The End Of Development

Contents

Acknowledgements

ix

1

Introduction: The End of Development?

2

From Post-Modernity to Post-Development 2.1 Introduction 2.2 From Modernity to Post-Modernity 2.3 Post-Development and its Discontents 2.4 Conclusions

12 12 13 28 43

3

Discourse of Power or Truth? 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Archeologies and Genealogies 3.3 Discourse Ethics and the Problems of Application

45 45 46 59

4

Towards a Development of Least Violence? 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Deconstruction at First Sight 4.3 Ethics as First Philosophy 4.4 A Philosophy of the Least Violence 4.5 Undecidability and the Decision 4.6 Deconstruction, Politics, Development 4.7 Conclusions

74 74 76 80 89 95 106 114

5

New Social Movements: A Subject of Development? 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Social Movements and Permanent Revolution 5.3 An Islamic Politics of Least Violence? 5.4 Conclusions

117 117 124 132 140

6

Aid and the Principle of Least Violence 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Participation as a Development of Least Violence 6.3 Conclusions

142 142 146 158

7

Conclusion

160

Bibliography Index

1

165 171

1

Introduction: The End of Development?

Towards the end of the 1980s a crisis emerged in development theory. Initially, this was referred to as the ‘impasse’. Most of the traditional theories that were used to examine and delineate development were regarded as having fallen into doubt (e.g. modernisation theory, the various forms of underdevelopment theory and more recently neo-liberalism). Leftist strategies of development were at least partially, if not wholly discredited by the collapse of communism, whilst theories that advocated a development path based on the Western capitalist model were also seen as having delivered few if any of the benefits that they had seemed to promise. Many parts of the ‘Third World’ had been struggling under the weight of accumulated debts to the industrialised countries for more than a decade, while also attempting to apply the market-influenced Structural Adjustment Programmes that had been forced on them by the West, in particular the Washington institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Structural adjustment was supposed to create the conditions for economic growth in the Third World by removing obstacles to the efficient operation of the free market. By the end of the 1980s (indeed up to the present day) there was (and still is) little evidence that the ubiquitous Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) had stimulated any growth, or created conditions conducive to growth. Under these circumstances it was hardly surprising that many of those involved in development began to feel that the old theories had failed (a notable exception included those practitioners and academics who were associated with the Washington, and other aid institutions, that had made a considerable intellectual and financial investment in such strategies as SAPs). The question was where to go from that position. Such was the nature of the ‘impasse’. In the absence of any trustworthy theoretical grounding many theorists have sought a path through the impasse by reference to the body of theory variously known as ‘post-modernism’, or poststructuralism. Post-modernism is associated with a wide body of theory 1

2

The End of Development?

by analysts as various as Jean Baudrillard, Jean Francois Lyotard, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Fredric Jameson. Although post-modernism is notoriously difficult to define, it is possible to point to certain themes, or tendencies, that are associated with this type of thinking (post-modernity is too diffuse to refer to it as a school of thought). In particular, postmodernists tend to take a critical position with regard to the habits of thought associated with modernity (although, as we shall see, some of them are more sympathetic than others to the body of ideas that is usually associated with modernity). Aspects of modern thinking that are often subjected to post-modern critique include the belief that history incorporates a teleology of progress, that if one examines human history one can detect a process of progress towards greater levels of civilisation, or towards human emancipation. Classical Marxist theory would represent one example of such a teleological theory, in that human society is seen as progressing from one socio-economic stage of development to another more advanced one, the culmination of this process being achieved with the establishment of communism, the most advanced form of society, and the goal of history. Post-modern theorists would deny that such a dynamic of progress is built into history, and would reject the possibility that there could be such a thing as the goal of history. History is viewed simply as a contingent succession of events. Postmodernists would also tend to criticise what is often viewed as a peculiarly modernist faith in the ability of humankind to improve their conditions through science, broadly conceived as the ability to mould and shape their world through the application of technology and such methods as rational techniques of planning. This is not to say that post-modernists argue that technology and planning never result in the desired, or at least beneficial outcomes, although some come quite close to such a position at times (e.g. Paul Feyerabend on science). However, they are usually suspicious of the ability of planners and social engineers to achieve their supposedly benign objectives for society (and this is to leave aside the possibility that they may express such benign objectives as a cover for less generally beneficial aims). The above does not amount to anything like a full definition of post-modernism. However, it does indicate that certain problems arise out of post-modernism for the related concepts of development and aid. After all, most, if not all of the traditional development theories, whether of the left or the right, took the form of teleolog-

Introduction: The End of Development?

