The Function Of Universality In Ethics

The functions of universality in ethics: a comparison between Aristotle and Mencius R.A.H. King, Philosophy Department, Glasgow University, UK. 金瑞, 格拉斯哥大學哲學系 ([email protected]) Introduction Mencius and Aristotle are addressing a very particular readership – very roughly, one might characterize their readers as pupils, would-be statesmen and actual statesmen. Both are operating in a context where there is no prospect of universal readership (whatever quite that may entail). Nonetheless: In both Aristotle and Mencius ethics is a universal enterprise. In the present state of scholarship, this is perhaps an unfashionable point to make; anti-rationalist communitarians have been quick to seize on both Aristotle and the Confucian tradition. But I think this is a mistake. In both cases, universality is involved in a wide variety of ways. While ethics must, I think, start from particular ethics, there is no reason that this starting point need limit the scope of ethical reflection. To begin with, consider something for which both thinkers are famous, or perhaps infamous. Both believe that a good human life is prescribed, at least in a very broad sense, by a nature which belongs to all humans. But what function does this proposition have in their thinking? It does not, I think, serve to justify their ethics. For one thing, neither justifies their ethics in the style of some modern western ethics- neither is a foundationalist: in each of the thinkers I am considering here, this is true for rather different reasons. Aristotle was perfectly well acquainted with such projects, for example that of Plato in the Republic. While much of Mencius’ thought shows clear signs of its dialectical origins, I think the project of justifying ethics is foreign to him. So just what is the point of referring to nature (physis or xing) in each thinker? One important point is that we are not just looking for universal statements, we are looking for the function or functions such statements may perform. For Aristotle, there are several functions for universalism: all humans have reason, this universal statement serves the purpose of providing the content of happiness (eudaimonia); virtue is definable, this serves the purposes of education and self-education. In Mencius, all humans have a sense that cannot bear the suffering of others: this serves to encourage the acquisition of benevolence (ren) towards all, by all. Let me begin my detailed discussion by introducing some distinctions made by

Christopher Gill in his discussion of universality in Greek ethics.1 He distinguishes two kinds of universality, by the content of the statements: 1. Abstract analysis of ethical concepts, above all virtue and happiness. 2. The connection between ethical concepts and aspect of reality (the cosmos, human nature). The point is not to establish universal rules, as in Mill or Kant or because such rules are necessary for virtue, but because ethical investigation since Socrates consist in separating the core of ethics from incidental aspects. Three levels of universality are also to be distinguished according to Gill: 1. Universal opinions determined by social and cultural factors, for example about individual virtues: courage is always such and such. 2. Universal opinions of the first level supported by the same factors, but also through reflexive understanding e.g. courage is a virtue, and a virtue is a fixed disposition of character. 3. Universal opinions of the first level are finally supported or revised by reflection connecting them to aspects of reality. Gill develops his theory as a way of explaining the function of universality in ancient Greek ethics; I think it provides a very helpful structure to develop a comparison between Greek and Chinese ethics. For it allows us to discuss ethical thought which takes its starting point in a given culture, and which allows us to follow the reflective process in our texts moving towards broader and broader contexts. A second reason is that the functions and areas of relevance of universality in Greek and Chinese ethics are so various: universality may have to do with objectivity and with reflection. But I think there are rather more to be considered, for example politics, and the possibility of universal governance. This in fact becomes much more relevant when considering the Chinese material alongside the Greek. Where Greek thought remains, with the important exception of the later Stoics, largely focused on smaller communities, the Chinese are very concerned with the problems of governing the world / empire. Thus here is an obvious advantage of a comparative ethical project. For Aristotle, the use of universals has to do with the possibility of argument about ethics on the basis of universal concepts: we can argue about what is brave or just, and reason for or against actions. In turn this is based on the universality of reason among humans. While his ethics is grounded on the uniquely Greek idea of the polis, he thinks that ethical concepts 1

C.Gill, 2005. Are Ancient Ethical Norms Universal In: ibid. ed. Virtue, Norms and Objectivity, Oxford, (15-40, here pp. 22-27 ff).

