Summary Notes Neypes And Others.docx

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DOMINGO NEYPES, ET. AL vs. CA 

15- DAY FRESH PERIOD RULE



It is clear from Neypes that the ruling shall not be applied where no motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration has been filed in which case the 15-day period for appeal shall run from notice of judgment.

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In Neypes it was held that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/ new trial before the RTC.

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It was said: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.



Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.

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The remedy from an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not to appeal from the order of denial because such order is not appealable.



The remedy is to appeal from the order itself subject of the motion (Sec. 9).



Can an order of denial of a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration be assailed by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65?

judgment

or

final

Not anymore. Effective December 27, 2007, an order of denial is no longer assailable by certiorari because of the amendment to Rule 41 by A.M. No. 07-712-SC. Deleted from those matters from which no appeal can be taken and from which order Rule 65 petition may be availed of, is “an order denying a motion for new trial or a econsideration”. The amendment obviously seeks to prevent the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on an order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration. The remedy available therefore, would be that prescribed under Sec. 9,i.e., to appeal from the judgment or final order.

2.

CLEDERA et. al, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE ULPIANO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, , et al.,



The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. The Neypes principles applies to criminal cases. (Yu v. Judge Tatad, February 9, 2011).



To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court are as mandatory as they are clear and simple; and non compliance therewith is fatal to the cause of the movant, because the mere filing of the motion for reconsideration, without the requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for appeal.



Order of denial, not appealable.

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Unless the movant has the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves the adverse party with the same, the court would have no way to determine whether the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which to file his reply or opposition. The rules commanding the movant to

The fresh period rule does not refer to the period within which to appeal from the order denying the motion for reconsideration but to the period within which to appeal from the judgment itself because an order denying a motion for reconsideration or new trial is not appealable (Section 9).

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serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of hearing "shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall estate the time and place for the hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions. 

To deviate from the peremptory principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases aforecited in, and to exempt from the rigor of the operation of said principle, the case at bar would be one step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon — all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rule and when their requirements may be ignored. We had to draw a line where and did when we promulgated on January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of court wherein WE delineated in a language matchless in simplicity and clarity the essential requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any motion, to eliminate all possibilities of equivocation or misunderstanding.

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was part and parcel of the defense that the Plaintiffs had set up to protect their interest. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case without costs.

WE have been so unyielding on this matter that even in the aforementioned case of Manila Surety, 24 WE ruled that the filing of the requisite notice of hearing one day before the expiration of the period to appeal, does not retroact to the date of the filing of the motion for reconsideration, which was filed much earlier or just ten days after receipt of the decision. In the Fulton case, 25 wherein the movant therein filed the requisite notice of hearing five days after the 30-day period for appeal had expired, although the motion for reconsideration itself was filed five (5) days after receipt of the decisions, WE maintained the same rule. In the case of Magno, 26 again WE reiterated the same principle, even when the trial Judge himself caused to be served upon all the parties a notice of hearing. The movant in the Magno case filed his motion for reconsideration on the thirtieth day from his receipt of the decision without the requisite notice of hearing, which he filed sixteen (16) days after the expiration of the 30-day period for appeal.

GREGORIO TARCA ET. AL CARRETERO, Defendant-Appellee. 

vs.

ANGELES

CASON

VDA.



But it appears on the very face of the complaint that those facts, which allegedly constitute the fraud on which the action of Plaintiffs is predicated, are matters which have transpired in the course of the ocular inspection made by the trial judge in the former case and which said trial judge had already considered and passed upon in his decision.

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It even appears that when the ocular inspection was made, both parties were present with their counsel, and the objection of Plaintiffs to the indication of the traces or remains of the old sugar mill and house determinative of Defendant’s possession has been duly noted by the trial judge only that the same was not given due consideration by him. And it likewise appears that these matters have also been taken up by Plaintiffs in connection with their appeal to the Court of Appeals but that said court did not decide them in their favor but instead affirmed the findings of the trial court.



It is therefore evident that the alleged fraud now advanced by Plaintiffs predicated on those facts is not extrinsic or collateral but intrinsic in the sense that they have not only been raised but were the subject of adjudication by both the former court and the Court of Appeals and as such it cannot be considered as sufficient basis for annulling the judgment rendered in the former case.

4.

VICTORIANO

SALAZAR, Plaintiff,

v.

CAYETANA

SALAZAR, Defendant.

- GENERAL RULE: A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer and he cannot file a motion for new trial on the ground of mistake of his lawyer. - The only EXCEPTION is based on equity decision “A new trial is sometimes granted where the INCOMPETENCY or NEGLIGENCE of the party’s counsel in the conduct of the case IS SO GREAT that party’s rights are prejudiced and he is prevented from presenting his cause of action or defense. (PEOPLE vs. MANZANILLA)

DE

the court found the motion to dismiss well taken on the ground that the alleged fraud on which the cause of action of Plaintiffs is predicated, even if committed, is not extrinsic or collateral to the issues involved in the former case, but intrinsic or one which should have been raised therein because it

In view of the evidence showing a compromise between the parties, it was natural and logical that the plaintiff herein believed that the action brought against him by the

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defendant herein had been ended by the aforesaid compromise and that he was relieved, therefore, from the duty of filing his answer. Such belief excusable and having prevented the plaintiff herein from making a defense that would have been good and efficacious, this case comes within the provisions of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the judgment by default must be set aside a new trial ordered. 

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5.

Victoriano Salazar filed a complaint in this court alleging that he had been unjustly deprived of the right of defense in the said case and asking that the said judgment be annulled and that this court order a new trial by virtue of the provisions of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, the SC granted the petition of Victoriano Salazar.

AYLLON SR., (Deceased) vs. PRIMA A. SEVILLA, ET. AL 

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discovered only if it satisfies the following requisites: (1) that such evidence has been discovered after trial; (2) that it could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (3) that if presented, it would probably alter the result.

ERLINDA

S.

AYLLON

The foregoing narration of facts and events illustrates once more an instance where the client has to suffer due to the fault of counsel. But, as held in several cases, 1 1 1 a client is bound by the mistakes and omissions of his counsel, so that if an appeal is lost through the unjustified neglect of counsel, as happened in the instant case, that loss is binding upon the client. . SEVERO ARCE vs. EMPERATRIZ ARCE, ET. AL 

ET

AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

The SC said: New trial should be distinguished from the exercise of the discretionary power of the court to REOPEN a trial for the introduction of additional evidence, to clarify its doubts on material points. This discretionary power is subject to no rule other than the paramount interest of justice and will not be reviewed on appeal unless the exercise thereof is abused. (Arce vs. Arce, L-13035, Nov. 28, 1959) So it is one of the inherent powers of the court.

 On the other hand the evidence appellants desire to introduce in the new trial requested by them after rendition of the judgment, is an admission by Emperatriz Arce that the contract was actually simulated and without consideration, as appearing in the affidavit dated November 5, 1955 which was attached to plaintiffs' motion for new trial. The trial court acted correctly in denying the motion, for certainly this kind of evidence cannot be considered as newly discovered under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of securing a new trail, evidence may be considered newly

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