Terrorist's Endgame: Tactical Nuclear Games

TERRORISM’S ENDGAME Tactical Nuclear Games: Counters & Politics

Lyle Brecht 15 May 2004

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games

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TERRORISM’S ENDGAME Tactical Nuclear Games: Counters & Politics Lyle Brecht 15 May 2004

Tactical Nuclear Games What is desperately needed today is a new counter-terrorism strategy, a counter-terror strategy that does not make the U.S. itself look like the terrorists it is fighting in its “war on terrorism.”1 Such a rethinking of counter-terror strategy is especially necessary before the U.S. or its allies is hit with a terrorist attack using CBRN weapons of mass destruction that kills or injures 30,000 or 300,000 people, rather than 3,000 people as in the 9/11 attacks.

The following discussion portrays the present “global war against terrorism” the U.S. is engaged in as an analyzable game competitively “played” by two opposing sides. 2 What this discussion 1

For example, in a January 25, 2002 memo from Alberto R. Gonzoles to President George W. Bush entitled: “Application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban,” the White House attorney is concerned that Bush administration officials could be prosecuted for ‘war crimes’ as a result of the measures to combat terror adopted by the administration in response to the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda. 2

The benefits of re-thinking the “war on terrorism” is not to arrive at a final solution or descriptive analysis, but to alter perspectives so that creative, potentially productive alternatives to conventional wisdom may be explored and included in a multifaceted counter-threat strategy. Here the exercise is to model terrorism as a game that is being played in real-time by two opposing sides. This exercise potentially uncovers salient aspects of the “fitness landscape” or underlying structure that is required for any counter-threat system to adequately address different threat scenarios. This approach also highlights relative levels of funding required for the various components in an interlinked network of components (the “counter-threat system”) to produce specific results. In no way does the dispassionate manner in which terrorism discussed here suggest that the author does not view terrorism as a horrific and morally reprehensible tactic to achieve political aims.

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argues for is a holistic approach to “war on terrorism” strategy based on the inclusion of all means at the disposal of the state; not only counter-intelligence and military might, but also diplomatic, economic, political, moral, and justice-seeking measures appropriate for the type of political conflict that engenders terrorism as a tactic to achieve political objectives.3 Instead of thinking about this as a “war against terrorism,” this can be more accurately thought of as a “proxy war” fought by privatized groups of individual actors (e.g. al Qaeda is presently a prime example of such a group) who use terrorism as a technique to achieve political objectives that have the intention of producing structural changes in power-sharing relationships that are international in scope.4 It is a “proxy war” in that al Qaeda, for example, is fighting as an agent on behalf of its “sponsors” rather than for its own power or territorial objectives.5 This proxy war, from the perspec-

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For example, well-funded hard-power components such as counter-intelligence and military power produce less value for dollar expended if other soft-power components such as diplomatic, economic, political, moral and justice-seeking measures are not also optimally employed as part of an overall counterthreat systems approach. See Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (PublicAffairs, 2004). 4

Terrorism as used here is systemized violence against a predominantly civilian population that may take the form of lethal force, symbolic violence, economic disruption, and other forms that impinge or impede on the normal human freedoms that are reasonable, normative, and expected by such civilian population. Thus, terrorism has been a common a tactic of war used, for example, by the Germans against the Jewish populations of Poland, Germany, etc. during WWII; by the U.S. in its fire-bombing of Tokyo, etc. (e.g. 100,000 civilians were killed in one night’s air raids) against Japan in WWII; the U.S. “pacification” program in Vietnam; Pol Pot’s “ruralization” project in Cambodia that systematically killed millions of Cambodians; as a tactic of the U.S.-supported mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war; Sadam’s use of WMD against the Kurds in northern Iraq in the 1980’s; etc. “International” describes the fact that the combatants are not fighting a domestic civil war within their respective domestic nation states, but internationally, across state boundaries. “Privatized” describes the fact that the terrorists are privately funded and are not controlled by the policies or directives of any particular nation state. 5

