The Purpose Of International Relations

The Purpose of International Relations EH Carr, State Propaganda and an Informed Public Opinion

by Ross Eventon

A thesis submitted to the International Relations Department of Webster University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MA International Relations May 2009

London, United Kingdom

© Copyright by Ross Eventon ALL RIGHTS RESERVED (2009) The author hereby grants to Webster University permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part for educational purposes.

WEBSTER UNIVERSITY

THESIS APPROVAL

The Purpose of International Relations EH Carr, State Propaganda and an Informed Public Opinion

by Ross Eventon

APPROVED: ______________________________ Committee Chair/Mentor ______________________________ Committee Member (Second Reader) ______________________________ Site Director/Department Chair ______________________________ Academic Dean

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ABSTRACT

The Purpose of International Relations EH Carr, State Propaganda and an Informed Public Opinion

by Ross Eventon

This paper returns to the thought prevalent at the inception of the discipline in order to assess how those issues deemed most relevant have been addressed in contemporary scholarship. Despite EH Carr developing his Realist approach with the aim of undermining State propaganda, this problem remains as, if not more, relevant in modern society. In contrast to Carrʼs approach, mainstream IR scholarship within the theoretical paradigms is consistently uncritical and status-quo. Consequently, this paper revisits the critical Realism of EH Carr and his purpose for the discipline. The transformation of this Realism is then traced through Classical Realism to contemporary NeoRealism. Thereafter, the paper examines the mainstream theoretical paradigms to illustrate the prevailing approach to International Relations and establish where the critique advocated by Carr has been transposed. The final section is concerned with the purpose of International Relations, arguing that the movement away from critical thought towards an allegiance to the State, as opposed to the public, is systematic of a widespread, and dangerous, obedience to the State within the discipline. Concluding, the paper advocates the return to a critical approach to international affairs, signifying the reversion to a disciplinary obligation to the public as opposed to the State.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction.............................................................................................................. 1 Chapter I: Realism................................................................................................... 4 Chapter II: The Contemporary Paradigms............................................................. 27 Chapter III: The Purpose of International Relations .............................................. 40 Conclusion............................................................................................................. 50 References ............................................................................................................ 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 How
is
it
possible
for
this
small
clique
to
bend
the
will
of
the
majority,
who
stand
to
lose
and
 suffer
by
a
state
of
war,
to
the
service
of
their
ambitions?

An
obvious
answer
to
this
question
 would
seem
to
be
that
the
minority,
the
ruling
class
at
present,
has
the
schools
and
press,
 usually
the
Church
as
well,
under
its
thumb.

This
enables
it
to
organize
and
sway
the
 emotions
of
the
masses,
and
makes
its
tool
of
them.





Albert
Einstein
in
a
letter
to
Sigmund
Freud




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LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper is a summary of thought and approaches within the theoretical paradigms and, as such, it largely constitutes a literature review in itself. In regard to the first part of the paper, discussions of the theoretical paradigms are usually left to textbooks. However, when Realism is discussed, Carrʼs ʻRealismʼ is taken together with other Realists despite the significant difference in their approaches. Michael Cox, in his appraisal of Carrʼs work, has gone some way towards correcting this.1 Although the difference between Carr and the later realists is occasionally acknowledged, I felt it necessary to show the development of Realism from a critical to a status-quo approach. Craig Murphy has rekindled Carrʼs ideas, in a way similar to my discussion here, by tracing what he calls the “democratic impulse” (the desire to have a more informed democratic opinion on foreign affairs).2 However, Murphyʼs discussion is brief, Carrʼs approach is outlined quickly and the ʻdevelopmentʼ of Realism is not shown in the way I felt it necessary to do here. The second chapter focuses on the approaches of the mainstream International Relations paradigms, again an issue often left to the textbooks or publications devoted to International Relations theory.3 However, in this case I present a comparative analysis of Carrʼs thought to the mainstream schools in order to show the consistent uncritical, Stateserving nature of contemporary International Relations theory and a marked shift in the purpose of the discipline. The third and final chapter is itself a literature review, analysing some of the most important and recent works regarding the purpose and future of IR and IR theory. My position with regard to these works will become evident in the course of the

1

Cox, M. ʻE.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisalʼ Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004 Murphy, C. ʻCritical Theory and the Democratic Impulseʼ in Jones, R. ed. ʻCritical Theory and World Politics”, Lynne Reiner Publishers, London, 2001 3 See the bibliography for the works relating to the relevant paradigms. 2

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paper, but it is enough to say here that I feel contemporary discussions of the discipline negate to address the most pressing issues and display a worrying level of allegiance and subservience to the State.4

4




See footnotes in chapter III and also the bibliography for the works appraised in this discussion.

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INTRODUCTION

International Relations (IR) as a field of academic study was inaugurated and formalised in 1919 at the University of Aberystwyth in Wales.5 Funded by concerned philanthropists following World War I, the discipline was charged with raising the level of education regarding international affairs, so that the ignorance that led to the destruction of the First World War could not be repeated.6 Such a task requires a particular philosophy regarding how a discipline should be structured and what approaches it should take in order to, if not achieve, move towards itʼs goal. As a social science, IR has been preoccupied with the creation of theory to explain the behaviour we observe among nation States. Given this, we can assume that through achievements in theoretical understanding IR scholars hope to determine and eventually undermine the factors that cause interstate warfare. Despite such efforts, it is difficult to observe substantial progress towards alleviating the scourge of war. Although Europe has not fallen into large-scale conflict as in the early parts of the 20th century, war is still as endemic a part of the international arena as ever. Moreover, one of the most prominent features of contemporary State violence has continually been the cloaking of actual intentions in ideologies and false pretexts. Whilst a significant and growing body of literature concerns itself with exposing this State propaganda, as well as academic and media complicity, these have come largely from outside of the discipline.7

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Throughout this paper, International Relations will be represented as ʻIRʼ and will refer to the academic discipline. 6 Hedley Bull observes that the “responsibility of students of International Relations was to assist the march of progress” in order to “overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill-will, and the sinister interests that stood in itʼs way.” Cited in Hollis, M. Smith, S. ʻExplaining and Understanding International Relationsʼ, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2003. p.20 7 See, for example, regarding foreign policy, the works of Noam Chomsky, Edward Herman, Alexander and Patrick Cockburn, Tariq Ali, Mark Curtis, Howard Zinn, William Blum, Ha-Joon Chang, Milan Rai and Arundhati Roy amongst others.

In light of this, it may be fruitful to revisit the issues deemed most pressing at the beginning of the discipline and to determine how or to what extent these problems have been confronted or resolved. EH Carr, one of the most important early IR scholars, developed his ʻRealistʼ approach in order to counteract State and academic propaganda.8 For Carr, the aim of this approach, and the discipline itself, was to create a more informed public opinion on international affairs. However, despite these beginnings, over the course of the twentieth century Realism changed significantly and came to dominate the discipline in a form almost unrecognisable to Carrʼs.

In this paper I will outline Carrʼs approach and trace the removal of his ideas from later Realist scholarship. I will focus, in particular, on his purpose for the discipline and the issues he deemed in most need of scholarly attention; the critical analysis of the State and State propaganda. Following this discussion of the Realist school, I will look briefly at other mainstream paradigms to ascertain the predominant approach to IR and to determine where Carrʼs ideas are most faithfully represented amongst the modern theorists. IR, in adopting theory, has separated scholars into competing paradigms of thought that determine the general principles on which the practitioners of the discipline operate.9 These paradigms have come to dominate IR and consequently they frame the discourse, and have a significant effect on the worldview, of IR students.10 IR is fundamentally concerned with teaching, hence a discussion of those paradigms presented as most relevant, prominent or important to students can go some way in assessing the type of approach to international affairs within the discipline that is dominant and most

8

In this paper, the ʻStateʼ refers to the government and political elites. The ʻpublicʼ will be the general population. 9 Nicholson, M. and Bernet, P. ʻThe Epistemology of International Relationsʼ in Groom, AJR. ʻCritical Theory and Postmodernism in International Relationsʼ Pinter Publishers, London 1994. p.198 10 Ashley. ʻThe Poverty of Neo-Realismʼ in Keohane, R. ʻNeo-Realism and itʼs Criticsʼ, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986

2

likely to prevail in future. In the final section the paper will attempt to determine why critical thought has moved away from the mainstream of the discipline by engaging and contributing to the contemporary debate regarding the purpose of IR.

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CHAPTER I Carr and Critical Realism

Edward Hallett Carrʼs The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis 1919 - 1939: an introduction to the study of international relations is widely considered the first significant contribution to the discipline and the seminal work of early, in the context of the institutionalised academic study of international relations, ʻRealistʼ thought. The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis is a critical analysis of the state of international affairs, particularly the prevailing approach to IR espoused by those Carr terms ʻidealistsʼ or Liberals, for whom “wishing prevails over thinking, generalisation over observation and...little attempt is made at a critical analysis of existing facts.”11 Carr countered this view with his ʻRealismʼ, which constituted a critical, and “somewhat cynical” approach to International Relations.12 As a result a number of assumptions are made. For Carr, egoistic power-seeking States were the main actors in international relations and conflict was rooted in the clash of interests between the “have” and “have-not” States.13 When defining the concept of State power, Carr assumed three key components: military power, economic power and the power over opinion.14 He deemed the latter to be “not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power” and “closely associated with them.”15 The consequent section Carr devotes to propaganda acts as a warning of its role within both democracies and

11

Carr, E H. “The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis: an introduction to the study of international relations”, London, Macmillan, 1948. p.8 It should be noted that there has been some confusion regarding exactly who the idealists, and the realists for that matter, actually were. For some, Carr is considered to have deemed ʻidealistʼ every approach other than his own. 12 ibid, p.10 13 ibid, p.60 14 ibid, p.108 15 ibid, p.132

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totalitarian States; the contrast between the two being less than “clear cut.”16 Democracies or “the groups who control them” were not, he observed, “altogether innocent of the arts of moulding and directing mass opinion.”17 He noted that the increasing prominence attached to power over opinion was largely a result of the “broadening basis of politics” which increased the number whose opinions were politically important.18

The

conditions that led to this broadening of politics also “created instruments of unparalleled range and efficiency” for “moulding and directing” public opinion. The most important of these was universal popular education because, invariably, the State providing the education decides its content. With increases in technology, however, the means had grown to include “the radio, film and popular press” whose management had “become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.” A situation, which he warned, “makes inevitable the centralised control of opinion.”19 Highlighting the efficacy of this problem, Carr wrote:

The issue is no longer whether man shall be politically free to express their opinions, but whether freedom of opinion has, for large masses of people, any meaning but the subjection to the influence of innumerable 20

forms of propaganda directed by vested interests of one kind or another.