3

ical theories that envisaged development in terms of achievement of some sort of societal end goal, such as communism in the case of the former group, or capitalism in the case of the latter. Postmodernists would not only dismiss leftist theorists who saw history as a progress towards communism, but also pro-capitalist theories, such as that of Rostow, who argued that all societies progressed through five stages of development, culminating in the achievement of high mass consumerism on the American model. It also follows from the above observations that post-modernists would be critical of the whole enterprise of development planning, both at the macrolevel of national and regional planning, and at the micro-level of designing specific project interventions, such as an agricultural, health or educational project. Indeed, there are plenty of examples of development plans and projects that misfire for a variety of reasons, including poor design, failure to anticipate operational or other problems, bureaucratic inefficiency or lack of capacity and so forth. Given the plenitude of such evidence and the post-modern suspicion of teleology and planning, it is hardly surprising that the theorists who took a post-modern route out of the impasse often ended by taking a rejectionist position towards development. One of the first examples of this post-development line of thinking was The Development Dictionary, published in 1992. Its editor, Wolfgang Sachs debunked development in the following terms: The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical conditions which catapulted the idea into prominence have vanished: development has become outdated. But above all, the hopes and desires that made the idea fly, are now exhausted: development has grown obsolete. (Sachs, 1992: 1) In the same volume, Gustavo Esteva provides a powerful critique of the word ‘development’ examining its origins as a Western concept and the way in which it has been used by imperial powers of various stripes as a support for their own ideological projects of domination. He also notes the changing content of the word, as it has moved from denoting an essentially economic process of growth to take on other connotations such as participation and human-centred development (Esteva, in Sachs, 1992: 6–25). Sachs

4

The End of Development?

comments that ‘development has become an amoeba-like concept, shapeless but ineradicable’, with ‘contours so blurred it denotes nothing ...’ (Sachs, 1992: 4). This renders it eminently clear that as far as the authors are concerned the whole enterprise of development should be abandoned as having done far more harm than good. Over the next few years The Development Dictionary was joined by a number of other volumes that variously used elements of post-modern theory to critique, and often to reject the idea of development. Arturo Escobar used critical techniques associated with Michel Foucault to analyse and dismiss development as a discourse in Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World published in 1995. Discourse may be defined as referring to bodies of ideas and concepts, or theory, which mediate power through their effects upon the way we act (this is a rather simplistic definition, but discourse will be dealt with in greater detail in future chapters). The same year saw the publication of the reader edited by Jonathan Crush, Power of Development, which gathered together a number of articles (including an excerpt from Escobar’s book) that took a similar approach to the analysis of development. M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton also used techniques influenced by Foucault to trace the history of development as an idea in Doctrines of Development (1996), although they take a more nuanced approach of criticising what they see as the negative and repressive content of the concept of development in the hope of liberating it for a more progressive and emancipatory reading. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree edited The Post-Development Reader (1997), in which they gathered a variety of readings that were critical of aspects of development. In his afterword Rahnema used elements of Foucauldian thought together with aspects of Ghandian and Confucian thinking to argue for the rejection of development. Esteva, together with Madhu Suri Prakash, produced Grassroots Post-Modernism: Remaking the Soil of Cultures (1998), which argued once again that development had done more harm than good, and that emancipation of the world’s social majorities (so-called because the majority of the world’s population are those living at the grass roots in the Third World, although there are concentrations of the poor in the North) is best left to movements originating with those social majorities (a position similar to that put by Escobar). Numerous periodical articles and other publications could be cited that take a similar line. It would seem that we have a new ‘post-development’ school of thought, or

Introduction: The End of Development?

5

discourse, emerging, which coheres around the central contentions that development has been harmful, and that consequently it should be consigned to the dustbin of history in order to make way for new strategies of emancipation associated with what are sometimes referred to as ‘new social movements’ originating in the ‘Third World’, such as the Zapatistas of Mexico. This is a line of thought that many find persuasive given the plentiful evidence of the ill effects that can be attributed to development initiatives in many countries, and the evident bankruptcy of so many of the theories that have been used to justify development. There is also much persuasive analysis in the above-mentioned volumes and associated post-development writings. Cowen and Shenton’s analysis of the concept of development is undeniably scholarly and cogent, revealing much about the body of ideas that have fed into the genesis of development as a discourse. Similarly, Escobar’s critique of neo-liberal development theory (particularly that underlying the aforementioned SAPs) is trenchant, while Esteva and Prakash provide some convincing arguments against development policies predicated on human rights. One could point to other instances of worthwhile analysis associated with post-development thinking. However, the point of this book is that the author fundamentally disagrees with some of the main contentions of this line of thought. This book will argue that the post-development school’s call for the end of development is misconceived and precipitate and that its view as to what should follow development raises problems that can be more effectively solved within the context of a pro-development approach. It is hoped that this book will make a contribution towards the elaboration of such an approach. What then is wrong with post-development thinking? In the first instance it is worth observing that although many post-development thinkers have made use of post-modern analysis, they have not always used it particularly effectively, and they do not appear to have read very widely. The majority of the above-mentioned authors have tended to use the body of theory developed by Michel Foucault. However, as we shall see, their use of his theory is incomplete in the sense that they focus on techniques of analysis that he developed in his earlier works, and they have failed to take on board all the nuances that Foucault later added to these methods. Further, they have failed to address some significant critiques of Foucault’s methodology by such commentators as Jurgen Habermas. In

