The Center For Grass Roots Oversight

The Center for Grassroots Oversight This page can be viewed at http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp? timeline=civilliberties&civilliberties_surveillance=civilliberties_promis___main_core

Loss of US Civil Liberties PROMIS / Main Core Project: Loss of US Civil Liberties Open-Content project managed by Paul, PDevlinBuckley, blackmax

add event | references Mid-1970s: PROMIS Software Developed, Can Integrate Information from Multiple Databases

An application known as PROMIS, the Prosecutor’s Management Information System, is developed. (Fricker 3/1993) It is designed to be used to keep track of criminal investigations through a powerful search engine that can quickly access all data items stored about a case. (Shorrock 7/23/2008) William Hamilton, one of the application’s developers, will describe what it can be used to do: “Every use of PROMIS in the court system is tracking people. You can rotate the file by case, defendant, arresting officer, judge, defence lawyer, and it’s tracking all the names of all the people in all the cases.” Wired magazine will describe its significance: “What this means is that PROMIS can provide a complete rundown of all federal cases in which a lawyer has been involved, or all the cases in which a lawyer has represented defendant A, or all the cases in which a lawyer has represented white-collar criminals, at which stage in each of the cases the lawyer agreed to a plea bargain, and so on. Based on this information, PROMIS can help a prosecutor determine when a plea will be taken in a particular type of case.” In addition, PROMIS can integrate several databases without requiring any reprogramming, meaning it can “turn blind data into information.” PROMIS is developed by a private business entity that will later become the company Inslaw, Inc. Although there will later be a series of disputes over the application’s use by the US government and others, this version of PROMIS is funded by a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant and is therefore in the public domain. (Fricker 3/1993) 1980s or Before: Database of Potential Enemies Established as Part of Continuity of Government Plan

As a part of the plan to ensure Continuity of Government (COG) in the event of a Soviet nuclear strike or other emergency, the US government begins to maintain a database of people it considers unfriendly. A senior government official who has served with high-level security clearances in five administrations will say it is “a database of Americans, who, often for the slightest and most trivial reason, are considered unfriendly, and who, in a time of panic, might be incarcerated. The database can identify and locate perceived ‘enemies of the state’ almost instantaneously.” He and other sources say that the database is sometimes referred to by the code name Main Core, and one says it was set up with help from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Alleged Link to PROMIS - The database will be said to be linked to a system known as PROMIS, the Prosecutor’s Management Information System, over which the US government conducts a long-lasting series of disputes with the private company Inslaw. The exact connection between Main Core and PROMIS is uncertain, but one option is that code from PROMIS is used to create Main Core. PROMIS is most noted for its ability to combine data from different databases, and an intelligence expert briefed by high-level contacts in the Department of Homeland Security will say that Main Core “is less a mega-database than a way to search numerous other agency databases at the same time.” Definition of National Emergency - It is unclear what kind of national emergency could trigger such detention. Executive orders issued over the next three decades define it as a

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“natural disaster, military attack, [or] technological or other emergency,” while Defense Department documents include eventualities like “riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, [and] disorder prejudicial to public law and order.” According to one news report, even “national opposition to US military invasion abroad” could be a trigger. How Does It Work? - A former military operative regularly briefed by members of the intelligence community will be told that the program utilizes software that makes predictive judgments of targets’ behavior and tracks their circle of associations using “social network analysis” and artificial intelligence modeling tools. “The more data you have on a particular target, the better [the software] can predict what the target will do, where the target will go, who it will turn to for help,” he will say. “Main Core is the table of contents for all the illegal information that the US government has [compiled] on specific targets.” Origin of Data - In 2008, sources will reportedly tell Radar magazine that a “host of publicly disclosed programs… now supply data to Main Core,” in particular the NSA’s domestic surveillance programs initiated after 9/11. (Ketcham 5/2008) Spring 1981: Justice Department Official Reportedly Says ‘We’re Out to Get Inslaw’

Lawrence McWhorter, director of the Executive Office for US Attorneys, tells one of his subordinates, “We’re out to get Inslaw.” Inslaw developed the PROMIS database and search application (see Mid-1970s) and is soon to become embroiled in a dispute with the Justice Department over it. Mallgrave will later tell Wired magazine: “We were just in his office for what I call a B.S. type discussion. I remember it was a bright sunny morning.… [McWhorter] asked me if I would be interested in assuming the position of assistant director for data processing… basically working with Inslaw. I told him… I just had no interest in that job. And then, almost as an afterthought, he said ‘We’re out to get Inslaw.’ I remember it to this day.” (Fricker 3/1993) April 1981: President Reagan’s Counsellor Praises PROMIS to Prosecutors

Edwin Meese, Counsellor to President Ronald Reagan, praises the PROMIS application at a gathering of prosecutors. He calls it “one of the greatest opportunities for [law enforcement] success in the future.” PROMIS is a database search system to help prosecutors find information about cases and people involved in them. (Fricker 3/1993) Spring 1981 or Shortly After: Justice Department Appoints Former Inslaw Employee to Supervise Contract with Company

Lawrence McWhorter, director of the Justice Department’s Executive Office for US Attorneys, gives the job of supervising a contract with Inslaw for the installation of the PROMIS database and search application to C. Madison “Brick” Brewer. Brewer once worked for Inslaw, but, according to documents used in court proceedings, was allowed to resign when Inslaw’s founder William Hamilton found his performance inadequate. McWhorter had told a previous candidate for the position that he was “out to get Inslaw” (see Spring 1981). The Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility will examine the matter and rule there is no conflict of interest. Brewer will later tell a federal court that everything he does regarding Inslaw is approved by Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen. Jensen had previously supervised a product known as DALITE, which lost a major contract to Inslaw in the 1970s. (Fricker 3/1993) 1982-1984: PROMIS Used by NSA, Treasury, and NSC to Track Loans to Soviet Union

The PROMIS database application is used for a program called “Follow the Money” to track loans made by Western banks to the Soviet Union and its allies. The top-secret program is run for the National Security Council (NSC) by Norman Bailey, who uses NSA signals intelligence to track the loans. Bailey will later say that the PROMIS application is “the principal software element” used by the NSA and the Treasury Department in their

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electronic surveillance programs that track financial flows to the Soviet bloc, organized crime, and terrorist groups. According to Bailey, this program marks a significant shift in resources from human spying to electronic surveillance, as a way to track money flows to suspected criminals and American enemies. (Shorrock 7/23/2008) March 1982: Inslaw Wins Contract to Install PROMIS from Justice Department

Inslaw wins a $9.6 million contract from the Justice Department to install the PROMIS application in 20 US attorney’s offices as a pilot program. PROMIS is an application designed to be used by prosecutors to keep track of case records (see Mid-1970s). If the trial installation is successful, the company will install PROMIS in the remaining 74 federal prosecutors’ offices around the country. According to William Hamilton, one of Inslaw’s owners, the eventual market for complete automation of the Federal court system is worth up to $3 billion. However, this is the last contract Inslaw receives from the Justice Department for PROMIS, as the deal becomes mired in a series of disputes. (Fricker 3/1993) April 14, 1982: Justice Department Official Suggests Terminating PROMIS Installation Contract

One month after the Justice Department and Inslaw sign a contract on the installation of PROMIS software (see March 1982), a departmental official raises the possibility of terminating the contract. At a meeting of the PROMIS Project Team, project manager C. Madison Brewer and others discuss terminating the contract with Inslaw for convenience of the government, according to notes taken at the meeting by department officials. In a sworn statement, Brewer will say he does not recall the details of the meeting, but if this recommendation were made, it was made “in jest.” However, Brewer will admit to being upset with Inslaw’s handling of the contract and its demand for payment for enhancements it had made privately to the application. After the contract is terminated, Bankruptcy Court Judge George Bason will find Brewer’s recommendation to terminate the contract constitutes “a smoking gun that clearly evidences Brewer’s intense bias against Inslaw, his single-minded intent to drive Inslaw out of business.” (US Congress 9/10/1992) April 19, 1982: Justice Department Official Criticises Inslaw in Meeting

Justice Department manager C. Madison Brewer displays his hostility towards Inslaw, Inc., in a meeting to discuss the implementation of the PROMIS application. An Inslaw memorandum of the meeting says, “Brewer seized upon this issue [that Inslaw wanted to be paid for privately-financed enhancements it had made to the software] and launched into a tirade which was very emotional, unorganized, and quite illogical.” Brewer’s complaints are: The memo claiming the payments is “typical of Inslaw and [Inslaw owner] Bill Hamilton and that it was self-serving and unnecessary.” How did the Justice Department “know that we might say work was not finished under our government contracts and the next week copyright the work and begin selling it back to the Justice Department.” A press release about a contract awarded to Inslaw was inaccurate because “it described West Virginia as a successful implementation when in fact, they had spent an additional 20K on the project and Lanier was doing all the work.” The memo had caused “all kinds of problems in Justice and had many people upset.” “Illinois Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Michigan Prosecuting Attorney’s Association, Andy Voight, and others,” would say that “Inslaw did not do good or successful work.” “Hamilton started the PROMIS system as an employee of the DC, USAO. And that all of the software was developed with Federal funds and what right did Hamilton have to try to claim ownership of the software.” The House Judiciary Committee will later comment, “All of these comments were based

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with an obvious dislike of Bill Hamilton and a resentment for the success of Inslaw personified in him.” (US Congress 9/10/1992) August 11, 1982: Justice Department Concedes Inslaw Owns Enhanced PROMIS

The Justice Department says that it accepts Inslaw has proprietary rights to the enhanced PROMIS database and search application. An initial version of the software had been designed using government money, and so is in the public domain, but a later version was funded by Inslaw itself, so the modifications belong to Inslaw. A Justice Department lawyer writes: “To the extent that any other enhancements (beyond the public domain PROMIS) were privately funded by Inslaw and not specified to be delivered to the Department of Justice under any contract or other agreement, Inslaw may assert whatever proprietary rights it may have.” This statement is made in response to a letter sent by lawyers acting for Inslaw founder William Hamilton informing the department that Inslaw intended to become a private company, and asking it to waive any proprietary rights it might claim to the enhanced version. Clarification will be provided in a 1988 deposition in which Deputy Attorney General Arnold Burns will say, “Our lawyers were satisfied that Inslaw’s lawyers could sustain the claim in court, that we had waived those [proprietary] rights.” (Fricker 3/1993) May 6, 1983: Justice Department Official Says PROMIS Will Be Provided to Israeli Government

A Justice Department official writes a memo saying he will soon provide the PROMIS application to an Israeli government representative. The official is Jack Rugh, the acting assistant director of the Office of Management Information Systems Support at the Executive Office of US Attorneys. The memo states that “Reference my memorandum to file dated April 22, 1983, on the same subject. [C. Madison] Brick Brewer [PROMIS project manager at the Justice Department] recently instructed me to make a copy of an LEAA version of PROMIS [a version wholly owned by the Justice Department] available to Dr. Ben Orr, a representative of the government of Israel. Dr. Orr called me to discuss that request after my earlier memorandum was written. I have made a copy of the LEM DEC version of PROMIS and will provide it along with the corresponding documentation, to Dr. Orr before he leaves the United States for Israel on May 16.” High Officials Possibly Involved - The House Judiciary Committee will comment: “Given the international dimensions to the decisions, it is difficult to accept the notion that a group of low-level Department personnel decided independently to get in touch with the government of Israel to arrange for transfer of the PROMIS software. At the very least, it is unlikely that such a transaction occurred without the approval of high-level Department officials, including those on the PROMIS Oversight Committee.” Actual Version of PROMIS Unclear - The committee will also later speculate that a version whose ownership is under dispute was also given to the Israelis, saying: “[I]t is uncertain what version actually was transferred. Department managers believed that all versions of the Enhanced PROMIS software were the Department’s property. The lack of detailed documentation on the transfer, therefore, only creates new questions surrounding allegations that Enhanced PROMIS may have been sold or transferred to Israel and other foreign governments.” (US Congress 9/10/1992) Rugh will pass the application to Brewer for handing over to Orr six days later (see May 12, 1983). May 12, 1983: PROMIS Application Handed over for Passage to Israeli Government

Jack Rugh, the acting assistant director of the Office of Management Information Systems Support at the Justice Department’s Executive Office for US Attorneys, writes a memo turning over the PROMIS application to a colleague, C. Madison Brewer. The application is for passage to the government of Israel, a transfer already discussed by Brewer and Rugh (see May 6, 1983). Rugh writes: “Enclosed are the PROMIS materials that you asked me to produce for Dr. Ben Orr of the government of Israel. These materials consist of the LEM DEC PDP 11/70 version of PROMIS on magnetic tape along with the printed specifications

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for that tape, as well as two printed volumes of PROMIS documentation for the LEAA version of the system.” (US Congress 9/10/1992) December 29, 1983: Justice Department Decides to Terminate Part of PROMIS Contract

Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen and other members of the Justice Department’s PROMIS Oversight Committee approve the termination of part of a contract with Inslaw, Inc., for the installation of PROMIS software (see March 1982). The termination, pushed through despite a report that there was progress with Inslaw’s attorney on the resolution of contract problems, only concerns the part of the contract for the installation of PROMIS on word processing hardware in 74 small US attorneys’ offices. Inslaw will still be contracted to install the application in 20 other US attorneys’ offices. The termination is to be for default, as Inslaw has allegedly failed to perform this portion of the contract, although a different reason will later be given (see February 1984). (US Congress 9/10/1992) February 1984: Justice Department Counsel Finds Inslaw Has Not Failed to Perform PROMIS Contract, Portion Terminated Anyway

Justice Department procurement counsel William Snider issues a legal opinion stating that the department lacks legal justification to terminate part of a contract on the installation of PROMIS software for default. The department’s PROMIS Oversight Committee had decided on this course of action in December (see December 29, 1983), as it said that Inslaw, the company installing PROMIS, was not performing the contract properly. However, the committee decides to terminate the portion of the contract anyway, but for convenience—meaning Inslaw may receive some compensation—not default. PROMIS project manager C. Madison Brewer then notifies INSLAW owner William Hamilton that Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen has decided on partial termination. (US Congress 9/10/1992) 1985: Private Company’s Attempt to Purchase Inslaw Fails

A company called SCT attempts to purchase Inslaw, which designed the PROMIS database and search application. SCT is assisted by the New York investment bank Allen & Co., which helps with the finance for the proposed deal. The attempt fails, but, according to Inslaw’s founder William Hamilton, in the process a number of Inslaw’s customers are warned by SCT that Inslaw will soon go bankrupt and will not survive reorganization. Wired magazine will say that Allen & Co. has “close business ties” to Earl Brian, a businessman who is said to be interested in PROMIS software and who is well-connected inside the Ronald Reagan administration. (Fricker 3/1993) Before 1986: Oliver North Develops Emergency Plan Including Suspension of Constitution, Detentions

National Security Council officer Colonel Oliver North heads the development of a secret contingency plan called REX 84. In the event of an emergency, the plan calls “for suspension of the Constitution, turning control of the United States over to FEMA [the Federal Emergency Management Agency], [and the] appointment of military commanders to run state and local governments.” The plan, initially revealed in the Miami Herald in 1987, also reportedly calls for the detention of upwards of 400,000 illegal aliens and an undisclosed number of American citizens in at least 10 military facilities maintained as potential holding camps. North operates the program from a secure White House site, allegedly using a software program known as PROMIS. PROMIS was designed to track individuals, such as prisoners, by pulling together information from disparate databases into a single record. According to Wired magazine: “Using the computers in his command center, North tracked dissidents and potential troublemakers within the United States. Compared to PROMIS, Richard Nixon’s enemies list or Senator Joe McCarthy’s blacklist look downright crude.” (Ketcham 5/2008)

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June 9, 1986: Inslaw Files Action against Justice Department in Bankruptcy Court

Inslaw files a $30 million lawsuit against the Justice Department over the alleged theft of the PROMIS software (see Mid-1970s) by the department. Inslaw’s attorney for the case, Leigh Ratiner of the Washington firm Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, chooses the bankruptcy court for the filing based on the premise that the Justice Department, the creditor, has control of PROMIS. He will later say, “It was forbidden by the Bankruptcy Act for the creditor to exercise control over the debtor property. And that theory—that the Justice Department was exercising control—was the basis that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction. As far as I know, this was the first time this theory had been used. This was ground-breaking.” (Fricker 3/1993) 1990: Court Rules Attorney General Does Not Have to Appoint Special Prosecutor in Inslaw Affair

A US District Court rules that Attorney General Richard Thornburgh does not have to appoint a special prosecutor in the Inslaw affair. Inslaw’s attorney Elliot Richardson had filed the case because of a dispute with the Justice Department over allegations that the department had stolen a version of the PROMIS database and search application from the company. However, the court rules against Inslaw, stating that a prosecutor’s decision not to investigate—“no matter how indefensible”—cannot be corrected by any court. (Fricker 3/1993) December 5, 1990: House Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Inslaw Affair

The House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law holds a hearing about the failure of Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to provide full access to all documents and records about the Inslaw case. At the hearing, Inslaw owner William Hamilton and its attorney Elliot Richardson air their complaints about an alleged criminal conspiracy in the Justice Department’s handling of a contract with Inslaw and its alleged theft of an enhanced version of the PROMIS application. Judge George Bason, a bankruptcy judge who had found in favor of Inslaw in a dispute with the department, testifies that he believes his failure to be reappointed as bankruptcy judge was the result of improper influence on the court selection process by the department because of his findings. Steven Ross, the general counsel to the clerk of the US House of Representatives, refutes the Justice Department’s rationale for withholding documents related to possible wrongdoing by its officials involved with the Inslaw contract. In addition, Government Accountability Office representatives describe deficiencies in the Justice Department’s Information Resources Management Office and its administration of data processing contracts. Following this hearing, Thornburgh agrees to cooperate with the subcommittee, but then fails to provide it with several documents it wants. (US Congress 9/10/1992) December 11, 1990: CIA Says It Does Not Have PROMIS Application; Retired CIA Official Disputes Claim

The CIA says that it does not have the PROMIS database and search application (see Mid1970s). The statement is made in response to a letter sent to CIA Director William Webster by the House Judiciary Committee on November 20 asking him to help them “by determining whether the CIA has the PROMIS software.” In response the CIA states, “We have checked with Agency components that track data processing procurement or that would be likely users of PROMIS, and we have been unable to find any indication that the [CIA] ever obtained PROMIS software.” However, information contradicting this will subsequently emerge. For example, a retired CIA official whose job it is to investigate the Inslaw allegations internally will tell Wired magazine that the Justice Department gave PROMIS to the CIA: “Well, the Congressional committees were after us to look into allegations that somehow the agency had been culpable of what would have been, in essence, taking advantage of, like stealing, the technology [PROMIS]. We looked into it and there was enough to it, the agency had been involved.” However, the official will say that

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when the CIA accepted PROMIS, it did not know that there was a serious dispute about the Justice Department’s ownership of the software. (Fricker 3/1993) July 17, 1991: Attorney General Refuses to Attend House Committee Hearing about PROMIS, Despite Prior Agreement

Attorney General Richard Thornburgh informs the House Judiciary Committee that he will not attend a committee hearing the next day, despite previously saying he would. The hearing is to discuss the committee’s access to departmental documents and the Inslaw affair, in which the department had allegedly stolen an enhanced version of the PROMIS application. According to a report by the committee, Thornburgh refuses to appear because a “press release announcing the hearing had been unduly aggressive and contentious and not in keeping with the tenor of an oversight hearing.” (US Congress 9/10/1992) July 25, 1991: House Subcommittee Subpoenas PROMIS Documents

The House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law votes 10 to six to authorize the issuance of a subpoena to the Department of Justice for documents related to the Inslaw affair. The subpoena follows on from a refusal by Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to appear before the House Judiciary Committee (see July 17, 1991). (US Congress 9/10/1992) Some of the documents will be forthcoming, but others will be reported missing (see July 31, 1991). July 31, 1991: Justice Department Says 51 PROMIS Documents Are Missing

Responding to a Congressional subpoena (see July 25, 1991), the Justice Department sends most documents requested about the alleged theft of a version of the enhanced PROMIS software to the House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law. However, the department says that 51 documents or files are missing and cannot be found. A report issued by the House Judiciary Committee in September 1992 will say that the subcommittee has still not received an adequate explanation on how the documents came to be missing. (US Congress 9/10/1992) Spring 1992: US Intelligence Official Mentions Connection between PROMIS and Main Core Database to Businessman

An unnamed US intelligence official tells businessman William Hamilton that there is a connection between the PROMIS database and search program and the Main Core database. Hamilton is a former NSA official who helped developed PROMIS, but is now involved in a series of disputes with the government over money he says it owes his company, Inslaw. Main Core is a database that is said to collect sensitive information, including about US persons. The specific type of connection is not certain. This is one of three times officials will tell Hamilton about the link (see 1995 and July 2001). (Shorrock 7/23/2008) 1995: Former NSA Official Tells Businessman about Connection between PROMIS and Main Core Database

A former NSA official tells businessman William Hamilton that there is a connection between the PROMIS database and search program and the Main Core database. Hamilton is a former NSA official who helped developed PROMIS, but is now involved in a series of disputes with the government over money he says it owes his company, Inslaw. Main Core is a database that is said to collect sensitive information, including about US persons. The specific type of connection is not certain. This is one of three times officials will tell Hamilton about the link (see Spring 1992 and July 2001). (Shorrock 7/23/2008) July 2001: Former Official Possibly Alludes to Link between PROMIS and Main Core Database in Conversation with Businessman

Retired Admiral Dan Murphy, a former deputy director of the CIA, indicates to businessman William Hamilton that there is a connection between the PROMIS database and search

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program and the Main Core database. Hamilton is a former NSA official who helped develop PROMIS, but is now involved in a series of disputes with the government over money he says it owes his company, Inslaw. Main Core is a database that is said to collect sensitive information, including about US persons. The specific type of connection is not certain and Murphy does not specifically mention Main Core, but says that the NSA’s use of PROMIS involves something “so seriously wrong that money alone cannot cure the problem.” Hamilton will later say, “I believe in retrospect that Murphy was alluding to Main Core.” This is one of three times officials will tell Hamilton about the link (see Spring 1992 and 1995). (Shorrock 7/23/2008) Shortly After September 11, 2001: Senior National Security Analyst Sees Main Core Database in Use at White House

According to a former senior Justice Department official, a high-level former national security official working as a senior intelligence analyst for a large domestic law enforcement agency inside the White House accidentally walks into a restricted room, where he finds a computer system logged on to what he recognizes to be the Main Core database. Main Core contains a list of potential enemies of the state for use by the Continuity of Government program (see 1980s or Before). He will refuse to be interviewed about the matter, but will tell the senior Justice Department official about it. The Justice Department official will add that when she mentions the specific name of the top-secret system during a conversation, he turns “white as a sheet.” (Shorrock 7/23/2008) October 23, 2007: National Intelligence Official Says Privacy Should be Redefined

Donald Kerr, the principal deputy director of national intelligence, tells a conference of intelligence officials that the government needs new rules about how to balance privacy rights and investigative needs. Since many people routinely post details of their lives on social-networking sites such as MySpace, he says, their identity should not require the same protection as in the past. Instead, only their “essential privacy,” or “what they would wish to protect about their lives and affairs,” should be veiled. Commenting on the speech, the Wall Street Journal will say that this is part of a project by intelligence agencies “to change traditional definitions of how to balance privacy rights against investigative needs.” (Kerr 10/23/2007 ; Gorman 3/10/2008) According to some accounts, the prime repository of information about US citizens that the government has is a database known as Main Core, so if the government collected more information about citizens, the information would be placed in or accessed through this database (see 1980s or Before). March 2008 or Shortly Before: National Security Lawyer Questions Legality of Information in US Government Databases

National security lawyer Suzanne Spaulding says that the constitutional question of whether the US government can examine a large array of information about citizens contained in its databases (see 1980s or Before) without violating an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy “has never really been resolved.” She adds that it is “extremely questionable” to assume Americans do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for data such as the subject-header of an e-mail or a Web address from an Internet search, because those are more like the content of a communication than a phone number. “These are questions that require discussion and debate,” she says. “This is one of the problems with doing it all [collecting data on citizens] in secret.” (Gorman 3/10/2008) Spring-Summer 2008: New Church Committee Suggested to Investigate Possible Abuses of Power during Bush Administration and Before

A new investigation modeled on the Church Committee, which investigated government spying (see April, 1976) and led to the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA - see 1978) in the 1970s, is proposed. The proposal follows an amendment to wiretapping laws that immunizes telecommunications companies from prosecution for

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illegally co-operating with the NSA. A detailed seven-page memo is drafted outlining the proposed inquiry by a former senior member of the original Church Committee. Congressional Investigative Body Proposed - The idea is to have Congress appoint an investigative body to discover the full extent of what the Bush White House did in the war on terror that may have been illegal and then to implement reforms aimed at preventing future abuses—and perhaps to bring accountability for wrongdoing by Bush officials. Key issues to investigate include: The NSA’s domestic surveillance activities; The CIA’s use of rendition and torture against terrorist suspects; The U.S. government’s use of military assets—including satellites, Pentagon intelligence agencies, and U2 surveillance planes—for a spying apparatus that could be used against people in the US; and The NSA’s use of databases and how its databases, such as the Main Core list of enemies, mesh with other government lists, such as the no-fly list. A deeper investigation should focus on how these lists feed on each other, as well as the government’s “inexorable trend towards treating everyone as a suspect,” says Barry Steinhardt, the director of the Program on Technology and Liberty for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Proposers - The proposal is a product of talks between civil liberties advocates and aides to Democratic leaders in Congress. People consulted about the committee include aides to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Judiciary Committee chairman John Conyers (DMI). The civil liberties organizations include the ACLU, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and Common Cause. However, some Democrats, such as Pelosi, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman John D. Rockefeller (D-WV), and former House Intelligence chairwoman Jane Harman (D-CA), approved the Bush administration’s operations and would be made to look bad by such investigation. Investigating Bush, Clinton Administrations - In order that the inquiry not be called partisan, it is to have a scope going back beyond the start of the Bush administration to include the administrations of Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan. The memo states that “[t]he rise of the ‘surveillance state’ driven by new technologies and the demands of counter-terrorism did not begin with this administration.” However, the author later says in interviews that the scope of abuse under George W. Bush would likely be an order of magnitude greater than under preceding presidents. 'Imagine What We Don't Know' - Some of the people involved in the discussions comment on the rationale. “If we know this much about torture, rendition, secret prisons, and warrantless wiretapping despite the administration’s attempts to stonewall, then imagine what we don’t know,” says a senior Democratic congressional aide who is familiar with the proposal. Steinhardt says: “You have to go back to the McCarthy era to find this level of abuse. Because the Bush administration has been so opaque, we don’t know [the extent of] what laws have been violated.” “It’s not just the ‘Terrorist Surveillance Program,’” says Gregory Nojeim from the Center for Democracy and Technology. “We need a broad investigation on the way all the moving parts fit together. It seems like we’re always looking at little chunks and missing the big picture.” Effect on Presidential Race Unknown - It is unknown how the 2008 presidential race may affect whether the investigation ever begins, although some think that Democratic candidate Barack Obama (D-IL), said to favor open government, might be more cooperative with Congress than his Republican opponent John McCain (R-AZ). However, a participant in the discussions casts doubt on this: “It may be the last thing a new president would want to do.” (Shorrock 7/23/2008) May 2008 or Shortly Before: Constitutional Lawyer Questions Legality of Main Core Database