This is a real war, at least from the perspective of the U.S., in that the U.S is engaged in the maximum use of “force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

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tive of the “enemies of the U.S.” has two primary political objectives: (1) to provoke a nonproportional violent response by the U.S. government that leads to escalation of violence, and (2) to achieve disproportionate economic costs for the U.S. that over time will negatively impact the U.S. economic hegemony in the world.6 Using the analogy of war, al Qaeda’s attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. immediate response to those attacks constitute one battle in this “proxy war.” Viewed from this perspective, al Qaeda decidedly won this battle, not because of the death and destruction in New York and Washington, DC on 9/11, but because al Qaeda achieved its two primary political objectives: (1) to provoke a nonproportional violent response by the U.S. government that leads to escalation of violence, and (2) to achieve disproportionate economic costs on the U.S. The U.S. immediately attacked Afghanistan where ~10,000 civilians were killed in that war. Then the Iraqi war was justified on the basis of the “war on terrorism” which killed another ~10,000 civilians so far. Economically, the U.S. response to the attacks on 9/11 that may have cost ~$2 million to plan and carry out was for the U.S. to spend ~$200 billion on two wars and counter-terrorism measures since 9/11/2001. The misconception of such disproportional retaliation by the U.S. is that such massive use of force will effectively destroy the fighting forces of the enemy; to “put [them] in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight.”7 However, this approach to this “proxy war” is doomed because the “sponsor” for whom the enemy (al Qaeda in this specific “battle”) is best imagined as groups of individuals who believe in the ideals of human freedom and democratic

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This assumption redefines terrorism as a “political socio-economic act” rather than a tactic to create a climate of fear and anxiety. Using this definition enables one to model terrorism as a “project” and to think about counter-projects from a capital budgeting, investment analysis perspective (e.g. what programs achieve the greatest return (reduction in terrorist “economic acts”) for invested capital?). 7

von Clausewitz, 90.

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self-determination ideas espoused by the U.S. 8 That is, at the core of the “war against terrorism,” the two opposing sides are the “theory” of the U.S. regarding human freedom, human development and self-determination vs. the praxis of the U.S regarding human freedom, human development, and self-determination. The role of the agents engaged in terrorism acting as proxies is primarily to call attention to the world community that what the U.S. espouses as its democratic values and how it lives these values are irreparably and immeasurably disjunctive. To cast the “war against terrorism” in theological terms of “good versus evil” only tends to reinforce the world community’s understanding of the U.S. as a fundamentally evil, imperial force. That is because the fundamental charge of the international privatized terrorist against the U.S. is hypocrisy – “a gap between appearance and reality, between saying and doing, caused by a misplaced hierarchy of values and excessive emphasis on external matters [“material things”] to the neglect of the interior.”9 For, rather than a force for human freedom and democratic selfdetermination, the U.S. is perceived as a nation that says one thing, “terrorism as a tactic of war” is evil, but practices something entirely different, “is willing to engage in terrorism itself for its own self-serving purposes.”

Categories, Types and Forms of Terrorism: Terrorism is commonly believed to be a tactic to create a climate of fear and anxiety. Fear and anxiety may result from terrorism, but this is of8

It is not accurate to portray “us” as “those who love freedom” and the enemy as “those who hate freedom.” The reality is that if “our” freedom despoils or constrains “their” vision of freedom, from the “other’s” perspective we are oppressors, not lovers of freedom. If we are discussing the Middle East, for example, terrorism has been used as a technique against oppressive governments (oppressive as measured by currently accepted international U.N. norms, for example) who could be classified as socialistic, authoritarian, or totalitarian – many of which at one time or another have received military aid from the U.S. (e.g. Sadam Hussein’s government in Iraq was a large recipient of U.S. military aid in Iraq in the 1980’s even as he used WMD on his Kurdish population in northern Iraq). 9

This was the charge against the scribes and Pharisees by Jesus as recounted in Matt. 23:13-21. See Daniel J. Harrington, S.J., (Sacra Pagina, Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1991), 326. This recollection of hypocrisy is also attested to in the Nevi’im (the “Prophets) of Jewish scripture which preserved the prophets’ words as “not only significant for the circumstances in which they were originally pronounced but potentially relevant for later ones as well…[in their] crucial role in critiquing and trying to change society.” See Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, editors, The Jewish Study Bible: Jewish Publication Society Tanakh Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 457-8.