6

The End of Development?

addition there are many other post-modern or critical thinkers whose ideas could have been examined such as Jacques Derrida and Emanuel Levinas (whose ideas will be considered in Chapter 4 of this book). One might also have expected a little more attention to be paid to the work of Habermas, whose position as a prominent critic of post-modernity should have alerted post-development analysts to the fact that there are alternative positions to the ones that they have embraced. A central argument running through this book will be that a more thorough reading of some of these alternatives leads to quite different conclusions than those asserted by the post-development theorists. For example, a common position in poststructuralist theory holds that the meaning of any word, or signifier, will be characterised by slippage from one context to the next. However, as we have seen, Sachs and Esteva point out such slippage in the meaning of the word ‘development’ only as an occasion for derision. This book will argue that any worthwhile definition of development will necessarily be unstable. Furthermore, it will argue for a conception of development that is centrally concerned with emancipation. In this sense development may be considered as entailing achievement of the freedom of a community, nation, or group, to pursue its own projects for realisation of a good life on the proviso that it does the least possible harm to others. Such a definition can never be finalised inasmuch as it connotes a wide variety of actual and possible projects. We shall also use the work of Jacques Derrida to argue that any attempt at presenting a complete definition is bound to fail since it will inevitably omit and repress projects that may legitimately be identified as falling within the ambit of development. This implies that existing attempts to provide complete definitions of development are likely to be exclusory and therefore repressive. Some may be deliberately repressive as in the case of movements that premise one group’s development as being dependent on exclusion of another group. Others may be more open being concerned with the emancipation of the social majorities in the Third World. This reading of the development discourse is suggestive that the word is a vigorously contested one. Indeed, various interests compete to move this discourse in the directions that they respectively favour, some of which might be deemed conservative in that they involve various forms of closure, whilst others are more emancipatory. This contestation is not suggestive that development is redundant, or in any sense a fit subject for ridicule.

Introduction: The End of Development?

7

Rather, it is indicative that development is a contested ground. To be sure, when conservative forces manage to gain control of the development agenda the results for the social majorities are often deleterious, as when the British Conservative Government of the 1980s used its aid budget to fund projects such as the notorious Pergau Dam in Malaysia (which was condemned as being ecologically and socially harmful, as well as cost inefficient) on the proviso that the Malaysian Government would buy British arms. However, the converse of this is that progressive forces can campaign to prevent such abuses and to move the development agenda in more inclusive directions. The contention of this book is that there is more to be gained by doing precisely that rather than taking a rejectionist position like the post-development theorists. Those who subscribe to a post-development position would tend to retort that progressive initiatives are certain to be coopted by conservative forces and turned against the interests of the social majorities. Alternatively, they would argue that the development discourse is itself based on Western ideas of progress and therefore cannot help but take the form of an imposition of those ideas on the South, thus repressing local cultures and interests. With regard to the first point, it seems likely that conservative groups will try to gain control of progressive initiatives, and in many instances they may succeed – but does that invalidate the efforts of progressive forces to gain control of the development agenda? To the extent that their efforts result in activities that are beneficial to those at the grass roots, surely not (on the proviso that the judgement of what is beneficial is made by those at the grass roots rather than by a bureaucrat from the aid agency). The second argument has more complex ramifications in that it suggests that the development discourse cannot help but be imperialist because it represents an imposition of the power of one set of interests, what Esteva and Prakash refer to as the social minorities (largely, though not exclusively, concentrated in the North), over another set of interests, the social majorities. However, as we shall see, it can equally be argued that all discourses can be seen as impositions of power by one interest over another. Moreover, the outcome of such an act of power need not necessarily be wholly deleterious for those subjected to that act. It could actually have beneficial effects. This line of argument is suggestive that it is pointless to reject development for being implicated with the application of power. Rather, it is indicative once again that interests associated with the social majorities should

8

The End of Development?

