman
If
is
makes that same (Brahman] it
be possible to have the cog-
(pure) intelligence, there
would
then result cognisability (to the Brahman}; but,according to your own saying, it must be that the Brahman should not possess the (cognisable) character of an experience".
J
4 4
be said that that knowledge, which is to the effect that the Brahman has the essential nature of intelligence, If
it
the destroyer of that avidyd (or ignorance), but not that (other) knowledge (or intelligence) which constitutes the
is
Brahman, we reply that it is not right because while both possess in common the power of bringing the true nature of the Brahman to light, it is not possible to make out any differentiating
essential nature of the
to
hold
so
;
(about them) to the effect that one of them contradictory of avidyd (or ignorance), and that the other is not. What is said is this Whatever is, by means
peculiarity is
:
of that 144.
knowledge which
The above quotation
is
in all
probability from the Nyayatattva. of Is'atliarauni.
the
grandfather of the
is
to
the
effect
that
famous Yamunacharya known
Tamil land as Alavandar.
the in the
Adhik.
1.
Sfit.
Brahman
has
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
i.]
nature
the
of
159
intelligence,
made
out
to be the true nature of the Brahman, that becomes evident of itself on account of the self-luminous character
Brahman
and
so, in the matter of contradicting is no differentiating there avidyd (or ignorance), peculiarity about the knowledge (or intelligence) which constitutes
of the
;
the essential nature (of the Brahman}, or about that (other) knowledge whose object is that (essential nature of the
Brahman}. the Pflrvapakshins, the whose essential nature consists of experience is
Moreover, according to you
Brahman
incapable of being experienced by any other experience; (to you) there can be no knowledge which has that
and so
for its object.
Therefore, if knowledge (or inbe held to contradictory of avidyd, then He telligence) (viz. the Brahman] is of his own nature opposed (to that
(Brahman}
is
avidyd};
and thus
it is
not possible for that (avidyd or igno-
rance) to reside in the other such substances,
Brahman. The mother-of-pearl and (on
which
illusions
are
posed), are themselves incapable of bringing their
superim-
own
real-
and are not opposed to the ignorance which to themselves; therefore they require some other
ity to light,
relates
knowledge for the removal of that (avidyd or ignorance). But the Brahman constitutes the reality of Himself, as established
by His own
self-experience
;
and
so,
He
is
opposed to that ignorance which relates to Himself. For very reason, it (viz. that ignorance which relates to the
this
Brahman} does not means
to
remove
further stand in need
of any other
it.
may again be said that the knowledge of the unreality of what is other than the Brahman is opposed to this ignorance. But it is not so. (Here) it has to be discriminated whether this knowledge of the However,
it
SRl-BHISHYA.
160 unreality of
what
other than the
is
\Chap.
I.
Brahman
is
Part.
I.
opposed
to the ignorance of the real nature of the Brahman, or, whether it is opposed to that (other) ignorance which is
to
the
effect is
(knowledge)
world
the
that
real.
is
Surely, this
not contradictory of the ignorance which Brahman, because it has
relates to the real nature of the
not that
(real nature of the
there arises
Brahman} for its object. Indeed, contradiction only when (both) knowledge
and ignorance have one and the same thing for their object. The (true) knowledge that the world is unreal is contra, dieted by the ignorance (or false knowledge) that-the world is real. By that (knowledge which establishes the unreality of the world), only that ignorance is contradicted which leads to the conclusion that the world
is
real.
Hence the
ignorance relating to the essential nature of the Brahman surely continues to persist. It may be said that the ignorance
which
relates to the essential nature of the
Brahman
is
in-
He has a second,and that
deed to the
effect that that (ignorance) is removed, as a matter of fact, by the knowledge of the unreality of what is other than that (Brahman], and
that the true nature of the experience.
But
this
is
Brahman
not
so.
is
If it
made is
self-experience that the true nature of the
out by
self-
established
Brahman
is
by to
be without a second, then there can arise neither that ignorance which to the effect that
is
opposed to that (true nature) and is has a second, nor can there arise any
He
of that (ignorance).
If it be said that this an attribute (of His), we say it is not because you have yourselves declared that the Brahso man is essentially of the nature of (pure) experience, and is thus free from all attributes that are capable of being
stultification
secondlessness
is
;
Therefore, solely on account of (such) incompatibility, the Brahman, whose essential nature is
experienced.
Adhik.
I.
SRl-BniSHYA,
Sut. /.]
intelligence cannot be the
Moreover, he
who
161
abode of ignorance (or avidya).
declares that the
Brahman, whose
essential nature entirely consists of luminosity,
theless) concealed
by avidyd
(or ignorance),
is
(never-
by him
is
declared the destruction of nothing other than the very essential nature of the Brahman Himself. The conceal-
ment of luminosity means
either the obstruction of the
origination of luminosity or the destruction of existing Since it is admitted that this luminosity of (luminosity).
the Brahman is incapable of being a produced thing, the concealment of luminosity (here) means only the destruction of luminosity.
Then again thing resident in
it is
realises itself
this
itself,
experience which
on account of a misguiding objectless and self-luminous
said that,
not dependent upon anything else, as having an infinite number of abodes, and is
as having an infinite
number of
objects
to experience
;
and here it has to be determined whether this misguiding thing, which is resident in that (experience) itself, is of the nature of a reality, or is of the nature of an unreality. not a reality, in as much as it is not admitted (by you) to be so. Nor is it an unreality. For if it were an unreality, 145 it (viz. this misguiding thing) must
Surely,
it is
be acknowledged to be either the knower, or the known Surely, it is not knowledge, beobject, or the knowledge. cause distinctions in relation to the essential nature ofknow145.
The
distinctions
universe in the forms of the the
known
object
in
the
knower,
and the knowledge be due
are held by the Adwaitins to to maya.
Consequently any unreal
21
thing which or
is
ignorance
either as the
the result of such
has to
be
knower or as
maya made out the known
the knowledge, which togetherimake upthe visible universe,
object or
as
1
SRI-BHISHYA.
62
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
and ledge (or consciousness) are not admitted (by you); because also unreality is not admitted (by you) in relation to consciousness itself which forms the basis of illusion, lest such (an admission) should give room to the hypothesis The knower, the known object, of the Madhyamikas. 1
^
and the knowledge (or consciousness) conditioned by them
may
(both),
themselves be characterised as constituting the
misguiding error (for the reason that they are conditioned); but then they require another error at their root (to make
them conditioned and erroneous) and thus ;
And
sus in infinitum.
arises a regres-
then, wishing to avoid this (difficul-
you may say that the really existent experience itself, which is the same as the Brahman, forms this misguiding ty),
And
the
Brahman Himself form
the misguiding error, then, the appearance of the phenomenal universe would itself be dependent upon that (Brahman). What is
error.
if
the use of assuming (in such a case) another avidyd (or ignorance) which is similar in nature to the phenomenal universe? If the
Brahman Himself have
the character of
the misguiding error, (then), owing to His eternity, there would be no final release (to the individual self). Therefore, as
long as a real misguiding error, different from the Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not
Brahman
possible to explain (the theory of) illusion.
Again, what is the meaning of the (alleged) impossiIt may be bility of definition (in relation to avidyd) ? said that this consists in
its
(?'.
e.
avidyd's)
having the
an entity nor of a non-entity; sure to be incapable of definition, be-
characteristics neither of if so,
146. listic
such a thing
is
The Madhyamikas
Buddhists. Vide Ved.
are Nihi-
30. for a fuller discussion
Sitt. II. 2.
cism of their theory.
and
criti-
Adhik.
I.
Sill,
cause there
What
is
163
no means of knowing a thing of that kind. this The whole of the totality of things
is
said
SRi-BHlSHYA.
i.]
is
:
has to be established as existent (only)by means of (mental) cognitions, and all cognition relates to entities or non-entities.
And
then
all
be held that the object of a cognition, which vhas (thus) to relate to entities or non-entities, has neither the characteristics of an entity nor those of a non-entity,
It
if it
things might
may
become the
objects of all cognitions.
be again stated here as follows
:
A
certain
particular thing
which conceals the true nature of all things,
which
material
is
the
cause of
and
various internal
external superimpositions, which is itself incapable of being defined either as an entity or as a non-entity, which is
denoted by the words avidya, ajftdna, &c., and which
is it-
capable of being removed by the knowledge of the real nature of things, (such a thing) is indeed made out, by self
means of perception and in the
inference, to be altogether existent
form of an entity, in as much as
it
happens to be
dif-
ferent from the antecedent non-existence 147 of knowledge.
The superimposition of such
distinctions,
as
egoity (or knowership), knowledge, and the thing known,, on the internal self, the essential nature of which is concealed by that (avidya)
itself,
and which (however)
is
(really)
un-
changeable and is made up of self-luminous intelligence, (such a superimposition) has for its material cause the
"Brahman who
is
conditioned
by that (same
avidya).
For the reason that there are various particular states of that same (avidya), there also arises, in regard to the world which is itself a super-imposition, the further superimposition, which consists of (the falsely perceived)
147,
Vide supra
p. 49. n. 37.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
164
[Chap.
I.
Part.
/.
that are capable of being stultified by (correct) knowledge, and consists also of the (correct) knowledge relating to all the various particular things snake,
&c.,
silver,
1
And
the fact also, that all things which possess the nature of unreality have that (avidya) for their material cause, is made out by the force of the. (in the
world ).
reasoning, that, of a thing which deserves to be certainly unreal.
unreal, the cause also
is
Indeed, the perception which has for its object that avidya, which forms the cause (of such a world), is a direct manifestation (of avidya) to consciousness to
know
" I
am ignorant, I do not But this (direct another."
the effect
myself, nor do
know
I
perception of ignorance) has not for its object the antecedent non-existence of knowledge; for, that (antecedent non-existence) is made out with the aid of the sixth means
of proof, 48 whereas this (perception of ignorance) 1
as direct as
"
when
I
am
is
quite
happy." Even when
(one feels) granted that non-existence (of knowledge)
it
being directly experienced, this experience
capable of can not deal
with the non-existence of knowledge in the
self
is
there
is
is
;
because
the knowledge (of such non-existence) even at the
time of this experience, and because also, if it (viz. such knowledge) were not existent then, there would be the impossibility of
What 148. are:
The
(l).
is
six
making out that there was no knowledge. amounts to this In this experience
said
means
:
of
proof
by
Pratyaksha, perception
the
non-existence
of things.
It
said that, according to this last,
is
we
the senses; (2) Anutnana,interence; (3)
make out
Upamana, analogy or comparison (4)
by not perceiving it. There are also three other means of
;
Sabda or 3ptavacAana, verbal testimony or revelation; (5)
A rthapatti, circumA nupalabdhi
the non-existence of a pot,
for instance,
known
proof
stantial presumption; (6)
namely,
or Abhavapratyaksha, negative proof
Aitihya,
of non-cognition intended to establish
mony
;
to Indian philosophers,
SamMava, tradition
and
or
equivalence; fallible
Cheshtd, gesture.
testi-
Adhik. '
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
I. Sut. /.]
am ignorant
165
is there or is there not any cognition of ' I ', as the thing which has the nonthe self, namely, existence of knowledge for its characterising attribute, and
I
',
the
also
(is
there
as
ledge If there it
or
is
is,
then, to
is
not any cognition) of know-
there
which
the thing
is
to
opposed
ignorance
?
to
self-contradiction, wholly owing have any experience of the non-
impossible If there is not, then that existence of (all) knowledge. experience of the non-existence of knowledge cannot at all
come
into existence, in as
much
as
it
depends upon
the knowledge of the thing characterised by that (non-existence of knowledge) and also upon the knowledge of the thing which
knowledge).
contrary (to the same non-existence of This objection holds good eqflially in the
is
case where non-existence of knowledge cible
by
inference,
and
to form the object that
proof known
as
abhdva
is
also in the case
taken to be dedu-
where
it
is
taken
by the means of When, how(or anupalabdhi}.* to be establshed
is
**
granted that this avidya (or ignorance) has the nature of an entity, then, even though there is the knowever,
it is
ledge of that thing which has this (non-existence of
know-
ledge for its) characterising attribute, and also (the knowledge) of that thing which is contrary (to the non-existence of knowledge), it has to be admitted that there is no con-
knowledge and that avidya or not merely the negation of knowledge, a positive entity of some sort). Therefore, this ex-
tradiction (between this
ignorance which
but
is
'
perience
I
am
is
'
ignorant
relates only to that avidya (or
ignorance) which has the nature of a
Again,
it
(positive) entity.
may be objected that, although (this) ignorance
149. Anupalabdhi is the negative proof of non-cognition intended to esta-
blish the non-existence of things,
Vide supra
n. 143.
1
SRi-BnlSHYA.
66
[Chap.
L
(or avidya) has the nature of a (positive) entity, yet,
Part. it is
1.
con-
by the witnessing principle of intelligence, the nature of which is to make the truth of things manifest. But tradicted
not right. The witnessing principle of 'intelligence does not deal with the truth of things, but deals with this
this is
ignorance for, otherwise, the manifestation to consciousness of all such things as are unreal would be impossible. Indeed, (this positive) ignorance (or avidya) is not removed by that ;
knowledge which has (that same) ignorance for its object and, accordingly, there is here no contradiction (between ;
this positive entity called ignorance
that same
and the knowledge of
'
ignorance
And
').
This ignorance, although may be said again of an the nature (independent) entity, becomes possesses a thing that is directly cognisable by the witnessing prinit
:
it
only in definitive association with a particular (external) object. And the object here (which by ciple of intelligence,
association defines this ignorance)
established independently of
is
itself
capable of being proof. There-
any means of
how
can this ignorance (or avidya), which is defi( nitively associated with the thing I ', (that is not an external object), become a thing cognisable by the witnessing fore,
principle of intelligence
The whole
?
There
is,
however, nothing wrong
is made up of which are the objects cognisable by witnessing principle of intelligence, either in the form of known things or in the
in this.
of the totality of things
form of unknown things.
It
being
so, there is
need of the
means of proof to prove only that thing which happens to be known as non-intelligent. But to prove the thing which is intelligent, subjective and selfevident, there is no need of the interposition of (such) a means of proof. Therefore, the presentation of this thing interposition of a
(viz.
the thing
'
I
')
to consciousness, as that which
is
al-
Adhik.
ways
I.
Sftt.
SRI-BHISHYA.
i.]
167
definitively associated with avidyd (or ignorance)
is
quite consistent with reason. And consequently, by means of direct perception which is supported by logical reasoning, this ignorance (or avidya) is made out to have indeed
the character of a positive entity. This ignorance (or avidya) which of an entity
is
established
by means of
has the
nature
inference also thus
:
That knowledge, which is obtained with the help of the accepted means of proof and (the nature of) which is the subject of dispute
(between
antecedent
us), has, for its
in
time, another existent thing which is different from the antecedent non-existence of that (knowledge) itself, and is veils the objects of that same (knowledge), and
capable of being removed by that (very knowledge), and is existent in the same place as that (knowledge) ; brings to light objects which were unknown before, and is thus like the light of the lamp-flame first lit up in the midst of darkness. Darkness is merely either the
because
it
absence of light or the absence of the perception of colour, but is not a substance and if, (on this supposition), it be asked how it is that it is put forth here as an illustration ;
to prove that ignorance (or avidya) which has the nature of a positive substance, it is replied that, because darkness is perceived to possess the conditions of density, thinness, &c.,
and because
also
is
(it
perceived) as having colour,
cannot but be a distinct substance.
ment here advanced)
To
all this,
is
we make
am
it
Therefore this (argu-
unobjectionable. the following reply
:
In the cog-
do not know myself, nor do I ignorant, know another,' that ignorance which has the nature of an
nition
entity
'
is
I
not
made
I
out either by perception in
perception) as supported diction, that
by
logical reasoning.
itself or
The
(by
contra-
has been pointed out in relation to (the ignor-
SRI-BHISHYA.
168
{Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
ance which forms) the antecedent non-existence of knowwell to this (other) ignorance also of an entity. Is the internal subject which has the nature (viz. the ego) made out or not made out to be that which is
ledge, applies equally
from ignorance by forming the abode If you hold that it is so made and the object (thereof) ? is when it so made then out, out, how can there remain definitively distinct
yet that ignorance of it which is capable of being removed by the knowledge of its true nature ? If you hold that it is not so made out, then, how is it possible to experience the ignorance which is not associated with the necessary concomitants of an abode and an object ? Then again, it may be said that the opposite of igno-
rance consists in the distinct manifestation of the true nature (of the ego), and that (to us however) there apprehension (of the ego) the true nature of which distinct
and
;
that,
even when there
therefore,
is
that
is is
in-
the
knowledge of that (ego) which forms the abode and the object (of this positive ignorance), there is no contradiction at all in experiencing such ignorance.
Indeed, if this is of non-existence the antecedent true, knowledge also forms true nature of which is the object of that (ego) the distinct,
(/.
e.
this
antecedent non-existence of knowledge
thus like your positive ignorance '). And the knowledge of the abode of this (negative ignorance also), as '
is
well as of
what
constitutes
its
contradiction, relates to that
(ego) the true nature of which
Therefore, (in upholding your is
is,
(of itself), indistinct^
'
positive ignorance
'),
there
nothing special, apart from the stubborn adherence to
your
own
views.
Even that ignorance, which has the nature of an entity ,is, while it is being made out as ignorance, really dependent upon other (correlated) things; just as the apprehension
Adhtk.
SRI-BHISHYA.
2. Snt. /.]
169
of the antecedent non-existence (of knowledge) is (so dependent). Accordingly, ignorance may be either the absence of knowledge, or what is different from that (knowledge), or what is the opposite of it. In the case of all these three (ways of looking at ignorance), the need for making out the true nature of that (knowledge, the absence of, the differ-
ence from, or the contradiction of which constitutes ignorance) has necessarily to be admitted. Surely, in making out the true nature of darkness, there
that (darkness) has to be made out as that which is the opposite of light, is needed the (previous) knowledge of
same
there certainly
The ignorance admitted by you
light.
in
but
as
it
is
not knowledge.
is
light.
when
Nevertheless, to be the
no need of
is
itself,
is
realised
is
merely Such being the
never realised as
case,
that which it
(viz.
the
ignorance assumed to be a positive entity by you) is as dependent upon knowledge as (is the idea of) the nonexistence of knowledge.
And
the antecedent non-existence
admitted by you also, and it is moreover all. understood by Therefore, it has to be granted that, in the cognition I am ignorant, I do not know myself, nor of knowledge
is
'
do
I
know
another,'
what
is
experienced
is
cedent non-existence of knowledge which
both of
only that anteis
accepted by
us.
Moreover, the experience of ignorance (or avidyd)
is
not possible to the Brahman, whose essential nature is altogether made up of eternal, free, self-luminous and uni-
form intelligence
;
because
self-experience. If it essential nature
avidya) asked, tial
when
He
is
Himself of the nature of
be said that, even the Brahman, whose
is
self-experience, perceives ignorance that essential nature of His is concealed,
(or it
is
what it is to have the concealment of one's own essen-
nature. If
it
be replied that 22
it is
the possession of an
SRI-BHISHYA.
i;o
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
unmanifest nature, it is asked again how that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-experience, can possess
an unmanifest nature. possible
for
that
If it
be again
Brahman,
said, in reply, that
whose
essential
it is
nature
is
self-experience, to acquire an unmanifest character through the influence of something other than Himself, then, as has been already stated, there would result to the Brahman
the destruction of His
own
essential nature,
owing to the
because (according to you) in other words, manifest intelligibility) has
influence of that other thing
;
luminosity (or, to constitute the essential nature of that (Brahman), owing to the fact that an attribute called luminosity is not acin relation to the
Brahman}. Again, forms the cause of the which avidya),
knowledged (by you this ignorance
concealment
(or
of the essential nature
of the
Brahman, Brahman, only after it is itself experienced (by the Brahman} and it is after (thus) concealing the Brahman, that it in itself becomes the object of His experience. Thus there arises the logical fallacy of re-
conceals the
;
ciprocal dependence.
conceals (the
Brahman},
it
If
it
be said that
Brahman} only
after
it is
it
(viz. avidya) experienced (by the
would follow that that Brahman, whose essen-
not concealed, Himself experiences that ignorance (or avidya). Then the hypothesis of concealment would be purposeless, as also the hypothesis of this (contial
nature
is
.
must be possible for the Brahman to perceive the world also which is acknowcealing) ignorance itself
;
because
it
ledged to be the result of ignorance (or avidya), in the
same way
in
which
(it
is
possible for
Him)
to perceive this
ignorance (or avidya). Further, does the Brahman, of Himself, experience this ignorance, or (does He experience it) through the influence of something other than
Himself
?
If
it
be said that
He
Adhik.
I.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
Sut. /].
171
of Himself (experiences it\ we reply that, because the experience of ignorance is thus associated with the essential
nature of the
Brahman,
there can be no release (from
Brahman, whose
Or, owing to the fact that the
nature
it).
essential
experience, acquires thus the character of being the experience of ignorance, there will arise the destruction is
Brahman Himself, through the knowledge which is destructive (of that ignorance or avidya);m the same manner in which the perception of silver
of the essential nature of the
(in
a mother-of-pearl)
destroyed by means of the knowthe falsely perceived silver. If the
is
ledge which stultifies
Brahman influence
experience ignorance (or avidya) through the of something other (than Himself), what is
that other thing ? If it be said that it is another ignoof rance for avidya ), there would result the fallacy 3 '
regressus in inftnitum. If it be (again) said that after having concealed the Brahman Himself, it (viz. ignorance or
avidya) becomes the object of experience, then it is re5 and other causes of plied that, in such a case, like kdcha* J
false perception, this
mere
fact of its
Brahman
;
and
own
ignorance (or avidya) also, through the existence as an entity, conceals the
that, in
consequence, there will be no
removal of ignorance (or avidya} by means of knowledge. It may be said again that this ignorance (or avidya) is itself
beginningless,
be the witness
150. Because
'
5 2
and that
this other ignorance
would have to depend upon a third ignorance, which again would have to
depend upon a fourth, and this again upon a fifth, and so on ad infinitum. 151.
Vide supra
p. 104. n. 69.
152. In this case, one
it
causes the
of (that ignorance)
and the same
itself,
Brahman at the
to
same
ignorance produces the concealment of the
Brahman
causes
and
Him
so
at the
same time
that
it
to be a witness of itself,
there
is
no
such
fallacy
as requires thepostuhuion of a series of avidyds.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
i;2
time that
it
also (produces) the
nature of the
no room
But is
for
Brahman, and fallacies
like
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
concealment of the essential
that there
is,
in consequence,
regressiis in uifinitum,
&c.
replied that this is not right ; because it impossible for the Brahman, whose essential na-
ture
is
it
is
self-experience, to acquire the character of being
a witness without the concealment of His
own
true na-
be said in reply that (the true nature of the Brahman) is concealed by some other cause (than ignorance or avidya), then, it is pointed out that the beginningture.
If
it
lessness of this ignorance (or avidya]
is (thereby) given up, of fallacy regressiis in infinitum also If one, whose essential nature is altogether unconfollows. cealed, acquires the character of being a witness, then that
and the aforesaid
one cannot possess the character of being altogether the basis of self-experience.
Furthermore,
when
Brahman is concealed by not that Brahman shine forth
the
ignorance (or avidya), does even a little ? Or does He shine forth a
little ?
On the
former
Brahman, whose essential nature is pure luminosity, becomes non-luminosity; and, as it has been already stated more than once, He (thus) acquires the chaOn the latter supposition, it is racter of a mere nothing. asked, which is the part concealed, and which is it that supposition, the
shines forth, in the Brahman who is uniformly Existence and Intelligence and Bliss throughout ? As it is impossible for a thing, which is destitute of parts, destitute is pure luminosity, to have two distinct and luminosity cannot, at one and the concealment forms,
of attributes, and
same time,
exist together in that thing.
Then, again,
it
may
be urged that, when concealed by
ignorance (or avidya), the Brahman who is uniformly Existence and Intelligence and Bliss throughout, appears like
Adhik.
I.
Si'tt.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
/.]
173
a thing which has an indistinct nature. Then, of what nature is the distinctness and indistinctness of that thing the essential nature of is
this
which
Whatever
:
is
pure luminosity ? What is said possessed of parts, whatever is is
possessed of attributes, whatever forms the thing illumined by luminosity, the complete manifestation of that thing is distinct manifestation. That manifestation in
which
absent
is
few
a
of
the
attributes
indistinct manifestation.
It
(of
a
being
thing) so,
are
whatso-
ever aspect of the thing is unknown, in that aspect, there is the absence of luminosity and for that very rea;
son, there can be no indistinctness in relation to luminosity. Whatsoever aspect of the thing is known, in that aspect
the luminosity relating to it is undoubtedly distinct. Hence, all circumstances, there can be no indistinctness in
under
relation
to
what
constitutes
ceiving an external
ness consists
object as
luminosity. it
not knowing
in
is,
Even
even then
in
per-
indistinct-
a few of the attributes
belonging to it. Therefore, when the Brahman who is not the object of perception, who is devoid of attributes, and is pure luminosity, is of Himself completely manifest in His
which
own
true nature, then that indistinctness,
consists in the non-perception of a
butes and which
few of His
attri-
said to be
the result of ignorance (or avidya), cannot at all exist (in relation to Him). Moreover, does this indistinctness which is the result of is
ignorance (or avidya) disappear at the rise of the knowledge of truth, or does it not ? If it does not disappear, then there cannot be the beatific state of final release.
appears, then reality
is.
ture, then, fest
If
it it
it is
If it dis-
has to be determined of what form the
be said that
it
has a distinctly manifest na-
asked, whether or not
this distinctly
nature existed before (that reality was veiled
by
maniigno-
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
174
[Chap.
Part.
1.
I.
ranee or amdya}. If it did exist before, then, (in relation to that reality), there cannot be that indistinctness which is the result of ignorance (or avidya), and (there cannot be) also the disappearance of that (same indistinctness).
did not exist before, then the beatific state of acquires the character of an effect, and thus
final
If
it
release
becomes
impermanent. has been already stated 33 that this ignorance (or avidya) cannot exist, simply because its abode cannot be defined. Moreover, even he, who maintains that illu-
And
1
it
sion has an unreal misguiding cause at difficult to
establish that
illusion
a (really existing) basis (for
it
is
root,
will find
it
to be imposed upon); because
possible, even when same way in which that illusion
illusion
its
does not arise without
its is
basis
is
possible
unreal,
when
in the
the mis-
guiding cause producing the illusion and (the reality forming) the seat of (such) a misguiding cause are (both) unreal. And from this (possibility of illusion without a real basis) there will only follow the nothingness of all things. What has been stated already to the effect that ignorance (or avidya), which has the nature of an entity, is established
by the
logical process of inference also,
that
not right; because (such) a logical process of inference is impossible. But it may be said that the inference intended
is
to establish this has already been given. True, so given; but
it is
wrong
;
it
has been
because, in (establishing) the ig-
norance (accepted by you), the middle term of the syllo84 gism proves also that other ignorance which is not accep1
hence unfavourable (to you). There your syllogism), if it (viz. the middle term) does not
table (to you), (/. e.
153. 154.
in
and
is
Vide supra pp. 157. et seq. p. 167. where this
Vide su^ra
syllogism
is
given in
full.
Adhik.
SRi-BniSHYA.
I. Snt. /.]
175
form the means of proving that other ignorance, then it ceasit does form the means of proving
es to be absolute. 1 53 If
that (ignorance) also, then this other ignorance prevents (the Brahman] from becoming the witness of the ig-
norance (or avidya accepted by you)
and consequently, the hypothesis of (a positive) ignorance (or avidya) becomes ;
purposeless.
Moreover, the illustrative example 136 is deficient in regard to the middle term, because the light of the lamp-flame does not really possess the power of illumining such things as were unknown before. Indeed, everywhere, it is intelligence alone that possesses the power of illumining (things). For, even when the lamp-flame is in existence, in the absence of intelligence, there will
be no illumination
relation
in
to
objects.
The
senses
also are merely the means of producing knowledge ; but they do not possess the power of illumining (things). The light of the lamp-flame possesses only the power of being helpful to the knowledge-producing sense of sight,
darkness
through removing the
which obstructs
The
current notion knowledge). production that the lamp-flame is an illuminator, depends upon its being a serviceable means to the sense of sight, which is
of
(the
engaged in the production of that knowledge which illumines (things). It may be said " The light of the lampflame has been cited by us as an illustration, not because
we admit
155. If the
it
middle term
to
of
possess the
the
syllogism here prove an ignorance or avidya, other than what has the nature of a
positive
entity, then
reasoning becomes too wide.
same middle term do
not,
If
same illuminating
prove the ignorance or avidya which other than the positive one under
is
discussion,
then the reasoning
be-
the
comes too narrow. In either
case,
the
syllogism cannot but be
fallacious,
however,
156. Vide supra
p. 167.
this
SRI-BHISHYA.
176
I.
[Chap.
Part.
I.
character as knowledge has ; but because we admit that knowledge itself has the power of causing such illumination as conies after the removal of what conceals its own is not, however, right. Surely, the characconsist does not illuminator ter of an merely in the re-
This
object."
moval of what obstructs (illumination); but wholly
(consists)
in the definite presentation of things (to conscious-
ness), or, in other words, (it consists) in
making things
fit
And this (power) belongs only to intelligence. of illumining things, that were not illumined power before, is admitted in relation to such things also as are to be realised. If the
helpful (in the production of knowledge), then, surely the power of illumining things not illumined before has to be admitted in relation to the senses also, because, (in
production of knowledge), they
the
are helpful in
the
it be so admitted, then, because, (in producing knowledge), they (viz. the senses) are not preceded in time by some other thing capable of being removed by them, the middle term (in your syllogism)
If
highest degree.
And now
ceases to be absolute.
let us
have done with
this (kind of criticism .)
And
in this connection there are the following counter-
statements That ignorance (or avidya), which the subject of dispute (between us), has not for its abode the Brahman who is pure intelligence because it (viz. that avidya) possesses the character of (illusory) non-
syllogistic
:
is
:
knowledge,
*
3 7
like the (illusory)
lates to the mother-of-pearl,
&c
;
non-knowledge which
re-
indeed this has the know-
er for is
its abode. That ignorance (or avidya), which the subject of dispute (between us), does not conceal the
157.
so
as
Non-knowledge to
denote,
is
used here
either false
know-
ledge, or the
or
what
is
opposite of knowledge,
other than knowledge.
Adhik.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
SfU. /.]
I.
177
Brahman who is pure intelligence because it possesses the character of (illusory) non-knowledge, like the (illusory) non-knowledge which relates to the mother-of-pearl, &c ; :
indeed
conceals
this
That (only external) objects. is the subject of dispute (be-
avidya), which
ignorance (or tween us), is not capable of being removed by knowledge:
it does not possess the power of concealing the obof knowledge. Whatever non-knowledge is removed jects by knowledge, that (non-knowledge) conceals the objects of
because
knowledge, like the non-knowledge relating to the motherThe Brahman is not the seat of ignorance of-pearl, &c. (or avidya), because, (according to you),
like pots, &c.,
He,
does not possess the qualit3r of being the knower. Brahman is not concealed by ignorance (or avidya) cause
He
is
The ;
be-
not, (according to you), an object of knowledge.
Whatever is concealed by non-knowledge, that has to be an
The object of knowledge, like the mother-of-pearl, &c. is not that ignorance (or avidya) which is
Brahman
because He capable of being removed by knowledge Whatever non-knowledge is not an object of knowledge. is capable of being removed by knowledge, that (non-know;
ledge)
an object of knowledge,
is
like (the
non-knowledge
That knowledge relating to) the mother-of-pearl, &c. which is acquired with the help of the accepted means of proof, and (the nature of) which is the subject of dispute (between
us,)
has not, for
its
antecedent in time, any different from its own
ignorance (or avidya) which is antecedent non-existence because that (knowledge also) possesses the character of such knowledge as is ob;
tained like the
with
the
help of the accepted -means of proof;
knowledge which, being derived with the help of
the accepted
means of
proof, proves (according to you)
the ignorance (or avidya) that
is
admitted by you.
Know-
SRI-BHISHYA.
178
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
destroyer of an entity; because it possesses the "character of knowledge, even when it is not associated with the manifestation of any particular
be
cannot
ledge
the
(constructive or destructive) power.
Whatever happens to
be the destroyer of an entity, that
seen to be either the
is
knowledge or the non-knowledge which is associated with the manifestation of a particular power, like the knowledge is possessed by the Lord, and by Yogins and others, or like the (non-knowledge which is found in a) club and
which
other similar objects. That ignorance (or avidyti) which has the nature of an entity is not capable of being destroy-
ed by knowledge; because it possesses the nature of an entity, like pots, &c., (which are not destroyed merely
by any knowledge).
may
It
be said again here that
we
(actually) see the fear 1 58 and other
(subsequent) stultifying knowledge destroy such emotions, which are (positive entities) caused by the previous (false) knowledge (of a serpent superimposed upon
But that
a rope, for instance).
is
not right. Indeed, the fear, &c.,) is not due
disappearance of those (emotions of to knowledge
because, being transitory, they themselves go out of existence, and because also, when their cause is removed, they never recur again. Their transitoriness is
made like
out
;
from
the
knowledge, only
fact
that
they
are
in the presence of that
experienced,
which brings
them
into existence, and also from the fact that they are not experienced otherwise. And if fear and other
158.
This
tion
of
tha.t
fear
is
an oil-quoted
the 2iwaitins.
illustra-
They hold
and such other emotions
in a rope, and that they can be destroyed by the knowledge of the real-
are of the nature of positive entities,
So also ignorance or avidya has the nature of an entity and can be de-
and may
stroyed by the knowledge of the Brah-
arise from illusory causes
like the false perception
of a
snake
ity.
man.
Adhik.
I.
Sftt.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
i.]
179
such emotions are not transitory, then, in a continuous succession of the same mental impressions which form the cause of fear and other such emotions, every one of those
mental impressions
will,
without any difference whatever,
act as the cause of the production of fear and of other such emotions ; and thus there will be room for many fears (to
without cessation from the same cause to the same
arise
person)
By
and therefore
:
also (they cannot but be transitory).
the mention of purposeless qualifications in the
statement that (knowledge) has, for its antecedent in time, another existing thing which is different from the antece-
dent
non-existence of
wonderful
skill in
Therefore,
1
that
(knowledge itself), words is indeed well shown using
by means of the
39
your
forth.
logical process of inference
cannot be the establishment of that ignorance (or avidyd) which has the nature of an entity. It will be stated presently that ignorance (or avidya)
also, there
cannot be established by scriptural evidence as well as by the evidence of circumstantial presumption in relation to the interpretation of the scriptures. This proposition cu also, namely, that the cause of a thing, which is unreal, 1
also certainly unreal, will
is
Vide supra p. 167., where statement in which these qua-
159.
the
lifications
runs thus;
occur,
knowledge, which
is
"That
obtained with the
be disproved by the logical ignorance or avidya. is a positive enbut not simply the negation of
tity,
knowledge. This idea that tity is
means an
help of the accepted means of proof and' (the nature of) which is the
vastu which
subject of dispute between us, has for
argument, here, that
its
antecedent in time, another existing
thing which
is
different from the an-
tecedent non-existence of that (knowledge)
itself."
The
ment above quoted
object of the staleis
to
prove that
Therefore
it
is
an en-
existent
make
redundant signifies
160.
it
all
signify
in as
an
thing,
pointed out in the
tions attached to that
as to
it is
expressed by the use of the word
much
the qualifica-
word
a?,
entity,
Vide supra
vastu so
an entity are
p. 164.
of
itself, it
SRI-BHASHYA.
i8o
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
arguments that are appropriately given in the section 101 which begins with the aphorism. "(The Brahman] is not (the cause of this world) being different from this world &c." [Ved. Sut.ll. 1.4.]. Hence, there can be no perception which has that indescribable ignorance (or avidyd] for its object. It (viz. that ignorance) can not be admitted to be of such (indescribable) nature even though (in relation to it), there are
Whatever becomes perception, illusion, and stultification. manifest to consciousness, that alone forms the object of perception, illusion, and stultification. It is not proper to assume that what is not arrived at by means of these modes
of manifestation, as well as by means of any other mode of manifestation, forms the object of these (very modes of It
manifestation).
perception
of
may
silver,
be said again, thus:
&c.,
and even at the time of
in
is
the
the
mother-of-pearl, &c.; perception there is the
this
stultification to the effect that
There
it
(viz. silver) is
not in exist-
ence (there); and one thing cannot, possibly, appear like another for all these reasons, it has to be assumed that :
a
new
indescribable "something in the form of this
silver
becomes manifest under the influence of a misguiding cause. But it is not right to say so because, even when such an assumption is made, the appearance of one thing like an:
other
is
not avoided; and because
it is
possible
have
to
and
perceptual manifestation, volitional activity, illusion, stultification (of illusion),
only
when
it
is
admitted that
ajid possible for one thing to appear like another because also it is improper to assume the existence of a it is
;
161. This section comprises sutras II. I.
of the
4 to 12. and goes by the
name
'Vilakshanat-wadhikarana,
account of the tion being
as
first
on
sutra in the sec-
follows:
"
The BraA-
man
is
not the cause of this world,
being different from this world and such difference is made out from the ;
scripture."
Adhik.
SRi-BniSHYA.
/. Sftl. /.]
181
thing which is absolutely unseen and has no originating cause whatsoever. Indeed, this (silver) which is assumed
(by you) to be indescribable is not perceived (then at the time of the illusion) to be indescribable, but (is perceived) to be nothing
other than real silver.
be no room
for
for
illusion,
volitional activity.
stultification,
also
Hence, you
it
(however),
If,
appeared to be altogether indescribable, then, there
and
would
also for
have to admit the
only the mother-of-pearl and other such things which appear to consciousness in the form' of silver and other such things because, when one thing does not
view that
it
is
;
appear like another,
it is
not possible to have (the related)
and
manifestation, volitional activity, stultification,
illusion
(in connection with things), and because also it is not possible to avoid that (kind of otherwise-manifestation).
who hold other opinions of things to consciousness, have regarding the manifestation the to necessarily accept appearance of things otherwise Moreover,
even those,
than as they are, although they
may have gone
very far
their course of reasoning). According to the view
says that
what becomes manifest
1
c 2
to consciousness
(in
which
is
mere
non-existence, (this non-existence has to appear) in the form of existence. According to the view 163 which says that what becomes manifest to consciousness is merely the idea, (this idea
to the
has to appear) in the form of objects.
According view 104 which says that what becomes manifest
consciousness
to
162. This
to
refers
is
the non-apprehension
Nihilism
or
This refers to Idealism, or the
view of the Yogacharas. 164. This is the view of
who
are
known
as
names
of the
several
or theories of perception
the view of the Madhyamikas. 163.
The
(of the differ-
in
this
commonly
are
quoted
khyahs given sloka
"^.tmakhydtiyasatkhydtirakhydtihkhydtir-
those
anyathd
\
iathdnirrachartakkydtirily-
!
Akfiydtivadiits.
etatftfty
3tifaHckal:am\\
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
182
{Chap.
I.
Part.
L
ence (between two things), the characteristic of one thing has to appear as the characteristic of another tiling, and
two perceptions have to appear as only one and even on the supposition that there is no object corresponding to this ;
erroneous perception, (a non-existent) object has to appear as existent.
Moreover, he,
who holds the view that here (/. e. in the kind of new and indescribable silver is
mother-of-pearl) a born, has also to state the cause of the origin of that (silver). It (viz. the cause of the origin of that silver) can not be the
mere manifestation of that tion) has that (same
come into That (a (silver).
itself
silver,
because that (manifestaand so cannot
for its object,
silver)
existence before the production of that particular manifestation) has arisen with-
out relating to any particular object, that that (manifestation itself) has afterwards produced that (object), and then has
made
own
is indeed the teaching of very be said that) it (viz. the cause (it may of the origin of that silver) is an error (or defect) found in the senses, &c. This is not so, because it (viz. such a cause it its
object,
this
great men!! Again
of erroneous perception) abides in the person, and so cannot have the power of producing an effect that is found in relation to external objects.
senses
(that
Then again
it
not the
is
form the cause of the origin of such
silver),
because they are the means of producing knowledge. Xor are the wrongly affected senses (the cause of the origin of that
silver),
because they also are capable of giving
something peculiar, only in relation to that knowis produced which ledge by themselves. That the beginningrise to
ignorance (or avidya) constitutes the cause (of the production of that silver) has, indeed, been already disproved. Again, how is it that this indescribable and newl}*
less
produc'ed totality of things
is
made
to be the object of the
Adhik.
I.
SuL
SRi-BulSHYA.
i.]
183
notion and of the word which denote silver and other (such falsely perceived) objects, but is not made the object of the
notion and of the word which denote pots and other (correctly perceived) things? If it be said that it is due to their
and other (such falsely perceived) obthe notion and the word (which denote this
similarity with silver
then
jects,
new and lity)
let
indescribable totality of things) denote that (tota-
same
to be the
as that
(silver
and other such things
which are perceived to be unreal). If it be said that it is due to their association with the genus of silver and of other (such falsely perceived) objects,it is asked whether this genus or whether it is unreal. Surely, it cannot be real ;
is real,
because, (in such a case), it cannot be (inseparably) associated with what is unreal. Nor can it be unreal; because, in it cannot be (then), (inseparable) association with what is real,
and because
also
not possible for the notion and
it is
word which denote reality to be made to denote that which is unreal. Thus we have had enough in the way of the
criticising unripe
and
fallacious reasoning.
On
the other hand, (the truth is as follows): "The opinion of those who know the Vcdas is that all knowledge is real, because, according to the Srutts and the Smritis,
every thing may become manifest in the form of every other thing. At the commencement of (the portion dealing with) creation
and the other acts
ed by His volition
'May
(of the
Lord) which are preced-
become manifold'
I
[QJthand.
Up. VI. 2. 3.] it is urged in the Sruti itself '(I will make) each of these 165 tri-partite'. 66 [Qt/iand. Up. VI. 3. 3
&
1
namely, the things water and earth. Vide Chhand.
of
VI. 2,3
water,
165. These, fire,
L'p.
4.
166. Tripartition
by which each one namely,
fire,
is
the
process
of the three things
water mid earth
is
so
constituted as to possess the character
is
all
the three
and
elements of
tfjas,
This composition
said to be caused at the beginning of
creation.
4
earth.
&
$.
Vide Qi/idnd.
Up. VI.
Thus, when the thing
3.
fire is
SRI-BHISHYA.
184
Part.
I.
[Chap.
I.
Thus, indeed, the tri-partition (of the elements) is made out by direct revelation. The red colour of fire 4.].
the colour of (the element) tejas, the white (colour of of the element) of water, and the black fire,) is (the colour is
(colour of
Thus to
1 cr (the colour of the element) of earth.
fire) is
form
this tripleness of
to
relation
in
exist
shown by the Sniti
is
fire
It
itself.
the Vishnu- Purana*** also at the
stated
so
is
itself
in
commencement
of (the portion dealing with) creation, in the following and other 169 passages: 'Then they (viz. the constituent elements divided into two equal these halves
the
is
element of
and
fire;
the
if
again subdivided
half be
made up
the thing
ment
Hence 50 per cent is
fire,
tejas,
made up
and 25 per
of water,
of
element
To
fire is
tejas
is
tion of
cent, of the
thing the in it the because given, preponderates over the
other two elements.
thing
of
of the ele-
25 per cent, of the ele-
element of earth.
name
of earth.
the case also with watery and
earthy things.
ment
two
into
element of water, and
of the
the other, of the element is
this
that
Similarly
called water in the composi-
which the element of water
preponderates over
elements of that thing
\vhichpreponderatesovertheothers.
other
one of these would be seen to be
parts,
Such
one of
parts,
found to be made up of
tejas is
the
and called
two
other
And
earth.
earth
in the
167.
ViteChhand.UpXl.i.
168.
Vide
169.
The
or
Ttlttvas
follow in
P.
V.
I.
elements
constituent of
to 6.
I
2.
the universe
are
the descending order:
Pradhdna
or
nature,
Prakriti,
as (/)
(2)
Mahal or Buddhi, the great principle', Ahahkdra or egoity; the Tan(?) '
matras or the subtle and rudimentary elements characterised by (4) Sabda, sound, (5) Spar'sa, touch, form or colour, (7) Rasa,
Gandha, smell
(<J)
Rupa,
taste,
(<)
the grosser elements
;
corresponding to these Tanmatras are (9) Akasa,
ether,
(//) Tejas, light
(id)
Vdyu,
or heat,
water, (/j) Sahghata or Prit/uv?,
earth
;
(14)
the
mind
;
air,
(72) Ap, the
the senses of
(75) Sro/ra, hearing, (16) Ttak, touch, (77) Chakshus, sight, (18) Rasa, taste
composition of which the element of
(19)
Gandha,
earth preponderates over the other
gans
of (20)
two elements of
ing, (22) walking, and the organs connected with (2j) defalcation and
tejas
manner every thing
and water. In in the
world
this
may
be said to contain every other thing in the world, but it derives its name from that
element
in!
its
composition
smell
(24) reproduction. is
;
speaking,
and
the or
(27) work-
The 2$th element
the individual soul, which
is
beyond
the \Pratriti, in the ascending order.
Adhik.
I. Sul.
SRI-BHISHYA.
/.]
185
themselves) possessing varied powers were, while separate, wholly unable to create beings, without (themselves) having been thrown together. Having secured combination
with each other, and abiding in each other, the elements, that begin with the universal principle known as the
mahat and end with the have gone to the Sutrakara
make up
(well
known)
particular principles, ~ J
the universe indeed.'
Further,
Badarayana) also has similarly spoken
(viz.
of the tripleness of form, belonging to the elements, to the effect that, although all created things consist of the three elements (of lejas, water and earth), still the
mention of water as the name of a particular thing is 7 and due to the preponderance of that element in it '
'
;
thus arises a difference of names
The wise hold that the
(in
relation to things).
direction of the Sruti to use the
putlka plant in the absence of the soma plant is due to the presence of the constituents of the soma (in the
The
pntlka).
use
of
wild rice
absence of cultivated rice
is
offerings)
(for
due to (the wild
in
the
rice) possess-
ing the characteristics of the cultivated rice. That which is found to form a part of any (homogeneous) substance that alone is similar (in essence) to that (substance). The
presence of silver, &c., in the mother-of-pearl, &c., is thus taught by the Sruti itself. The difference in the names of things such as silver, mother-of-pearl, &c., has preponderance for its cause. Moreover, the mother-of-pearl, &c., are perceived as being similar to silver, &c..
presence here The
SaiiJihvas
(/.
c.
in
the mother-of-pearl) of that
admit only these 25
tall-
ngf or principles. The VeJantins however add the Brahman as the 26th tatIra,
above and beyond the individual
soul. Cf.
170.
M.
B/i. II. 223.
&
Manu.
Hence, the
1.
For the seven principles from
the 169.
.Mahal downwards, vide supra
These are called universal
ciples,
2.
52 to 54.
171.
n
pi in
and the remaining sixteen arc Vide V.T.
called particular principles. I.
(viz.
Ved.
$t~it.
III.
I.
2,
1
SRI-BHISHYA.
86 is
silver)
determined
by
[Chap.
perception.
account of a defect in the sense
of
Part. /,
I.
Sometimes, on sight,
&c.,
the
apprehended without silver-part (in in quest of. silver one the shell-part and, accordingly, begins to act in obedience to volition. When the defect is the mother-of-pearl)
is
;
removed, and the shell-part of the mother-of-pearl
is
apprehended, that (volitional activity in regard to silver) ceases. Therefore, the perception of silver &c., in the mother-ofpearl, &c.,
the
is
real.
The
stultifier also, (existing
of
relation
the stultified
between these perceptions),
and re-
from the preponderance of the one (perception) over
sults
the other, according as the apprehension of the preponderance of the mother-of-pearl (over the silver) is partial or
complete. Therefore, this (relation of the stultified and the stultifier) is not dependent upon their relating to unreal
The
things and real things.
rule that every thing has the
characteristics of every other thing
is
thus established."
In the condition of dreams also, according to the merit living beings, God Himself creates corres-
and demerit of
ponding objects, which are capable of being perceived by certain particular persons, and which come to their end after a certain particular length of time.
To
this
same
effect
is
the following scriptural text relating to the condition of "There (i.e. in the condition of dreams), there are dreams :
no
chariots,
no horses
to be yoked,
and no roads.
But
He
and the roads. no happiness and no joy, but He creates happiness and joy. There, there are no puddles, no and no rivers, but He creates the puddles, the lakes,
creates the chariots, the horses to be yoked,
There bliss,
lakes,
is
no
bliss,
He is the creator." \Brih. Up. IV. these 3. 10.]. Although things are not at that time (of of dreaming) capable being perceived by all persons other and the
rivers.
Indeed,
(than the dreamer), yet the Lord creates
such
things
L
dhik.
^Ri-BHisHYA.
Sat. /.]
to be perceived only
by each
187
particular (dreaming) per-
He is the creator. That kind ofcreatorship is appropriate to Him who wills the truth and whose powers son. Indeed,
are wonderful. This
Again
text).
(it
is
the meaning (of the above scriptural " That stated in the scripture thus) is
:
Person, who, engaged in creating things according to His free will and pleasure, is ever wakeful, while all these are
That is the Brilliant One, That is the Brahman, That alone is called the Immortal. All the worlds abide in asleep,
Him, and there is none to transcend Him." [Kath. Up. V. 8.]. The Sftlrakdra also, (first of all) in these two aphorisms,
namely, "In the intermediate state
ing state), there (so)."
is
[Vcd.Sni.
dual self
is
(/. e.
it (vi/.
III.
"And some
the creator,
the dream-
the scripture) says (say the indivi-
creation, for, 2. i.],
in
sons and others (being the things
Silt. III. 2. 2.], supposes the individual be the creator in relation to the things seen in dreams;
created)." {Veil. self to
then by means of this aphorism, namely, "But it (viz. all that is seen in dreams) is merely the maya 7 - (of the Lord '
self), because they the the of attributes truth,
but not the creation of the individual
samsdra
state)."
[
Vcd.
Sill.
III.
2.
3.],
and by means
of other aphorisms, he shows that the individual self cannot have the characteristics of the creator, because the natural characteristics of willing the truth, &c., belonging to the
individual
self,
are
all
unmanifest there
in
the samsara state.
This wonderful creation, created so as to be capable of being perceived by certain particular (dreaming) persons, Seeing that the altogether proceeds from the Lord. scripture
says" All
172. A/dyd here
the worlds abide in Him." [Kath. Up.
means wonderful
creation.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
i88
V. 8],
it is
made out
{Chap.
that the Supreme Self
1.
Part.
1.
Himself the
is
dreams). Thus, he (the Sutrakard) To disproves (the supposition with which he started). exhim, who, sleeping in a room or in any other place, creator there
e.
(/.
in
periences a dream,
with his
own body,
it
is
to
possible to go to another country be crowned there as a king, to be
decapitated, and so on. These are the results of his karmic merit and demerit, and are possible only in consequence ot
the creation of another body having the same form and configuration as the body that is in the state of sleep.
But in the (perception of the) yellow conch and other such 73 combined things (by the jaundiced eye), the ocular rays 1
with the bilious substance existing in the eye are brought and other such things. The whiteness belonging to the conch is not apprehended, beinto association with the conch
overpowered by the yellow colour belonging to Hence, as in the case of the conch-shell covered with gold, there is the perception that the conch is yellow.
cause
the
it is
bile.
The
bilious substance
are
veiy subtle,
and the yellow colour, belonging to it, and are not therefore apprehended by the
by him who is (thus) afflicted with biliousness, they are, though subtle, apprehended well, because they have proceeded from his own eyes and are thus standers by. But,
in
close
They are also, though distance, apprehended by means of the ocular rays, which possess that peculiar power which is due to having apprehended them (in close proxivery
at
A
crystal
gem
apprehended to be
red,
mity ). is
proximity
by the
brilliant coloration
though the (coloured)
173.
(to
him).
a
Vide supi a.
p. 93. n. 59.
lying
close
because of that
it
to a china rose is
overpowered
Al(china rose). brilliance of the china rose radi-
Adhik.
L
Sffl.
ates in all
SRl-BHlSHYA.
/.]
it
directions, yet
clearness, only
when
is
apprehended with great
in association
it is
189
with a transpar-
ent substance (like the crystal gem). Thus, this (redness of the crystal gem) is capable of being established by perception. Again, the perception of water in a mirage poscharacter of reality, because water is (always) found in association with both the elements oflcjas and earth,
sesses the
and because there
is
earth on account of
(here,)
some
no apprehension of
lejas
and
defect in the
sense organs, and the apprehension of water through the influence of some unseen agency. Also, in regard to
because also there
the
of
circle
is
fire
produced
brand, the perception ed,
in
consequence
rotation of a
fire-
of that (circle) is right!}' causof there being no apprehension
of the interspaces (between of the fire-brand), owing of the fire-brand and
by the
its
any two successive positions to the very rapid motion
consequent association with
all
the
Even in the perception of this indeed such apprehension of certain particular objects in association with certain particular positions, as is attended with the non-apprehension of the parts (of the circumference).
circle,
there
is
In the case of some positions there is the nonapprehension of interspaces, for the reason that the interinterspaces.
spaces are themselves absent. In other positions, there is the non-apprehension (of interspaces) on account of the rapidity of
motion.
Such
is
the difference (between them).
Therefore, this (perception of the circle of fire) is based upon The perception of one's own face in the mirrreality.
other such things is also based upon reality. The rays proceeding from the eye are stopped and reflected in their movement by the mirror and other such things; and or and
thus,
and
in.
they then
apprehend the mirror and other such things, apprehend one's own face and other similar
first
SRi-J3HisHYA.
{Chap.
1.
Part.
L
In this case also, on account of the rapidity of movement (of the ocular aura), there is no apprehension objects.
of the interspace (between the mirror and the image), and consequently there is such a perception. Also in regard to the illusion relating to direction in space, since any other region of space may be actually found to exist in this (region of space), that other region of space
is,
through the influence of some unseen agency, apprehended as if unassociated with this region of space. Therefore the apprehension of is
one region of space as another
based upon reality itself. liven in the of the perception of two moons and other such
also
case
perceptions, there is a division caused in the movement of the aura proceeding from the eye, owing to timira, 1 * pressure with the fingers, &c., and hence there arises a l
variety in the
means intended to help
(the apprehension
of the moon,). Thus a duality of the means which are independent of each other forms the cause of the two apprehensions of the (one) moon. Of this (duality), one means apprehends the moon in its own place. But the second
being somewhat crooked in its movement, first apprehends the region near to the moon and then apprehends the moon there as dissociated from its own place.
one,
Therefore, in the apprehension of the moon in association with two regions at the same time, there arises, on account
of the variety in the apprehension, a variety in the form of the thing apprehended; and there is also the absence of
the apprehension of unity. Thus there is this particular perception to the effect that there are two moons. The association of that
than
174.
its
(moon which
is
perceived in a place other which is other than
own), with that place
Vide supra
p. 104. n. 69.
Adkik.
SnL
I.
SRl-Bii.\siiYA.
/.]
IQI
its own, is due to the incessant apprehension of (that) other place and of the moon as unassociated with its own Therefore, the two apprehensions of the moon place. which are associated with two regions are also real. On
account of there being a duality in the apprehension, the duality of the form which is apprehended in relation to the
moon
is
also
However,
real.
may be held (here) moon which are cha-
it
two apprehensions of the by two different qualifications, only one moon
that of the racterised
has to be the object.
But, in such an apprehension, there is no power possessed by the eye itself (to reduce it to one only apprehension), as (there is) in the case of the recognitive
cognition
and
;
two moons) continues
so
the
ocular
perception
to remain as such.
Although both the eyes form (only) one means intended to help (the apprehension of things), nevertheless, we have to assume (of
from the effect produced (in this case of double vision) that the aura proceeding from the eye
two means intended to help for the reason that
it (viz.
becomes changed
into
(the apprehension of things),
that aura)
is
split
up by timira and
other such misguiding causes. But when the misguiding cause is removed,the moon, as associated with its own region,
becomes
known by means
of only one Therefore, the belief arises that the moon place.
cause
;
apprehension.
only in one This duality of the means is due to the misguiding the duality of apprehension is due to that (duality is
of the means); the duality in the form of the thing apprehended is due to that (duality of apprehension). Accordingly, it (viz. this it is
is
explanation) is faultless. a settled conclusion that the totality of
(altogether) based upon reality. Criticisms of the other theories
fully given
by
those
who
Therefore all
perceptions
of perception are maintain those (various) theories
SRi-BHlSHYA.
192
themselves, and so no attempt
them.
(discussing) in too
is
Or
[Chap.
made
what
I.
Part.
(here) in the
way
I.
of
the use (of indulrather, forms of discussion of this kind? To is
many who accept the whole collection of the criteria of truth known as perception, inference, and scripture, and who acknowledge that Highest Brahman who is understood by means of the scripture, who is devoid of the least taint of all evil, who is possessed of hosts of innumerging)
those
able auspicious qualities unsurpassed
in
who
truth
is
and
omniscient
wills
the
excellence, (to
and
them),
there that cannot be proved and what is there that cannot be accomplished ? Indeed, the Divine Lord, who is
what
is
the Highest Brahman, creates the whole of this world to suit the merit and demerit of the individual souls, so that it
be enjoyed (and endured by them).
may Him
Accordingly, by there are created certain things which form the common
objects of experience to all, and are capable of being experienced as the experience of (harm ic) results in the form
of pleasures, pains, and states of indifference to pleasures and pains; and (by Him are also created) certain other things
which are the objects of the experience of certain particular persons only, and which last only for a certain length of time, and are to be experienced as subject to various specific conditions.
being so, the relation of the stultified and the stultifier (between these two sets of things) is due to the one constituting the object of the exprience common to It
and the other not constituting such an object. Thus the whole (argument) is perfectly appropriate.
all,
Then (the
again
a;
what has been urged
which
is
unlit
an entity or as a non-entity,
175.
Vide supra pp. 30
&
31.
is
to
be
1
7
'
to the effect that
defined either
established
by
as
revelation,
Adhik.
SM.
I.
that
SRi-BHlSHYA.
/.]