Carr recommended that, because “the close connexion between these different forms of power is so vital” and “has been so much neglected in theoretical discussion,” further investigation in these areas would be the most fruitful approach at the present time.21

Discussions of State propaganda of this sort were not uncommon in Carrʼs time. Reinhold Niebuhr, an important early 20th Century theologian and political thinker who had a 16

ibid, p.133 ibid, p.133 18 ibid, p.132 19 ibid, p.134 20 ibid, p.135 21 ibid, p.143 17

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significant influence on Carr and later Morgenthau, warned in his Moral Man and Immoral Society that “the stupidity of the average man will permit the oligarch, whether economic or political, to hide his real purposes from the scrutiny of his fellows and to withdraw his activities from effective control.”22 The facts in society, he contended, will be created by the “disproportion of power” and the justifications for political action will be “dictated by the desire of men of power to hide the nakedness of their greed.”23 Discussing the beneficiaries of this propaganda, Niebuhr observed that the ʻnational will,ʼ expressed by the government, is determined not only by the populace but also “the prudential self interest of dominant economic classes.”24 This “selfish exploitation of the instruments of coercion by the groups who wield them” was considered by Niebuhr to be inevitable. He summarised the situation, writing:

The economic overlords of a nation have special interests in the profits of international trade, in the exploitation of weaker peoples and in the acquisition of raw materials and markets, all of which are only remotely relevant to the welfare of the whole people. They are relevant at all only because, under the present organisation of society, the economic life of a whole nation is bound up with the private enterprise of individuals.

25

For his part, Carrʼs work went to significant lengths to discredit propagandists, of both academia and the State. In The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis, Carr criticised the ideological guises which States use to mask their intentions, including the consistent proclamations of statesmen that our weapons are “vital, defensive and benevolent” whilst others are always

22

Niebuhr, R. “Moral Man and Immoral Society”, Charles Scribnerʼs Sons, London, 1932 p.21 ibid, p.8 24 ibid, p.88 25 ibid, p.89 Murphy notes that Carr and Niebuhr both wrote for a democratic audience including citizens. Niebuhr was also closely linked to the industrial labour movement. See Murphy, C. “Critical Theory and the Democratic Impulse” in Jones, R. ed. 2001. p.66 23

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“offensive and wicked.”26 Similarly, he ridiculed the declarations of our actions always being “virtuous” and beneficial to the world and us.27 His main target, however, were Liberal scholars, whom he felt, misunderstanding the nature of international relations, advocated “supposedly absolute and universal principles (peace, harmony of interests, collective security, free trade)” which “were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time.”28

As with Niebuhr, throughout The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis Carr discusses the purpose and beneficiaries of this propaganda. When outlining the idea of the ʻState,ʼ Carr acknowledged it is merely a “fictitious group person”; albeit a “necessary fiction” and an “indispensable instrument of modern society.”29 Consequently, he recognised that when we speak of the ʻStateʼ making decisions we actually refer to those in a position to influence policy. In democratic societies then, he noted, “immense corporations are called into existence, which are too powerful and too vital to the community to remain wholly independent of the machine of government.”30 He warned that with elite groups representing the State in this way, “opinion is conditioned by status and interest” and this “ruling class or nation” not only “evolves opinions favorable to the maintenance of its privileged position” but can, using economic and military power, “impose these opinions on others.”31 In particular, Carr attacked the often-proclaimed notion of the ʻnational interestʼ;

26

Carr, E H. 1948 p.74 ibid, p.80-81 28 Carr, E H. ʻThe Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis: an introduction to the study of international relationsʼ, London, Macmillan, 1981. p.80 29 Carr, E H. 1948 p.149 30 ibid, p.135 31 ibid, p.143 27

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The doctrine of the harmony of interests...is the natural assumption of a prosperous and privileged class, whose members have a dominant voice in the community and are therefore naturally prone to identify its interest with their own. In virtue of this identification, any assailant of the interests of the dominant group is made to incur the odium of assailing the alleged common interest of the whole community, and is told that in making this assault he is attacking his own higher interests. The doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and 32

maintain their dominant position.

These discussions of propaganda and elite interests within the State form a significant part of Carrʼs other works; a testament to the importance he attributed them. In his The New Society, in which he analysed the present state of society and offered recommendations to move towards a fairer system of social organisation, he stated that propaganda had become “as essential a function of mass democracy as advertising of mass production” where the leaders are concerned with the “moulding and manipulation of opinion” as opposed to its reflection.33 Noting the increasing gap between the nature of debates among leaders and the terms in which these are presented to the public, Carr contended that the “spectacle of an efficient elite maintaining authority and asserting its will over the masses by the rationally calculated use of irrational methods of persuasion is the most disturbing nightmare of mass democracy.”34 This “nightmare” could be alleviated only if an “educated mass democracy” could be created. In moving towards this, the most necessary task was to “unmask the irrational by stripping from its hypothetical fig-leaf of false reason.”35 Continuing the theme in his Conditions of Peace, under a chapter titled ʻCrisis of Democracyʼ he argued that liberal democracy was effectively destroyed by 1920 as “the holders of economic power...now more and more openly descended into the

32

Carr, E H. 1981. p.102 Carr, EH. ʻThe New Societyʼ, Macmillan, London, 1951. p69, p76 34 ibid, p.78 35 ibid, p.79, p.106 33

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political arena.” This consequently made organised economic power the dominant factor in politics.36 Under these existing democratic institutions, Carr argued, the will of the majority was “impotent to assert itself against the domination of organised economic power.”37 Realism then, as Carr imagined it in The Twenty Yearsʼ Crisis, must “unmask” the propaganda of Statesmen and scholars to show a “hollow and intolerable sham” which “serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged.”38 In fact, the subversion of these mechanisms was the task Carr envisaged for the discipline of International Relations in general. At his inauguration to the International Relations Chair at Aberystwyth University, he stated that “the holder of the chair should endeavour...to promote a truer understanding of the nature of international relations, and thereby contribute to the creation of a balanced and well informed public opinion on international problems.”39

In summary, Carrʼs approach was a critical Realist paradigm concerned primarily with undermining domestic State propaganda and academic complicity. The result would be a more informed public opinion and a lifting of the ignorance that had served as the motivation for the disciplineʼs creation. Having outlined some key elements of Carrʼs thought, I will now assess the Classical Realist approach, which superseded Carrʼs Realism and came to dominate the discipline in the middle of the twentieth century.

36

Carr, EH. ʻConditions of Peaceʼ, Macmillan, London, 1943. p.21 ibid, p.26 38 Carr, EH, 1948 p.93 39 Carr, EH. ʻPublic Opinion as a Safeguard to Peaceʼ, International Affairs Vol. 15, No.6, 1936. pp.848 37

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Hans Morgenthau and Classical Realism

Following Carr, the US based émigré Hans Joachim Morgenthau became the most important contributor to Realist IR scholarship. Morgenthauʼs Classical Realist theory and approach are outlined in his Politics Among Nations, which subsequently became an early textbook for the discipline. Borrowing from Carr, Morgenthau took the power-seeking State as the main object of focus in International Relations. However, crucially, conflict for Morgenthau is not the result of a ʻhave-have notsʼ dynamic among States but instead stems from manʼs intrinsically evil human nature and his innate lust for power.40 The world as we know it is therefore a direct result of these characteristics.41 Rather effectively, this assumption removes the opportunity for critique of powerful nations that was inherent within Carrʼs ʻunequal Statesʼ dynamic. As will be shown, a large proportion of Morgenthauʼs work is essentially an apologia for powerful States, particularly the US. The Realism of the kind advocated by Carr is replaced by a uncritical approach favouring academic compliance with the home-State over a duty to the public.42

For Morgenthau, power comprised “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.”43 In a section titled ʻThe Struggle for the Minds of Men,ʼ he engages the role of propaganda, which, he argues, along with military force and diplomacy, is one of the means through which a State tries to achieve its aims. Morgenthauʼs analysis of propaganda, however, is fundamentally different to that of Carr. The discussion here is on the use of external propaganda, as a weapon of the State against enemies, and is not a 40

Morgenthau, H. ʻPolitics Among Nationsʼ, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1971. p.29-35 Morgenthau, H, 1971 p.3-4, 48 42 Justin Rosenberg has called Politics Among Nations, a “diplomats manual to statecraft”. Rosenberg, J. ʻEmpire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relationsʼ, Verso, London, 1994. p.16 43 Morgenthau, H, 1971, p.9 41

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critique but constitutes advice on increasing its efficacy. Examining the reports that US propaganda failed amongst farmers in China, whom they bombed, he observes “the inherent qualities of American ideas in terms of their truth and of the good they contain were extremely relevant for success or failure.” The failure then was a result of “the apparent irrelevance of democratic propaganda in the light of the experiences of the common man.” That is, “the policies the US supported, or seemed to support, made successes in the war of ideas possible.” The bombing itself, or the pretext for it, is not critiqued, but the failure of the propaganda is lamented. In order to rectify such problems he offers advice on how the United States can better achieve itʼs goals. Effective propaganda, he writes, “must determine popular aspirations of those to whom the appeal is made” and “must determine to what extent psychological warfare is capable of supporting political policy.”44 Discussing Korea, the appearance of “white intervention” could be refuted by “subsequent political, military and economic policies, which will establish in the life experiences of the Korean people the anti-imperialistic, democratic objectives of US policy.” Therefore, the immediate answer to the “psychological liability of a given political or military policy” is not propaganda, but “policies that will establish the psychological preconditions for successful propaganda.”45 After mentioning how to make economic and technical aid “fully effective as a weapon of propaganda,” Morgenthau confronts the issue of public opinion at home in the US. Here he advocates the government use the “simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade” which are “useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy.”46 In a similar discussion in his work Truth and Power, Morgenthau expressed the hope that “a future historian...will write the story of the far flung, systematic and largely successful efforts embarked upon by the government to suppress the truth and 44

ibid, p.327 ibid, p.329-330 46 ibid, p.330 45

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bend it to its political interests.”47 Whilst Carr saw the role of the Realism and the scholar as critiquing the States use of propaganda, implicitly aligning the scholar with the public, Morgenthau displays an elitist political philosophy, whereby Realism, and the Realist scholar, become an adviser, not a critic, of the State.

Like Carr, Morgenthau also discussed the role of ideology in State propaganda, but again the difference is noteworthy. Morgenthau sees statesmen cloaking real intentions in ideology as part of the “very nature of politics.”48 This is important, he argues, and a necessary tool of statesmen, because it “is the only way a nation can attain the enthusiasm and willingness to sacrifice without which no foreign policy can pass the ultimate test of strength.”49 This is especially true in the US, he notes, where the weight of American power in international affairs “is to a peculiar degree dependent on the moods of American public opinion.”50 When examining which types of ideology are most efficient, he advises that “peace and international law are eminently qualified to serve” in this respect.51 These are ideologies that can prove particularly effective since “the popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesmanʼs thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil.”52 Walter Lippmann, a contemporary of Morgenthau and influential 20th century political thinker, shared his contempt for public inclusion in politics:

Where mass opinion dominates the government, there is a morbid derangement of the true functions of power. The derangement brings about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis, of the capacity to govern.

47

Morgenthau, H. ʻTruth and Powerʼ, Praeger, London, 1970. p.26 Morgenthau, H, 1971, p.85 49 ibid, p.86 50 ibid, p.130 51 ibid, p.87 52 ibid, p.142 48

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This breakdown in the constituted order is the cause of the precipitate and catastrophic decline of western 53

society.

