The Method Of Power Consolidation In The State Of Libya

The Centralization of Power under Muammar Qadafi a Case Study on Libya

Political Science 359.02 Mark Baron November, 17 2006 By: Arunan Sivalingam ID: 309422

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Much research relating to the North African state of Libya has characterized it as just another authoritarian pariah state.1 This however does not allow Libya to be seen for the depth of transformation that has occurred there. Under Qadafi, Libya has not just been another African state under dictatorial rule. Based on Muammar Qadafi’s own personal radical revolutionary ideology, numerous mechanisms have been implemented to control all functions of the state, due to his belief in a total transformation of society. Through his use of many totalitarian schemes, such as terror, the concentration of power and the deautonomization of society.2 Qadafi has maintained his power by exercising his own personalized rule over the country, allowing him to have total control over important structures of the state. The initiation of modern Libya occurred on September 1, 1969, whereby Muammar Qadafi and others known as the Free Unionist Officers overthrew King Idris through a military coup.3 Upon seizing power, the new Revolutionary Command Council was instituted with Qadafi as chairman. Its first edict to the people was the “Law for the Protection of the Revolution” which criminalized all form of dissent against the state, demonstrations and arousing of class hatred.4 Furthermore, the constitution of 1951 was replaced with the constitutional proclamation of December 1, 1969, which was provisional until it could be amended later. Any perceived threats were removed immediately; the royal family, important officials, senior officers and politicians were all arrested.5 By now power had been secured, and the next step in the process of the 1

Martin Sicker, “The Making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Qaddafi,” (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 24 2 Sigrid Meuschel, “Totalitarianism and Modern Dictatorships: A Tentative Approach,” Thesis Eleven 6, No.1(2006), http://wwwca1.csa.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/ids70/view_record.php?id=3&recnum=5&SID=e714d71f766749b61 12183d032c3e199&mark_id=cache%3A0%2C0%2C14 3 Omar l. El Fathaly, and Monte Palmer, “Political Development and Social Change in Libya,” (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980), 38. 4 Mohamed Eljahmi, “Libya and the U.S.: “Qadhafi Unrepentant,” Middle East Quarterly 2, No.13 (2006), http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=56.5447&site=ehost-live (9 November 2006). 5 Martin Sicker, “The making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Qaddafi,” (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 17.

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revolution was to gain support by mobilizing the population. Clearly quite early on in the revolution the populace was apathetic to the new ideals being presented to them; Libyan society had not been in such a state of turmoil that people would feel a dramatic transformation was needed. Attempts to counter this sentiment were taken by creating the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which created local, provincial and national assemblies in attempt to try to consolidate support through citizen participation.6 It is evident by the initial stages following the coup; the new regime was doing what it could to strengthen its support as quickly as possible, and invigorate the people, with the ideas Qadafi had proposed to them. Qadafi now had to mobilize the population to move forward with the revolution. In his first public speech his objective was clear not to continue through military rule: “the revolution does not claim its leadership as the monopoly of the Revolutionary Command Council…government must revert to the people”7 Through the different assemblies of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Qadafi hoped the Union could persuade citizens to become a part of the new revolution. From the beginning, the regime did not see itself as a leadership that had come to be a new source of governing in Libya, but rather a completely new way of running society. For the most part, the ASU only ended up recruiting middle-class citizens, and bureaucrats with ideals of modernization8. They came believing the ASU would somehow emulate a western style of participatory democracy. Inevitably this led to criticism that the revolutionary council could not vie with. Many educated professionals saw the Arab Socialist Union as a way to practice popular democracy and challenge the government leaders on pertinent issues. This is not what Qadafi wanted, as it became a clear detriment to implementing the ideals of the revolution, as it hindered the amount

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Dirk Vandewalle, “A History of Modern Libya,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 83. Jonathan Bearman, “Qadhafi’s Libya,” (London: Zed Books, 1986), 61. 8 Dirk Vandewalle, “A History of Modern Libya,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 83 7

