The Human Person

he Fluman Person

r] J'rr,.. Vatican II, a significantly

broadconsensus in moral^theologiis the most appropriate point of person cal literature suggests that the human and for

of morality in general departure for elaborati"g ;" int *t"ttit'g tttttt"ty for dealing u'ith speu" which providing the fundament?l criteria the human has always been taken seriously cific moral questions. &;;;;;, for Catholics' to take the human in Roman Catholic -otl intotogy because-' God who became incarnate in the seriously is to take ,.ti;;tly th;"'""to' tt'ott striking.feature about the-reneu'al in humanity of Jesus. H;;;;' 'ht notice-able shift from using the lanmoral theology since int to"I1tit is the "human person'" orrrrre of "human nature" to that of the suaB;;1sHii."rf;; proloundly the rvay the human person serves as rhe behavior' For example' from its percriterion for determinit[ p'optt moral of comemph-asized the natural tendencies spective on human .,""?t'*tiitn absoderived Catholic moral thinking mon bodily ,,.rr.,,.tt' l"a f"t"tio"'' in done were which those lute, univers"l ,to.-'' M;;lly righractions,were Catholic in absolutes t'ih f"t"lty' The moral accord with the ,t*uoi "t'Joi on this basis' determined are example, "sexual - - ethics, for allowed a movement a\\/ay it . shiit to the human person, ho$,ever, has strucrul:::and funcbodily of from basing .no."t .otttlt"io't' ot the finality foundapersonalistic A persln rions taken i.,a.p.rla.t'ily olttre totality 9f.1he et Spes' inGaudiun Council Sttond Vatican tion for morality *"''f il;;tit II of that Part in employed was criterion especially in Part I. d;;;tnalistic tamily: the and marriage to document when dealing with i"ssues pertaining Thereforewhenthereisaquestionofharmonizingconjugallor'e the moral aspect of anr with the ,.rpot"iblt t"t"tni"iott of life' obiective.standards' These' procedure . . . ttt"tt be determined by acts ' (n' 51)' human Person and his based on the nature of the 63

Rewon Informed BY

GI

I'aith

et Spes' l,otris .f rtrrsscns, who has studicd thc official commentary of Gaudiu.m ancl activity, human of fi,,,l, ,i.,,,r this expression applies to the entire dornain expression the by affirmed is 11.t jrrsl t. sexuai activity.'Also, this rlt;rr "ltrrrlrl'r activity must be iudge<1 insofar 'rincipleas it refers to the human person mointt'glally and adeqlatelv consideicd."r In other words, in personalistic discovering for criterion is the r aliry thc human p".ro., adequately considered

morally right. 'l'5is chapter .orrrii".i the anthropological basis of pers.nalistic morality. It begins *ith ,tt. theological fonn'datiJn-s by presenting. an understandirig of th"e human person as the image of God' Its second section briefly

rvlrt't ltcr :rn act is

adequately contlc"scribes the fundamental dimensiorrr-of ",h. human Person be,lng' and historical. an subiect, embodied an sidcred": a relational being, -1

it will lrcing fundamentally .qr.tr'l .o others but-lniq9cly original'. Finally' making a briefl'y state the p.rro.r"litti. criterion which is to be applied in moral fudgment about human acts.

'I'he Human Person

65

a common human condition u,hich has a common end, namelv Ciod. lt also says that human clignity does not dcpend ultimately on human achievements,

in

but on divine love. We have u'itnessed the moral implications of this in arguments against abortion, in del-ense of care for handicapped nerylyrrns, for all regaldlctrs of and in reflection on issues of economic and social -'-' |justice race or hrrman

"

attributes.

Further implications of the image of God motif for

a

(,

personalistic moral-

ity can be drawn out of elaborations of the central symbols for God in the Christian faith. For example, the root svmbol of God is "God is love" (l Jn 4:8 and 16), i.e., God is the one who is perfectly self-giving. This claim leads to the Trinity which is the theological code word for the freedom and totality of God's self-giving. It means that God is eternally the giver or lover (Father),

the receiver or beloved (Son), and the gift or love u'hich binds them together (Spirit). When God expresses divine love outside the Trinity, nature colnes into being, with the human Person being the point at which nature reaches self-consciousness.