endeavour to exert their power effectively to move the development agenda in progressive directions that will benefit and empower the social majorities. It can also be argued that objective conditions in the Third World demand an active effort to ensure that the development discourse is won for the progressive agenda. There is much evidence to suggest that the majority of people in the ‘Third World’ are experiencing deteriorating living conditions. Escobar notes this, pointing out that statistics on growing hunger, the ‘Third World debt crisis, and destruction of the rain forest are all likely to be used to promote the view that aid and development are necessary’ (1995: 213). He would wish to resist such a conclusion given that he analyses development as a discourse of power that is used to the detriment of the social majorities. However, if we accept the above arguments that the agenda set by the development discourse can be moved in an emancipatory direction, Escobar’s argument falls. His fears that a strengthened development discourse will be bad for the social majorities would be borne out to the extent that development policy is dominated by those who wish to exploit the Third World. But this is not an inevitable outcome. The need to prevent such an outcome makes it all the more urgent to exert pressure to ensure that an emancipatory direction is taken. Indeed, it could be argued that a moral impetus is active here directing those forces sympathetic to the social majorities to actively campaign for a progressive development discourse. It would be immoral for the North to evade its responsibility to assist the social majorities at a time when their living conditions are deteriorating, in some cases to the point where life can no longer be supported. This leads us to one of the difficulties raised by the post-development scenario of emancipation led by the new social movements, which is in essence an ethical problem. We have already observed that an integral element of the post-development scenario (for most though not all of the analysts mentioned above) is that the North should cease intervening in the affairs of the social majorities through its development policies. One might ask if this leaves any acceptable role for the North in a post-development Third World, or if any intervention is to be seen as interference? As we shall see, postdevelopment thinkers seem undecided on this and no clear position has emerged. This question becomes even more complex if we pose it in terms of intervention by the social minorities rather than by the North. After all, many of the post-development thinkers are

Introduction: The End of Development?

9

members of the social minorities even if they have originated in the Third World. They work in Western universities, and many of them have worked in aid organisations. Yet they clearly feel that their intervention is justified. At the risk of presumption, one suspects that they feel an obligation to intervene in the attempt to help those who can be seen to be in need of assistance. A central contention of this book is that members of the social minorities are ethically obliged to assist the social majorities. However, it is clear that not all forms of such intervention would be acceptable. The post-development thinkers are correct to note that many of the interventions that have taken place under the rubric of development have been repressive and disruptive of local societies and cultures. In future chapters we shall argue that there are ethically acceptable models for provision of assistance available within the development discourse. An ethical problem also arises with the post-development school’s entrustment of the emancipatory project to the new social movements. This category covers a wide variety of groupings and organisations emanating from the grass roots of the Third World, ranging through the Chipko Movement to preserve the forest in Bangladesh, the Zapatistas of Mexico, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and the various Islamist movements operating in many parts of the Middle East. Are we to take a relativist position in which the products and characteristics of each culture are regarded as equally legitimate and consequently argue that all of these movements are legitimate representatives of emancipation in their respective areas of the world? Most of the post-development thinkers give a very clear negative answer to this contention. Some are to be accepted as genuinely emancipatory movements while others are not. For example, Esteva and Prakash embrace the Zapatistas as a genuine post-development emancipatory movement, but reject any claims that Islamic fundamentalist movements might have to such a status. Their reasons for such a decision are never clearly explained. This is a serious oversight. Clearly, we are all likely to feel that some movements or causes are worthy of our support. It may be that their objectives seem so meritorious that we feel a moral compulsion to offer our support to them. Equally, there will be some organisations that we feel unable to support, indeed, their objectives may seem so undesirable that we feel obliged to oppose them. The crucial issue here is the reasoning underlying our decision. In considering the process of how we reach such decisions we must have reference to another common position in post-modern thinking to the effect that

10

The End of Development?

we are all perspectival. This means that we are only able to think from within our own perspectives, each of which is characterised by its own normative biases and cultural, or other values. Consequently, each of us is biased and what seems right and justifiable to one may seem pernicious and wrong to another. The hostility to Islamic fundamentalism displayed by Esteva and Prakash may well seem like an unreasonable prejudice to an observer from the Muslim world. In deciding which causes we support as legitimate and which ones we reject as harmful, or misguided, we are obliged to explain ourselves. It seems inevitable to this author that such explanations will have an ethical dimension given that they deal in classifying what is right, in the sense of being worthy of support, and what is wrong, or undeserving of support. Given that we are operating across cultural boundaries this is complicated because we are dealing with different perspectives that have different ideas of what is right and what is wrong. This suggests that we must have reference to an ethics that is universal and that is not founded within a particular cultural tradition with its partial biases. In future chapters we shall examine the possibility for such an ethics. It will be argued that certain elements of post-modern and critical thought, particularly that associated with Derrida and Levinas, provide the basis for such an approach that will enable us to make distinctions between the new social movements. To summarise, the central purpose of this book is to reject the calls for the end of development, and to utilise post-modern and critical theory to demonstrate that there can after all be forms of development that are complementary to the emancipatory projects of the new social movements. The character of this development would be guided by an ethics based on the deconstructive thinking of Derrida, which is in turn influenced by the ethical philosophy of Levinas. The argument of the book will be organised as follows. Chapter 2 will initially examine some central themes in post-modern thinking, particularly inasmuch as they have a bearing on the post-development debate. It will then pass on to a more detailed consideration of the post-development literature, demonstrating that it has imported certain problems from post-modern thought, notably that of relativism. In Chapter 3, we shall proceed to an examination of some of the post-modern and critical literature that has been employed in post-development thought. Firstly, the work of Foucault will be examined to demonstrate some of the problems in his work that have been ignored by such commentators as Escobar and Rahnema.

