The Dichotomy Of Ethnic Conflict

The Dichotomy of Ethnic Conflict By Richard L. Dixon There exist today, differences of opinion on the nature of conflict in the Global structure after the decline of the Cold War. I would say that the best known explanation concerning conflict and ethnic strife has to be Samuel P. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations.” It is Dr. Huntington’s premise that conflict will arise out of differing regions of the world shaped by various religious movements such as Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Christianity. These religious movements will transcend the nation state and unite tribes, ethnic groups, villages, cities, and countries under a common ideological banner. “Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. (Samuel P. Huntington, Summer 1993). In this sense his premise has adds validity to the nature of conflict in fragile or failed states such as Bosnia, Chad, Rwanda, the Congo, and Haiti especially from an ethnicity perspective. Where I differ from Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization Analogy” is that he characterizes the conflict between civilizations will be spontaneous and manifest in a struggle between the adherents of Islam and western civilization. In actuality, the

sequences of events are manipulated by actors behind the scenes who seek to determine an outcome that will give power to their ethnic group, tribe, clan, or religious sect. Take for example the radical Islamic Ideology of Whabbaism which is the official state religion of Saudi Arabia. One will find that the Saudi Royal Family is no more religiously indoctrinated then the average citizen on the streets of Riyadh. Yet they use this virulent form of Islam to keep their population in check though religious police, suppression, and authoritarian rule. In addition, they have found it useful to drive their impoverished citizens into a religious frenzy against the U.S. while at the same time allowing U.S. bases, equipment, and personnel into their country. In retrospect, Dr. Huntington’s essay shares a common analogy in regards with John Mueller in his essay entitled “The Banality of Ethnic War.” Both characterize the ongoing violence between various religious and ethnic violence as having roots in chaotic mob sadism with criminal thugs controlling the show. “I consider first the violent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. These were spawned not so much by the convulsive surging of ancient hatreds or by frenzies whipped up by demagogic politicians and the media as by the ministrations of small--sometimes very small--bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political leaders and operating under their general guidance. Many of these participants were drawn from street gangs or from bands of soccer hooligans. Others were criminals specifically released from prison for the purpose. Their participation was required because the Yugoslav army, despite years of supposedly influential nationalist propaganda and centuries of supposedly pent-up ethnic hatreds, substantially disintegrated early in the war and refused to fight.” (John Mueller, Summer 2000).

Where they differ is that John Mueller treats ethnic strife in places such as Bosnia and Rwanda as manipulated by actors and players who whip up the emotional sentiments of the various low life of society who prey on the innocent in carrying out ethnic cleansing operations. Dr. Huntington treats the Clash of civilizations as being between West and East, Islam versus Christianity, and conflict that will ignite instantaneously with no invisible hand. The Sine Qua Non or caveat in both these premises is that emotionalism is the culprit that ignites conflict. For Huntington the combustible material is religious indoctrination in and for Mueller it is criminals being heavily influenced by actors behind the scenes such as Milosevic of Serbia. I would characterize such emotionalism as romantic nationalism that is steeped in sentimentalism or false love for one’s own religion, nation, or ethnic group at the expense of the lives, property, or personal wellbeing of those who don’t share in twisted traits of ideology. “Nationalistic sentiments become illegitimate when they become irrational or overly passionate. If a person, out of love for his country, begins, without justification, to harbour feelings of hostility towards another nation, or tramples over the rights of other nations and peoples in the interests of his own-for example, if he seizes their land or confiscates their property-he has exceeded legitimate bounds. Or, when he lets his love for his nation turn into a kind of racism, that is, when he claims that his own nation is inherently superior to another, he has adopted an irrational outlook.” (Harun Yaha, 2002) One of the central points that stood out in Mueller’s essay is that the Muslims could not readily explains why their neighbors, friends, and even close family members they had known for generations would descend into such depravities of gratuitous violence. “The

most common emotion among ordinary people caught up in this cyclone of violence and pillage seems to have been bewilderment rather than rage.” (John Mueller). I would agree with his assessment that the violence perpetuated by the Serbians against the Bosnians Muslims was not an instinctive Hobbesian bestial nature inherited trait in mankind’s genealogy, but rather the singling out of differing ethnic groups to become the bogeyman that must be exterminated. In this sense, then sentimental nationalism is a valid premise. Adolf Hitler stirred up the emotions of normally ordinary citizens who become psychotic with rage against Jews, Gypsies, or anyone else who did not fit the Aryan Mystique. The thugs, low lifes, criminals, and misfits of society at that time who did all the dirty work were the brown shirts who later morphed into the SS or Gestapo. Such a pattern manifested itself in India under the auspices of Hindu Nationalists who become virtual zombie killing machines against the poor and innocent Muslim Minority. Another parameter that adds credence to the argument of the nature or causes of conflict is how colonialism left its toxic side affects on regions such as Africa which weakened the areas economically and led to the domination of one ethnic group over another. Amy Chua in her book “World On Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability" gives credibility to that premise. Oliver P. Richmond’s essay gives further evidence of the detrimental effects of both the colonial and post-colonial period of a country or region internally along ethnic or religious lines. His study concentrates on the country of Cyprus to give justification to his argument. “What was worse was that the colonial heritage was often in no way compatible with the ethnic-linguistic formulations of the nation-state, to which liberation movements such as in Cyprus might have aspired. Such territories were multi-religious,

multi-ethnic, and multi-linguistic and attempts at creating unified forms of national identity to support a stable international states-system would only accentuate differences.” (Oliver P. Richmond, Autumn 2002). The one echoing theme throughout this essay was that the Westphalian model of governmental rule that was thrust upon the population was inadequate and actually contributed to the division of Cyprus along ethnic, religious, and economical lines. Samuel Huntington also alludes to the Westphalian model in his clash of civilization article. “The main features of the current international system can be traced back several centuries, in the form of the Westphalian system of sovereign states, but also to the years after 1945. The Westphalian system of states entailed a collection of sovereign political entities ruled by rulers or governments that, in theory and largely practice, exercised full control over the territories formally recognized as belonging to those states and over the populations living there. This control was sovereign in the sense that it was exclusivist: no other states or governments could or were allowed to exercise competitive jurisdiction over the territory and people of another state. In addition, the Westphalian system was grafted on the strict recognition of the legal equality of each and every state.” (The African Studies Centre, Leiden et. al., December 2003). In the eyes of social scientists such as Oliver P. Richmond the Westphalian system is a Western culture philosophy of government that is based upon the concept of the nationstate, homogenous in its outlook, and fails to take into account the various ethnic, cultural, and religious groups within a country. In some instances, there are nations within a state as was the case of the former country of Yugoslavia which resulted in a splintering of the union into the countries of Kosovo, Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia. In

essence, the Westphalian system has accelerated post-colonial countries descent into a cauldron of chaotic disorder. Somalia and Haiti can be now classified as failed states. The country of Yemen is now experiencing a civil war between the Sunni dominated government and the Shia minority due to the destabilizing influence of Colonialism. Even Iran cannot escape the cycle of ethnic and religious violence because it is currently battling Kurdish extremism as well as Turkey. “Countries in this category come closest to the phenomenon of ‘failed’ states - indeed, in the worst cases of political disintegration amount to what is seen as ‘collapsed’ states. While failed states can still be seen to have official governments and fully collapsed states are characterized by their complete absence, the distinction between them is to some extent a matter of degree. What is central to a failed state is that the state apparatus is unable to uphold an effective monopoly of violence over its whole territory, lacks an effective judicial system to guard the rule of law and promulgate judgments that are internationally regarded as legitimate and sound (especially in commercial matters), is unable or unwilling to fulfill international obligations (such as in debt repayment) and cannot prevent various forms of transnational economic crime or the use of its territory for the perpetration of violence (politically motivated or otherwise) against other states in the international system.” (The African Studies Centre, Leiden). However, one would readily agree that the pace of conflict accelerated with the dismantling of the colonial system after WWII because English, France, and Belgium were too weak economically, militarily, and politically to maintain their empires. There can be doubt, that their imperialistic ventures had a negative effect on the already raging ancient conflicts between tribes, ethnic groups, and clans within their sphere of influence.

Take for example the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent into the countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The partitioning caused ethnic and religious strife especially in the Kashmir and Bengal areas of the subcontinent. The country of Afghanistan also typifies the ethnic strife in that part of the world and has failed to be pacified by conquering army since the times of Alexander the Great. Realistically speaking both NATO and the U.S. are falling into the same quagmire in Afghanistan as were their previous predecessors because they are not readily equipped to fight a sustained low intensity conflict in that region. What the military alliance is now facing with the resurgence of the Taliban can be best characterized as Hybrid wars. “Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today’s hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community population. Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately determine success or failure. Hybrid war appears new in that it requires simultaneous rather than sequential success in these diverse but related “population battlegrounds.” Learning from the past, today’s enemies exploit these new battlegrounds because the West has not yet learned to fight effectively on them. We still do not fully appreciate the impact and complexity of the nuanced human terrain.” (Colonel John J. McCuen, USA, Retired, March-April 2008). The U.S. military is dangerously stretched pretty thin trying to fight an insurgency in Iraq while at the same time trying to counter the growing Taliban menace. The increasing of troops into the Afghanistan Theater of war has far failed to turn the tide because we have yet not figured out the tactics and mindset of our enemy.

“One need only read our daily newspaper headlines or listen to TV and radio news about the insurgencies being fought within the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq to understand the validity of the above observations. Insurgencies rage within these conflicts’ penetrated and often alienated populations in spite of our having first defeated the enemy’s conventional forces. Our population at home usually wearies of the protracted struggles, waged, until recently, with little apparent progress. We are in danger of losing if we fail to fully understand the human terrain in these conflicts, as well as, perhaps, the even more decisive battlegrounds of public opinion at home and abroad. In the context of hybrid wars, especially at the population level, outcomes should be approached in terms of success or failure rather than the usual military distinctions of victory or defeat. In this regard, the goal or end state sought should be something like “secure improved normalcy,” not “defeat the enemy forces” or “overthrow the enemy regime.” The critical point is that to win hybrid wars, we have to succeed on three decisive battlegrounds: the conventional battleground; the conflict zone’s indigenous population battleground; and the home front and international community battleground.” (Colonel J. McCuen).

It would be wise that the current NATO commander (US General Stanley A. McChrystal) in that area would listen to voices in the past that have fought the Taliban and know of their methods of operations if we are to suppress, dismantle, and destroy the enemy. “Russia's ambassador to Afghanistan has some advice for top NATO commanders fighting the Taliban based on the Soviet Union's bitter experience battling Islamist insurgents here in the 1980s: Don't bring more troops. "The more troops you bring the more troubles you will have here," Zamir Kabulov, a blunt-spoken veteran diplomat, told The Associated Press in an interview.