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ten neither the primary reason, nor result hoped for by the modern international terrorist. The difficulty is that terrorism is often discussed as a monolithic conceptual entity. But terrorism is actually pluralistic and polyvalent; it is not one thing. Also, depending on which category, type and form of terrorism someone is concerned with, dramatically different counter-terrorism approaches make sense. There are two major categories of terrorism: domestic and international: •

Palestinian-Israeli conflict involves domestic terrorism (use of lethal force against civilian populations by both sides in the conflict).

•

Soviet war in Afghanistan involved international terrorism (use of lethal force against civilian population of Afghanistan by both Soviet troops and mujahideen funded by U.S. and Saudis).

•

U.S. war against Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan involved international terrorism (use of lethal force, whether intentional or unintentional, against Afghan civilian population by U.S. troops fighting al Qaeda, a known international terrorist organization).

Within domestic terrorism there are two types: psycho-pathological and socio-political: •

Psycho-pathological: e.g. Columbine High School shootings perpetrated by a socio- or psychopathically disturbed individual for purely individualistic, bizarre reasons. An appropriate counter-strategy is proactive and interventionist law enforcement.

•

Socio-political: This type of terrorism usually takes place within pre-modern or modern nation states as a technique of the powerful against the powerless or the powerless against the powerful, incumbent government. An example of state-sponsored domestic terrorism is the repression of the Kurds under the former Sadam Hussein regime in Iraq prior to the U.S. liberation of Iraq. Domestic terrorism of disaffected groups against the incumbent government usually results when a disaffected, indigenous group of individuals believe they have no legitimate means for negotiating power-sharing relationships in the nation state. Good examples where this type of terrorism is evident are the Israel-Palestine conflict, the conflict in Chechnya between Chechnya rebels and Russian troops and presently in Iraq against the Coalition occupying force.

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•

The typical counter-strategy for political-nationalist terrorism is use of military force. Yet, the only solution that has ultimately worked historically is negotiated power-sharing arrangements. These are power-sharing relationships that address legitimate and substantive claims of the center political constituency. Diplomacy, not military counters, is most likely to produce satisfactory results. The vast majority of the world’s terrorism is this type of terrorism. For example, successful transitions from political-nationalist terrorism to peace after negotiated power-sharing has recently occurred in South Africa, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, etc.

Within international terrorism there are two predominant forms: publicly financed terrorism and privately financed terrorism. International terrorism is almost always socio-political terrorism: terrorism that is attempting to bring about a set of specific political objectives of a “transnational” nature: •

By publicly-financed actors: e.g. U.S. soldiers involved in Abu Ghraib jail abuses of civilian detainees reported by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as “systematic;”10 C.I.A. operatives involved in interrogations of al Qaeda detainees that contravene Third and Fourth Geneva Convention Act protocols for treatment of prisoners. Typically, only internationally constituted 3rd party interveners (e.g. UN “peacekeeping force,” International Red Cross, World Court, etc.) are an effective counter-measure for this form of terrorism.

•

By privately financed actors (“privatized”): e.g. al Qaeda 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and on the Pentagon in Washington, DC; some of the attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq; and some recent attacks in Saudi Arabia. As Richard Clarke points out in his op-ed “The Wrong Debate on Terrorism (NY Times, April 25, 2004),” this is a “battle of ideas” whose most effective long-term counter is neither military violence nor diplomacy but “finding

10

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Report of the ICRC on the Treatment by Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation,” February 2004.

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ideological and religious counterweights” to motivating figures and thought patterns that legitimize this type of terrorism.