Introduction: The End of Development?

11

A consideration of the critique addressed to Foucault by Habermas will lead to an analysis of the latter’s work to assess what light it may shed on questions pertaining to development. Chapter 4 will focus on the work of Derrida and Levinas, explicating various attempts to synthesise Derrida’s technique of deconstruction with the Levinasian view of ethics. This chapter will culminate in a consideration of how a deconstructionist ethics might be applied in a political context. In Chapter 5 we shall examine a number of the new social movements, applying the ‘ethical/deconstructive’ approach outlined in Chapter 4 to them. Chapter 6 will apply this viewpoint to aid policy and its application, raising the questions as to what forms of development aid actually assist in the emancipation of the social majorities and are ethically acceptable, with a view to indicating the direction that a viable development policy might take in the future.

Index Compiled by Sue Carlton

al-Quaida group 132 al-Shaab group 138 Allende, Salvador 144 Alvarez, S. 120 American War of Independence 98–9, 103 An-Naim, A. 133–6 apartheid 23 aporia 96–9 ‘archaeology’ 47 arche 24 arche-writing 89–90, 92, 93, 95, 98, 104 Arkhoun, M. 132–3 arms industry 108 aufhebung 97 autonomy, individual 19, 20, 38 Bacon, Francis 15 Baker, R. 137–8 Bali 144 Bangladesh 9 Barangay Amar Farmer’s Association 153 Barangay Taludtod 154 Bauman, Z. 82 Bawtree, V. 4, 38 Beardsworth, R. 75, 92, 93–4, 96, 98 Benhabib, S. 62 Bennington, G. 75, 98, 104, 106 Blaug, R. 62–8, 71, 72, 117, 126, 162 Boran people, East Africa 37, 38 bottom-up development 32, 159, 163 see also participatory development Boyle, Robert 15 Burke, E. 22 Burkey, S. 146, 148, 151–2, 154, 157 Burnell, P. 143–4

Cambodia 114 Canada 69, 153 capitalism 38, 108–9, 113, 117, 162 and development 39, 116 categorical imperatives 84, 85 change agents dangers of 153, 156, 157–8 making contact 152–3 role of 146, 150–2 understanding community 148–9 Chiapas 124, 125, 128, 131 Chile 144 China 39, 114 Chipko 9, 158 Clarkson, L. 38 class struggle 110, 111–12 closure 6, 110, 118, 123, 128–9 and consensus 163 and exclusion 94, 97, 115, 117, 126, 131 and revolution 113, 128 COCEI (Coalition of Workers, Peasants and Students of the Isthmus) 129–31, 140, 141, 163 Cohen, J.N. 85 Colombia 31, 32 communication 61 see also language; meaning Communism 1, 2, 111 see also Marxism communities, and ethical relationship 86–7 Comstock, D.E. 149–50 Confucius 40, 118 conscientisation (animation) 146, 150, 151, 157 consensus 63, 68–70, 115, 127, 163 Copernicus 14 Cowen, M.P. 4, 5, 39, 40, 41–4 Critchley, S. 76, 80, 83–8, 96, 101–2, 106

171

172

The End of Development?

Crush, J. 4 cultural relativism 27, 35–7, 53, 69–70 Dagnino, E. 121–2, 123, 140, 141 Dahl, G. 38 decisions and exclusions 91–3, 101, 105, 106 through ‘other in me’ 104–5 and undecidability 88–9, 95–106 deconstruction 74, 75, 76–80 and decision-making 104–5 and democracy 106–7 and difference 115 and ethics 84, 86, 88, 96, 103, 115 implications for action 105–14 as philosophy of least violence 89–95, 105, 115 see also principle of least violence and politics 78–9, 100–6, 115 and relationship to the other 96, 97 democracy 87–8, 94–5, 106–7, 113, 127–8 and exclusion 106, 107 promise of 109–10, 114 and vernacular societies 39–40 Derrida, J. 10–11, 74–80, 133 decision-making 95–8, 101, 106 linguistics 89–93, 95, 115 politics and ethics 100–14, 116, 161, 162 Descartes, R. 15, 16, 17, 24 development benefits to people 31, 33, 50 capabilities and entitlements 43 concept of 3–4 as continuous process 162–3, 164 and emancipation 4–5, 6, 8, 9, 52 as harmful 4, 34, 38, 41, 115, 142, 145, 161 and imposition of power 7–8 need for 160 objectives of 162, 164 planning 2–3, 29