Unsurprisingly Morgenthau, commenting on this work, found it to be “animated by a noble and moving faith.”54

Whilst Carr declared the scholar should aim to bolster the public knowledge of international affairs, Morgenthau advised statesmen that they must “resist the temptation to sacrifice” what they consider a good policy “upon the alter of public opinion.” Governments must, he continues, come to recognise that “conflict between the requirements of good foreign policy and the preferences of public opinion is in the nature of things.” Furthermore, government “must realise that it is the leader, not the slave, of public opinion; that public opinion is not a static thing to be discovered and classified...but that it is a dynamic ever changing entity to be continuously created and recreated by informed and responsible leadership.” This “moulding,” he contends, is the “historic mission” of the government.55 Regarding the nature of political debate in democratic societies, Morgenthau remarks uncritically that little information and few ideas “unfavorable to the national point of view” are allowed to reach the public. Instead, “with few exceptions, only men and organisations of considerable means and those who hold opinions approved by them can make themselves heard in the arena of public opinion.” These assertions are, he says, “too obvious to require elaboration.”56

53

Lippmann, W. ʻThe Public Philosophy,ʼ Little, Brown and Co, Boston. 1955. p.14-15 Morgenthau, H. ʻDilemmas of Politicsʼ, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958 p.380 55 Morgenthau, H. 1971, p.142 56 ibid, p.254 54

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The notion of the national interest, critiqued by Carr, was a concept on which Morgenthau wrote extensively throughout his academic career. So important did he deem this factor, that in Dilemmas of Politics he argued any theory of international politics should take the concept of ʻnational interestʼ as its primary focus.57 Defining his Realism in Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau assumed that unitary State actors seek interests, defined as power.58 Elsewhere in the same work, he clarifies that the “unitary” State is in reality “the individuals who, when they appear as representatives of their nation on the international scene, wield the power and pursue the policies of their nation” and “it is to them that we refer when we speak in empirical terms of the power and of the foreign policy of a nation.”59 Morgenthau is surely aware of the paradox in his ideas. Human nature, in his theory, is considered to be dominated by a selfish lust for power except, that is, among statesmen who unselfishly pursue the national interest rather than their own. In other works, however, Morgenthau was more revealing in his discussion of these issues. For example, when discussing the legitimacy of the term ʻnational interest,ʼ he conceded that on a sub-national level, there are group interests, particularly “ethnic and economic,” which tend to “identify themselves with the national interest.”60 Mentioning the role of economic interests in foreign policy, he considers it doubtful that these have had an impact on planning except in “a few spectacular cases”. More worrying, he states, is the “peculiar vulnerability of the national interest of the United States to usurpation by the interests of other nations,” most notably “communist subversion.”61 This denial of the plausibility of elite interests effecting policy is confusing in light of later discussion, where he argues “no social action can be completely free of the taint of egotism which, as selfishness, pride or self deception, seeks for the actor more than is his due.” This discussion continues in his work Truth and Power. Here 57

Morgenthau, H. 1958. p.54 Morgenthau, H. 1971. p.8 59 ibid, p.98 60 Morgenthau, H. 1958. p.69 61 ibid, p.69 58

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Morgenthau acknowledged that the gap between what the American government does and what it says it does is “as wide as ever.” A significant factor in influencing what America does, he asserts, is the distribution of power, which has “survived all reform movements.”62 This distribution is characterised by “unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of ruling groups, who possess a near monopoly of the most effective technologies of communication, transportation and welfare.”63 The result then, is that power has shifted to certain “technological elites, military and scientific,” who are not democratically responsible.64 Perhaps most tellingly, Morgenthau reiterated the properties of the national interest in an article in the liberal journal New Republic. The national interest, he says, is not defined by a man or political party but “imposes itself as an objective datum upon all men applying their rational faculties to the conduct of foreign policy.” However, he later notes that the “concentrations of private power which have actually governed America since the civil war” had “preserved their hold on the levers of political decision.”65

The preceding discussion has shown that whilst Morgenthau was aware the ʻnational interestʼ was a largely deceptive term, he chose not to acknowledge this in his theory outlined in Politics Among Nations. As we have seen, an excavation of a number of his works is needed to determine his views. If acknowledged, the implications for any discussion of national interest are profound. Given his own remarks, if Morgenthau were to have faithfully transplanted these ideas into his theory it would not be radical to replace the term ʻnational interestʼ with ʻclass interest.ʼ However, his decision not to include this critical aspect may be largely due to what Morgenthau saw as the role of IR theory and the discipline as a whole. 62

Morgenthau, H. 1970. p.4 ibid, p.7 64 ibid, p.215 65 Morgenthau, H. cited in Chomsky, N. Otero, CP. ʻEducation and Democracy,ʼ Routledge, London 2003 p.147 63

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Theory, he says, must “bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomenon.”66 A better understanding of this phenomenon can put the scholar “in the position of the statesmen” to “determine what rational options are when faced with a problem.”67 Taking into account Morgenthauʼs approach outlined earlier, it is unsurprising whose statesmen he is referring to. Clarifying his allegiance, he writes:

Since in the world the US holds a position of predominant power, and hence of foremost responsibility, the understanding of the forces that mold international politics and of the factors that determine its course has become for the United States more than an interesting intellectual occupation. It has become a vital 68

necessity.

Similarly, when listing questions regarding which kind of weapons/soldiers are useful where and when, Morgenthau follows with the statement: “Upon the quality of the answers we [scholars] give to these and similar questions today will depend the future power of the US in relation to other nations.”69 He also implores academics to discover what the industrialisation of Brazil, China and India will signify for the military strength of these countries; to attempt to rank the worldʼs nations in terms of power; and ultimately, the “supreme intellectual achievement” would be “detecting under the surface of present power relations the germinal developments of the future.”70 For Morgenthau then, IR should be inextricably linked to the home-government, for whom the academic then becomes a military adviser or strategy analyst concerned with prediction as opposed to critique.

66

Morgenthau, H. 1971. p.3 ibid, p.5 68 ibid, p.21 69 ibid, p.118 70 ibid, p.146-153 67

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Given this allegiance to the State, Morgenthau deemed it important to, in terms of theory, justify government behaviour. For example, when analysing military foreign policy in Politics Among Nations, he argues policies that seek to maintain the status-quo cannot be imperialistic, whereas actions intended to increase a Stateʼs power invariably are.71 This is an exceptionally biased conclusion that largely exonerates the powerful nations from accusations of imperialism; unsurprising perhaps given Morgenthauʼs earlier statement of allegiance to the US. Moreover, he argues that a policy of prestige (a display of power through violence) is an indispensable element of “rational foreign policy.”72 Therefore, the United States can use its power to violently impress the notion upon Latin America that it is an “unchallengeable force in the region” and this would not be constituted as imperialistic because the US is only trying to maintain the status quo; a state of affairs that has already acquired a “a certain moral legitimacy.”73 74 Consequently, the cold war itself was a war of prestige, and not imperialism, as the US and USSR sought to “win the support” of the uncommitted nations.75 Morgenthau contends that because of the legitimacy of status-quo non-imperialistic policy, there is no need to use ideology and it can be stated for what it is. The US then, the most powerful State in the world, implicitly has no need for ideology. For the student of IR, he argues later on in the work, “one of the most important and difficult tasks” is to “see through ideological disguises.”76 Given the previous discussion, it is evident that, for students in the US, this does not apply to their own government. Prediction and advice, not critique, become the goals for theorists in IR. Examining the scholar-government relationship, Morgenthau noted that the intellectual can respond to

71

ibid, p.37 ibid, p.77 73 ibid, p.76 74 ibid, p.86 75 ibid, p.77 76 ibid, p.93 72

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ʻpowerʼ (government) in four ways; retreat to the ivory tower, prophetic confrontation (confront those in power), give expert advice to the government or surrender.77 The option of informing the public is not mentioned.

The contrast in approach between Carr and Morgenthau is, as we have seen, significant. Morgenthau, although aware of the same issues as Carr, adopted a uncritical Stateserving approach to IR and conveyed a contempt for public opinion and democracy. Considering Realism in this new form came to dominate IR, this transformation has had widespread implications for Realism and the discipline itself. Regardless, the two scholars are considered part of the same Realist paradigm, although Morgenthau is more widely considered the “founding father of the discipline.”78 After Classical Realism, the most contemporary version of Realist theory is typified by the work of Kenneth Waltz and his structural or ʻNeoRealistʼ approach. Therefore, this will be the focus of the next section.

77

Morgenthau, H. 1970. p.15 Hoffmann, S. ʻAn American Social Science: International Relationsʼ in Hoffmann, S. ʻJanus and Minerva: Essays in the theory and practice of international politicsʼ Westview Press, London 1987 p.6 78

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Kenneth Waltz and NeoRealism

Kenneth Waltz, in his Theory of International Politics, attempted to create a structural/systemic theory of international politics and in doing so initiated the ʻNeoRealistʼ school of thought in IR. Waltz argued that a theory concerned with the structure of the international system is necessary because the condition of international politics cannot be inferred by analysing the internal composition of States; theories which do this he considered “reductionist.”79 Whereas Morgenthau stressed the importance of the inherent evil of man, Waltz departs from this fundamental assumption and contends that the nature of international politics instead be attributed to the systemʼs anarchical structure; that is, the lack of international government. As with Morgenthau, this assumption largely exonerates powerful nations from any accusations of responsibility for the violent nature of international affairs.

It may be worthwhile briefly outlining the systemic NeoRealist theory of international relations developed by Waltz. The premise for a systemic level of analysis is derived from the observation that throughout history, despite having numerous different compositions of actors with vastly varying characteristics (empires, city states, nation states, tribes etc.) we repeatedly experience the same phenomena (e.g. wars and conflicts). Waltz states “despite changes in attributes of actors, there is repetition and similarity in international outcomes.”80 Hence, he assumes that the causes are systemic; results of constraints exerted by the structure of the system in which States find themselves.81 Within the theory, States are considered to strive at minimum for their survival and at maximum for

79

Waltz, K. ʻTheory of International Politics,ʼ Addison Wesley Publishing Company, London, 1979. p. 64. Waltz, K. 1979 p.63 81 ibid, p.72 80

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world domination, and in doing so engage in ʻself-helpʼ behaviour.82 The ʻnational interestʼ then is a result of a State, having examined its security requirements, trying to meet them.83 Waltz defines ʻpowerʼ as a combination of internal (economic capability and military strength) and external (building alliances or weaken opposing ones) factors. The major assumption of his work, which defines it as systemic, is that “a systems structure acts as a constraint on the systems units.”84 Although he acknowledges internal factors are important in deciding upon action, the systemʼs structure constrains the actions that can or should be followed. He argued that not all States would react to these pressures in the same way, but instead interpret the signals sent to them by the system and behave how they see fit. Nor does he assume that States are rational. Consequently he mitigates for States who read the structure incorrectly by asserting that they will be punished by the system.85 In this way, States that read the signals from the system correctly will benefit, whilst, Waltz argues, those acting against the constraints will not.86 The ʻbalance of powerʼ concept is key to Waltzʼs theory. Importantly, this balance is considered not to be reached intentionally by States; a State can decide to ʻbandwagonʼ behind powerful States or opposed them. Either way, it is assumed that they will unwittingly reach a level of equilibrium. The purpose of the balance of power theory, according to Waltz, is not to say how a State will react to a certain structure, but what it is it will have to react to.87 Waltzʼs theory then, argues that States unwilling to respond to changes in the ʻbalance of powerʼ will inevitably suffer.

