Thant Myint U
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Thant Myint U
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http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/thant_myint_u.htm
Thant Myint U's Article explaining the role of UN in Burma/Myanmar The Straits Times (published 5 April 2008) Mr Ibrahim Gambari is no miracle-worker, yet some seem disappointed that he has not been able to work miracles in Myanmar over the past six months. There have been recently calls for an end to his efforts. But before jettisoning the role of the UN Secretary-General's 'Good Offices' in Myanmar, it's important to understand what it actually is and what it is not, and why calling it quits may not be in anyone's interest, least of all those unhappy with the status quo. A little more than two years ago, the UN's first and only 'Special Envoy' on Myanmar, Mr Razali Ismail, stepped down after being repeatedly denied entry to the country, ending a negotiation process which had begun with his appointment in 2000. The then Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan judged that the opportunities did not exist for a revived mediation effort, and instead asked Mr Gambari, who was then his Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, to keep an active watch of the situation and look for ways to restore a level of contact with both the government and the opposition. With the appointment of Mr Ban Ki-Moon as Secretary-General in 2007, Mr Gambari was appointed as his 'Special Advisor on the Iraq Compact and Other Issues'. Myanmar was designated as one of these 'other issues'. Mr Gambari has since made several trips to the country, including three since the protests last September. Though some of his initial proposals were accepted by the ruling State Peace and Development Council, others have more recently been rejected. No one will deny the difficulty of the task at hand. Between the views and desires of the government and those of the main political opposition led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi there remains a sea of difference. The government is very much in control and has its own agenda. It sees little point in engaging with outsiders and compromising on what it views as matters of basic regime and national security. To add to the mix are the more than two dozen different armed groups and a host of rival ethnic interests.And it's not like mediating in a civil war, with pivotal battles and potential ceasefires. In Myanmar, the UN is attempting to facilitate a process of democratic reform, a role it has seldom if ever played. Facilitating democratic reform is also not a role many UN Member States would like the organization to play. The General Assembly have passed annual resolutions on democracy and human rights in Myanmar since 1991. But though these resolutions have passed by consensus, they are Western-sponsored resolutions and enjoy only limited support outside the Western bloc. The reasons for are not just about Myanmar. Many countries are uneasy about the UN straying too far into what some see as the 'internal affairs' of sovereign states, something expressing prohibited by the Charter. And a contest between a military government and a pro-democracy opposition is viewed by a good
7/20/2009 11:11 AM
Thant Myint U
2 of 3
http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/thant_myint_u.htm
number as a clearly domestic matter. If Myanmar's neighbours complained that the situation in Myanmar now required Security Council action that would be one thing. But they haven't. It seems unlikely that a much harsher resolution is around the corner and even less likely that any General Assembly resolution would sway the basic political calculations of Myanmar's top generals. Then there is the Security Council. For some pro-democracy campaigners, the idea of Security Council action against the Myanmar government is the obvious and desired alternative to Mr Gambari's diplomacy. But this is based on an entirely unrealistic appreciation of where the Security Council is on this issue. The Council is deeply divided. Russia and China's veto a year ago of a US and UK sponsored on Myanmar demonstrated this clearly, much to the pleasure of the ruling junta. Nothing has changed since. The protests in September increased international attention but has not bridged the international divide. Several on the Council are nowhere near being convinced that Myanmar constitutes a threat to international peace and security. China does not want Myanmar on the agenda at all. The Security Council will likely continue to discuss Myanmar and hear briefings from the Secretary-General or his representatives, but even the mildest resolution is very far way. And so we are back to the Secretary-General and his 'Good Offices'. Under the Charter, the Secretary-General is a political organ in his own right and through their 'Good Offices' successive Secretaries-General have acted independently to further the Charter's objectives. But the Secretary-General has no special power, no troops on standby, and no punitive sanctions in his back pocket. He and his staff are facilitators and mediators and can do little without the consent of the government in question. They are also servants of the UN's Member States and as long as the the Permanent Five of the Security Council are themselves at odds over what to do about Myanmar, the real political space the Secretary-General has to operate is fairly limited. But before throwing up our hands in despair at the UN's mysterious ways, it is important to remember that the Secretary General's 'Good Offices' ofteny bear fruit only after many years of tiresome, frustrating, seemingly dead-end diplomacy. Sometimes (not always), after years of endless talking and bickering, a new political landscape will unexpectedly appear, and the contacts and conversations cultivated over the interim will take on a new life. We've seen this recently in the region in East Timor and in Nepal, where patient and quiet diplomacy suddenly changed into more active mediation. It was important to have had the UN waiting in the wings, talking to whomever it could, even if the immediate pay-offs were not there. This doesn't mean that other avenues to help should not be tried, either by individual governments or regional bodies like ASEAN. Certainly efforts should be made to provide humanitarian assistance to the country's poorest and to support economic reform.