and politico-diplomatic considerations 143–5 and power relations 28, 29–30 and progress 7, 8, 41 reform of 50 slippage in meaning 6 and women 31, 33 see also participatory development development agencies and openness 63 support for NSMs 79 development discourse 29–32 as creator of Third World problems 28–9, 31, 46, 48 history of 40–1 ‘differance’ 78 discipline 47–8, 49, 56, 57, 58 discourse and power 28, 45, 47, 49, 51, 57–8 and relativism 57 and truth 28, 51, 54, 56, 60 discourse ethics 59–73, 115, 162–3 and cultural difference 69–70, 71–2 implementation 63–8, 71 and judgements 65–6, 67–8 disempowerment 29, 63 Dreyfus, H.L. and S. 67 Dryzek, J.S. 64 Dupré, L. 13, 16, 25 ‘economy of violence’ 93 Egypt 137–9, 144 Egyptian War 138 Ehteshami, A. 132 emancipation 4–5, 6, 8 as continuous process 150 and democracy 107 and NSMs 5, 9, 52 and participatory development 148, 158 Enlightenment 13, 20, 46 Escobar, A. 4, 5, 8, 28–33, 45, 50, 55 relativism 36, 43 top-down development 142, 143 Esteva, G. concept of development 3, 6

Index critique of development 4, 5, 7 and emancipatory movements 9, 10, 12, 33–7, 124, 129, 131 relativism 35–7, 43 and vernacular societies 37, 118, 140 ethical relationship 59, 81, 82, 83–4, 85 and third party 86–8, 101, 102–3 and violence 95 ethics as first philosophy 80–9 pervertibility of 104 and rigid systems 80, 88 universal 10 and violence 104 see also ethical relationship ethnic cleansing 25, 53, 71–2 EU aid 144 exclusion 59, 73, 91–8, 129–30 and capitalism 108–9 and closure 94, 95, 97, 115, 117, 126, 131 and decisions 91–3, 101, 105, 106 and democracy 106, 107 and free speech 63 and violence 93, 94–6, 98, 103–4, 105, 115–16, 117, 131–2 Eyadema, General G. 144 fascism 131 Faurisson, R. 27 feminism 31, 72, 115 see also women Fichte, J.G. 18 Flacks, R. 119, 123 Flynn, T. 47 Foucault, M. 4, 5, 10–11, 28, 45–59, 92 relativism 51–3, 72 validity of theories 51, 58 foundationalism 20–1, 23–6, 27–8, 45, 77–8, 115 and exclusions 43, 59, 62, 75, 89 and vernacular societies 39–40 Fox, R. 149–50 France 144 Fraser, N. 51 free market 1, 38, 112

173

free speech 63–4 freedom 94, 103–4 Freire, P. 145–6, 157 French Revolution 22 Freud, S. 97 Fukuyama, F. 107 ‘genealogy’ 47, 49, 56 globalisation 112, 120 God 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 Gramsci, A. 121, 122 Gulag Archipelago 22 Gulen, F. 139–40 Gulf War 138 Habermas, J. 5, 6, 45–6, 54, 59–73 and difference 115 ideal speech situation 61, 63–5, 117, 126, 163 Hand, S. 81 Hegel, G.W.F. 93, 110 Heidegger, M. 83 Held, D. 61 Heller, A. 23–4, 26 hierarchical observation 48 history, and progress 2–3 Hizb al-Wasat 138–9 Hobley, M. 155 Hobson, M. 75, 95 Hohengarten, W.M. 60 Holloway, J. 124–5, 126, 127, 128 Holocaust 25, 27, 96 human mind, and a priori knowledge 17–18 humanism 46, 55 Husserl, E.G.A. 24 hypothetical imperatives 85 ideal speech situation (ISS) 61, 63–5, 68, 116, 117, 162–3 and evaluation of emancipatory movements 128, 131, 141, 156–7, 164 implementation problems 71, 72 Ideas of Reason 21–2 ijtihad 134–5 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 1, 21, 63, 108, 109 India 148

174

The End of Development?

