Transatlantic Relations Caught Up By Reality
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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS CAUGHT UP BY REALITY'
EKAVIATHANASSOPOULOU University ofAthens and Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
I. THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: BEYOND THF RHETORIC
Anyone familiar with the p
ISSN 1479-4012
Ekiivi Athanassopoulou Europeans and ihc Americans were (and slill are) dissimilar. 'ITic political and socio-economic systems, legacies and altitudes of Europe and the United Sialcs were (and still are) different despite a number of common values and a certain degree of "Americanisation" ol the urban culture in mosl western European countries since the sixties. Contrary to postwar America, where scx;ialism was totally discredited and liberalism, anchored on the American free-enterpri.se system. became the dominant ideology, contemporary Western European scKieiies were characterised by deep social cleavajies resulting from strong competition between the liberals and the left. Besides, while the US emerged after the war as a super power with world responsibilities and concerns. Wesiern European countries were inward Icxiking (with the exeeplion of Britain) l(Kked in their domestic and/or European unity priorities since the late 1950s. In fact the admission of Turkey which post-war American political elites did not consider as a member of Western civilisation' - into NATO in 1952 demonstrated that against Cold War pressures Washington early on came lo view lhe transatlantic partnership more as a security tool rather than an alliance based on a community of nations sharing similar values. One of the tnain arguments of the Netherlands and NATO's Scandinavian members against Turkey s membership was that it was contrary to the original concept ofthe Alliance as an integrated community.' The second problem witli such prescriptions is that they rest upon the idea that there was a time when there was a genuinely cohesive .Atlantic partnership based on eommon interests, while the serious eonlliets and disaeeords within the allianee during the Cold War are either ignored, or downplayed. Hence the conclusion is that through reasoning together and mutual concessions conflicts could be overcome (while many reeent di.sagreements are seen more as a matter of style rather than subslance). Yet. extended lissutes in the allianee go back more than thirty years reflecting a consistent tension and serious limits on its cohesion (the natural consequence of the divergence of interests between the US and tnost European countries) that need to be appreeiated. This tensitin was primarily the result of the inequality of power and deeisionmaking between the U.S and Western Europe, the source of which was that Eurt)pe as neither unified nor strong. The transatlantic relationship was built on the basis of US dominanee rather than on partnership, something that eaused diseord between the two sides of the Atlantic and among lhe Europeans. Washington refused to give the Europeans a share of the nuelear deterrent and a voice over ils international military and eeonomie policies even when they seriously affeeted its European allies. In faet the United States often used tts dominant position in the allianee to subordinate the interests of its European allies to its global security priorities, without even eonsulting them. The comparison 1 uropean statesmen - but also analysis ofAmerican foreign policy' - often tnako these days between the p(5st-Cold War unilateral trends in American foreign policy and Washington's multilateral policy in lhe aftermath of the Second World War idealises histt>ry. 112
Transatlantic Relations caught up hy Realiry Unilateralism ha.s always run deep in US foreign policy, (It i.s worth remembering thai the US Senate ratified lhe UN Charter because the United Slalcs would retain its freedom of action through the veto power, which was given to each permanent member of the Security Council), The US's post Second World War 'mullilateralism" in reality meant building institutions and frameworks of co-operation, designed to promote an intemational system framed in the interests of the US, European allies were compelled to agree with these plans (though France in particular repeatedly sought to challenge them), due to their economic as well as security dependency on the US, NATO's first enlargement in 1952 to include Turkey and Greece is a classic early example of American unilateral deiiancc of its European allies. The United States brought the two countries into NATO despite the strong objections of the British and of many smaller members of the North Atlantic Treaty who complained that they had not even been adequately informed, let alone consulted, about the issue.* Not only did unilateral Ameriean policies cause irritation and indignation in European capitals but often seriously jeopardi.sed the Europeans' security interests. The 1962 Washington-Moscou confrontation over the Cuban missiles brought the two superpowers close to a war which might easily have drawn in Europe, though this was an issue of no vital interest to it. Yet. the Kennedy administration handled the crisis without any consultation with its Eumpean allies. As the story goes, when former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was sent to Paris to enlist President de Gaulle's support for U.S actions in the crisis, the French President asked Aeheson whether he had come to consult, or to infonn, to which a slightly embarrassed Acheson admitted that his mission was to inform,^ In another example, as the 197.^ Arab-Israeli war unfolded (during which the Nixon administration re-armed Israel) Washington placed its military forces on a worldwide alert. This clearly demonstrated that the US (like in fact the USSR) considered the conllict to be potentially more than a regional issue. However, at no point did the Americans properly consult with the European allies whose security was conceivably jeopardised as a result of Washington's support for Israel, Furthermore, the fa(,'ade of the Cold War alliance could not conceal that the defence interests and strategic priorities of the United States and the Europeans differed more often than not. This set limits to the cohesion of the alliance and resulted in lack of political and military reliability between the allies. In the words of Ronald Steel. 'The Atlantie alliance was built on a reality and marketed on an illusion. The realily was that the United Stales could not let Western Europe fall into Russian hands, and that the Europeans wanted American protection. The illusion was that the alliance would lead to a true partnership of equals with virtually identieal inicrcsts',** E,ssentially, Europe was afraid of being caught in the middle of a eontiict between the iwo superpowers, as it was thought that most likely any major pt)wer war (conventional or nuclear) would start and escalate on European territory. The U,S for its part wanted lo avoid war on American territory due to a 113
Ekavi Athanassiipoulou conflict with the USSR which could be kept kx:al somewhere in the continent of Europe, The divergence in defence interests and consequent deterrence strategies between the two sides of the Atlantic became openly apparent in the early l%()s when the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the US. Washington made it clear that it would not defend Europe the way the Europeans preferred to be defended. In other words the US would be reluctant to risk a nuclear attack against North American cities in order to rebuff a Soviet conventional testing t>t Westem European defences, and yet the Americans made it clear that they preserved the option of a tactical nuclear war in Europe.' The 1973 Arab-Israeli war tore further away the image ofthe allies' common security interests and shared global politics perceptions. The Europeans saw the war as a rciiional conllicl and as they stood to lose far more than the US as a result of the Arab oil embargo ( Europe was much more dependent than the US on oil imports from the Middle East) resisted military co-operation wilh Washington to the great irritation of the Americans. Already by the late 1970s the utility (as well as the bonds) ofthe transatlantic relationship were weakened as a result ofthe difficulties mentioned above but this was also owing to a combination of new factors as the international system moved away from the rigidities of the Cold War, The US had entered a period of detente with Ihe USSR: Western Europe was resisting American nuclear strategy: and the US was faced with growing economic competition from a now prosperous European Economic Community.'" Open bickering about burden sharing in NATO was only the tip of the iceberg. Many Europeans were becoming more and more frustrated wilh Washington's military strategy and ils private deals with Moscow (characteristically no Western European government had been consulicd while the 1973 American - Soviet agreement on mutual force reductions was worked out). But also they were aggravated wiih Washington's drift towards economic nationalism, ils interference in the intra-European decision process, its high-handedness when dealing with ils European allies and its overall domination ofthe transatlantic alliance. The Americans for their part were irritated with the Europeans' failure to speak with one voice, the reluctance of some of them to accept American calls for monetary co-operation and support many of Washington's foreign policy initiatives, their refusal to allow NATO bases to be used for anything but Eurtv pean defence and their unwillingness to accept the US's lead in dealing with international issues. In short, rising mutual frustration and irritation rellecled on the one hand Europe's growth (albeit very slowly) as an entity which struggled to shape its own identity and therefore il wished to be treated hy Washington as a proper partner. On the olher il rcllected the growing ambivalence of many leading Americans in their attitude regarding the desirability of a politically and economically united Europe: Washington wislicd for a United Europe but only if it did not challenge American dominance in Atlantic policy. In 1974 Washington's great annoyance had been poured out publicly in a speech by President Nixon who made brutally clear what 114
Transatlantic Relations caught tip hy Reality Henry Kissinger had also staled a year earlier: (he American seeurity eommilment to Europe was linked to the European.s' lull polilieal and cconomie co-operation with the LFS." Following Nixon's speech. Washington s rhetoric subsided, nevertheless, the tension and eontiiets in the alliance eould not be concealed though there were trite re-arfirmations of transatlanlie solidarity. There were gotxl reasons why Atlanticism was preserved and there was no effort seriously to consider problems that bedeviled it. in spite of the pt>ignancy of the issues that undermined the coherence and challenged the utility of lhe alliance. The idea of a single coalition holding the world in balance against the infidel was fundamental to the post-War USA foreign policy establishment''wer of sentimental attachment to ties born out of intense historical circumstances. Despite problems and conflicts the transatlantic partnership and idea of a community had been pre.sent in the political life
115
Ekitvi Athana.\sopoulou of tiiost statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic - whose inlelleLiual formation tk plaec in the late forties or in the fifties - for most of their adult years. Thus the impulse often was to try and preserve what one eould rather than aeeept that relations may have to be seen through a dilTerent perspective and that even disintegration in the relationship could be expected. Many of the reasons mentioned above also accounted for the continuation of the Allantic alliance in the afiennath of the Cold War and lor the downplaying of its serious problems (although a number nl experts in politics and academia - on both sides ofthe Atlantie - seriously questioned ils need, being of the view that it was hii:h time to seriously re-assess the transatlantic military and polilical relationship), Inliuenlial policy makers in the George Bush and William Clinton administrations believed that Washington needed the help of ils l-^uropean allies to addre,ss threats outside Europe. In their minds close co-operalion, ol course under U.S leadership, between the advaneed industrialised countries was fundamental in successfully handling global problems,"" Furthermore NATO would provide an essential link wilh strategic nuclear forces. Thus Washington chose to perfect the alliance s military set up (implement the long-iime-soughi Ilex ibie response and the equitable sharing of defenee burdens) rather than abandon the alliance. Many Europeans for iheir part still deemed the US eommitment to Europe's security important. It reassured Germany and the other members ofthe alliance about Russia (which despiie all of its many problems remained a nuelear super-power), and about security threats originating in areas of instability such as the former Yugoslavia and North Afriea. Besides, maintaining NATO meant lhat the European countries would not have to enter a spiral of increased defense expenditures while faeing at the same time an increase in insecurity. And like before, unresolved divisions in liurope about ils role in the world, and how iis relationship with the USA should be approached, meant thai unless Europe was to fall into disarray the Atlantic relationship had to be pre.served. Also in many European capitals US hegemonic presence in Europe was seen as the lesser of two evils because il was thought that it helped prevent a re-emergenee of power political tensions between the major European slates.'' lissenlially in the early 1990s many European politieal leaders feared that intra-European tensions in the lield of security eould also easily spread onto other areas ihus undermining ihc European project. And, yci again, maintaining the allianee was a sale and comfortable choice against the background of the yel unknown posi-Cold war security environment. The ailianee's structures could help render unfamiliar challenges and threats in tenns ofthe "lamiliar", I urthermore lor many European leaders and siraleuisis ihe problems involved in seekini; to maintain and rcsiore the tran.satlantic relationship were less challenging than those inherent in striving to develop a i.uropean collective .seeurity identity and the political will to build the structures to support it, as the debacle over Bosnia had showed. Thus the l:uropeanists (those Europeans who, led by the French, particularl\ objected to Ameriean domination 116
Tran.iatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality of the transatlantic relationship and believed that there was enough divergence of interests and positions between l.urope and the US to justify a separate Ruropean policy), chose lo locus on transforming lhe political structures of the alliance in a way ihat would make il possible for the Europeans to assume a greater role in decision making and policy implementation regarding their security. In parallel they sought to develop a European Defense and Security Identity, which they did not want subordinated to the alliance, with the aim of developing il as the defence component of the European Union.