7/20/2009 11:11 AM
Thant Myint U
3 of 3
http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/thant_myint_u.htm
But it's possible that one day, whether it's months or years from now, there will suddenly appear a fresh opportunity in Myanmar and the 'Good Offices' of the Secretary-General will be an indispensible part of moving things forward. It's a role that needs to be protected and preserved. The costs are minimal and there are few alternatives in sight. Thant Myint-U 31 March 2007
7/20/2009 11:11 AM
1 of 3
http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/thant_myint_u.htm
Thant Myint U's Article explaining the role of UN in Burma/Myanmar The Straits Times (published 5 April 2008) Mr Ibrahim Gambari is no miracle-worker, yet some seem disappointed that he has not been able to work miracles in Myanmar over the past six months. There have been recently calls for an end to his efforts. But before jettisoning the role of the UN Secretary-General's 'Good Offices' in Myanmar, it's important to understand what it actually is and what it is not, and why calling it quits may not be in anyone's interest, least of all those unhappy with the status quo. A little more than two years ago, the UN's first and only 'Special Envoy' on Myanmar, Mr Razali Ismail, stepped down after being repeatedly denied entry to the country, ending a negotiation process which had begun with his appointment in 2000. The then Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan judged that the opportunities did not exist for a revived mediation effort, and instead asked Mr Gambari, who was then his Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, to keep an active watch of the situation and look for ways to restore a level of contact with both the government and the opposition. With the appointment of Mr Ban Ki-Moon as Secretary-General in 2007, Mr Gambari was appointed as his 'Special Advisor on the Iraq Compact and Other Issues'. Myanmar was designated as one of these 'other issues'. Mr Gambari has since made several trips to the country, including three since the protests last September. Though some of his initial proposals were accepted by the ruling State Peace and Development Council, others have more recently been rejected. No one will deny the difficulty of the task at hand. Between the views and desires of the government and those of the main political opposition led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi there remains a sea of difference. The government is very much in control and has its own agenda. It sees little point in engaging with outsiders and compromising on what it views as matters of basic regime and national security. To add to the mix are the more than two dozen different armed groups and a host of rival ethnic interests.And it's not like mediating in a civil war, with pivotal battles and potential ceasefires. In Myanmar, the UN is attempting to facilitate a process of democratic reform, a role it has seldom if ever played. Facilitating democratic reform is also not a role many UN Member States would like the organization to play. The General Assembly have passed annual resolutions on democracy and human rights in Myanmar since 1991. But though these resolutions have passed by consensus, they are Western-sponsored resolutions and enjoy only limited support outside the Western bloc. The reasons for are not just about Myanmar. Many countries are uneasy about the UN straying too far into what some see as the 'internal affairs' of sovereign states, something expressing prohibited by the Charter. And a contest between a military government and a pro-democracy opposition is viewed by a good
7/20/2009 11:11 AM
Thant Myint U
2 of 3
http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/thant_myint_u.htm
number as a clearly domestic matter. If Myanmar's neighbours complained that the situation in Myanmar now required Security Council action that would be one thing. But they haven't. It seems unlikely that a much harsher resolution is around the corner and even less likely that any General Assembly resolution would sway the basic political calculations of Myanmar's top generals. Then there is the Security Council. For some pro-democracy campaigners, the idea of Security Council action against the Myanmar government is the obvious and desired alternative to Mr Gambari's diplomacy. But this is based on an entirely unrealistic appreciation of where the Security Council is on this issue. The Council is deeply divided. Russia and China's veto a year ago of a US and UK sponsored on Myanmar demonstrated this clearly, much to the pleasure of the ruling junta. Nothing has changed since. The protests in September increased international attention but has not bridged the international divide. Several on the Council are nowhere near being convinced that Myanmar constitutes a threat to international peace and security. China does not want Myanmar on the agenda at all. The Security Council will likely continue to discuss Myanmar and hear briefings from the Secretary-General or his representatives, but even the mildest resolution is very far way. And so we are back to the Secretary-General and his 'Good Offices'. Under the Charter, the Secretary-General is a political organ in his own right and through their 'Good Offices' successive Secretaries-General have acted independently to further the Charter's objectives. But the Secretary-General has no special power, no troops on standby, and no punitive sanctions in his back pocket. He and his staff are facilitators and mediators and can do little without the consent of the government in question. They are also servants of the UN's Member States and as long as the the Permanent Five of the Security Council are themselves at odds over what to do about Myanmar, the real political space the Secretary-General has to operate is fairly limited. But before throwing up our hands in despair at the UN's mysterious ways, it is important to remember that the Secretary General's 'Good Offices' ofteny bear fruit only after many years of tiresome, frustrating, seemingly dead-end diplomacy. Sometimes (not always), after years of endless talking and bickering, a new political landscape will unexpectedly appear, and the contacts and conversations cultivated over the interim will take on a new life. We've seen this recently in the region in East Timor and in Nepal, where patient and quiet diplomacy suddenly changed into more active mediation. It was important to have had the UN waiting in the wings, talking to whomever it could, even if the immediate pay-offs were not there. This doesn't mean that other avenues to help should not be tried, either by individual governments or regional bodies like ASEAN. Certainly efforts should be made to provide humanitarian assistance to the country's poorest and to support economic reform.
7/20/2009 11:11 AM
Thant Myint U
3 of 3
http://www.freeburmacoalition.org/thant_myint_u.htm
But it's possible that one day, whether it's months or years from now, there will suddenly appear a fresh opportunity in Myanmar and the 'Good Offices' of the Secretary-General will be an indispensible part of moving things forward. It's a role that needs to be protected and preserved. The costs are minimal and there are few alternatives in sight. Thant Myint-U 31 March 2007
7/20/2009 11:11 AM
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