Image of God

To say that the Person adequately considered is the norm of morality

of supreme docs not dethrone God and raise the human person to the level the biblical fact, valuc. God remains supreme, the ultimate center of value' In

As Michael and Kenneth Himes have shown, our understanding of the triune nature of God (both the immanent and the economic Trinity) can shed light on the true meaning of being human. For example, by putting this great symbol of the Christian tradition into dialogue with the economic and ethical themes of the pastoral Ietter, Econornic Justice for All, they point out that

for

rvirness to rhe -yr,.iy of creation provides the theological foundation of rrnclcrsranding th! ultimate place of God and human life as a reflection

()<xl. The st6ry of crearion tells us that at the summit of creation

stands

motif of woman and man, made in God's image (Gn l:26-27)' Through the Bible the 3:9)' 11:7; Jas tlrc image of God (cf. Ps 8:5; Wis 2:23; I Cor any to prior every of Person uigurorriy affirms the sacredness or dignity the in example for reflected as human achievemenr. The Catholic tradiiion, EconomicJustice letter pastoral (n. the 5) and in Vatican Declaration on Abortion

|ilrAtt(n.32'79),hasbaseditsclaimsforfundamentalhumandignityand hrrrn:rn rights on this theological foundation'

'l'n ,lry that the human"person -before

is the "image of God" is first.a theological

it is an anthropological one. This means that it says someslittcment what rlting about the relation beru,een God and us which has implications for has so God is that it says thing one example, ir ,rr'i.rns to be human. For be properly cannot human the fh.t .tt with Person cstrrlrlishcd a relationship rr'tlc'sr..d apart from iod. God sustains this relationship by divine faithful(i.e., grace), humans will ever rrt.ss unrl loue. As long as Gocl offers divine love whether- in sin or not, dignity sacred ()<xl's a enioy and imagert.rrrlrirr the human person is about truth biblical not.'The or hurianly u,lrt.rlrt:r rrcting tlr:rt lx'ing thc image of God is irreversible' As :rn rrptl-rroiological statementr "image of God" saYs that u'e all share

if God is triune, if God is the perfect relationship of the love and the beloved and the love which unites them, then to maintain that the human being is created in the image of God is to proclaim the human being capable of self-gift. The human person is the point at which creation is able to acknowledge gratefully the divine self-gift and to respond by giving oneself in return.2 Likewise, the trinitarian doctrine implies a communitarian understanding of being human. The trinitarian vision sees that no one exists by oneself, -l'he individbut only in relationship to others. To be is to be in relationship. ual and the community co-exist. Humanity and relatedness are ProPortional so that the deeper one's participation in relationships is, the more human one becomes. Since community is necessary to grow in God's image, the fundamental responsibility of being the image of God and for living in conrmunity is to give oneself away as completely as possible in imitation of God's selfgiving. The freedom which humans need for living morally is the freeclom to give themselves more completell'. A deeper particiPation in the human community enhances the humanity of each person while the failure to establish community diminishes the humanity of all. r From tl-ris trinitarian r,ision of thc human person as the image of God u'e

Reason

66

Infonned BY Faith

morality is the dycrtn sce that the tunclarnental clynamic of a personalistic of tire great comnarnic of receivinq and giving lovc' Thc Johannine version one nrandment captuies it &".tt"y, "As I haie lovc'd vou' so -vou 1Ys::love of imitation in another" (Jn 13:34). We first receive love and then "'" to iou" in life-breathing
life paft of this dynamic m-oveTelt ceases' of God image the be to person tells us that

and breathing out. wf,; .i,rt.t cnds. The trinitarian ,iri." "iifrJ lived out of the is not only a gift but ,tro r.rpo,tsibility' The moral life " as gift' but also received image of God not o"ff t.;oi..t'i., *h't"o"e has others' with proitir., to use these gifts wetl in communion fundamental This theologi.d ti;i;" ;f ,ht Person lrelps us to see that our wa1's,we the it'-"d ttr-rough relationship to God g;;6;"t;ti ":1"* -glf-:: of God is an rmperattve enhrnce the giftJdness of others' To be the image "nd received by moving calling us to live o,r, oiitt" fullness of the gifts we have