International privatized terrorism as Infomercial: asking the question, “What is the information content of this form of terrorism?” International privatized terrorism is like an advertising campaign directed at the “civilized world.” Like advertising, its job is to reach the masses and to gain a “share of mind” on the part of the consumer. From this perspective, international privatized terrorism as advertising has been immensely successful; probably the most effective advertising campaign ever conceived at reaching a global audience and establishing “share of mind.” The purpose of international privatized terrorism as advertising is to produce massive, overresponsive counter-violence on the part of the government and communities violated by the terrorist event. When this violence/counter-violence cycle occurs, this achieves a share of mind at the lowest cost per viewer, similar to “viral marketing.” International privatized terrorism as advertising has produced stunning results, not only is its message top of mind, but it has produced a massive counter-violence/violence spiral that keeps its message top-of-mind week-to-week. The message, or information content, of terrorism as advertising directed at the “civilized world” is twofold: (1) “your narrative, how you define reality, is incomplete in that it does not adequately take us into account,” and (2) “you are not as strong and powerful and invincible as you believe that you are.” These are primarily “religious” as opposed to secular messages.

International privatized terrorism as a technique of personae miserae (the powerless) in modernity to post-modernity shift: Counter-terrorism strategy typically makes the mistake of approaching international privatized terrorism like a point-source pollution problem: “If only we can rid ourselves of the few terrorists who are doing this activity, then we will be safe.” Yet, the reality is that international privatized terrorism is like the result of non-point-

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source pollution in that it has general, tacit approval of the am harets,11 who make up the vast majority of the world’s population. The am harets are the implicit “us” in the information content of terrorism: “your narrative is incomplete in that it does not take us into account” and “you are not as strong and powerful and invincible [relative to us] as you believe that you are.” Even though terrorism is carried out by only a relatively “fringe” few on behalf of the am harets, the underlying message is believed to be “on-target” by the vast majority of the world’s population (even as terrorism itself as a technique of political warfare is widely denounced by the majority of the world’s population). As long as the message is on-target and international privatized terrorism is viewed as an effective, least-costly means to convey this information to the elite of the world, there will be an effectively infinite supply of new terrorists to replace those that are killed or dispersed. The shift from modernity to post-modernity is primarily a shift in the inclusiveness of human freedom, defined as self-determination of human development. In modern times, those with disproportionate access to the world’s resources served as colonial powers that exploited lesspowerful indigenous populations for the primary benefit of the colonial power. 12 Post-modernity is built on the premise that colonialism, in whatever hegemonic form, is not sustainable over time and is ultimately destructive of both the hegemonic power and the exploited, less-powerful

11 Am

harets is a Hebrew word meaning “people of the earth.” In the first century C.E. it was applied derisively to refer to individuals as “country bumpkins,” those perceived as “less civilized” whose speech was less refined and who were not up-to-date on the latest ideas from the centers of culture in that day and age. In today’s post-modern era, the am harets comprise about five billion of a total 6.3 billion human population and are found in differing degrees in all nations, including “developed” countries. 12

For example, in the U.S. drive to “liberate” oppressed peoples so that they may experience human freedom, it is vitally important that this is achieved in a manner that does not remind an indigenous population of “colonialism” or lead to conditions that in any way, shape, or form smack of colonial hegemony. For a view of colonialism as international privatized terrorism’s roots see Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim : America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (Pantheon Books, 2004).

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indigenous population.13 Thus, underneath the political rhetoric, false religiosity, and unrestrained violence of international privatized terrorism is a moral quest for self-determination and enhanced human freedom for the personae miserae (the powerless).

International privatized terrorism is not due to a disjunctive religiosity between Islam and Christianity (or Judaism) or even a “fundamentalism” of religious belief: The fundamental morality and underpinnings of human justice are concurrent across Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: •

Sacred scripture “tells us the kinds of people we are to become if we are to hear its message faithfully.”

•

Sacred scripture “is both a historical document and a canonical and sacred text for a believing community.

•

Sacred scripture contains information that is “useful to guide behavior today.”