II. ONE SHOULD NOT EXPEC T MIRACLl-S
The third problem with the pre.scriptions of those who tend lo downplay lhe stresses the allianee experienced over the last three decades, and who advise that prudenee and reason should prevail among the allies today, is that they often tend to scale down sonic of the post-Cold War realities and their disintegrating effect on the alliance. Europe no longer occupies a central position within lhe context of American global strategy. For quite some time American foreign policy makers have been moving their attention away from Europe, though the US has remained signiiicantly involved in European affairs. In fad. even before lhe end of the Cold War Europe had begun to lose iLs preeminence for the American Congress. Since the early 1990s conventional wisdom about the importance of Europe lor American strategy steadily gave way in the face of new and urgent issues elsewhere (particularly in Asia), the emergence of other strong international players, and the ascendancy for some time in the Republican Party and in Congress ol the Sun Bell political elite (which the current George W. Bush administration arguably represents). In the view of many observers this elite attached no sentimental value to the Atlantic relationship and the historic ties with Europe, unlike the old American East-coasl political establishment. Americans in policy making circles still viewed NATO as the core of US global defence and security efforts (given that it remained under US leadership while only small changes were explored). Bul congressional support for American involvement in Europe to a large degree depended on a robust NATO. However, most of NATO's post-Cold War political changes did nol go lo the heart of the alliance's dilemma: how to deline a new over-arching purpose that would enjoy public support in the US and justify an Ameriean stake in European security. On the contrary from an American point of view the contribution of the Huropean core members was becoming loss useful because ol Lhe growing eapability gap."* At the same time the preoeeupation of lhe Europeans wiih the completion of the European project and its expansiiin to include the whole ol Europe (something that the Americans have tended to dismiss as sell absorbtion). contributed to the decline of Europe's importance for US global security policy. 117
Ekavi Athanassopoulou The steady UxKening of the transatlantic ties and devaluation of the alliance in Washington's eyes was manilcsicd in many ways: Washington hy-passed or igni)red the Europeans and their ohjcciions to aholishing the ABM treaty and tried directly to reach an accommodation with Moscow The US also adopted a new strategic doctrine, that of pre-emptive altack, without any consultation in Huropean capitals, though it obviously had serious implications for intemational order and the Atlantic alliance. In fact Washington's strong message Ihal the transatlantic relationship, in its historic form, may be redundant hy differentiating hetween "old" and 'new" Europe reflected the devaluation ofthe transatlantic partnership, as mueh as it reflected the unilateralist streak in American international poliey. The American response to lhe 9/11 lerrorisi attaeks only served to further reinforce this reality. Immediately following 9/11, the response of NATO's European memhers was lo invoke "Article 5" in support of the US in ils war against terrorism and the military aetion in Afghanistan,'''Yet. Washington showed no interest in real ct)nsultation with Europe as such in lhe months following the terrorist attaeks and declined offers of assistance hy its N.ATO partners. To quote one Ameriean analyst among many holding a similar view: "The Pentagon undouhtedly worried that integrating European assets into the Afghan campaign would have diverted too much attention from the war effort. Also, the political constraints that each European government would have attached to the use of ils respective contingent would complicate command and control, all for liiile or no payoff on the battlefield."-" "The United States spurned the European action, and in doing so Washington signaled that it did not need NATO and lhat the European allies counted for little in the greatest threat to US vital interesis sinee perhaps the attack on Pearl Harhor.""' In the months following operation Enduring Freedom there was almost no perception in the US that there were also European troops in Afghanistan. In short, the American-EU strategic co-operalion in Afghanistan (whieh had heen so troublesome to put together, partly because i>f Ameriean reluctance), is unlikely to hecome a regular iKcurrcncc, in the foreseeable future (though one may see similar co-opcraiion on an ad hoc, casc-by-casc hasis). At the same time, the endemic tension in the alliance owing lo ils domination by the US should he expeeted to grow, Europe has been liherated from iis dependence on the Ameriean nuclear deterrent. Il is emerging as a new eenler of power with ambitions to play a bigger role in the world arena (which means a desire for independence as well as European influence over American policy), whilst Washington continues to see iiself as the dominant power within the context ofa glohal Ameriean-European strategic co operation. It is true that the Europeans are still divided over whal kind of relationship each of ihem and the I-.uropean I'liion should have with the US." While Erench governments have heen determined to limit NATO's scope and develop the European Security and Defence Identity, London has been trying hardest to prcscrsc Atlantic structures, Berlin for its part has been seeking to stay somcw here in the middle. (Most other European political 118
Tratisattantic Relation.s catif>ht up hy Reatity leaders are divided more or less along these positions of the three leading Eun>pcan countries). Nonetheless, it is equally true that although the EUphoria of the early 1990s has subsided European integration efforts have come very far. R> the turn ofthe 2tst century the TAJ had assumed powers traditionally assix'iated with the nation-state, in the fields of justice and home affairs, while sieps vscrc taken in developing a common defence ,sysiem. The now presumed dead 200.^ Constitutional Trealy for Europe, ihal gave the Union a single legal personality, illustrated the high degree o\' integration, although many on hoth sides of the Atlantic Joined the Economist in declaring that 'Rejection of the constitution signals that the dream of deeper politieal integration and, in the 1957 Treaty of Rome's famous phrase, "ever eloser union; is over","' The uncertainty of the road ahead for the I-.U following the rejectit)n oftlie Constitutional Treaty hy the referenda in Erance and the Netherlands should not ohscure the commitment and sense of belonging to the Union within the majorities (>f the politieal elites of Europe, nor the significance of the consensus reached helween them over the creation of a eloser integrated Union. Along with the growth ofthe European entity, conviction, ambition as well as eonlidence among leading Europeans that the EU can emerge as a p
119
Ekavi Athanassopoulou together the EU 6().(XX) defence foree that they had been detemiined lo have in place by 2(X)3. Nor did they seem that they had finally accepted to substantially inerease military spending. Nonetheless, the EU diK's nol need to waii to build the adequate security forces in order to develop a European voice on security issues and an independent global political role venturing into international lields that Washington expects to dominate. Military force is not automatically the mosi relevant tool required in dealing with international affairs today. What is of importance here is lhat the Trealy did constitute a major break through in the eontext of elTorts to achieve European integration in foreign poliey and defense matters, which might one day lead to a common army. The Huropean project has not been evolving according to a blue print; the exact outcome of this ongoing process can neither be predicted nor guaranteed as the two referenda proved. Nonetheless, one can feel conlident that European unily is going lo grow and not diminish - though there may be more crises yet to come - alongside the desire for I-.urope's di.stinclive voice in international affairs. Thus Britain, the most consistent advtKale ofa common defence policy in close co-operation with the US (a stance that reflects a continuous British ambivalence towards Huropean integration), will eventually have to decide whether it will give ils full support to elToris lo artieulate such a voice (and thus also help shape it). Some argue that transatlantic relatiiins could be re-invenied on lhe basis of proposals for a grand bargain"'' in which Europe spends more on defenee. develops a coherent strategy, and assumes a significant global security role in co-operation with the US. As a result. Wa.shington would agree to genuine consultations with its European allies hefore acting. Grand bargain ad\iK-ates disregard reality. More than a decade following the end of the Cold War. efforts within the alliance to address the fundamental burden and pt)wer-sharing problems have prcxiuced no satisfactory deals for either side. The Americans and lhe Europeans have been consistently assessing differently how much defence burden each carries and as a result they have been disagreeing about how much decision-making power each should have. The Europeans have adopted the view lhat the .\merican desire to lead lhe alliance is out of tune with ils financial contributions. The Americans for their part have not been prepared to acknowledge the value of Europe's economic assistance regionally and globally. The American rejeetion of the importance of Europe's financial contributions, and the consequciu resistance lo a more balanced power-sharing relationship with the Europeans, does nol simply refleet the preferred US approaeh to security issues, ihat is pre-eminence of hard versus soft power (as some would like to argue), but also Washington's wish to continue lo dominate the alliance. In fact, the background has been a specific concern with asserting .American global leadership now lhat the EU seems lo challenge it. In short, Washington's traditional ambi\alence regarding European unity continues. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War decision makers in Washington have lavoured a united Europe as a means lo enhance European stability 120
Tratmttlantic Relations caught up hy Reality but also in order to unify Westem policy. To hoth these ends they have suppt»ned the idea of Europe assuming a bigger international security role. At the same time, from a more narrow US perspective, such a role would mean that the Europeans would finally have to share more of the military burden. IncreiLsed European military spending would, in its tum. close the substantial and growing military gap between the US and the European eountries thus turning them into reliable and eredible allies, on whom the US eould eount in dealing with seeurity problems outside Europe. However, on the other hand Washington has heen resisting the development of any truly substantial independent European defence institutions. Certainly, US policy regarding the development ofa European Security and Defence Identity has been constantly evolving since the early 199()s, Nonetheless American concern about European competition (with or within NATO), has been consistent as it is essential for the US to lead the transatlantic policy in matters which are of American concern or interest. George W, Bush did not express simply a personal or popular helief among influential Republicans when he said that 'he must state a new strategic direction, or policy with hold, clear moves. And hecause it would he the policy of the United States, the only superpower, the rest ofthe world would have to move over, would adjust over time',"' Most DemtKrals think similarly despite pronouncements that the United States needs to consult more with ils allies. Eor instance, in the WDrds of lhe White House National Security Strategy dcKument of the second Clinton administration: 'The ability to a.ssure global security, shared prosperity and IreedtMii is heyond the power of any one nation. But the actions of many nations often follow from the aetions of one',"''The Clinton administration sought to promote American leadership internationally in a less provocative manner than George W, Bush and his team during his (irsi term in office, but in the final analysis lhe difference was one of taetics and rheioric, not substance,"^ As David Halherstam has put it, one ofthe early conclusions ofthe Clinton While House in relation to American international policy was that the "United States would not consult. It should decide in advance on its policy and then explain that poliey to its allies." '" In fact Clinton sought to maximise the American position of strength through US dominated multilateral institutions and coalitions in which the United States was expected lo assume primary responsibility for .shaping their agenda, objectives, strategy and responsibilities."' In other words, "Americans are instrumental multilateralisis".'" Whilst evidently there is a wide diversity of opini
Ekavi AthaiuLssapoitlou ally either sec the merits of the Ameriean approach, or hecau.se little alternative seems to he on offer. (Henee Ameriean acceptance ol multilateralism rests upon lhe understanding that the UvS as a glohal leader has the ahility. hut also the right to aet unilaterally). In lad it would he a remarkahle lirst for a dominant glohal power like the U.S to voluntarily surrender its drive for hegemony, a drive which seems to characterise all great powers. In other words, it is unlikely the United States will change the way it has heen operating in the world system since the Second World War. Sueh a change would essentially amount lo compromising the US's own particular glohal vision and to sharing decision-making pnvser. which in effect is the suhslance of power. The United .States might accept the need to share power if it began to seriously lose conlidenee in its capahilities. like Britain did in the wake ofthe Second World War. However, tcxlay the US - despite ils hruised moral authority - is the world's eeonomic leader, al technok>gy's cutting edge, the only country that can project military power anywhere on the globe, the only one that can deter nuelear war. thai ean assure Ihe free How of commerce hy patrolling the sea lanes, that has communications and intelligence eapahilities of glohal reach, and that can concei\ahly keep China in line. Moreover, il sees itself as a most dynamic siKiely. which exports us popular culture all over the world and constitutes a development model that attracts many. .\s discussed ahove Ameriean leaders are fully aware that the US needs allies to suppori an international system in accord with its interests, but their role is seen as strictly suhsidiary. It is not just that .Xmericans are conftdent in their military and technological superiority and their development model, or that they believe thai the US is the only country with a "will to power."" Underlying this confidence are two profound beliefs (albeit contradictory), which lie at the heart of Ameriean foreign policy in the 2()th century: Firstly that the US is exceptional, and secondly that American values (or most of them), are universal.''' In other words, the conviction among American leaders that the US must maintain global leadership is particularly strong because it has grown hand in hand with a deep rooted eertainty that Ameriean leadership is es.sential in maintaining international order; a belief that has been consistent in the hislory ol .'\inerican foreign policy in the 2()th century. When the Former .Secretary of State. Madeleine Alhright. stated that .America was "the indispensable nation". Americans "stand tall and hence see further than other nations." she was far from saying anything new. From an American perspecti\e the US is destined to be the world leader heeause the American nation alone has "sunicient moral force" (Woixlrow Wilson), or "moral standing " (George Bush).^' In 1992 a Pentagon internal document entitled Defence Plunning Guidance. argued that the United Stales; 'must discourage the adsanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership or even aspiring lo a larger regional or global rolc\ To prevent this from happening, the US. according to the same document, musi 'retain the preemincni responsihilily for addressing ... those wrongs which 122
Transatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality threaten not only our interests, hut those of allies or friends, or which eould seriously unsettle internaiional relations"."" This dix'ument. whieh was leaked to the New York Times, caused controversy in the Uniled States, yel not so much heeause of its stated objectives, but rather because of the implications they eould have for US defence hudgets. as well as its tone which could disturh many US allies." The Pentagon"s new Defence Planning Guidance d(x;ument which was leaked in the L<).'< Angele.s Times in July 2(X)2 contained all the key elements ofthe 1992 doeumenl.'" The other problem with the "grand bargain" idea is ihat ils advocates tend to fcx:us on military problems within the allianee yet the military gap is not accidental; it refleets a divergenee of interests and values. In the final analysis what is striking al the heart ofthe trans-Atlantie relationship is that slill today there is not an integrated community of shared attitudes and values across the Atlantie despite the defeat of Communism and the growing influence of the eapitalisi markelbased model in Europe sinee the welfare state crisis developed during the 199()s. The Europeans have their own understanding of what constitute healthy society and also the freedom of the individual. They have their own understanding of the meaning of equality, the pursuit of happiness, cohesive communities, and the market-driven economies." (Furthermore, on some of these issues there is not even a consensus within or among European eountries.) The gradual alignment of European and American social and political systems that many soeial .scientists foresaw lor some time has not happened. The Europeans today have the eeonotnie power and enough teehnological expertise to substantially close the military gap. In fact some European states have made a genuine effort to adapt Iheir defenee to the post Cold war changed security environment.^ However, pressed hy domestic priorities European governments do not wish to curtail s(x;ial welfare programmes lo finance ambitious defenee programmes particularly as they believe that "none of the new threats is purely military; nor ean any be taekled by purely military means"".^' Essentially the Amerieans" and Europeans" assessment of post ColdWar threats differs significantly. The US has been emphasising that against the new uneertain intemational environment security requires managing ""multiple potential adversaries"" (state but also non-state aetors) with a range of military capabilities hesides the threat to retaliate.^" The Europeans have been emphasising deterrence based on the threat of retaliation and have been attaehing much less importance to questions of military defence while fcKusing their attention on a wider range of instruments to respond to a wider range of threats sueh as illegal immigrati(3n, refugees, and trans-border organi.sed erime.^' The Deeember 2(H)3 European Security Strategy^'' which acknowledged lhe need for forward defence to deal with intemational threats including terrorism may he bringing closer the Atlantie allies' diverging security agendas in the short, perhaps medium tenn. Yet. it is unlikely that they will agree on what are the right instruments for the long-term management of new security threats, given that neither the Ameriean
Ekavi Athanassoptnthnt claim of a hroadly conceived right to pre-empt danger.^^ nor many Europeans" nervousness, or clear aversion lo the idea of provcniive attacks are going to disappear (particularly as the US does not intend to share veto power over its security poliey). It is worth noting that at the end of 2005 European leaders publicly elaimcd that iheir "soft" approach lo developing Ihc Muslim world - hased on economic development, dialogue, strengthening the rule of law - had greater credibility wilh Muslim leaders ihan lhe Bush administration's conception which focused on military intervention and aggressive diplomacy.'" In short, inlo the 21 si century Americans and Europeans continue to diverge in their perceptions of security, the requisites of a deterrence strategy that most enhances Iransatlanlic security (including how lo hesi tight lhe threat of the day, international terrorism), and whether hallistic ttiissile defences contribute to or undermine lhe security of Europe^ (like in lhe past lhe debate over tnissile defence has been reflecling European doubts regarding lhe credibility of U.S security commitment to its allies). These fundamental disagreements, which are nol new. have heen reinforced as lhe emergence of lar more complex seeurity challenges seetn to promise the sharpening of old dilTerences and lhe inlroduclion of new ones between lhe United Slates and lhe Europeans, wht). as they gain in confidence, arc developing their own perspeclivcs on many of lhe present security threats. Besides, there is a marked difference of opinion hetween many European counlrics and Ihc US on how to approach tnany international questic>ns. The disagreement over Iraq was far from exceptional. The .\mericans and tnost Eurcv pean governments disagree, over whal is ihc best long lerm poliey towards Iran (despite lhe narrowing of differences on thai front). Syria. Israel. China.^" Also there is a clash of strategic priorities between the Europeans (who are eoncenirating their energies on lhe European cotnmunity and iheir region) and the Americans who are selling glohal goals. The end of the war of words across the Atlantic. Washington's more conciliatory altitude towards European allies' rhetoric during the second Bush administration, and ofiicial statements about "an increasingly shared strategie vision wilh Europe".'*'' cannol conceal the existence of serious disagreements. Nor does it conceal lhe fact ihal already ihc EU when acting on the glohal security stage is seeking to promote a more European view of the world just as Henry Kissinger warned in The Troubled Partnership fortv years ago.** In the tinal analysis the idea of an Atlantic partnership and alliance was born out of a specific security need, to proiecl western Europe, and was in tune with the simple pattern of the Cold War international order. Today, in the post-Cold War environment this simple pattern cannot be restored particularly as the transatlantic relationship today does not simply suffer from circutnsiantial disagreemenls and tensions among like-tiiinded players but from sottielhing deeper, a larger ideological battle. As Isaiah Berlin, the European liberal philosopher, has einphasised, people sharing the same ideological heliefs can often have acule disagreements; moreover, ihese ottcn prove lo be irreconcilable.'" 124
Transatlantic Relatiotis caught up by Reality The American way of trying lo solve intemational problems is seriously questioned by the majority of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes. European critics of the US sec it as Janus-like in the way it acts in international affairs preaching for freedom, demtKraey and a liberal world order, but often undermining them with its aetions. Eumpean criticistn of the US and its intemational policies, whieh has been mueh more open than in the pa.st, draws upon a belief ihat the Amerieans often betray and discredit liberal and dem(v cratic principles, undermine the effectiveness of intemational instituiions and are weakening confidence in the West around the glohe. becau.se of their preference for the use of force as the solution lo force, rather than Ihe Law. their unquestioning eonfidenee in America's unfailing virtue and moral clarity, their belief in their omnipotence, iheir blind patriotism, their tendency to act unilaterally, to endorse the idea that the end justifies the means, to take upon themselves the role of global policeman while lhe failures of their leadership are very often assumed by the protected parties, and to dis[)ense with intcrnationai rules when they arc deemed inconvenient. In short American policies are attacked for being driven hy narrow self-interest dependent on US domestic factors, and American actions on the international scene for being based heavily on the use of foree. In fact critics ask whether, in the final analysis, the United Stales and Europe even adhere lo ihe same Wesiem principles in lhe conduct of iheir inlernational policy. This criticism, whether or not rational or balanced (or free of stereotypes), cuts across national boundaries." It has been coming nol only from the iradilional quarters (pacificists and lhe lefl). but has even been voiced, often loudly, by the populist righl^\ whieh has been growing in power in a number of European countries, as well as in those circles that are keen for Europe to tnaintain a vigorous link with lhe US. Il has also been fairly consistent despite the profound variance let alone clear dilTerences in ideological orientation and operational style among the critics. And the chorus is growing without serious opposition in Western Europe now that explicitly proAmerican parties, or leaders, have disappeared from the political scene (In fact the US is nol much discussed in Westem Europe unless it is lo he criiicised). If the transatlantic partnership were heing built from scratch today it might well exclude a few of the historic European allies who have beeome so openly disgruntled with, and critical of. Washington. It would be wrong to assume that this criticism is mere posturing, or jusi the expression of many Europeans' dissatisfaction with the power sharing stattds quo within the allianee. It would also be erroneous lo trace ils roots simply to domestic politics, in other words ihat it is another way for many Europeans lo assert their separaleness from the Americans in order lo shape iheir own identity,'''' or that it reflects domestic political costs and henelits calculations (ihough ihere is a good deal of iruth in all of the above).''' Of equal itnporlance. is ihat many Europeans have internalised tnore than Americans lhe Vietnam War lessons. The Europeans have learned, for instance, that liberal ends cannol be sustained by illiberal means. I2.S
Ekavi Athattassopoukm that force is adverse to liberty and ihat attempts to regulate (ralher ihan manage), lhe international system may evoke unforeseen and unwanted reaction and often result in reinforcing tension and violence. It is interesting to note ihal most Europeans fell thai lhe Americans should have seen 9/11 also as a lesson in humility in their pursuit of intemational policy, and lamented the fact that Washington drew almost exactly the opposite conclusion. Eor their part most Americans in policy making circles tend to hold lhe view Ihal lhe Europeans are weak, unrealistic, lack resolve, and accuse ihem of being hypocrilieal. The American view is ihal lhe Europeans criticise the US lor failing liberal values, but in practice it is the Europeans who betray liberal ideals because they arc unable to act in a robust manner against the enemies of the liberal system. whether this is Slobodan Milosevic. Osama bin Laden, or Saddam Hussein. Some right-wing Americans, piqued hy European criticism (and apparently oblivious of the new face of Europe), even go so lar as to privately suggest that Europe, in light of its fascist experience, lhe Holocaust and - in Iheir view - the present existence of strong anti-Semitism, is hardly qualified to preach humanitarian and deincKratic values lo lhe Americans.'* The view of a majority wiihin Atnerican political elites is thai those Europeans who preach for Law and iniernalional institutions tend to overlook the fact Ihat force is often needed lor Law to prevail, and that it is power politics more often ihan law that maintain peace and stability in the world. In fact European erilieism of US international policies has been perceived in lhe US nol as an efforl to promote liberalism. demcKracy or international eo-operation. bul as an obstacle to addressing US perceived needs and challenges within the context of a threatening intemational environment, if taken .seriously, there would he a risk of the Europeans debating the Americans into inaction. Essentially, at lhe core of the divide between lhe United States and many Europeans lies lhe question as to who is heller qualified lo safeguard the heart and soul of lhe Western world, spread ils message of liberalism and democracy, and help promote a liberal world order. The iradilional confidence and belief of Amerieans in their exceplionalism and in iheir system as the primary demcKTatic and liberal socio-political model, "a standing monutncnt & example for the aim and imitation of other countries." in the words of Thomas Jefferson*', is now rivalled by the confidence of European Union political leaders and senior bureaucrats in the exceptionalistn of the EU. Their belief in the uniqueness of the Union based on detiKKracy. freedom, and in its responsibility to serve as a model for the world is not to be doubled. .Xs Rotnano Prcxli, when President oi lhe European Commission, put it in his speech to lhe European Parliatncnl in 2(XX): 'Europe needs lo project its tnodel of s(K"iely into lhe wider world. We are not simply here lo defend our interests: we have a unique historic experience lo offer: the experience of liberating people from poverty, war. oppression and intolerance. We have Ibrgcd a mixlcl of devclopmeni and continental integration based on ihc principles of demtKracy. freedom and solidarity and it is a model thai works.'^" It is not sitnply 126
TransatUmtic Relation.^ caught up by Reality ihat each side believes that it is lhe more uhie guardian of liberal, dem(x:ratie and humanitarian values, but also that increasingly many Europeans now feel that the U.S is acting in a way ihal undentiines them.
III. BRIDGING THE GAP?
At some point this acute tension between Americans and many Europeans thai reflects diverging values and beliefs concerning the nature and scope of foreign and security policy and how power should be exercised globally may be reduced, if the gap between these values as well as beliefs is bridged. Yet, the likelihood of this hap[)ening d(x:s not seem very high, unless both sides make a systematic elforl to balance and moderate their attitudes to the breach between them. For instance. American political leaders and the public could appreciate the paradox that has long been identified by students of American foreign policy: cfforis to spread American liberal ideals "require the expansion of American p
Ekavi AthatHissopoitloH
point ihal the more expert Washington's leadership is. in matters of international affairs, the more sueeessful its foreign policy is bound to be. As has been noted for some time a growing number df members of the House and Senate (Democrats and Republicans) have no intemational orientation, do not care about international affairs, do not travel abroad, and in many cases do nol have passports.*' TTie Europeans for their part eould more readily recognise that there is indeed a paradox between liberal ideals and the practical requirements of exercising world power, an old dilemma that is never easily resohcd. They could also rellect upon the fact that in the United States (unlike in most European countries), there has been for a long lime a significant public debate about the relationship of liberal ideals and values in the conduct of foreign poliey. Huropean intellectuals, who are invariably hostile to the intemational choices ofthe United States, and arc unconditionally against the use of force, logeiher with those Europeans, who do accept that sometimes force is needed to uphold the law. but insist that force should be used within the limits of law. could perhaps give some thought to the dilemmas one is often confronted with in the real world. Though history shows that violence dcx;s indeed breed more violence, it also shows that non-violence is not at all contagious. To state the obvious, democracies may prefer to regulate relations between themselves through Law and treaties, but this is not yet a dem(Kratie globe regulated by demiK-ratic institutions. Of course, the Westem world needs for the sake of its own soul to live up to its own standards and prineiplcs. However, in a world whieh is not yet completely governed by the rule of law often these principles and standards are exploited by brutal regimes in order to perpetuate tyranny. In other words to suggest that there is a straight choice between the use of force or Law in foreign policy is tcx) simplistic in the light ofthe complexity of intemational affairs. It is as simplistic as to suggest that force is the ultimate guarantee of world stability. So tcx). the Europeans eould acknowledge that the foreign policy goals of most European states, or of the EU. are not always acted on in the spirit of the continent s highly held liberal ideals. For example, the EU routinely used to state in its official dtKuments its interest in the promotion of demiKracy in Palestine and eamiarked aid for individual projeets aimed at denKK'rati.sation. However, in practice the primary objective of its policies towards the Palestinian Authority was politieal stability, which direetiy contradicted the stated goal of democratisation. given the lack of interest in democratisation by the Palestinian political leadership and the autocratic nature ofthe Palestinian political system under the late Yasser Arafat."Europeans who readily and earnestK accuse the US of undermining internatit)nal institutions eould seriously question whether the promise of international institutions to deal with intemational conflict is true or false.'"' Can the UN offer solutions to problems such as intemational terrorism, violations ol human rights, or the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destmction.' The history of international insiitutions shows lhat their effectiveness depends on a communitv of interests 128
Transatlantic Relations caught tip hy Reatity which oticn dcK's not exist and certainly cannot be crcutcd al will. Europeans (uho tend lo feel free to adnn)nish the Uniled States on account of its unilaioralism). could also recognise that many European governments consistently lack commitment to the multilateralism they demand ofthe US. Mighl it not be true to say that the split within the EU over Iraq was partly due to the indilterence and arrogance with which France and Germany treated the other members ol the Union, and ihat no effort was made by the members ofthe EU to use the consultation mechanism of the Union to reach a consensus of opinion7 The same Europeans could ask themselves whether multilateralism should be the sole standard for judging the correctness, or effectiveness, of Ameriean policies. The creed of multilateralism, which essentially reflects opposition to concentrated authority, certainly carries a lot of merit. Yet. il alst) has the tendency to blur reality, il only because it implies that a nation s unilateral policies have no valid basis other than in Ihe promotion of its selfish interests, whieh are bound to be detrimental to lhe interesis ofthe rest. Faith in the dcK*trine ol' multilateralism confuses expeeiaiions about how a better, more balanced management of world alTairs might emerjie More spet ilically. such faith implies that better policies are guaranteed when more international actors are engaged. This a.ssumption is debatable. Multilateralism recently has come to be endowed by many critics ofthe US in Europe with almost magic qualities which it clearly does not have, at leasi not in ils applied fomi. Multilateralism as we have come to know it is not by detinition a recipe for a morv just world. Nor can it automatically guarantee a more stable, or better functioning intemational system. While it is true to say that unilateralism means the interesis of one. clearly multilateralism d(x;s not mean lhe intercsis of all. Nor is it axiomatic that collective decisions - usually reached on the basis of compromises and expeditious (often unholy) alliances - always produce the besi results for any uiven situation in hand. If attitudes across the Atlantic could be gradually tempered along some ol ihe lines suggested above the gap in values and beliefs might be reduced at some point. The probability of this occurring in the foreseeable future is hard to predict since this gap is the product of the complex interplay of p
tV. IHOt GHTS ABOUT THE FUTUKI Current elTorts to reconstruct the transatlantic alliance and reform the .'\ineric;iii European relationship do not hold the promise to ease the aceumulated frustration and edgy relations that exist between the allies. The solutions at hand cannot 129
Ekavi Athanassopoulou provide appropriate answers to an array of problems, lisscntially ihev do inn promise to lully satisfy the American desire lor a scctirity organisation which can he used to promote their jzlohal siraicgv. since many items on the American strategic "list" have strong opponent.s in Eurtipe. At the same time these soltitions arc jioinj; lo fall well short of European hopes lor a partnership of equals wilh the United States. There is. in fact, no cas\ policy, and no easy consensus (not only hetwecn the Americans and the Europeans but also among the Europeans themselves) as to what could, or should be done to build a grand transatlantic alliance and partnership for the future. Even if an ideal formula were lo he found, it would more likely founder on diverging sectjrity perceptions and ideological dilTerences. Nonetheless, both sides currently prefer to follow a mixlerate eourse of action and keep the pnK'ess of modifying NATO alive. Thus, they arc prt>bahly going to continue to .settle lor whatever second hc.st alternative arrangements they can agree, at least for the time being, in an effort to maintain a certain level of co-operation. After all habitual prescriptions for functional or institutionalised ways to bridge differences have been the means of choice for keeping the Atlantic relationship together lor some time now; though, most often ihey have merely managed to perpetuate rather than solve problems, something tew are willing to acknowledge. Hence the transatlantic relationship, and the rhetoric it generates, will picrsisi in the short-iuedium term in one fonn or another, though it is highly unlikely that it will be able to develop in a clo.scr. more fulfilling manner. Certainly there will he different degrees of US-tiU co-operation on political and security glohal issues in the future. However, any impetus for et>-operation wilt mosi certainly he the result of a convergence of interests on funetional issues and not the automatic outcome ol a special relationship", or an Acquis .\thmtique!'^ In laci ihis reaiily was reflected on N.ATO's Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) initiativ e As it has been pointed out. "although CJTFs certainly do enhance flexibility w iih respect to the use of people and resources, it is a Hexihility that is driven by the centrifugal reality of an increasingly Iragmented alliance, which in tum reliccts the growing divergence of interests and values".*' Until there is a genuinely united European front the transatlantic relationship will likely eontinue along the path taken in recent times - flexible coalitions depcndinii on the issues in hand. At the same time the Americans most likely will seek to strengthen their bilateral ties with those liU governments which they can identify as kindred spirits. Also they will seek to inaximi.se co-operation with Gennany. one of the three major Eumpean countries (the other two beint; Britain and France), with which Washington has had a long solid relationship, in the hope that it will act as sonic kind of a break for the Europeanists. For their part the Europeanists will continue to strive lo ttevelop and strengthen the I--1) security and defence policy. The changing rules ot American-European co-operation (based on ad h(x; ism. bilateralism and functionalitv ) have not merciv shown the futiliiv of the belief thut
Transatlantic Relations ccitii^ht up hy Reality an American-European partnership can be constructed to fit new circumstances by invoking a nostalgic (albeit/«M.v) sense of community spirit and common interesis They also point to the new way that the US has cho.sen to play the international CO operation game. Efforts to perpetuate, or build new grand structures of strategic co-operation based on the presumption of perpetual common interests in international affairs (reflecting a static rather than dynamic international environment), seem to be relkxcs of a bygone era. In fact it is these same rules that to some extent have also been shaping security co-operation between European countries?** Of course it is still far from clear whether functional unity rather than more traditional patterns of co-operaiion will prove to be an effective modus operandi in international relations in the years to come. Certainly, the former is more flexible and therefore desirable, but its unpredictability may increase rather than decrease the vulnerability of status-quo powers like the US. when seen from a long term perspective. At least within the context of the ELI one can anticipate that foreign policy coalitions between memher states risk raising suspicions within the Union that the KU will be used in the promotion of their interests even if there is no mandate from all its members. Therefore, in a paradoxical way ad hoc coalitions among EU groups of countries may result in strengthening the drive towards uniiy in foreign and security policy among EU members.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Reasoning together, making concessions and an effort to improve mutual understanding are frequently prescribed as solutions to restore, or renew the badly damaged transatlantic relationship. These calls for rational and responsible action bave the tendency to disregard that in a world of politics what is rexsonablc. responsible, or indeed realistic is in the eye ofthe beholder. Furthermore, they tend to minimise the deep-rooted causes of the current tension and \oo often invoke an idyllic pa.st strategic partnership and community that never truly existed and that is even harder to imagine today. The EU has grown politically and economically independent from the US. It is developing as an entity which desires to ;irticulatc its own identity and voice in the world arena, while there are no signs from Washington that it is willing to accept adjustments in the Atlantic relationship to reflect Europe's political evolution, by limiting US freedom of action. Many American leaders believe that the day when the Europeans will be able to raise a single and effective voice in challenging US international policies is t(K) far away lo really matter. But. perhaps this point in time is not as distant as it appears. Even if it is. Europe's autonomy in matters of international policy is bound to keep growing causing confrontations with the US. Despite cleavages between EU members on foreign policy issues and on the Union's relations with the US there has been substantial progress in putting together a European security and defence policy in 131
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the last three years. Apart from EU aspirations lor a global security role. I-.uropcan leaders have become acutely aware of the reduction of US strategic interest in their continent, which means that they seriously have to face up to the responsibility of taking care of security in Europe and the surrounding neighbourhotxis. It is also clear that even those among them who have been cautioning against antagonistic relations between the EU and the US. desire a relationship of equals between Brussels and Washington. Besides, the future viability ofthe transatlantic partnership will depend on the congruence of the interesis of the .Americans and Europeans, the compatibility of their securiiy conceptions and policy outlooks but also on the broader ideas and beliefs that influence political leaders in the US and the EU as well as their domestic constituencies. We already know that some of the security conceptions, policy outUwks and hroader beliefs across the Atlantic differ drastically. In fact what one may call a philosophical split has been emerging between Americans and the majority of leading Europeans, causing the allies to disagree over solutions to common problems. Hven the old Atlantic rhetoric that the US and Europe need a common policy and strategy lo sueeessfully promote shared interests is openly challenged by many Americans and Europeans alike who refute the logic that the best, or inore desirable answers, are to be found in common approaches. Failure to renew the transatlantic strategic partnership, disturbing as it may be for Atlanticists. does not mean that the West will suffer any apocalyptic consequences, assuming that the overall general objectives of l^uropean policy do not clash with those ofthe United States. In fact the boundaries of liberal dem(K-racy may he expanded to the extent that divisions between the US and the EU reflect a genuine European desire and commitment to achieve a better balance between a (xiwer-approach and the promotion of international Law in international policy, alongside a sustained interest in strengthening international co-operation as an instrument nl global stability. However, if the US and many European eouniries continue to drift apart not only in terms of strategic co-operation, but also psychologically then the Western world will be weakened. The real danger, in otber words, is that divisions (divergence of interests, value eonlliets. mutual negative perceptions), and bickering can eventually blur the importance of those fundamentals that the Americans and the Europeans share as heirs ofthe European 1-nlightenment. Arguahly we have already witnessed signs of this. If this trend grows it could lead to the Americans and the Europeans allowing themselves to become not simply rivals, but even opponents demonising each other's methixis and choices whilst exalting their own. Therefore, ihere is a challenge for both to acknowledge some of their weaknesses and genuinely appreciate the limits of iheir strengths and virtues as an attempt in the direction of avoiding unnecessary confrontation. We are in the midst of a dynamic environment which may yet hold many future surprises for transatlantie relations. Accepting reality, rather than pretending otherwise as has been the case for a long time, may well be the lirst real step
Transatlantic Relations caught up h\ Reality in strengthening relations between the VS and Europe for the future. American and Huropcan leaders should he pragmatic in iheir appreciation of what can be achieved on the basis of their differences, which are real, and of what each side is. isn't, or cannot he. They should direct their energies into protnoting co-operalion on issues they agree upon both in terms of |X)lic> and strategy, being always prepared to faee up to the faet that an agreement may be elusive. A minimalistic stcp-hy-step approach seems to be a realistic ehoice under eurrent circumstance> as it seems likely that we are not far from witnessing the emergence of two poles of the Wesiem system ecvoperating and competing at the same time.