193
not right because in the following scriptural Anritena hi pralyndhafr t * and in others, the
is
;
passage
word anrita does not denote what is indescribable. Indeed, word anrita denotes what is not rita. The word rita 11 1 (or the fruits of action), because it is expresses karma' stated 178 in the scripture that "there are the two enjoythe
'
Rita is that karma ing rita (or the fruits of action)." which is free from attachment to fruits, which consists in the
worship of the Highest Person, and the fruit of which is the attainment of that Person. Here (in the passage under discussion), anrita is the karma which is different from this (rita),
1 *
and (therefore) has samsara^
for its result,
and
is
opposed to the attainment of tlie Brahman. This (we 8 learn) from the scriptural passage "They (/. e. the creaof do this world the not obtain Brahman, being tures) (thus)
1
drawn away by anrita" Also in the passage 181 " Then there was neither existence (sat) nor non-existence the words sal and asat refer to intelligent and non(asat)" produced by the secondary particular because this passage is intended to establish that the two things, which, as found at the time of creation,
intelligent objects as
creation
J
8 2
;
are denoted
by the words
sat
&
176. 157. This is apparently a quotation from Cjihdnd. "For they (/'. e. the Up. VIII. 3. 2.
Vide supra pp. 31
creatures) are
drawn away (from the
BraAman) by means 177. Rita
duties life,
or
may
mean
&
3.
This
is
I
129.
182.
Vide supra
V.
p. 31.
the creation
of form-
bodies taking place after the creation
this
of undifferentiated primordial matter,
in
truth, law, &c.
183.
Vide Kath. Up. III. I. 179. The word samsara means the 178.
ever-recurring
X.
2.
religious
works performed
succession
and form the
Vide Chhdna. Up. VIII. 3. 181. Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. & R. 180.
possessing conscious and unconscious
of anrita."
also
/ya/ 183
and
of
births
and deaths and the consequent cotHinuance of the bondage of the soul.
the
Vide
Taitt.
individual
Up.
self
II. 6.
which
I.,
is
where intelli-
gent and the non-intelligent Prakriti^ or nature in
mordial
its
undifferentiated pri-
state, are respectively
called
Sat and Tyat, for the reason that the
SRI-BHISHYA.
194 differentiated
\Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
and non-intelligent objects pro-
intelligent
duced by the secondary particular creation, are, at the time of universal dissolution, absorbed into the thing which 8 4 is denoted by the word tamcis^ and constitutes the undifIn this primordial non-intelligent matter. (passage), there is no mention made of anything which is said to possess the character of being indescribable either
ferentiated
because only the absence, at a particular time, of the things denoted by the words sat and asat is (herein) mentioned. What is denoted by the as an entity or as a non-entity
word tamas here
made
is
;
mean
out to
undifferentiated
primordial non-intelligent matter from another scriptural ' 8 3 passage (also) which is to the effect "The avyakta is
absorbed
akshara
the
into
;
the akshara
absorb-
is
tamas." [Sub. Up. II.]. By the word denoted the subtle state of that prakriti which
ed into the
tamas
is
made up
is
matter
;
of undifferentiated primordial non -intelligent is indeed true. But if it be said that this
this
(prakriti}
denoted by the word maya, as
is
individual self
is
incapable of under-
going, any transformation,
non-intelligent Prakviti
undergoing
is
and the
capable of
transformations
at
all
184.
Tamas
Pradhana
is
one of the names of
or the Prakriti in
its
undifferentiated primordial state. Vide Sub.
6^.11. In this
state,
to be very subtle, so that
it
it is
said
cannot be
easily distinguished from the indivi-
dual
state,
tiated state,
tamas;
;
it
is
passage called
in its first
the
differen-
called the Vibhakta-
it is
in its next state,
it
is
called
the Akshara in which even the quali-
times.
the
erentiated
Avibhakta-tamas
in the
self
with which
it
is
invariably
associated.
iies ot
Sattva,Rajas and Ta mas are not
seen to be differentiated and in which it
is
to be
also said
promiscuously
mixed up with the individual last state,
it is
called the
self; in its
Avyakta
in
which the differentiation of the three
Gunas has begun
to take place.
From
of the
Avyakta proceeds the principle known as the Mahal, from this again
Prakriti or nature are mentioned in
proceeds the principle called Ahah-
185.
Four
Sub. Up. II.
this
different
In
its
states
primary undiff-
kqra or egoity
;
and so on.
Adhik. "
L
Know not
press
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
/.]
then that prakriti
and that
10.], it is
Si'tt.
so,
what
it is
mdyd."
mdyd If
indescribable.
is
it
Up. IV.
[Svct.
therefore indescribable;
because the word is
is
195
it is
not
replied that
known
to ex-
be said (again) that
the word mdyd, being synonymous with unreality
(/.
c.
ignorance or avidya}, expresses what is indescribable, it is replied that this (also) is not right. Indeed, the word maya does not, in all cases, denote unreality (/. e. ignorance or avidya)
;
because the word
weapons of Rdkshasas and
maya
A suras
is
used to denote the
which, surely, are real-
Accordingly, there is this passage thousand mayas (or wonderfully created weapons) of
ly existent things.
"
:
The Sambara were destroyed one after another by that quickly moving (discus of the Lord) in guarding from injury the body of the boy (Prahlada)." [V. P. I. 19. 20.]. Hence the word maya denotes the creation of wonderful things. Prakriti also
is
called
by the name of maya, because
it
certainly possesses the power of creating wonderful things. The scriptural passage " Out of this (prakriti ), He, who is the owner of the mdya (i. e. the Lord), creates
world wherein another being
this
(viz.
the individual
self)
bound down by mdyd'' \Svet. LTp. IV. 9.] also points out that the prakriti, which is denoted by the word mdya, possesses the power of causing the creation of wonder-
is
The Highest Person is called the May in, simply because He is the owner of that (mdya),* 86 but not because ful things.
He is
is
characterised
by ignorance
Indeed, it in that (world)
(or avidya).
"
And stated in the scriptural passage individual the soul) is (viz.
another being
bound down by
mdyd" \Svet Up. IV. 9.], as also in the passage "When the individual soul, that has beetf asleep under the influence 186.
The word miya means
either
wonderful powers or wonderful creu-
lion. It also
&c.
means
skill,
knowledge,
SRi-BHiSHYA.
ig6
[Chap.
I.
Part.
1.
of the beginningless mdyd, wakes up, (then he knows the Unborn One)." \_Md\id. Up. II. 21.], that the individual soul
is
bound down by mdyd (i. e. by
ing) scriptural passage also
" Indra
nature). In the (follow(i.e.
the Highest Lord)
known to assume many forms through mdyds (or His wonderful powers of creating things)" \Brih. Up. II. 5. 87 the wonderful I powers (of the Lord) are denoted (by 9-]> is
1
the word mdyd}. Indeed, said " He e. the
it
is
only for this reason that it is much like tvashtn
Lord) shines very
(/.
the creator)." [R. V. VI. 47. 19.]. Indeed nothing shines forth that is overpowered by unreality (viz. ignorEven in the passage " ance or avidya}. mdyd
(L
e.
My
[B. G. VII. 14.], it is stated that it (viz. mdyd) consists of qualities therefore, what denoted (by mdyd} is that prakriti itself which is is
is
difficult to
transcend."
;
made up
of the three qualities (of sattva or goodness, or passion, and tamas or darkness). Thus, by means rajas of the scriptures, there is no establishment of that ig-
norance (or avidya) which cannot be described either as an entity or as a non-entity.
Nor (is that ignorance or avidya established) by means of the inappropriateness (which, in the absence of ignorance or avidya, would result) in relation to the teaching of unity (between the individual self and the Supreme Self). 1 88 "That thou art," there is the teachFor, in the passage ing of unity between the individual self and the Supreme Self; yet we do not see here any such inappropriateness as.
forms the cause for assuming that ignorance (or avidya) which is contrary to (the nature of) the Brahman who is referred to in the context,
187.
Vide also R.
188. Vide
QhhdnJ.
V.
who is known
VI. 47. 18. Up. VI.
8.
7.
&
here
also n. 142 supra.
by the word
Adhik. '
That
who
',
SRi-BHlSHYA.
Sut. i.]
I.
who
omniscient, and
is
197 wills the truth,
and
is
the cause of the creation, preservation, and destruction of The teaching of unity (here,) is very apall the worlds.
by the word
propriate, because
word 'That'),
denoted the
is
individual soul.
By
the
'
thou
'
also, fas
by the
Brahman whose body
is
the
"
Entering in (also) the same as
scriptural passage
along with this individual self which is Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms."-
Up. VI.
(CTihdnd.
is stated that all things posto the extent that they include Hence, there need be no assumption of
3. 2.]
it
names and forms only
sess
the Highest Self.
ignorance (or avidyd) in relation to the Brahman. In the Itihdsas and the Puranas* 8 * also, the discussion regarding
any avidyd that
nowhere to be
found.
The passage
follows:
Vishnu"
[V. P.
that the
Brahman
II. is
191 beginning with
of
Intelligence,
1
9
12.
related to the
is
may
it
Nevertheless,
lays
is
be said as
"The Lights
beginning with 38.]
Brahman
are
down
the proposition then the passage
the only reality "Because the Lord has the nature ;
therefore,
He
the
(has
All
for
His
form)" explains that the world which is differentiated by the of mountains, distinctions &c., oceans, lands, relation is the result of the display of avidyd in Vide
189.
supra
p.
136.
n.
The whole
190. is
as
follows
" :
of
this
passage
The Lights
are
Vishnu, the worlds are Vishnu, the are
forests
Vishnu,
the mountains
and the regions of space, the rivers and the seas, all that is existent and
He
191.
Vide supra
all
that
alone,
manas
!"
O
is
non-existent, are all
thou,
the best of Brah-
passage thus is
of
to
where
the
quote
this
" Because the
:
nature
the
therefore
p. 31.
made
Adwaitins are
140.
of
Lord
Intelligence,
He has the All for His He is no material thing,
form.
But
Know
then that the distinctions, of
mountain, ocean, land, &c., are indeed born out of of
P.
Him and are
illusion II. 12. 39.
in
the outcome
Intelligence."
V,
SRI-BHASHYA.
198
Brahman whose
to the
telligence
essential nature
afterwards the
;
L
'[Chap. I. Part.
passage
192
is
altogether In-
beginning with
"But when (there remains Intelligence alone) own form, and pure, (then indeed cease to exist the
in its fruits
of the tree of illusion)" confirms that it (viz. the world) is the result of the display of ignorance, by means of the fact
is
Intelligence, exists in
to be
is
when
at the time
that,
nature
Brahman, whose
the
His
own
true
natural state, there
found no distinction whatever between things by means of the two stanzas, one beginning ;
thereafter
" Is there
with 93 1
"
any
and the other
(external) object
194 Mahl ghatatvam (which means "the beginning with of a pot out of it,") the unreality of formation the mud,
the distinctions between things is stated even from the 193 of the world then the ; stand-point of the perception This again has been quoted 192. according to the Adwaitins on pp. 31
ed
&
influence of their
32
thus
supra,
after all the effects
'' :
of
remains
stroyed, there
alone in Its
own
devoid of
evil,
But
when,
works are deIntelligence
indeed
cease
to exist
those fruits of the tree of
illusion,
which
12.
The " Is
:
(external)
whole
V.
P.
is
this
pas-
following
there
object
beginning,
which
of
the
to
is
sage
out
distinc-
40.
193.
effect
the
things in things."
tions of II.
form
anywhere any is withwhich
middle
and
end,
always uniform, and which,
moreover, undergoes changes of state, and which frequently is not what it was.
can II.
such a thing there be, indeed be the reality ?"
If it
12,41.
how 'V.
P,
This passage
thus
:
be translat-
may
Those who, through the
own Karmas,
are pre-
vented from having correct notions regarding (the nature of) the self
and
true form, pure
then
194.
by them are
seen (those various
states of matter such as) the
formation of a
mud, the
of
pot (out
the
it),
breaking (up of that pot) into
two
its turning into particles, their turning into dust, and this again into atoms. tell me (This being so),
halves,
whether
this (matter)
changeable) reality. 195. tins,
to
According
can be the (unP. II. 12. 42.
V.
to
the
Ad-wai-
the true nature of perception
is
apprehend the one Reality which
exists at all times, but not
to appre-
hend those distinctions which make up the world and are all super-imposed on the Reality by Ignorance or Avidyd. Vide supra pp. 42
&
43.
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
7. Sal. i.]
199
stanza beginning with 9C
"Therefore, (there can be) nothsums up the already enunciating other than Intelligence" ed unreality of whatever is different from the Brahman; then 1
by means of the passage
97
1
in
apprehended
telligence... (is
"The one Inmany ways)" it is made
beginning with
own karma
is the basis of ignorance of the the cause perception of differ(or ence in relation to the Brahman whose true nature is In-
clear that one's
avidya} which
is
by means of the passage "The Intelligence which is pure
telligence
with
alone
J
then,
;
98
beginning one)."
(is
Brahman, who has the character of Intelligence, is examined; and (lastly) by means of the " "(Thus) have I told you of what is real, &c." passage the true nature of the
1
the truth has been taught to you to the effect that the nature is Intelligence is alone real and
Brahman whose true
nothing else (is real); that everything else and that the reality of the world and
merely phenomenal. teaching
196.
in
(given
This p. 32.
Therefore,
at
such, indeed,
the
Vishnu-Purdna
found
supra as follows
and
no time
which
no
in
can there be any group of things other than Intelligence, O V. P. II. thou, the twice-born one.
place,
all
is
V. P.
of the passage
The One
the
second II.
12.
half
43:
is
apprehended in many ways by those whose minds are variously constituted on account Intelligence
of the variety of their 198. p.
32.
This
own Karmas.
passage runs
supra
:
The
thus on
Intelligence
other things
is
seen to be the the portion
in
pure, devoid of evil, devoid of is free
greed, &c.,
He
is
is
from contact with
one and always one,
is
there
This again
supra
32. I
nothing. V.P.
is
told
istence,
as
II.
follows
12.44.
quoted on
is
Thus
:
;
whom
Vasudeva, other than
199.
This
is
the Highest and the Highest Lord
12. 43.
197
is
sorrow, and
:
certainly unreal;
all
And
is
passage
quoted on
is
p.
have
you of what is real exand how Intelligence is real else is unreal and 1 have
and
all
told
you
;
also that this
which
is
phe-
nomenally realised well for practical purposes is that on which the world is
dependent.
V.
P.
II. 12.
45.
SRT-BHISHYA.
200
\Chap.
Part,
I.
L
named Bhuvanakosa).* not right. Here, after explaining in extenso the nature of the world which is conceived to be an unopened All this
is
flower-bud, another form
before
is
set forth briefly,
the world which
made
is
of
that was not mentioned
it
201 "Listen." In beginning with up of the intelligent and the non-
intelligent things, that intelligent part, the individual peculiarity of which is beyond the sphere of speech and mind is known to itself, and which, being entirely of the nature of intelligence, is untouched by any modifications of matter, (that part) is expressed by the word 'exist-
and which
ence', for the reason that
it is
indestructible.
But the non-in-
telligent part undergoes a variety of modifications caused by the karma of the intelligent part, and is destructible; and it is
(therefore) expressed
by the word
'non-existence'.
And both
form the body of Vasudeva, the Highest Brahman, and have Him for their Self. Therefore, this form (of the Lord) is (thus) briefly described here. Accordingly, in the passage " That water 202 which is the body of Vishnu, from that, 200.
Bhuvanako'sa
given to
to
I
chapters
name
the
is
of
12.
the
second Am'sa of the Vishitu-Puratia, because in these
the
conception V. P. II. 2. 10.
of a lotus-bud. Vide 201.
stanza it
Vide
V. P.
and the
are
as
stanza preceding
follow
the situation
Thus,
:
terrestrial world,
and
lowlands
mountains,
Moreover,
length,
between
and the
them (has
Listen again to another
description which 202.
mean the
is brief,
Here wafer the
O
also been
is
used so as to
primordial substratum of
whole universe
known
as
the
Brahmanda; because water has been held to be the first created thing, and in
it
the Self-existent
Lord
is
said to
the
of the oceans
the four-faced Brahma, the creating
the
of
all
as also
of
in
have placed the seed which became a golden egg. Out of which was born
of the mountains, has
described at
then,
earth and
of the
the Lights, of the divisions
and
This
12. 36.
II.
live
described),
chapters the world
under
described
is
which
of
of
been the
principal
the
rivers.
nature of the beings
deity. all
its
Hence primordial matter and evolved
modifications
are
denoted by the word water here. Cf. also
Manu
I.
8
&
9, et seq.
Adhik.
Sill.
I.
SRI-BHISHYA.
/.]
201
Brahmana, sprang the earth, lotus-shaped, together with its mountains, oceans, and all other such things." \V. P. II. 12. 37.]
it is
said that, because water forms
the body of
Vishnu, the world also, being a modification of water, forms the body of Vishnu, and that Vishnu is the Self of that
Hence, he (Parasara) says that, of the grammatical equation which is itself an explanation of the teaching of identity (between the individual self and the Supreme (world).
found in all scriptures, and which is also dealt with in the passage 203 beginning with " The Lights are Vishnu" (of that equation) the foundation is nothing other than the relation of the soul and the body (be-
Self) as
tween the Brahman and the universe). In this sastraic work (viz. the Vishnu-Purand) itself, even earlier (than in this context^, this very thing is mentioned more than once
"They are all His body" " the body of the Lord."- 2 5 Being thus
2
:
4
"The whole of that
indestructible,
is
He alone is
206 beings, and has the form of the universe." This identity (between the individual self and the Supreme Self), as consisting of the relation of the body and the soul,
the Self of
all
taught by the equation stated in the passage beginning are Vishnu." Here, the thing Lights which has the nature of existence and (the thing) which
is
with" The
has the nature of non-existence, both of which are found in the world, are spoken of as forming the body of 203.
Fide supra p. 197,
204.
Vide
P.
'V.
I.
which contains
n. 190.
22.
86.
The whole passage containing this " statement runs thus Here, there, :
anywhere else, whatever things embodied and unembodied, they
or
exist
are
all
205.
His body." Fide
V.
this statement
to the following
effect
:
P.
I.
22.
38.
is
forms the instrumental cause of any created thing which is created by
any living being, the whole
O
Brahmana,
is
the
body
Lord.
26
and
Whatever
206.
Vide
r.
P.
I.
2.
69.
of that, of
the
SRI-BHISHYA.
202
\_Chap.I.Part.I.
Vishnu, and as having that Vishnu for their Self. This (viz. the individual soul) is of the nature of existence; that (viz.
praknti or matter) has the nature of non-existence. reason for this existence
is
The
having the nature of non"Because the Lord is of the
(viz. prakriti)
given
thus:
nature of Intelligence, therefore, He (has the All for His 2 7 The natural form of the Lord, who is established form)". as the Self of all the individual souls,
is
Intelligence alone
;
not the form of things such as gods, men, and other embodied objects; and because this is so, therefore, the forms but
it is
of non-intelligent matter such asgods,men,ocean,land, and other such things are the result of the display of His intelligence, and are based upon the continuous apprehension of the self-differentiations of that (self) which is known as existence,
and which has altogether the nature of
intelli-
gence they (viz. those differentiations) are in .the form of gods and other material embodiments that is, they are ;
;
based upon karma which
(in
its
turn)
is
based upon the
continuous apprehension of the forms of gods and other material embodiments (in association with the self). This is
the meaning (of the stanza under discussion). From this, implied that, because the non-intelligent thing is the seat
it is
of transformations according to the karma of the individual soul, therefore it is expressed by the word 'non-existence',
and that
all else is
expressed by the word 'existence'.
He
208 be(Parasara) explains this same thing in the passage
ginning with in its
own
"But when
true form,
and
(there remains intelligence) pure, (then, indeed, cease
to exist the fruits of the tree of illusion,)."
the destruction of
all
When,
after
the karmas which form the basis for
the continuous apprehension of the self-differentiations (of 2O7308.
Vide supra p. 31, & also Vide sttf-a pp. 31 &
n.
32,
191,
&
also n. 192.
Adhik.
I.
Sfit.
self) in
the
self,
becomes
free
own the
from
evil
and perfectly pure and assumes
natural
form, then, among things, there will of things which are intended of the enjoyment (self), and which are them-
not be those for
'
distinctions '
karma
the results of the
selves
203
the form of gods, &c., the thing which is called and the nature of which is pure intelligence,
the
its
SRI-BHISHYA.
i.]
that
is
at
the
root
of the supposition that the self is identically the same with material forms, such as those of gods, &c. Those modifications of the material entity,
which are
men, mountains, oceans,
lands, &c.,
gods,
the form of
in
and which form
those things known as gods, &c., and which are wrongly taken to be the same as the self, they cease to exist when the karma which forms their basis is destroyed. Therefore, the meaning is that
the objects of enjoyment
among
the non-intelligent thing, which certain particular states
which
is
last
capable of being found in only for a time, has to be
denoted by the word 'non-existence', and that all else has to be denoted by the word 'existence'; because this (latter) is, at times, altogether of the form of self-evident intelligence. " Is there (anyAccordingly, in the passage beginning with all
209
he (Parasara) says that
to be
denoted by the word
where) any (external) object,"
the non -intelligent thing non-existence' alone because, every is
'
moment,
;
altered in form
and
is,
in
consequence, found
in
it
becomes
conditions
only for a time. Indeed, that thing which is always uniform and which is without beginning, middle and end, is that which is denoted by the word 'existence';
which
last
because
it is
not proper to think of
it
as non-existent
at
any time. Nothing that is non-intelligent is seen anywhere to be of that description. In the passage beginn2og.
This
is
the
fiibl
half of
V.
P.
11, 12, 41.
Vide supra
p. 198.
11.193.
SRI-BHISHYA. 210 ing with
[Chap.
Part.
1.
1.
external object)
"(Is there anywhere any
of state" he (undergoes) changes That it then is. thing which (really) undergoes changes of state every moment, that gives up its former states one after another, as it passes into
moreover,
which,
(Parasara) says what
one after another
latter states
one of
its
former
sociation with it
times,
states, it
any one of
and
;
so,
when
in
is
it
any
can not be in simultaneous asits
Hence, at
latter states.
all '
by the word non-existence to be so made out, is declared in
to be denoted
is
'
alone. That it has, indeed, the passage 211 beginning with
Mahl ghatatvam.
Those
who, through their own karmas, are found in the form of gods, men, &c., and are, in consequence, prevented from having correct ideas regarding the (nature of the) self, by them, the non-intelligent thing which is the object of their '
'
is
enjoyment (to
perceived to undergo transformations every is that it is actually experienced
The meaning
moment.
be of such a nature).
This being the case,
is
there
any non-intelligent thing which is seen to be always in the same state and to be without beginning, middle and end, and thus deserves to be denoted by the word ' exist'
ence
The intended
?
Because
thing. thing,
which
which
is
is
this
intelligence,
21 gives the passage
210.
This
passage P- J 9 8 n
V.
-
2X1.
-
in
is
P.
is
no such
is
never and nowhere
'existence'. Accordingly, 2
beginning with
fit
to be
he (Parasara)
"Therefore, (at no collection of
no place can there be any
12. 41.
P.
Vide supra
p. 198. n. 194.
V.
11.12.42. 212.
F.
'93-
Vide supra
that there
so,
the latter half of the II.
is
therefore, the non-intelligent different from the self the true nature of
denoted by the word time and
conclusion is
P.
This II.
199. n. 196,
is
the
12. 43.
first
half of stanza
Vide
supra
p.
L
Adhik.
Sut. /.]
things) other than
SRI-BHA.SHYA. intelligence."
where the uniform nature of
205
But the
intelligence,
self
and
has everyis, in con-
sequence, essentially opposed to the distinctions known as Nevertheless, those who think of the self itself gods, &c.
being differentiated by those distinctions known as gods, &c., which are based upon the various kinds of
as
karma performed by themselves and form the cause of their entering into the bodies known as gods, &c., (they) (the self) to be so varied in nature as to correspond to each of those particular forms. Accord-
imagine
he (Parasara) says in the passage 2 8 beginning with"The one intelligence is apprehended in many ways" that the conception of those distinctions is not due to anything '
ingly,
in the essential nature of the self (itself). Indeed, the essential
nature of the self
is
free
from karma
;
and
for that
very reason, it is untouched by prakriti (or nature) which Therefore again, it is dissociated from all acts as a taint. evil qualities such as sorrow, ignorance, greed, and the like. It is
because
one, ;
same
state
Him Him
for its
"
The
it
is
always
in the
intelligence,
which
is
pure,... (is one)."
21 *
same state, is But the non-intelligent every moment subject to modifications, and is thus
intelligent
is
not capable of increase and de-
Accordingly, he (Parasara) gives the
thing, being always in the
denoted by the word thing
is
and forming the body of Vasudeva, it has Self, because there is nothing which has not
for its Self.
passage
The
;
it
very same reason,
for that
crease
'existence'.
always subject to destruction therefore it is always fit to be denoted by the word 'non-existence'. The world, which thus made up of these intelligent and is non-intelligent ;
213.
stanza p.
This
V- P.
199. n. 197.
is
the
second half of
II. 12. 43.
Vide supra
214.
supra
V,
/.
u.
p, 199, n. 198,
I2
.,
SRi-BHlSHYA.
5o6
[Chap.
I.
Part. 7.
forms the body of Vasudeva, and has Him for Thus the reality of the world is very well explained. For this same purpose, (Parasara) gives the pasthings,
Self.
its
sage
2
3
'
"Thus (have
beginning with
I
told you) of
what
is
Here, (this explanation of what is) real (saland unreal (asatyaui) concludes the topic the conyam) sideration of which was begun in the passage 216 "All that is existent and all that is non-existent (are Vishnu)." real."
This thing
(viz.
telligence,
and
the
altogether of the nature of in-
self) is
thus similar throughout and its essenother is selves) inexpressible by means (from is
tial distinction
And
;
which, when mixed up with non-intelligent matter and thus brought within the material world, acquires those distinctions in the of words.
it
this thing alone
is
form of gods, men, &c., as required
Of
cal realisation of things. exist, the cause
so
And
215.
this
This passage
bhdra
evam
V. P. II.
the original
bhavato
is
meaning of what
you
how
is
12. 45.
Sad-
:
anyat
Thus have
\
I
told
real existence
and
:
intelligence
thing in the passage beginning
mayoJcto jild-
nam yathd satyam asatyam Its
'
same
very
as follows in
is
(Parasara) gives the passage 2 7 He exalso) that this is that."
have told you
(I
plains
is
real
and
all else
Vide supra p. 32. & n. 199. These expressions occur in V.
unreal.
is
2 16.
P.
Vide supra p. 197. n. 190, has been already quoted in
II. 12. 38.
where full.
it
sloka is as follows in
This
original
-Jyotimshi
:
vishnur
the
bhu-
vandni vishnur vandni vishnur girayo aisarc/iii
\
these (distinctions) which nothing other than
stated to be
is
Accordingly, he
karma. "
the proper practi-
for
nadyas
samuiirdscja
sa
sarvatn
era
vipravarya
the that
||
means
yadasti
all
is
expression existent
and
means
all
yanndsti
expression is
the
that
cha
yanndsti
yadasti
Here,
non-existent.
Vide
217.
passage
V.
Etattu
yal
tatrdpichpktatn
According
meaning
P.
II.
45.
This
as follows in the original
is
to
:
samvyavaharabhutani bhuvanasritam te\\ the
Advaaitim,
the
of this passage has been al-
ready given(vide supra p.32,& n.i99,)as " And I have told follows you also :
that this
which
alised well for
is
phenomenally
practical
purposes
reis
Adhik. with 2
'
I.
8
Sfit.
SRi-BnlSHYA.
/.]
"(The karmas which are made up
He says in the
the sacrificial animal, &c."
with 2
'
"And
9
to this
world,
207
which
passage beginning
have described to you to be the indeed goes he who is altogether under the
this
karma
influence of
of) the sacrifice,
(I
that the object of the knowreal is to induce the effort to
),"
ledge that the world is secure the means for the attainment of beatific release.
Here
(/.
e
.
even
in this context),there
is
not seen any one
word used to denote that Highest Brahman devoid of attributes, or (to denote) that ignorance (or
appropriate
who
is
which
avidyd]
resident
is
(Brahman] and
that
in
is
incapable of being defined either as an entity or as a nonentity, or (to denote that) the world is manufactured by that (avidya). The karma of the individual selves is
opposed to the knowledge of the truth of things, and that on which the world ent."
This interpretation
ticised
by Ramanuja.
is
depend-
is
here cri-
According to
him, the meaning of this passage, as
made out from it
occurs,
And
I
is
to the following effect
have told you also that
individual is
the context in which
self,
the
thus that
when mixed up matter, and non-intelligent
brought within the world, is which causes those distinc-
which
tions
are
proper realisation
required
sage are
is
ficial
animal,
are the
format
results
of these
enjoyments of the
of the universe. 2ig. 47., I
runs
have
the
he
This
F. P.
sloka
described to
who
p.
"And
thus:
world,
II. 12. 46,
V.
to
you
is
altogether
of
Karma.
.
which to
indeed,
this,
T2
\\.
this
be
goes
under
the
in
the
impermanent character of the fruits of Karma, one has to aim at that
pas-
of the sacrifice, the sacri-
the officiating priests, the
are seen (the forms of
influence
this
the sacrificial
it
and the
the
as follows :-The ~f\armas which
made up
in
for
of things
form of gods, men, &c. The whole of 218,
and
path,
gods, &c.),
earthly world and of the other parts
:
this
pure intelligence,
with
the gods, and the heavenly world of pleasure,form the (commonly adopted)
of which
nature
is
fire,
Soma
all
juice,
which always thereby deva."
is
firm,
uniform, surely
Knowing
unchangeable so that one enter into
the
and
may Vasu-
SRi-BnlSHYA.
208
declared to be thus the cause that
{Chap.
I.
makes the
Part. self,
I.
the
nature of which is pure intelligence, experience such varied and it is also declared to conditions as those of gods, &c. ;
be the cause that makes non-intelligent
undergo
(all
its)
transformations
(inert)
matter
moreover, the words
;
existence, non-existence, reality and unreality are (all) incapable of denoting that thing which cannot be defined either as an entity or as a non-entity for these reasons, the whole world which is expressible by the words existence and non-existence, and is made up of intelligent and non:
intelligent things, constitutes the .body of the
the Highest Lord, the Supreme
The words existence
Brahman, namely, Vishnu.
and unreality are the opposites of therefore, by means of them, only
non-existence
and
reality,
unreality or non-existence ability.
Most High,
is
made
out, but not indescrib-
The words non-existence and
unreality which have
been applied to the non-intelligent thing are not here used to denote what is a mere nothing or what is false, but are used to denote destructibility. It is only this destructibil220 ity which is set forth in the passages beginning with " Is there 221 Mahl any (external) object" and also with ghatatvam. (In regard to our view), there is neither want of proof nor stultification by means of right knowledge; because what is experienced in one form at one time
perceived to be otherwise at another time by reason of a certain transformation (thereof), and it is, in consequence, spoken of as non-existent. Indeed, to be a mere
is
nothing
is
to be
means of proof.
unworthy of any association with any if a thing, which is experienced as
And
existent in relation to a particular place and time, is also perceived as non-existent in relation to that same place and 22O.
Vide
suprq. p. 198. n. 193.
221.
Vide5/rap.
198. n. 194.
Adhik. time,
I.
Silt,
then there
experienced at
is
;
because
209
when a thing transformation and is, through out to be non-existent at another
stultification;
but not
one time
made
other such causes,
time
SRl-BHISHYA.
i.]
(in this latter case) there is (really)
no con-
owing to there being a difference in the time (of opposite experiences). Therefore there is no fal-
tradiction
the two
sity (here at all).
The thing known as the self is said is this nature of it is without beof the intelligence essentially
What
is
:
;
ginning, middle and end, and
natural condition pressible
by
;
is
therefore,
always
it is
the word existence.
in
one and the same
always and of
ex-
itself
But the non-intelligent '
'
which forms the object of the enjoyment of the individual selves, is subject to transformation and destruction? thing,
in
accordance with the
karma
of those (selves), and so
is
of the import of the word non-existence ; therealways is it fore expressible by the words non-existence and unreality. full
This same thing is also stated in the following passages :-"Whatever, even by a change of time, does not undergo such a change of name as arises out of transformations and other similar causes, what is that object, O king, what is it?'' [V. P. II. 13. ioo.]; "The wise acknowledge that what is indestructible forms the reality existent,
which
is
produced by
;
and that, no doubt,
destructible things."
is
[
nonV.
P.
II. 14. 24]. Unreality has been declared to be the realisation of the conception of pure existence in relation to a thing
which
is
found to be existent or non-existent in accord-
ance with particular conditions of place, time, and activity. The realisation under the conception of pure existence be-
be reallongs (rightly) only to the self, and so it is declared to Further, from the listener Maitreya's repetition (of the teaching listened to
has been taught to
by him)
me how
in the sloka all
which says
"It
the three worlds exist sup-
SRi-BHISHYA.
210
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
ported by Vishnu, and how intelligence is, by pre-eminence, the reality." \V. P. II. 13. 2.], it is made out that the foundation of the grammatical equation, contained in the 222 beginning with "The Lights are Vishnu", passage is the relation of the soul and the body (between the Brahman and the universe), that the intelligent and nonintelligent things are denoted, as a
by the use of the
rule,
words existence and non-existence, that intelligence has a by karma and is thus pre-emi-
natural condition uncaused
and that the non-intelligent thing
nent,
reason that
for the
it
karma
are due to the
What has been
not pre-eminent undergoes transformations which is
of that (intelligent
urged
223
self).
by the Pnrvapakshins
to the
speak of the cessation of ignorance means of the knowledge of (or avidya) as taking place by the attributeless Brahman alone, that is not right; for, effect that the scriptures
such a case) there would be the contradiction of the " I know following and many other scriptural passages (in
:
this great Person of sun-like lustre
He who
thus
no other path Ar.
222, 223, 224. 1 8.
for the
Cf.
who
"There
1.8.];
Vide supra Vide supra Vide also Taitt.
2r.
p.
attainment of
is
[ Taitt.
has the lustre of lightning." \M. Ndr. no ruler over Him; His glory is
197. n. 190,
III. 13. I 8.
&
kashtha=- 1/540
1/18
kald= 1/16200
kshana=i\i 94400 muh 27^/0=1/5832000
\aj. Sam/i.
is
here; there
final release."
is
;
XXX.
day =7/i35th
of a second, a
B. G.
equal to 24
hours.
VI, 15.
a twinkling of 225. the eye considered as a measure of time. According to some, it is=
nimesha
beyond darkness.
"All the nimeshas*** were born out
p. 32.
VIII, 9; Swtf. Up, III.
A
is
knows Him becomes immortal
III. 12. 7-]; 224
of the Person
who
V.
P.
1/15
I. 3. 8,
9
&
10,
day being
According to a nimesha is=
A&&Af=I/45O kala= 1/1350
mukurtallifi^txa day=l6/75th second.
of a
Adhik.
211
[M. Ndr. I. 10.]; "Those who know Person, they become immortal." \M. Ndr.l.n.'].
indeed this It
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
I. Sfit. i.]
great."
Brahman
only because the
i.s
butes, that all the
is
scriptural passages
release results solely
possessed of attrideclare that final
from the knowledge of the Brahman It has been already stated that
as possessed of attributes. 220 the
passages also prove only that
probative
who
is
Brahman
qualified.
The grammatical " That thou art"
227 equation, found in the passage and in other similar passages, has no re-
ference to the oneness of
any
attributeless
thing, because
the words 'That' and 'thou' have the power of denoting the Brahman as qualified. Indeed, the word ' That points '
Brahman who is omniscient, who wills the truth, and who is the cause of the world because in the passage "That thought 'May I become many'" [Qfehdnd. Up. VI. 2. 3.], and in other similar passages, it is He who to the
;
'
' thou which is equated forms the subject. The word ' with That sets forth the Brahman whose body is that in'
dividual self which
is
associated with non-intelligent matter;
because a grammatical equation has to denote only one thing which exists in two forms. If these two forms are given up, then the equation will have also to be given up ; because, (when those two forms are given up), there will be no difference in the significations (of the words ' thou and '
'That'),
tive
and because also there
istence,
Up.
Such
as
n. 142.
And when
it is
"The "Brahman
Knowledge,
11. 1. 1. Vide
227.
then have to be
(or secondary) signification in relation to
words. 228 226.
will
Infinity."
supra pp.
is
Taitt,
m.et
Vide Chhand. Up. VI.
said
Ex-
seq.
8. 7,
&
supra.
228. For a Samaiiadliikaranva or a
'This
is
a^ figura-
both these
that Devadatta',
grammatical equation to be right, it is necessary that it should not be a mere identity,
and also that the words equat-
ed in the, equation should not all have figurative or secondary significations.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
212
\_Chap. I. Part. I.
there is no secondary signification (in relation to all the equated words); because there is no contradiction in perceiv-
ing identity (in relation to Devadatta) as associated with a past and a present time. The contradiction arising from the same thing being found in different places is re-
moved by the difference in time. (If, in the equation 'That thou art', the two forms of the one thing referred to in it be given up), there would then be a contradiction of the beginning of that context wherein it is said "That thought,
'May
I
become
many'
";
229 the
proposition
by knowing one thing, all things become known, would also thus become inappropriate and He whose
that,
;
true nature
who
is
intelligence,
who
is
devoid of
all
evil,
whose nature is characterised by all the auspicious qualities, would thereby acquire ignorance (or avidyd) and (would become) the object of all the innumerable wrong aims of life which are produced by that is
omniscient, and
(ignorance or avidya}. If the equation (here) implies the stultification (of a previously existing wrong conception), then the two words 'That' and 'thou' have to figuratively signify a basis (for the super-imposition of that
wrong con-
(of that super-imposition). These figurative significations, &c., constitute those defects (which have been referred to above). There is, however, this
ception) and the removal
much
of peculiarity. Here, there is the unavoidable forced assumption of a stultification which is not realised in the same way in which it is realised in the cognition " This Cmother-of-pearl) is no silver"; and there is also the impossi'
a stultification (arising), because the word That does not, beyond expressing merely a basis (for the superimposition of a wrong conception), denote any attribute (of '
bility of
that basis, so as to contradict such a super-imposition). If 229. Vide Chhdnd. Up. VI.
2. 3.
it
Adhik.
L
Sfti.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
/.]
be said that the word
'
That
'
213
denotes the unveiled nature
of what was formerly veiled, (it is replied that it is) not because when first the basis itself is unknown, illuCSQ) ;
and
which are dependent thereon are be said impossible. (again) that the basis which forms the seat of illusion is itself unconcealed, then that very sion
its stultification
If
it
nature of the basis would be contradictory to illusion therefore
;
and
when that, (basis) becomes clearly known (by means
of the import of the equation under reference), then there can absolutely be no illusion and no stultification, as both of them are dependent on that (basis). Consequently it is difficult to establish an illusion and its stultification (in relation to the
grammatical equation 'That thou art '), when a really existing attribute and its concealment are not admitted (to be
denoted by the word 'That') over and above
(its denoting) the basis (for that attribute and its concealment). Indeed, when a basis which is merely of the fonn of a person, for
instance,
is
being perceived, and
when the really existing
tribute of royalty (which belongs to that person)
at-
and which
other than that (basis) is concealed, it is only then that there can be the illusion of (that person) being, (say), a and there will be the cessation of that (illuwild hunter
is
;
on explaining that the attribute of royalty (belongs to that person), but not on merely explaining that basis that (basis), being (itself) plainly (to be a person) because and visible, does not stand in need of being explained; sion)
;
because also, there can be no destruction of illusion (when merely the basis is thus explained). The two words ('That' and 'thou') mainly signify the Brahman who is the cause of the world, and
who has
the individual soul for His
has been (thus) established that the grammatical body. the denotaequation (here) is due to the fact of there being tion of one and the same thing as existing in association with It
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
1 14
two
(different)
modes
(or forms).
L
[Chap.
Part. /.
(By means of this gram-
matical equation) another peculiar characteristic in relation to the Brahman, who is devoid of all evil, and whose nature is
characterised
by
all
the auspicious qualities, ruler of
form of His being the internal
in the
and
is
established
all
individual
harmony with completely the beginning of the context (in which this grammatical equation occurs). Thus also there results the demonssouls;
in
is
(this conclusion)
tration of the proposition 230 that,
by knowing one thing, all things become known; because the Brahman, who owns the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in the subtle state
as His body,
is
Himself an
form of the Brah-
effect (in the
man] who
possesses the intelligent and the non-intelligent in the things gross state as His body. (According to our interpretation) there is also no contradiction of other scriptu" ral passages such as the following (May we know) Him who is the highest and greatest Lord of lords." [Svet. Up. " His VI. 7.] supreme power is revealed indeed as " He varied." VI. is devoid :
;
Up.
\Svet.
of
sins,
He
8.];
desires the truth
Up. VIII. 1.5.
& VIII.
Lord;
(/.f.lthe
and
wills the truth."
\_Qhhand.
7. i.].
be asked in what manner the subject and the predicate in the sentence That thou art are particularised, If
it
'
'
nothing predicated here of anything; because,fin the (earlier) statement 231 itself " All this has that (Brahman) for its Self" [khdnd. Up. it
is
VI.
replied that there
8. 7.], it (viz.
ready arrived at. 230. Vide
Chhdnd.
is
(really)
the predication of oneness) has been alIndeed the sdstra has a meaning only Up. VI.
I. 3.
wherein this proposition is given. 231, This statement occurs in the context cal
earlier
equation
than the grammati'That Thou art', in
Chhatid. Up. VI.
"All
That
is
8. 7.
this has
where we read
That
Existence, That
That thou
art,
O
for is
its
Self.
the
Self,
Svelaketu."
Adhik.
in so for as at.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
I. Sftt. /.]
2 s *
Here, '
expression
what has not been already arrived this statement), by means of the
relates to
it
in
c.
(/.
the world with the individual souls
all this',
pointed out it has this expression is first
;
then declared, by means of the
is
'
this
is
(Brahman)
215
(Brahman)
for
its
Self,
the Self of that
that
and the
(world) given in the passage which says "All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the sat (i. e. in the Existent One), have their
reason for
abode
it
in the sat,
Up. VI.
8.
"
4
&
Let a
;
is
and are established as
6.],
(it
in the sat."
\Qihanti.
also given) in the passage
is
man
which
mind says (meditate), by the knowledge that all this, indeed, is the Brahman, that all this is born in Him, is absorbed into Him, and lives
Him."
in
other
III.
\Chhand. Up.
Similarly,
i.].
with the intelligent and the non-intelligent
which are
things,
14.
speak of the identity of
scriptural passages also
Brahman
the
being tranquilled in
from Him, as being nothing
different
other than the relation of the soul and the
body (between
" He, who has them). Among others, they are as follow entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born and :
is
the
Self
of
all."
\Taitt.
Ar.
III.
dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, earth does not know, whose body is the earth,
He
nally rules the earth,
is
tal Self."
\Brih. Up. III.
the
within the
self, is
whose bod}
7
He
is
is
7.
self,
22.];
Cf.
Pur. Mim.
inter-
He who, dwelling in the self does not know, internally rules the self,
"He who
III. 4. 15.
who
and immor-
7. 3.];
whom
and who ruler and immortal
whose body
earth,
thy internal ruler "
self,
thy internal
Brih. Up. III.
232.
the
"He who, whom the
24.];
is
&
Self."
\Mddh.
moving within the matter (mrityu or prakriti],
X.
4, 22,
is
SRI-BHISHYA.
216
whom
[Chap.
I.
Part. I.
matter (prakriti} does not know, He is the internal He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine
Self of all beings,
He
is the one Nlrayana." [Sub. Up. VII. i.]; created that the Having (viz. world), He entered into that same (world); having entered into that same (world),
Lord, "
He became i.].
the sat and the tyat" - 3 3 [Taitt. Up. II. 6. In this context also by the statement "Entering
along with this individual self which (also) is the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form." \Qhhand. Up. VI. 3. 2.], it is declared that all things acquire the character of being things, and of in
by means of words, only by reason of having been entered into by the individual selves
being expressible their
which, (in their turn), have the Brahman for their Self Because the statement" Having entered into that (world)
}
He became
the
sat
and the
tyat"
has
to
possess that all
the same meaning as this (statement above viz. this has that Brahman for its Self), it follows that the individual self also has
owing to the
of the
fact
Brahman for its Self wholly Brahman having entered into
the
concluded that the whole totality of beings
Hence, which is made up of the intelligent and the non-intelligent things is identical with the Brahman, only because it is
it.
of the relation of the body and the soul (existing between them). Hence all that is different from the Brahman be-
comes an entity only through constituting His body and word the also which denotes that accordingly, (entity or ;
thing) imports
its
that (Brahman").
(full)
meaning only when
Therefore
it
is
it
includes
a demonstrated conclu-
words have severally the power of denoting the Brahman, as in association with the thing denoted resion, that all
233. Vide
The
supra
p.
193.
reference given above
is
n.
183.
accord-
ing to Jacob's Upanishads.
Concordance
to
the
Adhik.
spectively
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sat. /.]
I.
217.
by every one of them, in accordance with that im-
Thus port of theirs which is made out by popular usage. the import of the proposition, enunciated to the effect that " All this has that for its is
(Brahman)
summed up by means thou
Self",
specially
"That
of the grammatical equation
art."
Hence
it is,
that there
only one attributeless maintain that there
is
who 23
of those
who 234
that, in the case of those
-"
tiling,
and
the case
in
difference
is
maintain
and non-
difference (between the individual soul and the Brahman), and also in the case of those who 236 maintain that there is
absolute difference (between the individual soul and the
such teachings regarding the identity between the Brahman and the individual soul, as are given by means ofgrammatical inequalities 2 3 7 and by means of gramall
Brahman),
These are the Adiuaitins who
234.
are
of
who
is
Brahman
opinion that the
devoid of
attributes
is
all
and that
all
else is unreal.
These
235.
are the
and Yadavaprakaslyas.
latter,
lump
Bhdskartyas
to pots
The former
portion
of these maintain that the difference
viz.
the
compared
to
Yadavapraltdl'i-
hold that just as
ras,
a
is
Brahman.
The
characterising
alone real,
ether which
spatial
the
of clay
and
one portion of
be converted in-
may
dishes,
remains as
while
another
clay pure and
Brahman
simple, so also the
evolves
and the
the individual selves out of a portion
due to limiting condion the removal of
of Himself, the other portion remain-
those conditions, the individual self
both distinct from the individual selves
between the individual
Brahman
is
and
tions,
self
that,
For
becomes one with the "Brahman. instance, the spatial ether in
its
origi-
but
nal
state
may
get conditioned by the material
is
unconditioned,
outline
of a pot or any
thing.
The
pot
self.
is
On
the destruction of the pot, the ether in
the
pot
becomes one with
28
the
He
is
and also non-distinct from them. 236.
These
who hold 237.
be
the
are
that the
ly distinct
other such
ether within the
compared to the individual
it
ing undifferentiated, so that
is
entire-
from the individual selves.
A grammatical inequality may
exemplified
means
bodied Self of that U/>.
II. 3.
Tasya esha evi
by
sdrlra dtmd which
Taitt.
Vaiseshikas
Brahman
i.
is
He
"The emHimself."
Here the won!
SRT-BH.ISHYA.
2i8
matical equations, will
When
thrown away. in relation to
of
its
only
amount
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
to having been completely
only one thing in existence, (other thing) can there be the teaching If it be replied that that (identity) is there
is
what ?
identity
same
in relation to that
it
(thing),
is
that
rejoined
that (identity of the one existent thing with
has
itself)
238 relied scriptural text the Adwaitins), and that there is
been already made out from the
upon by yourselves ( i. e. thus nothing which remains to be learnt from statement
If
identity.
of)
(a
be said again that
it
fresh
it is
the
destruction of the superimposed differences (which forms the purpose of the teaching of this identity), it is replied that it has been already pointed out that that (purpose)
cannot be accomplished at all by means of the identity found in the equation That thou art'. Moreover, (this) '
grammatical equation indicates two
modes (or and thus Brahman, proves what
forms) in relation to the
(different)
unfavourable (to this monistic position). to the opinion of those who maintain that according there is both difference and non-difference (between the is
altogether
And
and the Brahman), the Brahman Himself
individual self
tasya
(meaning of tha') stands
genitive case
in the
in a different
grammatical case from that of the words
esha
dtman
/'.
e.
(He), x.irtra
(the
(the Sell), all of
the nominative case.
embodied),
II.
I.
ence, is
that, since this
in
cal
However,
in
to identity
with
forming a grammatical equation, all the words have to bs in
quently
the same grammatical case as in Sat-
The
238.
This text
stated hy
is,
lii-a/ima.
among
the Sriitaprakd'sikachdiya,
to be nothing other than
li
is
the
Tail/.
Self, '
idam
Uf>.
that all this
in
as
That thou
idea
is
identi-
grammatical equation is
meaningless,
text referred to here
means
Exist-
The
text itself declares
thou art,"
Tji-.it
is
no more teaching as necessary and conse-
itself,
AilaJatmyant others,
Infinity."
that the one existing thing
which stand
a sentence
vam jflanam anantam
"The Brahman
i.,
Knowledge,
much '
art
may
sarvam, has as
comes
Him
also he
which for its
the equation after this,
Adkik.
I.
Sul. /.]
SRI-!BHA.SHYA.
219
has to be in association with limiting conditions; and consequently all the blemishes, which are found in individual
and are due to those
souls
to taint the
Therefore,
all
the teach.
Brahman, who
the
Himself.
which teach the identity of the individual soul with
ings
of
Brahman
(limiting conditions), will tend
characterised
is
blemishes and possesses
by
the utter absence
the auspicious qualities, will, solely owing to self-contradiction, amount to having been wholly thrown away. And again, according to the all
opinion of those
who
all
maintain that the difference and
non-difference, (between the individual soul
man), are both natural ditions whatsoever),
it
(/.
c.
and the Brah-
uncaused by any limiting con-
has to be admitted that the
Brahman
Himself acquires (quite naturally) the condition of the individual soul, and thus all the blemishes (belonging to the individual self) will
own)
auspicious
become
as natural (to
Consequently,
qualities.
identity Cof the individual soul) with that is
devoid of
all
blemishes,
is
certainly
as (His teach the
Him) to
Brahman, who
inconsistent.
Fur-
ther, according to the opinion of those who maintain that there is absolute difference (between the individual soul
and the Brahman], it is impossible to have any kind of identity between things which are so altogether different;
and
it is
for this
very reason that the teachings which teach
Brahman and
the identity of the
become inappropriate.
Thus
the individual soul
(in this case)
the whole of the
Vedanla will have to be given up as meaningless. However, according to those who- a9 maintain that, as proclaimed in all the Upanishads, the whole world forms the body of the 239.
These are the
who hold
Brahman,
all
Vi'sishtaduiaitins
that the Bra/iinan
has the
those teachings which teach intelligent individual selves as well as tlje
non-intelligent matter a> His body.
SRI-BHASHYA.
220
Brahman Himself form*
that the
appropriate explanations
[Chap.
I.
the whole world
(of the truth).
A
Part.
L
become
grammatical
equation which expresses that, through the influence of karmas, an individual self has become an ox, a horse, a
man, or a god,
generally seen, in popular usage as well as in the scriptures, to possess a real and natural signifiis
cance; because, like generic characterisations and qualities,
substances also
may become
the attributes (of things)
they constitute the bodies (of those things).
when
Moreover,
that generic characterisations and qualities are merely the modes of substances forms the basis of gramma-
the
fact
tical
equations like
cloth
is
white'.
characterised
by
is broken-horned', and 'The that the material masses, which are Seeing the attributes of man and of other forms of
'The ox
become intelligible things only when modes of the individual self, the gram-
physical embodiment,
they constitute the
matical equation which says that the individual self has become a human being, a male, a eunuch, or a female, is, in all cases,
equally appropriate.
Therefore, the basis of
grammatical equations is altogether this (kind of) modality, but does not consist of generic characterisations and other such things all of which exclude each other. Indeed, when such substances as are capable of existing in themselves
form the attributes of (other) substances occasionally and in special cases, then there is seen the use of an affix having the force of matitp,-*
as in the instances of dandin
who
(one possesses a danda or a stick) and kuniialin (one who possesses a kwidala or an ear-ring). Such is not the case with substances which are incapable of existing in a condition in which they may be separately perceived. The 240.
When
one who possesses a a danfyn, the
stick (dani^a) is called affix
having the force of via/up here
is nini,
which
of a thing,
signifies the possession
Adhik.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
I. Sut. /.]
221
attributive character of those (substances)
sively
made
to be conclu-
out only by means of grammatical equations. it may be said thus In the case
Here, however, where,
is
:
the
through
influence
of
karmas,
an
indivi-
become an ox, a horse, a man, a god, a male, a female, or a eunuch, the material embodiment known as
dual self has
man and the
the other (material embodiments) are all held to be individual self; in the same way in which
modes of that
j
when it is said cloth
is
'The ox
broken-horned and hornless', 'The
'The cloth
white',
and (other)
is
is
black', generic characteristics
qualities (form the If
they qualify).
it
modes of the substances
be so held, then, as in the case of the
genus and the individuals (belonging to of the
body and the
it),
so in the case
individual self also, there
must
be, as
a general rule, the simultaneous perception of the mode and the possessor of the mode. But it is not seen to take place thus.
Indeed, as
characteristics (of the
and
(they
do perceive) the generic
ox and of other beings), simultaneously
in inseparable association
with what those characteris-
people do not, as a general rule,perceive the material embodiments like those of man, &c., simultane-
tics qualify, so,
ously and in association with the individual self, so as to make out that they are entirely dependent upon the individual
self.
says that a
man
Hence, the grammatical equation which is an individual self has a merely figurative
signification.
But
this
is
not
right.
The
material embodiments like
those of man, &c., possess, equally with generic and other qualifications, the character of being entirely dependent on the individual to that (self), (self).
The
the character of being serviceable only and the character of being the mode of that self,
character of their being altogether dependent is made out from the destruc-
upon the individual self alone
SRI-BHASHYA.
222
[Chap.
I.
fart.
L
tion of the body (taking place) on the separation of the individual self (from it). The character of their.being serviceable to the individual self alone (is made out) from the fact of their existing (self).
(self
is
merely to enjoy the
fruits
of the
karma
of that
Also, the character of their being the modes of that made out) from the knowledge that they constitute
the attributes of the individual
a god and a man.
This
self,
is,
as in the
indeed,
instances of
the reason
why
have their c., (genetically significant) words like ox, the so as to include individuals meanings (belonging to their respective genera).
Being devoid of
this aforesaid nature,
such (words) as danda (stick), kundala fear-ring) and others, have an affix possessing the force of matup (attached to them)
when they form
attributes, as in the instances of
dandin (the possessor of a stick) and kundalin (the possessor of an ear-ring). The material embodiments like those of
own nature, the characthe individual self alone, the dependent upon serviceable to that of character being (self) alone, and men, &c.,
gods,
possess, of their
ter of being
the character of being the mode of that (self) alone; it is therefore that the grammatical equation, which says that-an individual self is a god or a man, is freely current in popular is,
There
usage as well as in the scriptures.
as a general rule, the simultaneous perception of the and the individual (belonging to it), because both of
genus
them
are capable of being apprehended by the eye ; but is not apprehended at the time of the
the individual self
ocular apprehension of the body, because the individual Do self is not capable of being apprehended by the eye.
capable of being apprehended as existing separately, cannot have mere modality to constitute its own nature : because, it is made out that,
not say that a thing, which
like
generic and
other
is
qualifications,
the
body
also
Adhik.
SRI-BHASHYA.
I. S/lt. /.]
223
possesses altogether the nature of being a to
mode
of that
being solely dependent upon that (self), being solely serviceable to that (self), and
its
(self), owing and owing to its owing also to its being an attribute of that (self). And it has been stated that the law of simultaneous perception
dependent upon the knowability (of the mode and of the possessor of the mode) by means of one and the same is
Thus the eye cannot apprehend perceiving apparatus. earth and other substances, of the the possession, by smell, taste,
and other
qualities,
although these (qualities)
Similarly, although the body, naturally belong to them. which is capable of being apprehended by the eye, possesses
being a mode of the individual self, yet, not so apprehended, because the eye does not possess the power of apprehending the individual self. Merely on fully the nature of
it is
account of this much, the body cannot be destitute of the character of being a mode of that (self). The basis of the
grammatical equation (between the body and the individual self) is nothing other than (the body) possessing the character of being altogether a mode of that (self). Moreover, that word, which is ca'pable of denoting (the body) as a mode of the individual self, denotes that body to be the
mode
of the individual self at the same time that
denotes the individual
self also.
that, solely in accordance
It
it
may, however, be said
with the practical usage of words,
is only the body that is apprehended by means of the word body', and that therefore the word body does not possess the power of including the individual self also in it
'
its
meaning.
because, (here,
'
'
To /.
this
c. in
it
is
replied that
it
is
the case where the word
not so '
; '
body
denotes merely the body), that body, which is nothing other than a mode of the individual self, is specifically mentioned with the object of pointing out its distin-
SRI-BHISHYA.
224
[Chap.
Part.
I.
guishing feature as a thing. Therefore, the word is a definitively determinative word, like the '
1
'
ox-ness
(/. c.
Consequently, 1
whiteness',
gotva], like the
(
words
'
ox
',
'
body words
'
form',
quality',
&c., the words,
man', &c., include the individual self
Similarly, the individual selves,
'
their
in
I.
&c.
'
god',
import.
which are associated with
forms like those of god, man, &c., form the of the Highest Self, and hence possess the charbody Therefore all the words acter of being His modes.
material
which denote the Self also ligent
in
individual
their import.
self
the
include
all
Consequently,
Highest
the
intel-
and the non-intelligent things possess the character
of being things, solely because they are the modes of the Highest Brahman and that is why they are so spoken of ;
be grammatically equated with that (BrahThis matter is fully proved in the Vedartha-san-
in practice as to
man}. a 4 He (viz. the Sutra kara) speaks of this very idengraha. has the character of the relation between the which tity, '
the aphorism " But they Jabalas) worship the Lord as the self, and they
and the body,
soul
texts)
scriptural
[Ved. "
Siit.
IV.
The Lord
the
is
in
make
us
comprehend
(it
as
(viz.
the
(viz.
the
such)."
And
2 * 2 the Vakyakara also says, to be comprehended as nothing other than
i.
3].
self."
The
truth
here
is
this.
passages, such as the following
Some among
of the
scriptural
others, speak of the
between the non-intelligent thing the intelligent thing (or the individual sell), and
distinction in nature (prakriti),
the Highest
Brahman,
as
consisting in their possessing,
(respectively) ,the character of being the object of enjoyment, 241. to 60,
Vide Veddrtha-sahgraka pp. 20 edited
characters
at
Madras
by Messrs.
}.
in
Telugu
Tirtimala-
charya and A,
K.
Vijayaraghava-
charya. 242.
Vide supra
p, 33.
Adhik.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
Snt. /.]
I.