•

“Human love and justice is modeled for us in [sacred] scripture” (e.g. “the golden rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”).14

Given these starting assumptions, the following predicates for human justice are equally true for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam:

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There are a whole range of socio-political and political-economic reasons for this paradigm shift from modernity to post-modernity. However, a practical reason is that historical colonialism, in whatever form, has always led to conflict and in an era of proliferated WMD, the cost of such asymmetrical conflict with WMD is potentially unsustainable to even the wealthiest and most powerful countries. For a discussion of modernity and post-modernity as it applies to statecraft see Robert Cooper, Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004). 14

John R. Donahue, S.J., “The Bishop and the Proclaimation of Biblical Justice’” in David A. Stosur, ed., Unfailing Patience and Sound Teaching: Reflections on Episcopal Ministry in Honor of Rembert G. Weakland, O.S.B. (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2003), 246-248.

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1. Human history and human institutions and political arrangements are not “‘secular” in the sense of being outside God’s plan for humanity.” Thus, morality and human justice (see above tenets) “should inform a person’s public life in community.” 2. “Made in the image and likeness of God, all people have a human dignity and fundamental rights that are independent of their gender, age, nationality, ethnic origin, religion, or economic status.” 3. “The fullness of human life is found in community with others.” 4. Moses/Christ/Mohammed’s “message imposes a prophetic mandate to speak for those who have no one to speak for them [the powerless: the “poor”, the “widow,” the “orphan,” and the “stranger in the land”], to be a defender of the defenseless.” 5. To “misuse [] the world’s resources or [appropriate] them by a minority of the world’s population betrays the gift of creation” and distorts our community with others (see #3 above). 6. “On earth, we belong to one human family and as such have mutual obligations to provide the development of all people’s across the world.”15

International privatized terrorism’s link to and appeal to religion as a rationale is a false religiosity: International privatized terrorism as a condoned technique to redress social or political grievances of the personae miserae (the powerless) is outside the mainstream religions

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Donahue, 240-2.

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and even the mainstream fundamental movements.16 Wrapping terrorism in a rationale of religiosity (Islamism, of even “jihadist” movements, etc.) obscures the reality that international privatized terrorism is primarily like an advertising campaign of a widespread political movement for liberation and human freedom of self-determination. This does not obviate potential retrogressive political movement in the opposite direction of human freedom and self determination (e.g. Taliban in Afghanistan; Iran’s Mullah Government after deposition of the Shaw, etc.) However, these interim, repressive political structures are not the goal of the am harets or personae miserae or supported by any mainstream religion: Islam, Christianity, or Judaism (although sometimes nationalist movements can co-opt regional churches; e.g. regional Catholic and Protestant Christian churches were co-opted and basic Christian moral theology subverted in Germany pre-WWII).

Over-reliance on counter-violence to fight international privatized terrorism serves as confirmation of the personae miserae’s (the powerless) worst fears: Especially disconcerting is how often the spoken words, “kill the terrorists” presently occurs in public discourse at the highest levels of society; an almost mirror response to the terrorists’ verbiage of “kill Americans;” clearly, war talk. If this situation was only one aspect of a constellation of publicly knowable responses that addressed and countered the underlying messages (information content) of terrorism it would not be so corrosive or enlisting of new terrorists to the “cause.” However, if the U.S. response to the terrorist threat is multifaceted, inclusive of non-violent countering means, at present this is not readily publicly knowable. Some myths regarding terrorism include: 1. Terrorists are beyond rehabilitation. Saudi Intelligence routinely “rehabilitates” Saudi terrorists without coercion or torture according to Geneva Convention guidelines using

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The argument here is that as soon as an adherent steps outside the boundaries of normative community behavior, the individual is acting on their own individualistic beliefs that may be framed for them in a religious context (quoting “scripture,” using traditional “religious” vocabulary to rationalize their actions, etc.), but have almost nothing to do with the base religion – which is defined by the community, not the individual. Historically, sometimes the broader religious community is wrong (as in Germany during WWII where the mainline Christian denominations were complicit in the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis), but in almost all cases, the splinter community advocates traditional normative behavior not violent means to achieve relief from oppression (e.g. Dietrich Bonhoffer’s splinter “Confessing Christian Church” that pledged solidarity with the Jews during the Nazi oppression and attempted to enlist the Allies to help). A counter-argument to this thesis is Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2002).