In 2002, he noted, there were roughly 5,000 U.S. soldiers fighting in Afghanistan and the Taliban controlled just a small corner of the country's southeast. "Now we have Taliban fighting in the peaceful Kunduz and Baghlan (provinces) with your (NATO's) 100,000 troops," he said this week, sitting on a couch in the Russian Embassy in Kabul. "And if this trend is the rule, if you bring here 200,000 soldiers, all of Afghanistan will be under the Taliban." Kabulov served as a Soviet diplomat in Afghanistan from 1983 to 1987, during the height of the Kremlin's 10-year Afghan war, when Soviet troop levels peaked at 140,000.” (Associated Press, September 12, 2009). We cannot readily rely on our NATO allies for more support in terms of troops, weapons, and supplies because their fight against the Taliban has been lukewarm at best. “Leaked US memo has accused British troops in Afghanistan of being ill-disciplined, deficient in intelligence-gathering and suffering from problems of "personal hygiene". The confidential debriefing, said to have been handed out by a top American commander, cites a litany of concerns which the unnamed officer is said to have had about British allies in the fight against the Taliban. They include complaints that the British troops do not spend long enough in the country or with indigenous people. The marines’ commander is also reported to have accused the British of spending too long recovering from patrols and suffering too many injuries away from the battlefield.” (The Scotsman, September 9, 2009). It is a war of attrition meaning that the Taliban and the insurgency will keep going until pressure comes from the public and our congressional representatives to withdraw because it is turning into an unpopular war. “Our current enemies have targeted the

populations as their battleground of choice. They fully recognize that they do not have the military strength to defeat us in a conventional or nuclear war. However, past experience demonstrates to them that they can win wars within the population that we have not learned to fight. They know they can protract such wars until home front and international community discouragement over casualties and cost force us to throw in the towel and withdraw. Our enemies’ strategic and tactical objectives are thus not to destroy our conventional military forces and seize critical terrain, but to seize, control, and defend critical human terrain until we give up the fight. The decisive battles of the hybrid wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are being fought within the population battlegrounds—the populace in conflict, the home front populations of the intervening nations, and the international community.” (Colonel John J. McCuen). The only effective solutions then is to rebuild the country to the point of self-sufficiency, train and build the Afghanistan Army to the point that they are able to fight and defeat the Taliban, and leave the country once it has been stabilized and turn our attention to a belligerent nuclearly armed North Korea. If we fail to implement this strategy, then we will get bogged like the Soviets did in a protracted war with the mujahedeen that resulted in the lost of over 15, 000 lives. Trying to fix a region that has only known ethnic and tribal conflict for centuries will not happen overnight. One would come away with the notion that the amount of non-governmental conflicts have actually increased in the post Cold war era. In actuality they have decreased but the intensity, brutality, and incidents of ethnic cleansing among various religious and ethnic groups have multiplied in conflicts involving countries such as Sri Lanka, Sudan, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq. “In other words, the reason there is less warfare today

is because more wars are stopping, not because fewer wars are starting. In fact, the rate of new conflict onsets between 2000 and 2005 has remained higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s, but the rate at which wars have been ending is higher still. In the first six years of the new millennium there has been an average net decline (number of conflict terminations minus number of onsets) of 1.5 state-based conflicts a year. Were this rate to continue for a decade the number of state-based conflicts being waged around the world would be halved.” (Andrew Mack, 2007). In terms of the World System Movement analogy, the necessary explanation would be attributed to the changing Global System which is like a ripple effect due to the process of integration and disintegration. Countries, regions, cultures, and ethnic groups can be affected by economical, political, and social parameters globally. Global warming stands out as a textbook case according to World System proponents. The effectives of drought, water scarcity, and food have caused Global migration from the rural to the urban cities which puts a strain on a LDC (Low Developing Country) limited resources and adds to an already tense situation between ethnic groups. Nigeria with its mostly Muslim North and Christian South is now experiencing such a transition. Adding to this mixture, are a slew of various ethnic groups which are divided more by village, clan, or the caste system then religion. Kenya in recent years has also witnessed a rise in ethnic violence. In essence, the legitimacy of the state within the continent threatens to unravel because it has no built-in mechanism to handle the multitude of cultural, religious, racial, and ethnic entities. One minority dominates the majority which can light the cauldron of discontent and send a governmentally weak country off the cliff and into the crevice of civil war, riots, and ethnic strife. “A second major argument concerns diversity and pluralism. The