225
the character of being the enjoyer, and the character of "Out of t\\\z(praknti or nature), being the Supreme Ruler :
He who
the owner of the
the Lord) creates this world wherein another being(viz.the individual self) is bound down by mdya." [Svet. Up. IV. 9.]; "Know then that is
prakritiis mdya,
mdya (i.
e.
and the great Lord the
sessor of the mdya)."
[Svet.
Up. IV.
May in
10.];
(i.
"The
e.
the pos-
destructi-
the prakriti the immortal and the indestructible is the hara (i. e. the individual self); and the Lord alone rules ble
is
;
over the destructible (prakriti} and the individual self."here, by the expression that 'the \Svet. Up. i. io.]; immortal and the indestructible is the hara,' the enjoyer is
pointed out
he
;
(viz.
the individual
hara because the individual an object of his
own enjoyment;
the Lord of what
is
self) is (called)
self utilises
"
He
is
the lord of the senses
the
the prakriti as the cause, He is (/.
e.
of the jiva
He
has no progenitor and no superior." [Svet. //!>. VI. 9.];" He is the Lord of the prakriti and of the individual soul and is the regulator of the (nature) or the individual soul);
2
qualities."
universe,
*
"
^[Svet. Up. VI.
He
is
16.];
He
is
the Lord of the
the Lord of the individual souls, and
is
eter-
nal, auspicious and inexhaustible." [M. Ndr. XI. 3.] "The two unborn, the Intelligent and the non-intelligent (are) "The the Lord and the non-lord." [Svet. Up. i. 9.] ;
;
Eternal
among
intelligent,
the
eternals, the
who, though One,
Intelligent
fulfils
among
the
the desires of the
many." \Kath. Up.V. i$.& Up. VI. 13.]; "Knowing the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the Impeller,""One of them eats the sweet pippala [Svet, Up. I. 12.]; Svet.
fruit, 243.
while the other shines in splendour without eating at These
qualities are the well-
knovvn Sattva, goodness, Rajas, passion
and Tamas, darkness, by which
29
primordial prakriti becomes differentiated.
SRI-BHISHYA.
226 all."
1.
[Chap.
Part.
I.
&
Mund. Up. III. i. i.]; "Knowing Up. IV. 6. self and the Impeller to be different, and being
[Svet.
the individual
therefore blessed by Him, he attains immortality." [Svet " There is one unborn female which I. being (aja) Up. 6.];
and black, and which produces numerous offspring of the same kind as herself; there is another male being (aja) who loves her and is close to her; there is still
is
red, white
another male
being (aja) who, after having enjoyed her, 244 "On the same her tree, the gives up." [Svet. Up. IV. 5-]; e. the individual sits in immersed purusha (i. self) grief, and, being ignorant and powerless, he feels sorry. When he sees another, the Lord, to be fully satisfied, then he (also), reliev-
ed from
grief, attains
(To the same
His greatness."
[Svet.
Up. IV.
7.].
effect are) the following passages in the
"This prakriti of Mine is divided into eight 2 4 5 This is My parts in the form of the ahafikara, &c. lower prakriti. Know that to be My higher prakriti which Smriti also
is
:
other than this (lower one), and which consists of individu-
this world is supported, O thou, mighty-armG. VII. 4 [B. 5.]; "All created beings, O son of z *Q Kunti, enter into prakriti at the end of each kalpa, and at the beginning of each kalpa I again send them forth.
al selves.
By it,
&
ed one!"
My
244.
The female being referred to in
this passage is the Prakriti or primor-
male being is the the samsdra state;
dial nature; the first
individual soul in
the second male being
is
the indivi-
The
dual soul in the released state. three colours red, white,
and
black,
are explained as signifying the three
Gunas or
qualities, viz. Rajas, Sattva,
and Tanas, respectively. 245. These eight parts are the elements,
viz.
the
earth,
fire,air
"Buddhi,
246.
five
known
aka'sa)\ the
as the
mind;
Mahat
is
or
and the Ahahkdra,
A
Kalpa
is
a period of time
equal to 4,320,000,000 solar years. a day of the creating
his night
also
is
At the beginning
It
Brahma and
equal to the day. of each Kalpa, the
creation of the world
and
water
and ether (or
the principle
is
said to begin
end of each Kalpa happens the destruction of the whole world, at the
Adhik.
/.
Sfit.
SRI-BHASHVA.
i.]
227
Transforming My ownprafoiti, I send forth again and again, the whole of this collection of beings, which is itself not free, in as
IX.
much
&
7
as 8.]
it is ;
birth to all this
under the influence of praknti." [B. G. " Presided over by Me, prakriti gives
movable and immovable
creation. Indeed,
O
son of Kunti, that the world goes on "And undergoing transformation." [B. G. IX. 10.]; know that the praknti and the purusha are both beginningfor this
reason
it is,
"My womb
the great brahman. .he origin of all (or prakriti) ; in it I place the embryo O Bharata." from that, [.?. G. XIV. 3.]. beings proceeds That great brahman of Mine which is the source of this less."
[B. G.XIII. 19.];
is
;
world and
is
called the praknti, in
non-intelligent entity, as the intelligent thing.
it,
I
and which place the
is
a subtle and
embryo known
From thence, that is, from the connection between the intelligent and the non-intelligent things which is caused by Me, there results the origin of all
these beings which begin with the gods and end with the
immovable
things,
and which are
the non-intelligent thing.
This
is
thus mixed up with the meaning (of the last all
quoted sloka). Similarly, several other scriptural passages declare that the
Highest Person forms the Self (of all), and that the intelligent
and the non-intelligent things have no separate existence from Him; because those intelligent and non-intelligent things, which exist in the form of the enjoyer and the thing enjoyed, and which exist also in all conditions, constitute the
body of the Highest Person, and are, to His control.
They
are those
in consequence, subject
which begin with
"He who,
within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who internally rules the earth (He is thy internal ruler and immortal dwelling in the earth,
Sell)";
is
and conclude with
"He who,
dwelling in the
self,
SRI-BHISHYA.
228 is
within the
body
internal ruler 7. 3
self,
whom
the self and
is
to 22.]. " He
with
who
Part.
I.
[Chap.
I.
the self does not know, whose internally rules the
and immortal
Self."
To the same effect is who is moving within
self,
He is thy
\Madh. Brih. Up. III. the passage beginning the earth, whose body
whom the earth does not know" and (end" He who is with) moving within the akshara, whose ing is the akshara, whom the akshara does not know ; body He who is moving within the mrityu for prakritf) whose is
the earth,
body
whom
is
mrityu, internal Self of
all
mrityu does not know beings, He is devoid of sins, ;
He He
is
the
is
the
Divine Lord, He is the One Narayana." [Sub. Up. VII. means that subtle non-intellithe word Here, mrityu i.]. 1 gent thing which is expressed by the word lamas?*" because in this very Upanishad it is stated "The avyakta is absorbed into the akshara and the akshara is absorbed into the lamas."
[Sub. Up.
II.],
and (because)
it is
stated
"He, who
has entered within, is the (elsewhere) that are born and is the Self of all." [Taitt. ruler of things Thus the Highest Person Himself, who, Ar. III. 24.].
also
and the non-intelligent things conditions as His body, owns them as His in the form of the world in its condition
by having the existing in
modes,
all
exists
intelligent
as cause as well as in
its
condition as effect.
Accordingly,
with the object of making this very thing known, some scriptural passages say that the world in its condition as cause and also in
They
are tho^e
dear child, this second. It thought It created tejas."
247.
Vide supra,
its
condition as effect
is
He
Himself.
which begin with "Existence alone, my was in the beginning, one only without a
become manifold and be born.' [Qihand. Up. VI. 2. 3.], and (end with)
'May
p. 194. n. 184.
I
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
I. Sftt. i.]
229
"All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the sat (i. e. in the Existent One), have their abode in the sat,
and are established
That (Brahman]
for its Self.
He
That thou
is
the Self.
in the sat....A\\ this
That (Brahman]
O
art,
is
Svetaketu."
has
existence.
\Qhh and.
&
7.]. To this effect, there is, among others, Up. VI. 8. 4, 6 the following scriptural passage which begins with " He willed -'May I become manifold and be born.' He performed tapas. Having performed tapas, He created all
"While being the unchangeable
and concludes with
this" ;
and the changeable matter (anritd) has remained true to His own nature." Taitt. Up. [
individual self (satyd)
He II.
That
6. i.].
between the
distinction
intelligent
nature which exists
in
and the non-intelligent things (on
hand), and the Highest Person (on the other and which is learnt from other scriptural passages hand),
the one
as well,
is
brought to mind here
"Entering
passage)
with this individual I
ed
and
3. 2.],
that,
He
(/. e.
in the following
deities 248
along the same as Myself, and form." [Qihand.
self which is (also)
evolve the differentiations of
Up. VI.
also,
these three
into
name
also in the passage
entered into that
"Having
creat-
same (world). Having became the sat and the
entered into that (world), He He became the intelligent thing and the nontyat While thus being the unchangeable intelligent thing. individual self and the changeable matter, He has re-
mained true i.].
The
man
for
"
idea its
own
His
to
as
made
Entering along with this 248.
These are the elements
deities because they
\Taiti.
that the individual soul
Self,
water and earth.
nature."
They
II.
6.
has the Brah-
from the expression individual self which is (also)
tejas,
are called
are said
Up.
to be
out
the very
first
things created by the
presiding Deity of the universe,
SRI-BHISHYA.
230 the same as is
Myself
Up. VI.
[Qihand.
Part.
1.
[Chap. 3.
/.
that
2.],
understood to be dependent upon the relation of the and the body (existing between the Brahman
soul
and the individual
self);
because that expression has to
import the same meaning as this expression "Having entered into that (world), He became the sat and the tyat,
(He became) the
intelligent thing II. 6. i.].
That
and the non-intelligent differentiation of names
[Taitt. Up. and forms which is exactly of this very kind is mentioned in " this passage also, namely, Indeed, this was then undifferentiated. It has been now differentiated by means of
thing."
names and forms."
\_Brih.
Up.
I. 4. 7.].
and who
in the condition of effect,
exists
condition of cause, and
who owns
Thus
He who
exists
in the
the intelligent and the
non-intelligent things in their gross
and subtle
states as
His
body, He is the Highest Person alone. Therefore, for the reason that the effect is nothing other than the cause ^modified), and that, in consequence, the effect becomes
known when
is known, the desired knowledge from the knowledge of one thing is possible and very In the passage "Enterappropriate. into these three deities with this individual self ing along
of
all
the cause
things as resulting
which
is
of
(also) the
same
as Myself, I evolve the differentia-
name and form "all
the non-intelligent things the by expression 'the three deities'; and then the differentiation of names and forms is said
tions
are referred to
to result from the fact of the individual souls, which have
Him
for their Self, entering into those things.
significant
words
signify only
Thus,
that Highest Self
who
all is
associated with the individual selves which are themselves
Therefore the associated with non-intelligent matter. equating of the word which denotes an effect, with the word
which denotes the Highest Self
in
the condition of cause,
Adhik.
Snt. /.]
I.
SRI-BHISHYA.
231
has a real and natural significance. Thus that Brahman, the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in
who owns
and subtle
their gross
the effect and the the
Brahman
states as
cause
His modes,
(He)
is
Himself
and accordingly the world has
;
The Brahman
for its material cause.
Himself forms the material cause of the world, for the reason that that Brahman, who owns the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in their subtle state as His body, constitutes the cause (of all) nevertheless, by virtue of the ;
cause (of the world) being a composite thing (made up of the individual souls, the prakriti and the Brahman} the non-mixing-up of the natures of the Brah-
material
man and things
of the intelligent as well as of the non-intelligent
is
perfectly
possible
and appropriate. Thus,
for
although a variegatedly woven cloth has for material cause a mixture of white, black and red threads,
instance, its
the association of whiteness, &c., is to be found confined only to the region where a particular kind of thread exists is
;
and accordingly,
in the condition of effect also, there
no fusion of the colours
in all the parts (of the cloth).
Similarly, although the world has for
its
material cause the
mixture of the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing and the Lord, nevertheless, in its condition as an effect also, there
is
no
fusion of the
characteristics of the enjoyer, of
the thing enjoyed, and of the controller, &c. These threads which are capable of existing independently, when they are occasionally brought together by the will of man, acquire the character of a cause and (also) the character of an effect.
But here
(/.
e.
in the case of the world) there
is
this
much
peculiarity, namely, that the intelligent and the non-intelligent things existing in all conditions acquire their character of being things, only because they form the modes of the
Highest Person through constituting His body, and that
SRi-BHlSHYA.
232
therefore the Highest Person
modes
who
always denoted by
is
all
{Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
has those things as His words. The existence
of distinctions in nature and their non-mixing-up are both alike here (/. e. in the case of the production of the world) in the case of the
production of the This cloth). being the case, although variegatedly the Highest Brahman enters into the production of an effect, there being no transformation of His own nature, as well as there
(i.
e.
woven
the immodifiability (of the Highest ablished. The condition of an effect
Brahman], of the intelligent and the
when they
their gross state,
sions of
is
is
well est-
also very appropriate
He
for the reason that
(in relation to the
the Self
Brahman]
names and forms.
is
non-intelligent things in
by the divibecome an effect is another condition. The
are differentiated
Indeed, to
nothing other than passing into scriptural statements regarding the attributelessness (of the Brahman} are also appropriate because the Highest Person
is
not in association with evil qualities. This scripa 4 9 " He e. the which, in the portion (/.
tural passage Self) is
free
devoid of
sins, is free
from sorrow,
negatives
from old age, free from death, free from thirst,"-
from hunger,
free
all evil qualities
(in relation to
the Brahman),
and then lays down in the portion" He (the Self) desires " the truth and wills the truth the auspicious qualities (of the Brahman}-, (this scriptural passage) alone settles that the negation of qualities, which is declared elsewhere in the scriptures and is understood to be applicable in a
The general sense, relates (only) to evil qualities. 250 statement that the Brahman possesses the nature of is quite appropriate, because it amounts to saythat the true nature of the Brahman who is omnisciing
intelligence
249. Vide Cti/iand. Up. VIII,
&
VIII.
7. I
&
3.
I.
5.
250.
Vide
F.
P.
Balnmchppanishad.
I.
2.
6.
&
also
Adhik.
I.
Siit.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
/.]
233
ent and omnipotent, who is opposed to all that is evil, and who is the mine of all auspicious qualities,, is capable of being described only as Intelligence, and that He has the
nature of intelligence for the reason that He possesses selfluminousness. The following and other scriptural passages, " He who understands all
and who knows
namely,
[Mund. Up.
" His supreme power
I. i. 9.],
all"-
revealed, in-
is
deed, as varied and natural and as consisting of knowledge, " dear one, strength, and action." [Svet. Up. VI. 8.],
My
by what means has one to know the knower."
[Brih. Up.
teach that the Brahman is the knower; and 14.], " this passage, (The Brahman is) Existence, Knowledge, [Taitt. Up. II. 1. 1.], and others (teach that the (Infinity)." II. 4.
Brahman] has
He He
the essential nature of intelligence, because
can be described only as Intelligence, and because also is self-luminous. In the passages" He willed 1
"
'May I become many. 'May I become many.'"
II. 6. i.]," It
thought " It is 2. 3.], VI. [Gkhand. Up. differentiated by means of names and forms." \_Brih. Up. I. 4. is (it 7.], declared) that the Brahman Himself exists,
of His
own
Up.
[Taitt.
free will, in various
modes by reason
of His possessing the wonderful unchangeable things and
changeable things as His body and that, in consequence, the manifold nature of such things, as are opposed to Him and as have not the Brahman for their Self, is ;
unreal.
Therefore
it is
this (unreal
manifoldness of things)
and other passages negatived He, who sees this world as though it were manifold (or There is nothing here varied), obtains death from death. that "
in the following
is
many and varied." [Brih. Up. Up. IV. 10.]; "But where there is
that
is
there one sees another
30
;
:
IV.
& Kath.
4. 19.
duality, as
but where to one
all this
it
were,
becomes
SRl-BHISHYA. the
who
there
Self,
see
shall
know which by what
shall
On
IV.5. 15.].
modality of the of various
whom by
?"
the contrary,
[Chap.
[Bnh. it is
Brahman which
is
Part.
/.
what, and
Up.
II. 4.
I.
who
14.
&
not also that manifold
due to His assumption
names and forms, which is established in scrip" May I become manifold and be
tural passages such as
born"
and
Up. II. 6. i. & C&hand. Up. VI. 2. 3.], and which (again) is due to His own free will,
\_Taitt.
in others,
not this manifold modality) that is negatived. This (manifold modality) is proved to be existent in the comis
(it
mencement of even that passage which negatives (mani"But where to one all this becomes foldness) by saying the
Self,
&c."
& IV. 5. 15.]; and (it means of the followby "He who knows all things to be
Up.
\_Brih.
II. 4. 14.
also established to be existent)
is
and other passages apart from Him, him
ing
Up.
II. 4. 6.
&
IV.
the breath of
is
Up.
231 II.].
:
will all things
5. 7.];
Him
abandon."
"That which
is
this
\Brih.
Rig-Veda
of this great Being." [Sub. Thus there is no contradiction whatsoever /.
e.
which speak of such distinctions in essence and in nature as exist between
in relation to all those scriptural passages
the intelligent thing (or the individual soul), the non-intelligent thing (or praknti) and the Lord; and (there is no contradiction also) in regard to: those scriptural passages which speak of the relation of cause and effect (as exist-
ing between the Brahman and the universe) and (also regard to those which speak) of the identity of the The relation of the body and the effect with the cause.
in
soul exists at all times
between the
intelligent thing
(or
and the non-intelligent thing (or on the one hand), and the Highest Self (on the praknti, the individual
251.
Cf.
Bnh. Up.
soul)
II. 4.
10.
Adhik.
1.
This
other).
SRI-BHASHYA.
Sui. /.] is
made out by means
235 of the scriptural pass-
ages which declare that those things which form the body (of the Lord) acquire, when in the condition of cause, that subtle state
which
is
incapable of being differentiated by
means of names and
forms, and acquire (again), when in the condition of effect, such a gross state as is capable of that
by names and
(differentiation
Therefore there
forms).
is
2 5 maintaining the view which imposes ajildna (or ignorance) on the Brahman. And the view 253 which brings about distinctions in the
to be seen
no room whatsoever
'-'
for
Brahman Himself by means
of limiting conditions, and
those other views, which are based upon fallacious reasoning and are contradictory to (the teaching of) all the all
scriptures, (are also untenable).
The
intelligent thing (or
the individual soul), the non-intelligent thing (or matter), and the Lord, are all proved by means of special scriptural texts to be possessed of independent characteristics;
are also proved
by the
and they
scriptures themselves to constitute
respectively the modes (of the Brahmaii) and the possessor of those modes, for the reason that there is (between the intelligent
and the non-intelligent things on the one hand
and the Lord on the other hand) the relation of the body and the soul. In regard to these, other scriptural passages prove (the consequent) relation of effect and cause, and the
identity of the effect with
also prove (the resulting)
cause.
Indeed,
there
is
no contradiction
in
this.
For instance, the mandatory passage, 234 which says " (Let him perform) the new-moon sacrifice and the full-moon sacrifice," lays
part of
252, This view 2 53-
This
karlyax.
down
him who is
is
in
one commandment that, on the
desirous (of
held by the Aitwailins. the view of the B/ias-
is
Swarga)?**
it is
obligatory
254. Vide Taitt. Sani/i. 11.2.5. 255.
Swarga
of enjoyments.
is
the celestial world
to perform the six sacrifices beginning with the
which have
all
separately
come
various scriptural passages 2 5
<5
L
Part.
I.
[Chap.
Agneya
into existence from the
and
relating to their origin,
which, nevertheless, have fallen into two groups in accordance with the two 237 passages that refer to their grouping. The names
256.
are Agneya,
of the six sacrifices
curds,
two
moon
Agnishomiya^ the
Aindrdgna, and
Aindras,
The passage
relating to the origin
of the Agneya sacrifice
Samh.
Taitt.
Updm'su.
is
given in
to the effect
II. 6. 3. 3.
ch_a
Yadagneyoshtiikapalomdvdsydydm chlehyuto
paurnamttsydin
This means that the
sacrifice
are used for the
cups
age
relating
the
to
sacrifice is as follows
The
pass-
AgnlshomTya Tdbhydmeta-
:
magnlshomlyamekdda'sakapdlam purttamdse prdvachchhat. II. I
5.
2,
3.
ndra, gave to
That
Taitt,
to
is
Sam/i.
say,
he,
sacrificial offering
which
is
known
as
Agtiishomiya wherein eleven clay cups
make offerings to the The two sacrifices known as
are used to
the Aindras are mentioned in the
A ittdram dadhyamdvasydAmTaitt, Samh, II. 5. 4. I.;
passages
:
ydm. dram payotndvdsydydw. These mean respectively that ficc,
consisting
II.
in
the
A indra
saci
i-
the offering of
is
is
on the
sacrifice
given in
curds
of
in
to be performed
given in the passage
Samh,
Amdrdin
eight
the
clay
on the new-
The Updmlu
day.
known
Taitt.
which consists
sacrifice
moon
The
to the effect that the
5.
cups
sacrifice is
Tdvabrutdvag-
ndvupdnt'sii purBoth Agni and " Perform for us on the
nlshomdvdjyasyaiva
namdsydm
ya/att.
Sotna said
known
the sacrifice
full-moon day
as Upam'su andVonsisting in the offer-
All these six passages
ing of ghee."
enjoin in six separate the performance of fices
Agni and Soma, on
the full-moon day, that portion of the
deities.
as Aindrdgna
gna
days of new-moon and full-moon, never fails to be successful in produ-
A indra
also to be performed
is
offering
making offerings to the god Agni, and which is to be performed on the
cing the desired results.
milk
new-moon day.
bhavati.
purpose of
performed on the new-
to be
sacrifice consisting in the offering of
.known
Zgaeya, in which eight clay
as the
is
day, and that the other
The performance
257.
sacri-
6,
9,
I
Ya mam vidvdn Ya evam vidvdn
viz,
yajate\
Taitt.
yajate.
&
2.
thus
performs
fice,
he
six sacrifices
were, to two.
Samh,
"
He who knows
the
full-moon sacri-
who knows
new-moon
of all these
again enjoined in two
commandments,
purnamdslm amdtdsydm
the
the six
mentioned above.
six sacrifices is
I.
commandments
all
thus
sacrifice."
performs
Thus
the
become reduced, as
it
Adhik.
L
SRI-6HA.SHYA.
Sut. /.]
237
and other scriptural passages declare separately that the intelligent thing (viz. the individual self), the non-intelligent thing (viz. matter or prakriti}, and the
Similarly, the following
Lord are
distinct in essence
and
in nature
:
"The
destruct-
the prakriti, the immortal and the indestructible is the hara (i. c. the individual self), and the Lord alone rules ible
is
over the destructible {prakriti} and the individual self."" He is the Lord of the [Svct. Up. I. 10.]; prakriti and of 238 the individual and is the of the regulator
souls,
qualities."
" He is the Lord of the world, the [Svet. Up. VI. 1 6.]; Lord of the individual souls. The Highest Self is Nara-
Then the following and other 3.]. declare that the intelligent thing and the scriptural passages in all conditions, form the body non-intelligent thing, existing yana."
[M. Ndr. XI.
of the Highest Self and that that Highest Self constitutes the Self of those things "(He) whose body is the earth," :
\Sub. Up. VII.
i.];
se\f,"[MadJi.
Brili.
is
"(He) whose body III. 7. 22.];
Up. the avyakta,... whose body
the internal Self of
He
all
beings
He
is ;
"
is
the individual
(He) whose body
the akshara,*** He is devoid of
He all
is
sins,
the one Narayana." \Sub. Then the following and other scripturagain Up. VII. i.]. al passages" Existence (or Sat} alone, my dear child, the Divine Lord,
is
is
was in the beginning" [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 2. i.]; " All this has that (Brahman} for its Self (or Atman}" " All this, indeed, is the Brah[Chhdnd. //.' VI. 8. 7.]
this
;
man''
words
[Qihdnd. Up.
The
known ness,
Brahman Atman, who is the Embodied
like Sat,
Highest Self 258.
III. 14. i.]; ,
by means of
&c., which denote the
Being, that the Highest
'
'
qualities
are the
well
three qualities of Saliva, good-
Rajas,
declare,
passion,
and Tamas,
darkness. 259.
Vide supfa
p, 194. n,
185.
SRI-BHASHYA.
238 Self
who
who
is
one only,
who
is
I.
Part.
in the condition of cause,
in the condition of effect,
also
is
[Chap.
is
Himself
all
three 260 (kinds of real) entities which are separately
There
L
and the
made
wrong in denoting that the intelligent and the non-intelligent things as His body, by the word Paramdtman in the same way in which (there is nothing wrong) in denoting a
out.
Highest
indeed, nothing
is,
who owns
Self,
;
individual
particular
body, by a
self,
that has the figure of
man
for his
the word dtman, as when it is said (in relation to This individual self is happy." Therefore let
man)"
this
overlong discussion come to an end.
2 c (by the PuroapakAgain what has been further stated '
shins) to the effect that
it is
right to hold that the cessation
of ignorance (or avidya) takes place solely by means of the knowledge of the oneness of the self and the Brahman, that is not right ; because the bondage (of ignorance) is
real
and
How is
it
thus incapable of being removed by knowledge. possible to predicate unreality in relation to this is
bondage which
consists in the (individual self) entering into
bodies such as those of gods, &c., owing to its meritorious and unmeritorious karmas and is of the nature of the experience of the pleasures and pains that arise out of that 262 (embodiment) ? It has been already explained that the cessation of the bondage which is of this nature is attain-
by that grace of the Highest Person which is consequent on His being pleased with the worship that is offerable
ed
form of loving devotion (by the worshipper). As that knowledge, which is accepted by you, and (acin the
cording to you), relates to what 260.
These are
:
the Pralrili or
matter, the individual
Supreme
Self.
self,
-and the
is
261,
262,
different
from things as
Vide supra pp, 32 & 33. Vide supra pp. 2o, 21 &
22.
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
1. Sut. i.}
of an unreal nature, the consequence (thereof) is only the intensification of the bondage; because the sastra- 03 says "It is false, because an object which is
they
are,
is
from another cannot, indeed, acquire the character of that other object." and because also, in the following different
passages
-
" Different
son."- -[B. G.
from these "
XV.
17.]
;
Knowing
is
the
Highest Per-
the individual self and
the Impeller to be different" [Svet. Up. I. the that knowledge relating to the taught
who
different
is
from the individual
self,
it is
6.],
Brahman,
and who
is
the
is the means of obtaining internal ruler thereof, the final release which possesses the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit. Moreover, that know-
which
is (ignorance or capable of removing is is and which itself unreal. avidya), accepted by you, remove some other remover has to be Therefore, (to it),
ledge
sought and found. If it be said that this knowledge, which removes (ignorance or avidya), removes that whole totality of distinctions which is opposed to itself, and then, being
momentary, perishes of itself, it is replied that it is As its essence, its origin and destruction are all false, some other (knowledge), which is capable of removing that avidyd (or ignorance) by which (its) destruction and itself
not
so.
the hypothesis in relation to has to be sought and found. destruction 2c4 of that
are (both) falsely assumed,
it
If
it
be said (again) that the
(knowledge which removes avidyd)
is
nothing other than the manifestation of the true nature of the Brahman Himself, it is replied that, in that case, there 263.
stanza " If it
Vide supra is
p, 148.
where
as
follows
quoted
the
cause
:
be held that the identity of the
Highest Self with the individual is
this
highest truth,
an
object
it
is false,
which
is
self
be-
differ-
ent from another cannot, indeed, acquire the character of that other object,"
264.
V.
P.
This
II. 14. 27, is
the
non-existence
consequent on the destruction of a Vide supra p. 49, n, 37, thing.
SRi-BniSHYA.
240 will
[Chap.
I.
Part.
/.
be no origination of that knowledge which removes
(ignorance or avidya);
for, as
long as what constitutes the
destruction of a thing continues in existence, so long there is no possibility of the origination of that thing. Moreover, it is
asked
which
who
it is
that
Brahman, who
the
is
the
knower of this knowledge,
relates to the negation of all that is
different
is
Himself pure intelligence.
If
from it
be
replied that that (knower) is merely a superimposition, then it is replied that it cannot be so ; because that
(knower) forms the object of the knowledge which calculated to
is
remove
(avidya), and consequently deserves thus there is no possibility of that
be negated ; (knower) being (also) the agent (in the removal of ignorance by means) of that (knowledge which is calculated to
to
remove ignorance). is
be said (again) that that (knower) of the nature of the Brahman Himself, it is asked If
it
whether the knowership of the Brahman is, so far as it to that knowledge which removes (ignorance),
relates
If superimposed, then this superimposed. other and the avidya on which that (superimposition) (superimposition) is based cannot form the objects of that
natural
or
knowledge which therefore
it
calculated to
is
(viz. this
remove ignorance
;
and
superimposed knowership) certainly
If some other knowledge that is continues to persist. calculated to remove (ignorance or avidya) be admitted, then, since that (knowledge) also is subject to the three-
knower, the thing known,andthe would a regressus in inJinitum- G5 there result knowledge), fold differentiation (of the
Because
265. that
or
is
this
knowledge
calculated to remove the avidya
ignorance,
knower-ship,
another
ai
which is
itself
and
so,
superimposes based upon
another know-
ledge has to be assumed to remove it, and again another to remove each such
knowledge so assumed
Thus
there will
series leading to
in
result
no end.
succession,
an
infinite
Adhik.
relation
in
longs,
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
I. Sfit. /.]
by
the knower.
to
If this
Brahman
the
nature, to
241
(knowership) beHimself, then our
find acceptance (with you). The statement, that the knowledge which removes (ignorance or avidya) and the knower of that (knowledge) are (both) different
view must
from the Brahman, and are therefore included among those things that deserve to be itself,
is
removed by that (knowledge) which makes out
as ludicrous as the statement
that, in saying that Devadatta has cut off all that is above the surface of the earth, the cutter and the process of cutting
same cutting action
relating to this very also to be included
That knower who
(of Devadatta) are
among the things cut off (by Devadatta). is superimposed cannot himself become
the agent in the act of producing the knowledge which is calculated to remove (ignorance or avidya), and which (again)
forms the cause of his destruction
is
own
destruction; because one's
not an object of
human
pursuit.
If,
own
more-
over, the destruction of that (superimposed knowership)
is
admitted to be the same as the (manifestation of the) true Brahman, then, there will be no room at all
nature of the for the
and
assumption of the avidya and the other such things
(also for the assumption) of the perception of distinc-
tions as consequent thereon.
Therefore, let us have done
amounts to beating with a club him with this (criticism) who has been already killed by fate. ;
it
Therefore, as the bondage (of samsdra) is based upon that ajttana (or ignorance) which is of the nature of a
stream of beginningless karma, the destruction of that 2 66 which possess(ajnana} results only from that knowledge es the characteristics
266.
Vide supra pp. 17 to 3
1
already mentioned (by us).
22.
The
SRI-BHISHYA.
242
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
production of that (knowledge) is the result of the performance of those duties which are appropriate to the various stages and conditions of
life,
and are characterised
by the (spiritual) refinement due to that peculiar knowledge of the real nature of the individual self, which manithe form of the daily practised worship of the Highest Person. This being so, mere (ritualistic) works yield (only) fests itself in
small and transitory results. On the other hand, such works as constitute the worship of the Highest Person, and are performed without attachment to results, yield an infinite and ever enduring result in the form of that experience
of the real nature of the
Brahman which
origination of the knowledge which
is
is
caused by the
the same as steady
meditation (or worship). Both (these) cannot become known without a knowledge of the true nature of works.
(Without such knowledge), there can be no rejection of (mere and no subsequent ritualistic) works as they ordinarily are, adoption of them in the form pointed out above. Therefore, for this very reason, the enquiry into the Brahman has necessarily to be conducted immediately after the enquiry into works ; and hence it has been stated (by the Sutra-
"Then
kdrd)
therefore,
&c."
[Ved. Sut.
I. I. I.]. 267
these circumstances, another pfirvapakshin 268 hold the following opinion
Under
may
:
not possible to determine the power of a word to signify a meaning, except by means of the use it is put to It is
267. This sutra '
Then
is in full
therefore the
the Brahtnan"
as follows:-
enquiry
into
268.
These Piirvapakshins are the as the Prabha-
Mlmdmsakas known karas.
Vide5/fa
p. 41. n, 34.
L
Adhik.
Sut.
SRI-BHASHYA.
i.'\
by such (speakers and responsive
243
listeners) as are well ac-
quainted with the significations of words. And accordingly, the true signification of a word is only to denote an action;
because
it is
are actually
Vedas
with the object of denoting actions that words
made
use
Consequently the import of the
of.
Therefore, the merely Veddnta is not capable of occupying the position of autho-
the form of actions.
in
is
rity in relation to the
Highest
Brahman whose meaning
is
already established (otherwise than as an inference from actions).
Moreover, in regard to those sentences which relate to things that have an already established signification, as of the birth of a son 269 and other such
when they speak happy
incidents,
it is
not possible to determine that, through
the joyous expansion of the face resulting from the attainment of a desired object, and through other such indications (alone), they (viz. those sentences) form the means of importing a special meaning ; because the things which are productive of joy are existent in all the three (different)
times
(viz. past, present,
less in
number
;
and
and because
the birth of a son) there
is
future),
and
are (indeed) end-
also (in the present
the possibility of
its
case of
association
with other joy-giving things such as an auspicious and lucky moment (of birth), an easy and happy delivery, and so on.
270 that a
word has the power of denoting a has an which already established import, (this) it is thing not possible to determine by means of the fact that the Further,
meanings of ununderstood words and 269.
above
The Mlmamsakas mentioned criticise
example of
thus this
the birth of a son, which
is
cited
or the followers of
by the
Rumania-
terminations
are
Bhatta. 270.
sakas
Here again, the same Mtnidmcriticise this
the Naiyyayikas.
example cited by
SRI-BHASHYA.
244
made
{Chap.
1.
Part.
L
out either by ascertaining their etymological significor by ascertaining the meaning of the other (re-
ance,
words
a sentence); because that (ascertainment of the etymological significance of ununderstood words and
lated)
fin
terminations, as well as that ascertainment of the meaning of the other words), relates to a number of words known to denote actions,
and
is
(therefore) the
same
as determin-
ing a particular variety of those (actions).
And
271
cannot be maintained that, in the case of the person who is afraid of an (illusorily perceived) serpent, the fear of the serpent is seen to disappear immediagain,
it
'This is no serpent, this is a ately after he hears the words this (statement 'This is no serpent, therefore that and rope', this is a rope') forms the means of knowing the absence of
the (illusorily perceived) serpent; because, in this case also there are many causes for the cessation of the fear, such as those which give rise to the knowledge that this thing
(viz.
devoid of motion, devoid of poison, is inanimate, and so on; and it is not thus possible (for that statement alone) to produce this special conthe illusorily perceived serpent)
viction in particular
pent
is
(viz.
is
that the illusorily perceived ser-
a mere rope). may again be said as follows
On the strength of the universal concomitance of volition with voluntary activity, it is made out that words give rise to that knowIt
:
27
2
ledge which induces volitional activity. Thus every word relates to an action, and so all the words (in a sentence)
denote only a conjointly determined action. Consequently, it is not possible to conclude with certainty that the significant 271.
power of a word The example which
is
consists only in denoting cited
by the Adwaitins is here criticised by the MTmamsakas above mentioned. The very same Mltndmsakas 372.
here cite and
pati Misra.
own
the position of
who is, in all Mimdmsaka known
Vachaspati the
criticise
its
probability, as VSchas-
L
Adhik.
Sftt.
SRI-BHASHYA.
/.]
in association
meaning
sentence).
The
245
with that of the other (words in the own wishes forms
desire to accomplish one's
the cause of voluntary activity through giving rise to volition, but not by itself ; for, (otherwise), there would be no possibility of voluntary activity in regard to the desire to
accomplish such wishes as relate to the past, to the future
and (even) to the present. For, as long as the belief which is to the effect "Without my own effort, it is not possible
me
for
fore
it
to accomplish the fulfilment of my desires " has to be accomplished by my own actions
there-
;
is
not
long one does not put forth voluntary Consequently, volition alone is the cause of vol-
in one, so
produced activity.
And
untary activity.
accordingly, that which induces
is itself the thing which is expressed by therefore alone constitutes the thing that is action words;
voluntary activity
to be learnt from the Vedas.
Thus indeed there can be no
acquisition of the infinite and eternal results which are of the nature of the attainment of the Brahman (whose significance is) already naturally established ; and it is declared in the following passage among others, namely, " Those meritorious results of works which accrue to
him who performs the ch&turmdsya indestructible."
\_Ap.
Sr.
VIII.
27 3
sacrifice are
i.
that
i.],
indeed
works
alone are capable of producing permanent results; for Chaturmdsya
273.
is
the
name
given to three seasonal or four-monthly
which are performed Pan'ans or commencement of
sacrifices
at the
the three seasons, the spring, the rainy
season and the autumn. ficesare: is
(i)
The
Vai'svadeva
generally performed
moon
of Phdlguna, (2)the
gh&sa which
is
These
on the
sacri-
which full-
Varunafraperformed on the full-
moon
of slshdd/iafo)
dha which
day of as the
some
is
not
and the Sdkante-
performed on that same
Kartifta.
The
Sundsirtya to be a
known.
sacrifice
is
known
considered by
fourth
but the exact time of is
all
its
Qhaturmasya^
performance
All these sacrifices
belong to the larger subdivision called Haviryajila. Vide Sat, Br. II, 5.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
246 these reasons
the
it is
I.
Part.
1.
improper to undertake that enquiry into
Brahman which
inconsiderable and
{Chap.
gives rise to the
knowledge of the
impermanent character of the fruits of the knowledge) of the infinite
gives rise also to
works, (and and ever enduring character of the 'knowing' the
fruits
that result from
Brahman.
the following is the reply Those who criteria truth not highly the of do by accepted to which that manner of apvalue that opinion according
To
all
:
this,
are guided
prehending the relation between words and their meanings, which is known all the world over, is discarded, so as to give rise to the belief that words have the power of producing the knowledge of only such significations as are not
commonly
current in the world.
Indeed, children under-
stand the relation between words and their meanings in the following manner. Mothers, fathers, and others frequently indicate with (their) fingers (to children their) manias,
papas, maternal uncles and others, as well as the moon, (domesticated) animals, men, beasts, birds, serpents, &c.,
with the object of telling (the children that they should) know a particular person (to be such and such), and know a particular thing (to be such and such); then, by means of the particular words used, they (viz. the children) largely
and then they perceive ; that the knowledge which associates every one of those
learn those particular meanings
words with
their
meanings very Afterwards they come to the conclusion that the use of those words with those
particular
particular
gradually arises in themselves.
significations
forms the foundation-principle according to
which words acquire their character of being significbecause no other relation is seen to exist between ant words and their meanings, and because also there is no ;
Adhik.
I.
Snt. /.]
SRi-BHlSHYA.
247
knowledge of any person who fixes by convention (the between words and their meanings). And when, in regard to words other than those the meanings of relation
which are already known, they
the childern) are, in addition, taught by speakers (who are well acquainted with the meanings of words) that a particular word has (/. e.
a particular meaning, only then do they come to know the meanings of all the words and afterwards, for the purpose of imparting their ideas to others, they make use ;
of a
number of sentences which
give expression to
those
ideas.
In another relation
way
also
is
it
between words and
very easy to understand the
their meanings.
(For instance),
a certain person, by means of the movements of his hands and other gesticulations asks another to go and tell
Devadatta that
his father
doing well.
is
Then
this (other)
person, when engaged in so informing (Devadatta) makes use of the words " Your father is doing well." (third) person who is standing near and is desirous of learning the
A
meanings of words, and who,
like a
dumb man,
is
well
conversant with the details of gesticulation, learns that this person is called upon so to inform (Devadatta), follows (him),
and then
listens to the
words which are made use of in
giving that information ; and at last he thus arrives at the conclusion that a particular word signifies a particular
meaning.
Therefore the rule that the meaning of words
only to denote actions is not binding. Accordingly, the Vcdanta signifies the Highest Brahman (the import of the
is
words signifying
whom
is)
also (signifies) that worship
naturally established, and (it) relates to Him and yields
which
Consequently, that enquiry about the Brahman, the aim of which is to find out that (Brahman and that worship relating to Him), has necessarily to be
unlimited results.
SRI-BHISHYA.
248
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
conducted.
Even
the Vedas are denotative of actions, the en^ <|uiry into the Brahman has indeed necessarily to be conducted. How is that ? Because they (viz. the Vcdas) if
yield results which flow from the actions that relate to such worship as is taught in the following and other scrip" dear one, the Self has to be tural passages Verily,
my
:
seen, has to be heard, has to be reflected upon, has to be
"He [Brih. Up. IV. 5.6.]; has to be sought after, He has to be specially desired and known." [C&hand. Up. VIII. 7. i.]; " Having discovered steadily meditated upon."
Him,
him
let
" There
is
practise knowledge." [Brih. Up. IV. 4. 21.]; in it the small etherial space. What exists with-
in that (small etherial space), that has to
be sought
after,
that has to be well understood." [C&hand. Up. VIII. 1. 1.] ; " There also is the blissful small etherial Whatspace.
ever
within
is
[M. Nar. X.
it,
7.]
that has
following scriptural passage
man attains the
Highest."
"
be
to
and because
:
meditated
also, it is
upon." declared in the
He who knows Up.
[Taitt.
the Brah-
II. i. i.], as
in other similar scriptural passages, that the
well as
Brahman
is
attained as a consequence (of those results of worship). Therefore the true nature of the Brahman and His attri-
made
butes are
same way
in
out only as being helpful to actions, in the
which (the knowledge of the nature of the
thing to be attained is helpful to action) in the analogous case of Swarga* 1 * which is in itself a particular place of 274.
junction
The "
Vedas
give
the
in-
He, who desires to attain
Swarga, shall perform the Jyotishtoma sacrifice";
and the statement given
elsewhere describing Sivarga Vhere
is
as
that
the
world
nature of
"in
which
no heat, no cold and no
dis-
agreeableness" is helpful in producing the desire for the attainment of Swar-
ga and
is,
in consequence, helpful
in
causing the performance oltiiQjyotish-
toma
sacrifice in
obedience to the in-
junction relating to
it.
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sfd. /.]
I.
such pleasure as
unmixed with
is
249
and
pain,
also in other
found to be so helpful) in the case of * 27 the pre-eminence which is to be derived from the persimilar cases;
(it is
formance of the nocturnal salras- 76 and
(also) in the case
of that relation of cause and effect which exists between the
and beating 277 (of the Brahmanas) and the of a hundred gold coins (prescribed therefor).
fine
reviling
Even
"
Bring the ox", the significance of words does not relate to actions, because the 'action' in sentences like
thought of by you (
of definition.
is difficult
Indeed, your
'
comes into existence after the volition (in relation to it), and is (simply)that which is aimed at by that volition. To be that, which is aimed at by volition, is to be the object action
And
of volition.
which
to be the object 27 8 of volition
most
(that) volition
which
most desired to be attained
is
avoidance of existing pain by 275. Again, the Vedas give, in one place, the injunction " He shall
the
perform
nocturnal
sacrifices."
Elsewhere, the result of the perfor-
mance
of nocturnal sacrifices
is
stat-
ed to be the attainment of eminence, as,
for
in
instance,
"Those, indeed,
the passage
who perform
these
nocturnal sacrifices, they attain eminence."
This passage
action in as desire to
much as it
is
helpful to
stimulates the
attain eminence,
and thus
leads to the performance of those noc-
turnal sacrifices. Vide Pur, Mini. IV. 3.
17 to 19.
276.
A
Satra
is
a long sacrifice
its
This being
mentioned
277.
And
that
so, if
in Vedic literature,
again, the
Vedas prohi-
and the beating of a Brahmana by means of the injunction" Therefore, let him not revile and bit the reviling
Sam/i. II.
beat a Brahmana.'' Taitt.
The
6. 10. 2.
passage
given in the following
is
injunction
"
He who
:
beats (a Brahmana),
ed
by
coins."
of violating this
effect
the fine of Taitt.
reviles
and
him be punisha hundred gold
let
Samh.
II.
6.
IO.
2.
This
passage mentions the result flowing from disobeying the injunction, and thus is helpful in producing the desire to act in accordance with
or sacrificial session lasting, accord-
the above prohibition.
ing to some, from 13 to 100 days. Satras of many years' duration are
this definition of
32
And
pleasure, or the
is
means.
also
to be that
is
to attain.
desires
278.
Vide
Panini
karma
I.
4.
49.,
or object.
for
SRI-BHISHYA.
250
who
\Cliap. I. Part.
L
have pleasure, &c., perceives that these things cannot be acquired -without any effort on a person,
his
own one
desires to
part, then, that person
is
seen to act voluntarily
who
is desirous of putting forth effort. Thus, it is nowhere is the of that which desire, object regarding seen that to possess the characteristics of the thing aimed
like
at
by
volition
anything other than to have
is
complishment dependent on
its
(own) ac-
And an
(that) volition.
object of desire possesses the character of what stimulates (the accomplishment of that desire), only in so far as the
accomplishment (of that object of desire) effort
because
;
(all)
activity
is
proceeds
dependent upon only from this
(dependence of accomplishment on effort). Moreover, to be aimed at by volition is not to be that
which is agreeable to men; because pleasure itself (which is no Further, action) is that which is agreeable to men. does not possess the (positive) character of being what is agreeable to men. Indeed, the discrimination between the true nature of pleasure and pain the
is
cessation
of pain
to the effect that
what
agreeable to disagreeable to them is
and that what is that which is disagreeable; and hence,
its
men is
is
pain.
cessation
pleasure,
Pain
is
becomes
but not because that (cessation) is (in a Indeed, the existence of a thing positive way) in accordance with its own true nature, in a condition a desirable thing,
agreeable.
which
is
free
well as of
of pain.
which
from the association of what
what
is
agreeable as
disagreeable, constitutes the cessation Therefore action and (all) other similar things,
are
is
different
from pleasure, cannot possess the
what is agreeable. Moreover, it (viz. action) cannot be what is agreeable, even on account of its
character of also
aiming at pleasure because it is itself of the nature of pain. Even when it aims at pleasure, there is only the mere ;
Adhik. desire
Sut. /.]
I.
to is
cipal
thing
aimed
which
because,
on
has
(that)
your
side,
a principal thing has
(such)
251
Further, to be appropriate that (pleasure). at by volition is not to be that prin-
what
itself;
SR!-BHISHYA.
volition
subordinate
the character
not
to
of
being
been defined.
And
since the character of being so
subordinate (to a principal the same as to be capable of being invariably
is
thing)
by the
influenced
volition
which
is
set
in
motion
in
obedience to the purposes of another, it is not thereby made out that the character of being (such) a principal thing
to be that which
is
to that (subordinate thing).
For,
is
oppositely correlated were so, the volition
if it
would not possess the character of what is so subordinate and that which is to be accomplished by it would not, in ;
consequence, have the character of a principal thing. And again, for the reason that the character of being a subordinate thing
is
tical activity
another,
it
(simply) to be capable of producing that pracwhich is intended to serve the purposes of
cannot be said that that another forms the princi-
because the character of being what is aimed at (by volition) is all that is to be defined (here), and because also the master too is seen to be capable of producing the
pal thing
activity
vant. his
;
which
is intended to serve the purposes of the serbe said that the master, in accordance with desire,puts forth voluntary activity even in the mat-
But
own
if it
ter of feeding the servant,
it is
replied that this
is
not right
;
because the servant also, out of his own desire, puts forth voluntary activity in the matter of feeding the master.
Thus the true nature of 'action' itself has not been defined; and it is improper (to hold) that what is correlated to 'action', (as the thing to
be accomplished -by
it), is
the sub-
ordinate thing, and that what is correlated to this (subordinate thing as the owner thereof) is the principal thing.
1
SRl-BH&SHYA.
252
Part.
I.
[Chap.
L
Also, to be what is aimed at by volition is not the .same as to constitute the utility of volition. The utility of the volition of a person is indeed nothing other than that utility
he
is
which leads to the origination of
himself actuated
aimed at by
by
other than the thing desired. tainly
it
Consequently,
to demonstrate that
being that which
and
;
been definitely shown to be
volition has not
difficult
his volition
Therefore, the thing
desire.
'
cer-
is
'
action
consists
in
volition as well as in
accomplished by being the principal object of volition. is
a commandment also is different from and the cessation of pain, both of which are pleasure immediate objects of desire; therefore its desirability and the Moreover,
;
accomplished by volition are both due wholly to its forming a means of attaining those (objects of desire which are in the form of pleasure and the cessation possibility of its being
of pain). It
is
very reason that
for this
it (viz.
the
command-
other than the verb (denoting action). Otherwise, action denoted by) the verb itself would form the object (the to be accomplished. The object of accomplishment ex-
ment)
is
pressed
by the
litl-"* 9
with their use along
and other verbal forms, in harmony with the word swargakdma (in the
commandment Jyotishtomena sivargakdmo yajetd), nothing other than the attainment of Swarga therefore the object of accomplishment here is that new and invisiVedic
is
;
ble something itself
than the
(known
as apfirva),"
ephemeral action
(of
which
is
other
and which
sacrificing),
causes the enduring attainment of Swarga. Accordingly, the import of this new and invisible something (apurva)\\a.*
indeed to be attaining
made out by imagining
Swarga.
Thus
379. Vide sifra p. 41. n. 35.
it is
280.
it
to be the
said here that
Vide supra
means of
that object
p. 41. n. 36.
Adhik.
L
which
to be accomplished
Sut. /.]
is, at first, arrived at independother things; and then, for the purpose of upholding this independent character (of that object of accomplishment), it is said that it is only ilieapftrva which
is
ently of
all
on becomes the means of causing the attainment of
later
Surely this
Swarga.
is
ludicrous
;
because
word
that
(viz. yajetd) which denotes, while in association with the word swargakdma, the object of accomplishment, cannot
denote the independent character (of that object of accomplishment); and because also that independent thing, at
first
which
from pleasure, from the cessation
different
is
of
pain, and from the means of attaining them, is not seen to be capable of being accomplished by means of volition.
And ment
?
again,
If
it
possesses
(also)
what
is
commandcommandment
this usefulness of the
be said that, like pleasure,
the character of being agreeable,
some
like
particular kind of pleasure or other,
peculiar pleasure that is has to be explained
it
establish this.
is
for
;
that,
also a
synonymous with commandment,
what means of proof there
be said that one's
If it
it
is
(it
asked) whether commandment constitutes pleasure pleasure alone is what is agreeable. If it be said (again)
own
is
to
experience is because even,
the means of proof, you do not experience in any definite manner any pleasure arising out of the experience of a commandment, in the it is
same way
in
seen not to be so
;
which (you experience) the pleasure
arising
out of the experience of (pleasurable) external objects. If it be said that a commandment is declared by an authoritative regulation to
that
it
is,
be an object of human pursuit, and
therefore, carried into effect
subsequently,
it
is
that authoritative regulation is which says that a commandment is an object of human pursuit.
asked what
It
is
not
the
(law-imposing)
voice
of the
people
;
.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
254 because a
that
and because
;
the
also
it
Part.
I.
which
people
work
relates to
commandment)
with pain
of
(voice
[Chap.
which
is
I.
imposes identical
merely declares (the com-
to be
worthy of being carried into effect by in so far as it forms a means for the attainvolition, only ment of pleasure and other such things. Nor is it the
mandment)
voice of the Vedas, for that also enjoins the duty to be performed only as a means for the attainment of Swarga and
other such things. It is neither the daily obligatory nor the occasionally obligatory injunction (of the Smritis} because that also possesses its power of importing it (/. c. a commandment), only through the knowledge of (that) new ;
and
invisible
sentence as
now
2 8
J
something
(or apiirvd)
which
is
found
the
in
containing (the word) swargakdma. Therefore, it is unavoidable that that (injunction of the
stated,
Smritis} also implies the performance of works, (only) for the
attainment of pleasure and other such
things.
Those
works, the results of which are systematically temporal, bear fruit, as soon as they are performed, in the form of plenty of food, healthiness, and such other things which are enjoyed then (and there) and consequently there is no ;
experience of that pleasure which- in contradistinction to them has the nature of (the working
knowledge
out
a
of)
of the
Even
Thus we
commandment.
whatsoever to prove that a
commandment
in the explanatory
and
fables found in the Vedas, 282 you
281.
This
sentence
totnena swargakdMio
282.
The
isJyotish-
'Veda consists, according
three parts, viz. Mantras,
ViJ/iis
Arthavcidas. Mantras are sacred
of
and
hymns
is
means
a pleasure.
eulogistic allegories
do not generally
and
sec the
and prayers, &c. Vidlns are injunctions i.
yajeta.
to the opifiion of the Allwainsakas,
have no
e,
of
rules laying
down
the performance
particular
rites.
Arthai'daas are
explanatory remarks on the meaning of
Mantras and the purpose of rites, of Ninda or censure i, (
and consist
Adhik.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
I. Silt. /.]
255
modes of that pleasure which has the nature of a commandment, in the same way in description of the various
which (you there see) the description of the various modes of the pleasure which relates to Swarga and such
other
conTherefore, it is finally those passages which give out lift and the other inflectional
things.
cluded that, even
in
only injunctions, the forms of the verb denote, as established by the science of grammar itself, the fact that the meaning of a root relates
what
to nothing other than activity of the agent.
Him
is
to be accomplished
Under the aphorism
by the "
From
works), because (such a thing) [ Ved. Sut. III. 2. 37.], it will be est-
fruit (of our
(comes) the
is appropriate." ablished that sacrifices and other such things, which
denoted by the verbal roots (used
in scriptural
are
command-
ments), possess the character of constituting the worship of the Highest Person who is the internal ruler of gods like
Agni
aimed
sults
and that the accomplishment of the re(by such works) comes from that Highest
(Fire), &c.;
at
Person (who
is
so)
worshipped.
Therefore it is conclusively proved that the Veddnta teaches the Highest Brahman (the import of the words denoting whom is) naturally established. Accordingly, the endlessness and the
controversial
remarks
eternity of the fruits resulting from
Samsci
;
i.
e.
eulogium or 'recommendation'; Purdkalpa
the account
or
rites in
former times;
of
sacrificial
Parakriti
i.
e.
the ac hievement or the feat of another.
This
last
certain
comprises the stories about
performances
of
renowned
Srotriyas or sacrificial priests, gifts presented
by
kings
about
to Brah-
Under the head of manas, &c. Purakalpa come the numerous stories of the fight between the Devas and the Asuras,
as also the legends con-
cerning the sacrifices the gods. all
the
performed by
Thus Arthavdda
explanatory and
allegories,
fables,
c.
includes eulogistic
SRI-BHISHYA.
256
[Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
the worship of the Brahman are also proved. In the case of the chzturmasya'1 8 s sacrifice and other such (ritualistic)
works sults
;
taught that mere works yield unenduring reand therefore it has to be understood that the teachalso, it is
ing regarding (their) indestructible results is meant to be indicative of (their) relative superiority, as in the following
among
other passages
" This vayu (air)
where the
scripture
says,
and
(this) antariksha (ether) are immor284 tal." Thus, mere works yield \_Brih. Up. II. 3. 3.]. inconsiderable and unenduring results, and the knowledge
Brahman
of the
Consequently,
it
yields infinite is
mence that enquiry
and ever enduring
maintained that into the
it
Brahman
results.
proper to comthe fruit of which is is
the determination of that (knowledge of the Brahman}. 283. Vide supra p. 245. n. 273 284,
The
veyed here cit
idea intended to be is
this
:
There are expli-
statements in the scriptures to
the effect
that
the results derived
from the performance of
works are impermanent. ral
its
con-
ritualistic
This gene-
proposition allows no
exceptions, sacrifice
is
and
the
room
no exception to the
Therefore the statement that
permanent
for
ChdturmSsya
results can only
it
rule.
yields
mean
that
results last longer than those of
any other kind of 'work'. the
immortality
Similarly,
and
of air
ether
implies that they are less mortal than
other things.
For the general
state-
ment regarding the impermanence the results
Up. VIII.
of 'works', I.
6.,
where
of
vide Chhand, it
is
said
"Just as the world obtained by works here, so also, there, the perishes
world obtained by m2rit perishes."
Adhik.
SRi-BHlSHVA.
II. Sftt. 2.}
ADHIKARANA.
257
II.
Janmddyadhikarana.
To
point out what that Brahman really is which is stated to be the object of the enquiry here, he (the Sfttra-
kara] says
Sutra
2.
Janmadyasya yatah.
(The Brahman
is
whom
that) from
(proceed) the
creation,
The word janniadi means creation, preservation, and The attributive compound 285 (here) denotes
destruction.
that (collection of things) which is having 'creation' at its beginning).
denotes the world which
characterised
(as
The word asya
constituted in an unthinkably
is
varied and wonderful fashion, and which
is
mixed up with
souls, beginning with Brahma and (all) with a of ending grass, each of which has its own clump
the individual
particularly assigned enjoyment of the fruits (of karmas) limited to particular times and places. The word yatah denotes that that Highest Person who is the Lord of all,
who who
possesses a nature which wills the truth,
qualities,
who
is
hostile to all that
is
evil,
possesses innumerable auspicious
such as knowledge,
omnipotent, and merciful
bliss,
&c.,
who
is
omniscient,
and from and destruction, preservation,
whom
in the highest degree,
proceed creation, denotes .that that Highest Person) This is the meaning of this sfttra. (it
There is the
scriptural passage
the
is
Brahman.
which begins with
"The
celebrated Bhrigu, son of Varuna,. approached his father, ' saying Reverend sir, teach me the Brahman '", and con-
385.
Vide Patanjali's Maha-Bhashya on Panini
33
\.
\,
27
;
II. 2.
24
;
VI.
I.
I.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
258 eludes
with" From whom
all
[Chap.
I.
Part.
these beings are born,
I.
by
whom, when born, they are all preserved, and to whom they go when they perish, do thou desire to know that well ;
that
is
the
arises the
Brahman"
III. i. i.].
Here there
\Taitt. Up. doubt whether or not it is possible to
Brahman definitely by means
of this passage.
know
It is
the
perhaps
not possible. The words creation, &c., do not, indeed, define the Brahman by constituting His charac-
held that
it is
terising attributes
;
for,
(if
they did), there would result
the predication of non-unity in relation to the Brahman, in consequence of His being characterised by many attributes.