82

ibid, p.91 ibid, p.134 84 ibid, p.58 85 ibid, p.118 86 ibid, p.192 87 ibid, p.122 83

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Taking NeoRealism as a normative guide for statesmen, it is evident that they must seek, in the powerful nations, to maintain the status quo; regardless of public opinion. Therefore, State propaganda is condoned in order for statesmen to engage in a ʻbalance of powerʼ game. NeoRealism does not to attempt to change the nature of international politics, but to recommend and justify courses of action within the current framework. It is perhaps to be expected then, that among Western scholarship (i.e the powerful nations in world affairs), Waltzʼs work is considered the most influential book on IR of its generation.88

Where as Morgenthau and Carr discussed States and propaganda, admittedly from different angles, Waltzʼs work, largely because of the systemic focus, has little time for an examination of these issues. He does note, however, that States are the “primary vehicles of ideology” and, regarding the ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries, observes; “International movements were captured by individual nations, adherents to the creed were harnessed to the nationʼs interest, international programs were manipulated by national governments, and ideology became a prop to national policy.”89 The discussion is minimal and not critical. When he does confront these issues, it is in the context of advice for the US government:

The US can justify her actions abroad in either or both of two ways. First, we can exaggerate the Russian or communist threat and overreact to slight dangers. The domino theory is a necessary one if a traditional rational in terms of security is to be offered for periphery military actions. Second, we can act for the good of other people.

88 89

Brown, C. ʻUnderstanding International Relationsʼ, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005. p.45 Waltz, K. 1979 p.173

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Analysing the ʻStateʼ, Waltz assumes it is a unitary actor, largely mitigating discussion regarding the internal distribution of power and influence. However, he confronted the notion of the State as an individual unit in his earlier work, Man, the State and War. There, he acknowledged that “it does violence to the common sense” to think of the State, which is “after all an abstraction and consequently inanimate,” as acting. Regardless, he adopts this assumption because it is considered “an important point for any theory of international relations.”90 As with Morgenthau, the role of the scholar is implicitly to support the home government. Thus, in A Theory of International Politics Waltz devotes a significant proportion of the work to justifying US actions and advising the US government on future policy. Notably, he argues against the emergence of a united Europe, which could align with the USSR, and later devotes a chapter to analysing the US and its ability to manage the world.91 Considering US interventions since World War II, he notes the “US has responded expensively in distant places to wayward events that could hardly effect anyoneʼs fate outside the region.” These “miscalculations” are risky as they can threaten a change in the balance of power. However, he justifies “overreaction” as the “lesser evil because it costs only money and the fighting of limited wars.”92 The millions of deaths as a result of the “overreaction” in Indochina are not mentioned. Referring to Edward W Brookes assessment of the Vietnam War as a “just” effort to secure what is “best for South Vietnam, and most honorable and decent for ourselves,” Waltz adds “he was right.” In light of this, he contends that “States, and especially the major ones, do not act only for their own sakes...they also act for the Worldʼs common good.” The problem however is simply that “the common good is defined by each of them [individual States] for all of us,

90

Waltz, K. ʻMan, the State and Warʼ, Colombia University Press, New York, 1959 p.175 Waltz discussed the three images of focus for a theory of international politics; man, the state and the system. This is considered an important piece of scholarship that laid the foundations for the systemic/structural focus of A Theory of International Politics. 91 Waltz, K. 1979. p.202. Chapter 9 is referred to. 92 ibid, p.172

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and the definitions conflict.”93 The “countries at the top...blend necessary or exaggerated worries about security with concern for the State of the system.” That is, they seek to maintain the status quo. Waltz briefly alludes as to what this has entailed for the US: “In attempting to contrive an international security order, the United States also promoted its economic interests and gave expression to itʼs political aspirations for the world.”94 However, the influence of economic interests on policy is not warranted any further discussion.

Continuing his State-serving philosophy, Waltz writes, “if political outcomes are determined by what States are like, then we must be concerned with, and if necessary do something to change, the internal dispositions of the internationally important ones.”95 This is not, however, self-referential. The quote follows a citation of Morgenthau who was discussing US concern with the domestic situation of Russia.96 This approach was also apparent in Man, the State and War. Mentioning the ideas of Laswell, who argued for the reorientating minds as opposed to governments, Waltz responds: “Would Laswell, if he could have his wish rather change the Soviet system of education or the Soviet system of government?”97 Similarly, quoting Klinebergʼs statement, “we cannot know everything, but the more we know the better,” Waltz interprets we to mean the United States government, asking “are we in a cold war with the Soviet Union because we do not understand communist societies well enough?”98 When he does mention references to introspection

93

ibid, p.205 ibid, p.199 95 ibid, p.62 96 Morgenthau argues that Russia should be more domestically liberal and that American concern with this was not “meddling in the domestic affairs of another country...rather it reflects the recognition that a stable peace, founded on a stable Balance of Power, is predicated on a common moral framework that expresses the commitment of all the nations concerned to certain basic moral principles, of which the preservation of the Balance of Power is one.” Morgenthau, H. ʻDetente: The Balance Sheet,ʼ The New York Times, March 28th 1974. 97 Waltz, K. 1959. p.55 98 ibid, p.55 94

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Waltz is dismissive. For example, he quotes Cottrell who argued, “research can show how structure or other conditions must be altered to deprive presently powerful elites of their ability to choose war, or how some presently existing condition must be altered so that these elites will then choose not to go to war.” Waltzʼs response is that Cottrell “overestimates the efficacy of reason.”99 Later, he condemns as “hopeless” the Liberal objective for a system of social organisation that supports the utility of the people based on public opinion, and not the utility of the minority.100

Aside from Waltz, another notable Realist, Robert Gilpin, in his War and Change in World Politics, addresses the role of the scholar and the discipline. Referring to Carrʼs contention that IR should “seek to establish methods of peaceful change,” he disagrees, stating: “The real test for the peaceful State is to seek a peace that protects and guarantees itʼs vital interests and its concept of international morality.”101 Evidently, the IR academic and theorist should assist in realising this goal for his or her State. Like Waltz and Morgenthau, Gilpin notes uncritically that the behaviour rewarded and punished by the international system will “coincide with the interests of the most powerful members of the social system.”102 Regarding the ʻnational interest,ʼ he acknowledges that fictitious States “have no interests.” Instead, “the objectives and foreign policies of States are determined primarily by the interests of the dominant members or ruling coalitions.” Despite this acknowledgement, Gilpin sees this system as benign, with either “national security and power” or “domestic economic stability ensuring the welfare of the populace” being pursued by statesmen.103

99

ibid, p.75 ibid, p.102-119 101 Gilpin. ʻWar and Change in World Politicsʼ, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1981. p.8 102 ibid, p.9 103 ibid, p.18 100

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John Mearsheimer, an influential theorist, developed offensive-Realism, whereby all States are assumed to seek hegemony, in contrast to Waltzʼs defensive-Realism, where States are considered to act for their own survival.104 Mearsheimer is explicit in his reason for creating the theory, stating, “offensive realism is how States should act.”105 In his conclusion he alludes to his conception of the role of the IR scholar, and IR theory, when he asks “what are the implications of the preceding analysis for future American national security policy?”106 That is, in an arena where every State seeks to rule the world, how should the United States behave? A philosophy for the discipline shared, as we have seen, by other Realists. Also, like earlier Realists, he acknowledges the role of ideology and propaganda in politics, recognising in particular that public discourse in the US is often “couched in the language of liberalism” and that “a discernible gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy.” The reason for this deception is, he argues, because “Americans dislike realpolitik” and, as a result, the pronouncements of policy elites are “heavily flavoured with optimism and moralism.” Again, the discussion is not critical, and the deceiving rhetoric of “policy elites” who “behind closed doors…make national security policy” is benign because they act “according to the dictates of realist logic.”107 Henry Kissinger, a prominent Realist scholar-turned-Statesmen and key architect of Cold War foreign policy in the US, was possibly most forthright in his understanding of the role of the academic adviser or “expert” in society. They should, he writes, at a “high level...elaborate and define the consensus” of those who have a “vested interest in commonly held opinions or assumptions.” His prior discussion is regarding the

104

Hegemony signifies dominance or leadership of one country or social group over others Mearsheimer, J. ʻThe Tragedy of Great Power Politicsʼ, W.W.Norton and Co, London, 2001. p.11 106 ibid, p.401 107 ibid, p.25 105

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interests of political and business elites. It is implicit that it is these interests that “experts” should be elaborating.108

The previous analysis has traced the Realist approach from EH Carr to contemporary thought in the core texts of the school. A number of issues have arisen. First, it is clear that the Realism advocated by Carr was very different, minus assumptions regarding power seeking States, from the later Classical and NeoRealist schools. Second, the purpose of Realism, the scholar and IR, as Carr saw it, has shifted from “unmasking selfish vested interests” to create a better informed public, to supporting, advising and justifying the actions of the home-State. As a consequence, the issues deemed most pressing by Carr at the beginning of the discipline have been widely neglected in the Realist paradigm. Given these developments, the paper will now turn to the contemporary mainstream theoretical paradigms in order to determine the prevalent approach to IR and the extent to which the issues raised by Carr have been addressed.

108

Kissinger, H. “American Foreign Policy”, Widdenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969. p.28

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CHAPTER II The Contemporary Paradigms

The analysis that follows focuses on some of the primary texts within mainstream IR paradigms. This is not meant to be a comprehensive discussion; the body of work is simply to large. But we can look at the core texts of the mainstream schools in order to determine their approach and their purpose for the discipline. After addressing these schools of thought, I will then examine the paradigm to which Carrʼs ideas have been transposed. Liberalism, often presented as the main competitor to Realism, will first be discussed. Thereafter the paper will look at two emerging and influential paradigms, Constructivism and the English School. Finally, moving away from the mainstream, the paper will look at the Critical Theorists whose ideas have become more prominent since the 1980s.109

Liberalism Liberalism in International Relations is a paradigm based on fundamentally different assumptions to Realism. As opposed to the Realists, Liberals see human nature as essentially good, with a human concern for others making progress possible. Bad behaviour is therefore the product of corrupting institutions and social arrangements, which motivate people to act selfishly and harm others. As a result of these assumptions, war is 109

I have taken the reading lists for the paradigms from a range of textbooks (see the bibliography). Although the discussion here leaves out a number of paradigmatic approaches, I have chosen mainly those that are presented as important within the core textbooks. The pattern continuously emerges whereby a substantial amount of space is given to the Realist and Liberal Schools, then follows Constructivism and the English School and thereafter comes Critical and Postmodernist approaches. It is debatable whether this ordering or level of attention is justified, but importantly it is largely presented to the student of IR in this way, and hence, in such a short paper, these will be the areas of focus. I also realise that many critical approaches exist within theories of International Political Economy (dependency theory, world systems theory etc,) but my discussion is concerned predominantly with mainstream IR paradigms.