outofourselvesandintotheworldofourrelationships.To^withdrawintoand of receiving ;;;t;it;;; ; horra o.t, gir,s, and to cut off the dynamicand to mock God' gifts our abort to is another ili"g love by r"f,r.i.rg tJgift the the t*iq: being self-giving..-.hitl of sort ?i i. ,1", ,;mity put. Iiden"ies "j communron in fully Iiving toward movement and it blocks the God demands,

withGodandothers.ThejudgmentparablewhichJesustoldof.thetalents is a pou'erful indictment of given to the three servants i., Nl"ttht- 25:14_10 this kind of life. of A personalistic morality with th-eological foundations in the image to them we use God asks: Have we accepted our gifts, and how u'ell do the of the development contribute to positive, 1;g.'-giui"g reiationships and to of the trinitarian implications m'ral the .^ro.dr, otf,er In human environment? the quality of with to do vision of the human p.rron as the image of God have network of the destroy our relationships and *irh f,o- ot" "tiot" build up or relationships which make up human life'

The Person AdequatelY Considered ThehumanPerson..adequatelyconsidered''isthepersonasunderstood

byr"rro.,informedbyfaith'Thebiblicaltruthabouthumanitybeingthe grasp of the ir|,rg. of God is the clnviction of faith which informs reason's so in the h.rJ.. person' If v'e are irreversibly the image of God' then u'e. are intellect a.s such totality of our personalities arrd noi iust in certain aspects, person the ,rra *itt. so ail the fundamental dimensions r,r'hich constitute person's human ;:irrt"g..[y and adequatell, considered" participate in the imaging God.

Inthissection,Iamcleeplyindebtedtotheu'orku'hichLouisJanssens th. .o.t..pt of the person adequatelv considered' He

has done to elaborate

The

lluman

Person

67

based his analysis on the teaching tif Vatican [], especialh' Gau.dium et Spes.a I-Ie says, in brief, that tl-re human person is aclequately considered u'hcn taken as an historical subject in corporeality u,ho stands in relation to the rvclrld' to other persons, to social structures, and to God, and u'htl is a unique original-

ity u'ithin the context of being fundamentally equal with all other

Persons.

To say that these dimensions constitute an "integral and adequate" consideration of the person means that the human person is alu'ays, and at the same time, every one of these dimensions interacting to form a slrnthesis which is the integral human person. My separating them here is purelv fbr purposes of discussion. Since Janssens does not claim a hierarchy for these dimensions, I will present them in a manner slightly different from his own by organizing them under four maior groups: a relational being, an embodied subiect, an

historical being, and a being fundamentally equal to others but uniquely original.

A Relational Being The trinitarian vision of God in its implications for humanity underscores very clearly the relational dimension of being human. Human existence does not precede relationship, but is born of relationship and nurtured by it. To be a human person is to be essentially directed toroard others. We te communal at our core. The image of being human in the creation storv is a communal one: "And now we u'ill make human beings; thev will be like us and resemble us. . . Male and female, God created them" (Gn l:26-27). Personal existence, then, can never be Seen as an "1" in isolatiOn, but alu'ays as "I" and "you" in relationship. The significance of being directed torvard others has wide-ranging moral

implications. In medical moral matters, for instance, it has implications for uoih ludging the appropriareness of using life-sustaining treatments and for determining death. If someone's capacity for relationships, i.e., one's capacity to receive love and to give love, never develops (as in the case of the anencephalic fetus) or is irreversibly lost (as in the case of those in a chronic vegerative state) can we say that he or she enioys human life in srrch a personal way that it ought to be sustained at all costs? An awareness of iustice also shows us that personal existence is a shared existence. Through interdependence we discover that we bear mutual responsibilities. Our prrrsuit of individual ends can be justified onlv to the extent that u'e resPect the patterns of inter-dependence which make up our relational selves. From the point of vieu' of justice, then, we need to ask u'hether our moral choices and actions detract from the value of true community or promote the kind of self-giving which sustains the well-being of life together. As relational, social beings, human Persons need /a liae in social groups

