Supreme Court Rulings involving the Arias Doctrine G.R. No. 154499
February 27, 2004
ALBERTO V. REYES, WILFREDO B. DOMO-ONG and HERMINIO C. PRINCIPIO, petitioners vs. RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC., represented by HILARIO P. SORIANO, President and Principal Stockholder, respondent. In this case, an Administrative case was filed againstofficials of the BSP, for alleged act of petitioners in putting sensitive information in their training materials which led to a media leak of sensitive information of respondent, this led to a filing of an administrative case of unprofessional behavior against herein petitioner. Facts: Rural Bank of San Miguel Inc. (RBMSI) filed a letter-complaint against petitioners before the BSP for their alleged unprofessionalism as their letter before the BSP was leaked to a media outlet (the Manila Times) which contained very sensitive information. BSP in response conducted an investigation through an Ad-Hoc committee, which resulted to the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of merit. Unfazed by the dismissal, respondents filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which held that the petitioners were guilty of unprofessionalism and were meted with a penalty of fine equivalent to six (6) month’s salary. Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence they filed a petition for review before the SC. Having been dealt with an unfavorable decision by the SC, herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not Petitioners are guilty of unprofessionalism in allowing the training materials to contain matters involving the case of RBMSI, which led to the leak of sensitive information. Held: No, It is noteworthy again that petitioners’ alleged role in the disclosure of information is not anchored on any concrete piece of evidence. That explains the RBSMI’s effort to cast liability vicariously on the petitioners by a superficial resort to the principle of command responsibility which this Court did not reject. But neither the principle itself which is an accepted notion in military or police structural dynamics or its counterpart of respondent superior in the law on quasi-
delicts would be relevant in this case, involving as it does the actual performance in office of the petitioners and given the fact that petitioners are high ranking officers of the country’s central monetary authority. Indeed, as such officers, petitioners cannot be expected to monitor the activities of their subalterns. In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith of their subordinates. The case specifically involved the liability of the head of office in the preparation of bids, purchase of supplies and contract negotiations done by his subordinates. In the same fashion, petitioners in this case owing to their high ranks cannot be expected to acquaint themselves with such minutiae as the flow of files and documents which leave their desks. Myriad details such as those are, by office practice, left to subalterns and minor employees. Delegation of function is part of sound management. From another perspective, the negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the absence of evidence of the latter’s own negligence. Indeed, the negligence of the subordinate is not tantamount to negligence of the superior official so the Court ruled in a case where the mandated responsibilities of the superior do not include actual monitoring of projects. In another case, this Court rejected the principle of command
responsibility although the case involved a provincial constabulary commander, aptly noting that there was neither allegation nor proof that he had been in any way guilty of fault or negligence in connection with the unlawful raid and arrest effected by his subordinates. The immunity of public officers from liability for the non-feasances, negligence or omissions of duty of their official subordinates and even for the latter’s misfeasances or positive wrongs rests, according to Mechem, "upon obvious considerations of public policy, the necessities of the public service and the perplexities and embarrassments of a contrary doctrine." These official subordinates, he notes further, are themselves public officers though of an inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public officer is liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults.