Torts-6th-compiled-digest-rakes-to-de-roy.-updated.docx

M.H. RAKES VS THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY GR NO. 1719, January 23, 1907 TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE FACTS: The plaintiff, one of the employees of the respondent, works at transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company’s yard near the malecon in Manila. While working, the car used in the transport canted at a certain spot or near the water’s edge which caused the rails to slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg which was later amputated to the knee. He soon filed an action for damages against the respondent. He alleged that the respondent is negligent to properly secure the load on iron to vehicle transporting it that would have prevented side pieces or guards to prevent the iron rails from slipping of respondent is negligent to secure that the construction and quality of the track is that of general standard of tramways of that character. He also alleged that the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie were the immediate cause of the occasion of the accident which were raised by the recent typhoon. In its defense, the defendant argued that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to his employment and as such, assumed by him. The defendant contends that it was the plaintiff’s negligence that contributed to the accident in (a) having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work and (b) he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before it or behind it. Considering that before the start of the particular load the foreman frequently reiterates a general prohibition made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car. Hence, the company should be exonerated from liability. ISSUE: Does the plaintiff’s contributory negligence exonerate the defendant from liability? RULING: No. The court in citing the case of Davies vs Mann ruled that: “Although the defendant’s negligence might have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured; that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequence of the injured party’s negligence.” In this case, the defendant is guilty of negligence for its failure to provide safety appliances for the use of the employee when it failed to build and maintain a track or tramway in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently, the negligence of the defendant is established. Its contention of assumed risk by the employee also does not hold water since the occurrence of the accident was due to the failure to repair the track or duly inspect the same which violates its legal duty. Nevertheless, the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence. The officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before starting the particular load. Hence, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as a primary cause. Thus, as cited by the court in the case of Marquant, the cour de cassation held that the carelessness of the victim did not civilly relieve the person without whose fault the accident could not have happened, but that the contributory negligence of the injured man had the effect of only reducing the damages. As ruled in Heil vs Glanding, “the reason why, in case of mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an action against the other, is, not the wrong of the one is set off against the wrong of the other; it that the law cannot measure how

much of the damage suffered is attributable to the plaintiff’s own fault. If he were allowed to recover, it might be that he would obtain from the other party compensation for his own misconduct.” With such, the court ruled that instead of P5,000 as compensation for the damages, P2,500 is deducted as an amount fairly attributable to his negligence and direct judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff. Title: NAPOCOR(National Power Corporation) vs. CASIONAN Citation: GR No. 165969, Nov. 27, 2008 TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE FACTS: Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time of the incident that claimed his life. He worked as a pocket miner. A trail existed in Dalicno, Benguet and this trail was regularly used by members of the community. Sometime in the 1970’s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno, Benguet. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place. As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Thereafter, Melchor saw Noble fall to the ground. He rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not Noble Casionan is guilty of contributory negligence so as to mitigate NAPOCOR’s liability. HELD: NO, the court finds no contributory negligence on Noble’s part. The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicno to Itogon, Benguet. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its

liability.

TITLE: NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG, respondents. CITATION: G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005 TOPIC: Contributory Negligence FACTS: In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio. Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle. On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the Castillon heirs but reduced Lambert’s liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the real party in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the accident? In other words, was Lambert negligent? 2. Whether or not the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence? HELD: 1. No. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence”. Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be

the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision. 2.

Yes. The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victim’s negligence. Article 2179 reads as follows: When the plaintiff’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

TOPIC: Contributory Negligence TITLE: LARRY ESTACION vs. NOE BERNARDO, thru and his guardian ad litem ARLIE BERNARDO, CECILIA BANDOQUILLO and GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA, Respondents. CITATION: G.R. No. 144723, February 27, 2006 FACTS: On October 16, 1982 in the afternoon, respondent Noe Bernardo was going home to Dumaguete from Cebu. He boarded a Ford Fiera jeepney driven by Quinquillera and owned by Bandoquillo. He was seated on the extension seat at the center of the Fiera. From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride so Noe offered his seat and hung/stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The Fiera slowed down and stopped to pick up more passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck owned by the petitioner Larry Estacion and driven by Gerosano, which was travelling in the same direction, hit the rear portion of the jeepney. The Fiera crushed Bernardo’s legs and feet, and he was brought to Silliman University Medical Center where his lower left leg was amputated. Police report showed that there were 10 more who were injured by the accident. On February 18, 1993, Bernardo, and his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete a complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict against petitioner as owner of the truck and his driver. RTC ruled that Gerosano was negligent and it was the direct and proximate cause of the incident. It also held petitioner liable as employer. CA affirmed in toto the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable and whether or not Bernardo was guilty of contributory negligence?

HELD: Yes. From the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it can be shown that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 ft. as shown in the sketch of the police. There was also only one tire mark which meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned properly, otherwise, there would have been 2 tire marks. It is the negligent act of the petitioner’s driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of the respondent Bernardo’s injury. As employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solitarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. He is presumed to be negligent in the selection of his employee which petitioner failed to overcome. He failed to show that he examined driver Gerosano as to his qualifications, experience and records. Bernardo is guilty of contributory negligence by standing at the rear portion of the jeep. Contributory Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Bernardo’s act of standing on the left rear portion showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body. Quinquillera (jeepney driver) was also negligent because there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. He also allowed Bernardo to stand on the left rear of his jeep. There is also a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner of the jeep, Bandoquillo, to which she did not rebut.

TITLE: Libi vs. IAC CITATION: G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY PARENTS) FACTS: Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, and deceased Wendell Libi, between 18 to 19 years old, were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they be together again this made the guy resort to threats. But the girl hold steadfast to her decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978. On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city. Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts. Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Libi shall be liable for vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. RULING: Yes. The Court has perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation. Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm. In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al. which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,” followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder. Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. We

believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that “(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, xxx the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that “(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor x x x shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: “Should there be no person having such x x x minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law.”

TITLE: MACARIO TAMARGO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS REFERENCE: G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY BY PARENTS FACTS On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto. He, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment. On December 10, 1981, prior to the incident, the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto before the then CFI. This petition for adoption was granted on, November 18, 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, Spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondents, natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision, CA dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. In the present Petition for Review with the SC, petitioners contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. ISSUE Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

RULING NO. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parental authority is NOT properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. The court does not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not

yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

IN CASE IPANGUTANA LANG NI BASIS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of

dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC.,respondents. GR No. 132266 | December 21, 1999 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENT) FACTS: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez), was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Benjamin Abad was a manager of petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad brought Vasquez to Cebu Doctors' Hospital where he died. A Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. An action for damages was then commenced by respondents against Abad and petitioner Castilex Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly and solidarily respondents Petitioner Castilex and Abad separately appealed the decision. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner Castilex liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. Hence, Castilex filed the instant petition. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not an employer, Castilex, may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. 2. Whether or not the private respondents have sufficiently established that Abad was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.

RULING: 1. Yes. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply However, Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. DISTINCTION between 4th and 5th paragraph of Art 2180 of CC:  Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry.  The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.  The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.  Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions o Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks  But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed 2. No. Abad testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. The RTC and CA connotes that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. However, the Supreme Court do not agree with RTC and CA. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: o It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of

o

o o

some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip

In the case, it is undisputed that Abad did some overtime work at the petitioner's office. After, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, 7km away from petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place. At the Goldie's Restaurant, Abad took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when Abad was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. Abad's working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position Since no evidence that Abad was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle. Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle TITLE: ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents. CITATION::G.R. No. 82465, February 25, 1991 FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint against the St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves,

Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son. Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation. The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents.The precautions and reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard required by law under the circumstances. Had the defendant teachers made an actual and physical observation of the water before they allowed the students to swim, they could have found out that the area where the children were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who according to the female teachers were there to supervise the children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the children were swimming. They were somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree. On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. There was no sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to guard against the foreseen harm. Also, the school and principal Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and solidarily liable with the teachers for the death of Ferdinand, under Art 2180. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are negligent for the death of Castillo, thus liable for damages. RULING: NO. The petition is impressed with merit. In the instant case, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under them. At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion. The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore, respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son. Article 2180, par. 4 states that: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity. As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence.

Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child. With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages. Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them. While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.

FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORP VS WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY EMPLOYERS) Facts: Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer, assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning each school day. While riding the school jeep, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the both of them was on their way home one late afternoon. A fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Potenciano sued Filamer for damages but the latter denied any liability by contending that Funtecha was merely a working student who, under the Labor Code and its implementing rules, is not considered an employee of Filamer. Furthermore, Funtecha’s act of taking over the vehicle was outside the scope of his janitorial duties. Issue: Whether Filamer is liable for the injury caused by Funtecha? Ruling: Yes. Filamer is liable under the vicarious liability. The implementing rules of Labor code is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. It is not the decisive law in the civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim

brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doeremployee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.

TITLE: BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DIVINA VDA. DE DIONISIO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children MARK ANGELO and MA. LIZA, both surnamed DIONISIO CITATION: G.R. No. 116624. September 20, 1996 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER (PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR) FACTS:

• On 2 November 1990, at about 3:30 in the afternoon, petitioner’s Baliwag Transit Bus No. 117 was driven by Juanito Fidel to its terminal on 2nd Avenue, Caloocan City, for repair of its brake system. Juanito Fidel told mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the matter so that proper order to the mechanics could be made. Fidel then alighted from the bus and told the gasman to fill up the gas tank.

• Shortly after, Juanito Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the driver’s seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt something was hit. When he went down to investigate he saw Mario Dionisio lying on the ground bleeding and

convulsive, sandwiched between Bus No. 117 and another bus parked thereat owned by the same petitioner. Fidel summoned his co-employees and they all helped to extricate Mario Dionisio. They rushed him to St. Luke’s Hospital in Quezon City, however, few days after, he expired.

• A complaint for damages against Baliwag Transit was filed by the wife before the RTC of Quezon City. • RTC rendered a decision ordering Baliwag Transit and its employee Juanito Fidel jointly and severally to pay the heirs of the deceased.

• Private respondent appealed to the CA wherein it increased the amount of damages rendered by the RTC. • Petitioners maintain that respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the appealed judgment despite the contributory negligence of the deceased Mario Dionisio, i.e., in failing to take the necessary precaution while doing repair work on the brake system of Bus No. 117, and that the increase of the award of damages is unreasonable being unsupported by law and the evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is correct. RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that under Article 2180, in relation to Art. 2176, of the Civil Code provides that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care.

In the case at bar, the circumstances clearly show that the proximate cause of the death of Mario Dionisio was the negligence of driver Juanito Fidel when he failed to take the necessary precaution to prevent the accident. He boarded his bus, sat on the driver’s seat and was at the steering wheel when the bus moved pinning down the deceased who was repairing the defective brake system below. Driver Fidel should have known that his brake system was being repaired as he was in fact the one who told Dionisio to do the repair. Fidel should have parked the bus properly and safely. After alighting from the bus to tell the gasman to fill the tank, he should have placed a stopper or any hard object against a tire or two of the bus. But without taking the necessary precaution he boarded Bus No. 117 causing it to move and roll, pinning down the deceased which resulted in his serious injuries and eventual death. The reckless imprudence of Juanito Fidel makes him liable to the heirs of offended party for damages together with his employer.

Therefore, Petitioner’s failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by him. ** Wala gi mention sa case ang term jd na respondeat superior pero mao ra jd knuhay ni ang meaning. The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior:

• One type of vicarious liability is respondeat superior, which means “let the master answer.”When respondeat superior applies, an employer will be liable for an employee’s negligent actions or omissions that occur during the course and scope of the employee’s employment. This means that the employee must be performing duties for the employer at the time of the negligence for the employer to be held liable under respondeat superior.

• A plaintiff need not show that the employer was independently negligent but must prove there was an employment relationship.

• Respondeat superior only applies to employment relationships, not the relationship between a company and an independent contractor. L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and General Manager, petitioners, vs. HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents. G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY EMPLOYERS) FACTS: On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the Vallejera spouses, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by LG Foods Corporation (LG Foods) and driven by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. An information for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide was filed against the driver before the Bacolod MTCC. Before the trial could be concluded, however, the accused driver committed suicide. The case was then dismissed. On June 23, 1999, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against LG Foods alleging that as employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. In their defense, LG Foods denied liability by claiming to have exercised such diligence and prayed for dismissal for lack of cause of action. Also, in their motion to dismiss, they argued that the complaint was a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under Art. 103 of RPC and, as such, there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver to hold them liable. Since such condition was not fulfilled due to the latter’s death, they argued, the spouses had no cause of action. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit. Also, it denied the motion for reconsideration of the matter. LG Foods then went on certiorari to the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion of the part of the trial judge. The CA, however, affirmed the RTC decision ruling that the complaint by the spouses does not purport to be based on subsidiary liability since the basic elements of such liability, such as conviction and insolvency of the accused employee, were not even alleged in said complaint. It then said that the complaint purports to exact responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176 of CC, which is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from negligence under the Art. 103 of RPC. Liability under Art. 2180 of CC is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or showing of insolvency. Issue: Whether or not the spouses Vallejeras cause of action is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code

Ruling: The case is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 of the Civil Code to recover damages primarily from LG Foods as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to A2180, CC. The obligation imposed by A2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees. The Court in this case, ratiocinated and explain the following grounds why LG Foods is liable to the private respondent: First. Nothing in the allegations in the complaint suggests that the LG Foods are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Plus, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under said provision. Second. While not explicitly stated that the suit was for damages based on quasi-delict, it alleged gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of LG Foods, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was further alleged that LG Foods is civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son. Third. Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the "act or omission by which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto, and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. This is illustrated in A1161, CC providing that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of A2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. This means that A2177 provides an alternative remedy for the plaintiff. The choice is with the plaintiff. Fourth. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate, not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency. This was the recourse of the spouses since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver. Fifth. LG Foods has been alleging that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their] employees." This defense is an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict under A2180, CC. Sixth. Since it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of due to its premature termination, the fact that there was no prior reservation made to institute a separate civil action is of no moment. MEDARDO CADIENTE VS BITHUEL MACAS GR NO. 161946, November 14, 2008 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (OWNER OF VEHICLE) FACTS: Respondent Bithuel Macas, was standing on the shoulder of the road, an uncemented part of the highway intended for pedestrians where the stationary vehicles could unload passengers was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca causing the respondent to suffer severe muscular and major vessel injuries, bone fractures in both thighs and other parts of the leg which led to both legs amputated up to the groins. Cimafranca with the eyewitness brought the victim to the hospital in Davao Medical Center but had absconded and disappeared since then.

Upon investigation, the Ford Fiera was owned by the petitioner, Atty. Medardo Cadiente who claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the vehicle since he sold the same to Engr. Rogelio Jalipa wherein the certificate of registration and Official Receipt were turned over to him with the understanding that the latter would cause for its registration. A case for torts and damages was then instituted by the respondent’s father against Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC Davao wherein the latter filed a third party complaint against Jalipa. Nevertheless, Jalipa contended that he sold the same vehicle to a certain Abubakar where he implead such. The RTC ruled Cadiente and Jalipa jointly and severally liable for the damages to the plaintiff for their own negligence which was affirmed by the CA. Aggrieved, Cadiente appealed before SC in a petition for review on certiorari, hence this case. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the petitioner and Jalipa are jointly and severally liable RULING: No. The court in citing PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., that the registered owner of the vehicle, even have already sold it to some else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. As explained: …Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. Similarly, in Villanueva v. Domingo it provides that the policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. Hence, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the misfortune took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the respondent, who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with nary but two remaining limbs. Duavit vs CA Topic: VICARIOUS LIABILITY; Owner of Vehicle (No EER) FACTS: On July 28, 1971, plaintiffs Antonio Sarmiento and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep owned by plaintiff, Ruperto Catuar was driving at the moderate speed and while approaching Roosevelt Ave., Virgilio slowed down; suddenly, another jeep driven by defendatn Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff’s jeep on the portion near the left rear wheels and as a result of the impact, plaintiff’s jeep fell on its right and skidded by about 30yards. The jeep was damaged (windshield, differential part near the left rear wheel and top cover of jeep); Virgilio was thrown to the middle of the road, wrist broken and sustained contusions on the head. While Antonio was trapped inside and his leg was fractured. Virgilio and Antonio both were able to incur expenses due to the injuries sustained and were incapacitated from their respective work. Thus they filed for damages against Oscar (the driver) and Duavit (the owner of the jeep driven by Oscar).

Duavit admits ownership of the jeep, but denied that Oscar was his employee, at anytime until the present. Oscar on the other hand, presented that he was an employee of the Board of Liquidators from 1966 to 1973 and categorically admitted that he took the jeep from Duavit’s garage without the latter’s consent and was even filed a case for theft of the jeep but the case did not push through as his parents apologized on his behalf. He also made it appear that he took all the necessary precaution while driving and the accident was due to the negligence of Virgilio. Trial Court found Oscar negligent but found no employer-employee relationship between him and Duavit, and the latter was absolved from liability under Article 2180. When appealed to CA, it held Duavit jointly and severally liable with Oscar. CA held that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by the operator of record or registered owner and not necessary to prove actual owner of the vehicle and who the employer of the driver is. It is a conclusive presumption of the facts and law and not subject to rebuttal of proof tot he contrary. ISSUE: WON the CA is correct. RULING: NO. In the case of Duquillo vs. Bayot, it was held that the defendant owner of the truck cannot be held liable for anything, since the driver of the truck was not his employee nor did have anything to do with the latter’s business thus there was not the remotest contractual relation between the victim and the truck owner. It necessarily follows from all this that articles 1101 and following of the Civil Code, have no application in the case. The Court upholds the said ruling as still relevant and better applicable to the present circumstances. Unlike the basis that was relied upon by the CA, where the owner, relying on his representation, registered the vehicle in his name, and the Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration. While in another case relied upon by the CA, where the owner, also at the time of the incident she already sold the jeepney, but was still found civilly liable since she failed to surrender to the Motor Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates in violation of a commonwealth act. In this case, the CA misplaced its reliance of the cases. Petitioner did not levy ownership but completely denies Oscar being his employee. The jeep was virtually stolen from the garage of Duavit. To hold therefore, Duavit caused by Oscar who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. The court cannot just rule based on precedents. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. In this case, it failed to indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-emloyee relationship between the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner of the vehicle’s use, the Court cannot hold the owner liable.

MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (GPI) G.R. No. L-11154 34 Phil 311 March 21, 1916 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY STATE, PROVINCIES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES) FACTS: The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.

Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital Ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn in Taft Avenue. Merritt was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely, unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain mass had suffered material injury. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected. The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanent injuries and the loss of wages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit. On this appeal, Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred: • “in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint,” and • “in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.” On the other hand, the Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: • in finding that the collision between the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged agent or employee of the Government; • in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and • in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741. ISSUES: Whether or not the Government is legally liable to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence against it. Whether or not the ambulance driver is considered as an employee of the government. HELD: NO, the government is not liable by allowing a lawsuit to commence and neither that the ambulance driver is considered as an employee of the government. The waiver of immunity of the State does not mean concession of its liability. When the State allows itself to be sued, all it does in effect is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State is liable. Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code reads that “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent. Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As stated by Justice Story of United States “The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.”

TITLE:MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDOBANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents. CITATION: G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY STATE, PROVINCIES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES) FACTS: At about 7am, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. Private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney in the CFI of La Union. However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against Municipality of San Fernando and the driver of a dump truck of the Municipality. The case was subsequently transferred to respondent judge’s court. The private respondents amended their complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action and nonsuability of the State, among others. Respondent judge ordered defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs for damages. Upon MR, respondent judge issued an order providing that if defendant’s municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter already disposed of, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: 1. Are municipal corporations suable? 2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?

HELD: 1.

Yes. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in

governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. 2.

No. The Supreme Court held that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the

competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be – – imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents. SO ORDERED.

TITLE: Palisoc vs. Brillantes CITATION: G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY TEACHERS) FACTS: Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics students at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation transpired between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. It was found that the cause of death being “shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The incident was testified by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of any party. The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Teodosio Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Santiago M. Quibulue, who was the teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Antonio C. Brillantes who is a member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor of MTI. The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause “so long as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where the pupil lives and boards with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents., and such control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in this case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc together with the defendant Virgilio Daffon? RULING: The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded as party defendant. The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are deemed to have been set aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students’ activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, “the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority” and “where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction.” The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article. In this case, the unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they cannot likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court was modified, while claim for compensatory damages was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part of the said defendants.

TITLE: ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS REFERENCE: G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY BY TEACHERS FACTS Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, the vehicle owner, Vivencio and St. Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City. The RTC ruled against petitioner and held it liable for Sherwin’s death. On appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. ISSUE Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct? RULING NO. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In the case at bar, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep. Respondents, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle. Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded. Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. DE ROY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988 TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY PROPRIETOR OF BLDG, ENGR, ARCHITECT, CONTRACTOR)

FACTS: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch38I, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987.

On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision in holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code. RULING: No. The Supreme Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.