Reason

68

Informed

B.Y

Faith

human dignitv ancl the comrnon good' witb appropriate structilres u'hich sustain -rt *"r^r significance of this aspect of being hrrrnan is that \\'e must resPect

" ani ,fr.-f"*,

institutions of socicty u'hich promote cornrlurlal living and

to absolutize any one rrohold the common good. But \\1e must be careful not

.,l,"rrr

firrm. The ieed for social structurcs demands that struct*res

be

circumstances and the rener.l,ed, and at times revisecl, according to changing \\/as once an acslavery example, For dignity' hurnan grorving demands of years of formati'e the in as well as times in biblLal i.p,"a iocial institution of what sense the because accepted no krnger it is this country; however, today find the human dignity demands could not.uppott it' Likewise, many

fruoiing capital punishment to b. ttttpttt in light of new structures of the dignity lau. enforcement as well as a heightened sense of the respect due in structures of human life. The moral significance of living with appropriate our u'hether social groups is that in maiittg moral choices, we need to ask

ir*,

and actions"wili preserve o. .r.rd..rii.re the basic structures (such as marriage wellhuman the family) *hi.h *. need in order to safeguard and promote being.

"The

relational dimension of being human reaches its high point in our eternal signifirelationship to Godin faith, hope, andlove' Each PerTl has is that all person the of cance and worrh. The moral i..rpo.t of this aspect all, the After in God. relationships must find their source and fulfillment in knowing, fulfilled is life fundamenial conviction of our faith is that human loving, and serving God in communion with others'

An Embodied Subiect To speak of the human Person as a subject is to say that the person is in with a char$€ of hi, o. her own life. That is, the person is a moral agent

accordcertain degree of autonomy and self-determination empowered to-act catholic The kno$'ledge. u,ith and freedom, ing to his"or her conscience, in ,."'di,ion has been clear that we cannot speak of morality in anv true sense (cf' apart from human persons who are able io act knowinglv and u'illingly Sf. I-II, prologue). The gr"atloral implication of the person as subiect is that no one may ihurn"r, p.rru.t as an obfect or as a means to an end the rvav we do ever use

other things of the world. Every right entails a duty, and the rights that for them' belong ,o ih" p.rron as subiect entail the duty of demanding respect And so we must respect the other as an autonomous agent capable of acting u,ith the freedom of an inforryed conscience. Exploitation of human Persons for one's own advantage is never allou'ed. we show respect for the hurnan basis of a person as a subiect b/guaranteeing that he or she can act on the

'I'he

Iluman

69

Person

clulv infbrnrecl ancl free conscience. Sincc the inptlrtancc ri'hich thc (latholic traclition has gir,en to the person as moral sullject requires morc attention, thc sulrsequent chaptcrs on freeclonr anti knou'lcdgc, sin, and cousciencc u'ill explore this aspcct at greater length. Tcr speak of the human Person as 'an embndiel subiect is t
it-in

an embodied form.

The fact that we have bodies and cannot enrer inro relationships apart from them entails

a

number of moral demands. Since our bodies are svmbols

of interiority, bodily expressions of love in a relationship ought to be proportionate to the nature of the commitment bettveen persons. Alscl, boclilr'existence means that we must take seriousll' the limits and potential of the biological order. Since the body is subiect to the lau's of the material t-orld, we must take these lau,s into account in the way we treat our bodies. \\'e are not free to intervene in the body in any way we want. For example, to flood the blood system with toxic drugs means to so damage the body as to kill ourselves. To relate u'ell to others we must take care of our bodily health and respect bodily integrity. Bodily existence also means that we must accept our genetic endowment u'hich sets the baseline for certain possibilities and limitarions ro our phvsical, intellectual, and psychological capacities. We have the moral responsibility to live u'ell within these limits and not to push otrrselves to become or to do what our genotyPes, taken together u'ith our environment, would not support. As body persons we are a part of the naterial world. To be a part of the marerial world holds both great potential and serious limitation. 1-he potential is that, created in God's image v,ith the mandate to bring the earth under human control, we can act as co-agcnts ir ith God to make the u'orlj a continuously more livable place. The developments of sciencc and technology are certainly helping us to do that. But human creations are ambiquous. Herein lies the serious limitation. The very' products which help us to improve communication, production, and prosperitv can be detrimental to our

