The Mugabe Saga

The Mugabe saga Hector C Sikazwe 2008 Newcastle upon Tyne Keywords Land reform, Lancaster agreement, ZANU-PF, Mugabe, Freedom fighters, Economic Sanctions, Political process, African politics

Abstract When Robert Mugabe came to power in 1980, he promised to give white-owned land back to the indigenous black citizens. Yet 20 years on, 4,500 white farmers still owned 70% of the best land. Now after violent clashes, land invasions and legal challenges, many white farmers have left, while others are grimly hanging on. This discourse addresses briefly what happened to Mugabe’s promise, and why land is still the most contentious issue a poverty ridden and yet agriculturally rich Country.

The devil is in the details of the genesis of the interaction between the indigenous black population and the later white settlers who invaded the area. Hit by drought, HIV/AIDS and economic meltdown, Zimbabwe is in the grip of its worst humanitarian crisis since independence. The repeated cholera problem is simply an exacerbation of the situation with one of the world’s startling statistics: (a)

Average life expectancy 42.5 years

(b) Agriculture devastated and in continuous meltdown (c)

World's highest inflation rate standing at world record of 231,000,000%! 1|Page

Twenty years ago the country was hailed as an African success story and dubbed the “breadbasket” of southern Africa. Zimbabwe now has one of the lowest life expectancies in the world, according to the World Health Organization. Farming is the backbone of Zimbabwe's economy, but agriculture has been crippled by the combined effects of drought, HIV/AIDS and controversial government land reforms.

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Introduction

Land is extremely important to an African man, let alone any man that decides to use land as a way of livelihood. This concept is vital whenever Zimbabwean issues are being discussed. If Zimbabwe is viewed in isolation of this concept, Mugabe looks really despotic and evil. This concept was very important to all parties in 1980 that signed the Lancaster House Agreement that led to the transformation of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe. To the world, Mugabe is a tyrant and despot but to the indigenous Zimbabwean veterans, he is a patriot. This paper tries to explain the steps that have led the Zimbabwean situation to be almost unattainable due to the land issue being played down by the mediators. As long as the land issue is ignored, there is no hope for any co-existence of the millions of black people and the minority white farmers.

The land issue has always been emotive in Zimbabwe, as can be seen with the current crisis sparked off by the government seizure of mainly white-owned farms in 2000. Mugabe has always been a nationalist and has always dwelt on specific issues whenever he discusses the future of his Country: “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans”. The major promise that veterans were given after the struggle for independence from the colonial BSA Company, that had previously declared UDI (Unilateral declaration of

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Independence) from British domination was land, was cardinal to the future of the Nation of Zimbabwe.

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Background to Land Issue

When the first white settlers arrived in 1890, the land between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers was populated by the Shona and the Ndebele people, who claimed sovereignty. It is thought the Shona had been there for about 1,000 years. The Ndebele arrived in the 1830s, having migrated north from Natal after falling out with the Zulu King, Shaka. In 1889, the imperialist Cecil Rhodes, who had made a fortune in diamond mining in the Cape, set up the British South Africa Company to explore north of the Limpopo. He had already obtained exclusive mining rights from the Ndebele king, Lobengula, in return for £100 a month, 1,000 rifles, 10,000 rounds of ammunition, and a riverboat. As far as Lobengula was concerned he had not conferred land rights. The first 200 settlers were each promised a 3,000-acre farm and gold claims in return for carving a path through Mashonaland. The Shona were too fragmented to resist and the British flag was raised at Fort Salisbury on 13 September 1890. The name Rhodesia was adopted in 1895. It became the British colony of Southern Rhodesia in 1923.

Three years after the pioneers arrived in Mashonaland, they conquered King Lobengula and his people in neighbouring Matabeleland. Each volunteer in the war was granted 6,000 acres of captured land. Within a year 10,000 square miles around Lobengula’s capital Bulawayo had been marked out. Ndebele villagers who returned were treated as tenants. Most of their cattle were seized and they were forced to work

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on the white farms, a slave-master arrangement that has existed until the struggle for independence started in the 1950s

In Mashonaland, the white settlers imposed a ‘hut tax’ of 10 shillings (50p). Those who could not pay were told to work to earn the money. When the Ndebele and Shona rebelled in 1896, they were put down and their leaders hanged.