individualization 57 Indonesia 144, 157 intervention, justification for 8–9, 159 intimidation 63–4, 67 Iroquois, Canada 38 Islam centrist tendency 137–8, 139 and democracy 132 and relativism 133 and tolerance 139 Islamic fundamentalism 9, 35, 116, 131–40, 163 Islamic truth 133 Java 144, 145 jizya poll tax 134 Johnston, H. 121 Jordan, G. 120 Jucheticos 129, 130 judgement 99–100, 101 ‘judicative’ practices 47 justice 53, 54, 87–8, 102, 103 Kant, I. 17, 18–19, 21, 23, 93–4 Kemp, R. 63, 67 Kenya 144 knowledge and doubt 15 and exclusions 92–3 grounding of 23–4, 26, 27–8 and power 28, 45, 46–9, 58 and reason 16, 17–19 ‘kosmos’ 13–14 Laden, Osama bin 132 language 69, 83, 85, 89–93, 96, 115 Latin America 148 law 103–4 aporia of 96, 97–8 Lee, R. 132 Leibniz, G. 84 Leninism 130 Levinas, E. 10–11, 59, 74–6, 80–7, 95–6, 101–3 linguistics 89–93 ‘logos’ 13–14 Lomé Convention 144 Lorenzano, L. 127

Lyotard, J.-F. 20, 21–3, 27, 74 McNamara, Robert 145 mafia 108 Mahmoud, Ustadh 137 Malaysia 7 mandar obedeciendo (command obeying) 127, 129 Marcos, F.E. (President of Philippines) 144 Marcos, Subcomandante 125–6 Marglin, F.A. and S.A. 41 Marx, K. 42, 107 Marxism 2, 74, 75–6, 109–14, 161, 162 death of 107–8, 111 emancipatory promise of 109–10 and globalisation 112 materiality, mediated by discourse 30 mauvaise conscience 81–2, 83 May, T. 24, 25, 77 meaning and context 90 see also linguistics Megerssa, G. 38 Melucci, A. 119–20, 121 metaphysics 24, 76–7 metaphysics of origins 56–7 metatheories 20–3, 27, 40, 74, 160–1 Mexico 5, 33 Millan, M. 126, 127 min and jen 40, 116, 118 minority interests 71–2, 106, 119 modernity 13–21 Moi, Daniel Arap 144 Montaigne, Michel de 15 morality 82–3 see also ethics Mubarak, Mohammed 144 Mugabe, Robert 114 multiculturalism 70 NAFTA 124 naskh 136, 137 natural order 13–14 nature and science 14–15 unity of 19

Index Nazis/Nazism 25, 26, 27, 35 Nepal-Australia Forestry Project (NAFP) 154–6 ‘new commons’ 34, 35 New International 110, 111, 112, 113, 123, 141 new social movements (NSMs) 5, 79, 117–24, 131, 140–1 and authenticity 117–18, 129, 131 and common ground 111, 121–3, 140–1 and cultural politics 120–1 cultural relativism 53 emancipatory credentials 9–10, 35, 52–4, 79, 118, 129–31, 141, 163 in Islamic world 137–40 and permanent revolution 124–32 and social fragmentation 118–19, 120 and unaccountable power centres 119–20 Newton, I. 17, 18 Nicaragua 144 Nietzsche, F.W. 26, 28, 57 nihilism 12, 26, 54, 74 non-Muslims, and Islamic law 133–4 normalisation 48, 49, 50, 56, 57, 58, 59 norms, universally acceptable 61–3, 65–6 Norris, C. 27, 54, 77 nuclear weapons 108 Oakley, P. 146–8, 150–1, 152–3, 154, 157 Ockham, William of 14–15 Ojibway people, Canada 37 ontologisation 93, 95, 105 ontology 76–7, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87 oppositions/binary pairings 77–8, 86 oppression, spontaneous resistance to 156, 157, 159 ‘organic consistency’ 37 ‘parallel economy’ 34, 35

175

Participatory Action Research (PAR) 148–9 participatory development 32, 146–59 definitions of participation 146–7 and emancipation 148, 158 and empowerment 146, 147, 156 and interests of poor 155, 156 and need for external agency 148 post-development critique of 156–8, 164 and process of democratic learning 149–50 Pelaez, E. 124–5, 126 penal system 47 performative contradiction 51, 58 Pergau Dam 7 perspectivism 26 Philippines 144, 156 Pippin, R. 18 Pol Pot, 114 political correctness 70 politics, and ethics 100–1, 103 Porter, D. 32, 44 post-development theory 3, 4–5, 28–43, 45, 50–1, 160 and post-modern thought 12–13 and violence of exclusion 116 post-modernism 1–3, 4, 5–6, 12–13, 21–8, 59 and relativistic nihilism 74, 75, 79 power centres, unaccountable 119–20 power/knowledge relationship, ambiguity of 49, 50, 51, 54–6, 59 Prakesh, M.S. critique of development 4, 57 and emancipatory movements 9, 10, 12, 33–7, 124, 129, 131 relativism 35–7, 43 and vernacular societies 37, 118, 140 principle of least violence 115, 145, 161–2, 163 and evaluation of emancipatory projects/movements 117, 131, 141, 155, 159, 164 and revolution 114

176

The End of Development?