NOTI S ' ki.-sc;irch for this paper was completed during n stay at the P-aeilic ("ouneil on International Policy (L.A.) as a Getnian Marshall Fund of the United States Eurujvan Visiting Research Fellow. A larj;c part of research in the US was ba.sed on inter\ii.-v\s; I woulil liko Ul especially thank caeh and every one of the interviewees (who wished not to be quoted). " See lor in.stance. Ronald D. Asmus. "Rebuilding the Atlantic Allianci.-". Fort-ign AlTairs, vol.S2. no..*). Sopt/(3et 2()().'; Dominique Moisi. "Reinventing the West \ l-'oreign Afjairs. vol.82, no.d. Nin/Dec 2t)()3. Jiri .Scvidi. [no title|. inC. Lindstrom and B. .Sehmitt (eds.i. One Year on: Ix'ssoiis l-'irmi Iraq (Paris. Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper. no.68. MnrLh2(XM). p.lO8. ' Lord Inverehapel (British anibas.sador to Washington) to the Foreign OITice. 22 March 1948. F().ni/68067 AN 1276/1195/45 (Public ReetirdsOllicc. London): 2< March 1948. Foreign Relations of the United St,urs. vol.111, pp.64-.*>. * Ekavi Athanassopouldu. Turkey: .\iii;li>.\merifan Security Intert'sts I945-I'^f?2: The lust l-jitargement of NATO i Londtm. Frank C ass. 1999). p.217. ' For instance. Robert W\ Tucker and David C. Hendriekson. "The Souaes of American Legitimacy", ti'ivivn Affairs, vol.8.^. no.6. Nov/Dce 2(X)4. pp.21-2. '' Athanassopoulou. Inrkiw pp. 214-17. ' To whieh de Gaulle rcs[ionded by saying that it was the right of any nation to act independently. * Ronald .Steel. "The Abdication of Europe", in Janies Cha.se and I iiil C. Ravenal (cdsi. .\tlantis Lost: U.S.-luiniiH-an Relations .Xftcr the Cold War (New York. Council on Foreign Relations. 1976). ' The ambiguous language whieh NATO intentionally u.sed to describe it's novs I Icxible Respt)nse deteiTcncc dixtrine (formally adopted in 1967) favoured by the I'S reflected the wish to maintain the polilieal eohesion nl the allianee rather than a resolution ol their dilTerent seeurity interests. Ivo H. Daalder. lltv Nature and Practice of I'le.xihlc Response. NATO Striiit'i;\ and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 7967 (Now York. Columbia University Press. 1991) p.I.V '" Sec lor instance. Karl Kaiser. "Europe and Ameriea: A CHtieal Phase". Foreign affairs. vol.52, no.4. July 1974 '' Steel. "Abdication ul Europe", p.57. '' Godfrev ll(XJgst)n./lm<'n<-« in OtirTime (Vintage B(K)ks. New York. 1976). p.l2() '' Niehola.s Wahl. "The Atitonomy of 'Domestie Structures' in European-.Vmeriean Relations", in Chase and Ravenal . Atlantis Ijist. p.2.M. '* Andrew J. Pierre. "Ameriea Taccs Westem Europe in the 1980s: Atlanticism Prescrvetl.
Ekavi Athanassopoulou Disengauement. ur Devolution.'"', in Cha.se and Ravenal. Atlanits iMst. p.191. '•* Stanley llolTmann. "No Trumps. No Luek. No Will: Gloomy Thoughts on lurope's Plight", in Chase and Ravenal. Atlantis iMst. p.27. '" Ronald I). Asmus. Roben I) Blaekwill and F. Stephen Larrabee.' C an NATO Survne.'". Washington (Jtuirterly vol.19, no. 2. Spring 1996. " Robert J Art. AShy Westem Europe Needs the United .States ami NATO". Political Science Quarterly. \Q\. I l l . n o . I. 1996. Art's paper was bx"ied on inoa" than a hunda'd interviews with leading European strategic planners. One ofhis major litidings was that their biggest eoneem was that, if the I S withdrew from Europe. European states would eompete Tor power and infliienee among themselves. '* The New York Times. 16 March 2()()2: Riehard N Haass. -Charting a New Course in the Transatlantie Relationship". Remarks to the Centre for Euro|x:an Reform. London. H) Jutie 2«)2. available at w w \v.Mate.gov7s/p/rem/l0968.htm: Riehard I. Russell. "NAT( ) \ European Members: Partners or Dependents?", The X'mal Wur Cotlei;<- Rf\tc\s\ VDI.LVI. no. I. Winter 2(X)3. available at vmw.nwc.navy.mil/press/Re\iciv/2(H).iA\intir. ''' This was the lirsi time in N.'Vl'Os history that Artiele 5 had been lorinally invoked. •" Russell. "Partners or Dependents.'". "' Steven E. Meyer. "Careass of IX'ad Policies: The Irrelevaneeof NATO". Parameters {VS Army WarCollct;e Quarterly). vol.XXXIII. no.4. Winter 2(X).V4. pp.94-.'S. availiable at earlisle w w w .army.mil/usawe/Parameters •- These divisions (x;eur not only across national borders but also within European countries. -' "The 1 urope that Died". The EcotumLst. 2 June 2(K).'i. "•' See for instance. Julian Lindley-Freneh. Terms of Engagement: The Parado.x of American PoMCi aitJ till- Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 St-piemht-r (Paris. Institute lor Seeurily Studies. Chaillot Papers. no..'i2. May 2(X)2). p.77- 9; Peter Ludlow.' Waiiietl: A Global Partner", in .Alexander I J. Lennon (ed). What Does ilu- World Want from America? (Cambridge. M;LSS:. The MIT Press. 2(H)2). pp.l23-2.S: Andrew Moraxesik. "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain'. Foreign Affairs. July/.\ugust 20().^; Reginald Dale. "In .Se;irchofa New Trans Atlantie Template'./n/('rmj;/(»m;/W<'mW7'n7«inf. 1.^ May 2()()4: Gustav Gustenau. |no titlel. in Lindstrom. U'ssons From Iraq. p.76. -' Bob WiKKlward. Httsh At War (New York. Simon and Schuster. 2(X)2). p. 281.
•'' .A Xiiliiiiuil
Sectirity
S t i a l c t ; \ for lhe Global
A g e . T h e W h i t e H o u s e . IX'C.20<X). iv.
•' Similarly the less aggressi\e intemational leadership style employed by the .seeond Cicorye W. Bush administration amounted to little more than a more clever publie poliey. -* na\ id Halberstam. War in A tnm- of Peace: Btish. C 'linton and the Generals (New York. Simon and Schuster. Hm). p.229. ""' Linda P. Brady. "Working With Allies: Clinum Defense Policy and the Management of Mullilateralisin". in Stephen J. Cimbala. Clinton and I'ost-Cold Defense (Wcsiproi. Con: Praeger. 19%). espeeially 7 6 - 7 . "' Rob de Wijk |iio title|. in Lind.strom. lA-s.sons From Inn/, p.49. " Ameriean inliuentials pereeive global leadership to imply both responsibilities and freedoms that other nations do not have '- Conelusit)ns based on the author's interviews in 2(X)2 and 2(X);< with prominent Democrats and Republicans in Washington D.C. and Califomia. " Steel is usinj; this to nuike the point that "Europe lacks a fundamental quality that a state needs to be a major global aetor. li laeks a will to power". Ronald Steel, liurope: The Phantom Pillar", in R. Laurence M(K)re and Mauri/io Vaudagna (eds). Thf Aimiimn Cenittry in l-.iirope {llhaax. Comell University Press. 2()().^). p.74. " On the contradiction in these two beliefs see. Walter Lal eher. ""Ihe United States and
Transatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality Europe in an Ace ol American Unilalcralism"". in Moore. American Century in p.:.s. " Robert VV luckcr and I);t\ id C, Hcndrickson. I'he Imperial Icmptcition: The New World Onii-rimdAmeriitt's Purpose (New York. Council on Foreign Kclutions. 1992). p,.S7. ** Quoted in SlecL "Phanioni Pillar", in Moore and Vaudagna (edsi. The :\iiurican Century. p.72. " Following the controversy lhe 1992 Guidance was appaivntly reviewed, bul its objectionable part.s were not removed, unly sottcned. Barton Gellman, "Pentagon .Abandons Goal of Thwarting I S Rivals. The Washington Post. 24 Miiy 1992. '* David Armstrong. "Dick Cheney's Song ol Atnerica: Drafting a Plan lor Global l>i>niinatKe"\ Haqiers (Ocl 2(X)2). p.81. •'* I iM an iniercstinj: stuil\ of Europe in this regard see Jeremy RilVin. The Europttin Dream: How Eumpe s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (NcwYork.Tarcher. 2(X)4i •"' Collectively Europe spends IW) billion euros per year on defence. (The US spends two thirds more than Europe). ^' European ("ouneil. "Etiropean .Security Strategy. 12 Dec 2(K)3". in Antonio Missiroli (cottipl. Enmi Copenlutgett to Brussels: European Defence: Core Diximietits. xol.lV (Paris. Institute lor Security Studies. Chaillol Papers, no.67. December 200.^). p.32S. *- George W. Bush. 2(X)I. "Retnarks by the President to Siudent.s atid Faculty at National Defense University." Washingtoti. D.C. Available al http://www,v\hitflu>iisf,i;(n/nfw,
2(XX)). ** l-rotn Copenhaagen to Bni'iscts, vol.1 V. pp..'24-.VVv *'' On US strategy during lhe seeond Bush adtninistration sec John Lewis Gaddis. "Grand Strategy in lhe Second Tenn". Foreign Affairs, vol.84, no. 1. 2(K).S. " International Herald Tribune. 28 Nov. 2(X).'i. p.3. •*' The Missile l>:fensc.Aol of 1991 authorised lhe development of Theatre Missile IXMense Systctns and National Missile Defense Systems, to intercept and dcstrov a litnited attack, allhough Ihc US had nol proposed a specilic missile defence programme by lhe end of the Clinion Administration. The (k-orge W. Bush Administration made it clear in lhe lirsi half of 20()l thai il intended to priKeed with research and development ol a missile defence prt>gratnme. European opposition to Bush's tnissilc defenee plans has not been unanimous. •"* Reginald Dale. "Trans-Atlantic Dispute Over Arming China". Intenwtional Herald Tribune. LS July 2(X)4. US policy towards Israel has repeaietlly caused great tension even with London. •''' John Vinix:ur. "U.S. Views Atlantic Ties with l^abored Optimism". Intemationai Herald Tribune. 22 No\ 2(X).'i. '" Henry Kissinger. The Trotibled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Aildiiiic Alliance (New York. Doubleday. I9(i6).p.4() ^' Isaiah Berlin. "Two Concepts ol Liberty", in Henry Hardy (ed), Ilw Proper Sttuly of A/uiiJt/m/ (Lotidon, Chatto atid Windus. 1997). p. 197. ^' Many analysts lend to simplily the dynamics of tension in transatlantic relations by making a distinction, at most, between the 'old' and 'new' Europe, or those eountries which clashed with the US over Iraq (France. Germany) and the other liU metnbers (although European governments that supported Washington's policy o\cr the Iraq crisis did tiot always carry public opinion). While support for US policies is big among Eitst
Ekavi Athanassopouhm European political leaders criiicism of many US policies is sironj: across European national boundaries including Eastem linrope. '^ In fact the cutting edge of anti-Americanism has been coming from Ihe populist right. '^•' For an interesting analysis that views the Atlantic divide as a siruggle over post-Cold War identities v\iihin and among continenial Europe. Britain, and the US al Ihe heart of the Atlantic see Timt)thy Garlon Ash. Free World: .\merica. Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New York. Randotn House. 2004). " Clearly political success in a lew European countries including France. Germany. Spain, has inereasingly becoming also dependent on disagreeing with Washington on many of the most importanl intemational issues. ^ Certainly Ihis is not a new poinl. but generally is made in reference to the pre-Second World War Europe, see tor instance David Fromkin. In the Time of the Ameriams (New York. Alfred A Knopf. \mf>). ' ' Cited in Tucker. Imperial Temptation, p. 172. ^^ Romano Prodi. "2()(X)-2(K)5: Shaping the New Europe". Speech to the European Parliament. \ft Feb 20(X). Strasbourg. The .similarities in senior European officials' understanding of what the essence and purpose of ihe EU political paradigm is. with those underlined hy the early Americans, are striking. Daniel Webster, the 19th eentury American statesman and orator v\as declaring in a speech in 1826: "America held out Ihe lar dilTerent prospect dlbeingable. 'by the mere influence of civil liberty and relijiioiis toleration, to dry up these outpouring tounlains of bkuHl. and to extinguish these consuming lircs of war.'" in Tucker. Imperial Temptation. 168. '''' Samuel P. Huntington. "American Ideals Versus American In.stitutions". in G. John Ikenberry icd). American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essaw (Glenview. Illinois. Scott. Foresman and Company. 1989). p.236. "" Upon the victory in the Gulf War a jubilant President Bush told state govemment oflicials. "By God. we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all", quoted in Douglas Little. American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle i.u\t Since 1945 (London. I.B. Tauris. 2(X)2). p.2(i2. *"' David R. Gergen. "The Media and Intemational Relations and Foreign Poliey". in David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins (eds). Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21" C<'/i/«n'(University of Oklahoma Press: Norman. 1997). p.28l. ''^ Stephan Stetter. "Democratization without f)emocracy'.'The Assistance of the European Union lor Democratization PriKesses in Palestine". Mediterranean Politics, vol.8, fio.2'"' John J. Mearsheimer. "The False Promise of Intemational Institutions'. International Security, vol.19, no..^. 1994/1995. "^ It ha.s been argued that transatlantic relations are based on an Acquis Atlatuique. that is detined as a set of live principles: a common transatlantic heritage: demixrracy: liberty; peaee: prosperity. Peter BarsehdortT. Facilitating Transatlantic Cooperation After the Cold War: :\ii Acqias Attantiqtie (Palgrave. Lit Verlag. 2(K)I). p.2.^: It is worth mentioning ihai currently ihe most important relationship between Europe and the I'S revolves around economic imeresis. In this (ield the two are partners as well as strong competitors.. "^ Meyer. "The Irrelevance ul NATO". p.9.V ** A goixl example is ihe eo-operaiion between Germany, the UK and France in dealing wilh the question ol Iran's nuclear programme.