Indeed to be the characterising attribute (of a thing) be that which distinguishes it (from other things). It
"Devadatta
be urged that in the instance,
is
is
to
may
brown, youth-
there is seen only ful, red-eyed, and symmetrical in form", one Devadatta, although there are many characterising attributes (in relation to him); and that, similarly, in the
here also there
case
be
so.
In that case,
is
all
only one Brahman. It can not the characterising attributes meet
only one individual, because the oneness (which relates to Devadatta) is made out through other means of proof. Otherwise, even in that case, the predication of non-unity
in
would be unavoidable on account of this distinguishing But here, (in the case
character (of those attributes).
Brahman by
under discussion),
it is
means of this same
(collectively given) attribute (of creation,
intended to 'define the
&c.,); accordingly, that predication of plurality in relation to
the
Brahman, which
results
from a variety of distinguishing
attributes, is unavoidable for the reason that the oneness of
the If it
the
Brahman
made out by other means of proof. be said that that oneness is made out here also, because word -Brahman {in the scriptural passage under
discussion)
is
is
not
only one,
it
is
replied that
it
cannot be so
Adhik. It. Sut.
made
out.
who does desirous to know
to a person
If,
who
dual ox, and
SRI-BHASHYA*
2.]
is
259
know any
not
indivi-
(the ox), it is given broken-horned, hornless and there will then be the apprehension (by fully horned", him) of a plurality of individual oxen, owing to there being a variety of distinguishing attributes, such as the posses-
"
out
An ox
is
that which
is
of broken horns and so on, although the word ox used only once; accordingly, there must be many indivi-
sion is
dual Brahmans.
For
very reason
not possible to constitute (of creation, &c.,)
this
for these characteristics
it is
.
even collectively the definition of the thing which it is Nor can (these attributes of creation, intended to define. &c.,) point out (the Brahman} by constituting (His) accidental characteristics, because there is no apprehension (of the
Bra hman]
in
any other form.
Indeed,
dental characteristics are seen to be the
all
acci-
means of appre-
hending, under a different form, a thing already known in some one particular form; as in the following among other instances,
namely,
Devadatta's
field."
"
Where there is that crane, that is And it may be said that the creation,
&c., of the world form accidental characterisations in relation to Him who has already been made out by means of (the passage) Infinity."
"The Brahman
\Taitt.
Up.
is
Existence, Knowledge, But it is not right, for the to these two passages which define
II. i. i.].
reason that, in relation the Brahman, there results the fallacy of reciprocal dependence in as much as the form (of the thing to be defined) ;
denoted by either (of those passages) that which is denoted by the other. not possible to
know
the
is
dep-endent upon Therefore it is
Brahman by means
of any
definition. It is To this it is said in reply as follows to know the Brahman by means of the creation, :
possible
preserv-
SRi-feHASHYA.
26o
accidental
(His)
L
Part.
L
of the world, which (together)
and destruction
ation,
constitute
\Chap.
characteristics.
Moreover,
there can be (here) no non-apprehension of the Brahman due to the non-apprehension of a form (in relation to Him),
other than the
form
which
is
by these
characterised
Indeed, that which is characmeans of accidental characteristics is
accidental characteristics. terised
(here)
by
Greatness unsurpassed in excellence; and it is Growth 286 brih also, because the root (to grow) is capable of that
meaning. And the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world constitute the accidental characteristics of that
(Brahman thus made out to be Greatness and Growth).
' from whom', ' by whom and ' (to) By the expressions whom', the cause of the creation, &c., (of the world) is pointed out (in this passage) as though it is a well known '
thing
and
;
it is,
accordingly, restated here in conformity
known knowledge. And well known is due thus being
with that well
the fact of (that
cause)
to the only
one
'
is expressed by the word Existence' (or sat), the instrumental and the material cause (of the forming " Existence in as it is the alone, world), given passage
which
thing,
dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, a second ....... It thought 'May I become be It created tejas." and born'. many [Cfrhdnd. Up.
my
without VI.
2.
i
&
And
3.].
this (fact of the
Brah man forming
the instrumental and the material cause of the world) results thus from the statement that this 'Existence
'
:
was one only in the beginning, there is the predication of the character of a material cause (in relation to that only and from the expression ' without a second', the negation of any other presiding deity; and
one thing) there
8.86.
is
;
SeeAt.i. Up.
4.
&
also
V. P. III. 3. 22.
Adkik.
12. Silt. 2.]
again from the
many and
SRi-^HASHYA.
261
statement" It
be born';
thought, 'May I become " there is the created tcjas
It
declaration of only one (Being as constituting the deity
Hence that
presiding over creation).
whom proceed the creation,
from
tion of the world
is
the
preservation,
Brahman
and destruc-
consequently, the attributes of creation, and destruction define the Brahman to be preservation that thing which is their own instrumental and material ;
The Brahman
cause.
which
is
understood to be that Greatness
consists in possessing omniscience, the quality of will-
ing the truth, and wonderful powers and so on, which are
all
His being the instrumental and the material cause of the world and for this reason also there does not implied in
;
arise the inappropriateness
which
is
due to the non-realisa-
tion of another form (in relation to the creation, &c., constitute
man)
Brahman}, because the characteristics (of the Brah-
so realised.
There
is
nothing wrong in creation, &c., forming even
the defining characteristics (of the Brahman), in as much Even those attributes which as they are (His) attributes.
form the defining characteristics (of a thing) denote that thing which is contrary to what is characterised by their opposites. define,
Even when the
[thing,
happens to be (only) one
nature unknown, characterised
which
it
and has
is
its
desired to essential
(even then for that one thing) to be
by many
attributes,
which do not
conflict
with each other, does not imply any differentiation (in because all the characterising attributes are relation to it) ;
same thing, and are thus one and the same thing. But the
seen to relate to one and the
applied together to attributes of being broken-horned, &c., (mentioned before in relation
solely
to the ox), indicate different individual oxen,
by reason
of the contradiction (existing between
262
SRI-BHASHYA.
[Chap.
L
Part.
L
the attributes themselves). But here (i.e. in the case of Brahman] the attributes of creation, &c., do not con-
the
tradict (each other)
their occurrence).
owing to the
difference in the time (of
The Brahman, who
is
the cause of the
creation, c., of the world, is apprehended from the passage which begins with " From whom all these beings are " born \TaitL Up. III. i. i.], and deals with the cause of the universe and the scriptural passage " The Brahman ;
is
Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." \_Taitl. Up. II. i. i.], denotes that essential nature of His which is different
from the
all
other things.
Brahman
which
is
'
as possessing the state of the unconditioned
(word) the non-intelligent thing (or matter) subject to modifications, and the intelligent thing
By
being.
'
Here the word Existence denotes
this
(or the individual soul) which is associated with it are (both) excluded ; because these two (things) are not cap-
able of unconditioned existence,
owing to the
fact that
they
are capable of existing in various states so as to assume The word ' Knowledge denotes (in relavarious names. '
tion to
Him)
the eternal and uncontracted condition of
pure intelligence. By this (word) the released souls are excluded (from the definition of the Brahmaii), owing to the fact that their intelligence must have been at one time in a contracted state.
The word
'
'
Infinity
denotes that essen-
nature (of His) which is free from the limitations of space, of time, and of being some one particular thing (among others). This essential nature (of the Brahman)
tial
possessed of attributes, and therefore (His) infinity is the consequence of (His) nature as well as qualities. By this is
(word) are excluded (all) those freed individual souls whose nature and qualities are not unsurpassed (in excellence), and who are distinct from the two classes of things already excluded (from the definition of the
Brahman) by
Adluk. II.
Sftt.
means of the
SRI-BHISHYA.
2.]
first
263
two words (Existence and Knowledge)
;
because characterising attributes possess the power of exTherefore, by means of this clusively defining things.
"The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, passage, namely, Infinity", that Brahman, whose true nature is made out 2 8 7
from the creation, &c., of the world, is defined as being different from all other things; and thus there is (here) no fallacy of reciprocal
dependence.
Consequently,
it
is
a
Brahman who is the cause of the creation, &c., of all the worlds, who is untainted, who is omniscient, who wills the truth, and who is omnipotent, settled conclusion that the
is
capable of being understood by means of a definition. Those again who say that the object of the enquiry
(here)
the attributeless thing,
is
according to their view, (Then therefore) the enquiry into the and "(That is the Brahman} from whom (pro"
the aphorisms 288
Brahman"
',
would be inapceed) the creation, &c., of this (universe)." there is the because propriate ; (here) etymological explanation 289 that the
Growth
;
Brahman
is
unsurpassed Greatness and is declared
and also because that same Brahman
(herein) to be the cause of the creation, &c., of the world. Similarly, in the groups of succeeding aphorisms, as well as
the groups of scriptural passages quoted under those aphorisms, it may be observed that the association of the
in
powers of 'seeing', &c.,
is
Hence the
predicated (in relation to the
(or aphorisms) and the under those aphorisms do not scriptural passages quoted constitute any authority for that (/. c. for holding the view
Brahman}.
that the thing).
sfitras
object of the enquiry here is the attributeless Logic also is no means of proving that thing
287. Tatit. Up. II.
I.
288. Vide Ved. Sit'.
289. Vide supra n. 286.
I. 1.
I.
I
&
2.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
264
[Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
devoid of characterising attributes ; because it 290 deals with such a thing as is associated with the character-
which
is
of that which forms the basis of logical inference, and is invariably concomitant with the characteristics of
istics
which
the thing to be proved.
The
characterising attributes
not established even according
to your
own imaginary
whom
from
is
thing which
devoid of
is
Brahman
position that the
is
that
proceeds the illusion regarding the creation, because thereby it will have to be ;
&c., of the world
admitted that ignorance (or avidya) is the source of illusion, and that the Brahman is the witness of
this
this
ignorance. Indeed, (He) is said to be a witness simply because (He) has the character of homogeneous luminosity.
And
luminosity
is
a characteristic which distinguishes (the is non-intelligence, and it has
possessor thereof) from what
the nature of what
makes
itself
and other things
fit
to be
realised (by the mind). If this be so (admitted), then there results (to the
by
Brahman]
the condition of being qualified
characterising attributes.
there
If this
would be no luminosity at
be not (so admitted), and there would be
all,
only nothingness.
ADHIKARANA.
III.
Sdslrayon itwddh ika rana It
290.
who
has been stated that the Brahman,
cause of the creation, &c., of the world,
made
.
out from the Veddnta. The meaning
minor syllogism, the
is
In a
this:
term
is
found
This
is
mountain
is
the
Indeed,
improper. is
is
capable of being
fiery,because
the minor term
'
it
mountain
smokes", '
is
asso-
associated with the characteristics of
ciated with the characteristics of the
the middle term which
middle term
is
associated
with the characteristics of the major term.
Thus
in the syllogism,
"
The
'
smoke
'
which again
is
associated with the characteristics of
the major term
'
fire'.
Adhik. III. Sul. that
(Brahman)
He
because
To
is
SRI-BHISHYA.
not established by
265 (
Veddntd) passages,
by means of logical
established
inference.
such a supposition, he (the Sfitrakara) says in reply
Sutra
of
is
j.]
3.
Sastrayonitwat.
(That the Brahman is the cause of the creation, &c., the universe, follows altogether from the scripture),
scripture forms knowledge relating to Him).
because
He,
the
in relation to
the
source
whom the scripture
trie
is
scripture-sourced
one.
the
forms the source,
means of proof,
or the instrument (of knowledge), or the
He
(of
And
the state of His
being so scripture-sourced is His scripture-sourcedness. From that, (that is), from the sastra having the character of being the means of acquiring the knowledge relating to
Brahman, the Brahman has that (sastra) for (His) The Brahman is altogether beyond the senses, and so does not form the object of any means of proof, such as perception, &c.; and the sastra alone forms the means to prove Him. Consequently, the scriptural passage beginning the
source.
"From whom
with
Up.
III. i. i.],
all
bom"
these beings are
certainly teaches that
of the nature already described.
This
\_Taitt.
Brahman who
is
the meaning (of
is
this sfitra). It
may, however, be
not possible sastra as the
for the
said here thus
Brahman
Indeed, it is to be that which has the :
means of proving Him; because the Brahman of being made out by other means of proof. capable And the sastra* 9 has a meaning only in so far as it relates is
*
to
what has not been already arrived at. What 292 then is the means of proving that (Brah-
291. Cf.
HI.
5. 21.
Pur. Mlm. Vide supra
34
III. 4. 12, n. 232.
&
292. Here,
Mlmcinnaka,
the
objector
is
the
SRT-BHISHYA.
266
[Chap.
I.
Part.
/.
man),! Surely, it is not perception. It (viz. perception) of two kinds; that which is born of the senses, and that which is born of yoga (or introspective realisation through is
mental concentration).
The
(perception) which is bora of kinds, namely, outside-born (or exterand inside-born The external senses nal) (or internal).
the senses
is
of
two
own objects as to be brought into contact (with them) in the usual way; and accordingly they do not produce the knowledge which relates to that particular Person who is capable of
give rise to the knowledge of such of their are
fit
perceiving all things, and is (also) capable of Nor does the internal bringing them into existence. the Brahman}; because, in relation to (perception prove
directly
external objects (naturally) &c., which are (all)internal, ly of the external senses. not (prove the Brahman}.
distinct it
from pain, pleasure,
cannot operate independent-
Even yogic perception 298 does It (viz.
yogic perception) results
from the utmost intensification of mental conception, and although it has the character of a clear presentation before it is nothing other than the mere remembrance of previously experienced things; and it is, therefore, no (separate) means of proof. Under these circumstances,
consciousness,
how can
it
that there
have the character of direct perception, seeing no cause to make it deal with things other
is
than those (to which that remembrance and that concepIf it did deal with such things, it would ?
tion relate)
acquire the character of an illusion.
Inference also,
whether arrived at through the particular waj of deduction r
or arrived at through the generic way of induction, is not (the means of proving the Brahmaii). (Inference) arrived at through the particular way of deduction is not (the
293,
Vide supra
p.6g. n. 46,
Adhik. III. Sut.
means of proof
SRI-BHISHYA.
j.]
here), because there
is
267
no knowledge of
its
There relating to anything which is beyond the senses. is also no such basis of inductive inference as is seen to give rise to a generalisation and as is invariably associated with that particular Person all
who
is
capable of directly perceiving those (things) into
things and of actually bringing
existence. It
may, however, be again objected thus
294
:
(The
idea of) the world being a produced effect is invariably associated with (the idea of) there being, (in relation to
an agent,
who knows
thoroughly its material cause, its of auxiliary implements production, its disposal and its purpose. The idea also that the world is produced by the non-intelligent thing (or matter) is invariably associated it),
with the idea of intelligent
its
being.
being subject to the control of a single Indeed, all produced effects such as
pots, &c., are seen to be associated with a producing agent who knows their material cause, their auxiliary implements
of production,
their disposal
and
their
own
example), body, which is non-intelligent matter and is free from one's
subject to the control
world
is
purpose.
(For
produced out of disease, is indeed
of a single intelligent being. The it is made up of compo-
a produced effect, because
nent parts. It is replied (to this)
as follows
:
What
it
is
(for
a
thing) to be subject to the control of a single intelligent being ? It is, surely, not to have the origin and the exist-
ence (of that thing) subject to the control of that (being) for, then, the illustrative example (given above) will be
;
found to be defective proved. ^94.
partly
The
Indeed, objector here
in
one's is
regard to that which
own
one who
accepts the doctrines of the
body,
which
is
is
free
to be
from
NaiyyUyikcu and believes in the value ot
the
'
design argument*.
SRI-BHISHYA.
26S
[Chap.
I.
Part.
/.
disease, has not its origin and existence subject to the control of a single intelligent being ; because, to all (those) c., who are the intelligent beings, such as the wife,
enjoyers of that body, the origin and the existence of that (body) appear to be due to something that is unknown.
Moreover, the body which is organically made up of constituent parts does not, for the purpose of existing in the
form of a complete whole the constituent parts of which are inherently associated together, stand in need of an intelligent being over and above the peculiar putting together of
constituent parts. existence, which is characterised by its
And life,
that (kind of) can not possibly
be predicated in relation to the earth, the ocean, the mountain, &c., which are all admitted to fall into the same class fas the
body)
;
and hence, we
(kind of) existence that
is
find that there
of a uniform nature and
is
is
no
found
to be alike in the case under consideration as well as in
other parallel cases. If it be said that (for a thing) to be subject to the control of a (single intelligent) being, is the same as to have its movements determined by that (single being), then, this (lawj is seen to be transgressed in the case of heavy chariots and stones and trees and other such objects, which are all capable of being moved only by
(although they are all produced out of non-intelligent matter and have thus to be understood in accordance with the above hypothesis to be
many
intelligent beings,
subject to the control of a
single intelligent being).
If
it
the fact of being produced out of nonthe same as to be simply dependent intelligent matter) upon intelligent beings, then, there arises the fallacy of prov-
be said that
it (viz.
is
ing the proved. Moreover, it is proper to admit that the individual souls alone, which are accepted by both parties,
do possess the quality of being agents
;
because there
is
dhik.
lL
Sui.
j."|
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
(the support of) simplicity (in sion).
And
it is
269
favour of such an admis-
not right to hold that
it is
impossible
for the quality of
being an agent to exist in relation to the individual souls, since they do not know the material cause, &c., (in regard to the production of things)
;
for, all
the individual souls are in possession of the power of directly perceiving the material cause (of things) such as the (ele-
ment) earth, &c., and ing them), such as
(also) the auxiliary
means
(of produc-
sacrifices, &c. Accordingly, the (element)
earth, &c., and sacrifices, &c., are directly perceived
by them
now.
In relation to the intelligent beings (viz. the individual souls), there is (indeed) no impossibility of the quality of being an agent, even in the absence of the direct perception of that unseen something 293 which is expressed by the word apfirva and by other words, and has the nature of the
power which results from sacrifices, &c., that form the auxiliary means (of producing things) because the production of ;
a thing, does not stand in need of such direct perception. Indeed, the direct perception of that which has power is alone useful in causing the production of anything. It
is
the know-
ledge alone, but not the direct perception, of power that is (here) useful. As a matter of fact, potters and others do not
begin their work of making
jars,
water-pots,
and such
other things, only after having directly perceived the power of those things (which form the auxiliary imple-
same way in which (they and the other things that perceive) the rod, the wheel, to the means form the auxiliary performance of their work. ments of production)
And,
;
in the
in the case of those intelligent beings (or the indivi-
dual souls)
who
are, in
accordance with the sdstras, under-
stood to possess the particular kind of power which results Mini. 295. Vide supra p. 41, n. 36, Vide also Piir.
11. I.
I
104.
SRI-BHISHYA.
270
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
from
sacrifices, &c., it is not (at all) inappropriate here that they do the work (of producing things). Moreover, that thing the making of which is possible and the knowledge relating to the material cause, &c., of which is also
that thing alone is seen to have (been produced by) an agent who knows those (possibilities). But the earth, the mountain, the great ocean, &c., are things the making of which is impossible (to individual possible,
and the knowledge of the
.souls),
in relation to
them
is
material cause,
also impossible (to
therefore they are not
made by
&c.,
individual souls);
intelligent beings
(or the
individual souls). Hence, it is only such a quality of being a produced effect as is found in association with a thing
which
like jars, water-pots,
is
and other objects resembling
them, which is itself capable of being made (by individual souls), and the material cause, &c., relating to which are capable of being known (by them), quality of being a produced effect) that (all)
establish that
an intelligent maker
(or
(it
is
only this
competent to agent) must have is
Furnecessarily preceded (the production of that thing). as a or similar ther, such a produced effect pot any other object is seen to have been caused lord of all, whose knowledge and
who
who
has a body,
is
provided with auxiliary imple-
ments of production, and whose accordingly, this
by one who is not the power are very limited, desires are unfulfilled
means of proving an from the
;
intelligent agent (in
world possessing the characteristics of a produced thing, establishes an intelligent agent who is altogether of the above-mentioned relation to the world),
fact of the
.
and thus
nature
;
that
establishes in relation to the Person intended to be
it
it
proves unfavourable, for the reason
agent in the act of creation) the opposites of omniscience, the lordship of all, and other
proved here
(as the
Adhik. III. Snt.
SRI-BHASHYA.
j.]
Moreover, owing to
such qualities.
271 this
much
it
alone,
inferences have to be given a thing which has to be proved up falls (also) within the scope of some by logical reasoning other means of proof, then all such mistaken characteristics
cannot be said that
all logical
If
(in this matter).
to that thing), as are arrived at on the strength of the bases of logical inference, are contradicted by that (other) (in relation
means of proof and hence those (characteristics) cease to But here, in the case of Him who is the thing to be ;
be. 296
who is
proved,
incapable of being dealt with
means of proof (than the
and who
sastras),
by
is
other
all
skilled in the
the attributes, which are, as a rule, invariably associated with Him and are made out by means of direct and converse processes of logical inference, creation of all the worlds,
all
without exception, rightly found to be relevant and admissible and they continue to remain as such, because
are,
;
there
no other means of proving (Him) by which these
is
attributes
may become
stultified.
how
Therefore,
is
the
Lord to be established without the dgamas (or sastras) ? Here (again), they (viz. the purvapakshinsY* 7 say as follows
:
deny the
not possible to
It is
fact
that the
a produced effect; simply because it is made up And the following are the sylloof constituent parts.
world
is
296. For example, a traveller who has missed his way, and is overtaken to see at a dis-
by darkness, happens tance the ignis fatuus to be
some kind
and mistaking
;
of light
up by man, he draws the inference that a human habitation must be found it
near the light.
He moves
on
in the
and
at last per-
no such habitation.
Here, the
direction of the light, ceives
lit
existence of the
human
habitation
is
capable of being of
logical
means
made
inference
out by means as well
of direct perception
;
as by and the
infeired existence of the habitation
contradicted by means of ceived
non-existence
thereof.
is
the per-
Only
thus can the conclusions of logic be-
come 297.
the
stultified.
The Pnrvapakshins here
Vai'stshikits,
are
SRI-BHISHYA.
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
(in regard to this position): (i) The the earth, mountain, &c., which are (all) the subject of discussion (here), are produced effects, because they are
gistic
statements
made up
of constituent parts ; as is the case with pots, &c. (2) Similarly, the earth, the ocean, the mountain, &c., which are (all) the subject of discussion (here), are produced because, being themselves gross, they possess the power of being set in motion as is the case with a pot. (3) The body and the world, &c., are produced effects, effects,
;
because, being themselves gross, they have a definite form; In the case of such substances as is the case with a pot.
made up
of constituent parts, we do not find any characteristic, other than the fact of their being made up as are
of constituent parts, which uniformly defines the state of a produced effect so as to point out what is (really so) produced and what is not. If it be said that the possibility of (such things) being made, and the possibility of knowing their material cause, &c., are found invariably associated
with the fact of things being produced effects, it is replied Even in the case of things that to hold so is not right.
which are accepted to be produced effects, the knowledge and the power (relating to the maker of the produced thing) are inferred from the product itself. Elsewhere also, the fact of a thing being a produced effect is made out through its being made up of constituent parts and through such other (causes). Hence, those two things (viz. the
knowledge and the power of the producer of an certainly
capable
There
thus,
is,
no
of being
effect) are
established
peculiarity here.
(by inference). Accordingly, in the
case of jars, water-pots and other made things, a person, after knowing that they are produced effects, makes out,
by means of inference, the knowledge and the power which are found in the producing agent
and are needed
for the
Adhik. III.
Silt,
making of those
j.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
And
things.
palace of a king which
which
(such a person) sees
273 the
he had never before seen, and
wonderfully planned. Then, by means of the peculiarity in the arrangement of its parts, he arrives at is
a produced effect ; and immediately afterwards he learns by inference the wonderful nature of the knowledge and the power possessed by the producer the conclusion that
it is
There(of that palace) for (the purpose of producing) it. character of being a produced effect is established
fore, if the
in the case of the
body, of the world and such other things,
then, a particular Person, who is capable of directly perceiving and of creating all things as well as of performing
other actions in relation to them, is certainly proved. Moreover, in the case of intelligent beings (?'. e. the indivi-
dual souls), the enjoyment of pleasure and pain is based upon merit and demerit (respectively) ; however, these two things (viz. merit and demerit) are not themselves intelligent, and are not presided over by any intelligent being ; hence they are not themselves capable of being the means
Accordingly, some of particular Person, capable skilfully awarding all all the fruits in accordance with (various) karmas, has to
of yielding
the fruits (of
who
karma).
is
because hatchets and other instruments, be postulated which are themselves not intelligent, are not, for instance, ;
seen to be the means of producing the sacrificial pole and such other things, when not presided over by a carpenter, even though the proper place, the proper time, and the numerous other accessories (for making them) are all available
and at hand.
The
case of the seed becoming the
other similar cases (also) fall within the scope of this case under discussion therefore to maintain any variation in logic in relation to them is to display that
sprout and
all
;
ignorance which belongs to demons learned in the scriptures. 35
SRI-BHASHYA.
274
[Chap.
Part. I.
I.
For the very same reason, the statement which mainabove logic has to vary in the case of pleasure and other such things is (also) quite similar in character. 298 tains that the
Further,
not proper to assume, for the sake of simplici-
it is
ty, that this kind of presidentship belongs to the individual souls themselves, which are admitted by both parties ;
because, in their case,
conclusively established that they do not possess the power of perceiving what is it
is
what
is hidden, and what is far away. Indeed, in the hypothesis has to be altogether in accordance with the perception. And, in the case of the Lord of all,
subtle,
all cases,
there can be no demonstration of powerlessness, as (there Therefore, it is is) in the case of the individual soul.
not impossible to prove Him by other means of proof (than the scripture). He (the Lord) is proved to be arrived at as the cause of a produced effect which
ed with an surely
efficient
made
out
is
producing agent
as
naturally
invariably associat;
He is
and hence
possessing
the
power
of directly perceiving and controlling all things. What has been already stated 299 to the effect that, by postulating the absence of lordship, &c., (in relation to the agent of creation), there results the fact of proving, (in relation to that agent), the opposites of certain 298. Pleasure lions
and other
and emotions give
corresponding physical
sensa-
for their
expressions.
and emotions have to be
cause.
the sensations and emotions are
themselves
intelligent agents.
therefore be argued that effects
the hatchet has to be handled by
the carpenter, so also these sensations
These expressions are therefore prodnced effects having those sensations
and emotions
As
rise to their
all
~
f
It
And not
may
produced
need not have an intelligent
agent engaged in (producing them.
intelligent
being
;
felt
by an
otherwise,
there
can be no physical expression corresponding to them. Consequently, even here the predication of the intelligent
agent
cannot
cd.
299, Vide supra p. 270.
be
avoid-
Adhik. IH. Sat.
j.]
SRi-&HisHYA. that
attributes,
(desired)
of
of
275
due
is
the ignorance because
to
logical inference
the various processes the attributes which are found to exist together in ana-
all
;
form the logous and parallel cases, but do not themselves found to not cause of producing the effect (in question), are exist in the thing to be proved.
What
Anything which has to be produced requires, for its production, that its
is
said
is
this
:
(or made) by any one producer should have
the power of producing it, and have also the knowledge of its material cause and of the auxiliary means (needed for It does not require, (on his part), the incapit). of producing other things and the ignorance in reability gard to other (causes and means); because they (viz. this
producing
powerlessness and this ignorance) do not form the cause (of what he has to produce). When, indeed, the production of a thing is possible by means of the power of producing it
and by means of the knowledge of
its
of the accessories (needed for producing &c., of other things do not in any
material cause and it),
the ignorance,
way affect
(the produc-
and hence they do not deserve to form the cause production, merely on the score that they are seen to
tion of it) ;
of
its
some way
related (to that cause). Moreover, that other and thing (viz. powerless(that) ignorance ness) which, relating to objects other than the thing to be
be
in
do
produced, are, (according to you), capable of affecting the production of a thing (do they) relate to all (such producible) things, or do they relate to only a few (such) Surely, they cannot relate to all (such) things, not right to say that potters and others do not anything other than what has to be produced by
things
?
for
is
it
know them.
Nor do they
because there
is
no
relate only to a
few (such) things
;
definite rule to settle, in the case of
every one of all the agents, \vhat particular kind of ignorance
SRI-BHISHYA.
276
and powerlessness he
is
consequence, a straying
{Chap.
I.
Part.
L
to have, and there result*, in from the hypothesis to
away
to all things. Therepostulate ignorance, &c., in relation other such attributes, fore, the fact that non-lordship and
which do not found
affect the producibility of things, are
in association
with what
is
to be proved
(/.
e.
not
with
the Creator), does not (indeed) prove the contrary (of what It may be said that, since potters to be proved). and others are seen to possess the power of controlling the use of rods, wheels, &c., only with the help of their bodies,
is
therefore impossible for the Lord who has no body to become the controller of the material cause of the world it is
and of the auxiliary means (needed
for
producing it). not right to hold so, In such a case, it is replied that because the expulsion and destruction of ghosts, demons, it is
poisons, &c., found in the bodies of others are seen to result solely with the help of the will (of the magician,) If
it
be asked,
how
the Lord
have that will which
who
has no body can Himself
makes others
act, it is replied that
is not dependent upon the body, in as much as the does not form the cause of the will. The mind alone body is the cause of the will, and that is admitted to be found in
the will
the Lord also; because, from the very same fact of (the world's) being a produced effect, His mind also is arrived at (by us through inference), in the
knowledge and power
same way in which His
be said that, since he alone has the mind who has the body, the will born of the mind belongs only to him who has the body, it is replied that it are.
If
it
cannot be so; because the mind is eternal, and the mind continues to exist even after the destruction of the body, and is not, in consequence, invariably associated with it. Thus, the individual soul demerit, and
who
who is
is
under the influence of merit and
possessed of power and knowledge,
is
Adhik. III.
Sffl.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
j.]
277
not competent to produce such effects as the creation of the body, the world, &c., which are all characterised by a peculiarly wonderful arrangement of (their) constituent Consequently, that particular Person, namely, the parts.
Lord,
who
is
clever
in
the creation of
whose knowledge, power, and lordship
who
all
the worlds,
are unthinkable
and
without a body, who, merely by immeasurable, means of the instrument of volition, has established this infinite
a Lord)
is
and wide world of wonderful arrangements, (such is established solely by means of the logical process
of inference.
Therefore, in as
much
as
the
Brahman
is
capable of being conclusively made out by a means of proof (other than the scriptures), this scriptural passage (viz. "From whom, all these beings are born, &c.",) does not
Brahman. Moreover, it is seen that only two very extremely different things, namely, the mud and
establish the
the potter, constitute the material and the instrumental causes (of a pot). It is not further proper to suppose that the spatial ether and such other things, which have no constituent parts, possess the character of a produced effect. Consequently it is not possible to establish that the
only
one
Brahman
constitutes
(both) the
material
and the
instrumental causes of the whole world.
be thus argued,
we make
the following repty The scriptural passage relating to the origin, &c., rise to the knowledge of the the world) certainly gives (of Brahman as possessing the above-mentioned characteristics. If
it
:
300
Why ?
Because the
Brahman
is
to be proved solely
means of the sastras. What has been stated to the that the whole world is a produced effect, in as much made up of constituent parts and (possesses) other 300.
Vide
Taitt.
Up. III.
i. I.
by
effect
as
it is
allied
SRi-BnisHYA.
2/3
(characteristics); that a
produced
effect
[Chap. is
/.
Part.
1.
seen to be invari-
ably associated with a special agent suited to the production thereof ; and that, therefore, some one who is clever in the the worlds, and in knowing their material cause and the auxiliary means of producing them, has to be
creation of
all
this
inferred;
is
improper: because, though the earth, and
the great ocean, &c., are produced effects, there is no proof to show that they -were created by one (agent) at only one Again, all the things (in the world) do particular time.
not possess the character of constituting a single produced effect, in the same way in which a pot does (possess such a character), so that there may be one agent (to produce them all) at one and the same time ; because, in the case of produced things, which are quite distinct from one another, there is the perception of difference in
and there is, in conseof rule no any laying down only one apprehension quence, to the particular agent and one particular time (in regard
time and of difference in agents
;
production of things). Again, in as much as the individual souls are incapable of creating the wonderful world, and in as
much as
it is
inappropriate to assume
many
(individual
when, on the strength of the world being a produced effect, an agent different from those (individual souls) has to be assumed (as souls to be the creators of the world),
the creator of the world)/ merely on this score it is not right to hold that there must be only one agent (in the matter of creating the world) because, owing to the fact that those individual souls themselves who have increased their special :
merits are seen to possess wonderful powers, and owing also to the fact that to them alone there is the possibility of the fruition of that highly increased influence
which 301,
is
known
Vide supra
as adrlshta,*
p, 41.
n.
36.
01
it is
(of the
karmas) appropriate for each
Adhik. III. Sat.
j.]
SRI-BHISHYA,
279
of those (individual souls) to form the cause of producing particular and distinct created effects; and it is not, in con-
sequence, proper to assume (as the agent in the act of creation) a person who is distinct from them and is quite
unseen. Again, the (conceptions of the) simultaneous origination of all things and the simultaneous, destruction of all things do not deserve to occupy the position of proved truth ; because such a thing is not seen (to occur),
and because creation and destruction are seen to take place only one after another in order, and because also, even when the simultaneous origination and destruction of all things have to be assumed owing to the fact of their being produced effects, there is nothing wrong supposing that those acts (of creation and destruction)
in
take place in accordance with what is ordinarily perceived Therefore, if it is the agency of one (to be the case). intelligent being (in regard to the production of all things)
that
is
to be established, then, there
is
no invariable
asso-
ciation of the produced character of things single producing agent).
(with such a Moreover, the subject of the dis-
cussion (vi/. such an intelligent being) will (then) have to possess attributes generally unknown to be possessed
by him, and the given example
(of the pot) will be defective in illustrating the thing to be proved ; because
such a single person as is capable of creating all things I fit is only an intelligent is not known to exist. agency to be established, then there results the fallacy of proving the admittedly proved. Is this character of being
that
is
a produced effect, which is intended to prove some one being who is possessed of omniscience and omnipotence,
such things as are produced at one and the same time ? Or is it found in rela(is
this)
found in relation to
tion to all such things as are
all
produced one
after
another
280
SRI-BHISHYA.
in order
If
?
it
[Chap.
I.
Part.
1.
be found in relation to
are held to be produced at one
all things which and the same time, then
(owing to the hypothesis being untrue) the character of being a produced effect would itself remain unproved (in relation to the world) ; and if it be found in relation to all
things which are held to be produced one after another it would be established that they must be
in order, then,
and there would be the consequent contradiction (of what is to be proved here). Under
many
produced by
agents,
these circumstances, in proving the agency of (only) one being (in relation to all produced things in the world), there is not only the contradiction of perception and inference, but (there is) also the contradiction of the scriptures for, we see it mentioned (separately) in the scriptures that the ;
maker of the pot chariot
is
is
born, and also that the
maker of the
born. 302
Moreover, all produced effects such as bodies, &c., are seen to be associated with pleasures, &c., which are themselves the produced effects of the qualities of goodness, &c. 3 3 Therefore, it has necessarily to be admitted that
produced effects result from the qualities of goodness, &c. The qualities of goodness, &c., which form the source all
of the wonderful variety of produced effects, are indeed the It special characteristics found in the (producing) cause. (only) in consequence of the modification of the internal organ (or manas) of the person who is possessed of those
is
(qualities) that
The
it
becomes appropriate to declare that those things
scriptures contradict the idea that all
by one agent, the
produced things have only one pro-
of the pot cannot be different from the maker of the chariot. The
ducing agent. 303. These are the three well known
302.
idea
is
are produced only
that,
if
all
maker
scripture mentions
these separately
so as to imply that the}' are different
from each other.
Accordingly, the
qualities of Sattva,
passion
&
goodness, Tamas, darkness,
Rajas,
Adhik. III. Snt. produced
j.]
effects result
SRI-BHA.SHYA. from those
281
(qualities).
And,
in the
case of such a person, the possession of those (qualities; is due to karma. s 4 Therefore, for the very commencement
of any particular work, as the producing agent's knowledge and power, his association with karma (also) has necessarily to be
admitted to form, indeed, the cause of a producso admitted), for (It has necessarily to be the reason that the wonderful nature of (the agent's)
ed
effect.
knowledge and power
is Even (itself) due to karma. when it is held that desire is the cause of the commencement of work, it is not possible to give up the (agent's)
association with
which
is
for the
karma,
reason that that (desire),
specially characterised
particular object or other,
is
itself
by
its
relation to
due to the
some
qualities of
goodness, &c. Therefore the individual souls alone become the agents, and some one else who is distinct from
them cannot be al inference.
established (as agent) by means of logicAnd the syllogistic statements (in this
connection) are as follow (i) The body, the world, &c., have the individual souls for their (producing) agents ; :
because they possess the character of being produced effects, (even) as a pot does (2) The Lord is no agent because He has no purpose (in (in the act of creation) :
;
(have not): (3) The Lord act of because He has no the creation) (in body, just as those same (released souls have not). And this (last reasoning) is not fallacious in being too widely creation), just as released souls
is
no agent
;
applicable to the case of individual souls getting to preside own bodies, because, in such a case also, there
over their is
the
body 304.
actions
(previous) existence of the beginningless (4) Time, (in association with those souls) :
The word karma done
in
here means
previous births and
36
the effects of those actions,
subtle
about
SRi-BHlSHYA.
282
which there
is
[Chap.
difference of opinion, can never
devoid of (created) worlds
;
because
it
I.
Part.
1.
have been the
possesses
character of being time, (even) like the present time. And again, does the Lord perform work with a body, or (does
He
do
so) without a
body
?
Surely,
(He does)
not (do so) without a body because it is not possible for him who has no body to be an agent. Even mental actions are possible for him alone who has a body ; be;
mind
cause, although the
is
eternal, the released souls are
not known to be characterised by those (mental) actions. Nor indeed (does He perform actions) while possessing a the embodied condition of the Lord) does not admit any of the possible alternative views (in regard to it). Is that body (of the Lord) eternal or noneternal ? Surely, it is not eternal ; for, if that (body)
body
;
because
it (viz.
which is made up of constituent parts be eternal, there would be nothing wrong in the world also being eternal and consequently, there would be no proving of the Lord. Nor also is that (body) non-eternal because that which is different from it and forms (in its own turn) the cause of that ;
;
body can not then be
If
it
be said that He, (the
alone the cause (of His own body), it because it is impossible for
Lord,)
is
that
cannot be so
it
existent.
;
is
replied
him who
has no body to be the cause of that (viz. his own body). If it be said that, (at the time of creation), He acquires a
body by taking unto Himself some body other than His it is replied that it cannot be so ; because this will Is He lead to the fallacy of regressus in infinitum.
own,
of activity or is He devoid of all activity ? not full of activity, because He has no body at all. full
ther does
He who
is,
like a released soul,
He
is
Nei-
devoid of
all
perform any work. If it be maintained that the world which is a produced thing has for its (producing)
activity,
Adhik. 111. Sat.
j.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
283
agent one whose activity is only to desire, then the subject of the discussion (viz. the creating agent) will have to possess attributes generally unknown (to be possessed by such as he) ; and the given example will be defective in illustrating the thing to be proved. Therefore, the process of logically inferring the Lord, in accordance with
what we perceive, is itself stultified by having to accord with what we actually see. Consequently, the Highest Person who is the Lord of all, and is the Highest Brahman,
And the sdstras proved only by the sastras. to be entirely distinct- from all the things
is
Him
declare
which are cognised by all the other means of proof, to be an ocean of such unsurpassingly great and noble qualities
made up
of omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, and numerous other similar qualities, and to be as are
possessed of a nature which is in itself hostile to all that and hence there cannot result, (in relation to Him),
is evil;
even a
tittle
of that defect which
is
due to any similarity
with those things that are established to be existent with the help of the other means of proof. It
has been stated already by the pftrvapakshin identity of the material and the instrumental
that the
causes (of produced things ) is not actually perceived, and that the character of being produced effects cannot be
and such other things Even constituent parts.
established in relation to spatial ether as are not
made up
of (various)
not opposed to reason and it will be proved so under the aphorisms" (The Brahman is) also the material cause of the world, because (His being so) does not this is
;
disagree with the example given to illustrate the proposi"The spatial ether is tion." [Ved. Snt. 1.4. 23.]; and
not
(a
produced thing) on
account of the absence of
scriptural statements to that effect."
\Ved. Snt.
II. 3. i.].
SRI-BHISHYA.
284
{Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
a demonstrated conclusion that the " From whom all scriptural passage, which begins with these beings (are born)" [Tailt. Up. III. i. i .], proves the
Therefore,
it
is
Brahman
to be possessed of the above-mentioned characteristics; for the reason that He is not cognisable by any
other means of proof, and is, in consequence, to be dealt with solely by the sdstras".
ADH1KARANA.
IV.
Samanvayddhikarana. Although the Brahman means of proof (other than the sdstras
may
not cognised
by
any
sdstras), nevertheless, the
not prove the Brahman, the idea correspond-
whom
ing to
is
is
,naturally
established
in
as
much
as
He
does not import any activity or cessation from activity. In answer to such a doubt, he (the Sfitrakdra] says :
Sutra
4.
That
Tattu samanvayat.
the fact that the scripture forms altogether the the source knowledge relating to the Brahman) results, however, from (His constituting) the true purport (of the scripture). (viz.
of
The word however is intended to remove the doubt The word that denotes the fact that the sdstras form indeed the means of proving the Brahman. How? From (His constituting) the true purport (of the scripturej. raised.
(His constituting) the true purport (of the scripture) is (the same as His being) the highest object of human pursuit; because, the Brahman who is the highest object of human pursuit is alone intended to be denoted (by the sdstras}.
Upanishadic passages such as the following and others have to be interpreted to mean this very same
All the
Adhik. thing
IV.. Snt.
" :
./.]
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
From whom
2^5
these beings are born"
all
\Taitt.
/'Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second" \Qhhand. Up.VI. 2. i.]; "It thought 'May I become manifold and III.
Up.
i. i.];
be born'.
It
created tejas."
"The Brahman,
[C/ihdnd. Up. VI. 2. 3.]; indeed, this one alone was in the beginn-
\Brih. Up. I. 4. ii.]; "The Self, indeed, this one alone was in the beginning"-- \Brih. Up. I. 4. 17.]; " From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into ing"
existence."
alone then \vas" ence,
Knowledge,
Brahman
Up.
\_Taitt.
II.
i.
\_Mah. Up. I.]; Infinity."
is bliss."
"Indeed Narayana
i.];
"The Brahman
\Taitt.
Up.
II.
is
Exist-
i. i.];
"The
III. 6. i.].
\Taitt. Up. Moreover, those collections of words (that make up
the scriptural passages) are capable of denoting such well established things as are made out in accordance with the natural process of deriving the meanings of words, and the true purport of those (passages) is the Brahman who is the cause of the creation, preservation, and destruction of all
the worlds,
who
is
hostile to all that
an ocean of innumerable noble
and
qualities,
is evil,
and who
is
and has the nature
cannot be that they (viz. such with deal things other (than the Brahscriptural passages) of unsurpassed bliss
;
it
man}, seeing that they are (while so denoting the Brahman] devoid of utility either in the way of inducing activity or cessation from activity ; for, every one of all the means of proof has its finality in giving rise to the knowledge of that which forms its own particular object. Again, the operation of a means of proof is not determined by utility. Utility, indeed, is determined by the means of proof. Further, that (viz. the scriptural passage) which is free from all concern
with inducing activity or cessation from activity can not be said to be devoid of utility; because it is seen to be related
SRI-BHASHYA.
286
to one of the objects of
"A
human
{Chap.
pursuit.
L
Part.
1.
For instance,
born to you", "This is no in passages like serpent", which deal with matters of fact (without importson
is
ing any activity or cessation from activity), it is seen that they are (also) possessed of utility in the way of ('produ-
and (causing) the removal of fear (respectively). Here, he (viz. a Mlmdmsaka Purvapakshin] says The Veddnta passages do not establish the Brahman, because the sdstra, which is incapable of importing any cing) joy
:
from activity, is (thus) purposeless. No doubt perception and the other means of proof have their
activity or cessation
finality in giving rise to the
Nevertheless the sdstra
knowledge of the truth of things. (or the scripture) must have
Neither in popular usage nor in the see the use of any sentence that is purpose-
its finality in utility.
Vcdas do we
not possible for a sentence to be or to be listened to, without there being some It is
less.
And
in view.
that utility
is
made
made
use
of,
utility or other
out to have the nature
of the acquisition of what is desirable and of the getting rid of what is undesirable by means of voluntary activity or cessation from activity,
and other instances
' :
as
is
One who '
seen in the following is desirous of wealth
One whose digestion should go to the palace of a king ; is weak should not drink (too much) water'; 'One who is
'
Swarga should perform
desirous of
(the Jyotishtoma]
'One should not eat onions'. Moreover, it has been already stated to the
sacrifice';
even
in the
case of the statements
"A
son
effect that, is
born to
no serpent, but a rope", and in other similar (statements), all of which deal with things, the ideas corresponding to which are already naturally established, "This
you",
there
is
ments)
is
seen the association of utility (with those stateform of (the production of) joy and the removal
in the
Adhik. IV. Snt.
SRi-BHISHYA.
./.]
to be discriminated whether the
of fear, &c.
Here,
attainment of
utility results
it lias
287
from the
fact of the birth of
a
and so on, or from the (mere) knowledge thereof. If it be said that a thing, although existing, is of no utility when unknown, and that therefore it (viz. the attainment of utison,
from the knowledge thereof; then, even the thing itself is non-existing, utility must result merely from the knowledge (regarding that thing). Thus, although the sdstra has its finality in utility, nevertheless, lity)
results
when
it
(Viz. the sdstra} is
no means of proving the existence
of things in as much as it does not relate to things (but to knowledge merely). Therefore, all sentences
relates
have their
finality in
some
utility or other, either as re-
lating to voluntary activity or cessation from activity, or as relating to knowledge. Hence, no sentence is capable
of importing things, the ideas corresponding to which are already naturally established. Consequently the Veddnta passages do not establish the Brahman, the idea corresponding to whom is already naturally established.
The VedHere another (p&rvapakskin)*** may say dnta passages also are the means of proving the Brahman :
solely
by reason of their
cause the
relating to actions.
Brahman becomes
How
the object of a
?
Be-
command-
ment, which relates to the destruction of the phenomenal world, and is to the effect that the Brahman who is (in Himself) non-phenomenal, who has no second and is uniform intelligence, and who, nevertheless, appears to be with the phenomenal world owing to the should be influence of the beginninglessly old ignorance,
in association
realised as
305.
non-phenomenal.
What
is
that
Namely, the NishprapancJiikarananiyogavcidin.
commandment,
SRI-BHISHYA.
288
which
and
is
relates to the
Brahman who
to be realised
is
Part.
I.
[Chap.
I.
uniform intelligence,
by means of the destruction of the
phenomenal world that is found to exist in the (differentiated) condition of the knower and the known ? (That commandment is to be found in the following and other " Thou shalt not see the seer of the sight, nor passages) think the thinker of the thought". \Brih. Up. III. 4. 2.]. :
The meaning
that the
is
Brahman
should be realised as
pure and simple experience which is devoid of the distinction of the knower and the known. Even if the Brahman is
self-evident,
made
the
in the
there
is
of
object
nothing
in
wrong
an action so as to
(His) being
realise
(Him)
non-phenomenal form.
It is
wrong
to hold so
(says the
Mlmamsaka)^ 06 He,
who is
a
maintains that the syntactical meaning of sentences commandment, has surely to point out what the com-
mandment is, the attribute mandment is directed, the
of the person to
whom
the com-
special object (of the commandment), the performance thereof, the details of the procedure to be adopted, and the performer (of the command-
ment). Among these, the attribute of the person to whom the commandment is directed is, indeed, incapable of being
commandment of realising the non-phenomenal). And that (attribute) is of
postulated fin regard to this
Brahman
as
two kinds
as causal
and as
resultant. It has to be discrimi-
nated here what the attribute of the person this
commandment
resultant.
306.
objector against the
futes
from his
directed,
and whether
it
is
to
whom
causal or
If the experience of the truth regarding the
The Mimamsaka
Adhikarana.
is
is
is
the
main
Veddntin in this
The Mimamsaka own stand-point
re-
the
Nishprapa nchikarqnaniyogavqdin who
holds that the Upanishads give us the
commandment the "Brahman. is
to non-phenomenalise
Then
the
Mimamsaka
himself refuted by the Veddntin.
Adhik. IV. Sul.
./.]
SRl-BH.lSHYA.
289
Brahman constitutes the attribute whom the commandment is directed, then,
essential nature of the
of the person to
cannot be causal
this (attribute)
because
;
it
has not already
become available (to him), unlike life, &c., (which have so become available, and form the necessary conditions preceding, for instance, the performance
long as
sacrifice as
life
lasts, in
of the agnihotra accordance with the Vcdic
injunction-" One should perform the agnihotra 807
sacrifice
that (attribute) be lasts"). to its being eternal, there would be causal, then, owing room for the performance of what constitutes the special as long as
life
However,
if
object of that ever obligatory (commandment) even after the attainment of final release, in the same way in which
the agnihotra
sacrifice,
&c., which are dependent upon
Nor (are to be performed as long as that life lasts). also is that (attribute which has the character of the
life
experience of the real nature of the Brahmati) resultant because, by being the result of the working out of a ;
commandment, non-eternal.
it
has, like
Again what
commandment here ? If man Himself, it is replied
is it
Swarga, the
special
be said that
that
it
to
become
object
of the
&c.,
it is
cannot be so
the Brah;
because
He, being eternal, cannot be produced anew, and because also He is not imported by any verbal form signifying an be said that the non-phenomenal Brahman is the thing to be worked out (under the commandment), He is the then, although (thus) thing to be (immediately)
action.
If
it
He forms the final He cannot form the commandment, because He is not
accomplished (under the injunction), result
itself
(of the
special object of the
injunction).
imported by any verbal forms signifying an action. soy.
Vide
37
More-
SRI-BHISHYA.
290 over,
what
injunction)
is ?
it
Is it
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
that has to be accomplished (under the Brahman, or (is it) the destruction of
the
the phenomenal world
not the Brahman\ because He is ever-accomplished, and because also there would result non-eternity (in relation to the Brahman if he had
to be
accomplished).
phenomenal world injunction).
It is
?
Nor
is
it
the destruction of the
(that has to be accomplished under the
Then, indeed, the
Brahman would
not be the
thing to be accomplished (under the injunction). If said that the destruction of the phenomenal world
it
be
itself
forms the special object of the commandment, it is replied that it cannot be so because that (destruction) is the final ;
be achieved under the commandment) and cannot the immediate object of the commandment. form hence
result (to
Indeed, the destruction of the phenomenal world the beatific release (of the bound soul) and that ;
is itself is
the
And if this, (however), (of the injunction). form (also) the immediate object of the commandment, final
fruit
then the destruction of the phenomenal world would be due to the carrying out of the commandment, and the
commandment would be
carried
out -by the destruction
of the phenomenal world. There would, in consequence, be the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence. Further, is the phenomenal world, which has to be end to, false or real ? If it be of a false nature, then an put it has to be put an end to by right knowledge alone, and consequently the injunction (to do something) would be
of no use whatsoever.
If
it
be said that the injunction,
after producing the knowledge which puts an end (to the phenomenal world), thereby puts an end to the pheno-
menal world, (then, it is replied that) this (knowledge) results from the scriptural texts 31 8 on which you yourself '
308.
Such as
Erik. Up. III. 4.
2;
Chhand. Up. VI.
2,
i;
Brih.
Up. IV.
Adhik. IV. Sut.
4."]
SRi-l3HisHYA.
291
and that there is therefore no use for this .commandment. Moreover, the whole phenomenal world which is false, and is distinct from the Brahman, is stultified by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of rely,
scriptural sentences.
with
all
its
Consequently, the commandment, If the phenomeaccessories, is itself non est.
nal world happens to be the thing which is to be destroyed, then, does the commandment, which is intended to bring
about the destruction of the phenomenal world, relate to that which is the same in nature as the B'rah man ? Or (does it)
Him ? If it Brahman
relate to that
which
that which
the same in nature as the
then,
(He
is
is
different
from
relate to
Himself, the the existence of being eternal), very phenome-
nal world that
is
to be destroyed would indeed be impossi-
ble, for the reason that the destroyer thereof
is
eternal; again
such a case (that) commandment would become eternal, and it would not be possible for it to be accomplished by working out its immediate object. Or (the commandment in
may relate to) that which is different nature of the
Brahman.
Since that
in nature
from the true
(commandment)
to
is
by working out its immediate object which consists in the destruction of the whole phenomenal world, the person who has to carry out (the commandment) is be
fulfilled
Consequently, there is no establishment (of the injunction) for want of a (personal) foundalso destroyed thereby.
ation (for
it)
to rest upon.
is
different
from the essential nature of the
comes destroyed, what release cannot be .j.
i,
19; &c,, c,
by merely working out commandment) which conphenomenal world, all that
Since,
that immediate object (of the sists in the destruction of the
is
known
the final
which are quoted by you
the Nishprapaiithikarananiyoga-
fruit
as
or
be-
beatific
obtained by (obeying)
rddin to show alone
Brahman
moksha
is
real
that
the
"Brahman
and the world unreal,
SRi-B'HisHYA.
292 the
[Chap.
L
Part.
L
commandment. 309 Moreover, in regard to
commandment
such a performance of the
as leads to the destruction of the
nal world, there are to be found
cedure to be adopted
;
no
phenome-
details of the pro-
and whatever (commandment)
is
(thus) unassisted (by the details of procedure), that cannot be carried out. Consequently, there can be no perfor-
commandment under consibe asked how there is (here) the absence
mability (in relation to the If
deration).
it
of the details of procedure, it is pointed out that it is thus: The details of procedure in regard to this (commandment) are either of a positive character or of a negative character.
Such
(details of procedure) as are of a positive character are divided into the different classes of those that bring
about the corpus of the performance and those that (merely) render help to the performance. And both these kinds are not admissible (in this case). Indeed, like the stroke (which destroy a pot or some not seen (here) anything that is (by its operation) capable of putting an end to the whole world. these (details of procedure) Therefore, phenomenal of a heavy club, such thing), there
&c.,
is
are not (of a positive character and) thus perceivable. Nor also is it possible for a completed performance to stand in
need of any accessory help for the production of the thing to be accomplished (by that performance) because (in such ;
a case), owing to there being the (associated) existence of the thing which helps (the performance), it is not 309. is
The
called
distinction between
what
the immediate object of
commandment and what its final'fruit
in connection
may
a
constitutes
well be illustrated
with the
Vedic
com-
uuindment which says that he who
is
desirous
o.f
perform
the
obtaining Suarga shall Jyotishtoma
Here the Jyolishtoma
sacrifice.
sacrifice
is
the
immediate object of the commandinent, and Siuarga is its final fruit,
Adhik. IV.
$fit.
4.]
SRi-BHis.HYA.
293
possible to (distinctly) realise the essential nature of such
a performance (of the commandment) as consists in the destruction of the whole phenomenal world. If it be said that to know the Brahman to be without a second
produces the corpus of the
performance, which consists
in the destruction of the
phenomenal world, then, by that same (knowledge), final release which is in the form of the destruction of the phenomenal world is attained ;
accordingly, it has been already stated that, (in consequence), there remains nothing to be accomplished by If (the details of procedure &c. performance, then a of negative character, solely owing to their are) being non-existent, they do not produce the corpus of the performance nor do they help it. Therefore, it
the
;
not possible (to hold) that this injunction 310 relates to the non-phenomenal Brahman. is
Again, another (purvapakshin}** lows:
1
may
say as
fol-
No
doubt, the Vcddnta passages are of no authority as relating to the true nature of the Brahman, the idea
corresponding to whom is already naturally established. Nevertheless, the true nature of the Brahman is cer-
(by means of them). How ? On the commandment enjoining meditation. of the strength " the declare do indeed, Thus, scriptures Verily, tainly
proved
:
my
dear
the
one,
Self
has
to
be
seen,
has
312 to be steadily meditated upon," \Brih. Up.lL^. 5-]; " The Self who is devoid of sins;... He has to be sought
after,He has to be specially desired and known".
310. 311.
Brih. Up. III. 4.
This objector
is
2.
&c.
the Dhyana-
[Gfahand.
ni\of>ar&lin.
312. Vide also
ttri/i.
Up. IV. $ 6.
SRI-13HA.SHYA.
294
Up. VIII.
7. i.];
[Bnh. Up.
I. 4.
"Meditate on
\Chap.
Him
L
Part.
as the self itself."
"Let him meditate upon the
7.];
L
Self
alone as the object to be attained." \_Brih. Up. I. 4. 15.]. Here the commandment which certainly relates to meditation implies the thing to be meditated upon because the meditation which forms the special object of that ( commandment) is itself capable of being defined solely by ;
means of the thing
to be meditated
thing to be meditated scriptural passages
3
'
asked of what nature that),
upon 3
the
is
relied
He
upon by
(/. e.
by way of stating the
the Self)
And
upon.
Self, as
it is
shown by the If
yourselves. is,
that
then
(it is
it
be
replied
peculiarity of His true nature,
the following .and other similar passages become authoritative, as being complementary to the injunction relating to meditation, and that, therefore, those (passages) do, indeed, denote by implication the true nature of
Brahman who
the
included within the body of the which forms the special object of the in-
meditation junction
"The Brahman
(here):
ledge,
Infinity."
alone,
my
\Qihand.
is
Up.
\_Taitt.
II.
is i.
Existence,
"Existence
i.];
dear child, this was in the beginning."Up. VI. 2. i.]. Therefore, by means of the
following passages, namely, \Chhdnd. Up. VI. 2. i.];
"One only without a second" "That is Existence, He is the
That thou art, O Svetaketu." \Qihdnd. Up. VI. "There is nothing here that is many and varied."
Self,
Up. IV.
4. 19.];
as well as
man
is
is
unreal.
passages,
IV.
5.
6.
criticises
Distinction
is
apprehended by
karananiyogavCidin
who has quoted
The Dhydnaniyoga-
Brih. Up, III.
wherein the Self
the
is
313. See BfiA. Up. III. 4, 2
vadin
\_Brih.
out that only the essential nature of the Brahundoubtedly real, and that all else that is different
Him
from
&
by means of other
8. 7.];
made
it is
5.
Know-
11.4.
Nishprapailchi-
mentioned.
4- 2,
Adhik. IV.
Sfit.