Principle of Preservation (P) 68, 71, 126 Project Aid 153, 154 proletariat 21–2, 23, 111 promise, Derrida’s concept of 109–10, 133 psychiatry, distorting madness 55, 56 Quebec 69 Qur’an 134–7 Rabinow, P. 49 ‘radical alterity’ 78 Rafiq, Habib 138–9 Rahman, M.A. 146, 149, 154 Rahnema, M. 4, 11, 37–40, 118, 140, 156–8 reality 13–16, 18 reason 16–19, 26 reasoning subject 16, 17–18, 19, 23, 25 reciprocity conditions 62 relativism 12–13, 28, 59, 72, 74, 89, 115 cultural 27, 35–7, 53, 69–70 relativistic trap 26, 36, 45, 51, 56–7, 58, 75 repetition, and identity 90–1, 92, 93, 97 responsibilities, and conflict 100–1 revolution 113–14 Rondinelli, D. 142–3 Rorty, R. 27 Rostow, W.W. 3, 20, 162 Rouse, J. 51, 52, 53 Rubin, J. 129–30 Ryan, A. 75–6, 78–9 Sachs, W. 3–4, 6 San Andres Chicahuaxtla 33, 34 San Cristobal de las Casas 124 SAPRIN (Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network) 120 Sarilakas 153, 154, 156 Saussure, F. de 89–90, 91 Schuurman, F.J. 119

science empirical investigation 14–15, 19 and interpretation 26 moulding nature 2, 15, 19–20 and religious belief 14–15, 19 self care of 58–9 and the other 83 self-reliance 146, 153 Sen, A.K. 42–3 Sendero Luminoso 9, 12, 79 shari’a law 132–7, 139 Shenton, R.W. 4, 5, 39, 40, 41–4 Shining Path, Peru 35 Shura Council Political Parties Committee 139 Sidahmed, A.S. 132 signs and meaning 90–1, 97 see also linguistics silencing 63–4, 67 Simons, J. 46, 53–4 skepticism 15, 19 Smart, B. 58–9 social majorities, and control of development 7–8, 32–3 social minorities, and intervention 8–9 Somoza, García 114, 144 South Africa 23 Southern Africa 114 sovereignty 93–4 speech, and writing 77–8, 89–91 Sprinker, M. 113 state power, erosion of 119 Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) 120 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 1, 5, 21, 123 subject-object relations 21, 23, 25 subjection/subjectification 49, 50 sublime 21–2 Suharto, T.N.J. 145 Sunna 134–7 symmetry conditions 62 Taha, M.M. 136, 137 Taliban 132

Index Tarnas, R. 14 Taylor, C. 51, 69, 70 Third World debt 1, 108 Tibet 114 Togo 144 tolerance 70, 72, 115 top-down development 32, 34, 142–3 totalisation 76, 77, 80, 93, 97, 101, 105, 117 traditional societies 33–4, 37–8 see also vernacular societies Training and Visit Extension 48 Transmigration Project, Indonesia 144 Triqui Indians 33, 118 trusteeship 41–4 truth 51, 54, 56, 60, 93 universal 14, 15, 21 Tukucha 155 Turkey 139–40 Umar, Second Caliph 135 unemployment, world 108 United Kingdom 144 United Nations 109 United Nations Decade for Women 31 United States 64, 144 universal truth 14, 15, 21 USSR 144 utopianism 82–3 validity claims 60–1, 69, 74 ‘veridicative’ practices 47 vernacular societies and capitalism 118 characteristics of 37–9, 118 and democracy 38, 39–40 and economic expansion 39 violence inevitability of 105, 117, 161 see also principle of least violence Visker, R. 54, 55, 57–8

177

Walzer, M. 69, 70 Warnke, G. 69–70, 115 Warren, M. 69 Wasat Party see Hizb al-Wasat Wassittiyah 137, 139 Weedon, C. 120 welfare system 49–50 White, S. 52 Wittgenstein, L.J.J. 67 women and COCEI 130–1 and control of development agenda 33 and development 31, 33 Muslim 133–4, 139 women, and Zapatistas 126, 129 Women in Development (WID) 31 Women’s Revolutionary Law 126, 129 World Bank 29, 48, 63 and conditionality 120 creating dependency 50 and exclusion 108, 109 and political considerations 144–5 SAPs 1, 21 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) 147 Wright, T. 82 Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) 124, 128, 129, 131, 163 Zapatistas 5, 9, 12, 33, 124–9 avoiding exclusion 125–6, 131, 141, 163 and democracy 127–8 and gender equality 126, 129, 140 and ideal speech situation 128 and Marxist guerrillas 157 and permanent revolution 128–9 Zimbabwe 114 Zionism 96