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of control Qadafi had over society at large.9 Qadafi wanted to force a revolution onto a society that had no want or need of it. Qadafi may have believed that support for his revolution would grow, through the acceptance of participation by citizens of Libya. A major problem was that many did not understand the direction Qadafi intended to head towards. It seemed to be whatever Qadafi thought would be right for the moment. This experiment with legislative institutions had become disastrous, as with many dictatorial inclined leaders; Qadafi obviously could not tolerate disagreement, especially when it could be free to criticize his shortcomings.10 It became clear due to the failure of trying to institutionalize a framework within society to gain support for Qadafi’s new wave forward, something else had to be done. However, he still had the dilemma of not alienating the ASU (Arab Socialist Union), as his own colleagues of the revolution ran the union.11 Thus he devised a way to divide society by encouraging workers to take over factories and forming people’s committees which they should run themselves; he even encouraged people to not pay rent to landlords - literally turning son against father.12 It is through the ensuing chaos that Qadafi offered a way that could ameliorate the madness.13 This seems to have been the perfect stepping stone in moving to strengthen control of society: making people believe that Qadafi was offering the only viable solution to Libya’s problems. Analysis so far of early revolutionary Libya reveals it was not near the goals of any type of transformation of society. There is no way of trying to legitimize or implement something if you have no clear model of what that is, yet all forms of progression seemed to come from Qadafi himself, and whatever he seemed to think was the next great new idea to move forward.

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Mansour O. El-Kikhia, “Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction,” (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1997), 85 10 Ibid 11 Ibid. p.87 12 Ibid. p.85 13 Ibid. p.86

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It is only after the delivering his “five-point address” in April of 1973 that any real momentum of a revolutionary transformation began to take place. It is clearly evident by the points given in that speech that an upheaval was going to occur, the points included: purging the country of the politically sick, creation of a people’s militia to protect the revolution, and the Cultural Revolution.14 The last point in the address is quite significant; it is through this Cultural Revolution that Qadafi tried to change society completely, by using it as the major vehicle to generate state-wide support for the revolution. One main demographic Qadafi used when he propagated his ideas were University students; they were useful by the mere influence they had to spread ideas, also it was used as a check against them because they would easily be the first to speak out against the revolution.15 When instituted the Cultural Revolution encouraged citizens to weed out all remnants of the past, through their Popular Congresses, though it was also used as a means in which the leadership could dispose of people it saw as a threat.16 Later these Popular Congresses came under the umbrella of the Revolutionary Committees. The Revolutionary Committees would be established throughout the country for people to come together to propagate the revolution.17 However, this was used by Qadafi to keep tabs on all members; it allowed him to control what was tolerated, and to keep track of dissidents.18 The tedious steps that were being taken to facilitate the perceived citizen participation only reveal that these committees became a way for the state to watch over its citizens. It is very easy to keep track of individuals when they all are part of one group, where their information can be

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Mohamed Eljahmi, “Libya and the U.S.: “Qadhafi Unrepentant,” Middle East Quarterly 3, No.13 (2006), http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=56.5447&site=ehost-live (9 November 2006). 15 Omar l. El Fathaly, and Monte Palmer, “Political Development and Social Change in Libya,” (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980), 144 16 Joffe, E. G. H., and K. S. McLachlan (eds.), “Social and Economic Development of Libya,” (Wisbech, United Kingdom: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1982), 237 17 Ibid. p. 240 18 Ibid. p. 248

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recorded, and where others know what people are saying and thinking. This was indeed the best way to facilitate the propagation of the revolutionary ideas, and to keep check on those who were against them. Libya finally realized where the revolution was going with the unveiling of the Green Book, written by Qadafi that outlined his mechanism to create the ideal society. Many of his ideas are mentioned above such as the Popular Congresses. The ideas in his first volume of the book outlined how these institutions would be broken up and which body each reported to.19 This became the foundation on how society would be ordered, and the official guidebook of the revolution. Looking at the first decade of the regime, reveals it never had a clear cut ideological framework, but late in the mid 70’s Qadafi introduced The Green Book as a way to give guidance to society of his ideals and what the revolution was to stand for. It is difficult to understand how the revolution was being implemented, as it is shown above that many of the reforms ended up becoming detrimental to it, such as allowing direct participation. Qadafi to further the revolution needed the support and mobilization of the citizenry, yet that brought the unwanted fruits of opposition. It is in that regard it seems evident further on that Qadafi came to the realization to have the revolution progress his way; he had to consolidate all power to himself. This is evident when reading the name he gave himself as “Grand Legislator” and his internalization that he represented the will of the Libyan people.20 Though the framework for ideological revolution of society was not clear in the early stages, Libyan society was formed on the basis of it, and would continue to be. Opposition and older patterns of society were done away with, literally with the incoming of the younger new wave that would bring Libya to a perceived utopian society.21 This 19

Dirk Vandewalle, “A History of Modern Libya,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 104 Ibid. p.58 21 Jonathan Bearman, “Qadhafi’s Libya,” (London: Zed Books, 1986), 60 20

