Ukraine Article

Ukraine’s Unstable Alliances Stefan Simanowitz reports on the prospects for Ukrainian political stability Contemporary Review, Spring 2008, Vol.287, No.1688 'SO they've finished arguing over who will be in the new government', an elderly woman in Kiev told me with a shrug; 'Now the real fighting will begin'. Although the new coalition government looked different from its predecessor, with the telegenic Yulia Tymoshenko at its head, it is the same coalition that spectacularly collapsed after the Orange revolution in 2004 and that was unable to unite following the 2006 parliamentary elections. The 2006 collapse necessitated the prime ministerial reappointment of Viktor Yanukovych whose fraud-tainted election victory had originally sparked the Orange revolution. On 30th September 2007, Ukrainians went to the polls for the fifth time in three years in a last-ditch bid to haul the country out of political crisis. The election was called early to end a deadlock that has seen supporters of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych pitted against those of President Viktor Yushchenko. The vote gave the Tymoshenko and Yushchenko blocs a slim majority (with 30.71 per cent and 14.15 per cent respectively) over their rivals, the Party of Regions led by Yanukovych and the Communist Party (with 34.37 per cent and 5.39 per cent respectively). There then followed months of political deadlock and horse-trading. In early December, after tortuous negotiations, President Yushchenko agreed to put forward Tymoshenko as prime minister. However her nomination fell short of endorsement by Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. She was put forward again only to lose out by a single vote. Finally, at the third time of asking and after much public wrangling, Tymoshenko became prime minister with the bare minimum of votes required for confirmation after MPs used an unprecedented roll-call vote to make the decision. After more than two months in limbo, Ukraine's newly appointed a government looks anything but strong. The coalition is riven by differences of policy and riddled with personal antagonisms and rivalries. A total of 226 seats out of parliament's 450 has made for a fragile working majority. The one-seat majority may be enough to pass uncontentious legislation but it falls a long way short of the two-thirds majority needed to adopt constitutional changes and any hope of a radical reforming agenda will have to be put on hold. This at a time when Ukraine is badly in need of strong decisive leadership.

The muted enthusiasm with which Tymoshenko's appointment has been greeted in Ukraine contrasts starkly with the optimism that was so apparent following the Orange revolution. In the sixteen months following those heady days in 2004, amid rancorous public feuding, the Orange movement tore itself apart. In the four months following the 2006 parliamentary elections it struggled to piece itself together again. It failed then but now the Orange parties had another opportunity to prove that they can work together. Since becoming independent from the Soviet Union in 1992, Ukraine has been troubled by an absence of constitutional precedent. This has made it hard for all sides to agree on the balance of power between president, parliament, and legislature. This has manifested in the resultant power struggle between Yushchenko and Yanukovych which has dominated recent Ukrainian politics. In April 2007 Mr Yanukovych gained the upper hand after persuading 11 deputies from the pro-presidential Our Ukraine party to join his ruling coalition. This brought him close to the two-thirds majority needed to veto any presidential decree, which would have turned Mr Yushchenko into a lame duck president. Yushchenko responded by dissolving parliament. With Ukraine's constitutional court unable to solve the row, it seemed briefly that the crisis might escalate. In May over three thousand troops led by a commander loyal to Mr Yushchenko and acting in defiance of ministry orders, were reported to be heading to Kiev. Ultimately the crisis was peacefully diffused and both sides agreed to a September pre-term general election. The election result however, and Tymoshenko's appointment seem unlikely to resolve Ukraine's underlying constitutional problems. Whilst the free and fair conduct of the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections may represent an important step forward in Ukraine's democratic development, the results reflect the deep divisions within the country. Yanukovych's proRussian Party of Regions won the most votes in the both polls with President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party pushed into a humiliating third place. Yanukovych's poll results did not signify any increase in his popularity but were rather a reflection of the split between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. During their nine months in power together, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had fallen out very publicly amid accusations of corruption. Their feud reached a climax in September 2005 when Yushchenko fired Tymoshenko and she formed her own eponymous opposition party. Yanukovych was able to take advantage of these divisions. After the 2006 election, a pact on national unity signed by Tymonshenko and her erstwhile Orange revolutionary partner was short-lived. Although Yushchenko agreed to nominate Tymoshenko following the 2007 election, this was an action done of necessity and the bitter divisions that destroyed the coalition before threaten to hamper the efficient running of government. In 2006 and 2007 Yushchenko flirted seriously with the idea of forming a coalition with the Party of Regions. Allying with a former enemy of the Orange Revolution would have been