state as an institution (but not necessarily any particular state) and the apparatus of state sovereignty provide a container for pluralism and a framework for the protection of diversity. What animates this claim is the idea that peoples, nations, and communities have an identity and justifiably seek the protective and expressive power of the state to further that identity. If states and state sovereignty provide the basic institutional framework, it is some notion of political community and a belief in the moral value of self-determination—most commonly national but often shading into cultural and religious—that has come evermore to provide the political power and the moral meaning to the idea of living in a world made up of separate nation-states.” (Andrew Hurrell, 2007). Therefore the prevailing theory is that ethnicity and tribalism causes a decline in democratic rule because it cannot incorporate pluralism within its framework. I find myself in total disagreement with that assumption and only have to look to the country of Malaysia where religious and racial pluralism has added to the stability of that nation both economically and politically. Benjamin Reilly in his essay Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict draws on the strength of Papua New Guinea to dismantle this belief which he believes is flawed based on faulty methodology and data. “Taken together, these macro-and micro-level perspectives raises serious questions about the adequacy of existing theories on the relationship between democratic politics and ethnic fragmentation. In particular, they suggest that the conventional wisdom—that ethnic fragmentation necessarily undermines prospects for democracy-is wrong, and that under some circumstances, the presence of many ethnic groups can actually be a positive factor for democratic stability and persistence.” (Benjamin Reilly, Winter 2000/2001).

I have come to the conclusion based on my research that both poverty and inequality are causal effectives for deep rooted ethnic tensions and civil war. In some situations poverty and inequality are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Some countries can be marred down in poverty but will not explode into ethnic tension because the stigma of inequality between tribal groups and clans is not prevalent. The country of Bangladesh comes to mind in this respect. “The link between inequality and conflict are subtle as well. The relationship between standard measures of interpersonal inequality and conflict is weak and not well established as an independent casual phenomenon…..Given structural cleavages such as caste, religion, ethnicity, race, and region, if income disparities align with these splits they exacerbate tension and conflict. Even quite small shifts in the distribution of income between groups-the difference in group incomes, for example-can lay the foundations for group conflict.” (Ravi Kanbur, June 2007). The solution to the ethnic fragmentation, strife, and civil wars that are currently besieging poor countries around the world is a new Global architect that encompasses the culture, traditions, and religious views of various ethnic groups within a country or region. It means formulating democratic institutions that are built upon the premise of inclusion and not exclusion of one group from another.

Endnotes 1. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol 72,

Issue 3 (Summer 93), 3. 2. John Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War,” International Security, Vol 25, Issue

1, (Summer 2000), 1, 3. Harun Yaha, Romanticism: a Weapon of Satan, (India: Milat Book Center, 2002),

19. 4. John Mueller, 4. 5. Oliver P. Richmond, “Decolonisation and Post-Independence Causes of Conflict:

The Case of Cyprus: Civil Wars, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), 171. 6. The African Studies Centre, Leiden et. al. “Failed and Collapsed States in the

International System, December 2003. 7. Ibid., 4. 8. Colonel John J. McCuen, USA, Retired, “Hybrid Wars,” Military Review

(March-April 2008), 107. 9. Ibid., 107. 10. Associated Press, “Russian Cautions U.S. on Afghan Troops,” Military.com

September 12, 2009, http://www.military.com/news/article/russia-cautions-us-onafghan-troops.html?col=1186032325324 (accessed September 18, 2009). The Scotsman, “Marine Slams Brits' Discipline, Hygiene, Military.com, September 9, 2009, http://www.military.com/news/article/marine-slams-brits-disciplinehygiene.html?col=1186032325324 (accessed September 18, 2009). 11. Colonel John J. McCuen, USA, Retired, 109.

12. Andrew Mack, “Political Violence: Explaining the Post Cold-War Decline,”

Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, The International Peace Academy, (2007), 4-5. 13. Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order, Power, Values, and the Constitution of

International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28. 14. Benjamin Reilly, “Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and International Conflict,”

International Security, Vol. 25, Issue 3(Winter 2000/2001), 1. 15. Ravi Kanbur, “Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link,” Coping with Crisis

Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy (June 2007), 3.