,/.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
295
perception and the other means of proof, as well as by means of the sastra which relates to works and rests upon
When
distinctions.
distinction
there is mutual contradiction between and non-distinction, then, since it is also possible
for the perception of distinctions to be based upon the beginninglessly old ignorance (or avidya), it is decided that the absence of distinctions alone is the It reality.
being so, by means of the injunction relating to such a meditation of the Brahman as gives rise to the direct perception of Him, that final release is obtained which is the same as becoming the Brahman, who is devoid of all the manifold distinctions due to ignorance, a second and is uniform intelligence.
who
is
without
Moreover, it cannot be proved with the help of Vcddnta passages that it is possible (for us) to become the Brahman merely by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural
sentences
;
because such a thing is not known to take place, also the (actual) perception of a variety of dis-
and because
tinctions continues to persist
(even after the acquisition of such a knowledge). Under these circumstances, the in314 junction regarding' hearing', &c., 315 becomes purposeless. it
(Here), again,
the fear which
is
may
be said 3
due to the
314. This injunction 4.
or IV.
5
"
5.
6
is
"Brih.
wherein
Up. it
is
The
Self has to be
heard, to be reflected
upon, and to
declared that
be steadily meditated upon." Hearing', &c.,
1\
e.
'hearing
',
and steady meditation. 316. This is the well known exam-
reflection,
pie of the
Adwaihn who
is
" This
of opinion
is
It is
unreal
;
snake ceases
in the
which the snake a rope
states
is
seen that
a rope, (but) not a
that the ISrahman alone all else
is real.
'
315.
thus:
(falsely perceived)
by means of the teaching
If.
G
'
is
same
real
and
way
in
falsely perceived
in
unreal while the rope alone
The Dhyananiyogaradin here in
anticipation the
objection
from the stand-point of the Adwaitin before refuting
it.
RI-BHISHYA.
296
And
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
the snake
(falsely perceived) in the the world also is of a false nature. rope, the bondage of Consequently, it must be capable of being stultified by
snake."
like
knowledge. Therefore, it is proper (to hold) that freedom from such (bondage) results wholly from the knowledge derived from scriptural passages, but not from (working out)
any commandment.
be capable of being accomplished under an injunction, then there would be nonIf final release
eternity in relation to it also, as (there is) in the case of Swarga, &c. But the eternal character of final release is, in-
deed, acknowledged by all the disputants. Moreover, the merit and the demerit (of works) have the power of giving rise to their effects only in the
way
of producing such bodies as are
for the
enjoyment Therefore, they (viz. merit and
of those particular effects.
fit
must inevitably possess the character of givto samsara, 3 7 the nature of which consists
demerit)
*
ing rise
an association (of the individual souls) with the four 3 8 kinds of bodies commencing with Brahma and ending with the immovable things. Therefore, final release is not '
in
capable of being accomplished by merit. effect is the following scriptural passage
To the same To him who
"
:
and has a body, there is no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing the pleasing and the unpleasing touch is
;
not him 12. i.].
who
is
and has no body."
Thus, regarding
final release
[C/}hdnd. Up. VIII.
the nature of which
to be without a body, it is declared that there are no pleasing or unpleasing effects produced by merit and deis
merit. 317.
Therefore,
Samsara
dane existence.
is
it
made
is
the circuit of
mun-
In other words,
it is
the ever-recurring succession of births
out that the unembodied 318.
The
those of
and
of
four kinds of bodies are
gods,
men, lower animals
immovable things (Sthdvarj).
and deaths, and the consequent con-
Vide supra
tinuance of the bondage of the soul.
C. 20.
p. 154.
Cf.
also
V.
Dh,
Adhik. IV. Sat.
SRI-BHISHYA.
./.]
297
condition cannot be accomplished by merit. And in the way in which a particular result is to be accomplished by means of a particular commandment, the unembodied
condition cannot be accomplished by means of the injunction relating to meditation because the unembodied condi;
the
constitutes
tion
nature
essential
(of the self)
and
not, therefore, a thing which is to be accomplished. The following and other scriptural texts declare the same thing " thus Him to be the unembodied One who
is
Knowing
:
(knowing Him) to be the Self
exists in non-eternal bodies,
which
great and omnipresent, the wise man does not " Indeed He is pure, with\Kath. Up. II. 22.];
is
grieve."
without mind."
out
life,
this
Person
is
\Mund. Up. which
died condition
is
eternal,
of being produced
and
is,
following scriptural passage merit and demerit, that which :
cause, that say, if
which
is
3. 15.].
the same as the unembo-
is
by .merit.
"Indeed
2.];
\Brih. Up. IV.
devoid of attachment,"
Therefore, final release
II. i.
in
To
consequence, incapable the same effect is the
" That which is
is
other than
other than this effect and
other than the past and the future,
thou seest that."
[Kath. Up.
II.
14.].
to Again, it is surely impossible to predicate in regard final release that capability of being accomplished (anew),
which (accomplishing)
is
four-fold in the forms of origina-
tion, attainment, modification,
and refinement.
It is
not
final release, being of capable of being originated; because the nature of the Brahman, is itself characterised by eterNor is it capable of being attained (anew) because nity. the Brahman Himself is of the nature of the self, and ;
hence
it (viz.
attained.
final release)
Nor
also
is it
has the character of being ever modified ; becapable of being
cause non-eternity would result to it thereby, as (there Nor again is it capable of in the case of curds, &c. is)
38
Part.
I.
[Chap.
/.
being refined. Refinement, indeed, is accomplished either by the removal of defects or by the addition of excellence. Surely it (viz. refinement) cannot be (produced here) by the removal of defects, on account of the eternal purity of the Brahman. Nor is it (viz. refinement) to be (ac-
complished here) by the addition of excellence, because (the Brahman is) of the nature of such excellence as cannot
be added ble,
it
reason of
being eternally immodifiacannot form the object of any action which takes
By
to.
its
place either in itself or takes place in others; thus no refineeffected (in relation to it), as (it is effected) in
ment can be
the case of mirrors, &c., by the action of rubbing and the self is not purified by the act of bathing, &c., which relate to the body but (what is so purified is) that egoistic agent ;
;
caught hold of by ignorance (or avidya) and in association with that (body) and to him (/. c. to that
which is
is
:
agent) alone belongs the enjoyment of the result of that But the egoistic agent himself is not the (act of bathing).
because he has that fself) for his witness. Similarly, " of the scriptural hymn also declare words the One of them eats the sweet pippala fruit, while the other shines in self,
:
319 splendour without eating at all." [Mund. Up. III. 1. 1.]. Moreover, the essential nature of the self is distinctly made
out to be different from the egoistic agent hold of by ignorance (or avidya), (it is possess
who is caught made out) to
such excellence as cannot be added
eternally pure
and to be
to,
immodifiable, from
to be
the
fol-
"The
wise say that what lowing scriptural passages is associated with the body, the senses, and the mind, forms the enjoyer." \_Kath. Up. III. 4.]; "The one :
Lord
is
hidden
in all beings,
319. See also Svet. Up. IV. 6,
pervades
all,
and
is
the inter-
Adhik. IV. Sut. nal Self of
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
./.]
He
299
the presiding deity over acHe is the witness, the inteltions, and lives in all beings who is absolute devoid of qualities." and ligent one, [Svet. VI. ii. Brah. Up. Up. III.]; "He understood Him to all
beings
;
is
;
&
be bright, bodiless, scatheless, without sinews, pure, and
untouched by
evil."
Up. VIII.].
[7r.
Hence, owing to is not a
being of the nature of the Self, final release thing that can (thus) be accomplished (anew). its
It
may be asked
If so,
what
is it
by means of the knowledge of the sentences?
We
say (in reply) that
that
is
accomplished
syntactical it is
meaning of
merely the removal
of the obstruction to final release (that is so accomplished). To the same effect are the following and other scriptural " Thou art our Father who enablest us to cross passages to the other shore which is far away from Ignorance." \Pr " I have, indeed, learnt the Sastras thus. He Up. VI. 8.]; :
who knows
the Self crosses the ocean of misery, only with the help of venerable teachers like yourself. Venerable sir, I who am so (destitute of the knowledge of the Self) feel
am
very grieved. May you, venerable sir, enable me, who so, to cross over to the other shore (of the ocean of
\Qhhand. Up. VII. i. 3.]; "To him whose sins have been destroyed, the venerable Sanatkumara shows misery)."
the other shore of darkness."
\_CJj,hand.
Up. VII.
26. 2.].
Therefore, the removal of the obstructions to that final release, which is certainly eternal, is accomplished by means, of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences. But (such) removal, although capable of being
accomplished anew, has itself the nature of that non-existand hence it cunnot ence 320 which follows destruction ;
The
have an end.
3-!O.
Vide
snfifit
|>.
49. n, 37.
following and
other
scriptural
SRI-BHISHYA.
3otf
L
[Chap.
Part.
1.
" He who knows the Brahman bestatements, namely, comes the Brahman indeed." \Mund. Up. III. 2. 9.], " He who thus knows Him transcends death." [Svet. Up.
& VI.
III. 8.
diately after the
the
oppose
declare that final release follows
15.],
knowledge
interposition
(of the
of
any
imme-
Brahman), and
(so')
injunction (bearing (viz. final release or
Moreover, it meditation). the attainment of the Brahman) does not acquire the character of a produced effect, either by being the object
upon
of the act of knowing, or by -being the object of the act because such a character of being the of meditation of both (these acts) is negatived in the following object and in other scriptural passages: " It is certainly different from the known, and is also different from the knower."" one all ;
knows this, by what By Whom [Kcn. Up. I. 3.]; IV. 5. 15.]; is He to be known?" \Brih. Up. II. 4. 14. " Know thou That alone to be the Brahman, not this
&
which they worship." \Ken. Up.l. 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8.]. By this much, it does not also follow that the sdstras have no object whatsoever; because the sdstras relate to the removal of distinctions manufactured
Indeed, the sdstras do not
by
deal with the
ignorance.
Brahman
possessing definitely discernible characteristics
;
as
but, while
declaring the true nature of the internal (subjective) self
no (exterral) object, they put an end to the distincwhich are in the form of the knowledge, the knower,
which tions
is
and the object of knowledge, and which are To the same (or avidyd).
ed by ignorance
among
manufactur-
effect,
others, the following sdstraic injunction : the seer of the sight, &c." [J3rih.
shalt not see 4.
all
2.].
Further,
it
there is, " Thou
Up.
III.
should not be (supposed) that the
of bondage results wholly from knowledge, and that consequently the injunction relating to 'hear-
cessation
Adhik. IV. Sut. is
&c.,
ing ',
SRI-BHASHYA.
./.]
purposeless
30!
because
;
they
'hear-
(viz.
and steady meditation) form the means ing ', of understanding the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences, by causing us to turn away from all such distractions as relate to things other than the Brahman and are (all) due to our own nature. reflection
it should not be urged that the cessation of bondseen not to take age place by means of knowledge alone because bondage is of a false nature, and it is not hence
Again
is
;
possible for
it
to remain (even) subsequently to (the birth of)
knowledge. For
same reason
not right to say that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the falling off of the body. Indeed, the cessation of the fear due to the falsely perceived serpent does not require any destrugthis
it is
tion of a serpent
beyond the (mere) knowledge of the realof the If the association of the body (with the self) ity rope. were of the nature of a reality, then there would be the necessity for distinct It
ity.
ed,
its
is
known
knowledge
But that
destruction.
from the Brahman, that, to
is
is
(association), being not of the nature of a real-
him whose bondage has not ceasbecause the effect of know-
not born
;
ledge is not seen (in relation to him). Therefore, whether the body exists or not, immediately after knowing the syntactical meaning of sentences, one ed (from bondage).
is
undoubtedly releas-
Consequently, final release is not capable of being accomplished by the injunction relating to meditation and ;
hence, the Brahman is not proved to be dependent upon the injunction relating to meditation but (He is establish;
ed) by means of the following
altogether relate ence,
Knowledge,
"That thou
art."
to
Him
" :
Infinity."
scriptural passages
The Brahman Up.
\Taitt.
\_Qihdnd. Up. VI.
8.
7.];
is
II.
which Existi.
"This
i.];
self
SRI-BHISHYA.
302 is
the Brahman'.'
\Brih. Up. II.
5.
\Chap.
&
19.
I.
IV.
Part.
I. 21
4. 5.].a
This (position) 8 2 2 is not right because it is not possible for the cessation of bondage to take place merely by means ;
of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences. No doubt, the bondage which is of a false nature is capable of being stultified
by knowledge.
Nevertheless, as
that bondage is directly perceived, it cannot be stultified by that knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences
of an indirect (abstract) nature because, when the direct perception of a snake is existent in relation
which
is
;
to the rope and other such things, it is not seen that the removal of fear takes place merely by that indirect (ab-
knowledge, which
is contradictory of the serpent the produced by teaching of trustworthy persons " This is no serpent, this is a rope." And to the effect
stract)
and
is
the teaching of trustworthy persons becomes the cause of the removal of fear, only by happening to be the cause of such activity as results from the direct perception of the reality of things. Accordingly, a person who has fled away, taking fright at the sight of the serpent falsely perceived in a rope, begins to see the reality of
things by means of the teaching of trustworthy persons to the effect "This is no serpent, this is a rope"; then
he sees that (rope) itself from fear. Moreover, it testimony of
itself
directly,
and then becomes
free
not right to say that verbal produces such knowledge as has the is
nature of direct perception because it (viz. verbal testidoes not the character of an organ of sense. possess mony) Among the apparatuses of knowledge, the senses alone form ;
321. Vide also 322.
Mand. Up.
I. 2.
Here begins the Dhydnani-
yogaviidin 's refutation
of
the objcc-
tion against
by
his views raised
the Adwailin,
above
Adhik. IV.
Sr/t.
y.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
303
the means of direct perception. And in the case of that person whose sins have not been destroyed by the performance of works without attachment to their fruits, and
who
has not turned reflection,
ing',
away from
and steady
external objects by ' hearmeditation, the Vedic text
Even when produce direct knowledge. has the obstructions the fin (that) person way of his acquiring knowledge) removed, and is devoted to those things alone
cannot
(viz. 'hearing', reflection,
possible (for
him) to
and steady meditation),
have that
(direct
it
is
not
knowledge from
verbal testimony alone) because the senses, which (alone) form the special apparatus of (direct) knowledge, are not ;
seen to transgress their limitations in regard to what constitutes their object.
Moreover, meditation
is
no means of knowing the
syntactical meaning of sentences; because, (in such a case), there will arise the fallacy of reciprocal dependence, in as
much
knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences must be born before there can be the meditation of as the
and meditation must be completed before there be the can knowledge of the syntactical meaning of senAnd it should not be ("urged) that meditation and tences.
its
object,
the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences reIf they did so, then meditation late to different things.
would be no means of producing the knowledge of the syntactical
meaning of sentences.
Indeed, the medita-
tion of one thing cannot lead to the fruition of another It is unavoidable (to hold) that meditation, which the same as an unbroken flow of memory relating to
thing. is
a thing that is known, has invariably to be preceded by the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences ; because there is no other means by which the knowledge relating to the
Brahman, who
is
the object
of medi-
SRI-BHISHYA.
304
[Chop.
I.
Part.
I.
Further it is not right can be produced. to say that the knowledge which is at the root of meditation is derived from a different set of passages, while the tation,
knowledge which relates to the removal (of ignorance) is " That thou art." \_Chhand. Up. derived from passages like VI. 8. 7.]. Does this knowledge which is at the root of meditation, and is derived from a different set of passages,
same thing as that to which the knowledge derived from passages like " That thou art", &c., relates ? Or does it relate to a different thing ? If that (knowledge) relates to the same thing (as this), there results the already
relate to the
stated fallacy of reciprocal dependence. If that knowledge relates to a different thing (from what this knowledge relates to), then it is not possible to prove that by means
what
of meditation there arises the fruition of
knowledge)
this
(latter
Further, meditation pre-supposes entities like the object of medita-
relates to.
many phenomenal
and the agent of meditation, &c. Consequentis of no use, so far as we see, in producing that ly knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences which
tion,
it
relates to the oneness of the self with the
non-phenomenal
Brahman. Therefore, the commandments ing', reflection,
'
enjoining
hear-
and steady meditation are certainly useless
him who maintains
(the view) that the destruction of takes ignorance (or avidya) place merely by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences.
to
For whatsoever reason,
direct (perceptual)
knowledge
not produced by means of scriptural passages, and ignorance (or avidya) remains, in consequence, unde-
(of things)
is
stroyed by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences, for that very same reason, the idea -that (the self s) release from the bondage (of samsfira) takes place even while in this
life
is
also driven
Adhik. IV.
away
Sitt.
(as untrue).
even while
SRI-BHISHYA.
./.]
And what
in this life
?
It
is
305
this release
may
resulting (to the self) even in the
from bondage
be said that
it
is
release
embodied condition
;
but
then such a statement will be self-contradictory in meaning " like the statement My mother is barren"; because it has been declared by yourself, with the help of scriptural passages, that to be embodied is to be in bondage, and that to become unembodied is to obtain release. And again it is
not (right to say) that, when the appearance of the association (of the self) with the body is in existence, then, whoever has the belief that (such an) appearance is false, to
him there
is
the destruction of
(this)
association with the
with the body is destroyed by how can there be release to him
If (his) association
body.
the belief that
it is false,
even when he has the body ? That release (from embodiment) which results to one after death is also undeniably the destruction of the false appearance of one's being assoThen what is the peculiarity about
ciated with a bod}r . this release
Moreover,
it
which takes place even while in may be said that, in whomsoever
this this
life ?
false
appearance of his (self) having a body persists even after the stultification (of that falsity), just like the false percep-
two moons
tion of
there
son
is
(persisting
even when one knows that
only one moon), (it may be said that) such a perif so, it is he who is released even while in this life
is
:
because this stultifying know; Toledge relates to all things other than the Brahman. gether with the false appearance of (the self) having a body, replied that
it
cannot be so
the blemishes resulting from ignorance (or avidya) and from work (or karma) and from other such things, which are all '
'
the causes (of the false appearance of the self s embodiment itself), are all stultified by that (stultifying knowledge) alone
;
and thus, 39
it
is
not possible to say that (any)
SRI-BHISHYA.
$of>
stultified thing
does
persist.
But
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
in the case of (the percep-
two moons (when there is in reality only one moon), that defect, which is the cause of such a false appearance, is no object of the stultifying knowledge which tion of)
not thereby false
stultified.
moon
only one and hence it is Consequently the persistence of the
to the effect that the
is
is
;
appearance of two moons
is Moreover, this proper. So long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay then he will be
scriptural text,
which says
"
;
[Clihdnd. Up. VI. 14. 2.],
blessed."
case of
declares that, in the
him who observes the form of worship known 3
as
stands in need of only the Sadvidya, falling off of (his) body; and thus it prohibits the (occurrence This aforesaid release of) release even while in this life.
the
even while
-
3
final release
in this life
has been discarded by
Apastamba
"
Giving up the Vedas, this world, and the other, one should seek the Self. It may be said that, on knowledge arising, there is the attainment also in the following aphorisms
of
bliss;
but that
is
:
negatived by the scriptures.
If the at-
were possible on knowledge arising, then, even here, one should not have miser) By this, the other been Dh. II. 21. 13 to 17.]. has explained." (also) [Ap. tainment of
bliss
r
.
these
By
(occurs)
by
(aphorisms), (the opinion that) final release means of mere knowledge alone is also discard-
Therefore that release, which has the nature of the removal of all distinctions, does not result to one who ed.
Consequently, bondage comes to an end only means of that injunction which relates to meditation, by which and produces the direct knowledge of the Brah-
is
alive.
323
This
is
a
form
of worship
taught to Svetaketu by his father. Vide Chhdnd. Up. VI., wherein it is given that the Supreme Self
is
to be
meditated upon so that realised
as
He may
the self-existent
the whole universe,
be
Soul of
Adhik. IV. Sut.
No
man.
SRI-BHASHYA.
4.]
307
non-eternal character can
on
release
the
score
that
it
result to
final
is
simply accomplished with an injunction because what is (so) accomplished is merely the removal of the obstructions fto finin accordance
al release).
directly
by
;
Further, the cessation of bondage is not caused the injunction (itself) ; but (it is caused) by
the direct knowledge of the
menal, and who
is
Brahman who
homogeneous
ledge,
it
non-pheno-
And
intelligence.
injunction produces this direct knowledge.
how an
is
If
it
the
be asked
injunction ma}' be the cause of producing knowis asked in reply, how do your 'works' performed
without attachment to results form the cause of the production of knowledge ? Tf you say, (that they do so),
through the purification of the mind, I say that it is the same in my case also. It may be said again (by you) that, in
your case, knowledge the sdsiras, in the mind which
is is
produced, by means of (already) pure, but that,
my case, that thing has (indeed) to be pointed out which forms the apparatus for producing knowledge in the mind in
which
is
purified
that that relating
to
mind,
by the
meditation,
is
we
say in reply the injunction
by
purified
itself
is
If so,
the means for
how
the pro-
made made out in your case mind becomes pure by means of 'works' and that
duction of knowledge. out, we ask in reply, that the
injunction.
which
by means of hearing
If
it
how
be asked
is
is
it
'
',
this
reflection,
and steady meditation,
sastras produce that knowledge, which is stultificatory (of ignorance), in the pure mind of him alone who has turned away from all other tilings than the Brahman ?
the
You may answer
that
it is
(so)
made
out by means of the
following and other scriptural passages
know gious
(the
Brahman] by
austerities
sacrifices,
associated
with
"
They desire to by giving gifts, by reli:
fasting."
[/>/'///.
L 7h.
SRi-BtilSHYA.
308 IV.
"(The
4. 22.];
Self)
I.
[Chap.
Part.
L
heard, has to be
has to be
[Brih.
to be steadily meditated upon."" He who knows the Brahman 6.];
If so, I reply that, in
my
reflected upon, has
Up. IV. 5. becomes the Brahman indeed."
[Mund. Up. in
case also,
III. 2. 9.].
accordance with the
" (The following among other scriptural passages, namely Self) has to be... heard, has to be reflected upon, has to be steadily meditated upon." "
He who knows
the "
II. 4. 5.
[Brih. Up.
Brahman
He
&IV. 5.6.];
attains the Highest."
is not apprehend\_Tailt. Up. (/. ed by the eye nor even by speech." [Mund. Up. III. i. " But He (the Lord) is apprehended by the pure mind." 8.]
II. i. i.]
;
the Lord)
.
;
"He
apprehended- by the heart, by steady wisdom, and by the mind." \Kath. Up. VI. p.]; 324 it is made out that the mind becomes pure ?
[
];
(the
is
Lord)
by means of the injunction relating to meditation, and that the mind (so) purified gives rise to the direct knowledge of the Brahman. Thus it (viz. the whole argument) is
"
faultless.
If you say that by means Not this which' they worship!"
of the scriptural passage
[Ken. Up. 1. 4. et seq], the character of being the object of meditation is denied (in relation to the Brahman], it is replied that it cannot be fact of the Brahman being the object of meditanot denied (herein), but the fact that the Brahman distinct from the world is declared in this passage. The
so.
The
tion
is
is
meaning of people 324.
3
'-
6
this
here worship,
Vide also
to be the
" :
&
of this passage runs
Know
thou
Brahman who
out by speech and by
Him
alone
not
made
is
whom
this:
is
that
Suet, Up. III. 13.
M.Ndr. I. ii. 325. The whole as follows
325
passage
speech
U
is
"This world which
not the Brahman.
Know
brought into existence ; but not this which they worship." Vide Ken, Up, I.
4. et seq.
326. Literally, living beings (praninak),
Adhik. IV. Sru. thou
Him
SRI-BHISHYA.
4.}
alone to be the
by speech, and by
Brahman who
whom
is
not made out
is
brought into existence."
speech Otherwise, the statement 'Know thou Him alone to be the Brahman would be contradicted, and the injunction meditation would become purposeless. enjoining Therefore the whole of the bondage, which is made up of unreality and is of the nature of the phenomenal world consisting of the knower, the
known, &c., comes to an end
by means of that very injunction which enjoins meditation, and the result of which is the direct realisation of the Brahman. 97 that there is no contraby some 3 diction between distinction and non-distinction. This is cannot meet for distinction and non-distinction improper together in one and the same thing, as heat and cold, light
It is also asserted
;
and darkness, &c., (can not so meet). said again as follows
(To
this)
may
it
be
:
The whole of the
totality of things
is
indeed estab-
by perception and all things are apprehended as There is non-distinction (when distinct and non-distinct. they are looked upon) as constituting causes and as constilished
tuting genera (and species),
they are looked upon)
and there
tuting particular individuals.
The
But
distinction
in
and as
contradiction
between sunlight and shadow, &c., their not being found together, and by ity of abodes.
is
as constituting effects
is
(when consti-
existing
characterised
by
their having a divers-
the case of causes and
effects,
as
well as in the case of genera and (their) individual members, both those (characteristics) are not found but, on ;
327. This position the BhdstarTyas
is
and
maintained by it
is
here ex-
plained in ed.
full
before
Vide $/**
it is
contradict-
p. 217. n. 235.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
310
[Chap.
L
the contrary, one and the same thing appears in as
(when
it is '
en-horned',
there
is
form.
'
This pot
said)
This
ox
'
is
clay',
hornless'.
is
Part.
two forms
This ox
And
in
I.
is
this
brok-
world
nothing that is generally seen to have only one Nor is non-distinction seen to be that which
destroys distinction, as
when
(consume and destroy the
and such other things distinction) of grass and such fire
other things; accordingly, there diction (between distinction
object which
exists in the
is
no substantial contra-
and non-distinction) form of clay, gold,
;
for,
that
ox, or an
equine animal, &c., may itself exist (also) in the shape of a pot, a crown, a broken-horned (ox), or a mare, &c. There is no fiat of the Lord to the effect that non-distinc-
and distinction should (respectively) constitute the singular characteristics of the thing (genus) which is nontion
distinct, it
and of the thing
be said that there
is
(individual)
which
is distinct.
If
oneness of form (in relation to those
then let it be admittthings), because it is so perceived ed that there are also the two forms of distinction and ;
of non-distinction also perceived.
the same
for
Indeed,
broken-horned (oxen),
reason that they are
when
and
things such as pots, dishes, horn-less (oxen), &c., are
who
has his eyes wide open is not able to discern (any) distinction (in each of his perceptions) to This is clay, that is pot', and ' This is the the effect perceived, a person '
general property of the species ox, but this is the individual ox'. On the other hand, his perceptions are ' This pot is clay', The ox is brokenonly to the effect '
horned'. (in
the
If
it
be said that he does discern distinction
each of his perceptions), on the score that the cause and class are made out from the knowledge of their
persistence, while the effect
and the individual are made
out by. means of the knowledge of their power of logical
Adhik. IV. exclusion,
Silt.
./.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
replied that
cannot be so
because (such) not perceived. Indeed, even observe very minutely do not perceive, in rela-
it is
a distinction in character
who
those
311
it
tion to the thing placed before them, '
character to the effect
what
;
is
This
is
what
any
distinction in '
persists
and 'This
is
Just as, in the case of an effect and of an
excludes'.
individual, (both of)
whose oneness (with the correspond-
ing cause and the corresponding genus respectively) is well perceived, the idea of oneness is born (in the mind); so also,
what has a cause and belongs
the case of
in
to a genus, that idea of oneness
is
born without any
differ-
exactly similarly that the recogniis to the effect This is that same tive cognition, which thing', is born even in regard to all such objects as are ex-
ence whatsoever.
It is
'
tremely different from one another owing to (differences in) space, time,
as
much
and the
characteristic form.
Therefore, in
as (all) things appear as having certainly
tures, the enunciation of
any extreme
difference
two nabetween
the cause and the effect as well as between the genus and the individual is contradicted by perception. It
pot
'
This be again said that, as in the instances This ox is broken-horned', (so also) in the
may
'
is clay',
I am a man', there is the pera god', ception of oneness owing to there being a grammatical equation that in consequence there is distinction and non-
instances'
I
am
'
;
distinction
between the
self
and the body
also
;
and
that,
non-distincaccordingly, this declaration of distinction and tion acts like the flame of fire set to (consume) one's own
house.
This statement
(we, the Bhdskarlyas, say)
the outcome of undeveloped
is
wisdom regarding grammatical
equations which establish distinction and non-distinction, and regarding (also) the knowledge of the real meaning of those (same grammatical equations).
Thus, for instance,
SRI-BHISHYA.
3i2
\jChap. I. Part.
L
the unstultified idea alone which everywhere proves But the imposed idea of the self, existing in (intithings.
it is
mate) association with gods and other (material embodiments), is contradicted by all the means of proof which establish the reality of the self
;
and that
(idea) does not
prove, (in consequence), the non-distinction between the self and the body in the same way in which the idea of ;
the serpent (falsely perceived) in a rope, &c., (does not prove any non-distinction as existing between the serpent
and the rope). And the grammatical equations, which are to the effect' The ox is broken-horned', The ox is '
hornless', are
not seen to be
stultified
anywhere by any-
thing ; hence there is no exaggeration in (our) statement. For these same reasons, the self also is not totally disOn the other hand, as being tinct from the Brahman.
a part of the
Brahman,
it
non-
and
(both) distinct
is
Him). It being so, non-distinction alone and distinction is due to limiting conditions.
distinct (from is
natural,
If
it
be asked
made
"This IV.
"That thou is
is
made
out,
it is
replied (that
&
art."
Brahman"'[Brih. Up.
the
Mand. Up.
the self and the relates to the
I. 2.].
Brahman}
is
Brahman and
it is
scriptural
\Chhand. Up. VI. no other seer than He." -[/fr///. Up. III.
self is
4. 5.
this
by means of the following and other
out)
texts: " There
how
II.
8.
7.];
7. 23.];
5.
19.
&
Non-distinction (between declared in the hymn which
forms the Samhitopanishad
and it says, after introducing the subject-matter of the topic by mentioning the Brahman to be these two, namely, the Earth and the Heaven, that " The of the Atharvanikas
fishermen are the
;
Brahman, the
slaves are the
Brahman,
these gamblers are also the Brahman, man and woman are born out of the Brahman women are the
and
;
Brahman, and man
also
(is
the Brahman}."
And
distinction
Adhik. IV.
Silt.
4.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
313
and the Brahman] is also declared in the following and other scriptural passages "The Eter(between the
self
:
nal
the eternals,
the Intelligent among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfils the desires of the "The Svet. Up. VI. 13.]; many." [Kath. Up. V. 13.
among
&
two unborn, the intelligent and the non-intelligent (are) "Anthe Lord and the non-Lord." [Svet. Up. I. 9.]; other
(viz.
the Lord) also
seen to
is
be the cause of
their association with the qualities of the 'works' (which
lead
and the
to samsdrd)
lead to beatific release)."
qualities
[Svet.
of the self (which
Up. V.
"He
12.];
is
the Lord of the praknti and of the individual soul, and He is the cause of samis the regulator of the qualities ;
sdra, of final [Svet. is
of existence, and of bondage.""He is the cause, the Lord of what
release,
Up. VI.
1
6.];
the lord of the senses
vidual soul)."
[Svet.
the sweet pippala
e.
(/.
Up. VI.
of the jiva or the indi"One of them eats 9.];
while the other shines in splen-
fruit,
dour without eating at
all."
[Mund. Up.
III.
i.
i.
&
" He who, dwelling in the self, &c." Up. IV. 6.]; " He is embraced III. by the 7. 22.]; \Mddh. Brih. Up.
Svet.
omniscient
and knows nothing that
Self
"
He
is
external."-
ridden upon by the omni3. 21.]; scient Self and goes away giving 328 up his body." [Brih. " Knowing Him alone, one transcends Up. IV. 3. 35.]; [Brih. Up. IV.
is
death."
[Svet. Up. III. 8.]. Therefore, (both) distinction have necessarily to be admitted benon-distinction and tween the individual self and the Supreme Self. It being so,
non-distinction
the scriptural becomes the 328. is
is,
"
passage
Brahman
The word used
utsarjan which
however, made out to be natural, because
is
4
He who knows
indeed."
in the original
interpreted
by
the
[Mund. Up.
S.iiikara to
Brahman III. 2. 9.],
mean groaning
along.
SRI-BHISHYA.
314
and others
like
it
Brahman by what
I.
acquires the nature of the because also the passage " But where
and
;
all this
Part.
I.
declare that, in the condition of final
release, the individual
to one
{Chap.
self
becomes the
Self,
there
&
?"
who
shall see
whom
IV.
\Brih. (7p.ll. 4. 14. 5. 15.], negatives the apprehension of the Lord then as being different (from the individual self).
However,
it
may
be said that even then distinction
accordance with the scriptural passage perceived which speaks of the association (of the individual self with the Brahman), and is to this effect" He attains with the in
is
Brahman
omniscient U'p. II.
i.
i.];
same thing
all
the auspicious qualities."
and that he (the Sutrakard)
in these
aphorisms
"
Except
{Taitt.
also says the
in the
matter of
the activity relating to (the creation, &c., of) the world, (the released souls possess all the powers belonging to the
Lord); because (the Lord Himself forms) the topic of the contexts (wherein the above-mentioned activity is referred to),
and because also (the individual
souls) are not
mention-
[Ved. Sut. IV. 4. 17.]; "And on account of the characteristic of equality (between the individual
ed (therein)." self
and the Supreme
matter this
is
being solely confined to (the {Vcd. Si'tt. IV. 4. 21.].. (But)
Self)
of) enjoyment." not so because the distinction of the individual self ;
(from the Brahman) is denied by hundreds of scriptural " There is no other seer than He."passages such as {Brih. Up. III. " He
7.
23.],
and
others.
By means of the Brahman all
attains with the omniscient
passage the auspicious qualities." what is [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], said is that he enjoys the Brahman along with all (His) desirable qualities that is, he enjoys the Brahman possessed of all those qualities. Otherwise, the phrase " with the (omniscient) Brahman" would lead to the Brahman be-
Adhik. IV.
Sftl.
SRI-BHISHYA.
./.]
coming unimportant. "
If,
315
means of the aphorism
by
the matter of the activity relating to (the Except creation, &c., of) the world, &c.", the released souls are in
made
out to have a distinct existence (from the Brahman), the same as stating (that these individual souls
then
it is
have
a) deficiency
of lordship.
For, otherwise, there will
be the contradiction of this aphorism among others, name"
(Only) after attaining the Highest Light, is there the manifestation (of the individual self's own nature ; as ly,
be inferred) from (the use
may
IV. 4. i.]. [Ved. (between the self and Silt.
329
the word
of)
own
'."
non-distinction
Therefore,
the
'
Brahman)
alone
is
na-
tural.
But the
Brahman
distinction of the individual selves
as well as
from each other
is
from the
due to limiting
conditions, such as the intellect, the senses and the body. Although the Brahman is not made up of constituent parts
and
is
found everywhere, yet there certainly results diseven in relation to the Brahman by means of the
tinction
limiting conditions, such as the intellect, &c., just as (distinction results) in the case of the spatial 8
3
ether
by means
of (limiting conditions like) pots, &c. And there is (here) no fallacy of reciprocal dependence to the effect that there is
the association of limiting conditions like the
&c., with the
329.
Brahman who
The passage which
is
the basis
of this aphorism and contains the word own (or sva) runs thus :Pai-ail-
330.
The
ether which exists within
a pot (jghatakdsa}
is
tioned by the pot.
of the pot, the ether
padhyatel^jkhdnd. Up. VIII.
in
12. 2.].
the Bra/iiiian),
lie
becomes manifest
(the individual self) in his on'it
nature."
it
becomes one
ether outside itself,
is
said to be comli-
On
jyotii'iipasampadya svina riipen.ilrinn/i-
"After attaining the Highest Light(/>.
intellect,
already differentiated, and
is
the destruction
which was withwith the spatial
(in,ihjkii'.n),
unconditioned,
which, in
SRI-13HISHYA.
316 that there
is
\Chap.
Part.
I.
Brahman by
differentiation in relation to the
means of His
L
association with limiting 'conditions like
because the limiting condition and (with the Brahman] are (both) due to karma ; 331 and because also the stream of that (karma]
the its
intellect,
&c.
;
association
What
is
of the individual self which
is
is
beginningless.
said
is
this
By means
:
held in bondage by its past karma, there is produced that limiting condition which is found in association with that (self) itself; and
karma
produced) by the (self s) being associated with
(is
thus there is nothing wrong that (limiting condition) in as much as the relation between karma and (here), :
beginningless in accordance derived from the seed and the
(these) limiting conditions
with the
argument Therefore,
sprout.
332
is
the non-distinction
it is
of the indivi-
dual selves from each other as well as from the that
But tions.
Brahman
certainly natural.
is
distinction arises, however, from limiting condi-
The
distinction also of these limiting conditions
each other as well as from the
Brahman
from
natural, like
is
(their) non-distinction; because these limiting conditions are not subject to other limiting conditions, and because also, if
these (latter) be admitted, there would result a regrcssus in infinitum. Consequently, according to the karma
of
the
individual
produced 331.
selves,
Here karma means the
effects
332.
A
seed
produces a sprout another seed,
sprout produces
this seed
another sprout, this
another seed, and so on.
karma produces
conditions are
limiting
Brahman} this
as have, indeed,
condition
produces
another
karma another limiting and so on. Thus there
karma, this
of past works,
this
such
(in relation to the
again
Similarly a
a limiting condition.
condition,
can be no beginning to the relation
which
exists
between
limiting conditions.
karma
and
Adhik. IV. Sut. a nature which
is
4.]
SRi-BnlsHYA.
317
(both) distinct and non-distinct from the
Brahman. (In reply to this), it is said here*3 thus : has been stated that the whole collection of Vcd-
It
dntic passages relate to the injunction regarding the meditation of the Brahman who is without a and is
second,
that consequently it is knowledge and bliss non-distinction which is made out by means of Vcddntic passages; and that distinction is made out by means of the existence,
;
by means of percepdependent upon distinctions and
sastras relating to 'works', as well as
which are
tion, &c.,
all
;
that, (under these circumstances), non-distinction
the reality, because, there
is
is
alone
mutual contradiction between
and non-distinction, and because also the perof distinctions ception may result even from the beginningold But what lessly ignorance (or avidya) as its source. distinction
has been stated there that there
is
(in that context) to the effect contradiction between distinction and non-
distinction, for the reason that
both of them are estab-
by perception, that is improper. Indeed, for a be distinct from another thing is the same as that to thing thing having characteristics which are different from lished
those of the other thing
and
will
and non-distinction
;
Who
dition opposite to this.
is
there that
is
is
the con .
in his senses,
speak of the existence in one and the same
things (viz. distinction and non-distinction) which have (respectively) the nature of a particular condition and of the opposite of that particular
two
place of those
condition
the
form
If
?
of
it
the
be said that non-distinction cause
as
333. Hercunder, the Dhyanaiiiyoga-
vddin
refutes
the
position
of
the
well
as
in
the
B/iiiskarTyas stated above,
exists in
form
of
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
318
[Chap.
L
Part.
I.
the genus, and that distinction exists in the form of the effect as well as in the form of the individual, and that,
owing to there being (such) a difference between their forms there is no contradiction (between them), it is replied that
it is not (right to say so); because such (a position) does not admit of any one of the possible alternative views (in relation to it). Does he who says that there is no con-
tradiction (between distinction
and non-distinction) owing
to the difference in the form of their appearance, (does he) hold that distinction exists in one particular form,
while non-distinction exists in another paiticular form ? Or (does he hold) that both of them are to be found in
one thing which
forms
?
In the
first
is
capable of adopting both
those
alternative, distinction belongs to the
and non-distinction belongs to the genus, and hence, no one thing has both these forms (of distinction and If it be said that the genus and the non-distinction).
individual
individual
are both one
and the same
thing, then (the
contention), that there is no contradiction (between them), in as much as there is a difference in the form of their
appearance, will amount to have been given up. It has been already stated that it is contrary to reason for one
and the same thing to have its own peculiar characteristics and (also) their opposites. And, in the second are mutually conthere are two forms which alternative,
and the thing with which they are associated is Hence, even if a third form (other than the and the vyakti or the individual) be admittor jdti genus, ed, there would be only the proving of the mutual distinctradictory,
unknown.
(all) the three forms, but no (proving of the) distinction of absence (between them). If it be said that that non-contradiction (between distinction and non-dis-
tion
between
tinction),
which
it
is
sought
to
maintain
by
the
Adhik. IV.
Silt.
./.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
319
of) two forms, is the same as being (both) and non-distinct from the thing which forms the abode of those (two forms), it is asked in
(supposition
distinct
how
the
two
themselves
forms,
different
(thus)
reply a thing and are from (that) thing, can be
which abide
in
capable of introducing into that thing hostile attributes (at the same time). Of what nature is non-dis? If the two forms (on the one hand) and the thing, (on the other hand), which possesses them are admitted to be (distinctly) two in nature, then, there would be the necessity for another form that is
tinction then
capable of holding them together. Consequently, there would be the fallacy of regrcssus in infinitum. Moreover, there is the apprehension of an admitted oneness in .
relation to the perception of individuals ever,
in
there
arises
oneness to
the
similarly,
;
regard to that thing also which has
;
no such perception
because
all
characteristic
as
is
perception arises
modes
(of
how-
(its) similars,
characterised
only
things)
as
and
by
relating
to
the
by those modes, to the effect that a particular thing is of a particular nature. In such (a perception), the thing which characterises is the things characterised
genus, and the thing which is characterised is the individual (belonging to that genus); and therefore perception
has not (only) one form. For this same reason, the quality of being (both) distinct and non-distinct from
Brahman
not possible in relation to the individual self also. Accordingly, the perception of distinction is solely based upon the beginninglessly old ignorance is based (or avidya), in as much as non-distinction the
is
on the sdstras (the dependently It
may
(of all
logical result of
other
which
is)
arrived at in-
means of knowledge).
be said that,
if
such be the case, the Brah-
SRI-BHISHYA.
320
{Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
man Himself would
possess ignorance, and that consethe evils of birth, old age, death, &c., resulting quently from that (ignorance) would taint (Him); and that for
the same reason the following and other scriptural texts, namely, "He who understands all and who knows
z\\"[Mimd. Up. devoid of i
&
I.
i.
II.
9.
2.
3.],
"This
7.];
[Qterf. Up. VIII. would also be contradicted. sin."
i.
&
5.
But
Self
VIII.
this
is
is
7.
not
of ignorance, &c., are not But, you 334 do not admit (the existence of) things other than the limiting conditions and the Brahman, the association of those limiting right
because the evils
;
much
as
in
real.
Brahman Himself and
conditions with the
the
constituting
(His)
&c.,
ignorant,
(thus)
(association),
would
and
of)
(all
of (His)
self,
which
result
being
from that
occur (according to you) in reality. limiting conditions,which are associated
who
without constituent parts
is
do not get into association (with Him)
indivisible,
after
individual
the evils of
all
Indeed, these with the Brahman
either
as
Him
cutting
or after dividing
Him.
But,
on the contrary, they are associated with His essential nature, and hence they work out their effects within Himself.
You may, however, by
conditions
(individual
character
of the
and
that,
limiting
(in
means
who admit only
thing the
is
the that
Bhaskariyas
the "Brahman and
the conditions limiting
Brahman and
self; size);
that
limited
that that its
atomic
(or non-pervasive) nature
one of the limiting conditions
condition
therefore,
the
334. You
individual
due to the atomic
manas which
this
hold that the
atomic
is
self) is
that
with
the
is
Him. Beyond
is
evils, is
old
;
beginninglessly are associated ;
which
limited these, they
by
conditions,
do not admit the existence
of anything- else,
Adhik. IV. Suf.
SRI-BHISHYA.
4.]
321
are not associated with the Highest unconditioned BrahIf so, it has to be asked whether the individual self man.
which
atomic in
is
size is
a bit of the
limiting conditions
(from Him) by the individual self)
man
as
is
is
not at
all
any such
Brahman
or whether
;
special
cut off it
part of the
divided from the
(viz.
Brah-
Brahman and
is
(nevertheless) associated with that limiting condition which is characterised by the atomic size or whether it is, in ;
essence, the Brahman Himself in association with limiting conditions ; or whether it is some other intelligent being
associated with limiting conditions limiting condition being divided, the
itself.
;
or whether
As the Brahman
is
it is
the
incapable of
first alternative cannot be assumed; and be assumed), there would be a beginning (in time) to the individual self indeed cutting off means the splitting
(if it
;
of an already existing thing into two. In accordance with the second alternative, a particular part of the Brahman Himself is associated with limiting conditions, and hence all
the
Him
out of
evils arising
limiting conditions
accrue
and when a limiting condition is detached transferred and (from one part of the Brahman to another),
to
then,
alone
;
owing to the
fact that
it
is
not possible for the limit-
ing condition to carry with itself that part of the Brahman which was associated with itself (before), and owing also to the fact that the part of the ed with limiting conditions
Brahman which is associatvaries from moment to
moment, both bondage and taking place every moment.
final
release
have
to
be
If it were possible (for the itself (that part of the with to carry limiting condition) Brahman with which it is associated), then, since the
Brahman
is
whole (of the Brahman)\\o\\\A be said that a thing which has no all-pervading cannot be (so) carried,
indivisible, the
have to be so carried. constituent parts and
If it is
SRI-BHASHYA.
322
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
then the statement already made to the effect that the limiting condition is detached and transferred must itself be-
come an
When
the limiting conditions are associated with the (various) parts of the (one) undivided Brahman, then, since all the individual selves form such parts of the (one undivided) Brahman, they will have all to be error.
all
put together and realised as one. If, owing to their forming (His) various parts, there can be no putting them together (so as to cause their coalescence), then, even after the limiting conditions are detached and transferred, there
can be no coalescence of even a single part (freed from In aclimiting conditions with the unconditioned whole). cordance with the third alternative, the essential nature of the Brahman Himself assumes the state of the individual
and through association with limiting conditions hence there can be no establishment of the unconditioned sell",
;
Brahman as apart from
that (individual self), and there will have to be only one individual self in all bodies. In accordance with the fourth alternative, the individual self is
(by nature) altogether different from the
Brahman, and
therefore the idea that the differentiation of the individual
Brahman] is due to limiting conditions will to have been given up. In accordance with the last alternative, the view of the Charvakas 383 themselves self
(from the
amount
come
to
have
been
accepted. Therefore, on the strength of the sastras declaring that there is non-disincwill
:
335.
The Charvakas
rialists of
sceptical doctrines were
to
are the mate-
Hindu philosophy.
Charvaka and
his
Their
regarded as atheists by the orthodox matters of Vedic faith. The
in
handed down
Charvakas believe only
followers
rion
by
one Vachaspati or Brihaspati. Their opinions are embodied in what are called Bqrhaspatyz-sutras.
They
are
of
According to matter tion.
namely,
truth,
itself
them is
in
one
crite-
perception.
non-intelligent
the cause
of crea^-
Adhik. tV.
Silt.
SRI-BHISHYA.
4.]
323
tion (between things), it has to be accepted that all distinctions are based upon ignorance (or avidya) alone.
Accordingly, although the sastras are authoritative
only in so far as they relate to
utility either in the form of activity or of cessation from activity, it is established that Vcdantic passages are authoritative in relation to the
essential nature of the
Brahman
(also),
in
as
much
they are needed as a complement to the injunction
as
relat-
ing to meditation.
This (view) also is improper. 830 Even though it be are needed as that a granted they complement to the injunction relating to meditation, there
is
no authoritative
proof that Vcdantic passages import anything that
What
is
said
this
is
:
essential nature of the
Do the Brahman
real.
passages relating to the possess authoritativeness
in relation to that essential nature of the
porting the
is
Brahman, by im-
same thing as the injunction relating to mediOr (do they do .so) independently and of ?
tation (does)
own
they have (such) oneness of import, then they must refer mainly to the injunction relating to meditation ; and thus it is not possible for them to aim at their
accord
?
If
denoting the essential nature of the Brahman. If the}' import a different thing (from the injunction relating to meditation), then, since they are devoid of utility in the
form of inducing either activity or cessation from activity, they certainly cannot have any (real) meaning at all. should not be urged that meditation has the nature of a flow of memory, and is capable of being
Moreover,
336,
who
is
it
Hereunder the Mimamsaka* the
main objector against the
views intended to
be
propounded
by the Sutrak&ra. 4.,
in
\
7
ed.
6V/A
I.
I.
refutes the position of the D/iyana-
nyogavaJin.
SRI-BHASHYA.
$24
definitely described only
\Ciiap.
by means of what
L
Part.
L
constitutes the
thing that is to be remembered ; and that, if it be asked what the particular object of remembrance in connection
with this injunction bearing upon meditation is, then, the following passages "All this is that Self." \_Brih. "The II. 6. IV. is Brahman omnisci4. 5. Up. 7.];
&
ent."
"The Brahman
\Brih. Up.ll.$. 19.];
ence, Knowledge, Infinity."
Up.
\Taitt.
II.
is
i.
Exist-
i.J,
and
other such passages point out the essential nature and the peculiar characteristics of that (object of remembrance), and
thus acquire the sameness of import with that (injunction relating to meditation), and become authoritative in establishing the
reality of the thing (imported)
because, alto meditation is necessarily the relating injunction though dependent upon what forms the object of remembrance, :
yet the reality of the thing to be meditated upon is not absolutely needed, for the reason that the completion of meditation becomes possible even with the help of a certain thing tion 337
Name.
which
is
unreal,
as in the case
enjoining the realisation of the Thus it is arrived at that the
of the injunc-
Brahman as a Brahman is not
proved by means of the scriptures because Veddniic passages are devoid of utility in the form of inducing either ;
activity or
cessation
when needed
as a
from activity
complement
;
and because, even
to the injunction relating to
meditation, they have their finality only in denoting the essential nature of the particular object of meditation ; again because, even when they are capable of having an
independent import, there
is
to be found in merely
the whole range of their utility, as sentences (uttered) to gratify children,
ing (their meaning) is
the case with
337.
know-
Vide Chhdnd. Up. VII.
1,
J,
where
this injunction is given,
Adhik. 'lit. Sat.
./.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
$2$
and other such people and because also Vcdantic passages) cannot point out the reality of those things the ideas corresponding to which have sickly persons,
they
;
(viz.
been already naturally established. In this connection, it is laid down (by the Sntrakdra (viz. the fact that the scripture forms altogether the source of the knowledge relating to the Brahman] )
- -"
That
results, however, from (His constituting) the true purport (of the scriptures). "3 as The word samanvaya means the proper purport, that is, such a purport as constitutes an The meaning is that, owing to object of human pursuit.
the fact that the
human
Brahman who
is
the highest object of
pursuit and whose very nature
is
unsurpassed
bliss
forms the purport (of the scriptures) by constituting the thing that is to be denoted (by them), that, namely, the fact that the (the
Brahman}, The whole
forms the means of proving
scripture
is
undoubtedly established.
collection of Vcdantic passages
teaches
the Brahman who is the highest object of attainment, in as much as His essential nature is devoid of all evil and consists of unsurpassed bliss theless, lity,
it
(vix.
because
from
it
;
that collection) has not its finality in utidoes not lead to either activity or cessation
were), that a person who destitute of all usefulness in as
activity, (he) says, (as
dwells in
and whoever says that, never-
a palace
is
it
as he does not get into a dog-kennel. Individual souls have the What is said is this
much
:
know-
as well as of the reality of the ledge of their own nature that are concealed by the veil of higher and the lower truths in nature as the beginningsame the is which that ignorance the form of gods, Asuras, exist in lessly old karma they ;
338, This
is
\ed. Sut,
I.
I. 4.
and
is
us follows
:
Tatlu samamnyat.
SRi-BnlSHYA.
326
[Chap.
L
L
Part.
Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyddharas, Kinnaras, KimpuruYakshas, Rdkshasas, Pisdchas, men, beasts, birds, reptiles, trees, shrubs, creepers, grass, and other (material shas,
embodiments); they are differentiated by the distinctions of the male sex, of the female sex, and of sexlessness, and
have their own specially appointed supporters, protectors and special objects of enjoyment and (under these cir:
cumstances) that passage alone has its finality in utility which teaches that there exists the Highest Brahman
who, by means of His own and qualities, greatness and
essential nature, character
causes to these
activity,
(individual souls) unlimited and unsurpassed joy at the time when there happens to be no difference between the
(personal) experience of (the Brahman] Himself and the experience which these (souls) have in their released But that (other kind of) passage, state (of beatitude).
which not
relates to activity
its finality
and cessation from
in utility, in as
much
as
it
activity, has
gives rise to that
knowledge which can be utilised only so long as there are When it is desired to (desirable) objects to be attained.
know how
the
Brahman who
is
of this nature
tained, then, worship (or npdsand)
is
is
to be at-
enjoined,
as
the
means of attaining the Brahmanfty the words vcdana, &c., the following passages attains the Highest."" Let him worship the Self alone as
(meaning knowledge, &c.,) "
He who knows
\Taitt.
Up.
the
II. i. i.];
in
:
Brahman
the object to be attained." \Brih. Up. I. of the (utility teaching given by Veddntd)
4. 15.].
This
analogous to the case of a person who, on hearing the statement that there is hidden treasure in his house, comes to know of the is
existence of (such a) hidden treasure, (thereby) becomes It is also analogous pleased, and then tries to get at it. to this other case
:
A young prince,
while engaged in play
Adhik. IV. SfiL with (other)
SRI-BHISHYA.
y.]
out of the palace, and, straying from is taken by the king (to be so
lads, gets
the right road,
is
327
and
lost,
(The prince) himself does not know his (own) father, is brought up by a Brahmana of merit, and is made to learn the Vedic When he is sixteen years of (all) scriptures. 9 and is the age he possessor^ of all auspicious lost).
qualities,
hears a statement " effect Your
father
:
is
made by
a very worthy person to this the lord of the whole World, and
is
blessed with the qualities of dignity, liberality, affection,
heroism, bravery and overwhelming waiting in the best of cities solely
excellent behaviour,
He
c.
strength,
is
When (the (his) lost son." hears this he becomes then and there prince statement), " I full of unsurpassed joy by realising (within himself) with the desire to see you,
am is
indeed the son of a person who is alive, and abundantly blessed with all kinds of wealth."
also,
on hearing that
beautiful to look at,
own
his
and
son
is
is
alive,
conversant with
is
all
my
father
The king
healthy, is that has to
be known, becomes like one who has attained all the objects of human pursuit; and thereafter he tries to get him (/. c.
the son) back.
Such also
is
And
at last they both
meet together.
(this utility).
Again what has been stated
by the purvapakshin
to
the effect that Vedantic passages relate to things, the ideas
corresponding to which have been already naturally established, and are hence no means of proving the real exist-
ence of the things imported (by them), but are ;like the sentences which are uttered for the gratification of children, sickly persons utility has tal) 339. akara,
its
and other (such people), finality
only
knowledge of that The word used which
means
in the
a mine.
in as
much
in (producing) the
(to
which they
as their
mere (men-
relate);
that
is
signify
an
text
is
metaphorically used
It
is
inexhaustible source of anything.
to
SRi-BHlSHYA.
328
When
wrong.
the absence of the
[Chap.
Part.
I.
reality of the
I.
thing
imported (by a sentence) is definitely determined, then, even if that (thing) be (mentally) known, it cannot serve In the case of children, sickly people &c., joy &c., are produced by the illusion that the thing (imported by the sentences uttered for their gratification)
any
useful purpose.
at the time
when
such (illusory) knowledge is existent, the conviction should arise that the thing imported is really non-existent, then joy, &c., is
really existent.
If,
would, (in consequence), disappear that very moment. If, in the case of the Upanishadic passages also, it be deter-
mined that they do not denote the real existence of the Brahman, then, although they give rise to the (conceptual) knowledge of the Brahman, there would be (to those passages) no finality in utility. a demonstrated conclusion that the " From whom begins with scriptural passage, all these beings are born" III. i. i.], de[Taitt. Up. Therefore,
it
is
which
Brahman who is the only cause of all who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all who is the abode 340 of innumerable auspicious
clares that that
the worlds, that is evil, qualities,
such as omniscience, the quality of willing the
truth, &c., is
and who
is
bliss
unsurpassed in excellence,
really existent.
ADH1KARANA.
V.
Ikshatyadhikarana.
Sutra
5.
Ikshaternasabdam.
Because the activity imported by the root Jksh (to e. to think) is predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world) that which is not reveal-
see
/.
340.
Here again the word used
in the text is akara.
Vide supra
n,
339.
Adhik. V.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sftt. 5.]
329
ed solely by the scripture, (viz. the pradhana) 3 4 is not (the Sat or the Existence which is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to the cause of the world). 1
has been already stated that that Brahman, who is taught in the scriptural passage which relates to the cause of the world and which begins with " From whom all It
these (beings
are
Brahman] who
is
hostile to all that
auspicious
this
has
is is
to
aphorism
root tksh
(in relation to
that which
pradhana)
is
Up.
\Taitt.
who
III. i. i.],
is
omnipotent, evil and forms the only seat of
qualities,
by means of ported by the ed
born)"
omniscient,
what
(that
who all
is
the
be enquired into. Now, Because the activity im-
"
(to see
i.
to think), is predicat-
e.
constitutes the cause of the world),
not revealed solely by the scripture not (the Sat or the Existence which
(viz. is
the
refer-
red to in the scriptural passage relating to the cause of the and by means of other aphorisms, it is declared world)", that the scriptural passages 342 which mention the cause of the world do not possess the power of denoting the
and other similar things which are capof able being established by the process of logical inThis is what is revealed in the Qtfiandogya ference. " Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the begin-
pradhana
:
ning, one only, without a second manifold and be born'. I become
&c."
[Chhand.
doubt
and
is
341.
khyas
arises
is
Up. VI.
whether
that,
2.
i,
which
2, et is
It
It
thought created
seq.].
what
is
the Prakriti, It
of the
otherwise is
Sah-
known
Nature, or the
as
self-
the evolving material substratum of
4
2
tejas,
Here the
the cause of the world
denoted by the word Existence (or Sat),
The Pradhana
'May
is
the
universe. 342.
The passages forming
basis of this
the
Adhikarana are contain-
ed in Chhdnd. Up. VI.
.
SRf-BHlSHYA.
330
I.
[Chap.
Part.
I.
pradhana which has been mentioned by others and is capable of being established by logical inference, or whether it is
Brahman who
the
stated?
Why was
It
possesses the
characteristics already
* a
that it is the pradhana. perhaps held* "Existence alone, my dear child, this
is
The passage
?
one only, &c." speaks of the causal condition of that thing which is denoted by the word 'this', in the beginning,
which constitutes the thing to be enjoyed (or endured) by intelligent beings (viz. the individual souls), and which is
made up
(of the qualities) of sattva (goodness), rajas (pas-
sion), and tamas (darkness), and which (again) exists in Indeed, a variously modified forms such as the ether, &c. thing which exists in the condition of a cause acquires the
character of an effect merely
getting into another con-
by
Whatever thing and whatever
dition.