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not considered inevitable but can be overcome by collective action.110 With its emphasis on individual rights, private property and representative government, Liberalism is essentially a domestic theory.111 However, as with Realism, contemporary Liberalism has ʻinternationalisedʼ and developed a ʻneoʼ variant that focuses on the structure of the international system. The structural approach developed by NeoLiberal theorists accepts the core assumptions of NeoRealism, but differs regarding the ability of States to cooperate and the role of international organisations. The result has been a profound convergence between the two approaches. Baldwin, identifying the similarities, has shown that in the six areas where the schools differ, the divergence is largely a question of the amount of importance the theories attribute to these factors. The most prominent issue being whether States cooperate under absolute or relative gains.112 NeoLiberalism then, has emerged as a uncritical, status quo approach differing only superficially from NeoRealism. Despite their fundamentally different assumptions to Realists regarding human nature, it is significant that Liberals would choose the same approach to IR theory. Moreover, it is evident that NeoLiberals share a State-facing purpose for the discipline with the Realists. Robert Keohane, a prominent NeoLiberal whose After Hegemony is considered the archetypal work of the school, has argued that theory is “useful” because it could, for example, have better guided US foreign policy in the 1950ʼs.113 Implicitly in this sentence, but also throughout his work, he expresses the belief that a ʻgoodʼ IR theory could appeal to the statesmen and “change the premises” of US policy. The record so far,

110

Kegley, C. ʻControversies in International Relations Theoryʼ St Martins Press, New York 1995. p.4 Doyle, M. ʻWays of War and Peaceʼ Norton and Company, London, 1997. p.208 112 Baldwin, D. ʻNeoLiberalism, NeoRealism and World Politicsʼ in Baldwin, D. ed. ʻNeoRealism and NeoLiberalism: The Contemporary Debate” Columbia University Press, New York, 1993. p.4-8 The areas are anarchy, International co-operation, priority of State goals, intentions vs capabilities, institutions and regimes, and relative or absolute gains. In each case, he notes, the difference is the assumed relative influence or importance of each of the factors. Grieco also discusses the relative-absolute discussion in his ʻAnarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Internationalismʼ included in Baldwinʼs book. 113 Keohane, R. 1986. p.3 111

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he contends, is due to the “limitations of Realist assumptions.”114 (This belief that Governments are readily receptive to ʻbetterʼ theories will be discussed in more detail later in the paper). Regarding the problems raised by Carr, these are discussed briefly in Keohaneʼs influential collaboration with Joseph Nye. The authors mention the role of elite interests, which are “dressed up with the cloak called national interests.” However, their brief discussion is in a section titled “Limits of Systemic Explanations,” i.e. issues outside the remit of the NeoLiberal approach.115

Away from the ʻNeoʼ school, Immanuel Kantʼs ʻdemocratic peace,ʼ based on the assumption that democracies do not go to war with each other, has been the subject of a significant amount of Liberal scholarship. Although works focusing on these areas have the opportunity to discuss and try to improve the extent or nature of democracy enjoyed, such efforts are rarely forthcoming. David Held, who is prominent in this area, in his Democracy and the New International Order, accepts that “liberal representative democracy” has certain problems, including the “connection between the spheres of public and private” and “connections between public authority and economic power.”116 No more discussion is afforded these issues and instead a highly normative cosmopolitan democracy model, “a system of governance which arises from and is adapted to the diverse conditions and interconnections of different peoples and nations,” is outlined.117 Similarly Russett, one of the most important contributors to the debate regarding the democratic peace, uses his work to largely exonerate State violence in the name of good theory. At the beginning of his work, he equates “democracy” with “polyarchy;” the latter meaning literally ʻrule by the manyʼ in a representative democracy with substantial interest114

Keohane, R. Nye, J. ʻPower and Interdependenceʼ Longman, New York, 2001. p.viii ibid, p.135 116 Held, D. ʻDemocracy and the New International Orderʼ in Archibugi, D. Held, D. eds. ʻCosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Orderʼ Polity Press, Oxford 1995 p.97-98 117 ibid, p.106 115

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group influence on government.118 Thereafter he is content to use the terms interchangeably. A discussion of whether in a polyarchy, with its concentrated sectors of power, the public opinion could be influenced is not forthcoming. There is also a refusal to engage with a discussion of whether propaganda plays a role in these societies. Russett contends that in “democracies, the constraints of checks and balances, division of power, and need for public debate to enlist widespread support will slow decisions to use large scale violence and reduce the likelihood that such decisions will be made.”119 This is not the case, he continues, with leaders of non-democratic States who are not constrained to this effect. In the course of his study, Russett notes that democratic States frequently go to war with non-democratic States. Attempting to exonerate the “democracies,” he argues that because non-democratic leaders are not constrained by the public and can resort to violence more easily, they are likely to demand heavier concessions from those governments that are constrained. In this case, large-scale violence may be initiated by the democratic society in order to prevent them having to make such concessions.120 He goes on to analyse whether US intervention in Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Brazil, Chile and Nicaragua, where the leaders were democratically elected, could refute the democratic peace thesis. He argues they donʼt, because all of these countries were ʻanocraciesʼ at the time.121 This is a statement rather at odds with the historical record, but is one that serves to further ʻproveʼ the democratic peace thesis.122 He also argues “American officials might believe they were defending at least the chances for democracy” in these countries, despite later noting “where governments were overthrown the replacements were less democratic than their predecessors” with the caveat “though that 118

Russett, B. ʻGrasping the Democratic Peaceʼ Princeton, University Press, New Jersey 1993. p.14 ʻPolyarchyʼ definition in McLean, I. McMillan, A. ʻThe Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politicsʼ Oxford University Press 2003 119 ibid, p.40 120 ibid, p.40 121 ibid, p.121, p.122 122 ibid, p.24

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was not necessarily the US intention.”123 At the beginning of his work Russett advises that the “rich countries,” post Cold War, should push for democracy and “free markets.”124 Only at the end of his analysis does Russett concede that “a misunderstanding of the democratic peace could encourage war making against authoritarian regimes.” He could have added ʻrepresent a suitable pretext.ʼ Other Liberals have adopted similar status-quo, uncritical approaches. John Ikenberry, for example, studying US hegemony contends it has contributed to a liberal world order that has made the world more stable. He concludes that “US hegemony is fundamentally reluctant, penetrated and highly institutionalised - or in a word, liberal.”125

Outside of the mainstream scholarship within the Liberal paradigm there have been some efforts to address the issues being discussed here. This group of scholars, who challenge the assumption that the international arena and its institutions are essentially liberal i.e. they are critical of the international order, are labelled “radicals.”126 Freund and Rittberger, for example, echo Carrʼs discussion of elites when they argue “political leaders seek power and want to remain in power, while societal actors pursue - above all - economic interests.” Responsive governments will consequently “pursue foreign policy in accordance with the economic interests of domestic actors.”127 Andrew Moravcsik has, since the late 1990ʼs, attempted to develop a theory in this mould, whereby the key variable is “the mode of domestic political representation, which determines whose social preferences are

123

ibid, p.123 ibid, introduction. 125 Ikenberry, J. ʻLiberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Orderʼ in Paul, T.V. and Hall, J.A. ʻInternational Order and the Future of World Politicsʼ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. p.139 126 Dunne, T. ʻLiberalismʼ in Baylis, J. Smith, S. ʻThe Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relationsʼ, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006. p.197 127 Freund and Rittberger quoted in Dunne, T. Kurki, M. Smith S. ʻInternational Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity,ʼ Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007 p.99 124

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institutionally privileged.”128 Burnheim, also concerned with these issues, has called for a more democratic system where “functional authorities should be directly accountable to the communities and citizens whose interests are directly affected by their actions.”129

It is an inditement of the political philosophy of mainstream IR that these views are considered “radical”; particularly in the Liberal school with its emphasis (or stated emphasis) on the corrupting nature of institutions.130 Liberals, who advocate representative governments, would be assumed to be the most concerned with making States more democratic, i.e. the public better informed, but this has not been the case in the mainstream. Burchill has noted “the purpose of theoretical enquiry is to find ways of making international politics more pacific and just.”131 However, in the main, Liberal scholars have attempted to make international politics seem more pacific and just.132

128

Moravcsik, A. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, International Organization 51, 4, Autumn 1997 p. 530 129 Burnheim quoted in Held, D. McGrew, A. “The Global Transformations Reader” Polity Press, Oxford, 2000. p.411 130 Dunne (see note 126) actually takes the discussion of these “radical” values to the level of absurdity when he contends this group of scholars would like to “turn back the clock of globalization to an era in which local producers cooperated to produce socially responsible food in the day and wove baskets or watched street theatre in the evening”. The implicit assumption is that a call for more democratic institutions is a call for societal regression. A discussion of the role of elite economic interests is not as ʻradicalʼ as Dunne seems to think. Possibly the most well known classical liberal figure, Adam Smith, observed that in foreign and domestic affairs it would be the “merchants and manufacturers” whose interests the State would attend to. Smith, A. ʻAn enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nationsʼ 1976 Book IV p.180 131 Burchill, S. in the introduction to Burchill, S. Devetak, R. Linklater, A. Paterson, M. Reus-Smit, C. True, J. ʻTheories of International Relations,ʼ Palgrave Macmillan, London 2005 p.18 132 Dunneʼs chapter on Liberalism in Baylis and Smith is particularly confused. He consistently mixes moral, economic, and political liberalism. Likewise, ignoring Carr, those who profess Liberal values are consequently considered Liberal, regardless of the evidence. Possibly the most recurrent example of Liberals, and IR scholars in general, not heeding Carrʼs advice are the discussions of Woodrow Wilson (who was targeted by Carr to much Liberal furore at the time, particularly David Davies who inaugurated the Woodrow Wilson Chair at the University of Aberystwyth). Wilson is consistently referred to as “a liberal visionary,” the epitomy of “State centred Liberalism” (to take a few examples from the bibliography) etc. However, under Wilson the US invaded Mexico, Haiti (overthrowing the parliamentary system), Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. His secretary of State praised him for opening the “doors of all the weaker countries to an invasion of American capital and American enterprise.” Wilson himself had stated “concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of State, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process...the doors of the nations which are closed must be battered down.” He supported the “righteous conquest of foreign markets” because “our domestic markets no longer suffice, we need foreign markets.” Number 5 of his fourteen points requests “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal

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Possibly, as Keohane has stated, the hope is that these theories will convince governments to act differently. In contrast, Kenneth Waltz, in his critique of Liberalism, has argued, echoing Carr, that the “peace and justice which liberals claim is spreading beyond the central core, will be defined to the interests of the powerful.”133

My intention here has been to show the uncritical nature of mainstream Liberal thought in IR, as well as outline the approach that has been taken in order to progress towards a more “pacific and just” world. In the main, Liberals have focused on stressing the liberal aspects of the world system in the hope that Statesmen will see their mistakes and act differently. Similarly, Liberalism has been marked by highly normative discussions that recommend future arrangements for the international system. As we have seen, those who do question the liberal nature of the system or shift the focus to a critical analysis are marginalised as ʻradicals.ʼ

Constructivism and The English School Much like mainstream Liberalism, scholars of the English and Constructivist schools have adopted a predominantly uncritical approach to International Relations. Both paradigms emphasise the roles of norms, rules and institutions to a greater extent than the Realists and Liberals. Hedley Bullʼs The Anarchical Society is considered the masterwork of the English School.134 The book is an “enquiry into the nature of order in world politics” which accepts Waltzʼs anarchy framework with autonomous self-helping States but focuses as well on the extent to which ʻsocietyʼ exists in varying systems (bi-, multi- or uni-polar) of

weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” As stated earlier, the discrepancy has gone largely unnoticed in IR scholarship, and Wilson is everywhere a ʻLiberal.ʼ See Zinn, H. ʻA Peopleʼs History of the United States: The Twentieth Century,ʼ Harper Perennial, New York 2003 p81. 133 Waltz cited in Burchill, S. ʻLiberalismʼ in Burchill, S. Devetak, R. Linklater, A. Paterson, M. Reus-Smit, C. True, J. 2005 p.35 134 Brown, C. 2005 p.51

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world order.135 Like Waltz, Bull takes the State as a unitary actor without investigation into internal distributions of power. There is also a clear refusal to critique State propaganda in the way Carr advocated. Bull argues, for example, that modern States only go to war for security reasons, which can include “the making safe of governments abroad with congenial ideologies.” As Carr discussed 40 years before, security is almost universally the rhetoric of all State violence, but Bull is willing to accept it as a reason for violent action without further analysis.136 In this uncritical approach, as with the Liberals, the hope of Bullʼs theory is implicitly that a modification of Waltzʼs work to include discussions of ʻsocietyʼ, which it must be tacitly assumed is the most pressing issue at the present time, will help to prevent ignorance that leads to war.