This proved

excessively demeaning to the Africans but the white settlers realized that this would later become a vice that they would not be able to cope with. Consequently, as the settlers developed commercial farming, some lands were reserved for African occupation amid fears total dispossession could lead to uprisings.

After 1923,

European immigrants concentrated on developing Rhodesia's rich mineral resources and agricultural potential. The settlers' demand for more land led in 1934 to the passage of the first of a series of land apportionment acts that reserved certain areas for Europeans.

Significantly, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 barred African land ownership outside the reserves, except in a special freehold purchase area. Africans not needed for labour on white farms were removed to the reserves, which became increasingly congested, disease-infested and inhumanely unhygienic.

Following the abrogation of the company's charter in 1923, Southern Rhodesia's white settlements were given the choice of being incorporated into the Union of South Africa or becoming a separate entity within the British Empire. The settlers rejected incorporation, and Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed by the United Kingdom that year. Rhodesia was an internally self-governing colony with its own legislature,

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civil service, armed forces, and police. Although Rhodesia was never administered directly from London, the United Kingdom always retained the right to intervene in the affairs of the colony.

In September 1953, Southern Rhodesia was joined in a multiracial Central African Federation with the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) in an effort to pool resources and markets. Although the federation flourished economically, the African population, who feared they would not be able to achieve self-government with the federal structure dominated by White Southern Rhodesians, opposed it. The federation was dissolved at the end of 1963 after much crisis and turmoil, and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became the independent states of Zambia and Malawi in 1964.

White settlers in Rhodesia decided to maintain full control over the now Harare (then called Salisbury) and decided to declare UDI (unilateral declaration of independence) so that they could continue dominating and controlling land in Zimbabwe. Although prepared to grant independence to Rhodesia, the United Kingdom insisted that the authorities at Salisbury first demonstrate their intention to move toward eventual majority rule. Desiring to keep their dominant position, the white Rhodesians refused to give such assurances. On November 11, 1965, after lengthy and unsuccessful negotiations with the British Government, Prime Minister Smith issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom.

On December 16, 1966, the UN Security Council, for the first time in its history, imposed mandatory economic sanctions on a state. Rhodesia's primary exports

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including ferrochrome and tobacco, were placed on the selective sanctions list, as were shipments of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles, petroleum, and petroleum products to Rhodesia. On May 29, 1968, the Security Council unanimously voted to broaden the sanctions by imposing an almost total embargo on all trade with, investments in, or transfers of funds to Rhodesia and imposed restrictions on air transport to the territory. This was the beginning of sanctions that kept Ian Smith occupied for a long time to come as the African settlers (Mugabe and Nkomo) took to the bush with several leading African farmers that were later framed as “terrorists” whilst fighting for land that legitimately belonged to them.

In the early 1970s, informal attempts at settlement were renewed between the United Kingdom and the Rhodesian administration. Following the April 1974 coup in Portugal and the resulting shifts of power in Mozambique and Angola, pressure on the Smith regime to negotiate a peaceful settlement increased. In addition, sporadic antigovernment guerrilla activity, which began in the late 1960s, increased dramatically after 1972, causing destruction, economic dislocation, casualties, and a slump in white morale. The grounds were now ripe for negotiated redistribution of land that was in the hands of few white settlers.

In 1974, the major African nationalists groups – the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which split away from ZAPU in 1963 were united into the “Patriotic Front” and combined their military forces. In 1976, a combination of embargo-related economic hardships, the pressure of guerilla activity, independence and majority rule in the neighboring former Portuguese territories, and a UK-US diplomatic initiative, the Smith

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government agreed in principle to majority rule and to a meeting in Geneva with Black Nationalist leaders to seek an end to the conflict.

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Lancaster house agreement

When former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979 the situation of Rhodesia had been a central concern of the British government for years. War had raged since the 1960s between the white government led by Ian Smith and liberation fighters led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Mrs Thatcher was persuaded by the then Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington, to make one last push to try to resolve the en-passé. Negotiations between white farmers and the millions of displaced black Zimbabweans proved to be a major challenge for several initiatives that had failed on several occasions. The situation did not promise much prospect of success prior to the Lancaster House because the warring sides were so far apart in position, and in particular Ian Smith had talked about it all for a million times over that it was going to be a very difficult negotiation

Diplomatic efforts from the then Commonwealth Secretary-General Sir Shridath Ramphal, managed to persuade all interested but sulking sides to attend. Lengthy talks immediately got under way in the splendour of Lancaster House, just opposite Buckingham Palace in London. The issues were basic: (a) It was the toughest of issues. Whites - 5% of the population - owned 80% of arable land.