Constitutional lawyer Bruce Fein, formerly an associate deputy attorney general under President Ronald Reagan, says that the legality of the Main Core database, which contains a list of enemies primarily for use in national emergencies (see 1980s or Before), is murky: “In the event of a national emergency, the executive branch simply assumes these

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powers”—the powers to collect domestic intelligence and draw up detention lists, for example—“if Congress doesn’t explicitly prohibit it. It’s really up to Congress to put these things to rest, and Congress has not done so.” Fein adds that it is virtually impossible to contest the legality of these kinds of data collection and spy programs in court “when there are no criminal prosecutions and [there is] no notice to persons on the president’s ‘enemies list.’ That means if Congress remains invertebrate, the law will be whatever the president says it is—even in secret. He will be the judge on his own powers and invariably rule in his own favor.” (Ketcham 5/2008) May 2008 or Before: Former CIA Officer Speculates Main Core Database Resides within Homeland Security

Former CIA officer Philip Giraldi is interviewed by journalist Christopher Ketcham about the Main Core database, which apparently contains a list of potential enemies of the US state. Giraldi does not know any definite information about the database, but he speculates that it must be contained within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): “If a master list is being compiled, it would have to be in a place where there are no legal issues”—the CIA and FBI would be restricted by oversight and accountability laws—“so I suspect it is at DHS, which as far as I know operates with no such restraints.” Giraldi notes that the DHS already maintains a central list of suspected terrorists and says it has been freely adding people who pose no reasonable threat to domestic security. “It’s clear that DHS has the mandate for controlling and owning master lists. The process is not transparent, and the criteria for getting on the list are not clear.” Giraldi continues, “I am certain that the content of such a master list [as Main Core] would not be carefully vetted, and there would be many names on it for many reasons—quite likely including the two of us.” (Ketcham 5/2008) May 2008: Former Official Admits PROMIS Application Given to NSA

Former national security official Norman Bailey admits publicly and on the record that the PROMIS database and search application has been given to the NSA. As Salon magazine points out: “His admission is the first public acknowledgement by a former US intelligence official that the NSA used the PROMIS software.” Bailey also says that the application was given to the Treasury Department for a financial tracking project in the early 1980s that also involved the National Security Council (see 1982-1984). Bailey worked for US governments from the Ronald Reagan era until the George W. Bush administration and, in addition to the 1980s tracking program, he headed a special unit within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence focused on financial intelligence on Cuba and Venezuela in 2006 and 2007. (Shorrock 7/23/2008) May 2008: Number of Americans Listed as Potential Suspects in Main Core Database Reportedly Reaches Eight Million

What Radar magazine describes as a “knowledgeable source” claims that 8 million Americans are now listed in the Main Core database as potentially suspect. Main Core is a database of enemies of the state established several decades before as a part of the Continuity of Government (COG) program (see 1980s or Before). In the event of a national emergency, the suspects could be subject to, for example, heightened surveillance, tracking, direct questioning, or even detention. (Ketcham 5/2008) Home | About | Timelines | Forum | Development | Donate | Contact Privacy Policy | Terms of Use

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