The Eu Constitution--the New Backbone Of The Union

The EU Constitution: The New Backbone of the Union

09/11/04 Chris Haynes 0029115

Introduction On Friday, June 18th, 2004, the European Union’s 25 member states reached an agreement on the composition of the constitution of the EU. The European Convention looked at a wide range of changes in designing the proposed new EU structure, from the powers of the EU vis-à-vis its members states to foreign affairs. In between one also comes across decision making powers and voting rights, the reforming of institutions, defence policy and even a clause for members wanting to leave the Union. Though countries have yet to ratify the constitution, whether by referendum or parliamentary resolution, they would be wise to do so.

This essay attempts to answer why the EU requires a constitution, and what its advantages and disadvantages are. To do so I will explore what the constitution says about the different institutions of the EU and different perspectives on the implications of the new constitution on the EU and its people. I will talk about the provisions in the constitution covering voting, decision making and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, give one example of opposition European integration and discuss why the EU needs a constitution and its benefits.

What the new constitution says Despite some anxious speculation to the contrary, the intent of the constitution is not to create a new superstate. EU member states retain their veto in the areas of foreign policy, defence and taxation. In other words, unanimous decisions are required to enact EU policy in these fields. Thus, in framing a common defence policy, nothing will be

imposed on states without their agreement. They can opt out if national governments decide to do so. (BBC) Member states also have the final say in imposing sanctions on other members that do not comply with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the Stability and Growth Pact. (Crum, 333)

While unanimity borders impossibility in such a pluralistic union, in many policy areas it has given way to qualified majority voting (QMV). In other areas, QMV replaces the weighted voting procedure. QMV is, according to the constitution, at least 55% of the Council representing 15 member states and 65% of the population of the Union. (BBC) The European Parliament (EP) was granted the power of co decision with the European Council. In other words, if the EP does not agree to the proposed legislation, it will not pass. (BBC)

Another document the constitution has incorporated is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Written up at a previous convention in 2000 and praised at Nice, the Charter is designed to enshrine the freedom, equality, solidarity and justice of its citizens in a single document. The Charter gives the European Court of Justice the power to suspend the rights of a member state if it violates the rights of its citizens (or otherwise violates the constitution). It presents stipulations on most issues in justice and home affairs, such as asylum and immigration, crime and cooperation between court and police force. Finally, it makes (albeit vague) attempts to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law not only in Europe but around the world. (Europa)

The constitution has done away with the old pillar structure and extended its rights into new areas such as justice policy, and has generally retained those it had in other areas, including external trade, eurozone monetary policy and several domestic legal areas. These stipulations mean “a greater role for the EU in more aspects of life. In some areas, the EU will have exclusive competence, in others a shared competence and in yet more, only a supporting role.” (BBC)

Opposition to European integration The naysayers to the integration process have various reasons for their opposition. The permissive consensus of the 1970s gave way to increased enthusiasm in many parts of Europe for the economic benefits of the Common Market in the 1980s. But more recently, as integration has accelerated, opposition has become louder. For example, referenda or government decisions have revealed, in the UK, Denmark and Sweden, a refusal to adopt the Euro, one of the chief signs of a country’s Europeanness. While some hold that nationalism is restraining integration, Lauren McLaren of the University of Nottingham believes that this is unlikely. Firstly, it is important to remember that securing the peace in Europe was the prime reason for integration from the Schuman Plan to today. (McLaren, 896) National identity was a large cause of the many historic wars on the continent and the EU significantly reduces calls to nationalism. Her findings show an interesting lack of real concern about loss of national identity among those surveyed, and many of those that do fear that their culture is threatened are still content to live in the EU for the other benefits it proffers. (898) Adopting a utilitarian approach, McLaren finds

that certain economic factors are more likely to cause opposition to the integration of one’s country with the EU.

The free movement of capital and labour risks alienating those not in a position to take advantage of it. Firms can move from the UK to say, Slovenia, where labour is cheaper. British citizens lose their jobs. Slovenes can move to the UK and compete with locals for employment; British citizens could still lose their jobs. Furthermore, the fiscal requirements for participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the Euro are strict. Member states are having to tighten the leash on social welfare benefits, and labourers and the poor, especially in the more social democratic states, are of course the ones hardest hit. Some of these people are eurosceptics. Some, however, see other benefits to integration, such as a generally more powerful economy, and continue to support the EU. (899-901)

Why does the EU require a constitution? Until the drafting of the constitution in 2004, the vertebrae of the EU were encapsulated in its various treaties and agreements. Since Maastricht in 1992, the norm has been to constantly reform and improve on treaties (leading to Amsterdam and Nice) to move toward a closer economic and political union. (Crum, 323)

Replacing weighted voting with QMV is a step toward ensuring a more representative and thus democratic decision making process, one of the outstated goals of the Convention. Moreover, the clauses that previously required unanimity, meaning that

member states could veto many decisions, now require QMV as well. This move will speed up decision making in the Union and, as it seems to remove a certain national check on the EU’s power, could lead to a closer union among members as coalition building and compromise or win win solutions are sought. The reforms to the EP have strengthened it as a democratic institution, and given that it is the only directly elected of the EU institutions, is something decision makers should be proud of. In addition, now that the EP has power over budgets and budgetary controls, it has more power and a wider scope than previously.

The constitution cleans up many of the ambiguities left by the previous treaties and simplyfies most of the processes of the EU institutions. It has given the ECJ a firmer mandate by providing a clear set of rules for the EU and its members and citizens, and by stating clearly, "the Constitution and law adopted by the Union institutions in exercising competence conferred upon it by the Constitution shall have primacy over the law of the member states." (BBC)

One area where primacy over member states should be welcomed is in economic policy. It is fair to assume that, given the current economic and development policies of the EU, the Central Bank and EP will uphold the principles of economic growth better than the individual states. These principles are required to meet “services of general economic interest,” a fuzzy assertion of their good intentions, and, more specifically, “measures to combat major cross border health scourges.” (Crum, 334)

Finally, the clause allowing the withdrawal of members from the Union was a smart and necessary move. In the first place, like any other alliance, there should be provisions to withdraw and they should not make it easy to do so. Prospective states can feel more at ease knowing that joining the EU does not have to be for good, and thus will join more readily. Simultaneously, a formal procedure with difficult terms to abide by is reasonable because of the concessions the member states likely made to allow the exiting member to join originally.

Conclusion The advantages and disadvantages of the new constitution depend on one’s viewpoint. While it takes some power away from member states than it had before, it has also become more democratic in its operations by giving more power to a direcly elected body, and has streamlined the decision making process and provided for easier decisions. The inclusion of such essential elements as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights has put the question of rights and freedoms at the forefront of EU politics, given the ECJ a clearer mandate and simplified rules and rulemaking in the EU. While some so called eurosceptics have reasons to dislike the EU, and indeed, some probably lose something upon its creation and its new doctrines in the constitution, for the vast majority the constitution is likely to be an improvement over the past set of treaties and a clear roadmap for the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2950276.stm#decision Tuesday, June 22, 2004.

Crum, Ben: Towards Finality? An assessment of the achievements of the European Convention. In Amy Verdun and Osvaldo Croci (eds.): Institutional and Policy-Making Challenges to the European Union in the Wake of Enlargement. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press; New York: PalgraveMacmillan, pp 323-53.

Europa: Gateway to the European Union: http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/index_en.html

McLaren, Lauren M.: Opposition to European integration and fear of loss of national identity: Debunking a basic assumption regarding hostility to the integration project. European Journal of Political Research, October 2004, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 895-912(18).