EKAVIATHANASSOPOULOU University ofAthens and Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
I. THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: BEYOND THF RHETORIC
Anyone familiar with the p
ISSN 1479-4012
Ekiivi Athanassopoulou Europeans and ihc Americans were (and slill are) dissimilar. 'ITic political and socio-economic systems, legacies and altitudes of Europe and the United Sialcs were (and still are) different despite a number of common values and a certain degree of "Americanisation" ol the urban culture in mosl western European countries since the sixties. Contrary to postwar America, where scx;ialism was totally discredited and liberalism, anchored on the American free-enterpri.se system. became the dominant ideology, contemporary Western European scKieiies were characterised by deep social cleavajies resulting from strong competition between the liberals and the left. Besides, while the US emerged after the war as a super power with world responsibilities and concerns. Wesiern European countries were inward Icxiking (with the exeeplion of Britain) l(Kked in their domestic and/or European unity priorities since the late 1950s. In fact the admission of Turkey which post-war American political elites did not consider as a member of Western civilisation' - into NATO in 1952 demonstrated that against Cold War pressures Washington early on came lo view lhe transatlantic partnership more as a security tool rather than an alliance based on a community of nations sharing similar values. One of the tnain arguments of the Netherlands and NATO's Scandinavian members against Turkey s membership was that it was contrary to the original concept ofthe Alliance as an integrated community.' The second problem witli such prescriptions is that they rest upon the idea that there was a time when there was a genuinely cohesive .Atlantic partnership based on eommon interests, while the serious eonlliets and disaeeords within the allianee during the Cold War are either ignored, or downplayed. Hence the conclusion is that through reasoning together and mutual concessions conflicts could be overcome (while many reeent di.sagreements are seen more as a matter of style rather than subslance). Yet. extended lissutes in the allianee go back more than thirty years reflecting a consistent tension and serious limits on its cohesion (the natural consequence of the divergence of interests between the US and tnost European countries) that need to be appreeiated. This tensitin was primarily the result of the inequality of power and deeisionmaking between the U.S and Western Europe, the source of which was that Eurt)pe as neither unified nor strong. The transatlantic relationship was built on the basis of US dominanee rather than on partnership, something that eaused diseord between the two sides of the Atlantic and among lhe Europeans. Washington refused to give the Europeans a share of the nuelear deterrent and a voice over ils international military and eeonomie policies even when they seriously affeeted its European allies. In faet the United States often used tts dominant position in the allianee to subordinate the interests of its European allies to its global security priorities, without even eonsulting them. The comparison 1 uropean statesmen - but also analysis ofAmerican foreign policy' - often tnako these days between the p(5st-Cold War unilateral trends in American foreign policy and Washington's multilateral policy in lhe aftermath of the Second World War idealises histt>ry. 112
Transatlantic Relations caught up hy Realiry Unilateralism ha.s always run deep in US foreign policy, (It i.s worth remembering thai the US Senate ratified lhe UN Charter because the United Slalcs would retain its freedom of action through the veto power, which was given to each permanent member of the Security Council), The US's post Second World War 'mullilateralism" in reality meant building institutions and frameworks of co-operation, designed to promote an intemational system framed in the interests of the US, European allies were compelled to agree with these plans (though France in particular repeatedly sought to challenge them), due to their economic as well as security dependency on the US, NATO's first enlargement in 1952 to include Turkey and Greece is a classic early example of American unilateral deiiancc of its European allies. The United States brought the two countries into NATO despite the strong objections of the British and of many smaller members of the North Atlantic Treaty who complained that they had not even been adequately informed, let alone consulted, about the issue.* Not only did unilateral Ameriean policies cause irritation and indignation in European capitals but often seriously jeopardi.sed the Europeans' security interests. The 1962 Washington-Moscou confrontation over the Cuban missiles brought the two superpowers close to a war which might easily have drawn in Europe, though this was an issue of no vital interest to it. Yet. the Kennedy administration handled the crisis without any consultation with its Eumpean allies. As the story goes, when former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was sent to Paris to enlist President de Gaulle's support for U.S actions in the crisis, the French President asked Aeheson whether he had come to consult, or to infonn, to which a slightly embarrassed Acheson admitted that his mission was to inform,^ In another example, as the 197.^ Arab-Israeli war unfolded (during which the Nixon administration re-armed Israel) Washington placed its military forces on a worldwide alert. This clearly demonstrated that the US (like in fact the USSR) considered the conllict to be potentially more than a regional issue. However, at no point did the Americans properly consult with the European allies whose security was conceivably jeopardised as a result of Washington's support for Israel, Furthermore, the fa(,'ade of the Cold War alliance could not conceal that the defence interests and strategic priorities of the United States and the Europeans differed more often than not. This set limits to the cohesion of the alliance and resulted in lack of political and military reliability between the allies. In the words of Ronald Steel. 'The Atlantie alliance was built on a reality and marketed on an illusion. The realily was that the United Stales could not let Western Europe fall into Russian hands, and that the Europeans wanted American protection. The illusion was that the alliance would lead to a true partnership of equals with virtually identieal inicrcsts',** E,ssentially, Europe was afraid of being caught in the middle of a eontiict between the iwo superpowers, as it was thought that most likely any major pt)wer war (conventional or nuclear) would start and escalate on European territory. The U,S for its part wanted lo avoid war on American territory due to a 113
Ekavi Athanassiipoulou conflict with the USSR which could be kept kx:al somewhere in the continent of Europe, The divergence in defence interests and consequent deterrence strategies between the two sides of the Atlantic became openly apparent in the early l%()s when the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the US. Washington made it clear that it would not defend Europe the way the Europeans preferred to be defended. In other words the US would be reluctant to risk a nuclear attack against North American cities in order to rebuff a Soviet conventional testing t>t Westem European defences, and yet the Americans made it clear that they preserved the option of a tactical nuclear war in Europe.' The 1973 Arab-Israeli war tore further away the image ofthe allies' common security interests and shared global politics perceptions. The Europeans saw the war as a rciiional conllicl and as they stood to lose far more than the US as a result of the Arab oil embargo ( Europe was much more dependent than the US on oil imports from the Middle East) resisted military co-operation wilh Washington to the great irritation of the Americans. Already by the late 1970s the utility (as well as the bonds) ofthe transatlantic relationship were weakened as a result ofthe difficulties mentioned above but this was also owing to a combination of new factors as the international system moved away from the rigidities of the Cold War, The US had entered a period of detente with Ihe USSR: Western Europe was resisting American nuclear strategy: and the US was faced with growing economic competition from a now prosperous European Economic Community.'" Open bickering about burden sharing in NATO was only the tip of the iceberg. Many Europeans were becoming more and more frustrated wilh Washington's military strategy and ils private deals with Moscow (characteristically no Western European government had been consulicd while the 1973 American - Soviet agreement on mutual force reductions was worked out). But also they were aggravated wiih Washington's drift towards economic nationalism, ils interference in the intra-European decision process, its high-handedness when dealing with ils European allies and its overall domination ofthe transatlantic alliance. The Americans for their part were irritated with the Europeans' failure to speak with one voice, the reluctance of some of them to accept American calls for monetary co-operation and support many of Washington's foreign policy initiatives, their refusal to allow NATO bases to be used for anything but Eurtv pean defence and their unwillingness to accept the US's lead in dealing with international issues. In short, rising mutual frustration and irritation rellecled on the one hand Europe's growth (albeit very slowly) as an entity which struggled to shape its own identity and therefore il wished to be treated hy Washington as a proper partner. On the olher il rcllected the growing ambivalence of many leading Americans in their attitude regarding the desirability of a politically and economically united Europe: Washington wislicd for a United Europe but only if it did not challenge American dominance in Atlantic policy. In 1974 Washington's great annoyance had been poured out publicly in a speech by President Nixon who made brutally clear what 114
Transatlantic Relations caught tip hy Reality Henry Kissinger had also staled a year earlier: (he American seeurity eommilment to Europe was linked to the European.s' lull polilieal and cconomie co-operation with the LFS." Following Nixon's speech. Washington s rhetoric subsided, nevertheless, the tension and eontiiets in the alliance eould not be concealed though there were trite re-arfirmations of transatlanlie solidarity. There were gotxl reasons why Atlanticism was preserved and there was no effort seriously to consider problems that bedeviled it. in spite of the pt>ignancy of the issues that undermined the coherence and challenged the utility of lhe alliance. The idea of a single coalition holding the world in balance against the infidel was fundamental to the post-War USA foreign policy establishment''
115
Ekitvi Athana.\sopoulou of tiiost statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic - whose inlelleLiual formation t
Tran.iatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality of the transatlantic relationship and believed that there was enough divergence of interests and positions between l.urope and the US to justify a separate Ruropean policy), chose lo locus on transforming lhe political structures of the alliance in a way ihat would make il possible for the Europeans to assume a greater role in decision making and policy implementation regarding their security. In parallel they sought to develop a European Defense and Security Identity, which they did not want subordinated to the alliance, with the aim of developing il as the defence component of the European Union.
II. ONE SHOULD NOT EXPEC T MIRACLl-S
The third problem with the pre.scriptions of those who tend lo downplay lhe stresses the allianee experienced over the last three decades, and who advise that prudenee and reason should prevail among the allies today, is that they often tend to scale down sonic of the post-Cold War realities and their disintegrating effect on the alliance. Europe no longer occupies a central position within lhe context of American global strategy. For quite some time American foreign policy makers have been moving their attention away from Europe, though the US has remained signiiicantly involved in European affairs. In fad. even before lhe end of the Cold War Europe had begun to lose iLs preeminence for the American Congress. Since the early 1990s conventional wisdom about the importance of Europe lor American strategy steadily gave way in the face of new and urgent issues elsewhere (particularly in Asia), the emergence of other strong international players, and the ascendancy for some time in the Republican Party and in Congress ol the Sun Bell political elite (which the current George W. Bush administration arguably represents). In the view of many observers this elite attached no sentimental value to the Atlantic relationship and the historic ties with Europe, unlike the old American East-coasl political establishment. Americans in policy making circles still viewed NATO as the core of US global defence and security efforts (given that it remained under US leadership while only small changes were explored). Bul congressional support for American involvement in Europe to a large degree depended on a robust NATO. However, most of NATO's post-Cold War political changes did nol go lo the heart of the alliance's dilemma: how to deline a new over-arching purpose that would enjoy public support in the US and justify an Ameriean stake in European security. On the contrary from an American point of view the contribution of the Huropean core members was becoming loss useful because ol Lhe growing eapability gap."* At the same time the preoeeupation of lhe Europeans wiih the completion of the European project and its expansiiin to include the whole ol Europe (something that the Americans have tended to dismiss as sell absorbtion). contributed to the decline of Europe's importance for US global security policy. 117
Ekavi Athanassopoulou The steady UxKening of the transatlantic ties and devaluation of the alliance in Washington's eyes was manilcsicd in many ways: Washington hy-passed or igni)red the Europeans and their ohjcciions to aholishing the ABM treaty and tried directly to reach an accommodation with Moscow The US also adopted a new strategic doctrine, that of pre-emptive altack, without any consultation in Huropean capitals, though it obviously had serious implications for intemational order and the Atlantic alliance. In fact Washington's strong message Ihal the transatlantic relationship, in its historic form, may be redundant hy differentiating hetween "old" and 'new" Europe reflected the devaluation ofthe transatlantic partnership, as mueh as it reflected the unilateralist streak in American international poliey. The American response to lhe 9/11 lerrorisi attaeks only served to further reinforce this reality. Immediately following 9/11, the response of NATO's European memhers was lo invoke "Article 5" in support of the US in ils war against terrorism and the military aetion in Afghanistan,'''Yet. Washington showed no interest in real ct)nsultation with Europe as such in lhe months following the terrorist attaeks and declined offers of assistance hy its N.ATO partners. To quote one Ameriean analyst among many holding a similar view: "The Pentagon undouhtedly worried that integrating European assets into the Afghan campaign would have diverted too much attention from the war effort. Also, the political constraints that each European government would have attached to the use of ils respective contingent would complicate command and control, all for liiile or no payoff on the battlefield."-" "The United States spurned the European action, and in doing so Washington signaled that it did not need NATO and lhat the European allies counted for little in the greatest threat to US vital interesis sinee perhaps the attack on Pearl Harhor.""' In the months following operation Enduring Freedom there was almost no perception in the US that there were also European troops in Afghanistan. In short, the American-EU strategic co-operalion in Afghanistan (whieh had heen so troublesome to put together, partly because i>f Ameriean reluctance), is unlikely to hecome a regular iKcurrcncc, in the foreseeable future (though one may see similar co-opcraiion on an ad hoc, casc-by-casc hasis). At the same time, the endemic tension in the alliance owing lo ils domination by the US should he expeeted to grow, Europe has been liherated from iis dependence on the Ameriean nuclear deterrent. Il is emerging as a new eenler of power with ambitions to play a bigger role in the world arena (which means a desire for independence as well as European influence over American policy), whilst Washington continues to see iiself as the dominant power within the context ofa glohal Ameriean-European strategic co operation. It is true that the Europeans are still divided over whal kind of relationship each of ihem and the I-.uropean I'liion should have with the US." While Erench governments have heen determined to limit NATO's scope and develop the European Security and Defence Identity, London has been trying hardest to prcscrsc Atlantic structures, Berlin for its part has been seeking to stay somcw here in the middle. (Most other European political 118
Tratisattantic Relation.s catif>ht up hy Reatity leaders are divided more or less along these positions of the three leading Eun>pcan countries). Nonetheless, it is equally true that although the EUphoria of the early 1990s has subsided European integration efforts have come very far. R> the turn ofthe 2tst century the TAJ had assumed powers traditionally assix'iated with the nation-state, in the fields of justice and home affairs, while sieps vscrc taken in developing a common defence ,sysiem. The now presumed dead 200.^ Constitutional Trealy for Europe, ihal gave the Union a single legal personality, illustrated the high degree o\' integration, although many on hoth sides of the Atlantic Joined the Economist in declaring that 'Rejection of the constitution signals that the dream of deeper politieal integration and, in the 1957 Treaty of Rome's famous phrase, "ever eloser union; is over","' The uncertainty of the road ahead for the I-.U following the rejectit)n oftlie Constitutional Treaty hy the referenda in Erance and the Netherlands should not ohscure the commitment and sense of belonging to the Union within the majorities (>f the politieal elites of Europe, nor the significance of the consensus reached helween them over the creation of a eloser integrated Union. Along with the growth ofthe European entity, conviction, ambition as well as eonlidence among leading Europeans that the EU can emerge as a p
119
Ekavi Athanassopoulou together the EU 6().(XX) defence foree that they had been detemiined lo have in place by 2(X)3. Nor did they seem that they had finally accepted to substantially inerease military spending. Nonetheless, the EU diK's nol need to waii to build the adequate security forces in order to develop a European voice on security issues and an independent global political role venturing into international lields that Washington expects to dominate. Military force is not automatically the mosi relevant tool required in dealing with international affairs today. What is of importance here is lhat the Trealy did constitute a major break through in the eontext of elTorts to achieve European integration in foreign poliey and defense matters, which might one day lead to a common army. The Huropean project has not been evolving according to a blue print; the exact outcome of this ongoing process can neither be predicted nor guaranteed as the two referenda proved. Nonetheless, one can feel conlident that European unily is going lo grow and not diminish - though there may be more crises yet to come - alongside the desire for I-.urope's di.stinclive voice in international affairs. Thus Britain, the most consistent advtKale ofa common defence policy in close co-operation with the US (a stance that reflects a continuous British ambivalence towards Huropean integration), will eventually have to decide whether it will give ils full support to elToris lo artieulate such a voice (and thus also help shape it). Some argue that transatlantic relatiiins could be re-invenied on lhe basis of proposals for a grand bargain"'' in which Europe spends more on defenee. develops a coherent strategy, and assumes a significant global security role in co-operation with the US. As a result. Wa.shington would agree to genuine consultations with its European allies hefore acting. Grand bargain ad\iK-ates disregard reality. More than a decade following the end of the Cold War. efforts within the alliance to address the fundamental burden and pt)wer-sharing problems have prcxiuced no satisfactory deals for either side. The Americans and lhe Europeans have been consistently assessing differently how much defence burden each carries and as a result they have been disagreeing about how much decision-making power each should have. The Europeans have adopted the view lhat the .\merican desire to lead lhe alliance is out of tune with ils financial contributions. The Americans for their part have not been prepared to acknowledge the value of Europe's economic assistance regionally and globally. The American rejeetion of the importance of Europe's financial contributions, and the consequciu resistance lo a more balanced power-sharing relationship with the Europeans, does nol simply refleet the preferred US approaeh to security issues, ihat is pre-eminence of hard versus soft power (as some would like to argue), but also Washington's wish to continue lo dominate the alliance. In fact, the background has been a specific concern with asserting .American global leadership now lhat the EU seems lo challenge it. In short, Washington's traditional ambi\alence regarding European unity continues. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War decision makers in Washington have lavoured a united Europe as a means lo enhance European stability 120