Reasox Informed lly

70

Faitlt

corporeality and communalitv bv entailing negative effects such as traffic congestion, air, u,ater, and noise pollution, land erosion, and the accttmuiation of toxic waste. I-ikcu'ise, the \,ery techniques which are being developed in the life sciences to benefit the human community, such as developments in reprocluctive technology' and genetic engineering, can easily be extended to produce disturbing results for the wholeness of societv and the common good. Being part of the material world requires moral agents to consider the negative effects necessarily entailed in the positive discoveries of technologv and to weigh their moral importance.

An Historical Subiect An embodied spirit is necessarily an historical subiect. While the spirit enables us to become more than ourselves, our bodies anchor us in the here and now" To be an historical subject, then, means to be relentlessly temporal, seizing each opportunity of the present moment as Part of a progressive movement toward our full human development. Much of spiritual theology today has capitalized on this characteristic of the person by using the metaphors of Iife as a journey and of each person as a pilgrim made to rest only in God. Narrative theologv, too, reflects on the temporality of human existence when it talks about the "narrative quality of experience, "r i. e. , every moment of iife is in tension with the past and the future. When we integrate our Past into the person we are becoming we move into the future not only with a sense of integrity but also u'ith a coherent sense of direction. The moral imperative of being an historical subiect is to integrate the past into the person we are becoming so as to shape a future rather than to settle into a static condition. The moral significance of the personal historical process is that one's moral responsibility is proportionate to his or her capacities at each stage of development. We must be careful to regard moral culpability for behavior relative to each stage of development. Also, the actions of historical subjects have their full moral meaning only when considered in

relationship to the total context u'hich includes the future consequences. Just as persons develop and change, so do cultures. Progress or regress is always possible and the elaboration of new values is never ending. As neu' possibilities open up to us through science and technology (such as artificial means of reproduction) and as ne\\r values emerge (such as a new appreciation for the relational meaning of sexuality), we must constantly discern and order lau,'s and values which rvill enrich human dignity. As historical subjects, our

moral reflection must be as dynamic as the human life which it intends t
Tl:e Human Person

7t

L'undamentally Equal but

Llnique\ Ariginal The dimensions of being human considerecl tl'rus f ar afhrm a frndatncntal equality among human persons. Iiquality allor.vs us to takc an intcrcst in

everything that is human and to understand the moral obligations u'hich inform our common humanity. Flou'ever, human persons are sufficiently diverse so that u.'e must also taken into account the originalitl, and unitlueness of each person. This means that while everyone shares cgrtain common features of humanity, each one does so differently and to different degrees. James M. Gustafson has analyzed a person's unique moral character according to the uncontrollable and the somervhat controllable features.6 The fertures of ourselves over r.lhich we have no conlrol in esrablishing our uniqueness are our genetic endou'ment, our unconscious motives, and the social-cultural conditioning to which we have been subjected in the process of growing up. Beyond these uncontrollable features are those over u hich lr'e do have some control. One of these features is our beliefs, or stable convictions,

which give direction and meaning to our lives. The extent to u,hich our beliefs influence the originality of our lives depends not only on u'hat beliefs we hold but also on how intensell, u'e hold them. The perspective, or point of view, from which we look on the u'orld also accounts for originalitr'. What we think is important and how we respond to it are inlluenced b1' the \\'ay $/e see it. Also, dispositions, or a readiness to act in a certain wa1', mark our unique character. Affections, or sensitivities, influence the depth and swiftness of our moral responses. Finally, our intention, or the basic direction of our actions governed by our knou'ledge and freedom, puts the distinctive mark of personal style on what we do. In each of us, these leatures are all interrelated through the imaginarion. Understood in its deepest sense, the imagination is not merely a capacity for frivolity in an otherwise serious u'orld; rather, the imagination is the capacity to construct a world. By means of the imagination u'e brinq together diverse experiences into a meaningful u'hole. Influenced by the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Philip Keane describes the imagination in his studr', Cbristian Ethics and tbe lrnagination,