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(b)

95 % of the rest of the population, majority of the Millions being

indigenous black people scratched a living on the rest of the poor infertile land. The above situation was critical for any future discussions on the future of Zimbabwe. Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo found this arrangement unacceptable and cardinally critical. As though to add salt to the wound, when Lord Carrington finally presented the draft constitution at the convention, it contained no reference to the land issue and the African contingent went ballistic. The conference nearly came close to collapse. As Mugabe and Nkomo later observed, this was typical of past discussions from the British government's point of view where the future constitution was always being proposed to preserve the status quo for a minimum of 10 years and then let the Africans take over. They (Nkomo and Mugabe) found this insulting and degrading to the African contingent.

When Mugabe and Nkomo understood the implications, they expressed indignation and threatened to walk out of that meeting. They demanded Lord Carrington to explain this insult as in their perception; the struggle was about land allocation and not necessarily political independence for the struggling African Nation. This volatile situation threatened to introduce the idea that Carrington was literally proposing that the African representatives to sign a constitution which stipulated that they could not redistribute land, and if that was the case they should go back to the bush and take up arms again and the conference would have to break up. Sir Shridath believed the conference was doomed to failure and that Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo would walk out and the civil war would resume. The attendees had to change the method and nature of the conference as more allies were created within very short period of time

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as Mugabe and Nkomo threatened to walk out. Mugabe then stated the famous eloquent words regarding the state and independence of the Nation of Zimbabwe by stating:. “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again. Never shall we retreat!” A secret diplomatic deal was then entered into with the support of the American government to compensate White farmers so that the land could be redistributed amongst the millions of black Zimbabweans. This deal was done secretly between the American then President Jimmy Carter and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

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Time line to destruction

Land reform in Zimbabwe began after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979 in an effort to more equitably distribute land between the historically disenfranchised blacks and the minority-whites who ruled Zimbabwe from 1923 to 1979. The government's land distribution is perhaps the most crucial and the most bitterly contested political issue today and anyone dealing with the Zimbabwean situation needs to have this history in perspective. After the Lancaster House Agreement paved the way for democracy, the first democratic elections were won by Robert Mugabe in late February 1980. The threemonth long Lancaster House conference nearly failed over land issues. However, the British government in conjunction with the American government agreed to fund reform on a willing buyer, willing seller principle, where farmers who were unwilling to stay in Zimbabwe would be bought out by funds provided by the American and British government through a meticulously designed process using the Zimbabwean government.

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Early 1980s In 1981, the British government, under Margaret Thatcher was instrumental in setting up the Zimbabwe conference on reconstruction and development. At that conference, more than £630 million of aid was pledged to the Zimbabwean government to finance the land redistribution program by compensating “willing white farmers” to give up their farmland willingly through a negotiated 10 year program. Within the program, in 1981, the Communal Land Act changed the Tribal Trust Lands into Communal Areas and shifted authority over these lands from traditional rulers to local authorities.

The 1985 Land Acquisition Act, though drawn in the spirit of the 1979 Lancaster House “willing seller, willing buyer” clause (which could not be changed for ten years), gave the government the first right to purchase excess land that white farmers owned for redistribution to the landless millions of black Zimbabweans. However, the Act had a limited impact, largely because the Zimbabwean government did not have the money to compensate landowners as the pledge by the British government to supply the compensation funds were withheld amidst claims that the Zimbabwean government was corrupt and the farms were being given to top ZANU-PF leaders. In addition, white farmers mounted a vigorous opposition to the Act. Because of the "willing seller, willing buyer" clause, the government was powerless in the face of the farmers' resistance. As a result, between 1980 and 1990, only 71,000 families out of a target of 162,000 were resettled. This started proving to become a sticking point between the Zimbabwean government and the British government.

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1992 Due to the volatile relationship that now encompassed the Nation over land reform, the Zimbabwean government enacted the 1992 Land Acquisition Act. The 1992 Act was enacted to speed up the land reform process by removing the "willing seller, willing buyer" clause. The Act empowered the government to buy land compulsorily for redistribution, and a fair compensation was to be paid for land acquired. Landowners could challenge in court the price set by the acquiring authority. Opposition by landowners increased throughout the period from 1992 to 1997

While some land was purchased by the fund, few families were resettled. Instead, hundreds of abandoned and expropriated white farms ended up in the hands of cabinet ministers, senior government officials and wealthy indigenous businessmen. Most British and Americans cut their losses and money, alleging widespread corruption. To date, fewer than 70,000 of the people of Zimbabwe have been resettled, most without the necessary infrastructure to work the huge commercial farms on the 12 hectare plots they have been allocated.