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would all be facilitated by Qadafi himself, who was seen to be the great mind behind the revolution. Two days following the five-point address the mechanisms to institute Qadafi’s new revolution took place. Arrests took place against lawyers, academics, government employees and others who could “propagate poisonous ideas” that were seen as lethal to the Libyan people; the arrests were mainly carried out by secret police, who were ordered to do so by Qadafi himself.22 All groups that could be seen as having some type of opposition to Qadafi were detained as well, which included groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Movement, left-wing oriented groups and others that could perpetuate an ideology other then the one emanating from the leadership.23 Once groups who could pose outside threats were put down, control was moved to be exercised over the public. The mechanism by which this was implemented was through the aforementioned Revolutionary Committees. The Revolutionary Committees had become the highest authority.24 The Revolutionary Committees formally were announced by Prime Minister Abd al-Ati al-Ubaydi in January of 1980 that “all People’s Congress and the secretaries of the Basic People’s Congress are under the permanent control of the revolution and Revolutionary Committees.”25 This worked by establishing Committees throughout the country, and placing founders who were loyal to the revolution in charge. Founding members first had to pass through surveillance checks through Qadafi’s office to be deemed acceptable to the leadership. Qadafi had to make sure no “enemies” of the revolution had infiltrated into these committees.26 After founding members were accepted they were sent to 22

Mansour O. El-Kikhia, “Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction,” (Florida: University Press of Florida,1997), 47 23 Jonathan Bearman, “Qadhafi’s Libya,” (London: Zed Books, 1986), 140 24 Joffe, E. G. H., and K. S. McLachlan (eds.), “Social and Economic Development of Libya,” (Wisbech, United Kingdom: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1982), 248 25 Dirk Vandewalle, “A History of Modern Libya,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 120 26 Joffe, E. G. H., and K. S. McLachlan (eds.), “Social and Economic Development of Libya,” (Wisbech, United Kingdom: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1982), 248

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special camps, where they learned how to provide surveillance reports on community members who were part of the committees, and how to use propaganda effectively.27 The Committee leaders were only responsible to Qadafi, and under his direct guidance, going further along those lines Committee members were part of Revolutionary courts, which were not bound by the legal statutes of the country, making them above the law. 28 This paved the way for abuses of human rights, and executions against state citizens. The Committees only were power centers for Qadafi and the regime to keep a secure eye on the populace, by making sure that surveillance reports were sent to him, he could keep tabs on who was keeping inline with the tenets of the ideological framework. Many of the leaders of the Committees were given many material benefits for their loyalty to Qadafi and it is also in that sense that Qadafi himself every so often had to “purge” the Committees of the leaders when they had gained too much wealth and influence.29 Qadafi did not put trust in many people, and was always watching to see who may be plotting against him, or those who possibly could if given too much power, thus he played a very smart game of cat and mouse even against those who were are at the top of the political order. Military coercion had become important in the years following the coup, helping to solidify control in Libya. In addition to the army, there was the parallel army, multiple centers of intelligence gathering, including the Revolutionary Committees, and three Special Forces units which were there solely to protect Qadafi.30 This increased militarization was evident with the infamous campaigns against Libyan citizens which began manifesting itself in early 80’s. Not 27

Ibid. 249 Dirk Vandewalle, “A History of Modern Libya,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 122 29 Camilla Sandbaken, “The Limits to Democracy Posed by Oil Rentier States: The Cases of Algeria, Nigeria and Libya,” Routledge 11, No.13 (2006). http://www.metapress.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/(eiheeiidswmq34rhz31v2j2k)/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer =parent&backto=searcharticlesresults,1,1; 30 Joffe, E. G. H., and K. S. McLachlan (eds.), “Social and Economic Development of Libya,” (Wisbech, United Kingdom: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1982), 252 28

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only was Qadafi on the edge against perceived threats within the state, but also to exiles and individuals who could be muttering outside in foreign countries. One of the best known outside opposition groups to Qadafi was the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), which was a part of many military campaigns against Qadafi in the 80’s with the support of the U.S and the French.31 Qadafi was on the margins of paranoia when it came to these outside threats, and for good reason, there had been at least twenty attempts to overthrow him, but all ended with arrest and execution.32 Qadafi had taken many excessive steps to keep his opposition under check; in 1984 the government announced the formation of “suicide squads” who were employed in the duty of eliminating dissidents living in exile.33 In addition to this, Qadafi had relied on many outside sources such as ex-CIA agents to work as mercenaries for him to silence opponents.34 Qadafi’s idea of a popular democracy is quite contradictory in the traditional sense of the term. Through the course of his rule, it was evident that allowing dissent would only create opposition to his rule, and he did everything to keep opponents at bay. Libya has been infamous for its human rights abuses by many groups such as Amnesty International.35 The regime did all it could to make sure it was the only source of information to the people, and that all elements posing a threat were taken care of, as not to set a precedent. Qadafi not only monopolized power into the institutions he created such as the Revolutionary Commitees, but more importantly unto himself. Through the course of Qadafi’s rule, there had been change in one institution after another in terms of first having People’s Commitees and then