(general) nature
(thereof) exist in the condition of a cause, that
same thing
and that same nature (thereof) exist also in the condition of an effect. Moreover, a produced effect is made up (of the qualities) of sattva, &c. Therefore that pradhana in which these qualities are held in a state of equilibrium 344 is The Sahkhya
343.
is
the f-Hrra-
pcikshin, or the objector here.
According
344.
to the Sahkhyas,
the evolutionary processes of creation are
possible only
when
there
is
he-
terogeneity in the constitution of the Prakriti.
This heterogeneity
of the
result
differentiation
Pratriti into the Sattva
,
fiafas,
three
and
this
differentiation ceases, or is
when
in the constitu-
and no evolution.
presents the
of
When
tion of the Pra(riti, there can be
creation
the
of the
Gunrts
'lamas.
there
homogeneity
is
condition
no
Sattta re-
of completed
development and perfect equilibrium.
Rajas represents the condition of active
up-building heterogeneity,
want
of equilibrium in
cause
of the
And Tamas to
is
the the
progress of evolution,
represents that other con-
dition which causes the
verse
which
tend
evolved uni-
towards
dissolution,
These three terms aie also used with a psychological significance, which partly figurative but
due
to the belief
is
more
is
largely
that the material of
incarnating soul determines largely the nature of the the body of the
mental and moral qualities possessed
by
it
in the
embodied condition, and
that this material
itself is
so
chosen
Adhik. V. Sat.
SRi-BniiSHYA.
5.]
33!
alone the cause (of the That same (pradhdna) universe). in the passage" Existence alone, this my dear
is,
child,
was
in the beginning,
one only, without a second ", declared to be that undifferentiated existence which has absorbed into itself all differentiating It is for peculiarities. this reason that a cause and its effect have no (essential) difference between them. Only thus can this proposition become appropriate (which says) that, by knowing one thing, all things become known. Otherwise, there would further be a complete difference between the thing intended to be illustrated and the example of the lump of clay and of the produced effects thereof, which are (all) given
an
as
with
illustration
-"Just as,
in
my
the
scriptural passage that begins
one lump of clay,
dear child, by
&c." [Ulihdnd. Up.\\. 1.4.]. Therefore, in the scriptural passage which relates to the cause of the world, nothing other than the pradhdna taught by the great sage Moreover, this passage (now under Kapila is mentioned.
and an
discussion) contains a proposition
thus
has
it
the
surely
form
a
of
illustration,
logical
and
inference.
Consequently, what is denoted by the word Existence (or Sat) is nothing other than that (pradhdna) which is capable of being proved by -inference (to be the cause of the world). If
it
be so held, it
activity imported
stated (in reply) thus the root iksh (to sec i.
is
by
predicated (in relation to world), that which
"Because the
:
what
e.
to think), is
constitutes the cause of the
not revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the pradhdna) is not (the Sat or the Existence which is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to that is
cause of the world)."
;ih
to suit the
Karma,
ul
the
That which
incarnating
i>uul.
is
not revealed solely
^Ri-BHlSHYA.
332
by the scripture
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
that in relation to which the scripture alone does not form the means of proof. It is that which is
is
capable of being established by the process of logical The meaning is that it is the pradhana. That
inference.
(prad hand) is not denoted by the scriptural passages relatBecause the act? ing to the cause of the world.
Why
ivity imported
by the root Iksh
That
predicated.
is,
"
cular kind of activity in relation to
word Existence intelligent
i.
because the root iksh
It
thought [Qihdnd. Up. VI.
scriptural passage
and be born."
(to see
May
I
2. 3.],
what
is
e. to is
think)
is
used, in the
become manifold to denote a partiimported by the
And it is not possible for the nonto be associated with the activity of
(or Sat).
pradhana
seeing (i. e. of thinking). Therefore, what forms the import of the word Existence (or Sat) is that Highest Person who ( capable of so seeing ', and who is a particular intelligent Being that is omniscient and omnipotent. Accordingly, in
is
contexts which relate to creation, the act of creation is invariably preceded by the act of seeing' (/. e. of thinking), " He as in the following and other scriptural passages thought' May I create the worlds'. He created these " He thought He created worlds." 2.]; [Ait. Up. I. i all
'
:
&
[Pr. Up. VI. 3
the prdnas."
& 4.].
may, however, be said here that the cause has necessarily to be !in natural conformity with the effect. It
That is true and the Highest Person who is omniscient and omnipotent, who wills the truth, and who owns the ;
intelligent as well as the non-intelligent things in their subtle state as His body, is certainly in natural conform-
For example, the follow" His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied, natural, and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action." [Svct. Up. ity
with
all
produced
effects.
ing scriptural passages say the same thing:
Adhik. V. "
Sift. 5.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
333
He who
understands all and who knows all and whose tapas** 5 consists of knowledge" \Mund. Up. I.i. 9.]; "He whose body is the avyakta*^ whose is whose body is mriiyu, He is the body the akshara VI.
8.J
;
internal Self of all beings." [Sub. Up. VII.]. " will be fully explained under the aphorism
man
is)
not (the cause of the
different
and
this
(from
And
(The Brah-
world), because
world)"
[Ved.
(He
II.
Sftt.
this
i.
under other aphorisms. Here, (however), maintained that the scriptural passages relating to also
is)
4.], it
is
the
creation of the world are not capable of importing the pradhana. The logical objections in regard to what actually forms the
ed
in that
import (of those passages)
same context
(in
which
aphorism occurs). What has been stated to the
this
will
be invalidat-
above-mentioned
effect that this
passage
&
(viz. Clihand. Up. VI. i 2.) is decidedly in the form of a logical inference, on account of its containing a propo-
sition
and an
illustration,
that
is
not right; because there
not given in it any basis of logical inference ( /. c. the middle term). When, by means of the passage " (Did you ask for that teaching) by which what is not heard beis
comes heard" teach
[Qthand. Up. VI.
how by knowing
i.
3.], it
is
(a certain) one thing
desired to all
things then, the example (of the clay, &c.,) is use of merely to show the possibility of such
become known, indeed
made
a thing
to
him who
The word
345.
tapas ordinarily
denotes penance and terities.
Vedic fore
and
It
is
of opinion that such a thing
is
religious aus-
frequently
said
in
Vedantic literature that be-
creation
formed tapas.
the
Creator
per-
Surely this tapas can-
not it
mean penance
is
His inner mental
and
or austerities, to
generally interpreted effort of
and willing which has been
mean
thinking
at the root
of all creation, 346,
Vide supra un. 184
is
&
185.
SRI-BHISHYA.
334
1.
[Chap.
Part.
1.
altogether impossible. As a matter of fact, solely for the reason that the activity imported by the root iksh (to sec to
e.
i.
think),
declared (in relation to what forms the
is
cause of the world), it is made out that there is not even the remotest mention of any logical inference (here). It is not that main and again be said thus ' natural significance of seeing ', which is found to exist in It
may
:
intelligent beings, that
other
hand, is
(that
it
a
is
is
mentioned here
but,
on the
of 'seeing'
significance
figurative
implied here); because, " "
;
in the following scriptural
That fire saw {Qihand. Up. VI. 2. 3.], " "Those waters saw [Qihand. Up. 1.2.4.], there is
passages
the association of a figurative 'seeing' (with the pradhana). Moreover, it is common to apply figuratively the attributes
of intelligent beings to non-intelligent things, as in the " The paddy crops are expecting the rains ", instances, " By means of the rains the (sown) seed became exceedingly gladdened."
the
Therefore, after stating '
'
(here mentioned)
seeing
Sfttrakard) disproves
Sutra
6.
If it
see)
is
be so; in
it
may
supposition
that
be figurative, he
the (the
(thus).
Gaifi.asihennatmasabdat.
be said that
it (viz.
the import of the root Iksh,
to
maintained that) it cannot (here) figurative, because there is the word Atman (or Self mentioned (it is
the context).347
What there 347.
has been stated (above) to the effect that, since the association of a figurative seeing (with the '
is
The Upmushodte
luting to this section
is
context
the
whole
reol
'
the sixth Prapcithaka of the (._hhand-
ogya-Upanishad,
Adhik. V. Sut.
SRI-BHASHYA.
6.]
335
pradhana), this predication of 'seeing' in relation to Existence (or Sat) also is figurative, and is intended to denote that condition
(of the
cedes creation,
this
is
pradhana) which invariably pre-
not right; because,
in the following " All this has That
passage (occurring in that context) for its Self;
That
is
Existence; That
Self)." [Qihand. Up. VI. 8. the word Existence (or Sat)
Atman is
(or Self).
found
That
in the
the Self."
is
(also)
What is said is this:
the
Atman is
[Qihand.
(or the
denoted by
denoted by the word That teaching, which
"All this has That for
passage
the world which
7.], is
is
that which
Up. VI.
8. 7.],
its Self.
has in view
made up
of intelligent and non-intelliand out that the Sat (or the Existgent things, points ence) is the Self thereof and it (viz. such a teaching) canis
;
not be appropriately given in relation to the (purely) nonThus the elements of fire intelligent thing pradhana. water, and earth have also the Highest Self for their Therefore the words tejas, &c., are also significant
(tejas), Self.
of the Highest Self alone.
lowing scriptural passage
:
Accordingly there is the fol" Indeed entering into these
three deities along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names [JJihand. Up. VI. 3. 2.]. And from this it that tejas and the other elements acquire the character of being things and also the capability of assum-
and forms." follows
ing their own particular names wholly as a consequence Therefore in of the Supreme Self entering into them. " That fire saw"; "Those these statements also, namely,
&
the predica4.], -\3ihand. Up. VI. 2. 3 natural and has its significance. primary seeing
waters saw" tion of
'
'
"
" It saw [Qihand. Up. Consequently, in the statement VI. 2. 3.], the supposition, which gives a figurative significance (to seeing ') even a* a consequence of the associa'
SRI-BHISHYA.
336
dispelled
I.
Part.
I.
'
'
tion (of that
[Chop.
with the pradhdna), is altogether Such is the meaning of this wrong).
seeing
(as
aphorism.
What
denoted by the word Existence (or Sat]
is
the pradhdna, for the following reason also
Sutra
7.
is
not
Tannishthasya mokshopadesat.
Because
who
is
:
taught (in the context) that he firmly devoted to That (viz. the Sat) obtains final (also) it is
release.
After the
scriptural
sentence
" That thou
art"-
[CJihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.], teaches Svetaketu, who is desirous of attaining final release, that the Sat is to be continuously meditated upon as the Atman (or the Self), this " As (other) sentence long as he is not freed (from the
then he will be blessed."body), so long there is delay VI. him that in the case of tells \Qihand. Up. 14. 2.] ;
who is firmly devoted to that (Sat or One Existence), final release, the nature of which is the attainment of the person, the
Brahman,
is
delayed only
till
the falling off of the body.
And
if the non-intelligent pradhdna had been taught to be the cause of the world, then it would not have been appropriate to teach that the continuous meditation of it as the
means of
Self forms the
ing
to the
worship death."
is
passage
attaining final release. And accord" Of whatever nature a man's
in this world, of that nature
\Qihdnd.
who
Up.
III.
14.
i.],
he becomes
after
there must result
firmly devoted to that (pradhdna), other than the attainment of that (same) non-innothing Moreover, the sastra telligent thing (or the pradhdna). to him,
is
Adhik. V. Sut. (or the
wards
scripture),
us)
SRI-BHISHYA.
8.~\
which
is
much more
337 affectionate (to-
than even thousands of mothers and fathers,
cannot teach (us) to attain that non-intelligent thing (or pradhdna) which forms the' Cause of (our) being attacked
by
(our)
well-known three
miseries.
3
48
Indeed those
who
maintain that the pradhdna forms the cause of the world do not acknowledge that final release results to him who firmly devoted to (that) pradhdna.
is
Again the pradhdna is not (what is denoted by the word Sal or Existence] for the following reason also :
Sutra
8.
Heyatvavazkanachcha.
Because also
not declared (in the context) that it (viz. what is denoted by the word Sat or Existence) deserves to be discarded. it is
pradhdna alone were that cause (of creation) which is denoted by the word Sat (or Existence}, then (the idea of) Svetaketu, who was desirous of attaining final release, being the same as that (Sat) would .
If the
be opposed to (his; final release, and should therefore have been taught (to him) to be only such (an idea) as altogether deserved to be discarded. And that is not done. On the contrary, in the following passages, namely,
"That thou
"So long as he is not art," \_Chhdnd. Up. VI. 8.7.]; VI. 14. 2.],(freed from the body), &c."[C&Iiand. Up. it is taught that that (idea of his being the same as the to be adopted (by Sat} is necessarily such as deserves him).
348, Vide supra p.
43
4. n. 12.
SRI-BHISHYA. The pradhdna
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
not (what is denoted by the word Sat or Existence) for the following reason also:
Sutra
Pratljnavlrodhat. 3
9.
Because of
is
(also) there 3 30
the proposition If the
* 9
would then be the contradiction
(enunciated in the context).
pradhdna were taken
to be the cause of the
world, there would also be the contradiction of the proposition (enunciated in the context). Indeed, in the very
beginning of the scriptural passage (under reference), the proposition is enunciated that, by knowing a (certain)
become known. And that (propohas to be sition,) justified solely by means of the fact that, from the knowledge of the causal Sal (or Existence), the single thing, all things
world, which is its produced effect and is made up of the intelligent and the non-intelligent things, becomes known and the reason (for this) is that a cause and its ;
effect are
not different from each other.
But the whole
of intelligent beings (viz. the individual selves) cannot be the effects produced out of the pradhdna and consequently, by knowing the pradhana, the knowcollection
;
ledge relating to the whole collection of intelligent beings cannot result thus this (proposition itself) would be con;
tradicted
if
the pradhdna be
taken to be the cause of
the world.
349.
This Sutra
is
not
commented
by Sankara and by Anandattrtha their commentaries on the Vedanta-
tipon in
Sutras. 350.
ed in
This proposition Chhand.
Up.
VI.
is
contain-
i.
3.
and
is
to the effect
"
Did you ask for what is not
that teaching by which
heard becomes heard, what
is
thought becomes thought, what not known becomes known, '
not is
Adhik. V.
Srit.
/o.J
The pradhana Sat or Existence
SRI-BHA.SHYA,
not (what is denoted by the word in the scriptural passage under is
discussion)
for the following reason also
Sutra
10.
:
Svapyayat.
Because
there is (mentioned in the context), the individual self) into its own cause,
(also),
the withdrawal (/.
339
(of
into the Safr.
e.
This scriptural passage, namely, "Know from me, my dear child, what deep sleep is. When any person is known to be asleep, he is then in union with the Sat. He
withdraws into
his
sleeps, because he
is
own
cause.
Therefore they say, lie own cause (i.e. into the
absorbed into his
[Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. i.] relates to that It subject which is denoted by the word Sat.
Brahman}:' very
declares that the individual soul,
who
is
asleep
and
is
in
union with the Sat, has withdrawn (himself) into his own cause that is, that he has been absorbed into his own ;
And (the) dissolution (of a thing) is (its) absorption Moreover the non-intelligent pra(its) own cause.
cause. into
to become the cause of the individual " He withof the scriptural statement draws into his own cause," \Chhdnd. Up. VI. 8. i.], is
dhdna does not deserve
soul.
The meaning
that the individual soul goes back only unto the Supreme It is declared in the scriptural passage 351 relatSelf. that ing to the differentiation of names and forms that
who
has the intelligent thing (or the individual soul) for His body and forms its Self, is denoted the word jlva (which ordinarily means the individual
Brahman
Himself,
by
By means of the statement" He is then in union with the Sal; He withdraws into his own cause." [Chhcind. soul).
351.
Vide (J.hdnd.
U/>.
VI
3. 2.
SRI-BHISHYA.
340
I.
[Chap.
Part.
L
Up. VI. 8. i.] it is taught that that Brahman who is denoted by the word jlva is free from (any) association with names and forms at the time of deep sleep also, as
(He
at the time of universal dissolu-
is)
and (He) is hence to be denoted merely by the word Sat (or Existence). To the same effect it is stated in
tion
;
similar contexts (elsewhere) that,
dividual
self's)
owing to
his
(/.
e.
the in-
not being associated with names and forms,
Him who is omniscient; and consequently When he is embraced by the omniscient
he is embraced by "
it is
said that,
Self,
he does not
thing that til
know anything
that
is
external nor any-
\_Bnh. Up. IV. 3. 21.]. Indeed, unfinal release takes place, the individual self is associated is
internal."
with names and forms born
;
and
it is,
therefore,
that there
is
(in him) the knowledge of objects other than himAt the time of deep sleep he certainly gives up
self.
names and forms, and is embraced by the Sat (i. e. by the Brahman] and again, in the wakeful state, he becomes associated with names and forms and assumes (for himself) a particular name and a particular form. This is clearly :
stated in other scriptural passages, namely,
the individual
e.
(/.
self)
is
asleep,
"
When
he
he sees no dreams
whatsoever; and he becomes one wholly with that Prdna
From
Brahman]
(or
that
Self,
the prdnas proceed each towards its (own,) place."[Kaush. Up. IV. 19.]. To the same effect is the following "Whatever these beings are here, scriptural passage also in the state of separation
(/. c.
tiger, or fly,
a
lion, or
or a mosquito,
'
352,
The
from their cause), whether a
a wolf, or a boar, that they
quotation here
is
not
Tomplete, the portion omitted being
become again and " or an insect or a moth."
332 or a
again."
Adhik. V. Sut. \Qihand.
//.]
Up. VI.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
9. 2.
&
VI. 10.
341
2.].
And
scriptural text also says that the individual soul
"
in
is
embraced by the omniscient
deep sleep Up. IV. 3. 21.]. Therefore, word Sat (in the scriptural
is
He who passage
that Highest Person alone
man, who
is
omniscient and
who is
is
a similar
who
so
is
Self." \Brih.
denoted by the
under
discussion),
the Highest Brahthe Highest Lord. The is
(Bodhayana) says the same thing thus " In the Then he is in union with scriptural text the Sal.' this (viz. the fact that the Sat is the Brahman Vrittikdra
:
'
who
is
the cause of the world)
is
conclusively
made out
by means of (the creatures) withdrawing (into the Sal) and returning (from the Sat); and the scripture also says that He (the individual self) is embraced by the omnisci'
ent
Self.'"
not (what is denoted by the word Sat) for the following reason also
The pradhdna
is
:
Sutra
11.
Gatisamanyat.
has to be a similarity of import (between the passage under reference and the other passages relating to the cause of the creation, &c., of the
Because there
world).
the import of the following among other passages relating to the creation of the world, namely, "The Self, indeed, this one only was in the beginning. No-
Whatever
is
333 He thought 'May I create the thing else lived. He created these worlds." [Ait. Up. I. i worlds.' " From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came 2.];
&
353.
Literally,
winked or opened Us
eyes.
SRI-BHASHYA.
34 2
I.
[Chap.
Part.
1.
from the spatial ether the air (came into from the air, the fire from the fire, the
into existence,
existence)
;
;
waters; and from the waters, the earth." II.
of
i.
i.]
"That which
;
Him, that
is
this
Rigveda
\_Taitt. is
Up.
the breath
of this Great Being."
a
54
[Sub. Up. II.] from the similarity (whatever) (their) signification, (of import) with that, that is, from the sameness of meaning (which) this (passage under reference) is to have with is,
is
that (signification) (it has to be inferred that the pradhdna is not the Sal). In all these (above passages) also, the Lord of all is made out to be the cause (of
the world). is
Therefore here
(/.
in this passage)
c.
definitely determined that the Lord of
all is
also
it
alone the
cause (of the world).
The pradhdna
is
not (what
Sat} for the following reason also
Sutra
12.
is
denoted by the word
:
Srutatva ^h^a.
Because also it is revealed (in the very Upanishad in which the passage under discussion occurs, and in other Upanlshads, that the Supreme 5elf is the cause of the universe).
Indeed, in this very Upanishad in the following
(viz.
the Chhdndogya},
"
Entering in along the same as Myself, (also) I evolve the differentiation of names and forms." \Qihdud, " All these which are VI. born, my things 3. 2.], Up. dear one, have their origin in the Sat (i. e. in the One
with
passages, namely,
this individual self
which
is
Existence), have their abode in the Sat, and are established "All this has 6.], \Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 4 That for its Self. this (Brahman} is Existence.
&
in the Sat."
(Brahman}
354.
Vide supra
n. 251.
Adhik. V. Sut.
He is
SRI-BHISHYA.
12.]
343 "
the Self."
[Qihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.], Whatever there here as existent and whatever there is as non-existent in is
relation to him,
Up. VIII.
i.
all
that
is
contained in Him."
"In Him,
3.],
all desires
[Qihdnd.
are contained."
" This Self is devoid of sin, is \Qihand. Up. VIII. i. 5.], free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth,
and 7.
the
wills
&
i
it
3.]
by the word
Up. VIII.i.
5.
&
declared that that, which
is
denoted
truth."---\Chhand. is
Sat,
is,
in
consequence of
the same character as the
Self,
its
VIII.
possessing
capable of causing the
names and forms and possesses (the quaomniscience, lity of) (the quality of) omnipotence, the of the being quality support of all, the quality of being differentiation of
devoid of
&c., the quality of desiring the truth, and To the same effect
sin,
also the quality of willing the truth.
are the following and other scriptural passages found elsewhere also : " He has none as His lord and (none) as
He
whatsoever.
is
and
He
has no characteristic body the cause and is the Lord of what is'
His ruler in the world
;
e. of the jlva or the individual (/. has no progenitor and no superior." [Svct. Up. "The omniscient Lord who creates all beings
the lord of the senses
He
soul);
VI.
9.];
gives
them names,
and, calling
ever continues to be."
who
them (by those names), He
\Taitt. Ar. III.
has entered within,
is
the ruler of
12.
7.];
all
"He,
things that
are born, and is the Self of all." \Taitt. Ar. III. 24.]; " He is the Self of the whole universe and is the best
refuge ; He vidual souls
is ;
the Lord of the world, the Lord of the indi-
whatever thing there
seen or heard,
without and so "
He
is
is
in this world, either
that within and Narayana pervades remains for ever". \M. Nar. XI. 3 5.];
the internal Self of
all
all
beings,
He
is
devoid of
all
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
344
[Chap.
I.
Part. I.
He is the one Narayana.' Therefore the scriptural passage i.]. which mentions the cause of the world is not capable of
sins,
He
is
the Divine Lord,
[Sub. Up. VII.
importing (as such) the pradhdna and other similar things. Consequently it is settled that that Narayana alone who omniscient and omnipotent, who is the Lord of all lords, who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that
is
is
all
who is the great ocean that receives the flood of the collections of (all) the innumerable auspicious qua-
evil,
which are
lities
Highest Person, universe and
is
unsurpassed in excellence, who is the He alone forms the one cause of the
the
Brahman
For the same reason
it
that has to be enquired into. has to be understood that the
contention, which maintains that the Brahman
is pure inof devoid characterising attributes, has also been telligence set at naught by the Sutrakara with the help of these (above quoted) scriptural passages ; because it is establish-
ed (by him) that that Brahman, into, is associated
who
is
to be enquired
with the real attribute of
which forms the main and natural
'seeing', &c.,
significance of the root
iksh, (to 'see'). Indeed, according to the contention which maintains that that (which is the cause of the world) is devoid of characterising attributes, even the character of
a witness
(/.
e:
of one
who
'sees')
has to be unreal (as
applied to that cause). That the Brahman, who is to be made out from the Vcdanta, has been enunciated to be
the object of the enquiry (here), and that He is intelligent, are (both) declared by means of this aphorism among others namely, "Because the activity imported by the ;
root zksh
what
(to see i.e. to think] is predicated (in relation to constitutes the cause of the world), that which is
not revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the pradhana}, is not (the Sat or the Existence which is referred to in
Adhik. V. SuL
12.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
345
the scriptural passage relating to that cause of the world)." Vcd. Sftt. I. i. 5.]. To possess the character of an intelis known to.be the same as to possess the of quality And accordingly that which is intelligence. devoid of the attribute of 'seeing' (or thinking) has exactly the same nature as \hzpradhana.
ligent being
Moreover, according to the position which maintains Brahman is pure luminosity devoid of charac-
that the
terising attributes,
it is difficult
even to establish that
(such) luminosity. Luminosity (or intelligence) known to be that particular which is
He
is
indeed
capable of mak-
thing
ing itself and other things
is
to be realised (by the mind). devoid of attributes does not possess both fit
The thing which is these characteristics, and
it
certainly has in consequence
the character of a non-intelligent thing like a pot or any other similar object. If it be said that, even though it does not possess both these characteristics, it is as good as if it
had them, it is replied that it cannot be so. To be as good as if it had them is indeed nothing other than (for it) to be able to do
what they
are capable of doing.
On
admitting the possession (by the Brahman} of the quality corresponding to this capability, the position which maintains the attributelessness (of the
Brahman)
have been given up. Again, rity of the
scripture,
this
will indeed
amount
to
be urged that, on the authoone particular characteristic
if it
quality (of capability) has to be admitted, then indeed, for that same reason, omniscience, omnipotence, the quality of
being the Lord of all lords, the quality of being the abode of all auspicious attributes, the quality of being hostile to all that is evil, and all other similar qualities will have to Again, to possess a capability as to be able to produce a particular effect
be admitted.
is ;
the
same
and that
of the capability) has to be definitely determined (possession
44
SRf-BittSHYA.
346 solely
by means of
(its)
[Chap.
When
effect.
produced
Part.
I.
I.
(such) a
particular produced incapable of being proved, then the possession of that capability, which has to be defieffect
nitely determined solely
is
by means of that
becomes
(effect),
also incapable of proof.
him who maintains
Further, according to
man
to be) an attributeless entity,
(the
Brah-
impossible to prove (that the Brahman possesses) the-character of being a thing at all ; for, it has been already 335 pointed out that perception, inference, revelation, and one's own experience deal it is
with things which are possessed of attributes. Therefore,
is
it
Highest Person alone, 3 willing to the effect
36
of the world which
is
and non-intelligent
He who
conclusively established that that ' is capable of seeing and of '
who
-'May I become manifold in the form made up of wonderful intelligent
things',
that (Highest Person alone)
is
has to be enquired into.
ADHIKARAXA.
VI.
Anandamayddhikarana. It
has thus been pointed out
how
Brahman, who
the
to be enquired into, is distinct from the pradhdna which (merely) an object to be enjoyed (or endured) by intelli-
is is
gent being* (/>. by individual in its
own
souls),
nature, and which
saliva (goodness), rajas (passion),
Now, to
all
it
will
that
356.
is
non-intelligent
and tamas (darkness).
be declared that the Brahman, is
distinct (both)
355.
which
consists of the qualities of
evil
and who
is
unsurpassed from the subjective self who
Vide supra pp. 54 to 60. Vide Taitt. Up. II. 6. I.
Chhana Up. VI
&
who
is
hostile
bliss itself, is is
.2. 3.
pure,
and
Adhik. VI. SnL also
SRi-BHisHYA.
/j.]
(from the subjective is
self)
(thus) impure,
who
347 under the influence
is
owing to his being immersed
.pf&z/v/zaaud in the ocean of varied and endless miseries resulting from his association with the which is made prakriti up of the three qualities (of saliva, &c.).
Sutra
13.
Anandamayobhyasat.
That which is denoted by the word Anandamaya (is the Brahman); because there is, (in the 3 8 Uhe context), repetition of various grades (of bliss which culminate in the Anandamaya or the Highest Bliss).
Starting (the exposition of) the subject-matter of the context in the passage "This purusha a 38 is thus a modification of the essence of food ", \Taitt. Up. II.
i.
which
the Taittinyas recite
i.j,
consists
of
of Bliss)."
sists
understanding (or knowledge)
inner Self, the
(still)
arises
whether
who
different
is
"Different from this
Anandamaya
\Taitt_.
this
Up.
II. 5.
Here the doubt
i.].
Anandamaya
from the individual
is
the
is
That which con-
(or
the
Highest
self that is
Self,
subject to
bondage and release, and is generally denoted by the word jlva; or whether (the Anandamaya is) that (individual himself.
self)
It is
the individual
it is
" This itself
is
perhaps thought right to hold self.
Why
the embodied Self of that (which consists
declared that the
embodiment.
357.
358.
is
mean
Anandamaya
Taitt.L'p\\.
The word Purusha to
[Taitl. is
is
the body.
here
359.
Up.
II. 5.
is
that individual
The Purvafaks/iin
jector here
is
i.]
associated with an
Indeed the embodied one
The context here
intci^reted
that
Because, in the passage
?
of understanding or knowledge)." it is
33 9
the Sdfitftya.
or the ub-
SRi-feHisHYA.
34$
who
self
is
in association
Part. I.
/.
[Chap.
with the bod}*.
It
may how-
ever be said that the scripture has (here) the aim of showing what that happiness is which is enjoyed by the Brahman, who is declared to be the cause of the world; '
and
(with that object in view), it refers in the beginning to what consists of food, &c.; and that, going on step by step, it finally teaches that that same cause that,
of the world
is
consists of Bliss.
of the world has been
the cause
is
what
omniscient Lord of all, because " It saw " tural sentence
it is
(/. e.
that which
stated to be the
revealed
[Qihdnd
that
And
Up.
in the scrip-
VI.
2. '
3.] '
that (cause) is capable of the activity of seeing of thinking). True, it has been (so) stated but that ;
(cause of the world) is nothing other than \\\Q jiva (or the individual self); because, in the passages " Entering in along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself,
O
&c."[&hdnd. Up.
VI.
3.
"That thou
2.];
that [Chhdnd. 7.], Up. is to world out be the the cause of pointed be seen to grammatically equated with the individual art,
which
Svetaketu."
VI.
8.
is
A grammatical equation is indeed intended to the give teaching of oneness (about the things equated in the instance" This is that Devatherein); as self.
datta",
and
in other (such instances).
creation which
thinking)
is
And
that act of
'
'
invariably preceded by seeing (/. e. by certainly appropriate to the intelligent indiviis
dual self (also). Therefore, by means of the passage "-He who knows the Brahman attains the Highest." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], is
that essential nature of the individual
(altogether)
free
from association with the
self,
which
non-intelli-
be the (final) (viz. matter), is taught to of that essential of The definition attainment. object the nonwhich free with from association is nature,
gent thing
Adhik. VI. Sat.
13."]
SRi-
intelligent thing (matter),
Brahman Up.
II.
is i.
Existence, i.].
Indeed
is
said to be this, namely, "
Knowledge, final
Infinity."
release
is
The
[Taitt.
nothing other
than the attainment of this nature (by the individual self); because " To him who is and has a body, there is no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not .him
who
is
and has
no body."
\Qihdnd. Up. VIII. 12. i.]. Hence, that essential nature of the individual self, which is free from ignorance (or avidyd) and is referred to in the very beginning (of the context under reference), (that) is" taught to be the Anandamaya (or that which consists of bliss). Accordingly, with a view to indicate the essential 'nature of the indi-
the body is, in accordance with the manner of pointing out the moon with the help of (an apparently contiguous) branch of a tree, first of all pointed out in the vidual
self,
statement that the purusha is made up of food \Taitt. Up. H.i. i.]; and then the five-fold prana existing within that (body) and forming its support, then the mind existing in the interior of that (prana} and then the intellect
even
each in its existing within that (mind), are all mentioned, to ready apprehension, particular place, in an order helpful
by means of the expressions
prdnamaya (or that
for that
which
which
(that
the purusha
consists of prana),
consists of mind),
and
is
is
is)
manonmya
vijildnamaya (or that
which consists of understanding or knowledge); afterwards, the individual self which exists in the interior of all these the vitaught in the passage" Different (from the inner [Taitt. anandamaya'.' self, jndnamayd) is the things
Up.
is
II. 5. i.];
brings to
and then
a close the
it (i.e.
the context under reference)
series leading
to the internal
self.
that what is (here) Consequently, it is definitely determined nature of the individual self taught is-^that the essential
SRI-BHASHYA.
350
Brahman which
that
itself is
is
[Chap.
i.
and that that same
i.],
individual self) It
bliss).
is
the
may
be said 3C
the scriptural statement " the support." \_Taitt. Up.
out to be other than the
"
is
He who Up.
\_Taitt.
what
(or
consists of
that, in accordance
The Brahman II. 5. i.],the
Anandamaya
is
the
Brahman
with
and
tail
made
is
(or that which consists
can not be so(made out). TheBrahman Him(here) conceived to have the form of an embodied
of bliss). But self who
1.
(essential nature of the
dnandamaya
also
Part.
referred to in the very
beginning of the context in the passage knows the Brahman attains (the Highest)." II.
L
it
person (or purushd)
is,
harmony with His own
to be
nature, represented
arm and the
in
Just
tail.
as,
peculiar
possessed of the head, the in the scriptural statement
beginning with "This is its head" [7a///. Up. II. i. i.], the body, which is a modification of food and is an organic
whole made up of constituent parts, is described as possessing the-head, the arm and the tail which are (all) its own constituent parts and are not different from itself; so also, the Brahman too, who consists of bliss, is described by
which are [not different from HimIt being so, on account of His being the seat of joy, self. pleasure, satisfaction and bliss, which are (all) described
means of
joy, &c.,
to be (His) constituent parts, the
Anandamaya who
is
an
spoken of as "the Brahman who is the tail and the support." And if anything other than the Ananda-
indivisible
whole
is
maya
what
consists of Bliss)
then
(or it
would have
" Different from (still)
.What
360.
inner is
Self,
said
This
is
this,
indeed, which consists of Bliss,
the Brahman." this:
had been the Brahman,
also been described to the effect that
And
it is
the
not so described.
The Brahman, who
objecti'oiv against
is
is
referred to in
the Sdhkhya proceeds from the
A du -ailm*
Adhik.
VL
Snt, /j.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
351
the very beginning (of the present context) in the passage " He who knows the Brahman attains the Highest ". in
II. i.
Up.
[Taill.
the passage^
by means of the definition given The Brahman is Existence, Know-
i.], is
"
01
"
ledge, Infinity
Him
guishes
Brahman
is
declared to possess such a nature as distinfrom all other things; and then that same
mentioned by the word Atman
(or
Self)
" From that same Self, indeed, (the passage spatial ether came into existence)", \Taitt. Up. II. then i. and the which i.]; scriptural passage, explains in
the
being the innermost (essence) all, gradually passes in review the pranamaya and other such things which, owing to each of them being more self-hood to
in
consist
of
and more within, are, one after another, represented to be the self of those things which are denoted as the annamaya and so on and then (lastly) what is pointed out by the word Atman (or Self), in the scriptural statement "Differ;
ent (from the vijnanamaya}
maya"
\Taitt.
meaning
in
of Bliss).
At man
context)
it is
Self,
made
what
Anandamaya
definitely
the Ananda-
to have
its
final
consists
(or (the use of) the
word
determined that the Brah-
to in the very beginning (of this the Anandamaya (or what consists of Bliss) is
is
referred
may again be said as Brahman is the tail and
It
"the
is
by means of
Therefore,
man who
the inner
Up. 11.5.1.],
(denoting) the
(or Self),
is
follows
:
After stating that
the support"
\Taitt.
Up.
II.
by means of this
the context here) points out, (j/0fl)-"Whoever knows the Brahman as non-existent, he becomes non-existent indeed; whoever knows the Brah5. i.], it (viz.
man
as existent, him, therefore, they
\Taitt.
361.
Up.
Tatti.
II. 6. i.],
Up.
II. i. i.
know
as existing."
that the existence and non-existence
SRl-BniSHYA.
352
7.
[Chap.
Part.
L
of the self result (respectively) from the knowledge and the ignorance relating to the Brahman, but not from the
knowledge and the ignorance relating to the dnandamava Further it is not appropriate (or what consists of bliss). to have any doubt in relation to the knowledge of the existence and non-existence of such an dnandamava as is
known
the world over to consist of joy, pleasure, &c. Therefore this sloka (mentioned above) is not given in reall
ference to the
Accordingly the
Anandamaya (or what Brahman is other than
ya (or what consists of Just as, after
say) so.
the
tail
earth
is
Anandama-
the
it is
not (right to " This is
making the statements
and the support." [Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], "The the tail and the support." [Taitt. Up. II. 2. i.],
"The Atharudngirascs
(or the
vas and Angirases) are the
Up.
But
bliss).
consists of Bliss).
II. 3. i.],
the support.".
"The ma has [Taitt.
Up.
hymns revealed by the Atharand the support."
tail
(or splendour)
II. 4. i.],
is
the
the slokas
[Taitt. tail
and
commenc-
ing with-" All the creatures are produced from food (anna}" in their respective [Taitt. Up. II. 2. i.], are all given
contexts so as not to denote merely the tail, but so as to denote the (whole) body which is made up of food, &c.; so " He becomes nonalso, here too, this sloka which says existent indeed, &c."
not relate to the
tail
relates to the
which
is
Anandamaya, but does from the Ananda-
different
Even when the Anandamaya is the Brahman, it is certainly appropriate
itself
maya.
taken to be
to have the doubt
regarding the existence and non-existence of that bliss which is (in itself) undefinable but is (merely) described as consisting of joy, pleasure, &c. The unknowability of that
Brahman
also
who
is
spoken of as the
due to (His) consisting of undefinable said that the
Anandamaya
is
tail
is
bliss.
altogether If
it
be
not the Brahman, because
Adhik. VI. Sut.
SRI-BHISHYA.
73.]
353
Brahman does not possess the head and other such constituent parts; it is replied that the tail also cannot be the Brahman, because the Brahman does not the
of being a tail, and (does not also the nature of It may (here) possess) being a support. be said, however, that the expression 'the tail and the possess the nature
'
is
support
man,
a merely indicatory description of the Brahas He forms the basis of that thing which
much
in as
caused by
Then, avidya). and other things as indeed, possess joy form will an other parts (of the body) (also) indicatory description of that Brahman who is different from pain and
is
illusorily
consists of bliss.
Brahman II. i. i.],
ignorance (or
as the head,
to
is
The
result
is
this
:
Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."
He
is
"The
In the passage \_Taitt.
declared to be different from
all
Up.
things
which are other than Himself, which are subject to modiand fication, and which are non-intelligent and definable ;
the statement that different (also)
mavat found the
He
is
Anandamaya
from pain.
in (the
Brahman who
And
teaches that
He
is
for this reason the affix
word) Anandamaya, which relates to indivisible and wholly consists of
is
uniform bliss, has to be understood to denote the same thing as the word to which it is affixed (viz. the word Ananda), in the same the
way
in
which (that
word prdnamaya.
tiated into the varied
The
affix
has to be understood) in
individual
and wonderful
self,
who
divisions
is
differen-
manufactured
(or avidya) and consisting of gods and other such (embodied) beings, has such an essential nature as is indivisible and homogeneous and forms the only seat of
by ignorance
pleasure ; and he is accordingly called Anandamaya (or that which consists of bliss). Consequently this Ananda-
may a
is
the subjective
45
self.
SRI-BHASHYA.
354 If is
I.
Part.
I.
we
be so argued,
it
[Chap.
say in reply "That which (is the Brahman], bethe context), the repetition (of various
denoted by the word Anandamaya
cause there
is,
(in
grades of bliss which culminate in the
Highest
[Vcd.
Bliss)."
That which
Silt. I. i. 13.].
Anandamaya or the The Anandamaya
is the Highest Self. a (graded) repetition (of bliss). " Now In the passage beginning with this is an in-
(or
Why
consists of Bliss)
Because there
?
is
vestigation into bliss."
with
''
From
Whom
bliss is
II. 9. i.],
[Taitt.
speech
Up.
and ending
II. 8. i.] "
&c.
'returns,
[Taitt. Up. an order in
in
continuously repeated, (bliss) is a hundredfold of the
which each succeeding (preceding
it),
so as to reach that (bliss)
summit of an unsurpassable
bliss
which forms the This
condition.
(last
bliss)
not possible to the individual self who is capable of enjoying (only) a small and limited amount of pleasure which is mixed with endless miseries; and it (viz. this bliss), in is
consequence, denotes, as forming Self Himself
who
is
hostile
to
its
all
abode, the Highest that
is
evil,
who
is
the only seat of all auspicious qualities and is quite distinct from all other things (than Himself). Accordingly, the following passage says "Different from this which consists of understanding (or the vijAdnamaya)
That
the
which
is
the
(still)
inner Self,
of Bliss)." Anandamaya (or that which The vijttanamaya (or [Taitt. Up. II. 5. i.]. consists of understanding or knowledge) is, indeed, the consists
self, and not merely the intellect because, by means of the affix may at, a distinction is implied (between vijilana and vijnanamaya}. But, in the case of the word
individual
;
accepted as a matter of necessity that that mayat) imports the same thing (as the word prdna to
prdnamaya, (affix
which as
it is
much
as
it is
affixed). it
is
Here
possible
(in
vijflanamayd) however, in
for the individual self to possess
Adhik. VI. it
(/.
c.
Silt,
SRi-BHiSHYA.
/j.]
v/jflana,
or understanding),
355 it
is
make
not right to We have al-
that (affix mayaf) meaningless. mentioned that the individual self, in the bound and ready released conditions, is nothing other than the knower. And it
will
be stated presently 362 how, in the case of the (word)
prdttamaya and others, the
capable of being It may be asked, how, if such be (fully) significant. the case, the use of the word vijflana itself (to denote the
individual
may at
is
appropriate in the sloka which, beginning vijiiana performs the sacrifice." [ Taitt. Up. II.
self) is
"The
with
affix
5. i.], relates to the vijft&namaya
of understanding).
(or that
which
consists
nothing wrong to speak ofvijfidna (or understanding) as constituting the essential nature of the It is
who is none other than the knower; because he possesses self-luminosity, and because also the essential nature of the knower (too) has to be described only by individual self
means of (his) knowledge. Indeed those words, which denote such attributes as are descriptive of the essential nature of things, import, by means of ;(those same) attributes, the essential nature also of that thing
those attributes
;
like
which
is
the possessor of
ox and other words (which by means
of the general attributes they denote import also the essential nature of the thing to which they belong). Or, in " The accordance with the (grammatical) aphorism kntya affix 3C3 has more than one significance."
lyut
\_Pdnini.
has to be accepted that, (in the case of the root jtta, to know, associated with the suffix vi), the affix lyut denotes the agent. Or, accepting that it (viz. the root jtia III. 3.
1 1
3.], it
know) belongs to the group of roots commencing with nand (to please), the affix lyur has to be understood,
to
362, See 363.
under aphorism 14
The Rntya
affix
Lyut
infrt. (i.
e.
And} may denote the agent or object or impersonal activity,
the
SRi-BmsHYA.
356
\_Lhap. I. Part. /.
jna to know), to denote the agent, accordance with the (grammatical) aphorism, which begins
(in the case of the root
in
with (the group of roots commencing
nand, (to
with)
please), and (the group of roots commencing with) grah, (to seize), and which prescribes (the affixes) lynr, &c., (to those
respective groups of roots).
And
it is
it
"The
passage
scriptural
and
\_Panini. III.
very reason that
for this
also performs the
vijfiana
karmas"
it
i.
134.].
3C4
declared in the
is
performs the
Up.
\Taitt.
sacrifice,
II. 5. i.],
that the vijflana possesses the quality of being the agent in performing sacrifices, &c. Indeed it is not possible for the
mere
intellect to possess the
As a matter of food
(/.
(similar) all
c.
fact,
quality of -being an agent.
in relation to
what
is
made up
the annamaya]y as also in relation
things which are
which are and which are all
all non-intelligent,
serviceable to intelligent beings,
mentioned before the vijilanamaya context), there
is
of
to other
(is
mentioned
in
the
no declaration of that quality of agent-
ship which forms (exclusively) the attribute of intelligent For the same reason, the scriptural passage beings.
the Supreme Person became) the intelligent /. c. the and non-intelligent thing." [Tailt. Up. II. 6. i.] thing
"(He
separately points out the intelligent thing (or the inself) and the non-intelligent thing (or matter) of their characteristic peculiarities of having a means by dividual
home and
of being homeless
this
indicates
ingly
364.
Lynr
is
(passage)
That
is
to
say,
the
affix
to be applied to the group
roots beginning with the affix nttti
is
Nand
of
to please;
to be applied to the
group of roots beginning with Grali U> seize; and the affix AcJi is to be
(respectively);
and accord-
by means of the word
applied to the group of roots beginning with Pack to cook. By the application'
of
these
several
affixes
nouns signifying agents are derived from these several roots.
Adhik. Vl.
SRI-BHISHYA. intelligent
who
being
possesses that (vijHdnd) as his characteristic 363 which relates Accordingly, in the Brahmana
quality.
Him who
yandinas is
/j.]
knowledge or understanding) the
c.
(i.
to
Silt.
to the
-\Mddh.
the
is
who mention the "He who, effect Brih.
Up.
Ruler of
Internal
III.
7.
all,
the
Madh-
passage which dwelling in the self, &c." 22.], in the place of that alternative
passage which is stated in other words, in the recension of the Kanvas to the effect " He who, dwelling in know-
\Kan. Brih. Up. III. 7. clear that what is denoted by the word
ledge (or understanding), &c."
make
22.],
it
vijndna (or understanding), as contained in the recension of is (nothing other than) the individual self.
the Kanvas,
The neuter gender used denotes that Therefore the
it
is
in the case of the
intended to point
Anandamaya
word
vijfiana
out as a thing. (or That which consists of Bliss) it
accordingly different from the individual self consisting of intelligence, and is the Highest Self who exists within that (individual self). Although, in the sloka "The
is
performs the sacrifice, &c." \Taitt. Up. II. 5. i.], mere knowledge alone is mentioned but not the knower ; vijfidna
" Different (from by means of the statement is this inner the the manomaya) self, vijftdnamaya (or -that nevertheless,
which
consists of knowledge)." it {Taitt. Up. 11.4.1.], the knower himself who possesses that (vijndna or knowledge) that is taught (to be the individual self). For
is
example, although merely the food following sloka, namely, food, &c."
{Taitt.
passage, namely, This
365,
of
the
is
Up.
mentioned, in the
II. 2. i.];
nevertheless, in this (other)
"This same embodied person (purusha)
the seventh Bra/i-
third
is
"All creatures are produced from
chapter of
the
"Bnhadaninyaka-Upanisliad.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
35 8 is
what
thus
is
made up
I.
[Chap.
Part.
of the essence of food."
I.
[Taitt.
not merely the 'food that is pointed Up. on the other out; but, hand, (what is pointed out) is II. i. i.], it
that which
is
made up
is
of that (food), -that
modification thereof.
all this in
is,
what
is
a
mind, the Siitra-
Bearing kdra himself says (almost) immediately afterwards, (that the Anandamaya is different from the individual self) " Because (also), there is, (in the context), the declaration of difference (between the individual self and the Brah-
[Ved. Snt. I. 1.18.]. has been stated (by the Ptirvapakskiri) to the effect that what forms the cause of the world is also none other mati)." It
than what possesses the essential nature of -the individual self, on the ground that He who is mentioned to be the cause of the world
is
(again) pointed out
by being gramma-
tically equated with the individual self in the scriptural " Entering along with this individual self which passages is
(also) the
same
as Myself, &c."
\Qthdnd. Up. VI.
"That thou art'{Qi/iand. Up. VI. has also been stated) that, bearing this
and
essential nature of the starting,
the
is
Brahman
attains the Highest."
taught to be the of bliss) owing to
is
is
not
individual
self
right
;
Anandamaya its
7.];
in
3. 2.],
and
(it
mind, that which, at
itself,
"
referred to in the passage
8.
He who knows
[Taitt.
Up.
II. 1. 1.],
(or that which consists
This being distinct from pain. although the individual self
because,
possesses the nature of an intelligent being, it is not possible for it to be associated with that varied and wonderful act of creation
which
is
invariably preceded
by
his
own
volition fas forming the cause thereof), in accordance with
the
"
passage
and be
Under
It
thought
'May
I
become manifold
created tefas." \Qhhdnd. Up. VI. 2.3.]. " the aphorisms Except in the matter of the activborn';
It
Adhik. VI. Sut.
/j.]
of
istic
"
and
Sut. IV. 4. 17.],
359
creation, &c., of) the world
to (the
ity relating
SRI-BHASHYA.
And on
" [
Ved.
account of the character-
(between the individual self and the being solely confined to (the item of) enjoy-
equality
Supreme Self) ment" [Ved.
be established that, even when he (the individual .self) is in the pure and free condition (of release), he cannot have the activity relating Sut. IV. 4. 2i.],
it
will
to (the creation, &c., of) the world.
when
the
Brahman who
is
be asked, how, the cause of the world, is not If
it
admitted to possess the same essential nature as the individual self, the grammatical equation in the statements "(Entering along) with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself" \Qhhand. Up. VI. 3. 2.], and
"That thou
art."
appropriate
it
who who who
is
;
is
\_Qihand.
asked
in
Up.VI.\S.
reply,
how
7.],
the
devoid of even the smallest taint of
who
all
would be
Brahman that
is evil,
omniscient and omnipotent, possesses the whole collection of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, and who is the wills the truth,
is
cause of all things, can acquire that essential nature of the individual self which is full of thinking and blinking, and (full)
of
which
all
said that priate
other similar activities resulting from the
karma
the abode of endless and varied miseries. If it be
is
it (viz.
when
the grammatical equation) becomes approtwo (equated things) is taken to be
either of the
Pray, to which (does that falsity belong)? Does it belong to that (individual self) which is associated with evil, or to that (Supreme Self) the essential nature
false, it is
whereof
asked
is
hostile to evil
and forms the only abode of
auspicious qualities ? If it be said that the hostile to evil lities,
Brahman, who
is
and forms the only abode of auspicious qua-
constitutes the basis of the
(or avidytf),
all
and thus appears
beginningless ignorance
falsely to
be associated with
SRI-BHISHYA.
360
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
this (apparent association with evil) is false it amounts to making a self-contradictory then in nature; statement to the effect that the Brahman is hostile to evil
evil,
and that
and forms the only abode of auspicious 'qualities, and becomes, (at the same time), owing to His iforming the basis of the beginningless ignorance (or avidya) the abode of such false appearances as give rise to endless miseries. Indeed to be associated with evil is nothing other than to be the basis of ignorance (or avidya), and to be also the
abode of such false appearances as lead to the miseries To be associated with them resulting from that (avidya] or with ignorance and its effects) and to be avidya (viz. .
hostile to
them
are certainly contradictory of each other.
In spite of this being so, do not say that there diction, for the reason .that that
or ignorance
and
its results) is
is
no contra-
(association with avidya
of a false nature. Whatever
that certainly constitutes a wrong aim and you yourself say that (the study of) the whole of the Vedanta is commenced for the destruction of that
is
of a false nature,
of
life
;
(wrong aim). And the of
life
association, with such
as deserves to be set at naught,
contradicted
by that nature
(of the
is
a
wrong aim
undoubtedly
Brahman) which is hostile
and forms the only abode of (all) auspicious qualities. may be said What shall we do? The proposition that, by knowing one thing, all things become known has been ento evil It
unciated in the passage
by which what Up. VI.
i. 3.];
"(Did you ask for that teaching) heard becomes heard ?" [Chhand. and then, in the passage beginning with 'not
is
"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning" \Qihand. Up. VI. 2. i .] it has been declared that the Brah,
man
is
the only cause of
"It thought Up. VI. 2. 3.],
'
(it
May
the worlds and in the passage become manifold ?" \Cfrliand
all I
has been declared)
;
.
that
He
possesses
Adhik. VI.
Silt,
SRI-BHASHYA.
ij.]
361
the quality of willing the truth and afterwards, by means of the grammatical equation, contained in the passage " That thou art" [Ctotf. Up. VI. 8. 7], it has been pre;
dicated in relation to that
same Brahman that
one with the individual
who is the abode of endless mise-
and now, because
self
'
That
'
is
incapable of being otherwise explained, it has to be assumed that the Brahman Himself is the basis of ignorance (or avidya) and of other such things. If it be so said, it is replied that what ries
:
this (oneness)
is
inappropriate and opposed to reason should not be assumed even for the purpose of making the scripture approThen again it may be said that (His) association priate. is
indeed a reality, but (His) possessing the character of being the only abode of (all) auspicious qualities
with
is
evil
is
of the nature of an unreality.
Then
this sastra,
which
has been promulgated with the object of saving such intelligent beings (or individual souls) as are tormented by the three 366
miseries,
teaching them
saves
them well enough indeed by Him (viz. the Brahman],
that, in relation to
the torment of the three miseries character of pure and
imposed by
illusion
!
!
is
alone real while (His)
unmixed auspiciousness
And
again conclusion
with
the
is
superof
desire
it may be said, reavoiding this erroneous His that the Brahman, possessing the character garding self and of one who is misery-stricken, of the individual
&c., which are
all
different
from His essential nature of
pure and attributeless Intelligence, must be assumed to be and that similarly His possessing the quality of false His being the abode of auspicious quathe truth, willing ;
His being the cause of the world, and His other such If you all to be assumed to be false). qualities also (have lities,
366.
Vide supra
n. 12.
46
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
362
{Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
say so, how wonderful must be your skill in thinking out the meanings of sentences The proposition that, by !
knowing one thing, hold good, as
much
when
all
in relation to the all
become known, cannot
things are taken to be
things also
in the
If,
one thing
way
is real,
equally real
is
in
at all in
unreal,
have to be known
as all the things that
be non-existent.
to
all tilings
will
then
which the knowledge
the knowledge relating is included in that
and
(knowledge relating to that one thing),
then indeed,
it
is
possible to say that,
things
by knowing that (one thing), all become known. As a matter of fact, by knowing
the really existent mother-of-pearl, the silver that is superimposed upon that (mother-of-pearl) and is unreal does
not become known.
It
ing of the proposition things
become known
buteless surely
alone
is
this
:
and
real
that thing which all
else
is
would not have been declared
is
unreal. in
attri-
Then
the scripture
"
(Did you ask for that teaching) by which what not heard becomes heard, what is not thought be-
thus is
is
it
be again said that the meanthat, by knowing one thing, all
may
:
comes thought, what is not known becomes known ?"3?7 \Qjhand. Up. VI. i. 3.]. The meaning of this passage is indeed this when that one thing is heard, all that which was unheard becomes also heard. If the real existence of that one thing alone, which is attributeless and is defined to be the cause of the world, had been en:
unciated in the proposition, then the illustrative example given to the effect "Just as, my dear child, by one
lump of
clay, all that
(Qhhand. Up. VI. 367.
But
it
is
1.4.),
made
would
would have been de-
clared to the effect for that teaching
" Did you ask
by which
all
of clay becomes
things
also
"-
have been found to
are (taught) to be of a
or by which tifiecl."
known
all
false
nature,
things become stul-
Adhik. VI. Snt. be
SRI-BF.A.SHYA.
ij.]
Indeed what
inappropriate.
363 illustrated
is
is
(here)
by knowing the lump of clay, all the modifications of that (clay) become known. It may be said that here (z. e. that,
in this
the unreality of the modifications is But then the unreality of these modi-
illustration)
also implied.
fications of clay could not
have been such a conclusive-
proved thing to the pupil* 88 (Svetaketu), as the (illusorily perceived) snake in the rope and other (such falsely perceived) objects (would have been). Accordingly
to illustrate the import of the proposition enunciated, could not have been -appropriate to introduce,as if they had been well known, the examples beginning with "Just as, my dear child, &c." \Qtliand. Up. VI. 1.4. ly, it
&
5
6.J.369
Moreover
it cannot be said that, previous to the geneof the knowledge produced by the scriptural passage "That thou art." [G&terf. Up. VI. 8. 7.] and by other
sis
similar passages,
we have any
with or without the support of
such criterion of truth, either the know-
logic, as gives rise to
ledge of that unreality which is associated with all modificaThis subject will be dealt with under the aphorism tions. " (The world) is not different from that (Brahman), be-
cause the
word
made
out) from the (group of) passages having [ Vcd. Sut. 'beginning' at their commencement."
(it is
so
Accordingly there are the following and other "Existence alone, my dear child, this was similar passages: II. i. 15.].
368. Literally, one
of
who
is
desirous
hearing 369.
i. e.
of learning.
These are three
given in Chhand.
Up.Vl.
illustrations I.
4 .5
&
6,,
and are to the following effect Just as, by knowing one lump of clay, all :
that as,
is
made
of clay
is
known
all
that
and
'
'
;
just
by knowing one nugget of gold.
is
made
just as,
of gold
(iron) nail-scissors,
of iron
by
is
is
known
;
by knowing one pair of
known
knowing
:
the
all
One
namely, the Bra'unan, evolved out of
that
exactly
is
made
similarly'
Existenceall
Him becomes
that
knowi).
is
SRI-BHASHYA.
364
[Chap.
in the beginning,
one only, without a second."
Up. VI and be
"It thought
" 3.];
2.
i.];
born.'
Indeed,
created
It
which
I.
\Qihdnd.
become manifold
I
[Qfihand. Up. VI. 2. three deities along with
is (also)
evolve the differentiations of " All these VI.
name
the same as Myself, I and form." [Qlihdnd.
things which are born,
3. 2.];
Part.
tej'as."
entering these
this individual self
Up.
'May
I.
my
dear
one, have their origin in the Sat (i. e. in the One Existence), have their abode in the Sat, and are established in the Sat."
-{Qlihdnd. Up. VI.
8.
4
&
\CIihdnd. Up. VI.
Self."
6.];
" All this has That for
And by means
8. 7.].
innumerable characteristic attributes
Brahman}, by means of the
sdstras,
cations) are the following
are predicated
and others
:
relation to the
(in
made
such as are capable of being ;
its
of these,
out solely
and (those predi-
This world has the
Sat (or the Brahman] for its Self before the time of creation it is destitute of the differentiation of names and forms; ;
matter of creating the world the Brahman, who is denoted by the word Sat (or Existence}, does not stand in need of any cause other than Himself He is at the in the
;
time of creation possessed of that characteristic volition which is peculiar to none other than Himself and is to the "
effect
endless
I will myself become manifold immovable and movable things"
with His volition, creation
in the ;
in
form of
accordance
by a peculiarly well defined arrangement of endless and wonderful entities; the differentiation of endless names and forms results from is
the entrance of the individual
characterised
self,
which has (the Brah-
man] Himself for its Self, into all the non-intelligent things and all things other than (the Brahman] Himself have Himself for their basis, have Himself for their abode, are capable of activity through Himself, live by none other ;
than Himself, and are established
in
Himself,
In other con-
Adhik. VI. Sut.