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religious deprogramming techniques that replace a radical, violent Islamism with a moderate Islamism. 2. One should never negotiate with terrorists. Turkey effectively diffused internal terrorism by the Kurdish P.K.K (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) by negotiating with Ocalan, the P.K.K. leader, and making good on its promises if Ocalan stopped terrorism against the Turkish government. In contrast, Russia refused to negotiate and is still contending with Muslim Chechens in southern Russia seeking independence. 3. The best means to fight terrorism is through military pre-emption. According to the C.I.A., the U.S. war in Afghanistan, at best, scattered al Qaeda operatives making them harder to find and strengthened al Qaeda’s regional leadership structure in over 60 countries. 4. All terrorists are evil and deserve death. I agree that violence is usually evil. However, one must remember that during the War of Independence, the British called the American colonists “terrorists” because they shot at British soldiers from behind trees, which was considered “cowardly.” 5. Terrorism against the U.S. is predominantly due to fundamental Islamists or jihadists from the countries of the Middle East. Probably the gravest form of domestic terrorism today is the 70,000 rapes annually perpetrated on young women attending colleges in the U.S by male U.S. citizens.17 The Oklahoma City bombing, the most devastating act of political terrorism in the U.S. prior to 9/11 was perpetrated by a white Caucasian male U.S. citizen, who was also a decorated Viet Nam War veteran. Redefining the problem of international privatized terrorism requires that we first stop viewing the objective as to “fight” terrorism. Especially harmful is the concept of a “war on terrorism.” This framework for policy and action only leads from violence to counter-violence and then more violence in retaliation, etc.(e.g. the ever-escalating and pervasive cycle in violence between the two sides in the Israeli–Palestinian terror war).

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Task Force of the National Advisory Council on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, “A Call to Action: Changing the Culture of Drinking at U.S. Colleges,” April 2002.

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International privatized terrorism is best viewed as a form of political “pollution.” Something has gone very wrong in the political process to engender a response of terrorism to make a political statement. This form of political pollution occurs in pre-modern, modern and post-modern societies of vastly differing per capita wealth and under all forms of political governance: democracy, totalitarianism, and authoritarian regimes. The only fruitful approach to international privatized terrorism is to “define solutions in terms of underlying drivers and forces.” The history of “fighting” terrorism, with few exceptions, by attempting to eliminate or even slow the destructive forces of terrorism, have largely failed in the past (e.g. “Battle for Algiers”) and will fail in the current U.S. “war on terrorism.” The failure stems in part from focusing too much on symptoms (terrorism) while neglecting the underlying causes of this pollution of the political process (why terrorism is being used?, what is behind these horrific acts of human self-sacrifice?: to claim all terrorists are “evil” and “deranged” is neither a theologically nor politically useful explanation). If one bothers to ask basic questions regarding political realities that engender terrorism as pollution of the political process, a number of universal drivers emerge, which are constellated in unique ways depending on which terrorist political group one is examining. Such universal drivers for terrorism include socio-political drivers revolving around issues of: (1) population pressures and demographics, (2) affluence differentials, (3) technology access, (4) relative poverty, (5) market failures such as ``perverse pricing” of externalities, (6) policy and political failures of inclusiveness and power-sharing arrangements, (7) the scale and rate of economic growth, (9) cultural and religious values, and (10) the local impacts of globalization. Fix the politics, prosecute the terrorists, and avoid the violence/counter-violence spiral is how to solve the problem of international terrorism. Counter-violence without addressing the underlying drivers will only lead to more terrorism – on a grander scale than what the U.S. has yet experienced.