to risk accusations of opportunism or betrayal. Although Yushchenko, might have tried to justify a coalition with the Party of Regions on the grounds of unifying the country, such a coalition was ultimately deemed to be potentially too politically damaging. His credibility as well as his ambition to steer Ukraine towards NATO and EU membership would have been seriously compromised. A key reason that Yushchenko was so opposed to Tymoshenko's appointment as prime minister resulted from constitutional reforms brought in 2006 which had redistributed political power more evenly among branches of government giving parliament and the prime minister more influence at the president's expense. Whilst constitutionally the president still has the power to appoint a large number of key state posts, any coalition deal required posts to be spread among coalition partners. Yushchenko was therefore against the generally accepted principle that the prime minister should be named from the biggest coalition partner. Ukraine is facing a number of hardships. Social problems, such as poverty and spiralling levels of unemployment, are compounded by alcoholism, drug abuse and the rapid spread of HIV/Aids. Economically, this country of 47 million people experienced a decade-long recession throughout the 1990s and was severely affected by the instability caused by the disputed elections in 2004. Although the economy has been growing steadily in recent years buoyed by the Russian boom next door, there are still many areas of anxiety. The battle with Russia in the winter of 2006 over natural gas prices has only been temporarily resolved and threatens to further destabilise the economy. Russia is Ukraine's main energy supplier, and their ambassador indicated that the price of gas sold to Ukraine this winter could be adversely affected if Tymoshenko became prime minister. Russia has imposed three stiff price increases in as many years on natural gas exports and Ukraine's own gas transport system, Naftogaz Ukrainy, is on the verge of bankruptcy. On 22 February Prime Minister Tymoshenko announced that she would proceed with the sell-off of government shares in six energy companies in spite of President Yushchenko's opposition. The country is also deeply polarised on regional grounds with the Ukrainianspeaking population in central and western Ukraine supportive of greater Western integration. Those in the eastern regions do not speak Ukrainian and see themselves as much more closely aligned to Russia. Although Tymoshenko's appointment as prime minister might go some way to diffuse regional tensions, her party having gained support in both the east and west of the country, attempts by the new government to speed Ukraine's membership into the European Union and NATO are likely to further stir up regional resentments. With her white clothes, traditional braided hair-do and populist style, Tymoshenko stirs passionate support and anger in equal measure. Her declared determination to combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law starting at the highest levels of the government will inevitably lead to conflicts within the Rada whilst her foreign policy looks set to shake up relations with Russia. Indeed her article published in Foreign Affairs magazine last May entitled 'Containing Russia', has left many politicians in Moscow deeply suspicious of Tymoshenko.

The harsh living conditions for many Ukrainians have been made harder to bear by the weight of disappointed expectation. For most, the glittering promise of the market economy has proved hollow. The general standard of living may be rising but, for many, life has become harder and less secure since the fall of the Soviet Union. The average monthly salary is around $200 and, although central Kiev resembles any bustling modern city, its subways remain filled with elderly street vendors. The disappointment that followed independence and the Orange revolution has fed into a wider national mood; that of political fatalism, apathy and pessimism. After three centuries of Russian Imperial control followed by the brutalities of Stalinism and Nazi occupation, the origins of this fatalism are understandable. And yet in the freezing weeks before the Orange revolution, it seemed that the pessimism for which Ukrainians are famed was starting to thaw. The centre of Kiev was transformed into a medieval pageant of flags, tents, music and political street theatre with thousands swelling into the central Maidan Square to attend daily concerts and rallies. On election day, long queues had formed outside the polling stations even before the doors were opened and the mood was festive. The high voter turnout in the three subsequent elections and the largely free and fair nature of the process represents a genuine step forward for Ukraine's infant democracy. Whilst the appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko is unlikely to result in a sudden transformation of Ukrainian politics, the hope remains that Ukraine can now produce something resembling accountable and transparent government. Although the coalition might not be a stable one, the fact that an agreement was reached represents an important achievement and suggests that Ukraine's elected leaders might get beyond the politics of grievance and recognise the importance of political compromise and nation-building. According to the novelist Philip Roth, everyone has the predisposition to melancholy but it is betrayal that forges despondency into a habit. In Ukraine, where melancholy sometimes seems ingrained in the national psyche, the country is braced for their hopes of effective leadership to be betrayed once more. And yet, while there are reasons to fear for the success of the new coalition government, is it not possible that this time the Orange parties might be able to work together and form an effective government? Open optimism is hard to come by in Ukraine, but as the first stanza of the country's national anthem states: 'Ukraine is not yet dead'. Stefan Simanowitz is a writer and political analyst. He was part of the OSCE/ODIHR international election observation missions to Ukraine in 2004 and 2006.