7j.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
365
all incapable of being made other means of proof (than the sastras) are in a thousand ways declared to be found in association with
texts also such qualities as are
out by
all
Him and they ;
void of all that
are,
is
among
others, the quality of being de-
evil so as to
be wholly free from sin and of
such other evil things, the quality of omniscience, the quality of being the Lord of all, the quality of desiring the truth
and the quality of willing the truth, the quality of possessing that unsurpassed bliss which forms the cause of the bliss that belongs to all (others). (In the passage That thou art '), the word 'That' points out the Brahman, who forms '
the subject of the context and
which are
is
characterised
by endless
attributes, manner, not within the (all), of means of any other province proof (than the scripture) and to say that that (word) is intended to teach only that in this
;
thing which is devoid of attributes is to talk incoherently like a mad man because it is (so very) inappropriate (to word thou denotes the individual self And the say so). ;
'
'
who
associated with the condition of being in samsdra
is
If this (word) also (or the circuit of mundane existence). be intended to denote that (thing) the essential nature of which is free from all attributes, then its own real significa-
tion
would have to be given up.
already avidya)
Moreover
it
has been
369 is
which
is,
reason
is
pointed out that concealment by ignorance (or indeed not possible in relation to that thing the by nature, attributeless and luminous
that,
;
(if
it
were
destruction of the essential
would lead to the nature (of that thing) itself and possible),
it
to other such (inconsistencies). Again in such a case, in re' ' gard to both the words That and thou which are found '
in the
grammatical equation
370. Vide supra p. 161.
('
'
That thou
art)',
their
main
SRi-BHlSHYA.
[Chap.
1.
Part.
L
and natural
significance has to be given up, and in consea quence figurative significance (in relation to both of them) has necessarily to be accepted.
Further,
found
may
it
be said thus
:
The (words) which
are
a grammatical equation are not at all capable of importing (any) thing which has the character of a special in
because they are all intended to denote only one thing. And solely from this there results the negation of attributes which gives rise to the denotation of the oneattribute,
ness of the thing
Therefore there
itself.
is
no room
for
any figurative interpretation (here). For example, in the " The instance the two words ( blue and lily is blue" lily)
are intended to point out the oneness of that thing
which
characterised (by fore the quality of being a is
blue are not both
meant
what they denote); and therelily and (the quality) of being
to be spoken of (here).
If
they
meant
to be spoken of, then, indeed, there would (so) result the denotation of the oneness of that form which is
were
characterised
by the
quality
of being a
lily,
with that
(other) form which is characterised by the quality of being But this cannot be. Indeed that (one) thing (which blue. is
imported by the grammatical equation)
is
not character-
ised by (what is signified by) the word lily, which is (itbeself) in the form of what is characterised by blueness ;
cause there would (otherwise) be room for the relation of reciprocal inherence 3 7 between a class and a quality. J
Therefore what
denoted by the grammatical equation the oneness of that thing which is (at merely (here) once) characterised by the quality of being blue and the For example, in the instance, quality of being a lily. is
is
371.
The
class
would have
to
be
inherent in the quality and the quality
in the
clasa.
As
a
matter
ol
fart, it
is
the quality
cut in the class,
that
is
inhcr-
Adhih. VI. Sut. 1
This
tical
is
/j.]
SRf-BHlSHYA.
that Devadatta'
it is
367
not possible for the gramma-
who was
equation to denote that a person,
tion with a past time
and a
in associa-
far off place, is existing in that
very same condition in association with a near place and the present time ; accordingly, what is denoted by the grammatical equation (here) is merely the oneness of that essential nature (of the person)
which
is
characterised
by
both (those) times and both (those) (its) Although that quality, which is made out at the places. time of hearing a single word such as blue or any other, association with
'
'
account of contradiction, denoted (by that word) at the time when it is grammatically equated (with any other word or words); nevertheless, as it denotes a is
not, on
main part of the thing which
is
intended to be denoted (by
the grammatical equation), there is no figurative signifiOn the other hand there is cance (in relation to it).
merely a desire not to mention (any) thing which constitutes a quality (of that one thing which forms the import of the equation). tical
equation in
wrong all
This indeed all
cases.
is
the nature of a
Therefore there
is
grammanothing
(here).
This aforesaid (argument) is of no value. Indeed in sentences what is to be understood is merely those
which are found between the things words the (in those sentences), and which imported by have arisen in accordance with the proper process of makEven when they are used ing out the meanings of words.
particular relations
grammatical equation, words like blue ', &c., denote the thing which is characterised by blueness, &c., as estab'
in a
lished in accordance with
the proper process of making out the meanings of words and (they denote that thing) in its relation with the (other) things denoted by the Other words (therein). For instance, when it is saicl ;
SRI-BHASHYA.
368 1
Bring the blue
I.
Part. I.
what
is brought is a thing which &c. when it is said by blueness, Again, herd of elephants, which is excited with ruttishness
lily/
characterised
is
"
[Chap.
A
exists in the
(madamudita],
what
Vindhya
forest
(or
Vindh.
yatavi)" pointed out is only that thing which is characterised by the attributes denoted by the two is
words (madamudita and Vindhyatavi). In the same manner, in Vedantic passages also wherein grammatical equations are mentioned, what is to be understood is that
Brahman who
undoubtedly characterised by all (those) particular attributes (which are denoted by the various words in those grammatical equations). Moreover,
when
it is
a thing),
desired to mention an attribute (as qualifying
it is
characterised ised
is
by some
not that a thing, which has a form already by some attributes, is (again) to be character(other)
the essential characterised
nature all
by
attributes
;
but,
on the other hand,
(of that one thing itself) is to be the attributes. Accordingly
"A
grammatical equation (between words) means that words having a variety of significations are used so as to 372 import only one thing."
The
function of a grammatical equation is to predicate, (in relation to a thing), either affirmatively or negatively, by means of certain
words that that same thing which has already a particular form denoted by some words is also possessed of a cer" Devadatta is tain other form as, in the instance :
brown, youthful, and red-eyed, without mental weakness, And where, by without money, and without fault." the words of a grammatical equation, any two attributes
mentioned which are not capable of being consistently applied to one and the same thing, even there it has are
372.
Vide supra
n.
75.
Adhik. VI. Sut.
SRl-BHlSHYA,
13.]
369
be accepted that (only) one of the two words (signifying those attributes) can not have its main necessarily to
and natural "
instance,
significance, but not
The man of the
(or a brute)." in others like
it,
is
'The
as in the
;
a go 373
is
In the
instance
there
no contradiction of the
is
ence of two attributes
hence what
both of them
Valilka country
(in
is
lily
one and the same
denoted (there)
by two attributes. Again you may hold as
is
and
blue'
co-exist-
thing,);
and
only one thing as charac-
terised
follows: --What
as being correlated to (any)
from what
distinct in nature
is
pointed out
one particular attribute is
correlated to
is
some other
Accordingly, even though (the words in a grammatical equation) are found in the same grammatical case, attribute.
not (thereby) possible for them to import oneness (in regard to the thing they denote), as (it is not possible) in the case, for instance, of (the words) pot and doth. There-
it is
words
grammatical equation) are not capable of denoting (only) one thing as characterised by many fore (the
in a
On
attributes.
the other hand,
is
it
the essential nature
(of a certain thing) that is first explained by means of the attributes (denoted by the words in the grammatical equation);
and
it is
subsequently (to this) that they
(viz.
those
words) become capable of denoting the oneness of that (thing). It
may
be
so,
tion (of a thing) to ness, (of
case.
373.
provided (only) that the mere correlatwo attributes is opposed to the one-
that thing).
The
original here
is
vahikah, and the word Vdhlka interpreted to is
Ganris
also
mean the person who
outside the pale of
47
is
not seen to be the
way
of the oneness (of
This, however,
Indeed, what stands
Vedic religion.
in the
What lion
is
is
to be noted in
that the
meaning
an
ox
senseless brute.
this illustru-
word go as usual
iinsteacl
of
means a
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
370
1.
{Chap.
Part.
I.
only the association (of that thing) with two such attributes, as are not capable of meeting together in one
a thing)
is
and the same thing that attributes. in
And
is
to be
characterised
by
(those)
(such) incapability (of meeting together
one and the same thing) is, in the case of the characterof the pot and those of the cloth, established by
istics
The other means of proof. But, in the instance blue and in others like it, no such contradiction '
lily
is
'
ceived
;
is
per-
same way in which no contradiction is the case where the attribute of owning a stick
in the
perceived in and the attribute of wearing an ear-ring (are both found in association with one and the same person), and also in the
case where the attribute of having a form, the attribute of c., having a taste, the attribute of possessing a smell, (are found in association with one
and the same
thing).
It
not merely that there is no (such) contradiction whatsoever but the association (of a thing) with two attributes
is
:
(denoted by two words in a grammatical equation) certainly proves (also) that a grammatical equation has the power of importing a single thing through the difference in the Otherwise, significations (of the words used therein). there would be no reason to use
more than one word to
indicate merely the oneness of the essential nature (of a thing);
and thus there would be no grammatical equation
at
If,
all.
irrespective of their
own
relation (to themselves
and to the thing they qualify), the attributes (denoted by the words in a grammatical equation) be taken to denote only the accidental characteristic
of the essential nature
then, that thing would be sufficiently well (of that thing), marked out by only one (such accidental attribute); and, in consequence, all other accidental attributes would cer-
become meaningless.
If another form, characterised other accidental attributes, be admitted (in relaby (these)
tainly
Adhik. VI. SuL.
7j.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
371
tion to the essential nature of that thing),
would be room is
for saying that
a qualified thing.
Devadatta', there
is
it (/. c.
then,
there
that essential nature) '
This is that Again in the instance not even the slightest room for (any)
figurative (or secondary) interpretation
;
because there
is
(to be thereby got over), in as much as that thing, which at a past time was in association with a particular far off place, may, without any contradiction,
no contradiction
exist at the present time in association
Indeed
with a near place.
by means of this very reason that those who
it is
maintain 374
the perdurability of external objects prove This is that person', the recognitive cognition through a been in that association with two differthing which has '
ent periods (or points) of time is (really) one and the same. Otherwise, there would be a contradiction between the
(same) perceptions (belonging to different times), and all things would in consequence acquire the character of being transient in existence. And the contradiction resulting from the association (of one and the same thing) with t\yo different places
ence
is,
however, invalidated by the
differ-
in time.
For whatever reason the words used
in a
grammatical
equation possess the power of denoting a single thing which is characterised by many attributes, for that very
same- reason, the exchange
which
heifer,
is
(in
one year
return for the so ma) of the
old and
is
characterised
by
enjoined as the thing that has to be done under the commandment "With the red, tawney-eyed heifer, one year old, let him purchase the soma plant." [Taitt. redness, &c.,
Samh. VI. 3/4.
is
i. 6.
7.].
And
As against the Saugalas who maintain that
IkiddhibU
or all
it is
accordingly stated thus:
external things are transitory,
Ski-BHlsHYA.
372
"Because the substance are associated with one
[Chap.
L
Part.
I.
(heifer) and the quality (redness) and the same action (of buying in
the binding rule that they shall together denote one and the same thing." [Pfir. Mlm. Ill The pfirvapaksJiin (or the objector) here is of i. 12.].
the above passage), there
is
the following opinion: No doubt, the word 'red' denotes the quality of redness which is contained in substances, for the reason that quality also, like genus (or jdli) possesses the singular character of being a mode of substances. Nevertheless, in relation to the redness (here), there is no rule compelling its invariable association with the
old heifer; because to enjoin '
two
it is
one year
not possible, (in one commandment), the effect " Let him purchase
things to
with the one year old heifer, and let that (purchase) be made in exchange for a red one." And for this reason, the to be broken up where the word arunayd (i. c. red] occurs, so as surely to denote without distinction that redness which is contained in all the things mentioned in
sentence
is
the context as necessary (for the sacrifice). the feminine gender in connection with the is
intended to denote
which are mentioned which are of
(in
as
a general
necessary
The use of word 'red'
all) the things the context and
way in
genders. Therefore, in relation to the redness (here), there is no rule compelling its invariable In reply association with the one year old heifer. " to this it is stated as follows Because the substance all
:
(heifer) and the quality (redness) are associated with one and the same action (of buying), there is the binding rule that they shall together denote one and the
same
thing."
\Pur.
Mlm.
III.
i.
12.].
By means
of the
grammatical equation (in the passage above quoted), the words arunavft and ekahdyanyd, which (respectively) denote the thing that is characterised by redness and the
Adhik. VI. Sfd.
SRI-BHASHYA.
13.}
373
thing that is only one year old, are made out to import one and the same thing and this being the case, the thing heifer which is one year old and the quality of redness ;
by that very word aninayd to be relatform of the qualified and the qua-
are (both) declared
ed to each other lifier
;
and there
in the is
nothing opposed to reason in their beand the
ing (thus) associated together in relation to one
same action of buying; consequently,
is
it
unavoidably
necessary for redness to be associated with the one year old heifer which forms the means for the purchase (of the
soma
If, like the association of the act of buying plant). with the one year old heifer, the association of redness also (with it) is to be definitely made out by means of the
(mandatory) sentence itself, then the (one) sentence will have to be construed as having two meanings. But this is
By means
not found to be the case.
(arunaya) ness
is
tically
itself,
the thing which
what
is
made
is
red
'
characterised
out by
its
by redbeing gramma-
expressed equated with the word ckahdyanyd ;
'
of the word
(7. c.
the one
year old heifer) is merely the fact that that thing is the one year old heifer and its association with this quality is not (what is so made out). Indeed, a grammatical equation imports nothing other than the oneness of that thing ;
which
is
characterised
nition of a
by (many)
grammatical equation
"A
attributes. is
The
surely as
defi-
follows
373
grammatical equation (between words) means that words having a variety of significations are used so as to import only one thing." It is certainly thus that the statement
'
statements constitute (the
37;,.
words Vide
in
The
cloth
is
red
'and
other such
(each) a single sentence owing to
them) importing only one thing.
!>upra n.
75.
Indeed
L
SRI-BHASHYA. {Chap.
374
L
Part.
the function of this sentence consists in (denotthe association of the cloth with the predication ing) ' expressed by the verb to be'. But its association with (here)
expressed merely by the word red. What is definitely made out by the grammatical equation is only this much, that the cloth is that substance which is assothe red colour
is
ciated with the red colour.
Thus
nothing wrong to say that, (in any particular sentence forming a grammatical equation), a thing which is characterised by one attribute, or
two
attributes, or
words
particular
karaka
many
used
it is
denoted by certain agreement either with the
attributes
in
is
case-affixes 370 or with the nominative case-affix
;
made
out by means of the granuriatical equation that the thing so characterised by all the attributes is only one; and that this one thing is associated with
and that
it
is
the action denoted by the verb (forming the predicate of the sentence). (To illustrate this) there are the following " Devadatta is instances brown, youthful, red-eyed, "- -" Let him possesses a stick, and wears an ear-ring :
make
the curtain by means of the white cloth The word Karaka
376.
instrumental case;
expresses
the relation of a noun to the verb in a sentence. tions
There are
six
such rela-
according to Panini,
Karman, the
viz.
(i).
object or the idea
ex-
pressed by the accusative case;
(2).
Jfarana, the instrument or the
idea
expressed by the instrumental case; (3).
A'ar/f/, the
the instrumental
agent expressed by case
;
not ex-
if
pressed by the instrumental case, is
not considered a Karaka
when
it
ex-
by the nominative case; the agent and the instrument are both
pressed
capable of being expressed
by the
the .
gift
of
recipient ;
the tion
this
the
is
(4)
the
"
Bring
Sampradana, a
of
object
idea expressed by
dative case; (5) /. e.
"
Apciddna,
abla-
the departure or removal of
a thing from a fixed point this is the idea expressed by the ablative ;
case
;
and
(6)
AdhikaraM,
or the place of action,;
this
location is
the
idea expressed by the locative case-
The
genitive
or
possessive
case
not considered a Karaka^ because expresses the
relation
is it
between two
nouns but not the relation between a
noun and a
verb.
Adhik. VI.
Sill,
jj.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
375
"
" the lily which is blue Bring the blue lily " Bring the cow which is white and which possesses beauti" " Let him offer the sacrificial cake of rice ful eyes (puroshows the in to who way." dd'sa) eight clay cups Agni 377 Sam /i. II. 2. 2. And the same is the case \Taitt.
i.].
with the scriptural passage " With the red, tawney-eyed heifer, one year old, let him purchase the soma plant."
Samh. VI. when it is said
\Taitt. as,
What
i. 6. 7.]
" Let
is
him cook the
said
is
rice in
this
:
Just
a vessel
by
means of verb
is
different
one single action denoted by the fire-sticks," made out to be simultaneously associated with
words which are
in
so also, at the very time relation
is
made out
(in
such kdraka relation as
more than one kdraka
case,
when any
kdraka
a grammatical equation), every mentioned in the group of
is
words forming the grammatical equation characterised
by many
particular
is
attributes at once
:
perceived to be and thus it is
that each (such relation) agrees with the verb. In this there is nothing opposed to reason, and there are the follow" Let the ing and other similar instances (to show it) : clever cook cook the food prepared with milk, in a propersized vessel, by means of dry fire-sticks got out of the
khadira tree (Acacia Catechu). What has been (by implication) stated to the effect that a word, which denotes a quality and is used in a sentence in which a substance has been already mentioned, denotes merely a quality, and that therefore the word 'red'
(arunayd) in the sentence (given above) denotes nothing other than a mere quality, that is not appropriate; because it
is
the
377,
not anywhere seen, either in popular usage or in VedaSy that a word, which denotes a quality and is Vide also
Ait.
/-.VIf. 8,
SRI-BHISHYA.
376
I.
[Chap.
Part.
1.
grammatically equated with (another) word denoting a It is even wrong substance, imports merely a quality. to say that a word, which denotes a quality and exists in a sentence in which a substance has been already mentioned,
denotes merely a quality ; because, in the instance "The cloth is white" and in others like it, although a substance
made mention
what
denoted (by the sentence) is nothing other than a substance which is characterised by a " The white quality. In the following instance, namely, is
of,
is
belonging to the cloth", 378
which
cloth
is
the non-apprehension of the characterised by whiteness is due to the
mention of the words not at
all
grammatical cases; but is due to a substance having been already menin dissimilar
tioned (in the sentence). Adopting that same instance, we may speak of The white part belonging to the cloth', '
some
or
white and
sucli thing.
bhaga
i.
e.
In this case, the words (sukla i. e. part) are (both) used in the same
grammatical case, and what is therefore apprehended substance which is characterised by whiteness.
is
a
What
has been further stated to the effect that, since the purchase (of the soma plant) is completely concluded
with the exchange of the one year old heifer, (its) redness lias no necessary relation whatsoever to this transaction of purchase,
that also
is
inappropriate
;
because a word, is found in
which denotes a quality (such as redness) and
a grammatical equation along with any other word denoting a substance that is not characterised by any quality op-
posed (to the quality already referred The Sanskrit
378. this
as
follows: 5)'
is
equivalent of
given in the original
Palasva
siiklah.
is
as
Pata-
the genitive of pala and so is
to),
expresses that
in the genitive case,
the
and
nominative case.
siiklah is in
Thus
there
are two dissimilar grammatical cases here.
Adhik. VI. Snt.
/j.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
377
quality as abiding in that (substance) ; and hence there is nothing wrong in such a quality being associated with the action denoted
by the verb (in the sentence). Moreover, it been established having by means of the foregoing argu-
ment that the
quality of redness has, according to grama certain relation to the substance (/. e. to the one year mar, old heifer), the conclusion (of the pftrvapakshiri) was accordingly given to the effect that, since substance
are not (separately)
and quality
capable of serving as the
soma
means
for
purchasing (the plant), it proved by implication that they are both mutually related to one another that also is inappropriate. Therefore the meaning of this is
:
(Pftrva-Mlmatnsa aphorism) is nothing other than what has been given above (by us). Accordingly, in the grammatical equation 'That thou art' and in others like it, the teaching of oneness has to be brought out without giving up, even in the least, the qualifications denoted by both the words ('That' and 'thou').
But
this
is
not possible for him
Highest Self (or the
who
Brahman)
does not admit the
to be hostile to all that
to form the only abode of all the innumerable auspicious qualities, and to be a separate Being from the intelligent individual soul, which is capable of existing both
is
evil,
pure and in the impure condition and is subject to endless miseries superimposed by the beginningless ignorance (or avidya). Since it has to be accepted that the
in the
words used in a grammatical equation are intended to denote the oneness of that thing which is characterised by such attributes as are given (therein), it may be said that, even when one admits (the Highest Self as described above), the association with all those evils that belong to what is denoted by the word thou will tend to affect '
the Highest Self.
But
it is
'
replied that
it is
not (right to
SRT-BHASHYA. say.) so;
because,
\Chap.LPart.L
by means of the word
Highest Self alone that
'thou' also,
it is
the
denoted as forming the internal
is
ruler of the individual selves.
What
said
is
is
this
The Highest Brahman
:
who
is
denoted by the word Sal (or Existence), who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil, who possesses, together with the quality of willing the truth, the whole collection of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence,
to the
and who forms the cause of all
effect
'May
I
things,
willed
become many'; then He created
in
order the whole world consisting of (the elements of) fire, water, earth, and of such other things then, in that world ;
form of the wonderful material configurations known as gods, &c., He caused the whole series of existing in the
emkarmas
intelligent individual souls to enter into such material
bodiments as were suited to their
own
respective
so that they might (^severally) constitute the self (of those
He Himself, wholly of His own acinto individual selves so as to form their the entered cord, internal Self and then He introduced the differentiation embodiments); then
;
of names and forms are
known
among the
as gods, &c.,
material embodiments which
and which, being of
this nature,
are composite and include Him also within themselves. The meaning is that He caused the composite mass, which is
altogether of this nature, to assume the character of a thing and also to become capable of being denoted by words. In the passage 379 "(Entering along) with this individual self which is (also) the same as self, the expression
My
'
self
with this individual ',
which
shows that the individual
his Self.
379.
self
And
it
is
made
Vide Ch/iand, Up,.\1,
3. 2,
is
also the
self
has the
same as MyBrahman for
out that the individual self has
Adhik. VI. the
Silt.
Brahman
SRI-BHISHYA.
/j.j
Brahman
for his Self for the reason that .the
has entered into this individual self Self;
379
as to constitute his
so.
because in the context in which the passage 380
created
whatever there
all this,
created
Having
is.
"He it,
He
entered into that same thing. Having entered into it, He became the sat and the /va/." 381 occurs, the two things, namely, the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing, '
which are denoted by the expression all this ', are separately pointed out by means of the words sat and tyat, as also
by means of the words
Brahman
the
is
vijilana
and
avijttdna
;
and then
spoken of as entering even into the
thing (viz. the individual self). Therefore it has to be understood that, owing to the differentiation of names and forms having taken place in this manner, all intelligent
words denote the Highest Self as associated with the non-intelligent thing (matter) and with the (insignificant
telligent) individual self.
Moreover, by means of the passage
That is
for its Self."
"All
this has
\CJihdnd. Up. VI. 8. 7.], the world
which
associated with the intelligent things for the individual
selves)
is (first)
pointed out as
'
this
all
',
and then
it
is
declared that He, (the Lord), is the Self thereof. And since the Brahman forms in this manner the Self of
and the non-intelligent intelligent things the world whole things, together with all the intelligent individual selves forms His body. And to this effect there " are these other scriptural passages: He, who has entered is the of all ruler that are within, things born, and (He) is all
the
380. Vide Taitt. Up. .The continuation of this
as follows:
"He became
or the defined
II.
6.
passage
I
is
the Nirukta
and the Anirukta or the
undefined, the Nilayana or what has a
home and less,
the
the Ani/ayana or the .horne1'ijtldna or the intelligent
thing and the
AvijMna
or the non-
intelligent thing, &c."
381,
Vide supra
n. 185.
SRI-BHISHYA.
380
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
"
He who, dwelling in within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who internally rules the earth, He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self. the Self of all."
the earth,
[Taitt. Ar. III. 24.];
is
He
who, dwelling
self
does not know, whose body
nally rules the
in the self,
He
self,
is
within the
is
is
the
self,
self,
whom
and who
the
inter-
thy internal ruler and immortal
"He who is \_Madh. Brih. Up. III. 7. 3 to 22.]; He moving within the earth, whose body is the earth, who is moving within the waters, whose body is the Self."
He who
waters
whose body not
is
moving within the akshara,
the aksharq,*** whom the akshara does He is the internal Self of all beings, He
is
know
He
the Divine Lord, He is the one Narayana." [Sub. Up. VII. i.]. These and other passages first point out that the whole world together with is
devoid of
all sins,
is
the intelligent individual selves constitutes His body, and then they teach that the Highest Self forms the Self of that (world). Therefore those words also, which denote the intelligent things (or the individual selves),
est Self alone
things
denote the High-
who
forms the Self also of the intelligent these intelligent things for His body in
and has
;
the same manner in which those words which denote the non-intelligent configurated material masses known as gods, &c., denote only those individual selves who have those their bodies. particular masses of matter for this)
(To illustrate " other and The there are the following (examples)
four
who perform the sacrifice known as i\\Q pattehadasardtra
acquire god-hood."
383
The meaning
is
that they
become
gods. In the case of words which denote material embodi-
382.
Vide supra,
n.
185.
383.
Vide
3r. Sr.
XI.
2, 9.
Adhik. VI. ments,
it is
Silt.
SRi-BnlsHYA.
13.]
381
right (to say) that they also include in their im-
port that which
is
the embodied
bodiment possesses, racter of being a
;
because a material em-
in relation to the
mode
embodied, the cha(thereof); and because also those
words which denote modes include
in their import the the which are of those modes. Indeed things possessors what is meant by a mode is that aspect, which is made out
to be of a particular nature, and which
thing that
is
denoted,
when
it is
said
is
in relation to the
"This thing
is
of this
That (mode) is necessarily dependent upon that thing hence, the knowledge of that (mode) is necessarily dependent upon that (thing) consequently, it is proper (for that mode) to include (within its significance) that very thing. Accordingly, even the word which denotes that
nature." ;
;
(mode) includes that (thing) in its import. It is for this very reason that ox, horse, man, and other such words, as are denotative of particular genera and are the modes of masses of matter, include in their import the masses of matter which are (respectively) character-
particular
modes. And any such mass of matter, the constituting body -of an intelligent individual soul, forms his mode. Similarly, even those intelligent individu-
ised
al
by
(those)
souls,
who have
bodies, form
particular
masses of matter
modes of the Highest
for their
Therefore they
Self.
those words) finally include in their import the HighThus the Highest Self Himself is denotest Self Himself. (/. c.
And consequently the grammatical the word 'That'), with the word ('thou'), which equation (of (so) denotes the Highest Self, has certainly a primary and
ed by
all
words.
natural significance. It is only such may, however, be said (here) thus words as denote genera and qualities that are seen to be grammatically equated with words denoting substances It
:
;
SRI-BHASHYA.
382 as,
'
in the
instances,
The ox
[Chap.
L
broken-horned
is
Part. (
',
1.
The
candied sugar is white '. And in the case of such substances as form the modes of other substances, the affix having the force of matup 3 8 4 is seen to be applied to them (when they are used in grammatical equations); as in the instances
ofdapdin (or one who is the possessor of a stick) and kundaBut it is not lin (or one who is the wearer of an ear-ring). Neither the genus, nor the quality, nor right to say so. the substance,nor any single one of these can make a grammatical equation (fully) significant because each of them ;
may
In the case of a thing which can of another thing, the existence, persist-
stray into the other.
exist as the
ence,
and
ed with denote
mode
realisation (of that thing) are invariably associatthis
substance which themselves.
Hence the words which
(other) thing.
(mode) possess the power of denoting the
that
is
by what
characterised
Consequent!)
7 ,
it is
is
denoted by
certainly proper for
them
to be grammatically equated with the word which denotes that substance as characterised by an attribute different
(from what they themselves denote). Where, on the other hand, it is desired that a substance, which is capable of being realised separately and exists in itself, should form, somewhere and at some time the mode of another substance,
there, the affix having the force of
Thus
applicable.
it
(/'.
c.
matup becomes
the position here maintained)
is faultless.
Therefore the words T, 'thou', and others, which in
themselves specially denote the individual self, signify the Highest Self Himself, owing to the individual selves also,
who
are associated with the non-intelligent thing (matter),
384. This
possession.
affix
The
has the sense of affix
nint also has
.
the
same
affix
signification.
This
is
the
used in Dandin and Kund
Adhik. VI.
Sr/i.
SRT-BHA.SHYA.
TJ.]
383
mode
of that (Highest Self); the reason for this is that they thus constitute the body of the Highest Self. And this (view) is summed up in the grammatical equation
forming a
That thou
art'.
Such being the
case, in
consequence of
the individual self (thus) standing in the relation of the body to the Highest Self, those peculiar attributes which
belong to the individual self do not affect the Highest Self; in the same way in which childhood, youth, and other such conditions, which are associated with one's own body, do not affect the individual self. Therefore, in the That thou art the word That grammatical equation denotes the Highest Self who is the cause of the world,
'
'
'
',
who
wills
the truth,
cious
qualities,
of
that
all
is
who
evil
;
is
who
is
the
abode
of
all
auspi-
devoid of even the smallest taint
and (the word)
'thou'
also denotes
that same (Supreme Self) as possessing for His body that embodied individual self. Accordingly, the grammatical equation ('That thou art') has a primary and natural significance it
;
there
is
no contradiction
occurs); there
(wherein the scriptural passages
all
of the context
no contradiction of any one of and even the slightest taint of
is
;
ignorance (or avidyfi) and of other evils does not become possible in relation to the Brahman who is free from im-
forms the only abode of auspicious qualiSince the fact of (the Brahman) being grammatically equated with the individual self also imports in this manner that He is different from the individual self who purity
and
ties.
forms His attribute, therefore the Anandamaya (or He who consists of Bliss), who is the Highest Self, is different
from the individual
self
who
consists
of knowledge
(or
understanding). What has been stated above 383 to the effect that, in ',
385.
Vide the objection-statement supra pp. 347
&
348.
SRI-BHISHYA.
384 the statement
"This
itself is
[Chap.
L
Part.
I.
the embodied Self of -that
(which consists of knowledge or understanding)" \Taitt. Up. II. 5. i.], the dnandamaya (or he who consists of and that bliss) is declared to be associated with a body, it
is
not thus possible for him to be other than the that is not right self; because, in this con-
individual text, this
:
"
The embodied Self of by means of the statement the same as that of the former." \Taitt. Up. II.
is
&
3. i. II. 4. i.
II. 5. i.], it
is
declared in each case that
the Highest Self Himself is the embodied Self (of all). How ? Because the Highest Brahman who is other than the individual
self,
and who,
in
accordance with the scrip-
statement" From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into existence." \Taitt. Up. II. i. i.], is known tural
to be the supreme cause of the
whole
series of created ob-
jects such as the spatial ether and other things, is (Himself) taught to be the Self ; it is (therefore) made out that the spatial ether and other things including the annamaya (or
what
made up
of food), which are all different from Him, And by means of the following passage " belonging to the Subdlopanishad (He) whose body is the earth.... whose body is the waters,.... whose body is is
constitute His body.
the
fire....
whose body is the air whose body is the spawhose body is the akshara.... whose body is
tial ether....
prakriti or nature), ....He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the One Narayana." [Sub. Up. VII. i.], it is
mrityu
(i.e.
clearly
stated that all the
constituent principles of the Thereuniverse form the body of the Highest Self. " From that same in this fore, very passage, namely, 'into indeed, (the spatial ether came Self, existence) [Taitt.
Up.
Highest
Self
II.
i.
i.],
what
is
made
out
is
that the
Himself forms the embodied Self
of
the
Adhik. VI. Sat.
385
made up of food). The context pranamaya (or what consists of prdnd) in
annamaya
what
(or
speaks of the the passage "
He
mer
SRI-BHISHYA.
/j.]
is
He who
Himself
is
is
(the
embodied
of the for-
Self)
the embodied Self of this."
\_Taitt.
Up. II. 3. i.]. The meaning is that He who is the embodied Self of the annamaya mentioned before, and
who
forms
the
established
supreme
means
by
of
cause
(of
other
scriptural
the
universe),
passages,
as -is
Himself the Highest Self; it is He alone who is the embodied Self also of the pranamaya (or what is made
up of pritna).
In this manner
the context) has to manomaya (or what con-
it
be understood in the case of the
(viz.
of mind) and the vijflanamaya (or what consists of knowledge). But in regard to the Anandamaya (or that which consists of bliss), the indicative expression 886 " He sists
Himself"
is
made out
that the Highest Self
Self of ;the
vijftdnamaya (or This knowledge) being the case, if be said that He who is the embodied Self of the vijfi-a-
what it
How
Self.
going manner, it has been Himself is the embodied
given to show that He that ? In the fore-
is
Up. H.6.I.]
\Taitt.
has none other for His
consists of
namaya
(or
also.
what
consists
of
bliss) also:
then, the
is
knowledge)
the embodied Self of the
Anandamaya Anandamaya who
consists of
made
out by the
(or is
Himself
what
repetition (of the word 'bliss '), to be the Supreme Self will Himself have to be understood as forming the Self of the
Supreme Self. Accordingly the whole, collection of intelligent and non-intelligent things which are different from Himself constitute His body. the unconditioned embodied 386. in the
This expression "
passage
is
contained
The embodied
of this (which consists of bliss)
49
is
Self
He
He
alone
Self.
It
Himself who
is is
is
in
consequence
for
this
(the embodied Self)
of the former (which consists
derstanding)."
very
of
un-
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
386
reason that this sdstra which to the
Highest Brahman
as the Science of the
Anandamaya who
He This
promulgated
called
is
self
who
relation
in
is
undoubtedly
consists of
dis-
knowledge.
might say (here) as follows not different from the individual self,
(a pfirvapakshhi)
Anandamaya
because the
affix
I.
Consequently the
the Highest Self
is
Part.
/.
by worthy persons
Embodied.
from the individual
tinct
is
[Chap.
is
:
mavat which signifies modification The affix mayat is taught
found to be used (here).
is
to
possess the significance of modification in the (grammatical) aphorism which (for the first time) introduces (its modifi" The affix also
catory significance) by saying is used in these two (significations)"
and
143.];
(it
the effect
to
is
used
It
mayat)
(viz.
IV.
3.
aphorism which
is) also (taught) in the " the affix
is
always
of modification) after the words as the vriddhas 387 and after the group of words the
(in
known
mayat
\_Pdnini.
sense
beginning with sara."
word Anandamaya
is
(here) that the affix
[Panini. IV.
a vriddha.
mayat has
144.].
3.
It
may
also the
And
this
(again) be said
power of
signifying
abundance, because it is taught (to have that signification) in the aphorism " The affix mayat is (to be employed) wherever the abundance of a thing has to be expressed." \Pdnini. V. 4. 21.]; for example, where it is said "The sacrifice is
abundantly
full
of food (annamaya)"
this (signification) alone. 387.
The
definition of this
given in Pdnini the
first
I.
I.
to the process
known
word is
That word
73.
vowel of which
It
is
subjected
as Vridd/ti
(/'.
e.
is,
that (affix mayat) has
(however), not right
lengthening)
is
a VridJha, as in the
word Ananda where the a
lengthened
a.
first
vowel
is
Adhik, VI.
Sftt. 7^.]
to say so.
It (viz.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
387
the affix mayat} in
annamaya
seen
is
the very beginning (of this context) to possess the significance of modification. Therefore, according to the propriety of interpretation suited to the context, it is in
right for this (affix
mayat
also
the signification of modifi(viz. the affix mayat} have
Moreover, even if it signification of abundance
cation.
the
word Anandamaya}
in the
to have nothing other than
Anandamaya}, the
(in
character of being other than the individual self cannot result to that (Anandamaya}. Thus, when it is said that
one
is
abundantly
full
of
bliss, it is
indeed unavoidable
that one) to be mixed up with misery of bliss implies the possession of a small
Indeed to be an individual
;
(for
an abundance
for
modicum of misery.
nothing other than to Therefore it is right (for the
self
is
be associated with misery. affix mayat} to have only that significance of modification which is arrived at in accordance with that propriety of inin
which
is
suited to the context.
Furthermore, popular usage as in the instances mrinmaya (or what
terpretation
made up of clay), hiranmaya (or what is made up gold), darnmaya (or what is made up of wood), and
is
and
other such instances
in the
Vcdas as
of in
in the instances
made of leaves (parnawhich are made of the wood
of the semicircular vessel which
is
and of the ladles saml (samimayyaft), and of the girdle which is made of grass (darbhamay'i} and in other such instancrnayl},
called
es,
the affix mayat
of modification
comes to the self
;
mind
is
and
very frequently used in the sense consequently
at the very outset.
that
And
(sense)
alone
the individual
does certainly possess the character of being a modi-
fication of bliss.
To
that
(individual
self)
who
is
in
bliss, the condition of being found in the state of samsdra is nothing other than becoming
himself of the nature of
SRI-BHASHYA.
388
a modification of that
In as
(bliss).
L
{Chap.
much
as
Part.
L
the affix
mayat which denotes modification is found to be used (in the case of the word dnandamaya}, the dnandamaya (or what consists of blissj is accordingly nothing ,other than the individual
After stating this (objection) thus,
self.
he (the Sutrakdra) invalidates
Sutra It
it
(as follows)
:
14.
Vikarasabdanneti^henna pra^huryat.
may
be said that owing to there being the affix
(mayat) significant of modification, (the Anandamaya is not (the Brahman); but it is not (right to say) so because that (affix mayat) signifies abundance. ;
This (above-stated position of the Pfirvapakshin) is not right. Why? Because of there being the significance of
abundance. That
is,
because there
is
an abundance of bliss
Highest Brahman, and because also it is possible the affix mayat to signify abundance. What is said is
in the
for
this is
This Bliss
:
is
resident in the
not possible for the individual
that
Ananda
(or bliss)
which
is
order in which each succeeding
Brahman, because self to
it
be the abode of
continuously repeated in an a hundredfold of the
bliss is
being so determined, the Anandamaya (or That which consists of Bliss) must be the Highest Brahman, because there can be no modification in relabliss
(preceding
tion to
that
it).
It
Brahman, and because
also
it is
possible for
the rule regulating the use of the affix mayat to operate so as to signify abundance also. Even on account of the propri-
ety of interpretation suited to the context, and on account of the frequency of its use (in the sense of modithe affix mayat cannot (here) have the significance of modification; because, (if it did), there would be fication),
the contradiction of the context. Moreover (this) propriety of interpretation suited to the context has been given
Adhik.
VL
up even
in relation to the
in
Sut.
/./.]
SRI-BHASHYA. word pranamaya
the case of that word,
it is
to import modification.
may at)
389 because, the affix (for
itself;
not possible
Thus, in this case, the
which usually has a five-fold 388 activity, vayu becomes capable of being denoted merely by the word/ra(or vital air),
for the reason that it is in possession of the of the prdna, or for the reason that, among the activity five activities known as the prdna (or the vital activity),
namaya,
the apana (or the excretory activity), &c., the activity of the prdna is here in abundance. Again, it cannot be said that the affix mayat is not largely used in the sense of
abundance
;
because
it is
so seen in the following
and other
"
instances
may a)""
The sacrifice is abundantly full of food (annaThe journey is abundantly full of carts (sakata-
mayi).
What ance of
has been stated above to the effect that an abund-
bliss necessarily
amount of misery, ance of a thing
is
amount of it, and
that
implies the existence of a small is not right. Indeed the abund-
the same as having an exceedingly large this does not necessarily imply the exist-
ence of another thing. On the other hand, it implies the The existnegation of the smallness of that thing itself.
ence and non-existence of that other thing have to be made out by other means of proof. And in the present case, the absence of such other things is made out by this other in the scriptural passage "He who
means of proof found devoid of
is
others like
sin."
it.
much can be
\Qihdnd.
The
7.
i.]
and
in
Under these circumstances, only this said, that the exceedingly large amount
of the bliss belonging to the 388.
Up. VIII.
five activities are of
the
Brahman Samanct
or
necessarily implies digestive
activity,
the
Prdita or the principal vital activity,
Vydna or circulatory activity and the
the
Uddna
Apdnn
or excretory activity, the
or respiratory activity.
SRI-BHASHYA.
390
[Chap.
the smallness of the bliss belonging to other*. passage beginning with "That is one unit of
Up.
\Taitt.
this (fact)
II. 8. i.],
comparison with the
is
/.
Part.
/.
And in the human bliss."
declared to the effect
belonging to the individual self, the Bliss belonging to the Brahman is in an unsurpassable condition and is exceedingly large. that, in
What
bliss
has been further stated to the effect that
possible for the individual self to
it
is
become a modification of
not appropriate. That, in the way in which clay becomes modified into the form of pots, &c., the individual self, whose essential nature consists of knowbliss,
that also
ledge and
is
becomes modified into some form or other And it will be scripture, tradition and logic.
bliss,
against all established hereafter 889 that, in the condition of samsara, his knowledge and bliss are (merely) in a contracted condi-
is
of karma. Therefore also, the That which consists of Bliss) is different Anandamaya (or self and is the Supreme Brahman. from the individual tion under the influence
The Anandamaya different
also
(or
That which
from the individual
consists of Bliss)
self for the
is
following reason
:
Sutra
15.
Taddhetuvyapadesa^h^ha.
Because also He (the Anandamaya) is declared (in the context) to be the cause of that (which forms the bliss of the individual souls).
" If this Akdsa
indeed 389.
is
(i.
e.
there that can
Vide Sri-B6as/iya under
the
Brahman] be not
live,
Bliss,
who
and who that can enjoy
Ved. Sut. 111. 2. 3.
?
Adhik. VI.
He
For
Siil.
SRI-BHISHYA.
16.]
Himself causes
bliss,"
'
causes bliss
it is
In
i.].
Therefore
who
the cause of bliss to
is
it
to be understood
is
that Highdifferent from the individual self that is to be
that this bliss-giver
who is And
He
declared that
the individual selves.
blessed.
II. 7.
\Taitt.Up.
by means of the statement' He Himself
this passage,
est Self
391
it
maya Himself is
is
the
Anandamaya
is
be stated presently that the Anandahere 390 denoted by the word Ananda .(or will
Bliss.)
The Anandamaya for
is
Sutra
self
:
Mantravarnikameva
16.
from the individual
different
the following reason also
ci_a
giyate
(Because) also that same Being, who is denoted by the words of the mantra 3 9 (in the context), is declared 1
(there to be the
Anandamaya).
That same Brahman who
is
the mantra, which begins with ence, Knowledge, Infinity." en of as the Anandamaya.
Highest
Brahman who
is
denoted by the words of
"Tbe Brahman
\Taitt.
And
i
is
Exist-
], is
spok-
that
different
(Anandamaya] is the from what constitutes
the essential nature of the individual ly,
Up.
II. i.
And
self.
according-
by means of the passage" He who knows the Brah-
man
attains the Highest."
Brahman
pointed out that the 390.
Sut.
I.
391.
Vide Sri-Bhashya under J-W. I.
ence,
hidden
" :
is
to the follow-
The "Brahman
Knowledge, in the
is
Infinity
is
;
II.
Up.
i.
i.],
the object that
highest ether
(Him
20. infra.
This mantra
ing effect
\Taitt.
thus)
Omniscient
;
and he who
He
The word Mantra means composition,
to be knows
along with the "Brahman all the auspi-
cious qualities."
cave of the heart, in the
is
attains
Existis
is
it
Taill.
Up.
II.
j. I.
a metrical
SRI-BHISHYA.
392 attained is
by the
individual
'
Up.
\_Taitt.
I.
" This
II. i. i.],(the
'
That means the Brahman.
in view, that
man)
Part.
I.
In (the sentence)
self.
stated in relation to That."
word)
[Chap.
Him
accepting
is,
taught, this rik (or verse) the Vedas. The meaning
is is
Having that (Brahas the thing to be
repeated by those who study that the subject mentioned in
the brdhmana ag *is clearly explained by means of this manThe object to be attained by the individual self who tra. the worshipper is certainly the Brahman who is entirely And immediately afterwards (in the distinct from him. is
context), by means of the succeeding brahmanas as well " From that as the mantras, beginning with the passage
same
indeed, the spatial ether
Self,
\Taitt.
Up.
Therefore the
ed.
vidual
this
II. i. i.],
same
came
(thing)
Anandamaya
is
into existence ."-
is
expoundfrom the indi-
clearly
different
self.
No (a purvapakshin) might say thus : be attained the has to individual (by self) doubt, must be different from the individual self who is the he
Here
He who
worshipper. Nevertheless, the Brahman denoted by the words of the mantra (above) is not a different thing from the individual self but, on the other hand, He is that pure ;
essential nature of the aforesaid worshipper himself, is
devoid of even the smallest taint of
devoid of attributes, and which
That same
intelligence. self) is
evils,
which
which
is
pure undifferentiated
(essential nature of the individual
by means of the mantra begin, "The Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Infini-
clearly brought out
ning with 392.
is
all
A
Brafimana
commentary on composition.
a
Mantra
The
is
a
prose
or a metrical
Taittiriyobanishad
consists also of a miscellaneous colleclion of
Mantras and Brahmanas
the Tdittirlya-SQmhitQ
itself,,
like
Adhik. VI. ty."
Sftt.
\Taitt.
Up.
77.]
SRl-BHlSHYA.
II. i. i.].
That same
393 (essential nature of
the individual self) again is known to be devoid of attributes owing to its being beyond the province of speech and
accordance with the passage " Without being able to attain Him, speech returns with the mind." \Taitt. Up. II. 9. i.]. Hence, it is that same (essential nature of the individual self) which is denoted by the words of the in
mind,
mantra (under
maya
is
vidual
the
Ananda-
not other than that (essential nature of the indi-
he (the Siltrakdra] gives the following reply:
this
17.
Netaronupapatteh.
He who is other who is denoted by (in
Consequently
self).
To Sutra
reference).
(than the Brahman] is not (that Being the words of the mantra], because
such a case) there would be inappropriateness.
He who is different from the Highest Self and is denoted by the word jlva (which means the individual self), is not, even in the state of final release, that Being who
is
denoted by the words of the mantra.
Why
inappropriateness; that
not possi-
Because there
is
is,
it is
?
ble for such an individual self to have unconditioned omni-
This very same unconditioned indeed meant to be explained by the reference " He to the quality of willing the truth in the passage desired May I become many and be born'." [ Taitt. science
(yipasclLittva}.
omniscience
is
'
Omniscience (inpaschittva] is indeed the possession of such an intelligence as 'sees' in man}' ways. After eliding the syllable vat forming a part of the word it because it pasyat, the word vipa'scliit is derived from
Up.
II.
6.
i.].
;
(viz.
the word vipa'schif) belongs to the group of words
50
SRI-BHISHYA.
394
s beginning with prishodara.
s
Omniscience
I.
Part.
I.
is
certainly Nevertheless, as individual self has no omniscience in the state of
possible to a released
same
that
*>
[Chap.
individual
self.
samsara, it is not possible for him to possess unconditioned omniscience. The released individual self, who has attained the state of pure undirrerentiated intelligence, can-
not at
possess this omniscience
all
;
because he does not
'
ways. Such is (the inappropriateness). has been already 394 pointed out that the thing which is devoid of attributes cannot be made out by any
'see
in a variety of
It
accepted criteria of truth
whatsoever.
If
the passage
"
(Without being able to attain) Him, speech returns (with the mind)." -declare the return of [ Taitt. Up. II. 9. i.] speech and mind from the Brahman (without attaining Him), it (surely) can not thereby become capable of giving to the knowledge of the attributelessness of (that) BeBut, on the other hand, it will merely tell us that ing. rise
speech and mind form no means of proving that (Being). accordingly, He will acquire the character of a
And
mere nothing.
3 Beginning with the statement
who knows
Brahman
mentioned scient, that
the
(in
attains
(the
5
Highest)",
"He it
is
the scripture) that the Brahman is omniis the, cause of the world, that He is the
He
only abode of knowledge and bliss, that He is the bestower of bliss on all other*, that He is, of His own free will, the creator of the whole world
made up
of the intelligent things, that He forms
things and the non-intelligent the Self of the whole series of created things by entering into them, that He is the cause of fear and of fearlessness, that
that 393. 394.
He possesses Vide
Pdnmi
He
is
the ruler of the wind, the sun, &c., is unsurpassed in the or-
that bliss which
VI.
3.
Vide supra pp. 54 to
109. 60.
395. Taitl
U/>.
II. i, i.
VL
Adhik. cler in
Sul. /;.]
SRJ-BHISHYA.
which each succeeding
bliss
is
39$
a hundredfold of the
immediately preceding it, and that He is many other such things. And it is the idle talk of a deluded person to say that the Brahman is, after all (these are mentioned), bliss
declared to be incapable of any proof, in as
and mind cannot operate ledge) in relation to the
Ananda
Brahman
refers to the Bliss
"
pression
Brahman.
"
He who knows
the
"
II. 9. i.], this
\Taitl. Up. passage pointed out by the word yat in the ex-
able
(Without being
speech returns (with the it
as speech
any knowBy means of the word
(or Bliss) in the expression
Bliss of the
much
(so as to give rise to
mind)"
then says that that Bliss
is
to
attain)
\_Taitt.
that (Bliss)
Up. 11.9.
related to the
i.J;
Brahman
by distinctly mentioning that it belongs to the Brahman; and if, by saying he who knows', it then speaks of the knowledge of that same Bliss which is beyond the province of speech and mind, it will be, like the bellowing noise of an old bull and other such things, (altogether) meaningless, and will not at all fall within the class of what are called '
sentences.
passage) proceeds to give the definite measurement of the excellence of the Bliss
of the bliss is
Accordingly,
Brahman
it
(vix. this
order in which each succeeding a hundredfold of the bliss (immediately preceding in that
and then speech and mind return from Him (without attaining Him) on account of that (Bliss,) being incapable
it);
And it is this that is of (such) definite measurement. stated in the expression (Without being able to attain) '
It is said that (Bliss) speech returns (with the mind)'. that he who knows that Bliss of the Brahman, which is in
this
manner incapable of
have any
fear
measurement, need not Moreover it is undoubtedly
definite
from anywhere.
very clear that this omniscient Beingwho is denoted by the words of the mantra (under reference), and who is
SRi-fcHisHYA.
596
[Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
the passage beginning with "He desired, \Tailt. Up. II. 6. i.], to have of His own free will thought it fit to create and preserve the world, to be has in consequence the internal Self of the world, c.,
subsequently declared
in
c."
characteristics other than those tial
which constitute the essen-
nature of the released individual
For the following reason that which consists of bliss) self,
who
is
is
also,
the
Anandamaya
(or
from the individual
different
capable of existing in both the states (of bond-
age and of
final release).
Sutra
Bhedavyapadesachc[a.
18.
self.
Because also there
is (in
the context) the declara
tion of difference (between the individual self
and the
Brahman).
The statement
scriptural context,
"From
that same
which, beginning with the Self, indeed, the spatial ether
(came into existence)." \_Toitt. Up. II. i. i.], explains Brahman denoted by the words of the mantra (above
the
quoted), teaches, this
by means of the passage
which consists of understanding
(still)
inner Self, the
He is same way
that
prana
different in
Anandamaya."
(principal vital air),
Different from
knowledge)
[Taitt.
from the individual
which (He
made out
(or
"
Up.
is
the
11.5.1.],
self also;
in the
different) from anna (food), and manas (mind). Therefore
is
owing to the declaration of (this) difference (between the Anandamaya and the individual self), this Being, who is denoted by the words of the mantra (under reference) and is the Anandamaya, is certainly it
is
that,
SRl->HA.SHYA.
Ad/ilk.
VI.
different
from the individual
Slit.
79.]
self.
For the following reason different
Sutra
from the individual
Kama ^h^
19.
397
also,
Anandamayd)
(the
is
self.
a nanumanapeksha.
Because also His
will (is in itself the cause of creaaoc is not needed (by Him in the the pradhana tion), act of creation just as it is needed by the individual self).
In connection with the act of creating the world, it is impossible for the individual self, who is subject to the influ-
ence of avidyd
with
(viz.
nika,
matter) which the
that
Indeed,
four-faced
it
the
non-intelligent
denoted by the
is
&c.
pradhana,
ner that
avoid
to
(or ignorance),
ity of being associated
is
thing
words
dnumdthis man-
only in
Brahma and
necess-
others
form the
cause of the world. In the present instance, however, the creation of wonderful intelligent and non-intelligent " He created all this, whatthings is, in the statement ever there
is."
\Taitt.
place solely from that
declared to take
Up.
II.
will,
which belongs to
6.
i.],
Him who
devoid of any association with the non-intelligent thing (pradhana), and which is referred to in the statement-" He
is
desired
(/.
c.
willed),
'May
I
become manifold and be
II. 6.1.]. It is accordingly made out that does not, while creating the world, stand Anandamaya in need of any association with the non-intelligent thing
born.'" [Taitt.
Up.
the
pradhana. 396.
The
word
literally that which
ing
made out by
~Anumd,na is
capable
inference
to
means of be-
be the
cause of the world.
Anumdnika,
it
Like the word
denotes the Pradhana
of the Sdhk/tyas,
SRI-BHISHYA.
398
The Anandamaya for
is
different
the following reason also
Sutra 20. Asminnasya
cj[a
[Chap.
I.
L
Part.
from the individual
sell
:
tadyogam
sasti.
(viz. the scripture) declares (that) his (/. e. the individual self's) acquisition of that (bliss takes place when he is) in (association with) this
(Because) also
it
(Anandamaya). '
In this'
means
of the individual
in '
self.
acquisition of bliss.
*
It
the
Anandamaya.
The acquisition declares', that
'
His
of that is,
'
'
means
means
the
the scripture de-
clares. It is said
very same
"
Bliss,
Bliss indeed
is
He.
he (the individual
Having obtained that self) becomes blissful."
The meaning is this: When it is declared that, by attaining the Anandamaya who is denoted by the word Bliss, that being, who is apt to be denoted by the word jlva (which means the individual self), \Taitt.
Up.
becomes
by he
II. j. i.].
blissful,
then,
who but
attaining whichever (Being) himself that same (Being)
is
a
mad man
will say that,
whoever becomes blissful, It has been thus deter-
?
mined that the Anandamaya is the Highest Brahman, and hence it is that that same Anandamaya is denoted by the word Ananda (or Bliss) in the following and " If this Akdsa be not Bliss"other scriptural passages \Taitt. Up. II. 7. i.]; "The Brahman is Knowledge, Bliss." [Brih. Up. III. 9. 28.]; in the same way in which the :
vijilanamaya (or what consists of knowledge) is (denoted) by the word vijftana (or knowledge.) It is for this very reason (of our having to interpret Ananda as Anandamaya) that there
is
given a distinct indication (to that effect)
Adhik. VI. Snt. 20.] SRi-BHISHYA.
399
passage "He who knows the Bliss of the Brahman not have any fear from an)7 where)." [Taitt. Up. II. 9. (need is for this same reason again that the result (of i.]. And it
in the
such knowledge of the Bliss of the Brahman] is pointed out "He reaches that Self who is the Anandain the statement
maya" -[Taitt. Up. II. (or what is made up
Moreover the annamava
of food) and the other things, mentioned in the earlier 397 annvaka
been
which have
8. i.].
are recapitulated in the later 3 9 8 annvaka to the follow" Let him know the anna (or food) as the ing effect :
"Let him know the Brahman." {Taitt. him know the "Let manas (or mind) as Up. III. 3. i.]; "Let him know the Brahman." [Taitt. Up. III. 4. i.]; the vijttana (or knowledge) as the Brahman." \_Taitt. Up. III. 5. i.]. Hence it is made out that, in this statement also, " luimely, (Let him know) the Ananda (or Bliss) as the Brahman."
6^.111.2.1.];
[Taitt.
prana (or the principal vital
Brahman." Himself that
[Taitt. is
Up.
air) as the
III. 6. i.], it is
the
Anandamaya
taught (by means of the word Ananda). And
same reason, even that (/. c. the later annvaka) concluded by the statement" He (i.e. the released self) having reached that Self which consists of Bliss (Anandafor that
is
wrtw)...(sits I'//)."
down
[Taitt.
Up. it
Therefore,
singing this sfiman
//,
Vilha,
Vf/ha,
III. 10 5.]. is
a demonstrated conclusion that that
Highest Brahman, who is a different entity from what is apt to be denoted by the word pradhana, is also a different entity from that (other) entity, which signified
by
word
the
j'iva
is capable of being (which means the individual
self). 397.
The
"A/iaiidavalli Ut>.
eailier
Awtrata
Chapter
II
is
the
of the T^///.
398.
The
B/irigura/.i Tailt,
Up.
later
Chaptei
Antirdta III
is
of the
the
same
SRI-BHISHYA.
400
ADH1KARANA.
[Chap.
/.
Part.
I.
VII.
A ntaradhikarana. It is certainly
who
possess very
their
own
bliss,
to form
free
not possible for the individual selves merit to create the world out of
little
will,
to be associated with unsurpassable
the cause of fear and of fearlessness, &c.
Nevertheless, such a thing may surely be possible in the case of the Sun, Indra, Prajapati, and other such (individual selves)
who
He
possess peculiarly valuable merit.
(the Sfdrakara} disproves this aforesaid supposi-
tion thus
:
Sutra 21. Antastaddharmopadesat. (/. e. the Person; who is within (the Sun and the the Brahman), because His attributes are deeye clared (in the context). 3
He is
"
" This Person revealed in the Chhdndogyct thus He is brilliant like gold, seen within the Sun,
It is
who
is
:
has a golden beard, and has golden hairs, and is altogether golden even to the very tips of His nails. His two eyes His name is are like the lotus just opened by the sun. This same above-mentioned Person
High. all sins.
praise
the
399.
is
risen
above
thus rises indeed above the two psalms
sins.
in
He who knows (Him)
The Rik and the Saman are This is what relates to Him as He of Him He is is what relates to Him as Now this gods.
The
context referred to here
is
Chhandogyaml'panishad.
f,
6
&
7.
all
in is
in
Adhik. VII.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Sftt. 21.]
401
Again, that Person who is seen within the eye, He is that same Rik and that same Saman, He is that (Sktha,* OQ that Yajus and that Brahman. The form
our selves
the eye) is the same as the form of that (other Person in the Sun). The psalms in praise of that other (Person) are (the same as) the psalms of this above-mentioned Person
in praise is
the
8.
&
(in
of this (Person). The name of that (other Person) of this (Person) also." [Qihand. Up. I. 6. 6 to
name I. 7. i
to
5.].
Here the doubt arises whether this Person who exists within the eye and the bright orb of the Sun is that same individual self who possesses such sovereignties as result from an accumulation of the merit of works, and who is capable of being denoted by Sun and other such words
;
or whether
than that (Sun).
He
is
It is
is
(Person)
possible only
a body.
the Supreme Self
is
who
is
other
perhaps thought right to hold that self who has accumulated the
same individual
that
merits of his works. that
He
Why
?