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Using game theory to develop a holistic counter-terrorism strategy: terrorist openings with tactical nuclear devices:18 More terrorism – on a grander scale that what the U.S. has yet experienced is inevitable because under the present counter-terrorism strategy of the U.S., the international privatized terrorists are encouraged to use CBRN weapons as an opening to the next level of warfare. From a game perspective, this is a rational course of action. 19 The use of tactical nuclear devices (or other CBRN weapons) on U.S. soil by terrorists is high because: 1) the use of CBRN weapons produces a winning endgame for the terrorists; 2) CBRN weapons are relatively inexpensive and offer the greatest destructive value per dollar cost; 3) there is a large and growing supply of both CBRN weapons and international terrorists to carry out such attacks, and 4) the U.S. continues to position itself as the most attractive target for international privatized terrorism.20 A range of scenarios can be modeled whereby the terrorist side’s attack comprises the detonation of one or more CBRN weapons in one location, in multiple locations, over a relatively short time period or over a period of weeks, months or years. The type of attack can also be modeled to include a biological, chemical, or radiological component along with or in lieu of the tactical nu18

The purpose of this section of the discussion is to explore game simulations where the terrorist side opens with an attack using tactical nuclear weapons (and/or comparable CBRN weapons). To those unfamiliar with such simulations, the prospect of thinking of a terrorist attack as a game of moves and counter-moves must seem somewhat bizarre and horrible. However, the purpose is to model potential unfolding scenarios to determine the robustness of plans and capabilities of the underlying support systems necessary to carry out these plans. In the contest against international privatized terrorism, one of the most important uses for such a model is to determine: (1) if our counter terrorism strategy is sound; (2) if we are allocating adequate capital to our counter-terrorism systems; and (3) if we are funding each component of this system in an optimal fashion. 19

Various assumptions concerning the exact attack scenario and probabilities related to the ability of a terrorist group to obtain tactical nuclear devices (or other CBRN weaponry) and carry out complex logistical planning and execution steps leading to a CBRN attack can be assessed and argued. 20

Each of these four propositions or explanations are themselves controversial and demand considered debate. However, for the purposes of this discussion, we will assume that they are true or nearly true and see where the game scenario leads us. Then, once we have followed through with one complete game scenario, we can modify these assertions to see how that would impact our counter-terror moves to such an attack.

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clear component.21 Remember, the international privatized terrorists’ strategy is to develop attacks that undermine underlying systems that support economic well-being or destroy confidence in these support systems and their ability to protect and nurture the national economy and to force a disproportionate violent response from the U.S. government to such an attack.22 For example: •

For less than $2 million, the attacks on 9/11 produced about $90 billion in property damage and lost income (experiential data) and created a one-time, short-term (less than 2 years) structural $200 billion dollar cash outflow (as measured by the U.S. war response to these attacks).

•

For less than $50 million, one could model a series of CBRN attacks timed over a short period that could produce a long-term 2%-3% reduction of each year’s annual GDP or ~$600 billion cash impact over a period of 2-5 years.

•

For less than $500 million, one could model a series of CBRN attacks timed over a longer period that could produce a long-term 10% reduction of each year’s annual GDP or $2,000 billion cash impact over a period of 3-7 years.

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The model itself is based on an assumption that the game we are presently playing with terrorists today is one of wealth destruction and escalation of a violence/counter-violence cycle. The objective of the game from the terrorist’s perspective is to destroy as much of America’s wealth as possible for a given dollar of cost and to encourage the U.S. to respond with disproportionate violence. 22

From this perspective, the international privatized terrorists attempt to damage our productive capacity and our will to carry on economic activity in the face of adversity. These terrorists function as modern anti-entrepreneurs leveraging capital to destroy rather than to create wealth. With this perspective of terrorism as primarily a dis-economic activity, monetary measures can be used as a proxy to discern results of various counter-terrorism strategies. While many scenarios can be envisioned where the terrorists bungle such an attack, from a game strategy perspective, we believe that one must assume that the best game move will be chosen by the opponent – that is, the terrorists will make the best use of a tactical nuclear device (or other CBRN weapon), and not a sub-optimal use.