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Dirk Vandewalle, “A History of Modern Libya,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 128 Martin Sicker, “The Making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Qaddafi,” (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 32 33 Ibid. p.33 34 Ibid. p.34 35 Libya Human Rights Concerns, http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/libya/index.do (accessed November 13, 2006) 32

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Revolutionary Committees, then even another Ideological Committee to replace that later.36 It would not be stretching the point to say Qadafi actually saw himself to be a modern day prophet, with a new gospel (The Green Book) that could fix the ailments of modern day society.37 If Qadafi had a new idea, or saw something that should be implemented it went through as his next experiment. It seems to be no surprise then, Qadafi as mentioned before had seen himself to be the man who represented the will of the Libyan people, and knew what was best for them. He believed himself to be the personification of knowledge and true understanding; he made sure those closest to him were loyal and true disciples of his revolution; this inner circle was known to emulate his dress, mannerism and even hairstyle.38 From the onset of the revolution Qadafi saw himself to be the leader and mind behind the greatest modern social transformation of the contemporary 20th century. Believing himself to be the only one who held the key to unlock the great mysteries of human society, he channelled all power to himself, liquidating opponents and controlling the entire structure of power within the state. Qadafi has claimed many times that the revolution was led by the people, and for their ultimate liberation, but it did not seem to progress that way, only by name, Qadafi has said: “the cost will be high, sweat will run and perhaps blood will be shed…it is the cost of progress…the liberation and emancipation we want to attain.”39 Yet this has only cost Libyans the freedom they did have, any chance of a stable economy, and meaningful political participation. Instead they have been given rule by corrupt elites, the fear of police terror, and being under the whims

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Mansour O. El-Kikhia, “Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction,” (Florida: University Press of Florida,1997), 78 37 Mohamed Eljahmi, “Libya and the U.S.: “Qadhafi Unrepentant,” Middle East Quarterly 6, No.13 (2006), http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=56.5447&site=ehost-live (9 November 2006). 38 Mansour O. El-Kikhia, “Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction,” (Florida: University Press of Florida,1997), 7 39 Omar l. El Fathaly, and Monte Palmer, “Political Development and Social Change in Libya,” (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980), 149

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of the enigmatic mind of their leader Muammar Qadafi. It is clear the years of Qadafi’s rule have been characterized by his personalized rule over the populace, with total control over all political, economic and social institutions within society. The revolution was Qadafi’s own personal project and society has paid the sacrifice for his mechanisms of state building. The revolution began as new direction for Libya, but became the state of Qadafi.

Bibliography Bearman, Jonathan. Qadhafi’s Libya. London: Zed Books, 1986. El Fathaly, Omar 1, and Palmer, Monte. Political Development and Social Change in Libya. Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980.

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Eljahmi, Mohamed. Libya and the U.S.: Qadhafi Unrepentant. Middle East Quarterly 2, No.13 (November 9, 2006). http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=56. 5447&site=ehost-live El-Kikhia, Mansour O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction. Florida: University Press of Florida, 1997. Joffe, E. G. H., and McLachlan, K.S (eds.). Social and Economic Development of Libya. Wisbech, United Kingdom: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1982 Meuschel, Sigrid. Totalitarianism and Modern Dictatorships: A tentative Approach. Thesis Eleven 6, No.1 (November 15, 2006). http://wwwca1.csa.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/ids70/view_record.php?id=3&recnum=5&SI D=e714d71f766749b6112183d032c3e199&mark_id=cache%3A0%2C0%2C14 Sandbaken, Camilla. The Limits to Democracy Posed by Oil Rentier States: The Cases of Algeria, Nigeria and Libya. Routledge 11, No.13 (November 13, 2006). http://www.metapress.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/(eiheeiidswmq34rhz31v2j2k)/app/home/c ontribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=searcharticlesresults,1,1; Sicker, Martin. The Making of a Pariah State: The Adventurist Politics of Muammar Qaddafi. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. Vandewalle, Dirk. A History of Modern Libya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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