by which u'e drau' together the concrete and the universal elements of our human experience. With imagination u'e let go of any inadequately pre-conceived notions ofhori. the abstract and the concrete relate to one another. We suspend iudgment about how to unite the concrete and the abstract. We let the tu'o sides of as the basic process

our knowing play with one another. By allowing this interplav

Reason 72

Infonned BY Faith

we ge-t.a much deeper between the tu'o asPccts of our knowing, a vision of it'7 chance to look at rvhat u'e know, to form

Wlrenwe..getthepicture''throughtheimaginativeprocesswecometo

and experiences_so that \ve can rrn image which"puts together diVerse beliefs When religious it ,,nd"rsia.r.i -h"i is goiig on and relate to appropriatelv. enter into the they process, lrcliefs, for example,*".."p"r, of the imaginative the manv connecting toward conrent of what *. ."p.ii..rce and contribute gives This beliefs. those in entailed tlirnensions of experience with the values to responding of wav a and world the "picture" of

,,r r dirtlrl.tively religious it such as we explored in the last chapter' guided and formed by the images which give us a "picture" Since *" ^." limits of our moral ol- the world, the imagination sets the directitn and we see' the way we what think, we what llcSavior. The imaginat-ion informs It gives a definiteactions. our of direction fcel, our readinessio act, and the change, we images master our when that way llcss to our characters in such a through ,,r. ,ig.rifi.a.ttly changed. Since this is so, we find a clue to ourselves and lives our organize to us help They i.n^ge, of ihe imagination' rhc m-aster

71

Tfu Human Persort

[-he Personalistic Criterion These then are climcnsions of the human Person adequatelv considcred'

Wtren taken together in an integrated u'ar-, thcy fcrrn'r thc foundation of a personalistic mirality. l,ouis Janssens has used these cssential dirnensirlns of ,h. hl.,,-,,rr,-, pcrson to form this criterion: an action is morally rigbt if it is (i bcneficial to the person adequately considered in himself or herself e '' as an unique, emboclied spiri$ and in his or her relations (i.e.' to others, tti social .r.u.r.,."r, to tht: material world, and to God).e For Janssens this is an obiective criterion since it is based on the constant dimensions of being human. But since it is a criterion about the human Person as an historical being, it requires a regular review of the possibilities we have available to p.o.inr" the human p".ron so that \\'c can determine whether they truly do ,n. Jr,l.r"rm r".ogrrires that the application of this criterion is not easy. To use"it in a *or"ll-y responsible u,ay requires u,isdom-the special gift of the morally goo<1 peison who has an affinitv for u'hat is right and whose iudgment i; iirpir.a by a morally good disposition, an attitude u'hich is ready to place our activitv as much as possible at the service of the human person adequately considered.

ro

irr{lrrence our rnoral arguments. choices' and actions'

a commuA person's ,tniqu! identity within the fundamental equality of pastogiving for especially implications' moral nity of persons has profouncl

features of humanr.rrl'guidance. Becauie each person embodies the common the same situation ity iiiffer.rrtly, we canno, .*p.., nvo people to respond-to moral character i,r rhc same way. They ,r" simply not capable of it' One's is limited both ,.'t, th. ,".tg" oi porsibllities fot ttiiott' Eaih person's capacity givens intel,y the .r.r.5.trroil"ble givens and by.the somewhat controllable to the all.,appeal *1y gi'.t"a by one's moral"imagination. Even though -: able be only will us of each srrnc objective norms in rela'tion to the same issue, her or to his according lo live uP to the norm and respond .t-o--lht issue to relative is behavior cupacity.^A person's sublective responsibility for-moral responsiheld be can one itr" a"ultop*ent of that i..so."t moral capaci'y' fo lrlc lor doing what is be1'en6 his or her power to do" the In a pisto.al ,ettirig, then, the ad"ite of Bernard Hnring reflecting impose to try never should "One u,isrl'm oi S,. ,{prro.rr,i, Lig.rn.i is sound, case ofpreventthe other person cannot"sincerely internalize, except the u,lrur