2

are applicable everywhere; thus he thinks that there is something called natural justice (Nichomachean Ethics (henceforth NE) V 7). For Mencius universality has to do with the status of moral sense as innate, and also with the possibility of including all within the ambit of a single ethical rulership, encouraging readers to see themselves within the ambit of this project. In both cases, the function of universality diverges from modern uses of universality as fixing the content of morality: moral rules are universal rules. I Aristotle Let us begin with Aristotle: Three important areas in which universality is pivotal in Aristotle are the following 1) The ergon argument. When in NE I 7 Aristotle is faced with the task of filling the concept of eudaimonia with content, he resorts to the ergon argument. The ergon or function of something he thinks is that which it alone performs or performs best. So he goes on to consider living things and the functions they have – nutrition (metabolism), perception, thought and thus he comes to conclusion that man’s function is thought. Hence since a virtue consists in performing a function well, virtue, and so the good life for humans will consist in an activity with reason. One massive problem with this line of thought is the way in which a bit of Aristotelian physics, and indeed metaphysics is imported into ethics.2 Not only that, this proposition is used here to set up a norm. (There are dialectical reasons for this: Platonists, who he has been criticizing in I 6 for their view of ‘the Good’, will object neither to the conception of function (see Republic I 352D-353E), nor to the importation of metaphysics into ethics; indeed, it is Aristotle himself who makes great progress towards disentangling these two areas of thought.) The function of something does not just say what it is it says what it should do. At a crucial point we seem to be appealing to something non-ethical, to give one aspect at least of the content of ethics for Aristotle (rational activity is what ethical discussion is about). 2) Definition of virtue. Aristotle defines virtue as follows: a disposition that leads to decisions, which depend on the mean relative to us, determined by a correct prescription (orthos logos), in the way a wise person (phronimos) would determine it. (EN II 6 1106b36) Recent commentators have tended to emphasise the fact that the correct prescription 2

For critical discussion of Aristotle’s realism see especially Williams, B. O.A. 1995. Acting as the virtuous person acts. In: Heinaman, R. ed. 1995. Aristotle and Moral Realism (Keeling Colloquia I), London: 13-23.

3

here is not a universal rule, but something that is, in the context of the proposed action, correct. I think this view is right. Universality does not enter this definition at the level of the agent (Gill’s level 1), but at the level of reflection (level 2); it is relevant to the organisation of the state and one’s own life to realise that virtues are thus and so. Even if one admits that there is no universal formulation available to the agent, rationality is still involved: the prescription must be correct (that is to say, both true and issuing from the right desire). So we are still dealing with rationality here: the function of the intellect is to tell the truth. This is also something that the wise man, the phronimos, does, tell the truth, in the restricted sphere of human goods. So two points should be noted. Firstly, that we are here reconstructing what good people do, from the perspective of people who are concerned a) to lead their own lives well, but also b) to organise city-states (poleis) in such a way that people lead good lives. Neither of these functions means that the concepts used in this definition must be available to all those who, as a matter of fact, would be judged by those in possession of these concepts, to be acting according to the mean relative to us, as laid down by the phronimos. So even if this ‘the’ definition of virtue, those acting virtuously need not have it. The point is the following: even if one needs a certain motivational structure to act virtuously, and this motivational structure involves forms of cognition, you do not need the concept of virtue, as opposed to concepts of concrete virtues, in order to act virtuously. However, at least some virtues can, according to Aristotle’s analysis only be possessed if you possess the concept (for example justice). This is an important finding from the point of view of comparative ethics. For the search for a concept of virtue in ancient Chinese, for example, is reduced in importance, if none is needed for virtuous action. Of course, it is another question if one needs the concept of virtue to reflect on good action and good agents. This is surely a crucial philosophical question, especially for those who welcome the revival of virtue ethics. One way of posing the question is: Is Aristotelian Ethics universal in intent? On the one hand, he thinks one deliberates about only things that are up to us: there is no point in deliberating on behalf of others. But that does not affect the validity of ethical reflection. This is bound to living the good life, but if the good life is bound to universals such as the function argument presupposes, then there should be no limit to this validity. (One could turn this argument around, and point out that Aristotle’s reflections allow no place for the plurality of values necessary to modern society. I will allow this point to stand without discussion here.) (A third interesting aspect in which universal propositions play a crucial role is the practical syllogism (see EN VII 3), a reconstruction of the way in which deliberation is rational; again this is a reconstruction, but which involves the claim that universal 4