Tratmttlantic Relations caught up hy Reality but also in order to unify Westem policy. To hoth these ends they have suppt»ned the idea of Europe assuming a bigger international security role. At the same time, from a more narrow US perspective, such a role would mean that the Europeans would finally have to share more of the military burden. IncreiLsed European military spending would, in its tum. close the substantial and growing military gap between the US and the European eountries thus turning them into reliable and eredible allies, on whom the US eould eount in dealing with seeurity problems outside Europe. However, on the other hand Washington has heen resisting the development of any truly substantial independent European defence institutions. Certainly, US policy regarding the development ofa European Security and Defence Identity has been constantly evolving since the early 199()s, Nonetheless American concern about European competition (with or within NATO), has been consistent as it is essential for the US to lead the transatlantic policy in matters which are of American concern or interest. George W, Bush did not express simply a personal or popular helief among influential Republicans when he said that 'he must state a new strategic direction, or policy with hold, clear moves. And hecause it would he the policy of the United States, the only superpower, the rest ofthe world would have to move over, would adjust over time',"' Most DemtKrals think similarly despite pronouncements that the United States needs to consult more with ils allies. Eor instance, in the WDrds of lhe White House National Security Strategy dcKument of the second Clinton administration: 'The ability to a.ssure global security, shared prosperity and IreedtMii is heyond the power of any one nation. But the actions of many nations often follow from the aetions of one',"''The Clinton administration sought to promote American leadership internationally in a less provocative manner than George W, Bush and his team during his (irsi term in office, but in the final analysis lhe difference was one of taetics and rheioric, not substance,"^ As David Halherstam has put it, one ofthe early conclusions ofthe Clinton While House in relation to American international policy was that the "United States would not consult. It should decide in advance on its policy and then explain that poliey to its allies." '" In fact Clinton sought to maximise the American position of strength through US dominated multilateral institutions and coalitions in which the United States was expected lo assume primary responsibility for .shaping their agenda, objectives, strategy and responsibilities."' In other words, "Americans are instrumental multilateralisis".'" Whilst evidently there is a wide diversity of opini
Ekavi AthaiuLssapoitlou ally either sec the merits of the Ameriean approach, or hecau.se little alternative seems to he on offer. (Henee Ameriean acceptance ol multilateralism rests upon lhe understanding that the UvS as a glohal leader has the ahility. hut also the right to aet unilaterally). In lad it would he a remarkahle lirst for a dominant glohal power like the U.S to voluntarily surrender its drive for hegemony, a drive which seems to characterise all great powers. In other words, it is unlikely the United States will change the way it has heen operating in the world system since the Second World War. Sueh a change would essentially amount lo compromising the US's own particular glohal vision and to sharing decision-making pnvser. which in effect is the suhslance of power. The United .States might accept the need to share power if it began to seriously lose conlidenee in its capahilities. like Britain did in the wake ofthe Second World War. However, tcxlay the US - despite ils hruised moral authority - is the world's eeonomic leader, al technok>gy's cutting edge, the only country that can project military power anywhere on the globe, the only one that can deter nuelear war. thai ean assure Ihe free How of commerce hy patrolling the sea lanes, that has communications and intelligence eapahilities of glohal reach, and that can concei\ahly keep China in line. Moreover, il sees itself as a most dynamic siKiely. which exports us popular culture all over the world and constitutes a development model that attracts many. .\s discussed ahove Ameriean leaders are fully aware that the US needs allies to suppori an international system in accord with its interests, but their role is seen as strictly suhsidiary. It is not just that .Xmericans are conftdent in their military and technological superiority and their development model, or that they believe thai the US is the only country with a "will to power."" Underlying this confidence are two profound beliefs (albeit contradictory), which lie at the heart of Ameriean foreign policy in the 2()th century: Firstly that the US is exceptional, and secondly that American values (or most of them), are universal.''' In other words, the conviction among American leaders that the US must maintain global leadership is particularly strong because it has grown hand in hand with a deep rooted eertainty that Ameriean leadership is es.sential in maintaining international order; a belief that has been consistent in the hislory ol .'\inerican foreign policy in the 2()th century. When the Former .Secretary of State. Madeleine Alhright. stated that .America was "the indispensable nation". Americans "stand tall and hence see further than other nations." she was far from saying anything new. From an American perspecti\e the US is destined to be the world leader heeause the American nation alone has "sunicient moral force" (Woixlrow Wilson), or "moral standing " (George Bush).^' In 1992 a Pentagon internal document entitled Defence Plunning Guidance. argued that the United Stales; 'must discourage the adsanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership or even aspiring lo a larger regional or global rolc\ To prevent this from happening, the US. according to the same document, musi 'retain the preemincni responsihilily for addressing ... those wrongs which 122
Transatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality threaten not only our interests, hut those of allies or friends, or which eould seriously unsettle internaiional relations"."" This dix'ument. whieh was leaked to the New York Times, caused controversy in the Uniled States, yel not so much heeause of its stated objectives, but rather because of the implications they eould have for US defence hudgets. as well as its tone which could disturh many US allies." The Pentagon"s new Defence Planning Guidance d(x;ument which was leaked in the L<).'< Angele.s Times in July 2(X)2 contained all the key elements ofthe 1992 doeumenl.'" The other problem with the "grand bargain" idea is ihat ils advocates tend to fcx:us on military problems within the allianee yet the military gap is not accidental; it refleets a divergenee of interests and values. In the final analysis what is striking al the heart ofthe trans-Atlantie relationship is that slill today there is not an integrated community of shared attitudes and values across the Atlantie despite the defeat of Communism and the growing influence of the eapitalisi markelbased model in Europe sinee the welfare state crisis developed during the 199()s. The Europeans have their own understanding of what constitute healthy society and also the freedom of the individual. They have their own understanding of the meaning of equality, the pursuit of happiness, cohesive communities, and the market-driven economies." (Furthermore, on some of these issues there is not even a consensus within or among European eountries.) The gradual alignment of European and American social and political systems that many soeial .scientists foresaw lor some time has not happened. The Europeans today have the eeonotnie power and enough teehnological expertise to substantially close the military gap. In fact some European states have made a genuine effort to adapt Iheir defenee to the post Cold war changed security environment.^ However, pressed hy domestic priorities European governments do not wish to curtail s(x;ial welfare programmes lo finance ambitious defenee programmes particularly as they believe that "none of the new threats is purely military; nor ean any be taekled by purely military means"".^' Essentially the Amerieans" and Europeans" assessment of post ColdWar threats differs significantly. The US has been emphasising that against the new uneertain intemational environment security requires managing ""multiple potential adversaries"" (state but also non-state aetors) with a range of military capabilities hesides the threat to retaliate.^" The Europeans have been emphasising deterrence based on the threat of retaliation and have been attaehing much less importance to questions of military defence while fcKusing their attention on a wider range of instruments to respond to a wider range of threats sueh as illegal immigrati(3n, refugees, and trans-border organi.sed erime.^' The Deeember 2(H)3 European Security Strategy^'' which acknowledged lhe need for forward defence to deal with intemational threats including terrorism may he bringing closer the Atlantie allies' diverging security agendas in the short, perhaps medium tenn. Yet. it is unlikely that they will agree on what are the right instruments for the long-term management of new security threats, given that neither the Ameriean
Ekavi Athanassoptnthnt claim of a hroadly conceived right to pre-empt danger.^^ nor many Europeans" nervousness, or clear aversion lo the idea of provcniive attacks are going to disappear (particularly as the US does not intend to share veto power over its security poliey). It is worth noting that at the end of 2005 European leaders publicly elaimcd that iheir "soft" approach lo developing Ihc Muslim world - hased on economic development, dialogue, strengthening the rule of law - had greater credibility wilh Muslim leaders ihan lhe Bush administration's conception which focused on military intervention and aggressive diplomacy.'" In short, inlo the 21 si century Americans and Europeans continue to diverge in their perceptions of security, the requisites of a deterrence strategy that most enhances Iransatlanlic security (including how lo hesi tight lhe threat of the day, international terrorism), and whether hallistic ttiissile defences contribute to or undermine lhe security of Europe^ (like in lhe past lhe debate over tnissile defence has been reflecling European doubts regarding lhe credibility of U.S security commitment to its allies). These fundamental disagreements, which are nol new. have heen reinforced as lhe emergence of lar more complex seeurity challenges seetn to promise the sharpening of old dilTerences and lhe inlroduclion of new ones between lhe United Slates and lhe Europeans, wht). as they gain in confidence, arc developing their own perspeclivcs on many of lhe present security threats. Besides, there is a marked difference of opinion hetween many European counlrics and Ihc US on how to approach tnany international questic>ns. The disagreement over Iraq was far from exceptional. The .\mericans and tnost Eurcv pean governments disagree, over whal is ihc best long lerm poliey towards Iran (despite lhe narrowing of differences on thai front). Syria. Israel. China.^" Also there is a clash of strategic priorities between the Europeans (who are eoncenirating their energies on lhe European cotnmunity and iheir region) and the Americans who are selling glohal goals. The end of the war of words across the Atlantic. Washington's more conciliatory altitude towards European allies' rhetoric during the second Bush administration, and ofiicial statements about "an increasingly shared strategie vision wilh Europe".'*'' cannol conceal the existence of serious disagreements. Nor does it conceal lhe fact ihal already ihc EU when acting on the glohal security stage is seeking to promote a more European view of the world just as Henry Kissinger warned in The Troubled Partnership fortv years ago.** In the tinal analysis the idea of an Atlantic partnership and alliance was born out of a specific security need, to proiecl western Europe, and was in tune with the simple pattern of the Cold War international order. Today, in the post-Cold War environment this simple pattern cannot be restored particularly as the transatlantic relationship today does not simply suffer from circutnsiantial disagreemenls and tensions among like-tiiinded players but from sottielhing deeper, a larger ideological battle. As Isaiah Berlin, the European liberal philosopher, has einphasised, people sharing the same ideological heliefs can often have acule disagreements; moreover, ihese ottcn prove lo be irreconcilable.'" 124
Transatlantic Relatiotis caught up by Reality The American way of trying lo solve intemational problems is seriously questioned by the majority of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the political classes. European critics of the US sec it as Janus-like in the way it acts in international affairs preaching for freedom, demtKraey and a liberal world order, but often undermining them with its aetions. Eumpean criticistn of the US and its intemational policies, whieh has been mueh more open than in the pa.st, draws upon a belief ihat the Amerieans often betray and discredit liberal and dem(v cratic principles, undermine the effectiveness of intemational instituiions and are weakening confidence in the West around the glohe. becau.se of their preference for the use of force as the solution lo force, rather than Ihe Law. their unquestioning eonfidenee in America's unfailing virtue and moral clarity, their belief in their omnipotence, iheir blind patriotism, their tendency to act unilaterally, to endorse the idea that the end justifies the means, to take upon themselves the role of global policeman while lhe failures of their leadership are very often assumed by the protected parties, and to dis[)ense with intcrnationai rules when they arc deemed inconvenient. In short American policies are attacked for being driven hy narrow self-interest dependent on US domestic factors, and American actions on the international scene for being based heavily on the use of foree. In fact critics ask whether, in the final analysis, the United Stales and Europe even adhere lo ihe same Wesiem principles in lhe conduct of iheir inlernational policy. This criticism, whether or not rational or balanced (or free of stereotypes), cuts across national boundaries." It has been coming nol only from the iradilional quarters (pacificists and lhe lefl). but has even been voiced, often loudly, by the populist righl^\ whieh has been growing in power in a number of European countries, as well as in those circles that are keen for Europe to tnaintain a vigorous link with lhe US. Il has also been fairly consistent despite the profound variance let alone clear dilTerences in ideological orientation and operational style among the critics. And the chorus is growing without serious opposition in Western Europe now that explicitly proAmerican parties, or leaders, have disappeared from the political scene (In fact the US is nol much discussed in Westem Europe unless it is lo he criiicised). If the transatlantic partnership were heing built from scratch today it might well exclude a few of the historic European allies who have beeome so openly disgruntled with, and critical of. Washington. It would be wrong to assume that this criticism is mere posturing, or jusi the expression of many Europeans' dissatisfaction with the power sharing stattds quo within the allianee. It would also be erroneous lo trace ils roots simply to domestic politics, in other words ihat it is another way for many Europeans lo assert their separaleness from the Americans in order lo shape iheir own identity,'''' or that it reflects domestic political costs and henelits calculations (ihough ihere is a good deal of iruth in all of the above).''' Of equal itnporlance. is ihat many Europeans have internalised tnore than Americans lhe Vietnam War lessons. The Europeans have learned, for instance, that liberal ends cannol be sustained by illiberal means. I2.S
Ekavi Athattassopoukm that force is adverse to liberty and ihat attempts to regulate (ralher ihan manage), lhe international system may evoke unforeseen and unwanted reaction and often result in reinforcing tension and violence. It is interesting to note ihal most Europeans fell thai lhe Americans should have seen 9/11 also as a lesson in humility in their pursuit of intemational policy, and lamented the fact that Washington drew almost exactly the opposite conclusion. Eor their part most Americans in policy making circles tend to hold lhe view Ihal lhe Europeans are weak, unrealistic, lack resolve, and accuse ihem of being hypocrilieal. The American view is ihal lhe Europeans criticise the US lor failing liberal values, but in practice it is the Europeans who betray liberal ideals because they arc unable to act in a robust manner against the enemies of the liberal system. whether this is Slobodan Milosevic. Osama bin Laden, or Saddam Hussein. Some right-wing Americans, piqued hy European criticism (and apparently oblivious of the new face of Europe), even go so lar as to privately suggest that Europe, in light of its fascist experience, lhe Holocaust and - in Iheir view - the present existence of strong anti-Semitism, is hardly qualified to preach humanitarian and deincKratic values lo lhe Americans.'* The view of a majority wiihin Atnerican political elites is thai those Europeans who preach for Law and iniernalional institutions tend to overlook the fact Ihat force is often needed lor Law to prevail, and that it is power politics more often ihan law that maintain peace and stability in the world. In fact European erilieism of US international policies has been perceived in lhe US nol as an efforl to promote liberalism. demcKracy or international eo-operation. bul as an obstacle to addressing US perceived needs and challenges within the context of a threatening intemational environment, if taken .seriously, there would he a risk of the Europeans debating the Americans into inaction. Essentially, at lhe core of the divide between lhe United States and many Europeans lies lhe question as to who is heller qualified lo safeguard the heart and soul of lhe Western world, spread ils message of liberalism and democracy, and help promote a liberal world order. The iradilional confidence and belief of Amerieans in their exceplionalism and in iheir system as the primary demcKTatic and liberal socio-political model, "a standing monutncnt & example for the aim and imitation of other countries." in the words of Thomas Jefferson*', is now rivalled by the confidence of European Union political leaders and senior bureaucrats in the exceptionalistn of the EU. Their belief in the uniqueness of the Union based on detiKKracy. freedom, and in its responsibility to serve as a model for the world is not to be doubled. .Xs Rotnano Prcxli, when President oi lhe European Commission, put it in his speech to lhe European Parliatncnl in 2(XX): 'Europe needs lo project its tnodel of s(K"iely into lhe wider world. We are not simply here lo defend our interests: we have a unique historic experience lo offer: the experience of liberating people from poverty, war. oppression and intolerance. We have Ibrgcd a mixlcl of devclopmeni and continental integration based on ihc principles of demtKracy. freedom and solidarity and it is a model thai works.'^" It is not sitnply 126
TransatUmtic Relation.^ caught up by Reality ihat each side believes that it is lhe more uhie guardian of liberal, dem(x:ratie and humanitarian values, but also that increasingly many Europeans now feel that the U.S is acting in a way ihal undentiines them.