At that time, British contribution in terms of aid to Zimbabwe stood at a half billion pounds since independence. Furthermore, £47 million of that was specifically targeted for land reform, and approximately £100 million was budgetary support which could have been used for land reform.

1997 As part of the implementation of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, the government published a list of 1,471 farmlands ear-marked to buy compulsorily for redistribution.

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The list came out of a nationwide land identification exercise undertaken throughout the year. Landowners were given thirty days (as the 1992 Act demanded) to submit written objections. 1998 In June 1998, the government published its "policy framework" on the Land Reform and Resettlement Program Phase II (LRRP II), which envisaged the compulsory purchase over five years of 50,000 km² from the 112,000 km² owned by commercial farmers (both black and white), public corporations, churches, non-governmental organizations and multi-national companies. Broken down, the 50,000 km² meant that every year between 1998 and 2003, the government intended to purchase 10,000 km² for redistribution.

In September 1998, the government called a donors conference in Harare on land reform (LRRP II); 48 countries and international organizations attended. The objective was to inform the donor community and involve them in the program. The donors unanimously endorsed the land program, saying it was essential for poverty reduction, political stability and economic growth. They particularly appreciated the political imperative and urgency of the land reform, and agreed that the "inception phase" (covering the first 24 months) should start immediately.

1999 The Commercial Farmers Union freely offered to sell the government 15,000 km² for redistribution. Landowners once again dragged their feet. In response to moves by the National Constitutional Assembly, a group of academics, trade unionists and other political activists, the government drafted a new constitution. The draft was discussed

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widely by the public in formal meetings, and amended to include restrictions on presidential powers, limits to the presidential term of office, and an upper age limit of 70 years for presidential candidates. This was not a suitable outcome for the government, so the proposals were amended to remove those clauses and insert a new one to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution without compensation. The drafting stage of the constitution was largely boycotted by the opposition who claimed that Mugabe only wanted a new constitution to entrench himself politically.

2000 The government organized a referendum on the new constitution, despite having a sufficiently large majority in parliament to pass any amendment it wished. Had it been approved, the new constitution would have empowered the government to acquire land compulsorily without compensation. Despite vast support in the media, the new constitution was defeated 55% to 45%. There was wild jubilation by the MDC's local and foreign supporters, prompting "End of Mugabe" headlines in the British and Zimbabwean media. A few days later, the pro-Mugabe War Veterans Association organized like-minded people (not necessarily war veterans, as many of them were too young to have fought in the Liberation War) to march on white-owned farmlands, initially with drums, song and dance. As the "liberation" continued, the seizing began to take on a more aggressive aspect. They claimed to have "seized" the farmlands. A total of 110,000 km² of land was seized.

The referendum result prompted the government to delay the parliamentary elections, so that an intensive voter registration exercise could take place. In the June 13 | P a g e

parliamentary elections, ZANU PF got 48% of the vote (62 seats) and the MDC and ZANU got 52% (58 seats). The composition of the new parliament prevented the government from making further amendments to the constitution without opposition support.

2002 Mugabe defeated Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in presidential elections in March 2002. The incumbents picked Land Reform as the basis of their campaign. The western media labeled the elections as having been rigged and undermined the confidence of the Zimbabwean government. Tension grew between the MDC and the ZANU-PF party as accusations flew left right and center. When the election results were declared, Robert Mugabe immediately decided to live up to the elections pledge he had made to implement land reforms. This meant white farmers who were on land that had been designated as “land to be redistributed” had to be given eviction orders. The eviction orders were nevertheless meant to be contested in a court of law if the compensation package was disputed. Robert Mugabe ordered white farmers defying eviction orders to pack up and leave but said loyal farmers willing to cooperate with his government would not be left completely landless. "All genuine and well meaning white farmers who wish to pursue a farming career as loyal citizens of this country will have land to do so," was Mugabe’s pledge to white farmers. Hundreds of white farmers ignored government orders throwing them off their land waited anxiously for Mugabe's annual Hero's Day address to the nation, marking the guerrilla war that ended white rule more than two decades ago. Mr Mugabe stopped