Somewhat similarly to the English School, the aim of the Constructivists is to draw attention to the ways in which actors in world politics are socially constructed. In this respect, they see the Realist and Liberal theories as being “under socialized.”137 Essentially, it is an ontological disagreement that separates the Constructivists from these other schools. Alexander Wendt, in his Social Theory of International Politics, takes a systemic approach similar to Waltz, but he sees the structure of the international system as a distribution of “ideas” as opposed to power-seeking States. Consequently, an idealist ontology, as opposed to materialist with Waltz, is adopted.138 Wendt also makes the assumption that States “really are agents” as opposed to “useful fictions or metaphors.” The reason he does this is because decision makers routinely speak in terms of “national interest,” “needs,” “responsibilities,” and “rationality” and it is “through this talk that States

135

Bull, H. “The Anarchical Society”, Palgrave, London, 1977. Intro and p.4 ibid, p.189 Bull displays a similar allegiance to the Realists; when listing countries he considers to have resorted to war simply to spread an ideology, his list is wholly comprised of enemies of the West: Soviet Union, China, Cuba, United Arab Republic and Algeria. 137 Wendt, A. ʻA Social Theory of International Politicsʼ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999. p.4 138 ibid, p.5-6 136

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constitute themselves and others as agents.”139 As a result, Wendtʼs theory is highly abstract, by his own admission, and consequently critical only in terms of ontological differences, and not in terms of approach.140 In a paper titled What is International Relations For? Wendt outlined his purpose for the discipline. The overall aim for the scholar, he argues, is to develop a science for the “purposive control over the constitutional evolution of the world system.” If the world is going to develop a “constitutive order (i.e. the UN, EU, WTO, NATO etc),” Wendt says, “It makes sense to think skeptically about how we might direct this process.”141 He therefore advocates the “steering” of this constitutive order by academics who must attempt to influence States, and not civil society, because this is a better way of “getting things done.”142 The scholar of IR, he continues, should try to “create expectations in the same way that advertisers create tastes.”143 Whether this “steering” could be misused, or whether it should be more democratically decided upon, are issues not confronted.

Analysing the assumptions of the two main texts in these schools is by no means a fair reflection of the broad scope of thought which these paradigms engender.144 However, my aim has been to show the core assumptions, level of focus of the schools and their differences from the Liberal and Realist approaches. As we have seen, both have chosen a structural/systemic theory that aims to place more attention on ideas, norms, institutions and their socially constructed nature. Consequently, the same issues raised with the NeoLiberal and NeoRealist position apply here; namely, a focus which moves away from 139

ibid, p.10 Wendt admits the approach is abstract, but elsewhere has contended that he is a critical theorist because he differs from Realists in this way. I disagree with this, as a critique of a predominant ontology does not constitute a critical theory in my opinion. 141 Wendt, A. ʻWhat is International Relations For?ʼ in Jones, R. ed. 2001. p.207 142 ibid, p.215 143 ibid, p.222 144 Also, as Brown has noted, these are two schools which prove notoriously hard to pin down. Brown, C. 2005 p.48 140

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the State allows far less space for a critical analysis of internal distributions of power and influence. The aim of these schools then, is to bring different ontological and epistemological factors to the forefront of IR theory. What is implied is an understanding of these factors can lead us to better understand the international system and consequently find ways to alleviate the most pressing international problems.

Critical Theory It is perhaps unsurprising that those scholars most closely linked to Carrʼs critical approach should now work within a paradigm loosely termed ʻCritical Theory.ʼ Away from the mainstream, this Marxist influenced body of work represents a diverse range of thought that aims for a “restructuring of social and political theory,” which challenges the mainstream approaches and proposes alternatives.145 As Robert Cox famously asserted, Critical Theory, which envisages the possibilities of structural transformation, is different from mainstream “problem-solving theories” where the permanence of existing structures is tacitly assumed and not challenged. 146 Problem solving theories, he argued, serve “particular national, sectional or class interests which are comfortable within the given order.”147 For critical theorists then, the aim is to “produce an analysis of society that aims, eventually, to facilitate and support a process of emancipatory social transformation.”148

It is within this broad school that the critiques of Realism and Liberalism that I have outlined, as well as the role of elites and the implications of domestic propaganda in society raised by Carr, have been most comprehensively discussed. The Critical Theorists

145

Brown, C. “Critical Theory and Post-Modernism in International Relations” in Groom, AJR. “Contemporary International Relations”, Pinter Publishers, London, 1994. p.58 146 Cox, R. ʻApproaches to World Orderʼ, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. p.53 147 Cox, R. ʻSocial Forces, States and World Orders,ʼ in Keohane, R. ed. 1986 p.209 148 Jones, R. 2001. p.67

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are often separated into four groups; NeoGramscians, the Frankfurt School, PostModernists and Feminists. All have developed different approaches to combating the problems of the mainstream. However, it is among the NeoGramscians, and particularly the work of Robert Cox, that, since the 1980ʼs, Carrʼs approach has been most faithfully adopted.149

Cox has articulated and developed the ideas of Antonio Gramsci who, whilst imprisoned in fascist Italy, analysed the subservience of intellectuals to State power. Gramsci noted disapprovingly, “The role of the intellectual is to represent the ideas that constitute the terrain where hegemony is exercised.” They must therefore supply intellectual and moral support for the domestic hegemonʼs dominant political role to the point that “what is politics to the productive class becomes rationality to the intellectual class.”150 Bringing these ideas into the contemporary debate, Cox has argued that we cannot accept the notion of ʻnational interestʼ unless we account for the “way in which dominant groups in the State have been able, through concessions to the claims of subordinate groups, to evolve a broadly accepted mode of thinking about general or national interests.”151 The similarity here with Carr is particularly evident. Observing these problems, Coxʼs remedy is to propose an alternative theoretical perspective and to develop a historical materialist theory, in the Marxist tradition, that tries to “find the connections between the mental 149

It should be noted that the Post-Modernists have raised some of the points regarding realism that I discussed in chapter I. In particular, Richard Ashleyʼs critique of NeoRealism is, in my opinion, the most comprehensive discussion of the problems inherent in Waltzʼs approach. However, I have not included the Post-Modernists because theirs is largely an ontological and epistemological challenge to the mainstream approaches, bringing in discussions of discourse, the “other” in international relations, semiotics, genealogy and “inter-textualism” and other ideas. Furthermore, I am unable to comprehend or see the purpose and/or aim for a large body of the work. Fortunately I am not alone. Fred Halliday for example, discussing the Postmodern approach and its language has referred to it as largely “meta-babble.” A position with which I agree. Kenneth Waltz, in his reply to Ashleyʼs critique of NeoRealism is unable to respond fully because he cannot understand the points Ashley is making. As Waltz then argues, the extremely convoluted language of the Postmodernists only adds to the elitist discourse for which the social sciences are justifiably criticised. I think this is a sensible point to make. 150 Gramsci, A. cited by Augelli, E. and Murphy, C. in Gill, S. “Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations”, Cambridge, 1993. p.131 151 Cox, R.1996. p.56

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schema through which people conceive action and the material world which constrains both what people can do and how they think about doing it.”152

The NeoGramscians raise many of the issues that Carr saw as problematic. However it should be noted that Cox is saying, albeit in a more complex way, ideas that had been articulated just as clearly within the discipline almost half a century earlier.153 Furthermore, and possibly a cause for concern, Cox has attempted to internationalise these ideas as opposed to analysing the extent to which dominant groups in the State (the ʻhistoric blocʼ in Gramscian terms) might influence domestic factors which determine the ability to resort to violent international action. In this respect, it is somewhat of a departure from Carrʼs discussion of the role the State plays in influencing domestic opinion.

Having briefly reviewed the mainstream IR paradigms, it has been illustrated that Carrʼs critical approach has been pushed to the periphery of the discipline and is now addressed mainly by the ʻradicalʼ Liberals and a certain section of the Critical Theorists. In the mainstream, an uncritical approach prevails, where the IR theorist is devoted to advising and appealing to the home-State for ʻbetterʼ policy; a purpose for the discipline markedly different from that imagined at itʼs inception. Much like the work above, Craig Murphy has traced the history of Critical Theory and what he calls “the democratic impulse in IR”; that is, the desire for a more democratic and informed society. Noting the removal of Carrʼs critical approach by Morgenthau and later Waltz, he found that the primary challenge to this “uncritical” Realism came from writers who have not come to be considered part of the “canonical tradition of International Relations.” These were largely authors who presented an alternative and more critical view of US foreign policy, including Noam Chomsky, 152 153

Cox, R. in Keohane, R. 1986 p.242 See Carrʼs sentence at footnote no.31

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Michael Harrington, William Appleman Williams and Walter Lefeber.154 In particular Murphy cites Anatol Rapoport who argued that intellectuals should aim at a “critical enlightenment” in “areas where obsolete thinking and habits and vested interests perpetuate superstitions that stand in the way of removing a very real threat to civilization.”155 Why those writers who challenge the mainstream approaches should be excluded from the “canonical tradition,” and why Carrʼs ideas should have moved from the mainstream to the ʻradicalʼ end of the discipline, will be the subject of the next chapter.

154 155

Murphy, C. in Jones, R. 2001 p.67 Rapoport, A. cited in ibid, p.72

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CHAPTER III The Purpose of International Relations

Analysing the mainstream IR paradigms it has become evident that the aim of creating a better-informed public, advocated by Carr and the disciplineʼs founders, has been replaced by an obligation to the government; consistently seen as the proper outlet for theoretical ideas. Furthermore, mainstream IR theory is now largely an apologia and justification of the status-quo, particularly concerned with providing advice and predictions for the homegovernment. This approach, and the movement of Carrʼs critical thought away from the mainstream, is systematic of a prevalent subservience to the State within the discipline.