III. BRIDGING THE GAP?
At some point this acute tension between Americans and many Europeans thai reflects diverging values and beliefs concerning the nature and scope of foreign and security policy and how power should be exercised globally may be reduced, if the gap between these values as well as beliefs is bridged. Yet, the likelihood of this hap[)ening d(x:s not seem very high, unless both sides make a systematic elforl to balance and moderate their attitudes to the breach between them. For instance. American political leaders and the public could appreciate the paradox that has long been identified by students of American foreign policy: cfforis to spread American liberal ideals "require the expansion of American p
Ekavi AthatHissopoitloH
point ihal the more expert Washington's leadership is. in matters of international affairs, the more sueeessful its foreign policy is bound to be. As has been noted for some time a growing number df members of the House and Senate (Democrats and Republicans) have no intemational orientation, do not care about international affairs, do not travel abroad, and in many cases do nol have passports.*' TTie Europeans for their part eould more readily recognise that there is indeed a paradox between liberal ideals and the practical requirements of exercising world power, an old dilemma that is never easily resohcd. They could also rellect upon the fact that in the United States (unlike in most European countries), there has been for a long lime a significant public debate about the relationship of liberal ideals and values in the conduct of foreign poliey. Huropean intellectuals, who are invariably hostile to the intemational choices ofthe United States, and arc unconditionally against the use of force, logeiher with those Europeans, who do accept that sometimes force is needed to uphold the law. but insist that force should be used within the limits of law. could perhaps give some thought to the dilemmas one is often confronted with in the real world. Though history shows that violence dcx;s indeed breed more violence, it also shows that non-violence is not at all contagious. To state the obvious, democracies may prefer to regulate relations between themselves through Law and treaties, but this is not yet a dem(Kratie globe regulated by demiK-ratic institutions. Of course, the Westem world needs for the sake of its own soul to live up to its own standards and prineiplcs. However, in a world whieh is not yet completely governed by the rule of law often these principles and standards are exploited by brutal regimes in order to perpetuate tyranny. In other words to suggest that there is a straight choice between the use of force or Law in foreign policy is tcx) simplistic in the light ofthe complexity of intemational affairs. It is as simplistic as to suggest that force is the ultimate guarantee of world stability. So tcx). the Europeans eould acknowledge that the foreign policy goals of most European states, or of the EU. are not always acted on in the spirit of the continent s highly held liberal ideals. For example, the EU routinely used to state in its official dtKuments its interest in the promotion of demiKracy in Palestine and eamiarked aid for individual projeets aimed at denKK'rati.sation. However, in practice the primary objective of its policies towards the Palestinian Authority was politieal stability, which direetiy contradicted the stated goal of democratisation. given the lack of interest in democratisation by the Palestinian political leadership and the autocratic nature ofthe Palestinian political system under the late Yasser Arafat."Europeans who readily and earnestK accuse the US of undermining internatit)nal institutions eould seriously question whether the promise of international institutions to deal with intemational conflict is true or false.'"' Can the UN offer solutions to problems such as intemational terrorism, violations ol human rights, or the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destmction.' The history of international insiitutions shows lhat their effectiveness depends on a communitv of interests 128
Transatlantic Relations caught tip hy Reatity which oticn dcK's not exist and certainly cannot be crcutcd al will. Europeans (uho tend lo feel free to adnn)nish the Uniled States on account of its unilaioralism). could also recognise that many European governments consistently lack commitment to the multilateralism they demand ofthe US. Mighl it not be true to say that the split within the EU over Iraq was partly due to the indilterence and arrogance with which France and Germany treated the other members ol the Union, and ihat no effort was made by the members ofthe EU to use the consultation mechanism of the Union to reach a consensus of opinion7 The same Europeans could ask themselves whether multilateralism should be the sole standard for judging the correctness, or effectiveness, of Ameriean policies. The creed of multilateralism, which essentially reflects opposition to concentrated authority, certainly carries a lot of merit. Yet. il alst) has the tendency to blur reality, il only because it implies that a nation s unilateral policies have no valid basis other than in Ihe promotion of its selfish interests, whieh are bound to be detrimental to lhe interesis ofthe rest. Faith in the dcK*trine ol' multilateralism confuses expeeiaiions about how a better, more balanced management of world alTairs might emerjie More spet ilically. such faith implies that better policies are guaranteed when more international actors are engaged. This a.ssumption is debatable. Multilateralism recently has come to be endowed by many critics ofthe US in Europe with almost magic qualities which it clearly does not have, at leasi not in ils applied fomi. Multilateralism as we have come to know it is not by detinition a recipe for a morv just world. Nor can it automatically guarantee a more stable, or better functioning intemational system. While it is true to say that unilateralism means the interesis of one. clearly multilateralism d(x;s not mean lhe intercsis of all. Nor is it axiomatic that collective decisions - usually reached on the basis of compromises and expeditious (often unholy) alliances - always produce the besi results for any uiven situation in hand. If attitudes across the Atlantic could be gradually tempered along some ol ihe lines suggested above the gap in values and beliefs might be reduced at some point. The probability of this occurring in the foreseeable future is hard to predict since this gap is the product of the complex interplay of p
tV. IHOt GHTS ABOUT THE FUTUKI Current elTorts to reconstruct the transatlantic alliance and reform the .'\ineric;iii European relationship do not hold the promise to ease the aceumulated frustration and edgy relations that exist between the allies. The solutions at hand cannot 129
Ekavi Athanassopoulou provide appropriate answers to an array of problems, lisscntially ihev do inn promise to lully satisfy the American desire lor a scctirity organisation which can he used to promote their jzlohal siraicgv. since many items on the American strategic "list" have strong opponent.s in Eurtipe. At the same time these soltitions arc jioinj; lo fall well short of European hopes lor a partnership of equals wilh the United States. There is. in fact, no cas\ policy, and no easy consensus (not only hetwecn the Americans and the Europeans but also among the Europeans themselves) as to what could, or should be done to build a grand transatlantic alliance and partnership for the future. Even if an ideal formula were lo he found, it would more likely founder on diverging sectjrity perceptions and ideological dilTerences. Nonetheless, both sides currently prefer to follow a mixlerate eourse of action and keep the pnK'ess of modifying NATO alive. Thus, they arc prt>bahly going to continue to .settle lor whatever second hc.st alternative arrangements they can agree, at least for the time being, in an effort to maintain a certain level of co-operation. After all habitual prescriptions for functional or institutionalised ways to bridge differences have been the means of choice for keeping the Atlantic relationship together lor some time now; though, most often ihey have merely managed to perpetuate rather than solve problems, something tew are willing to acknowledge. Hence the transatlantic relationship, and the rhetoric it generates, will picrsisi in the short-iuedium term in one fonn or another, though it is highly unlikely that it will be able to develop in a clo.scr. more fulfilling manner. Certainly there will he different degrees of US-tiU co-operation on political and security glohal issues in the future. However, any impetus for et>-operation wilt mosi certainly he the result of a convergence of interests on funetional issues and not the automatic outcome ol a special relationship", or an Acquis .\thmtique!'^ In laci ihis reaiily was reflected on N.ATO's Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) initiativ e As it has been pointed out. "although CJTFs certainly do enhance flexibility w iih respect to the use of people and resources, it is a Hexihility that is driven by the centrifugal reality of an increasingly Iragmented alliance, which in tum reliccts the growing divergence of interests and values".*' Until there is a genuinely united European front the transatlantic relationship will likely eontinue along the path taken in recent times - flexible coalitions depcndinii on the issues in hand. At the same time the Americans most likely will seek to strengthen their bilateral ties with those liU governments which they can identify as kindred spirits. Also they will seek to inaximi.se co-operation with Gennany. one of the three major Eumpean countries (the other two beint; Britain and France), with which Washington has had a long solid relationship, in the hope that it will act as sonic kind of a break for the Europeanists. For their part the Europeanists will continue to strive lo ttevelop and strengthen the I--1) security and defence policy. The changing rules ot American-European co-operation (based on ad h(x; ism. bilateralism and functionalitv ) have not merciv shown the futiliiv of the belief thut
Transatlantic Relations ccitii^ht up hy Reality an American-European partnership can be constructed to fit new circumstances by invoking a nostalgic (albeit/«M.v) sense of community spirit and common interesis They also point to the new way that the US has cho.sen to play the international CO operation game. Efforts to perpetuate, or build new grand structures of strategic co-operation based on the presumption of perpetual common interests in international affairs (reflecting a static rather than dynamic international environment), seem to be relkxcs of a bygone era. In fact it is these same rules that to some extent have also been shaping security co-operation between European countries?** Of course it is still far from clear whether functional unity rather than more traditional patterns of co-operaiion will prove to be an effective modus operandi in international relations in the years to come. Certainly, the former is more flexible and therefore desirable, but its unpredictability may increase rather than decrease the vulnerability of status-quo powers like the US. when seen from a long term perspective. At least within the context of the ELI one can anticipate that foreign policy coalitions between memher states risk raising suspicions within the Union that the KU will be used in the promotion of their interests even if there is no mandate from all its members. Therefore, in a paradoxical way ad hoc coalitions among EU groups of countries may result in strengthening the drive towards uniiy in foreign and security policy among EU members.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Reasoning together, making concessions and an effort to improve mutual understanding are frequently prescribed as solutions to restore, or renew the badly damaged transatlantic relationship. These calls for rational and responsible action bave the tendency to disregard that in a world of politics what is rexsonablc. responsible, or indeed realistic is in the eye ofthe beholder. Furthermore, they tend to minimise the deep-rooted causes of the current tension and \oo often invoke an idyllic pa.st strategic partnership and community that never truly existed and that is even harder to imagine today. The EU has grown politically and economically independent from the US. It is developing as an entity which desires to ;irticulatc its own identity and voice in the world arena, while there are no signs from Washington that it is willing to accept adjustments in the Atlantic relationship to reflect Europe's political evolution, by limiting US freedom of action. Many American leaders believe that the day when the Europeans will be able to raise a single and effective voice in challenging US international policies is t(K) far away lo really matter. But. perhaps this point in time is not as distant as it appears. Even if it is. Europe's autonomy in matters of international policy is bound to keep growing causing confrontations with the US. Despite cleavages between EU members on foreign policy issues and on the Union's relations with the US there has been substantial progress in putting together a European security and defence policy in 131
Ekavi Athanit.s.sopoulou
the last three years. Apart from EU aspirations lor a global security role. I-.uropcan leaders have become acutely aware of the reduction of US strategic interest in their continent, which means that they seriously have to face up to the responsibility of taking care of security in Europe and the surrounding neighbourhotxis. It is also clear that even those among them who have been cautioning against antagonistic relations between the EU and the US. desire a relationship of equals between Brussels and Washington. Besides, the future viability ofthe transatlantic partnership will depend on the congruence of the interesis of the .Americans and Europeans, the compatibility of their securiiy conceptions and policy outlooks but also on the broader ideas and beliefs that influence political leaders in the US and the EU as well as their domestic constituencies. We already know that some of the security conceptions, policy outUwks and hroader beliefs across the Atlantic differ drastically. In fact what one may call a philosophical split has been emerging between Americans and the majority of leading Europeans, causing the allies to disagree over solutions to common problems. Hven the old Atlantic rhetoric that the US and Europe need a common policy and strategy lo sueeessfully promote shared interests is openly challenged by many Americans and Europeans alike who refute the logic that the best, or inore desirable answers, are to be found in common approaches. Failure to renew the transatlantic strategic partnership, disturbing as it may be for Atlanticists. does not mean that the West will suffer any apocalyptic consequences, assuming that the overall general objectives of l^uropean policy do not clash with those ofthe United States. In fact the boundaries of liberal dem(K-racy may he expanded to the extent that divisions between the US and the EU reflect a genuine European desire and commitment to achieve a better balance between a (xiwer-approach and the promotion of international Law in international policy, alongside a sustained interest in strengthening international co-operation as an instrument nl global stability. However, if the US and many European eouniries continue to drift apart not only in terms of strategic co-operation, but also psychologically then the Western world will be weakened. The real danger, in otber words, is that divisions (divergence of interests, value eonlliets. mutual negative perceptions), and bickering can eventually blur the importance of those fundamentals that the Americans and the Europeans share as heirs ofthe European 1-nlightenment. Arguahly we have already witnessed signs of this. If this trend grows it could lead to the Americans and the Europeans allowing themselves to become not simply rivals, but even opponents demonising each other's methixis and choices whilst exalting their own. Therefore, ihere is a challenge for both to acknowledge some of their weaknesses and genuinely appreciate the limits of iheir strengths and virtues as an attempt in the direction of avoiding unnecessary confrontation. We are in the midst of a dynamic environment which may yet hold many future surprises for transatlantie relations. Accepting reality, rather than pretending otherwise as has been the case for a long time, may well be the lirst real step
Transatlantic Relations caught up h\ Reality in strengthening relations between the VS and Europe for the future. American and Huropcan leaders should he pragmatic in iheir appreciation of what can be achieved on the basis of their differences, which are real, and of what each side is. isn't, or cannot he. They should direct their energies into protnoting co-operalion on issues they agree upon both in terms of |X)lic> and strategy, being always prepared to faee up to the faet that an agreement may be elusive. A minimalistic stcp-hy-step approach seems to be a realistic ehoice under eurrent circumstance> as it seems likely that we are not far from witnessing the emergence of two poles of the Wesiem system ecvoperating and competing at the same time.