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short of calling for immediate action against defiant farmers, but vowed that those who "Want another war should think again when they still have time to do so." Mugabe with his specific land redistribution policies declared that no white farmer need go without land but the Zimbabwe government would not allow whites to remain on large properties or own more than one farm while clinging to ties with Britain, the former colonial power whilst the black community thrived on small potions of rejected land in their own country. Defiant ant-British comments were given on National Radio "To those who want to own this country for Britain, the game is up and it is time for them to go where they belong. There is no room for rapacious supremacists," Mugabe declared. Nearly 3,000 white farmers were ordered to leave their land as part of the country's often violent program to seize white–owned farms and give them to blacks. The government targeted 95% of white owned farms for seizure. Several senior government officials warned white farmers they faced arrest and possible imprisonment of up to two years if they continued to defy eviction orders. The government explained that the policy was a mere "fast track" land seizure program that was launched in 2000 as a final effort to correct colonial era imbalances in land ownership.

2004 On July 3, 2004, a report adopted by the African Union executive council, which comprises foreign ministers of the fifty-three member states, criticized the

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government's handling of the election and for the first time, Mugabe was on his back foot to defend the situation. Nationalization of Land became the only alternative to legitimize the government’s actions. Minister for Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement John Nkomo said, on June 5, 2004, that all land, from crop fields to wildlife conservancies, would soon become state property. Farmland deeds would be replaced with 99-year leases, while leases for wildlife conservancies would be limited to 25 years. However, there have since been denials of this policy.

2005 Parliament, dominated by Zanu-PF, passed a constitutional amendment, signed into law on September 12, 2005, that nationalized Zimbabwe's farmland and deprived landowners of the right to challenge in court the government's decision to expropriate their land.

2006 In January 2006, Agriculture Minister Joseph Made said Zimbabwe was considering legislation that would compel commercial banks to finance black peasants who had been allocated formerly white-owned farmland in the land reforms. Banks failing to lend a substantial portion of their income to these farmers would have their licenses withdrawn, Made warned. This proved to be the initial pangs of the economic recession that Zimbabwe now experiences.

The newly resettled peasants had largely failed to secure loans from commercial banks because they did not have title over the land on which they were resettled, and 16 | P a g e

thus could not use it as collateral. With no security of tenure on the farms, banks have been reluctant to extend loans to the new farmers, many of whom do not have much experience in commercial farming, nor assets to provide alternative collateral for any borrowed money.

5.0 International pressure on Zimbabwe Zimbabwe’s economic woes are the direct result of a concerted and systematic campaign to affect regime-change through an economic strangulation. Zimbabwe has a critical shortage of foreign currency. However for the past four years or so, Zimbabwe has been unable to obtain finance or credit facilities from international lenders to inject into the economy. And this is a direct consequence of a sanctions regime imposed against the Zimbabwe by particularly the US, The United Kingdom and the EU nations in particular.

Some believe Mugabe is an evil, brutal, dictator that needs to be removed from office at all cost, even by assassination as hinted by the MDC. It is however immoral to cause the removal of Mugabe from office by precipitating the collapse of a developing, only recently independent, now famine-ravished African country through an economic sanctions regime. Consider the following sanctions that have been implemented in the past decade:

(a)

The US introduced economic sanctions on Zimbabwe through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 2001. (ZIDERA) Through this enactment Zimbabwe’s access to finance and credit facilities was effectively incinerated. ZIDERA empowers the US to use its voting rights and influence

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(as the main donor) in multilateral lending agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank, and the African Development Bank to veto any applications by Zimbabwe for finance, credit facilities, loan rescheduling, and international debt cancellation. The US cites Zimbabwe’s human rights record, political intolerance and absence of rule of law as the main reasons for the imposition of sanctions. The ZIDERA also suggests that if Zimbabwe acts to correct these ills, then the sanctions will be removed and economic support measures are suggested. (b)

Zimbabwe’s ability to reschedule previously obtained loans from the IMF, World Bank etc affected outstanding projects conditions of application of terms of the loans were severely applied. Loan payments and opportunity to apply for new debt cancellations in times of severe financial crisis has severely affected the Zimbabwean economy. Once the IMF and World Bank stopped doing business with Zimbabwe, this had an immediate and adverse impact on Zimbabwe’s credit and investment rating. The drop in investment rating affected the dream of low cost capital on the international markets.