propositions play a crucial role in action. The interpretation of these universal propositions is contested See Woods 1986 This is a function of universal propositions that Mencius does not know.) II Mencius Where I have isolated two arguments from Aristotle to make some points about universality, I will adopt a rather different approach to Mencius: I will concentrate on a single text. The most famous, and perhaps the most important piece of Mencius is that in which he presents the bu ren ren zhi xin (IIa6) - the sense (‘heart-mind’ as it is often rendered) that cannot bear [the suffering of] humans. This text provides useful material for the discussion of universality. The adverb chie is used to express the universality of this proposition: all humans possess this sense. In sentence three, the further assertion will be made (IIa6.4) that someone without this xin is not a human (ren). The question arises what the purpose of the assertion is that all humans possess this sense. He presents the case of a child falling into a well, and the sense (xin) which is moved by this sight, and the motivations (suoyi) for these emotions. The case of the child and the well is presented by Mencius as explaining his meaning (suoyiwei), or perhaps what he has said, his utterance. So does Mencius present this imaginary case as proof for the fact that the xin actually do occur in all humans? This is the way the text is often read. It is very hard to see how it could. For it is a) a single case b) imaginary. And furthermore Mencius does not develop an explicit doctrine of proof. He cannot himself have regarded it as a proof according to a worked out theory of proof. Of course, that might not preclude it from being a proof. So let me suggest that the sentences in question serve the function of something like an exhortation to the emotions roused by this scene: a sense of fear and horror (chu ti zhi xin), and of a sense of compassion and sadness (ze yin zhi xin). How does this work? It appeals to the reader or listener that they should consider themselves in this position. (Cf. VIa17 for a similar thought, namely that people all have a certain characteristic, but do not see it in themselves.) Then they grasp the meaning or claim Mencius is referring to. The fact that his claim is true, I suggest, is not something that Mencius can prove by a single imaginary case, for it is something required of every reader, to find it within themselves. A particularist about ethics may object that Mencius introduces his discussion here by reference to the Former Kings (IIa6.1), and that in this way he is operating explicitly within a particular tradition. That is certainly true; but that does not necessarily mean that his ethics are circumscribed in scope. Tradition is not a restriction, as it is for modern communitarians, but a resource for reflection. Thus we can move from Gill’s first level of generality to the second, 5

and third embedding the particular doctrine in wider contexts. Now in what way is the reader being addressed here: as just anyone – or as someone who is a noble engaged in government? For it is possible that ren here has at least some of its older meaning of noble: at the outset of the passage Mencius points out that the government of the earlier kings possessed the bu ren zhi xin, and that with this government of the world (tianxia) is like turning something on the palm of your hand. This motif is returned to later in the passage and provides a very evident link to the activities of the governing elite. But we also have to consider the child falling into the well: for clearly the example of the child does not work unless the child is being considered as a ren; and there is no sign of its noble birth in the text at all. So the message is complex: the agent is being addressed as someone interested in government, but someone who is interested in, because moved by, the suffering of anyone (in other words, in the phrase buren ren zhi xin, the second character Romanized ren means human, not noble). Not just anyone is being addressed, but an appeal is being made to a capacity for feeling with universal scope. Note that the example does not include any mention of action; we are moved by the plight of the child, but not moved to action. Furthermore, there is no sign of the agent’s own interest in the quality of their own life. Humans are said to possess the four shoots (siduan) just as they possess their four limbs. Yet nonetheless it seems possible for someone not to possess the shoots. “Looked at in this way someone without a heart of pity and compassion is not a ren.” Here the word ren is clearly, if inexplicitly, being used normatively: you only fall within the concept if you fulfil certain norms (cf. VIa15, and contrast VIa17). So what role does universality play in this story? The reader, with an interest in government is meant to agree to the claim that he has the emotions of pity and compassion for just anyone. The scope of government thus includes just anyone. We have thus two universals: All humans have this sense or these emotions. And these emotions are directed at all people. Thus all humans are both benefactors through and beneficiaries of benevolence (ren). The story consists in reflection on a situation in which we are called on to act or feel in a certain way. While the story itself only concerns compassion and sadness, the further reflections of the four “virtues” provide three other faculties which are said to be the shoots for other virtues – wisdom (zhi), ritual behaviour (li) and justice (yi). It is noticeable that there is not here any one term covering the four ‘virtues’ as they are commonly known. Thus one interest in universality – the abstraction from particular virtues to the concept they fall under found in Aristotle is not to be found here. All humans are said to have to four shoots within themselves and to know how to spread them and fulfil them (cf. VII B31.1-2 for the thought that benevolence and justice 6