Outside of the theoretical paradigms, this subservience is evident in the debates regarding the purpose, aim and future of IR and IR theory. Discussions of this type centre largely on recommended areas of more concentrated study and cases for and against various ontological or epistemological factors.156 The issue of domestic State propaganda is rarely

156

Some of the more prominent examples: Ken Booth, in his contribution, has argued for a return to “Utopian thought.” James Rosenau has advocated more attention be paid to “Collective Mind Theory.” And Fred Halliday has recommended more research into areas such as, amongst others, ecology, migration, communications, demography, transnational communities, historical sociology, gender, social revolutions in the history and formation of the international system, culture, language and the illegal side of globalisation. Regarding theory, David Singer famously raised the level-of-analysis problem in IR, discussing the implications of a chosen “level” of theoretical focus. He compared the relative merits of systemic and Statefocused theory and, concluding, argued for a more structured approach to empirical analysis. Zalewski, in a paper titled ʻAll These Theories Yet The Bodies Keep Piling Upʼ: Theory, Theorists, Theorising, has the opportunity to critique the role of mainstream contemporary theory but instead argues for more attention to be paid to feminist and post-modernist approaches. Regarding the role of theory, Zalewski concludes, counter intuitively, that comments such as ʻall these theories yet the bodies keep piling upʼ may “foster a back to basics mentality which implies a retreat to the comfort of theories.” Zalewski, M. ʻʻAll These Theories Yet The Bodies Keep Piling Upʼ: Theory, Theorists, Theorising.ʼ Halliday, F. ʻThe Future of International Relations: Fears and Hopes.ʼ Rosenau, J. ʻProbing Puzzles Persistently: A Desirable but Improbable Future for International Relations Theory.ʼ all in Booth, K. Smith, S. Zalewski, M. ʻInternational Theory: Positivism and Beyondʼ, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996. Singer, D. ʻThe Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, The International System: Theoretical Essays. (Oct., 1961), pp.77-92. Halliday, F. ʻIR in a Post-Hegemonic Worldʼ, International Affairs, Volume 85, Number 1 January 2009. p4446.

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addressed and scholars in the mainstream exhibit a consistent unwillingness to critique the government. Fred Halliday, for example, Professor Emeritus of IR at the London School of Economics, in a recent article titled IR in a post-hegemonic world, examines the state of the discipline. After making recommendations for new areas of concentration, he then discusses “humanitarian intervention,” which was a form of “liberal internationalist action in promotion of human rights and of peace” and a “dominant hope of the 1990s.”157 The military actions of the 1990ʼs, to which Halliday refers, have since undergone significant amounts of scrutiny and analysis, in light of which the pretext of humanitarian intervention, espoused by the US and UK governments, is extremely spurious.158 Ignoring this evidence Halliday exhibits a persistent, and extremely worrying, acceptance of State propaganda and reluctance to question the motives of the home-government.

A discussion regarding the obligations of IR, i.e. to whom the discipline should be responsible, is more rare. When these do arise, scholars frequently exhibit a commitment to the State and reluctance to engage the public. William Wallaceʼs assessment of the relationship between the scholar and the State is particularly instructive. His well-known argument is that the academic has a duty to constructively criticise the government: to, in his words, “speak truth to power.” In their responses to his paper, Ken Booth and Steve Smith both expose the futility of Wallaceʼs argument, stating that governments consistently Booth, K. ʻSecurity in Anarchy; Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,ʼ International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, 1991. 157 Halliday, F. 2009. p.48 158 See Ali, T. “Masters of the Universe: Natos Balkan Crusade”, and Cockburn, A. and St Clair, J. “Imperial Crusades: Iraq, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia” among others. In particular regarding the reasons for the “humanitarian intervention” in Serbia in 1999 see Norris, J. ʻCollision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovoʼ. Norris, a top aide in the clinton administration at the time, confirms that the bombing was undertaken because Serbia was not conforming to US-run neo-liberal economic reforms. This is given added legitimacy in the foreword written by Strobe Talbott, the head of the Pentagon/State Department intelligence Joint Committee during the bombing, where he says that this is the book to read to best understand the thinking in the Clinton administration at the time. Somalia is a similar case, where the US supported the brutal Barre dictatorship throughout the 70ʼs and 80ʼs and then sent troops after the worst of the famine (the pretext for intervention) had passed. Oxfam and Save the Children condemned the military action, but both were pressured to call off these criticisms by the British Government.

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reject views that are not conducive to their own; something both scholars recalled experiencing. Compounding this, they cite empirical evidence that statesmen, once in power, do not change their implicit theories about the world. However, despite these points, neither discusses whether IR should have the public, rather than the government, as its audience.159 Michael Nicholson continued the debate in an article titled Whatʼs the use of International Relations? and exhibited a similar view. He argues that the academic has to decide whom to advise when offering policy advice and this should be based upon an assessment of the best way to achieve the scholarʼs political goals. The choice is then between the home-government, another government (if we “do not like our government” very much), Greenpeace or Amnesty International or, “more lucratively,” Shell or BP. At no point, even when the government is for some reason disliked, are the general public discussed as an appropriate outlet. Nicholson argues that to be engaged in policy in this way is “not merely worthy but also necessary” and being an adviser is “the proper function for an academic.”160 Commenting on Wallaceʼs “speak truth to power” recommendation, he contends this is not enough when addressing selfish political and business elites who will not accept a policy that will inconvenience them. Exhibiting a strict commitment to the State, he suggests the solution for the scholar is to find more congenial ways of influencing power, such as providing “profitable alternatives” to current activities. This is important, he writes, “because we can talk truth to power until the cows come home but it will make little difference if the truth told is uncongenial.” By means of demonstrating his approach, Nicholson advises subsidies be provided to arms companies to encourage them to shift

159

Wallace, W. “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats”, Booth and Smith reply in Linklater, A. ed. “International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science”, Routledge, London, 2002 Vol 5 p.1975 Booth recommends, fairly cryptically, “showing how various versions of the power/truth relationship operate between civil society and the State.” 160 Nicholson, M. ʻWhatʼs the use of International Relations?ʼ, Review of International Studies, 26, 2000 p.183-185

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away from supporting “unsavory regimes” into “some different forms of production.”161 The other option, not mentioned, would be to expose the role of these arms companies to the public, who, in a democratic society, are in a position to effect government policy. Nicholson goes further, stating that if theorists are unable to offer predictions on which government can base policy we should “stop pretending” and “disband the discipline.” Ignoring the effects of privately concentrated and centralised control of the media, he contends that IR will then become “a careful reading of the newspaper.”162 Following his appraisal, it is implicit that if we have nothing to say to powerful elites, we have nothing to say at all. At no point is there a discussion of the academic being accountable to the public and, consequently, speaking truth about power. Displaying a now familiar elitist philosophy, Nicholsonʼs approach is typical of a rather systematic contempt for the general public amongst IR scholars and a consistent subservience to the State. Recognising this half a century earlier, Martin Wight, commenting on the discipline, observed this “moral poverty,” which, he argued, was due largely to the “intellectual prejudice imposed by the sovereign State.”163

This prejudice and consequent contempt for democracy is seen perhaps most clearly in an important piece of scholarship in practice. Samuel Huntington, former chairman of the department of government at Harvard, one of the most influential post World War II political scientists and a US government adviser, co-authored a report for the Trilateral Commission in 1975 titled The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies. The “crisis,” the report concludes, is that the US has entered a phase of too much or “excessive” democracy that may present a threat to those in power. “Ignorant

161

ibid, p.188 ibid, p.187,191 163 Wight, M. ʻWhy is there no International Theory?ʼ in Wight, M. Butterfield, H. ʻDiplomatic Investigationsʼ George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London 1966 p.20 162

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and meddlesome” outsiders, who should be “spectators” and not “participants,” had begun participating in politics in order to defend their interests. Their involvement in the political process, the report states, represented a departure from the preferential system under President Truman whereby he had “been able to govern the country with the cooperation of a relatively small number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers.” This system was deemed a better “moderation of democracy.”164 This work and itʼs conclusion are worth contrasting with Carrʼs chapter also titled ʻCrisis of Democracy,ʼ discussed earlier, in which the threat is not a democratic public but economic power influencing government. The conclusion of the report is obviously not indicative of all IR academics, but it to some extent shows how, in practice and theory, scholars in the highest echelons of IR academia persist with an undemocratic philosophy of subservience to the State as opposed to the public; a far-cry from the initial role that, it was hoped, the discipline could come to embody.

Stephen Chan, contributing to this debate and displaying a similar contempt for the public, has critiqued the current relationship between scholars and Statesmen. He argues, correctly in my opinion, that academics should not be a “priest class that mediates between rulers and ruled.” However, he contends that critical theorists have been harmed by their inability to communicate their ideas to the public and, thereafter, his discussion descends into an insulting caricature of the general population. He advises scholars who wish to engage with the populace that they “craft a sense of care” using “media accessible, 164

Crozier, M. Huntington, S. Watanuki, J. “The Crisis of Democracy; Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission” New York University Press, New York, 1975. The report is also concerned with rise of “value-orientated intellectuals” who "assert their disgust with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy and with the subservience of democratic government to 'monopoly capitalism'" and who consequently “devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimization of established institutions” including those that are responsible for the “indoctrination of the young.” Control of these institutions should be maintained, the report recommends, by the “responsible men”, “technocratic and policy-orientated intellectuals” who will work within and not challenge the pre-established framework of thought.

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instantly digestible semiotics” (or ʻsoundbitesʼ to the layman). This approach is necessary, he says, because the academic is dealing with “three minute consciousness of abbreviated attentions.”165 Similar issues were discussed over thirty years ago by Stanley Hoffman who, in his critique of IR in the US, noted a number of problems with the discipline. In particular, he warned that IR was tied too closely to government, that academic research and policy-makers priorities had tended to converge, and that there existed a scholarly dependence on the State and “the ambitions of itʼs political elite.”166 Remarking on these points he concluded that IR had come “too close to the fire” and needed to move away from the perspective of the powerful. Hoffmann also evaluated who should be the recipients of academic advice. He observed that the most fruitful, although not in his eyes commendable, approach for the IR scholar was to be an “efficient Machiavellian” and advise the government. These scholars who “advise the prince on how best to manage his power and on how best to promote the national interest,” would inevitably become the well-paid strategists and researchers turned consultants and policy makers.167 Despite these points, when discussing scholars who wish to engage the public (the “populist dream”) he determines this is a “romantic hope” to think that people “can be aroused and led to force the elites that control the levers of action, either out of power altogether or to change their ways.”168 This is clear appeal to scholars not to try and upset

165

Chan, S. ʻCritical Theory, Praxis and Postmodernismʼ, in Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. “Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy Making: National Perspectives on Academics and Professionals in International Relations”, Pinter Publishers, London, 1994 p.30-33. Chan advocates this condensing of information into appealing sound-bites because “popular culture in popular society has no difficulty accepting the grafted and glamourous image of Daniel-Day Lewis as the Last of the Mohicans, will purchase Hello! in more prodigious quantities than New Left Review, and conceives of solidarity, humanism and action in terms of Bob Geldofʼs Band-Aid Archetype.” p.32 166 Hoffmann, S. 1987 p.6-13 167 ibid, p.18 168 ibid, p.19 Hoffmann also says that encouraging the population in this way may lead to more problems, specifically it may inspire intelligentsia that want to displace certain elites in developing countries or inspire established elites in the developing world who want to “boost national power against foreign dominance.” The result then is unlikely to be a world of peace and justice but a world of revolutions and news conflicts and inequities.