(c )

ZIDERA was like a hunchback crisis for Zimbabwe. At the stroke of a pen, Zimbabwe’s access to international credit markets was blocked. Zimbabwe relying purely on barter trade, and trade, mining, agricultural concessions, and on exports-generated foreign currency, the economy has been slowly but surely asphyxiated whilst the British government and western media have scoffed at the visibly economic woes.

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(d)

The direct consequence of the foreign currency crisis/squeeze has resulted in the continued devaluation of the domestic currency, rapid inflation, and all else that has manifested itself in the current Zimbabwe economic crisis.

(e)

In addition, both the US and the EU froze financial and other assets of persons, or companies linked to ZANU PF who it is alleged sustain the ZANU PF government.

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Misinformation and propaganda

For almost a decade now, the British government has sustained a campaign against Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. The British government describes Mugabe’s country as corrupt and non-democratic. Mugabe is considered as a brutal dictator who must be removed from power at all cost. In its estimation, he is too old; Zimbabweans deserve a democratic government, human rights, regular meals and a stable currency.

Unfortunately, this also happens to be the mindset of the conventional British media on the matter. One cannot surpass the BBC, Sky news or the Economist in this propaganda. These foot soldiers of neo-imperial Britain have trekked miles to sell their pear-shaped campaign of calumny against Mugabe. For example, the Economist of March 15, 2007 raised this alarm for the umpteenth time: "Once the bread-basket of southern Africa and one of the continent's wealthiest countries, Zimbabwe is now a basket-case and suffers a severe shortage of food. It is also the world's fastest-shrinking peacetime economy, with unemployment now standing at 80 percent. Its inflation rate is the world's highest: currently 1 730 percent, although the IMF thinks that figure could rise to over 4 000 percent by year's end. From infant mortality to life below

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the poverty line, the country's unhappiest trendlines run remorselessly upwards. To stifle dissent and quash opposition, Zimbabwe has been turned into a police state where elections are routinely rigged." The suggestion that Zimbabwe’s economy is as disabled as it is because of mismanagement is partly true but misleading. What Mugabe has done is to mismanage the endemic crisis caused by the country’s inability to access capital, which in turn are the result of a raft of economic sanctions in place against the country. The Western Countries must take a fair share of blame for the economic crisis in Zimbabwe as they have driven the African Nation into a catch-22 situation. Simply put, owing to the size of the US and British vote and influence in these institutions, neither the IMF, World Bank nor the African Development Bank will lend to Zimbabwe, or offer it credit facilities. Therefore, needless to say, as a direct result of the US 2001 Act, Zimbabwe’s relationship with these multilateral lending agencies was immediately and severely affected the poor African ailing economy. Like a sting in the tail, The International Monetary Fund affirmed that it would maintain its suspension of financial and technical aid to Zimbabwe for failing to clear its arrears and remedy the Southern African country's deteriorating economic and social conditions. Hypocritically, the board expressed deep concern over the deteriorating economic and social conditions and regretted that the authorities have not undertaken the policies recommended by the IMF, whilst on suspension.

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Conclusion

Zimbabwe has continued to struggle with the stranglehold that the US and British government through their surrogate world lending institutions (IMF, World Bank, ADB etc) have imposed whilst the majority of the black community suffers. Propaganda to bring down the Mugabe-led government has persisted for almost a generation and yet the regime continues to defy the international community because reason at the end of the day has prevailed. There is the cold hand of injustice that the British government has played in Zimbabwe through the long corridor of History.

With the amazing rise in the Zimbabwe's official inflation rate that has surged to over 231,000,000%, the opposition has resumed calls of appeal to South Africa's former president, Thabo Mbeki, to rescue the historic power-sharing deal he brokered last month but the ZANU-PF are no longer interested in discussing the future of the Country with the opposition and regard Tsvangarirai as a non patriotic-western-bootlicking slave. The Zimbabwean economy in the meantime has taken a definite tumble for the worst and the last kicks of the dying embers of the once vibrant economy are now doing their last legs. With the economy continuing its rapid collapse and no end in sight to the political deadlock, the World Food Program with the help of local non governmental organizations have launched a non-partisan program to feed starving Zimbabweans directly. It said that more than 80% of the country's population was living on less than £1 a day and nearly half is chronically malnourished.