come about by this process of extending a natural faculty, also VIIA15); clearly this is practical knowledge, and it is being attributed to all humans; it is something they have in their “self” (wo). The structure of this knowledge is unclear; for example, what makes it knowledge, and what quite is the object of this knowledge. It is also puzzling that there is also, besides this knowledge, the sense of approval and disapproval, which is the shoot of knowledge (IIa6.5). The reason that knowledge is so interesting from the point of view of universality is that one might be tempted to think that what is known is universal – the definitions, for example, that are among the axioms of Aristotelian science. But in point of the objects of knowledge, nothing is said about universality or particularity. Instead, the emphasis is on spreading the natural faculty, so as to encompass “all within the seas”. This increase in generality can be compared with an interesting passage in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Z 3 1029b5-7), in which he says that the progress of moral education leads from something good to the individual to something universally good. Several points of discrepancy should also be mentioned: Mencius is concerned with concrete rulership: talking to potential statesmen and rulers he is talking about the rule they may exercise. The universals meant by Aristotle may be but need not be enshrined in a concrete polity. But perhaps one should also allow this possibility for Mencius, if in a slightly different way. For of course he is, like all Confucian thinkers familiar with the advisor who is unemployed. He knows how the tianxia is to be ordered, but may not do it. At any rate, it would appear that the start of the process lies in the family for Mencius. Further considerations about the four shoots are of course also universal; but I think also exhortative; they form a reflection on ethical concepts, to be applied by the reader to themselves. Let us look at Mencius’ aim. The conclusions to be drawn from the story are about government: the universality of the four shoots is meant to recommend a kind of government informed by compassion for all; the absence of the four shoots makes the basic form of communal living in the family impossible. What can one say about the universality to be achieved by expanding the four shoots? Is the claim here on the level of the agent or of their reflection? The levels do not seem at the first glance to be differentiated. We might appear to have a kind of grounding of ethical universals in non-ethical universals, namely human nature. It must be said that I doubt whether for Mencius one can really talk about human nature in abstraction from its moral aspects, even if he does compare the possession of the fours shoots with the possession of our four limbs; presumably the four limbs are part of our xing (and note VIa3.2). He does not seem to give a list of all the constituents of human nature. In which case, at least internal to Mencius’ own thought, these are purely ethical universals, though not of course in the context of his competitors; that is the point of the argument with 7

Gao Zi (VIa1-4).3 How does Mencius consider his utterances? Two texts give at least some indication. VI a1 suggests that he thinks that what he says will make people love benevolence (ren) and justice (yi). VIa9 suggests that he thinks his audiences with the king can make the latter wise (zhi), and that this is a process of growth. This metaphor fits IIa6 very well, with the talk of shoots (and cf. VIa8); it is not clear how knowledge fits with the other virtues, whether, for example, knowledge is in some way basic to all other virtues for Mencius as phronêsis is for Aristotle, for example. IIa6 suggests rather that benevolence is primary in some sense. A final text in which Mencius reflects again on speaking (yan), here also primarily with rulers and advisers, suggests that the reason he has no choice but to speak is that otherwise the rule of the kings (their “dao”) would not assert itself (IIa2.11, 17). Concluding remarks This paper is about the importance of universality and its varieties in Mencius and Aristotle. One advantage of the model we have been pursuing is that it enables one to make room for particularist concerns: all morality grounds in the lived life of a community. But reflection on this morality can well situate it in a universal context. Mencius does not use universal statements as premises in arguments; rather he uses it in such a way that the reader has no choice apparently but to include himself in the scope of Mencius’ claims: universality is used to apply pressure to the reader. The speech act is thus not so much an assertion, but an exhortation. Let us in closing recall some restrictions on universality in Aristotle. Firstly, particulars must be knowable for the phronimos. Secondly even in areas where there are universals, these cannot cover all cases. Therefore the judge or statesman needs to use equity (epieikeia) to judge cases that had not been foreseen when laws were being made (EN V 10). This would seem to be a general aspect of ethical thought for Aristotle: he thinks we should not demand of ethics the precision we would of mathematics for example. Here again, his target is Plato who would consider the good to be subject of the most precise science. The addressees of the ethics in both thinkers considered here are statesmen, would-be statesmen and pupils. The fact that at one level this is clearly the public for both thinkers does not preclude reflection at a deeper, universal level in both cases.

3

To what extent does Mencius have a classification of things? To what extent does the problem of classification interest him, and in what way? These are fascinating questions I pass over here. See for example IVB19, III A1, III B9.

8