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the status-quo and not attempt the “romantic hope” of working towards a more democratic society.

Looking briefly at these works, a consistent picture emerges, whereby the State is seen as the appropriate outlet for academic ideas and the public is largely ignored. This prevailing desire to be involved with State policy is evidenced in a study of the academic-statesmen relationship by Girard, Eberwein and Webb. Interviewing IR scholars they found a clear desire for recognition by, and influence on, policy-makers; a desire not reciprocated by the latter. They also noted that theorists in particular were to a large extent reliant on practitioners of foreign policy for information and access; there was a “structural dependence” that “raises problems which might appear insurmountable.” 169 Significantly, their study highlights the inability of academics to influence the policy makerʼs ideas if recommendations were not within a predetermined framework of thought.170 They found that the policy maker, who, they contend, it is naive to think of as politically neutral, “obeys a political, organisational and/or perhaps a personal logic.” Likewise, they argue that IR theorists greatly desire to see their theory accepted and “pass the test of practicality.”171 The result then is a tailoring of ideas to accommodate the views of the policy maker. Or as Michel Girard writes, “international political analysis is haunted by the ambition to become also a theory of practice, that is to say, a theory that allows the behaviour of the actor to be

169

Girard, M. “Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy: Epistemological Problems and Political Realities”, in Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. 1994. p.4 170 One of Keith Webbʼs chapters in the study concerns the relationship in the UK and is particularly enlightening. He observed it was consistently academics who sought to make contact with statesmen (as opposed to the other way around) and, of those in contact, only 7% thought they had any influence on policy outcomes. He also noted that those academics who are sought by statesmen are “perceived to be in the same ball park” in terms of their policy opinions. Despite this, academics exhibited a strong desire to be part of the policy making process. As a side-note, perhaps unsurprisingly, he also found that 67% of direct entrants into the British Foreign Commonwealth Office were from Oxford or Cambridge University. Webb, K. ʻAcademics and Professionals in IR: a British Perceptionʼ in Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. 1994. 171 Girard, M. in Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. 1994. p.10

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followed through.”172 This sentence alone goes a significant way in explaining why mainstream IR theories are status-quo and not critical of the State. Regardless, Girard concludes, possibly because he doesnʼt see any of this as problematic, that “relations between academics and practitioners are thus, without doubt, destined for a brilliant future.”173 Elsewhere in the work, Keith Webb argues that the academic shouldnʼt try to be a policy maker, but should aim to assist the professional with information, sensitization and criticism.174 All of which must, it is now implied, be within a certain framework of preexisting thought on foreign policy issues. Although Girard does not consider this an issue, Richard Flack summarises succinctly the problem of such a relationship;

The experience of the twentieth century has made it obvious that an alliance between intellectuals and power-orientated organisations is problematic. The logic of States and parties requires the subordination of truth to that of organisational maintenance and growth. The organisationally mobilised intellectual is, by definition, not free to set his or her agenda of enquiry, to publish freely his or her knowledge and 175

understanding or to say fully what is on his or her mind.

As Hoffmann observed, there are undoubtedly benefits to being uncritical of the State; employment being a significant reason. It is unlikely that a genuine critic of the government is likely to enter itʼs ranks, or even the “canonical tradition” of IR, or be consulted as an adviser. In addition, links have been created between the State and academia, ʻthink tanksʼ being the main example. If the academic instead engages the population, the links are less prestigious and certainly not as lucrative.176

172

ibid, p.9-10 ibid, p.7 174 Webb, K. ʻAcademics and Practitioners: Power, Knowledge and Roleʼ in Girard, M. in Girard, M. Eberwien, W. Webb, K. 1994. p.23-25 175 Flack, D. ʻMaking History and Making Theory: Notes on How Intellectuals Seek Relevanceʼ, in Lemert, C.C. ed. ʻIntellectuals and Politics: Social Theory in a Changing Worldʼ, Sage, London, 1991. p.9-10 176 In the US, the Council on Foreign Relations and in the UK, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, were created specifically to develop a bridge between academics and the State and to help guide policy. Halliday, 173

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For the theorist, as unlikely as it is in human affairs, a theory that can predict, rather than critique, may go some way to proving the scholars worth to policy-makers within the State. The inability to do this thus far has been a particularly sore spot, especially for IR theorists; who failed to predict the end of the Cold War (a point raised by historian John Lewis Gaddis). That this is lamented is indicative of the desire, in the words of Hoffmann, for a paradigm “masterkey” which will bring “practical recipes” for the government; finally proving the worth of the IR theorist to those in power. An attitude he called a “fascinating sort of national ideology.”177

The implications of this subservient uncritical approach coupled with a prevalent elitist political philosophy cannot be overstated.178 Mainstream scholarship has developed the impression that the functionaries of the State are the only worthwhile audience for their ideas and this is how they can “get things done.” The allegiance of the theorist then shifts from creating a better-informed public to better serving the needs of the government. The aim is to determine what the State should do, as opposed to informing the public of what States are doing. This approach leads, as we have seen, to a movement away from critique into theories that can hopefully be used in practice by statesmen. The most crucial ramifications, however, are in regard to State propaganda. An approach to IR that aligns itself with the government as opposed to the public will neglect critique of the State and itʼs attempts to influence public opinion. In fact, particularly within the Realist paradigm, this practice is largely condoned. Consequently, the role of State propaganda in influencing F. ʻRethinking International Relations,ʼ Macmillan, London 1994 p.8 Murphy, citing Robert McCaughey, has offered the view that critical scholars are comfortable remaining politically detached from the social movements they seek to represent. He also contends that as more opportunities open for these kinds of scholars within the academic institutions, the need to serve as popular intellectuals of social movements fails. Murphy, C. in Jones, R. 2001 p.75 177 Gaddis, J. ʻInternational Relations Theory and the end of the Cold Warʼ International Security, 17, 19921993 p.5-58 and Hoffmann, S. ʻAn American Social Science: International Relationsʼ p.8 178 Mexican economist Victor Urgundi has argued that the predominance of an uncritical culture in IR is similar to the predominance of neo-liberal thought within the Economics discipline; with equally disastrous implications for the poor or politically weak. Cited in Murphy, C. in Jones, R. 2001 p.72

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and misleading the public has been insufficiently addressed within IR. However, the problems are as acute, if not more, than when Carr discussed them in the early twentieth century. A brief look at contemporary military action will illustrate the extent to which reasons for actions are cloaked in ideology and false intentions; the US/UK invasion of Iraq being the most pertinent example. To leave these issues on the periphery on the discipline, and to have neglected them in the mainstream for so long, is to ignore one of the most important contributing factors to war perpetuated by democratic States.

There are also worrying implications for the student of IR. The mainstream uncritical status-quo approaches of Liberalism, Realism, Constructivism and the English School are presented to the student as the most significant. This serves, to borrow Richard Ashleyʼs phrase, to “neuter the critical faculties” of the student. These problems may have farreaching connotations in practice. Michael Banks, in a work titled The International Relations Discipline: Asset or Liability for Conflict Resolution?, observed that many scholars he encountered held status-quo views which meant they were more inclined towards “the partisan manipulation of a conflict than towards it impartial mediation.”179 Therefore, in the climate of State obedience evidenced within contemporary IR paradigms, it is unlikely that these issues will be confronted without significant changes in scholarly allegiance. A discipline that does revert to an allegiance with the public, as opposed to the State, could work in earnest towards alleviating some of the most pressing issues of international affairs. An outcome that seems unlikely under the prevailing approach.

179

Banks, M. ʻThe International Relations Discipline: Asset or Liability for Conflict Resolution?ʼ in Azar, EE. Burtton, JW. eds. ʻInternational Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practiceʼ Wheatsheef Books Ltd. Sussex 1986 p.24

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CONCLUSION This paper has addressed a number of issues. First, the critical approach of EH Carr was outlined. Then the development of ʻRealismʼ into a paradigm significantly different from Carrʼs, in its approach and purpose for the discipline, was evidenced. Thereafter, in chapter II, the mainstream paradigms were discussed and Carrʼs ideas were found to reside most prominently amongst the ʻradicalʼ Liberals and the NeoGramscian Critical Theorists. The result is that the critical approach, as well as a commitment to creating a better informed the public, has moved from the mainstream to the periphery of the discipline. Chapter III discussed why this may be the case, arguing that IR displayed a systematic subservience to the State in terms of theoretical approaches and the aim of the discipline.

Today there remains confusion over the purpose and nature of the discipline itself. In a social science concerned with human affairs, the scholarʼs motive for investigation will affect the approach taken; in Carrʼs words “purpose precedes and conditions thought.”180 Therefore, a substantial amount of thought needs to be placed on why we do International Relations. What are the most pressing issues and how should we best approach them are important discussions that need to take place. Similarly, scholars have to be aware that, in such a politicised discipline, their theory will have implications in a way that does not exist in the natural sciences. Principle questions to ask then are, what are the goals of this approach? And who is it for? The answer to the latter has consistently been “the government.” The implications are profound and harmful for anyone genuinely concerned

180

Carr, E.H. 1948 p.8

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with State violence. The result has been the compromising of theory to fit the needs of statesmen and a neglect of the most pressing and acute problems of the international arena. This prevalent attitude may go some way to explaining why scholars are consistently reluctant to criticise or question their own governments action, and why works of this type are instead left to activists and certain journalists outside of the discipline. Carr, observing the development of the discipline in this way, wrote to a friend “whatever my share is in starting this business [IR], I do not know that I am particularly proud of it.”181

If we are concerned with alleviating the scourge of war, then we must, to quote Michael Banks, “decide what are the most significant questions that our discipline needs to answer, and select from the competing ideas the ones which most pervasively deal with those questions.”182 EH Carr, and Einstein for that matter, thought it was the indoctrination of the population, the use of propaganda and ideology by political and business, and we can add academic, elites to sway the opinions of the masses that was the most pressing issue. IR, instead of confronting these issues, has aligned itself with the political elites. Modern society, with its ever-greater concentrations of centralised power, has only exacerbated these factors, but as we have seen, they have not been significantly addressed within the discipline; for reasons that have been outlined. Instead, the majority of the work has fallen to those outside of IR and its “canonical tradition.” A serious analysis of contemporary military violence perpetrated by liberal democratic States evidences the extent to which political elites continue to hide their actual intentions from the general population; often with the support of academics and the media. IR scholars have the responsibility of addressing these problems and informing the public regarding such issues; to speak truth about power. As we have seen, attempts to advise and influence the government directly 181 182

EH Carr in a letter to Stanley Hoffmann cited in Michael Coxʼs introduction to Carr, EH. 1981 p. xiii Banks, M. in Azar, EE. Burtton, JW. eds. 1986 p.7,23

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will have little effect and constitute largely futile attempts at alleviating international problems that IR is, or should be, concerned with. If the discipline hopes to move towards achieving its originally stated goals of removing ignorance from international affairs, then a dramatic change will be required, not in issues of ontology or epistemology, but in a shift of allegiance from the State to the public, from status-quo to critique. In this way, almost a century after it was first proposed, we can move towards a revival of the “democratic impulse,” to ensure a more informed public opinion on world affairs.

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