NOTI S ' ki.-sc;irch for this paper was completed during n stay at the P-aeilic ("ouneil on International Policy (L.A.) as a Getnian Marshall Fund of the United States Eurujvan Visiting Research Fellow. A larj;c part of research in the US was ba.sed on inter\ii.-v\s; I woulil liko Ul especially thank caeh and every one of the interviewees (who wished not to be quoted). " See lor in.stance. Ronald D. Asmus. "Rebuilding the Atlantic Allianci.-". Fort-ign AlTairs, vol.S2. no..*). Sopt/(3et 2()().'; Dominique Moisi. "Reinventing the West \ l-'oreign Afjairs. vol.82, no.d. Nin/Dec 2t)()3. Jiri .Scvidi. [no title|. inC. Lindstrom and B. .Sehmitt (eds.i. One Year on: Ix'ssoiis l-'irmi Iraq (Paris. Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper. no.68. MnrLh2(XM). p.lO8. ' Lord Inverehapel (British anibas.sador to Washington) to the Foreign OITice. 22 March 1948. F().ni/68067 AN 1276/1195/45 (Public ReetirdsOllicc. London): 2< March 1948. Foreign Relations of the United St,urs. vol.111, pp.64-.*>. * Ekavi Athanassopouldu. Turkey: .\iii;li>.\merifan Security Intert'sts I945-I'^f?2: The lust l-jitargement of NATO i Londtm. Frank C ass. 1999). p.217. ' For instance. Robert W\ Tucker and David C. Hendriekson. "The Souaes of American Legitimacy", ti'ivivn Affairs, vol.8.^. no.6. Nov/Dce 2(X)4. pp.21-2. '' Athanassopoulou. Inrkiw pp. 214-17. ' To whieh de Gaulle rcs[ionded by saying that it was the right of any nation to act independently. * Ronald .Steel. "The Abdication of Europe", in Janies Cha.se and I iiil C. Ravenal (cdsi. .\tlantis Lost: U.S.-luiniiH-an Relations .Xftcr the Cold War (New York. Council on Foreign Relations. 1976). ' The ambiguous language whieh NATO intentionally u.sed to describe it's novs I Icxible Respt)nse deteiTcncc dixtrine (formally adopted in 1967) favoured by the I'S reflected the wish to maintain the polilieal eohesion nl the allianee rather than a resolution ol their dilTerent seeurity interests. Ivo H. Daalder. lltv Nature and Practice of I'le.xihlc Response. NATO Striiit'i;\ and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 7967 (Now York. Columbia University Press. 1991) p.I.V '" Sec lor instance. Karl Kaiser. "Europe and Ameriea: A CHtieal Phase". Foreign affairs. vol.52, no.4. July 1974 '' Steel. "Abdication ul Europe", p.57. '' Godfrev ll(XJgst)n./lm<'n<-« in OtirTime (Vintage B(K)ks. New York. 1976). p.l2() '' Niehola.s Wahl. "The Atitonomy of 'Domestie Structures' in European-.Vmeriean Relations", in Chase and Ravenal . Atlantis Ijist. p.2.M. '* Andrew J. Pierre. "Ameriea Taccs Westem Europe in the 1980s: Atlanticism Prescrvetl.
Ekavi Athanassopoulou Disengauement. ur Devolution.'"', in Cha.se and Ravenal. Atlanits iMst. p.191. '•* Stanley llolTmann. "No Trumps. No Luek. No Will: Gloomy Thoughts on lurope's Plight", in Chase and Ravenal. Atlantis iMst. p.27. '" Ronald I). Asmus. Roben I) Blaekwill and F. Stephen Larrabee.' C an NATO Survne.'". Washington (Jtuirterly vol.19, no. 2. Spring 1996. " Robert J Art. AShy Westem Europe Needs the United .States ami NATO". Political Science Quarterly. \Q\. I l l . n o . I. 1996. Art's paper was bx"ied on inoa" than a hunda'd interviews with leading European strategic planners. One ofhis major litidings was that their biggest eoneem was that, if the I S withdrew from Europe. European states would eompete Tor power and infliienee among themselves. '* The New York Times. 16 March 2()()2: Riehard N Haass. -Charting a New Course in the Transatlantie Relationship". Remarks to the Centre for Euro|x:an Reform. London. H) Jutie 2«)2. available at w w \v.Mate.gov7s/p/rem/l0968.htm: Riehard I. Russell. "NAT( ) \ European Members: Partners or Dependents?", The X'mal Wur Cotlei;<- Rf\tc\s\ VDI.LVI. no. I. Winter 2(X)3. available at vmw.nwc.navy.mil/press/Re\iciv/2(H).iA\intir. ''' This was the lirsi time in N.'Vl'Os history that Artiele 5 had been lorinally invoked. •" Russell. "Partners or Dependents.'". "' Steven E. Meyer. "Careass of IX'ad Policies: The Irrelevaneeof NATO". Parameters {VS Army WarCollct;e Quarterly). vol.XXXIII. no.4. Winter 2(X).V4. pp.94-.'S. availiable at earlisle w w w .army.mil/usawe/Parameters •- These divisions (x;eur not only across national borders but also within European countries. -' "The 1 urope that Died". The EcotumLst. 2 June 2(K).'i. "•' See for instance. Julian Lindley-Freneh. Terms of Engagement: The Parado.x of American PoMCi aitJ till- Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 St-piemht-r (Paris. Institute lor Seeurily Studies. Chaillot Papers. no..'i2. May 2(X)2). p.77- 9; Peter Ludlow.' Waiiietl: A Global Partner", in .Alexander I J. Lennon (ed). What Does ilu- World Want from America? (Cambridge. M;LSS:. The MIT Press. 2(H)2). pp.l23-2.S: Andrew Moraxesik. "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain'. Foreign Affairs. July/.\ugust 20().^; Reginald Dale. "In .Se;irchofa New Trans Atlantie Template'./n/('rmj;/(»m;/W<'mW7'n7«inf. 1.^ May 2()()4: Gustav Gustenau. |no titlel. in Lindstrom. U'ssons From Iraq. p.76. -' Bob WiKKlward. Httsh At War (New York. Simon and Schuster. 2(X)2). p. 281.
•'' .A Xiiliiiiuil
Sectirity
S t i a l c t ; \ for lhe Global
A g e . T h e W h i t e H o u s e . IX'C.20<X). iv.
•' Similarly the less aggressi\e intemational leadership style employed by the .seeond Cicorye W. Bush administration amounted to little more than a more clever publie poliey. -* na\ id Halberstam. War in A tnm- of Peace: Btish. C 'linton and the Generals (New York. Simon and Schuster. Hm). p.229. ""' Linda P. Brady. "Working With Allies: Clinum Defense Policy and the Management of Mullilateralisin". in Stephen J. Cimbala. Clinton and I'ost-Cold Defense (Wcsiproi. Con: Praeger. 19%). espeeially 7 6 - 7 . "' Rob de Wijk |iio title|. in Lind.strom. lA-s.sons From Inn/, p.49. " Ameriean inliuentials pereeive global leadership to imply both responsibilities and freedoms that other nations do not have '- Conelusit)ns based on the author's interviews in 2(X)2 and 2(X);< with prominent Democrats and Republicans in Washington D.C. and Califomia. " Steel is usinj; this to nuike the point that "Europe lacks a fundamental quality that a state needs to be a major global aetor. li laeks a will to power". Ronald Steel, liurope: The Phantom Pillar", in R. Laurence M(K)re and Mauri/io Vaudagna (eds). Thf Aimiimn Cenittry in l-.iirope {llhaax. Comell University Press. 2()().^). p.74. " On the contradiction in these two beliefs see. Walter Lal eher. ""Ihe United States and
Transatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality Europe in an Ace ol American Unilalcralism"". in Moore. American Century in p.:.s. " Robert VV luckcr and I);t\ id C, Hcndrickson. I'he Imperial Icmptcition: The New World Onii-rimdAmeriitt's Purpose (New York. Council on Foreign Kclutions. 1992). p,.S7. ** Quoted in SlecL "Phanioni Pillar", in Moore and Vaudagna (edsi. The :\iiurican Century. p.72. " Following the controversy lhe 1992 Guidance was appaivntly reviewed, bul its objectionable part.s were not removed, unly sottcned. Barton Gellman, "Pentagon .Abandons Goal of Thwarting I S Rivals. The Washington Post. 24 Miiy 1992. '* David Armstrong. "Dick Cheney's Song ol Atnerica: Drafting a Plan lor Global l>i>niinatKe"\ Haqiers (Ocl 2(X)2). p.81. •'* I iM an iniercstinj: stuil\ of Europe in this regard see Jeremy RilVin. The Europttin Dream: How Eumpe s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (NcwYork.Tarcher. 2(X)4i •"' Collectively Europe spends IW) billion euros per year on defence. (The US spends two thirds more than Europe). ^' European ("ouneil. "Etiropean .Security Strategy. 12 Dec 2(K)3". in Antonio Missiroli (cottipl. Enmi Copenlutgett to Brussels: European Defence: Core Diximietits. xol.lV (Paris. Institute lor Security Studies. Chaillol Papers, no.67. December 200.^). p.32S. *- George W. Bush. 2(X)I. "Retnarks by the President to Siudent.s atid Faculty at National Defense University." Washingtoti. D.C. Available al http://www,v\hitflu>iisf,i;(n/nfw,
2(XX)). ** l-rotn Copenhaagen to Bni'iscts, vol.1 V. pp..'24-.VVv *'' On US strategy during lhe seeond Bush adtninistration sec John Lewis Gaddis. "Grand Strategy in lhe Second Tenn". Foreign Affairs, vol.84, no. 1. 2(K).S. " International Herald Tribune. 28 Nov. 2(X).'i. p.3. •*' The Missile l>:fensc.Aol of 1991 authorised lhe development of Theatre Missile IXMense Systctns and National Missile Defense Systems, to intercept and dcstrov a litnited attack, allhough Ihc US had nol proposed a specilic missile defence programme by lhe end of the Clinion Administration. The (k-orge W. Bush Administration made it clear in lhe lirsi half of 20()l thai il intended to priKeed with research and development ol a missile defence prt>gratnme. European opposition to Bush's tnissilc defenee plans has not been unanimous. •"* Reginald Dale. "Trans-Atlantic Dispute Over Arming China". Intenwtional Herald Tribune. LS July 2(X)4. US policy towards Israel has repeaietlly caused great tension even with London. •''' John Vinix:ur. "U.S. Views Atlantic Ties with l^abored Optimism". Intemationai Herald Tribune. 22 No\ 2(X).'i. '" Henry Kissinger. The Trotibled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Aildiiiic Alliance (New York. Doubleday. I9(i6).p.4() ^' Isaiah Berlin. "Two Concepts ol Liberty", in Henry Hardy (ed), Ilw Proper Sttuly of A/uiiJt/m/ (Lotidon, Chatto atid Windus. 1997). p. 197. ^' Many analysts lend to simplily the dynamics of tension in transatlantic relations by making a distinction, at most, between the 'old' and 'new' Europe, or those eountries which clashed with the US over Iraq (France. Germany) and the other liU metnbers (although European governments that supported Washington's policy o\cr the Iraq crisis did tiot always carry public opinion). While support for US policies is big among Eitst
Ekavi Athanassopouhm European political leaders criiicism of many US policies is sironj: across European national boundaries including Eastem linrope. '^ In fact the cutting edge of anti-Americanism has been coming from Ihe populist right. '^•' For an interesting analysis that views the Atlantic divide as a siruggle over post-Cold War identities v\iihin and among continenial Europe. Britain, and the US al Ihe heart of the Atlantic see Timt)thy Garlon Ash. Free World: .\merica. Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New York. Randotn House. 2004). " Clearly political success in a lew European countries including France. Germany. Spain, has inereasingly becoming also dependent on disagreeing with Washington on many of the most importanl intemational issues. ^ Certainly Ihis is not a new poinl. but generally is made in reference to the pre-Second World War Europe, see tor instance David Fromkin. In the Time of the Ameriams (New York. Alfred A Knopf. \mf>). ' ' Cited in Tucker. Imperial Temptation, p. 172. ^^ Romano Prodi. "2()(X)-2(K)5: Shaping the New Europe". Speech to the European Parliament. \ft Feb 20(X). Strasbourg. The .similarities in senior European officials' understanding of what the essence and purpose of ihe EU political paradigm is. with those underlined hy the early Americans, are striking. Daniel Webster, the 19th eentury American statesman and orator v\as declaring in a speech in 1826: "America held out Ihe lar dilTerent prospect dlbeingable. 'by the mere influence of civil liberty and relijiioiis toleration, to dry up these outpouring tounlains of bkuHl. and to extinguish these consuming lircs of war.'" in Tucker. Imperial Temptation. 168. '''' Samuel P. Huntington. "American Ideals Versus American In.stitutions". in G. John Ikenberry icd). American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essaw (Glenview. Illinois. Scott. Foresman and Company. 1989). p.236. "" Upon the victory in the Gulf War a jubilant President Bush told state govemment oflicials. "By God. we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all", quoted in Douglas Little. American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle i.u\t Since 1945 (London. I.B. Tauris. 2(X)2). p.2(i2. *"' David R. Gergen. "The Media and Intemational Relations and Foreign Poliey". in David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins (eds). Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21" C<'/i/«n'(University of Oklahoma Press: Norman. 1997). p.28l. ''^ Stephan Stetter. "Democratization without f)emocracy'.'The Assistance of the European Union lor Democratization PriKesses in Palestine". Mediterranean Politics, vol.8, fio.2'"' John J. Mearsheimer. "The False Promise of Intemational Institutions'. International Security, vol.19, no..^. 1994/1995. "^ It ha.s been argued that transatlantic relations are based on an Acquis Atlatuique. that is detined as a set of live principles: a common transatlantic heritage: demixrracy: liberty; peaee: prosperity. Peter BarsehdortT. Facilitating Transatlantic Cooperation After the Cold War: :\ii Acqias Attantiqtie (Palgrave. Lit Verlag. 2(K)I). p.2.^: It is worth mentioning ihai currently ihe most important relationship between Europe and the I'S revolves around economic imeresis. In this (ield the two are partners as well as strong competitors.. "^ Meyer. "The Irrelevance ul NATO". p.9.V ** A goixl example is ihe eo-operaiion between Germany, the UK and France in dealing wilh the question ol Iran's nuclear programme.
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