hold a Person itrg grave iniuitice tou'ard a third person'"8 We can only is only A-p.er.son capacity. person's that sccourrtable for what is relative to Thereof doing. is capable she or tre rr,,hat to do ,.,.,,,tty culpable for failing-r.tio.r, remain subiect to iustification in light of lr',c, since each person', one's capacity, we ,lrjt.ctivc moral ntrms, the demands of the situation, and situation demands a moral what betu'een ,',rr'r cxpcct to find some differences another' of ,,1 ,,rtclrcrson and what it demands

Conclusion As we try to understand the human person adequately, u'e .may better "huappreciate the great advantage of the language of "human Person" over man nature" t6 express the anthropological foundations of morality. The advantage to "human nature" is that it underscores what is common to all' Its great di.lsadvantage, however, is that it does not adequatelv express one's iundamental orifinality. The language of "human pelso,n, by contrast, is more adequa,. 6"."n.. it caPtures the uniqueness of the person u'ithout abandoning those features of the common human condition and the moral demands founded uPon them. A view of the iruman person such as the one presented here challenges assessRoman Catholic theology to integrate empirical evidence into its moral

a personalistic perspective must take into account the experienceJ of people over time in order to determine what sorts of activities beit serve the peison adequatelv considered. As a result' moral theology must include noi only deductive but also inductive methods in order to take-human experience seriously. An inductive approach rvill yield reliable though tentative conclusions oPen to revision. \ew historical erperience and new"euidence u,ill emerge to reinforce a position already held or to call it into question and ask that it be reformulated or rescinded if necessary. Even though each of the features of the human Person treated above can be given rrr.,.L,.-gr""r.r elaboration in order to develop the anthropological

ments. Moral theology

f.o*

Reason Inf'onned BY

74

f'uith

foundations of a personalistic mtirality of responsibilitv, I u'ill fiicus in thc ncxt chaptcr only on those u,hich the (,atholic tradition has macle the irldis-

pensable features of thc. nroral subtect: knou'ledgc ancl freeclom. Iior u'itllout ih.r. *" c'lo not have rrue ntortlity at all. 'I-he subscquent chaPters on sin and conscience u'ill then consider the person e\)en rlore adequately in the light of faith and grace.

Notes

l.

Louis Janssens, "Artificial lnsemination: Ethical considerations,"

Louvain Studies 8 (Spring 1980): 4.

2. the

his

Michael 1. Him.s and Kenneth R' Himes, "Rights, Economics, and

Trinity," Commonttseal 113 (March 3. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

14, 1986): 139'

4. t ouis Janssens explored these dimensions in a preliminary way in ,,Personalisr Morals," Loutsain studies 3 (Spring 1970): 5-16. His most

worked out version is in the methodological introduction to his treatment of artificial insemination, "Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations," L\uvainStudies 8 (Spring 1980): 5-13. 5. The e*pr"ision is from Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Qualitv of Iixperience," Journal of the American Acadenty of Religion 39 (197 l): 2^91-311. 6. For this analysis of Gustafson's, see l-is can Ethics Be cl:ristian? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. :2*47 ' z. enitlp S. Keane, Christian Ethics an.d the Imaginatioz (Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1984), p. 81. some of the influential material from Paul Ricoeur are ..The Metaphorical Process as cognition, Imagination, and Feeling," critical Inquiry 5 (f978), pp. 143-159; aIso, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. .rrd ti".rt. by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198

l). Free and Faithful in Christ, York: Seabury Press, 1978), p. 289.

8. Bernard Haring, 't'heologl (New

Vol.

1: General Moral

9. 1r.ttt.ttt, "Artificial Insemination: L,thical Considerations," I'ouaain

(Spring 1980): ll. 10. Ibid.,pp. l4-15.

Studizs 8