The latest inflation figures are envisaged to increase pressure on the country's president, Robert Mugabe to stop stalling over the composition of a new powersharing government with the prime minister designate, Morgan Tsvangirai. The president is demanding security ministries such as the army and police as well as the

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finance portfolio even though foreign donors have made it clear that there will be no aid to revive the economy unless that falls under Tsvangirai's control. Mugabe views the demands by the donor community as “posturing” and “interventional” and has indicated that only Zimbabweans will make decisions for Zimbabwe!

The influence of Britain and the USA on what happens in Zimbabwe has become a cancerous detriment to the inter-party talks. Western International pressure on the political process in Zimbabwe has emboldened Mugabe who is currently using the political maneuverings to allow China and Russia to side with Robert Mugabe’s government as gesture of support for the beleaguered leader in their own quest for supremacy in African politics.

The Lancaster house agreement is a sad history that the British government can not shake off as it is a stigma that can not be erased as long as remedial action is not considered. Mugabe has legitimacy when he declares that Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans and that the land reforms policies are meant to reverse the balance of economic control from minority white farmers to majority black indigenous population. Pride as a Nation has as well played a major role in Zimbabweans being prepared to be in dire poverty than to oust their only source of pride; Robert Mugabe and Tsavangari have signed an agreement in September 2008 that still jointly holds the United Kingdom as being responsible for compensating the white farmers that have had their land seized by the Zimbabwean government. The 30 page document says in part:

“Britain should compensate those whose lands were taken, describing the seizure of thousands of white-owned farms as irreversible. The parties hereby

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call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired from former landowners for resettlement," The Zimbabwean government has said it would only compensate farmers for improvements on the farm, not the land. Instead, the agreement states that former colonial-power Britain should compensate for the land according to the Lancaster house agreement. The recently signed power-sharing deal underscores this and also adds that land acquisition and redistribution is irreversible as it is the right of the Zimbabwean government to autonomously decide on what it intends to do with the land and the redistribution process without pressure from

Mugabe insists for the following issues to be resolved before he steps down and hand over power: (a)

Land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe and cannot be separated from other issues of concern to the Commonwealth or UN such as the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and the economy. A program of land reform is, therefore, crucial to the resolution of the Zimbabwe problem;

(b)

Such a program of land reform must be implemented in a fair, just and sustainable manner, in the interest of all the people of Zimbabwe, within the law and constitution of Zimbabwe;

(c)

The crisis in Zimbabwe also has political and rule of law implications, which must be addressed holistically and concurrently. The situation in Zimbabwe poses a threat to the socio-economic stability of the entire sub-region and the continent at large;

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(d)

The need to avoid a division within the African neighbours, SADDC, Commonwealth,; and

(e)

The orderly implementation of the land reform can only be meaningful and sustainable, if carried out with due regard to human rights, rule of law, transparency and democratic principles. The commitment of the Government of Zimbabwe is, therefore, crucial to this process.

Unfortunately, Economic sanctions have been used and seen in several countries to affect and sometimes bring down a whole Nation. Human rights groups are opposed to economic sanctions as has been proven with time that sanctions tend to simply affect ordinary citizens and barely touch the regime leaders being targeted. It is highly bemusing that very highly schooled academicians and learned individuals instigate these sanctions with full knowledge that the effects do not affect the targeted individuals. The only sane explanation is that there is a dark movement of West imperialistic and regime-change notion in the world that needs to be arrested and shamed for what it is.

Russia, South Africa and China blocking of further economic sanctions against Zimbabwe using the UN indicates the huge chasm between the west and the rest of the world. South Africa and the rest of the African Nations that understand the imperialist approach to Africa by the British and US government shows the resistance that domination will always churn up anywhere it raise its ugly head. Meddling in other Nation’s internal politics through systematic economic and political manoeuvring will constantly be resisted.

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Mugabe was ready in 2004 to hand over power to younger and better articulate Zimbabwean men belonging to ZANU-PF until there were serious espionage links to British and US secret agents that were discovered to have been in touch with these young men. Mugabe’s obsession that the British government wants to re-colonize the Nation in whatever format will always be an anchor for the response that the government has always taken.

Considering, the impasse that has gripped the Nation, the only solution that can be found is in the hands of the indigenous Zimbabweans and local regional leaders to get involved. Zimbabwe’s problem is an African problem and can only be resolved by Africans who have the interest of African affairs at heart.

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7.0

Bibliography and References

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