Because
it
is
associated with a body.
for the individual selves to
As a matter
of fact,
it
is
declared that
Indeed
it
is
be associated with
for the
purpose of
experiencing pleasure and pain in accordance with the results of works that there is the association (of the self)
with a body. release,
declared in in
for this very reason that final from association with karmas, is the following passage to be capable of attainment It is surely
which
free
is
the bodiless condition:
"To him who
is
and has a body,
no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who is and has no body." [Qthand. Up. VIII. 12. i.]. Moreover it is there
400.
is
An
;
Uktha
is
a
verse be-
longing to the subdivision known as the Sas/ras which are recited either 5
1
audibly or inaudibly as opposed lo the Slonias which are sung-
SRT-BHISHYA.
402
[Chap.
I.
Part.
1.
possible for an increase of knowledge as well as an increase of strength to take place from the greatness of the merit of
For
works.
this
same reason the lordship of worlds and
appropriate only to such (an individual self as has so made his own merit great). And for the same reason desires
is
for him) to be the object of fruits of works, and also to the of the to be giver worship, be useful in causing the attainment of final release by pro-
again
(it
becomes appropriate
ducing the annihilation of sins. Even among men, those who have accumulated merit are seen to be very great in c. The Siddhas (their) knowledge, power, and the Gaudharvas are greater than they. Even greater than these are the gods. Still greater are Indra and others.
consequence of
Accordingly, some
from
one among
him downwards
attains in
Brahma and
the others
each halpa^^ the above-
mentioned sovereignty as a consequence of (his own) special merit and thus performs even the work of the ;
creation,
of the world.
&c.,
which deals with
passage, the world and with
Therefore, the
what
forms
what forms the
the
scriptural
cause
of
internal self of the
world, &c., relates only to this being who has specially increased his merit and is (thereby) omniscient and omni-
Hence
nothing that is called the Supreme This being the Self as distinct from the individual self. " That which is neither the case, gross, scriptural passage potent.
there
is
nor atomic, nor short, &c." \Brih. U'p. III. 8. 8.] and others like it are intended to import the essential nature of the individual self. And those scriptures which deal
with
final release are
intended to teach the essential nature
of that (individual self) and also (to teach) the means of attaining that (pure essential nature).
4.01.
Vide supra
p. 226. n. 246,
Adhik. VII.
Sill.
SRi-BHlSHYA.
21.}
40 3
" He (i.-c. reply the person) who is within (the Sun and the eye is the Brahman), because His attributes are declared (in the If
l)e
it
context)."
so held,
it
Silt.
\_Vcd.
stated
is
I.
i.
21.].
in
That Person who
is
within the eye He is other than the individual self.
within the Sun and
perceived the Supreme
Why
and
Self,
is
Because His attributes are declared
?
That
text).
which
attribute
it is
the con-
(in
for
impossible
the in-
which belongs only to Him who is other than the individual self and is the Highest Self, and dividual self to possess,
which imports the quality of being devoid of that "
statement
the
in
taught
This same above-mentioned Person
sins." is
is
I. 6.
[Qihand. Up.
7.].
with
above
all
Indeed to be devoid of
sin
risen
is
The meaning
to be free from karma.
&c.,
sin,
beginning
that
is
it
to
is
be free from even the smallest amount of subjection to the influence of karma. As a matter of fact, individual selves are subject to the influence of karmas, in as
much
as
they have to experience pleasures and pains in obedience to their kannas. Therefore, the quality of being free from all sin
who
is
forms the attribute of the Supreme Self Himself, Based upon this other than the individual self.
and conditioned by His own essential nature are the quality which relates to the lordship of worlds and
(quality)
desires, the quality of willing the truth,
c.,
the quality of
beings, which are all His own being the internal Self of attributes. Says the scripture to the same effect "This all
Self
is
i.
5.
&
the passage
He
free
and
desires the truth
VIII.
is
devoid
VIII.
"
from old age, from hunger,
free
sin, is free
from sorrow,
free
and
devoid of
He
of
7. is
all
wills the i
&
3.].
free
truth."
And
the internal Self sins,
He
is
from death, from thirst,
[Qihand. Up.
similarly there
of
all
is
beings,
the Divine Lord,
He
SRI-BHISHYA.
404
L
[Chap.
Part.
1.
To be capthe one Xarayana." \Sub. Up. VII. i.]. and all the non-intelligent intelligent
is
able of creating
things, in conformity with the quality of willing the truth
"
as stated in the
passage
manifold and be born."
He
desired,
Up.
\_Taitt.
May
II. 6. i.],
become
I
to form the
absolute cause of fear and of fearlessness, to possess that
unsurpassable
bliss
which
is
devoid of the limitations due
apprehension by speech and mind, these and such other attributes, which are natural and are not capable of to
being acquired by means of karmas, are impossible for the individual self to possess.
What
been
has
stated to the effect
the mention of the
to there being
owing
that,
with a
association
body, the Person (referred to in the scriptural text quoted above) is not other than the individual self, that is not right.
(any) it is
Indeed, association with a body does not establish because subjection to the influence of karmas ;
Him who
possible for
association It
will.
a
with
may
body
wills the truth to
merely through
again be said thus
The body
:
to be that aggregate of the elements
qualities.
His
who
And
association with
will, result to
it
that Person
is
own known
which are modifica-
made up
tions of the prakriti (or matter)
have the His
of the
three 402
cannot, in accordance with
who
is
devoid of sin and
because such (an association) cannot ; be an aim of (His) life. And he who is subject to the influence of karmas, and who is totally ignorant of his own wills the
essential
truth
nature,
cannot possibly avoid that association
(with the body), in consequence of his having to enjoy the results corresponding to his works, even though he does
not like
it.
It
would be
402. Vide supra n. 344.
so,
provided (we grant) that His
Adhik. VII. Sul. 21.] SRI-BHASHYA. is
body
made up
of the three qualities and
and
is
own
is
a modification
But that (body)
of the prakriti (or matter).
ance with His
405
desire,
and
altogether non-material
is
is
accord-
in
own nature,
suited to His
and thus the whole
;
What
is
said
is
(of our
this
is
:* argument) appropriate. There are myriads of innumerable auspicious qualities which are natural in themselves, and are unsurpassed in excellence,
and belong to that Highest Brahman Himself who is entirely distinct from all other things (than Himself), by reason of His possessing that nature which is wholly made and which is hostile In the very same manner, there is to all that is evil. divine form also, which is in accorda natural and Him) (to up of
infinite
ance with His
knowledge and
bliss,
own
suited to Himself,
desire
and
is
eternal
uniform, unthinkable, immaterial, wonderful, faultless,
and which
is
the
home
which
is
and
of endless collections of
unsurpassable qualities such' as splendour, beauty, fragrance, With the tenderness, elegance, youthfulness and the like. object of favouring His worshippers, He (/. c. Narayana) causes this same form of His to assume such a configuration as is suited to the understanding of each of those
Narayana
(worshippers) less
who who est
who
is
sweet disposition,
mere}',
the ocean
affection
is
free
from even the smallest taint of
is
free
from
Brahman,
who
of boundand generosity, all
the Highest and the Highest Person. all sin,
is
that
Self,
is
evil,
the High-
By means
of these passages,namely, "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning" \Cbhand. Up. VI. 2. i.], "
The
Self,
indeed, this one only
was
in the beginning.".
"Indeed, Narayana alone then was, and i.], [Ait. Up. not the (four-faced) Brahma nor Isana", \Mah. Up. I.] and by means of others, (the Brahman] is made out to be I.
the only cause of
all
the worlds
;
and the
essential
nature
SRI-BHISHYA.
406
Brahman
of that Highest
is
\Chap.
L
Part.
L
understood to be of this
(above-mentioned) character with the help of such passages -"
as
The Brahman
is
Existence, Knowledge,
"The Brahman
Infinity."
knowledge and In the following and other bliss." \_Brih. U'p. III. 9. 28.]. " scriptural passages, namely, (That which is) without attributes, without taint." \_Adh. Up. 68.], "(This Self) is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires Up.
\_Taitt.
II. i. i.],
is
the truth and wills the truth." VIII.
i
7.
&
\Qhhdnd. U'p. VIII. 1.5. has neither body nor senses, and
"He
3.],
seen neither His equal nor His superior His is and revealed indeed as natural varied supreme power and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action."
there
is
;
Up. VI. 8.], "(May we know) that highest and Lord of lords, who is the highest Deity of deities." greatest " He is the VI. cause, the Lord of what 7.], [Svet. Up. \Svet.
is
(/. c. of the jiva or the individual has no progenitor, and no superior." [Svet. Up. "The omniscient Lord who creates all beings, gives
the lord of the senses
soul);
VI.
He
9.],
them names, and, tinues to be."
great
calling
them (by those names), ever con-
\Tailt. Ar.
III.
Person of sun-like lustre
darkness."
\Taitt.
Ar.
III.
12.
who
12.
7.],
7.], is
altogether
[M. Nar.
I. 8.]
;
(in these
this
beyond
"All the nimeshas
were born out of the Person who has the ning."
"I know
lustre
of light-
and other passages), they
the scriptures) deny that the Highest Brahman possesses such qualities as belong to prakrdi (or nature) and as deserve to be discarded ; (they deny) that He is (i.e.
body made up of prakriti and (thus) of worthy rejection, and that He has any association with the condition of being subject to the influence of karma associated with a
>
which has that (association with the body) at
its
root
;
VIL
Adhik.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Snt. 21.}
407
and then they declare that He possesses auspicious qualities and has a beautiful form. To bless His worshippers, the Divine Lord who is all-merciful makes this same aforeform of His assume,
said natural
own
in
accordance with His
desire, the configurations of gods,
have that appearance which
may
same
"Although He
fact thus:
it
suited to the under-
The
standings of those (worshippers). this
so that
men, &c.,
is
scripture speaks of
is
He
unborn,
born
is
[Taitt. Ar. III. 12. /.]. And the Smriti ways." also (says the same tiling) thus "Although I am unborn, in various
:
and inexhaustible in My own nature, and although the Lord of all beings, taking up My own prakriti, born
then
again
and again, by means
for the protection of the
mdyd
destruction of evil-doers." the
good
object
(here)
[.
But
the
&
is
destruction
of
Indeed principal
than
evil-doers
object of secondary importance, because that
am am the
for
8.].
worshippers. nothing other
of accomplishment
protection.
good and
G. IV. 6
I
My own
of
The
the
are
I
is
their is
an
possible
Him) even by merely willing it. The expression My own prakriti means His own peculiar nature. The mean'
(to
"Taking up His own peculiar nature, but not (taking up) the nature of those who are in samsdra, (He is born again and again)." The meaning of the expression 'by means of My own mdyd' is by means of that mental power ing
is
which
is
of the nature of His own
read the word (or jfidna) as
Nir. this
III. 9.].
Moreover the venerable Parasara speaks (of "Wherever, O king, all these :
another great form of the different from His Universal Form. He, out
powers are established, that Lord, which
own
Lexicographers
mdyd synonymous knowledge when they say mdyd vayunam jildnam. [Vide
form of the Lord) thus
of His
will.
also with
as
is
playfulness,
is
makes that (form of
His),
which
is
SRl-BHASHYA.
408
{Chap.
I.
Part.
I.
possessed of all powers, actively manifest under the names of gods, animals and men. That (activity) is (intended) for the good of the worlds and is not produced by means of
karma
e.
(i.
upon Him)." Mahabhxrata
by means of the
works operating
effect of
And in the 70 72.]. thus stated that even the incarnated
[F. P. VI. it is
to
7.
is not made up ofprakriti (or matter): of this Highest Self is not a configuration of The body the collection of material elements." Hence the Highest
form (of the Lord) "
Brahman Himself
the possessor of that form which
is
of this description,
and so
also
this (form)
He who
attribute.
is
is
His own
abides within the
Consequently, of the Sun and within the eye is the Highest Self Himself who is other than the Sun and other indivibrilliant orb
dual selves.
Sjtra 22. Bhedavyapadesa^Jchanyah.
And he
different (from the dual selves) because also there is
difference ("between the
the
Sun and other The
Sun and other is
Brahman on
the
indivi-
declaration of
the one hand
and
individual selves on the other).
difference of this Highest Self from the sun-god
and other individual selves
declared
is
fin the
scriptures).
"He who, following scriptural passages also, namely, dwelling within the Sun, is within the Sun, whom the Sun
The
does not know, whose body rules the
Sun
(He
is
thy
Self)
the
self, is
within
whose body
is
the
the
self,
self,
who
is
the Sun,
internal
He whom
ruler
who
internally
and immortal
who, dwelling within the self does not know,
internally rules
the self
(He
Adhik. VIII. Sfd. is
SRI-BHASHYA.
2j.]
thy internal ruler and immortal
III. 7. 9 to 22.];
Self)."[J/#(?//.
"(He) whose body
the akshara does not know,... who
whose body
mrityu (or pra kriti), does not know, He
is
He
409
is
Bnh. Up.
is
the akshara.... whom
is
moving within the
mrityu,
the internal Self of
whom
all
mrityu
beings,
He is
the Divine Lord, He is the one Xarayana." \Sub. Up. VII. i.] (these) first point out that the individual selves form the body of this Highest Self free
from
who
is
all sins,
from
free
internal Self of
sin,
them
is
and then declare that Therefore
all.
it
is
He
forms the
an established
conclusion that the
from
Supreme Self is altogether different the individual selves from the four-faced Brahma
all
downwards.
ADHIKARANA.
VIII.
Akasddhikarana.
in the passage
born" - -[ Taiit. Up.-lll.
man
is
"
From whom all these beings are i. i.],it is made out that the BrahWith the object of satisfythat cause of the world is, that
the cause of the world.
ing the desire to know what cause of the world has been pointed out in general terms (such as Sat, Atman, &c.,) in the following passages ''Existence (or Sat) alone, my dear child, this was in the :
[Qhhdnd. Up.\{.
beginning."
[Qihand. this orte
worlds." Self (or [Taitt.
Up. VI.
2. 3.];
2. i.];
"The
Self (or
only was in the beginning
[A it. Up. I. Atman} the Up.
II, i. i.];
52
i
&
2.];
" It created tcjas'-
Atman), indeed,
He
created these
"Indeed from that same
spatial ether came into existence." and it has the nature of such a
SRJ-BHA.SHYA.
4io special entity as
is
characterised
by the '
'
ed by the attribute of seeing
{Chap.
1.
Part.
I.
peculiarities indicat-
and the
attribute of bliss
:
consequently that (cause) has been declared to be the Brahman who is different from the pradhana (or matter),
and from the individual
and from other such things. That which is denoted by the word Aka'sa (is the Brahman}, because His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context in relation to
Now,
in the
aphorism
self,
"
what is denoted by that word)." [Ved. Sut. 1. i. 23.] and in other aphorisms (following it), which make up the remaining portion of
this quarter (of the first chapter), it of the cause that world) is denoted by means of (viz. terms such as Akd'sa, &c.; and then(certain) particular
upon what constitutes the cause what upon possesses the sovereignty of and such other it is the Brahman the world, upon things, even
in discussions bearing
of the world, and
Himself
who
is
declared to be the entity that
is
different
from those intelligent and non-intelligent things, which are well known to be denoted by akdsa and other words, and (it is
IJe Himself)
who
of the characteristics
is
(also declared
to be) possessed
mentioned already.
Sutra 23. Akasastalllngat.
That which is denoted by the word Akasa (is the Brahman], because His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context 403 in relation to what is denoted by that word). It is is
revealed in the Chhdndogya to this effect:
the goal of this world 403.
The
And he
?
context referred to here
is
"What
(Pravahana) says in
CjihUnd. Up,
I.
9.
Adhik. VIII
.
SuL
23.]
SKi-l3HASHVA.
411
reply It is the Aka'sa all these beings are, indeed, born out of the Akdsa; they go unto the Aka'sa at the end as the A kdsa is greater than all these beings, the Aka'sa is the best ;
;
\Chhand. Up.
refuge."
whether
1.
Here the doubt
9. i.].
arises
known
element o^ dkdsa (or ether) itself that is denoted by the word Akdsa, or whether it is the Brahman Himself as having the above-mentioned the
is
it
characteristics. It
element of dkdsa.
is
well
perhaps held that it is the well known Why ? In the case of any thing that
made
out altogether by means of a word, that same meaning (of it), which is established in accordance with the proper process of deriving the meanings of words has to be
and which
expressed by that word, that alone has to be accepted. Hence, the well known element of dkdsa (or ether) is itself the cause of the whole world which is is
made up
of the totality of able beings. Therefore the
(all
the)
movable and immov-
Brahman
can not be other than
that (dkdsa). However, it has been already pointed out that the Brahmanis distinct from the non-intelligent thing (matter) as well as from the (intelligent) individual self, for the reason that He performs such acts of creation, &c., as are invariably caused by (His) ' seeing' (/. c. willing).
True,
it
right.
was
Accordingly, when
whom all \_TaiU.
(so) pointed out
;
these beings are born
Up.
III. i. i.],
but that (statement) is not declared that " He from
it is
then,
it
That
may
is
the
Brahman" -
be specially desired
know what
that particular entity is which is the cause of the birth, &c., 4 4 of all those beings that are born; in to
such a case, that special entity is made known by means of the passage beginning with "All these beings are indeed born out of the dkdsa" [C/ihdnd. Up. I. 9. i.];
404.
Birth,
ere.,
means
birth, subtciilaliou
and destruction.
SRI-^HASHYA. thus, the cause of the origin,
c.,
L Par
\Chap.
of the world
is
I.
I.
definitely
It being determined to be nothing other than the dkdsa. so, Sat and other words which possess a general signific-
ance, and which are mentioned in the following passage " Existence (or Sat) among other passages also, namely, alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning" [Qihdnd.
Up. VI.
denote that same special entity dkdsa. In "The Self (or the Atinan),indeed, this one only
2. i.],
the passage and in others, in the beginning." [Ait. Up. I. i.] the word Atman is also used to signify that same thing
was
,
Indeed that word Atman also is not restricted mean only intelligent beings. For example, there is the instance "The pot is mriddtmaka (or made up of clay)." Since the word Atman may be derived 403 from the root dp to pervade, the word Atman also signifies the dkdsa (or the ether) quite absolutely. Hence, when it is thus determined that the dkdsa itself is the Brahman that forms the cause of (dkdsa).
to
the world, then the activity of ' seeing ', &c., have to be understood in their figurative sense so as to suit that ,
(element of dkdsa}. If the cause of the world had been, as a matter of fact, denoted only by Sat and other such general terms, then, in accordance with the import of ' seeing ', &c., (predicated in relation to it), that cause
would have been
made
out to be nothing other than a particular intelligent being. But by the word dkdsa itself a characteristic entity is definitely pointed out ; specially
and thus there
is nothing else that has to be particularly understood (to be its import) as arising from the naturalness of its meaning (in the context). Indeed, it may be
said (here) that, in the passage came into existence." [ TaitL 405
.
See Sjttifr/Vtf- Upanishad.
J 1 1
,
"
From
Up.
the Self the dkdsa
II. i.
i.],
the dkdsa
Adtiik.Vltf.SM.2j.'] SRI-&HASHYA. itself is
made out
to be a produced
413
True
effect.
;
in
fact,
other such things exist in two conditions, the subtle condition and the gross condition. Of namely, these the subtle condition of the element of dkdsa consti-
vdyn
(air)
and
all
and its gross condition, the effect. The " From the Self the the dkasa came of meaning passage from its that into existence."- -{Taitt. Up. II. i. i.] is, tutes the cause;
it became changed into its own the passage beginning with means of By
gross form. " All these
subtle form,
[Qihdnd. Up. beings are, indeed, born out of the dkdsa." I. 9. i.], it is declared that the whole world derives its existence from, and has
hence
Brahman
its
dissolution in, the
determined that that
it is
same dkdsa
dkdsa is
itself
;
indeed the
that forms the cause of the world. .For whatever
reason the
Brahman
element of dkdsa, tural) statements
is
for that
not other than the well
known
same reason the (following
"If this dkdsa be not
bliss,
&c."
scrip-
[Taitt.
" The akdsa is, indeed, the evolver of name Up. II. 7. i.], and form." [Clihdnd. Up. VIII. 14.1.] and other such (state-
Therements) are also (seen to be) very appropriate. fore the Brahman is not other than the well known
element of dkdsa. be so held, we reply (thus): "That which is denoted by the word Akdsa (is the Brahmati), because If
it
His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context in relation to what is denoted by that word)." [ Ved. Sut. is
I.
i.
That which
23.].
is
that Highest Self Himself
denoted by the word Akdsa has the characteristics
who
already mentioned, and who is a different entity from the non-intelligent and well known element of dkdsa (or ether).
Why
mentioned
in
Because His peculiar characteristics (are the context in relation to what is denoted
?
by that word).
To
be
the
only
cause
of
all
the
SRi-fiuisrivA.
414
worlds, to be greater than &c., which are all the
L
[Chap.
Part.
L
to be the best refuge, characteristics of the Highest
all others,
are found mentioned (in the context under reference).
Self,
which
not possible for that non-intelligent thing, usually denoted by the well known word akasa,
it
Indeed, is
is
to be the cause of the world
because it is not possible an intelligent thing to be the produced effect of that (non-intelligent thing). And to be the best refuge is to ;
for
be that highest object which is worthy of being attained by intelligent beings and to be this, it is not possible for ;
that non-intelligent thing which deserves to be discarded and which is opposed to all the desirable aims of life. And to be greater than all
is
to be unconditioned
by means of all the auspicious unsurpassed by all. To be this also,
great
;
it is
to be so
qualities as to it is
remain
not possible for
the non-intelligent thing. What has been stated to the effect that a specially characteristic thing is mentioned by means of the word
Akdsa,
query to know what that partiwhich forms the cause of the world, and
in response to the
cular object
is
that, in consequence,
every thing else
(in
the context) has
agree with that (akdsa) " All because, in the passage.
to be explained so as to exactly
that
itself,
is
improper
;
these beings are, indeed, born out of the Akdsa" \CMhdnd. were (a out as if it is I. that 9. i.], pointed (Akdsa) Up. a mention to well known. Indeed, thing as thing) already if it were well known implies that there is some other
means of knowing
it.
And
the other means of knowledge
(here) are, indeed, the following passage and other similar " Existence ones alone, my dear child, this was in the :
[Qihdnd. Up. VI. 2. i.]. And they declare the Brahman to be altogether the same as has been al-
beginning."
ready mentioned.
Accordingly, the
Brahman
established
Adhik. VIII.
Sfit.
by those (passages) it
SRI-BHISHYA.
2J.] is
pointed out by the word Akasa as
And
were a well known thing.
the
415
Highest Brahman
be
to
if
also possible for
it is
denoted
by the word the power of
as He possesses that is, in as much as He is luminilluminating things, ous to Himself and also causes other things to shine. Further, this word Akasa, even when it is capable of
Akdsa,*
Q
much
as
in
importing a particular (well known) entity, denotes that particular non-intelligent thing which it is not possible to think of as forming the cause of the intelligent thing. Such excerpts from scriptural passages as the following " " It among others, namely, thought \Qhhand. Up. VI. 2.
"He
3.]
Up.
II.
who
is
6.
May
desired
become manifold"
I
enable us to
i.],
characterised
by
\Taitt.
know
that peculiar Being the attribute of omniscience and
&c.; and now to the cause, (akdsd), import of those scriptural passages, which are capable of proving that (Being), this is not to be other than what that (import) really is, the attribute
willing the
of
truth,
by means of that
(certainly) within the province of correct reasoning. larly, it is
not also possible to
make
the
Simi-
common
import of those numerous passages, which are capable of denoting that peculiar Being thus characterised
endless
attributes,
become something
by
peculiar
and
other than what
is, through the influence of a single merely a restatement (of something that
that (import) really
passage which is has been already taught). It has been stated that the word ly restricted to
mean
The word
^Aka'sa.
is
in
to
mean
that
the instance
derived
from the root Ka's to shine and Interpreted
not absolute-
intelligent beings, because "
(to be used otherwise) 406.
Atman is
which
is is
luminous to
it
The pot
itself
is is
seen
mrid-
and also that which
causes other things to shine.
SRI-BHISHYA.
416
atmaka thus
(or
No
:
made up of
even so as to denote things
Atman
some is, other than what is
Atman
Nevertheless, the word
Part.
I.
In reply to this
clay)."
doubt, the word
[Chap.
in
it is
L
said
cases, used intelligent.
very largely used so as to which forms the correlative denote that (intelligent entity) of the body. Consequently, that intelligent entity itis
the body is made out to be mentioned in the follo.wing and other passages, namely, " The Self (or Alman), indeed, this one only was in the beself
which
ginning."
is
correlated
I.
Up.
[Ait.
to
i.];
"From
the
Self,
the dkasa (or
came into existence." \Taitt. Up. II. i. For i.]. example, although the word go (i. e. ox) may express many things, that thing alone which has the dewlap and other such (characteristics) is naturally and of itself ap-
the spatial ether)
prehended thereby, on account of its being largely used (to signify that thing): and to apprehend its other meanings, it is
necessary to have a special mention
meanings)
in particular.
and other
particular
thought desired,
Up.
May May
Atman)
I
it
"
namely,
\A Up. become manifold and be born." it.
themselves confirm that
signifies
of each (of those
scriptural passages,
create the worlds."
I
II. 6. i.]
made
Similarly, each of the following
I. i.J,
(viz.
"
He He
[Tailt.
the word
nothing other than that intelligent entity,
of itself arrived at (from the common use of that word) and forms (also). the correlative of the body. Thus the Brahman who forms the only cause of all
which
is
the worlds, and ful
who
is
characterised
attributes, as are peculiar to
by many such wonder-
none other than Himself,
and as are made out by means of excerpts from scriptural passages, is Himself established by means of the passage beginning with
" Existence alone,
my
dear child, &c."
\Qihand. Up. VI. 2. i.]. And it is thus a settled conclusion that (that Brahman) Himself is pointed out by
Adhik. IX.
Sftt.
24.]
SRi-BiusHYA.
417
means of the word
Akd'sa, in the passage beginning with " All these beings are indeed (born out of the Akdsd)"-
\Qbhdnd. Up.
I. 9.
i.],
as if
He
were already well known.
ADH1KARANA.
IX.
Prdnddh ikarana Sutra 24.
,
Ata eva praiah.
For that same reason (which has been given in the case of Akasa), He who is denoted by the word Prana or is the Brahman]. (also in the context* After commencing the context by means of the stateO thou prastotri, that deity which invariably
ment"
4 8 it is revealed in the prastdva, &c.", " Which is that deity ? He Qihandogya to this effect said' Indeed it is the Prana. All these beings certainly enter into the Prana (to be absorbed into it) they are
attends
the
:
evolved out of the Prana. bly attends t\\Qprastdva.
This
is
that deity which invaria-
And if, without knowing that deity,
you had sung (your) psalms of praise, your head would have fallen off':'[Cbhand.Up.I. 10. 9. & I. & 5.]. n._ 4 Here the word Prdna also denotes, like the word Akdsa,\\\e Highest Self Himself
known prdna 407. is
The
who
(or vital air);
is
context here referred to
Chliand. Up.
I.
408. Prastava
io& is
other than the ordinarily well is described
because this (prdnd]
if.
the prelude or the
introductory words of a Sdinan sung
by the Prastolri who of the Udgatri or
Samaveda.
is
the assistant
the chanter of the
SRI-BHISHYA.
418 the context), as
(in
if it
Part.
I.
[Chap.
I.
were a well known thing, by means
of the characteristics of the whole world entering into it and coming out of it, tS:c., which are not (at all) common to
it.
also be an additional objection effect to the since the whole of the totality of that, (here) beings is seen to have its existence and activity depend-
However, there may
ent upon the
pram, the
And
of the world.
the
to
is
certainly
I.
Up.
into
are
evolved
to stones tial
can
5.]
and
sticks,
nature of the
self);
them).
because
it
not as
be
(viz.
objection)
" All these beings be absorbed into
appropriate
in
\Chhand. relation
also in relation to the essen-
intelligent
Therefore the
(of this
the Prana (to out of the Prana'.'
enter
ii.
invalidation
that the statement
effect
they
it),
the
well known prana be pointed out as the cause
ordinarily
(or vital air) itself deserves to
thing
that prana}
word Prana
(viz.
the individual
does not (here)
exist
(in
denotes the
Highest Brahman Himself for the reason that it is to be understood as that which gives life to all beings. Consequently, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the
Highest Brahman Himself who is altogether different from the ordinarily well known dkdsa (or ether), prana (or
and other such things, who is the only cause the worlds, who possesses infinite myriads of auspicious qualities, such as the quality of being free from sin,
vital air),
of
all
the quality of omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, &c., is denoted (here) by such words as Akasa, Prana,
&c.
Adhik. X. Sut.
SRI-BHISHYA.
25.]
ADH1KARANA.
419
X.
Jyotiradhikarana. " That which by means of the aphorism is denoted by the word Jyotis (is the Brahman], because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context) "\_Ved. Siit. I. i. 25.] and by means of the other aphorisms Hereafter,
declared that that Jyotis (or Light), by at least a certain unsurpassable quality invariably associated with what constitutes the cause of the world, and which is also denoted by (following
which
is
it),
it
is
characterised
Indra and other words that are ordinarily well known to refer to other things,
is
the Highest
Brahman
Himself.
Sutra 25. Jyotiszttaranabhidhanat.
That which is denoted by the word Jyotis (is the Brahman), because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context). It is
revealed in the Qihdndogya to this effect:
"
Xow
that Light which shines beyond this Highest Heaven, beyond all the things in the universe, beyond the whole universe, in the highest worlds than
which there are no higher
worlds, that is that same Light indeed which is within this person." [Qihdnd. Up. III. 13. 7.]. Here there arises the doubt whether that thing which is denoted by the word Jyotis (or Light), which is associated with unsurpassable brilliance and forms that same well known light which belongs to the sun-god and others, (whether that) is the Brahman that forms the cause of the world or whether ;
that
(thing)
is
the Highest Person,
who
is
altogether
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
420 distinct
gent
things, limited splendour, It is
truth.
1.
the highest cause, who has unwho is omniscient and wills the
known
by the \vordjyotis). Jy'otis) is described as thing, there
Part.
i.i
perhaps thought right to hold that
well
ordinarily
I.
of intelligent and non-intelli-
from the aggregate
who
{Chap.
itself
light
Why if it
(which
?
it
is
Because, although were an already well
is
the
denoted it
(viz.
known
are not found mentioned in the passage in
occurs any such characteristics as are invariably associated with the Highest Self, in the same way in which
which
it
(they are seen to be so associated) with (what is denoted by) Akdsa, Pram, and other such words ; and it is not, in consequence, possible to derive (from that context)
any knowledge which leads to the recognition of the Highest and because also that (Jyotis itself) is Person (therein) same as the digestive heat in the be the to taught :
stomach.
The
(thus) to be
world
;
the
Brahman
there
for,
known
ordinarily well
is
that
itself
has
forms the cause of the
associated with
which
light
it
(also) that unsur-
concomitant with
is
invariably passable splendour constitutes the cause (of the world). " That which is deIf it be so held, we state in reply noted by the word Jyotis (is the Brahman), because there
what
is
a connected context)." Light', which is described as
the mention of (His) feet (in
[Vcd. Snt.
I.
i.
25.].
That
'
being related to the Highest
Heaven and
is
associated
the Highest Person Himwith unsurpassable splendour, " All ? self. Because, in the passage beings make immortal feet are in the Highthree His one foot His up is
Why
;
est
Heaven."
\_Qhhdnd. Up. III. 12. 6.],
all
beings are de-
same entity who is in relaWhat is said is this tion with the Highest Heaven. " That In the passage Light which is beyond the Highest clared to form the foot of this
-
:
Adhik. X. Sut.
SRI-BHA.SHYA.
26."]
421
[Qihdnd. Up. III. 13. 7.], the peculiar characteristics of the Highest Person are certainly not mention-
Heaven, &c."
ed; nevertheless,
son
is
it is
mentioned
in
recognised that, since the Highest Pera former passage (in the same con-
text) as being related to the Highest also
which
is
related to that Highest
Heaven,
Heaven
is
this Light
that Person
Himself. And in the teaching that that (Jyotis} is one with the digestive heat of the stomach, there is nothing wrong because it (viz. that teaching) is a command;
ment
enjoining the continued meditation of that (Highest Person) in the form of that (digestive heat) for the
purpose of attaining the fruition of a desired result. And that the digestive heat of the stomach has the character of that (Highest Person) is declared by the Lord Himself in the passage " Becoming the vaisvd-
nara,*
[.
G.
Q * I
XV.
dwell
in
the
bodies
of
all living
14.].
Chhandobhidhananneti*tenna torpa.anigamat tathahidarsanam.
Sutra 26.
If it
beings."
tatha^Le-
be said that, on account of the metre (known as
the gayatrj] being mentioned (in the context, the Light or Jyotis described above is) not (the Brahman), it is not because the teaching (here) relates to (right to say) so ;
the concentration of the mind (on the Brahman) conceived as that same (gayatrlY. indeed the scripture declares it
accordingly. In a former passage (in the same context), the metre 409. This
or Fire.
is
Here,
an epithet of Agni this word denotes
the digestive heat of the stomach
in
accordance with the scriptural pas-
sage
''This Fire
which
is
within
man
and by which food is digested that is " the 1'aih'a nam. Brih. Up. V. 9.1,
SRI-BHASHYA.
422
known
asthe^-diya/r/is
Gdyatri indeed
Rik verse
this
metre there
also,
Brahman]
is
:
is
also
hence, here
(/.
.
after
and the
same (Gdyatri known
this
Rik*
declared in a
the
III.
effect" Such 12.
in the
6.],
10 is
L
"The
statement
[C&hand. Up. which is then quoted
Up.
[Clihdnd.
in the
III. 12. i.];
III. 12. 5.] to
\Qhhdnd. Up. ness."
mentioned
this."
" Therefore
statement the
is all
Part.
I.
[Chap.
as
verse."-
His great-
relates to (that)
passage under discussion) If it be so
no mention of the Highest Person.
cannot be (right to maintain) "Because the teaching (here) relates to the concenso, tration of the mind (on the Brahman) conceived as that held,
(it
is
replied that)
same (gayatri)." is
the
Here
it
not
is
the
merely
metre
denoted by the word Gdyatri because impossible for what is merely a metre to form Self of all. But on the other hand, it is taught
(gdyatri} that it
it
;
mind
here that the applied
is
as concentrated on the
Brahman
to the
gay air I is to be
The meaning
Himself.
is
that, for the purpose of attaining the fruition of the desir-
taught in relation to the Brahman that He be to continuously conceived and meditated upon as being similar to the gdyatri. And from the passage
ed
result, it is
is
" All beings feet are in
make up His one foot the Highest Heaven
;
His three immortal
"*-
\j3ihand. Up. III. 12. the Brahman who a between there arises similarity 6.], feet and the has tour which also has four (thus) gdyatri
And
the gdyatri (metre) with four feet occasionally, as in the following instance feet.
:
Indrassachipatih
\
Valenaplditah Duschyavano vrishd ||
410.
Vide
A'.
V.
X.
90. 3.
\
is
met with
Adhik. X. Sut.
SRI-BHASHYA.
27.]
Samitsu sdsahih
423
41
1
||
" Indeed " that (the scripture declares it) accordingly elsewhere also a word which ordinarily denotes a metre
is is
used to denote other things, in consequence of its simifor example, in connection with the larity with them ;
vidyd (or the form of worship) in which the vital air enjoined to be meditated upon and worshipped as having the quality of absorbing all things at once into itself, it is declared, in the passage beginning with "Now these five and the other five make ten.'' 412 is
[Chhdnd. Up. IV.
3.
8.],
same
that "this
(ten-syllabled
metre) virdj (which consists of ten constituent parts) is that which eats the food (consisting of ten parts)."
\Qhhand. Up. IV.
3. 8.].
For the following reason also, what word Gdyatrl is the Brahman Himself:
Su tra
is
denoted by the
Bhu tadipada vyapadesopapa tteschaiva m
27.
.
Because also it is appropriate only thus to declare that (intelligent) beings and other objects form the feet (of the Gayatrj}. 411. Halayudhabhatta quotes these
Indrcillacfripatih
almost as they are given above his commentary under the following
Valena vllitah
lines in
aphorism of Pingala
Sanskrit prosody: "Adyam cjiatushpat Here the metre known as
ritubhih.
Gdyatrl
is
said
to
consist
parts of six syllables each. illustration
example
is
of
given
this ;
the
||
Du'sckyavano vrisha
Lamatsu sasahih
work on
in his
\
412. air,
The
Agnr,
fire,
first
five
\
||
are
%ditya, sun,
Vayn,
Chanara,
of four
moon, and Ap, water; the second
And
are
in
following
kshus, sight, Srotra, hearing, was,
five
Pran.i, breath, Viik, speech, Cha-
mind-
and
J/
SRI-BHISHYA.
424
1.
[Chap.
Part.
1.
After pointing out the (intelligent) beings, the earth, the body, and the heart (to form the feet of the Gayatrl), there is this teaching which is given to the effect " This above-mentioned (Gayatrl} has four feet." \Chhdnd. Up. III. 12. 5.];
and such (a teaching) can be highly appropriate
Brahman Himself, only denoted bv the word Gdvatri. in
relation to the
who
is
(here)
Sutra 28. Upadesabhedannetiehennobhayasminnapy' avirodhat. If it be said that, on account of there being a difference between the (two) teachings f given in the context, what is denoted by the word Jyotis or Light) is not (the
Brahman),
it
cannot be (right to say) so because even is nothing that is contra;
both those ('teachings) there dictory (of each other). in
In a former passage (in the same context), namely, " His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven
(divi)."\Chhand. Up.
III.
12.
6.],
the Highest
Heaven
(dyii) pointed out as the position of location and here in the passage under reference), viz." Beyond the (/. e. is
;
Highest Heaven, (divak}"
\Chhand. Up.
III.
13.7.],
it
(viz. that Highest Heaven) is indicated to be a boundary and thus the teaching has different forms. Consequently ;
that
Brahman who cannot
be
is
declared
in
the
previous
pas-
the
subsequent one. recognised be so held, (it is replied that) it cannot be so because even in (regard to) both those teachings there is a similarity in the nature of their import, and there sage If
it
in
;
thus nothing to hinder such a recognition. For an (analogous) example, there is this instance "The hawk
is
XL
Adhik. is
SRI-BHISHYA.
Silt. 29.]
on the top of the
tree,"
425
and" The
hawk
above
is
the top of the tree."
Therefore, the Highest Person possessed of unsurpassable splendour, is declared to be that Jyotis (or Light) which is resplend-
Himself,
is
And the Highest declared to have four feet in this passage, " Such His greatness. Greater than that is the Purusha. All
ent
beyond the Highest Heaven.
Person is
who
is
beings make up His one foot. His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven." Qt/iand. [R. V. X. 90. 3.
&
Up.
III. 12. 6.]:
He
and
is
also declared to " I
material form in the passage
12.
7.]; is
Person)
faultless to
dour),
Person
darkness."
also
is
non-material.
say that, owing
He
have an im-
this great
beyond [Taitt. Ar. and the splendour belonging to such (a
of sunlike lustre III.
who
know
Himself
is
Consequently,
it
is
to His possessing that (splen-
denoted by the word^vo//s (or Light
here).
ADH1KARANA. XL Indrapranddhikarana It
has been stated that that which
.
is
associated
with
is denoted by the \\ordjyounsurpassable splendour, which if it were a welltis (or Light), and which is pointed out as Himself. Person is the Now, he (the known Highest
thing,
denoted also by Indra, say si that what are Prdna and other such words, and are declared in the scripSfitraktira]
owing to their forming the means of attaining that immortality which is invariably associated with what constitutes the cause of the world, tures to constitute objects of worship,
(they) are
(all
the same as) the Highest Person Himself, 54
SRI-BHISHYA.
426
Sutra 29.
[Chap.
Part.
I.
I.
Pranastathanugamat.
That which is denoted by Prana (Indra and other such words is the Brahman), because it is so understood the sequel.
in
In the Kaushltakl-Brdhmana, the context 4
'
3
dealing
with the vldya (or form of worship) taught to Pratardana " Now is begun with the passage Pratardana, the son of Divodasa, went
to the
abode of Indra by and therein it is remarked
favourite
means of battle and valour"
;
by Pratardana to Indra, who had asked him to choose a " You boon, yourself choose for me that boon which you is most beneficial to man"; and thereafter, it is " He said 'Indeed, declared thus (in the same context) I am the Prana and the omniscient Self. Worship and
think
:
meditate on
me
as
life,
as immortality'."
[Kaush. Up.
III.
i.].
Here the doubt
arises
whether
this Being,
who
is
de-
noted by the words Indra and Prana to be the object of such worsh'ip as is most beneficial (to man), is the individual self himselfj or whether is
other than the individual
He
self.
right to hold that that (Being)
is
is
the Supreme Self who
It
is
perhaps thought
the individual self him-
Because the word Indra is ordinarily well to denote only a particular individual self, and the
Why ?
self.
known
word Prana
also
which
is
grammatically equated with
that (word Indra) signifies that same (individual self). When this individual self having the name of Indra was " You yourself choose told by Pratardana to the effect for
me
413. is
that boon The
which you think
context referred to here
the third chapter of the Kaushitakl-
is
most
Bra/imana-Ufianishad.
benefi-
XL
Adhik.
man."
to
cial
Silt,
jo.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
[Kansk.
Up.
III.
427 he
c.
Indra) taught the worship of himself as being the most beneficial " Worship me." [Kaush. Up. III. i.]. And by saying
what
most
i.],
(/.
nothing other than what forms the means for the attainment of immortality. That is
beneficial (here)
is
the worship of that (Being), which is the cause of the world, forms the means for the attainment of immortality, " So is made out from this passage long as he is not freed the is so there (from long delay then he will be body), ;
Therefore the well [Qihdnd. Up. VI. 14. 2.]. Indra himself who has the nature of an individual
blessed."
known self
that
is
To which is
the
Brahman who this
forms the cause of the world.
supposition
[Ved.
Sfit. I.
i.
29.]
This
the words Indra and Prdna self;
but,
who
is
is
is
this
denoted by Prdna Brahman}\ because it is so understood is
on the other hand,
"
That reply (Indra and other such words there
in the sequel.''
Being who is denoted by is not merely the individual
He
is
the Highest
Brahman
a different entity from the individual self; because it only on such a supposition that that meaning in the
becomes appropriate which is derived from the grammatical equation of what is in the very commencement denoted by the words Indra and Prdna with the words dnanda (blissful), ajar a (undecaying), and amrita sequel
(immortal), as mentioned in the scriptural passage " That same Prdna is the omniscient Self who is blissful,
undecaying and immortal." [Kaush. Up.
Sutra 30.
III. 9.].
Navakturatmopadesaditichedadhyatm&-
sambandhabhu mahyasmin. be said that, on account of the speaker (Indra) declaring himself (to be the object of \vorship, \vhat If it
i
SRI-BHISHYA.
428
[Chap.
L
L
Part.
denoted by the words Indra and Prara is) not (the Brahman, it is replied that it cannot be right to say so); because there is here (in this context) the mention of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self.
What
has been stated to the effect that
denoted by the words Indra and Prdna
He who
is
the Supreme that same entity that is im-
Brahman^ in as much as He is " He ported by the passage immortal."
\Kaush. Up.
is blissful,
III. 9.],
that
is
is
undecaying, and not appropriate;
the speaker in the passages "Know [Kaush. Up. III. i.j and "I am the Prdna and the omniscient self. Meditate on me as life, as immor-
because Indra,
me
who
is
alone."
[Kaush. 6^.111.1.], teaches Pratardana that he is made out to be of the nature of an indivi-
tality."
who
himself,
dual self on account of his having killed Tvashtra and of having done other (such acts) as are stated in the following
passage
among
Tvashtra",
others
namely III.
Up.
[Kaush.
"I killed the three-headed i.],
is
undoubtedly the
Hence, it having been object of worship (sought after). understood in the beginning (of the context,) that he (Indra) a particular context) with
is
individual
"He
is
self,
blissful,
the conclusion
that
(of
undecaying and immortal,
has (necessarily) to be interpreted in conformity with that (commencement). When it is so held, he (the Siitrakdra] disproves (such a
&c."
[Kaush. Up.
supposition)
III. 9.]
by saying
" Because there
is
here
(in this
context) the mention of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self." That related quality which exists in the Self '
the attribute of the Inner Self.
is
multitudinousness
'
is its
abundance.
The meaning
Its is
that
This manifoldness of the related quality results from the manifoldness of the things which are it is
manifold.
Adhik.
Jf/. Stf/. jo.]
SRI-BHISHYA.
429
related to the Self so as to be contained in
Him.
And
indeed possible only in relation to the Highest Self taken to be the speaker here. " Just as, in a chariot, the circumThus, in the passage
this (manifoldness of attributes)
is
ference (of a wheel) is fixed to the spokes and the spokes are fixed to the nave, so also these subtle material elements
made
depend on the subtle intelliand the subtle intelligences are gences (prajilamatras], made to depend upon the Prana. This same Prana Him(bhulamatras) are
self is
the omniscient
to
who
Self,
is
blissful,
undecaying,
and immortal." \Kaush. Up.\\\. 9.], the whole collection of non-intelligent things is denoted by the word bhntamatra\ then by means of the word prajftdmatra the whole series of intelligent individual selves is denoted as forming the support of those (non-intelligent things) then it is pointed ;
out that the subject of the context denoted by the words Indra and Prdna forms the support of those (intelligent individual selves) also
;
and- (finally),
it
(viz.
that context)
same Being is "blissful, undecaying, and The meaning is, that this quality of being the
teaches that that
immortal."
support of
all
the things, which consist of the intelligent
and the non-intelligent
entities,
relation to that Highest Self
the individual
who
is
is
appropriate only in
a different entity from
self.
" Because there
Or, in the expression
is
here
(in
the mention of a multitude of attributes be" the attributes of the Inner longing to the Inner Self, this' context)
'
Self are those teristics
that
is,
attributes
of the
Highest
their manifoldness
which are the peculiar characSelf. is
Their 'multitudinousness',
indeed found
'here', that
is,
in
the present context. Accordingly, at the outset it is made out in the passages " You yourself choose for me that boon which you think is most beneficial to man," [Kaush,
SRi-BHisHYA.
J6
Up.
III.i.]
and
"Worship me."
[Chap.
[Kaush. Up.
Part.
I.
III.i.],
L
that
the Indra, who is denoted by the word Prdna, is the object of that peculiar worship of the Highest Self, which
forms the means for the attainment of larly,
to be the Impeller of
Simi-
final release.
all activities, in
accordance with
the passage "He of Himself induces him, whom He wishes to lead beyond these worlds, to do work which is good ;
He
whom He
of Himself induces him,
wishes
to lead
downwards, to do work which
is not good." \_Kaush. Up. an attribute of the Supreme Self. So also to be the support of all, in accordance with the passage
III. 9.], is also
"
a chariot, the circumference (of a wheel) is and the spokes are fixed to the nave, so also these subtle material elements are made to depend Just
as, in
fixed to the spokes,
upon the III. 9.]'
and the
subtle intelligences,
made
are
subtle intelligences
depend upon the Prdna," \_Kansh. Up. an attribute of Himself. Similarly again those
to
is
which are found mentioned in the passage " This same Prana Himself is the omniscient Self who
attributes,
is
blissful,
III.
9.],
undecaying and
immortal.
"
\Kaush. belong to that Supreme Self Himself.
Up.
And
these (attributes) also, namely, that " He is the Lord of " and that " He is the Lord of all "all the worlds \_Kansh. Up. III. 9.], the Supreme Self. attributes of the
tioned,
it is
are
only in relation
possible
to
Consequently, in as much as the Supreme Self are here abundantly men-
the Supreme Self Himself
who
is
denoted by
the words Indra and Prdna here.
To
point out
how under
comes appropriate
for Indra,
the nature of an individual is
the object of worship,
such a circumstance
who
self,
is
well
known
it
be-
to be of
to teach that he himself
he (the Sutrakdra] says
;
Adhik.
XL
Stitra 31.
SRI-BHISHYA.
Silt, j/.]
431
SSstraJ>'ish^yatJpaJeso Vamadevavat.
And the teaching Vamadeva,
the context)
^in
is,
as in the case of
accordance with the view found
in
in
the
scripture.
This teaching, which, in the statements alone"
Up.
\_Kaiish.
and
III.i.]
"
Know me
"Worship me"-[Kaush.
given to the effect that his own self is the Brahman who has to be worshipped,is not derived from that self-knowledge which is obtained from other means of proof
Up.
III. i.],
is
(than the scripture); but, on the other hand, it is the result of the self-knowledge which is derived from the scripture
What is
In accordance with the follow" passages, namely, Entering in along with this individual self, which is (also) the same as " Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form " All this has That for VI. itself.
ing and other
said
this:
is
similar
[ZVidtid. Up.
its Self."
3. 2.J,
"
\Qhhand. Up. VI.S./.],
He who
ruler of all things that are born,
[Taitt.Ar. III. 21.], in the self, is
the
Brili.
He
is
self,
Up.
whom
has entered within
and
is
"He who, dwelling
the
self
the Self of in the self,
is
the
all."-
is
with-
does not know, whose body rules the self, &c." \Madh.
and who internally III. 7. 22.],
devoid of
sin,
"
He is the internal Self of all beings, He is the Divine Lord, He is the One
[Sud. Up. VII. i.], he (/. c. Indra) had in mind that the Supreme Self owns the individual selves as His
Xarayana."
body, and knew also that the words 7, thon, and others, which denote individual selves, include the Supreme Self
Himself within their import
;
and
thereafter,
by means of
"
Know me alone" \_KausJi. " "Worship me [A'aws//. Up. III. i.]
the scriptural statements
Up. III. i.] and he taught that none other than the Supreme Self who has (Indra) himself for His body forms the object of worship.
SRI-BHISHYA.
43 2
"As
1.
[Chap.
Par I.
1.
Va made va. " That is, Vamadeva Highest Brahman forms the internal
in the case of
realised that the
and that all things form His body, and that those words which denote material embodiments in-
Self of all things
clude the embodied in their import ; and then he -indicated Brahman who has himself (/'. e. Vamadeva)
the Highest
His body by the word
'
and
he taught, with the help of a grammatical equation with that (T), that he (himself) was Manu, the sun, &c., in the following and other for
passages
:
" After
Up.
[Brih.
I I.
';
(lastly)
this (Brahman], the sage have become Manu and the
seeing
Vamadeva experienced sun also."
I
" 4.
10.],
I
am And
the sage and
Prahlada also [R. V. IV. 26. i.]. the same thus: "Since the Infinite One exists says thing in all things, I am also none other than He all things
seer Kakshlvat."
;
proceed from me,
me who am
I
eternal."
am
all
[F. P.
things and I. 19.
all
things exist in
85.].
After previously stating an objection (that
may
raised against his position), he (the Sutrakdra) gives
be
below
the reason why, in this context, the words that denote the individual self and denote also certain non-intelligent things (such as the prana or the principal vital air) are used to denote the Highest Brahman who forms the object of
worship.
Sjtra 32.
Jlvamukhyapranalingannetlchennopasa-
traivldhyadasritatvadihatadyogat.
be said that, on account of the characteristics and of the principal vital air (being mentioned in the context), there is no (reference to tlje If
it
of the individual self
Adhik.
XL
Silt.
J2.]
SRI-BHASHYA.
433
Brahman
here at all, it is replied that) it cannot be to say) so; because the worship (of the Brah(right a threefold nature; because (else where) this has man) (threefold nature of His worship;
and because here (same kind
The ed
of
(/.
e.
worship)
is
taken for granted
be appropriately referred
may
who
the speaker is." the three-headed Tvashtra
;
" :
The
III.
man
him under-
[Kaush. Up.
III.
characteristics of the principal vital air are given
in the following passages in this
is,
Let no
let
[Kaush. Up. III. 8.]; "I killed I handed over the devotees,
(named) Arunmukhas to the wolves." i.].
to.
characteristics of the individual self are mention-
the following and other passages specially desire to know what speech in
stand
;
in the present context also) that
" :
So long as the prana dwells
body, so long surely there is life." [Katisk. Up. "Now indeed the sentient prana, firmly taking
i.];
hold of this body, makes it rise up." [Kansk. Up. III. 2.]* If it be said that, in consequence, there is here (/. e in this context) no mention (really) of a multitude of attri.
butes belonging to the Inner
Self,
(it is
replied that)
it
cannot be so for this reason, namely, that the worship The denota(of the Brahman) has a threefold nature. tion (of the
words
Brahman} by means
(in this
particular
meant to teach the threefold The meaning is that it is worship.
context)
nature of (His)
of certain
is
serve the object of teaching the three kinds of continued meditation (in relation to the Brahman}, name-
meant to
ly,
the continued meditation of the
Brahman
as forming
the only cause of all the worlds in accordance with His own essential nature ; the continued meditation (of the
Brahman]
as having the
individual selves)
55
for
whole
His body
series of enjoyers ;
(or the
and the continued medi-
SRI-BHISHYA.
434 tation (of the
Brahman]
[Chap.
I.
Part.
L
as having the enjoyable (material)
things and the auxiliary (material) helps to enjoyment for His body. This same threefold continued meditation of
the
Brahman
taken for granted
is
In the following
contexts also.
"The Brahman
namely,
\Taitt.
nity." \_Taitt.
Up.
Brahman]
Up.
III. 6.
He
as
is
II. 1. 1.]
is
other (scriptural)
in
and other
passages, Existence, Knowledge, Infi-
and "The Brahman
is bliss."-
i.], the continued meditation (of the in His own essential nature (is taken
In the following and other passages, namely, " Having created it, He entered into it; having entered into it, He became the sat and the tyat, the defined and for granted).
the undefined, the possessor of a home and the homeless one, the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing.
While being the unchangeable individual self (satya] and the changeable matter, He has (nevertheless) remained true to His own nature." [Taitt. Up. II. 6. i.], the continued meditation (of the Brahman] as having the enjoyers (or the individual selves) for His body and also as having the enjoyable (material) things and the (material) auxiliaries of enjoyment for His body, (is taken for granted). The meaning
is
that here, that
is,
in the (present) context also, this
threefold meditation of the
Brahman
is
appropriate.
What
Wherever particular individual selves from the four-faced Brahma downwards and particular nonintelligent things from the prakriti downwards are found mentioned in association with the peculiar^ characis
said
teristic
is
this
:
attributes
of
the
Supreme
Self,
or
wherever
the words denoting them (/. e. those intelligent individual selves and those non-intelligent things) are seen to be grammatically equated with the words denoting the
Supreme taught
is
Self;
in all
such cases, what
the continued meditation of the
is
intended to be
Brahman as
form-
Adhik. ing the
XL
SRi-fiHiSHYA.
Sat. j2.]
Inner Self
of those particular
non-intelligent entities.
conclusion that he
and Prdna here
who
(/.
435
c.
intelligent
and
Consequently, it is an established denoted by the words Indra
is
in the context
the Supreme Self Himself,
who
is
under reference J
is
a different entity from
the individual selves.
END OF VOLUME
I.
Printed at The Enihmarddin Press, Triplicane, Madias,
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS VOLUME. M. Nar.=Atharva-Mahanarayana-Upanishad. Adh. Up.=Adhyatma-Upanishad. Adhik.=Adhikarana.
A.
Ait.
Ar.=Aitareya-Aranyaka.
Ait.
Br.=Aitareya-Brahmana.
Ait.
Up.=Aitareya-Upanishad.
Ath. Up. =Atharvasira-Upanishad. A. S.=Atmasiddhi of Yamunacharya.
Ap. Dh. =Apastamba-Dharma-Sutras. Ap. Sr.= Apastamba-Srauta-Siitras. As. Sr.= Asvalayana-Srauta-Sutras. B. G.==Bhagavad-Glta. Brih.
Up. =Brihadarany aka-Upanishad. Brah. Up. =Brahma-Upanishad. Chhand. Up.=Chhandogya-Upanishad. Up.==Isa.vasya-Upamshad. Kath. Up.= Katha-Upanishad.
Is.
Kan. Brih. Up.=Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad,
Kanva
recension.
Ken. Up. Kena-Upanishad. Kaush. Up.== Kaushltakl-Brahmana-Upanishad.
M. Bh.=Mahabharata. M. Nat. =Taittir!ya-Mahanarayana-Upanishad, Mali.
Up.=Maha-Upanishad.
Manu.= Manusmriti. Madh.
Brih.
Up.
Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad,
Madhyandina Mand. Up.=Mandukya-Upanishad. Mund. Up. =Mundaka-Upanishad,
recension.
ABBREVIATIONS.
438 n.
= foot-note.
nn.= foot-notes. Nir.=Nirukta of Yaska. Panini.=Ashtadhyayi of Panini. Pur. Pr.
Mlm.=Purva-Mlmamsa aphorisms
of Jaimini.
Up.=Prasna~Upanishad.
R. V.=Rigveda-Samhita. Sat.
Br.=Satapatha-Brahmana.
Svet. Up.==Svetasvatara-Upanishad. Sub. Up.=Subala-Upanishad.
Sut.=Sutra. Taitt. Ar.=Taittiriya-Aranyaka.
Taitt. Br.=TaittirIya-Brahmana.
Taitt.
Samh. =Taittirlya-Samhita.
Taitt. Up.=Taittirlya-Upanishad.
V. Dh.=Vishnu-Dharma. V. P.=Vishnu-Purana. Vaj. Samh.=Vajasaneyi-Samhita.
Ved. Sut.=Vedanta-Sutras of Badarayana,
v.j
THE FOLLOWING
is THE SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION ADOPTED IN THIS WORK.
Equivalents and Pronunciation.
Vowels.
3T
a
3TT
a
\ $
in
father (father).
i
,,
i
^
mica.
give.
police (police).
u
put.
3J
u
rule (rule).
55
ri
gridiron or critique.
5KT
ri
the above prolonged.
<3[
Iri
revelry (revel ri).
<s%
In
the above prolonged.
q;
e
prey.
^
ai
aisle.
3TT
o
^
note.
au
like
ou
loud.
Equivalents and Pronunciation.
Consonants.
^
k
5ST
kh
T
g
U
gh
in
kind.
ink-horn (inkhorn). -
gun. log-hut (loghut).
^
ri
king (king).
=3
ch
such.
^
chh
church-hill (churchhill).
^
j
jump.
440
TRANSLITERATION.
ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA. Page i
viii
16
48 86 95 124 132 146
184 204.
203 209 215 228 247 256 317 343 347
352 388
407
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