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Many scenarios can be elaborated and alternate assumptions put forth that alter this conclusion to the terrorist threat somewhat – but always at an unsustainable cost (the diversion of such a large portion of GDP to counter-terrorism activities as to be unsustainable over any length of time). That is, instead of the game ending in a terrorist-winning move, we can envision a series of counter-moves that defer for a time a capitulation to the terrorists’ demands at an unsustainable economic cost. To continue to play an unwinable game is pure folly or badly managed hubris. From a strategic perspective there are two fundamental questions that need a definitive answer: 1) Is the present game truly unwinable if CBRN weapons are used by our opponent, and 2) If we are in fact playing an unwinable game, how can we alter the game itself in our favor? The results of the analysis so far suggest that indeed, once our opponent plays CBRN weapon in the game, the terrorist always wins under the U.S. present counter-terrorism strategy, as there are not winning conventional countermoves readily available. 23 Presently, our approach to counter-terrorism, while multi-faceted, relies heavily on threat assessment (primarily through intelligence gathering), forward deployment of military and paramilitary forces, and law enforcement. Planned activities include pre-emptive attacks; a true homeland security strategic capability that includes hardening of domestic infrastructure; and a more coordinated perimeter policing, among other defensive measures. However, this strategy and its attendant budget are precisely what the models suggest that the terrorist opposition can and will contravene and ultimately win against through the use of CBRN weapons.24

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If one believes that there are strategies and vetted counter moves (tactics) that enable the U.S. to continue with its present counter-terrorism policies and strategies after such an attack, these need to be input into the models and exposed to debate as to their soundness. Absent such new ideas and analysis, clearly a discussion of the game itself and what changes might be made to its underlying structure rises to uppermost importance. 24

While the counter-terror models are sensitive to budget (how much we have to spend to accomplish a certain level of threat preparedness), they are also sensitive to speed – how fast can we close off a specific threat opportunity, and more importantly – how fast can responsible organizations learn to counter new threats that the terrorists think up. Thus, pouring more and more dollars into solving the problem will not necessarily produce more security if the result is a bigger and slower bureaucracy.

Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games

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Continuing to invest in conventional moves of counter-violence will not produce a winning endgame against international privatized terrorists: The more traditional counter-terrorism measures, primarily hard power that relies upon coercion and violence for effectiveness because they are well-understood and can be implemented with existing intelligence, military and federal law enforcement infrastructure are what are receiving the lion’s share of total budget allocated toward countering the terrorist threat. Yet, our model predicts that this approach alone is doomed to fail over time (see above discussion). Part of the reason the present approach to counter terror will fail is that we are approaching the problem as a point solution: identify known terrorists, discover their plans, interdict their materiel, deter their attack, find them, and prosecute them. All of these activities are fairly narrowly constituted, linearly dependent, and focused on results, assuming that we have: 1) the capability for discovering plans and specific individuals associated with those plans, and 2) the capability to interdict the attackers and their CBRN materiel before they are able to carry out an attack. Unfortunately, there is little data to support the supposition that such a set of assumptions is valid or a greater degree of success can be achieved than for example, discovering the plans of organized crime syndicates and interdicting drug shipments into this country. With enough diligence and organization, over time one can expect to be successful at learning the plans of and interdicting some percentage of drug shipments into the U.S. However, when one considers the consequences of an attack using CBRN weapons, the percentage of leakage matters a lot. One means to measure the probability of a CBRN weapon entering the U.S. is to assess the relative probability of a specific drug shipment entering. That is, when we are able to close our boarders to all illegal drug shipments, one may also assume that it is equally improbable for a CBRN weapon to enter.

To win against international privatized terrorism we must change their will to play this game! [soft power discussion, in detail, along with hard power components that are multilateral and meet 3rd and 4th Geneva Convention rules and guidelines] [need to secularize legitimacy of international privatized terrorists political objectives by heightened use of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim mainline religions, not only to condemn terrorism as a war technique to achieve political objectives but to let mainline churches legitimately carry a voice for necessary power-sharing relationship changes in order to blunt voice of terrorists.] Terrorism’s Endgame:Tactical Nuclear Games

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