Strategic Project Management And Strategic Behaviour

PERGAMON

International Journal of Project Management 18 (2000) 93±103

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

Strategic project management and strategic behaviour Tony Grundy Cran®eld School of Management, Cran®eld, Bedford MK44 0AL, UK

Abstract Strategic projects are crucial to the implementation of strategies. Besides the analytical diculties of managing strategic projects these are perhaps overshadowed by behavioural diculties. Research into the strategic behaviour at BT has identi®ed several techniques for managing the behavioural issues facing strategic projects more e€ectively. These techniques include: cause of behaviour analysis, personal and strategic agenda analysis, behavioural scenarios and diculty, energy and frustration over time curves. # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction In ``Strategy Implementation and Project Management'' [1] I argued that there were close anities between strategy implementation and project management. In that article, I imported a number of tools from strategic management, value management and from organizational change to enrich project management techniques. These included: . The ®ve forms of strategyÐand the strategy mix . The notion of a set of strategic projects (the `strategic project set') . `Fishbone' or root cause analysis . How±How analysis . From±To analysis . Force ®eld analysis . Stakeholder analysis . Attractiveness±implementation diculty . Assumption analysis/uncertainty . Importance±urgency analysis These techniques deal primarily with the more analytical aspects of strategy implementation. Recent research (in collaboration with Robin Wensley at Warwick Business School) has led me to the conclusion that equally important are the behavioural aspects of strategy implementation. Practising man-

agers will easily recognise that the conduct of strategy itself is a battleground, given the considerable turbulence which surrounds both external and internal strategic moves. Strategic projects, however well intentioned, become easily bu€eted by strategies which are highly emergent and unpredictable. The more dicult of the in¯uences are frequently behavioural in nature. There appears to be great merit in incorporating techniques for surfacing behavioural issues in project management, especially for the more strategic projects. But ®rst we need to de®ne `strategic behaviour'. This is de®ned as: ``The cognitive, emotional and territorial interplay of managers within (or between) groups when the agenda relates to strategic issues.'' [2] Our de®nition of strategic behaviour stresses the extent to which cognitive, emotional and territorial perspectives and agendas of managers are interwoven. We are thus more able to understand those aspects of strategy implementation which are perhaps less easily discussible by managers. This diculty could be due either to the fact that they involve power (whether manifested through o€ensive or defensive behaviour, or through alliances) or because of emotional sensitivities.

0263-7863/00/$20.00 # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 2 6 3 - 7 8 6 3 ( 9 8 ) 0 0 0 7 6 - 3

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Two examples of strategic behaviour include: . A ®nancial services company is trying to reduce its business complexity from ®fteen to ®ve strategic business units. One of the directors raises semi-spurious reasons for retaining one business unit even though the balance of evidence is clearly against remaining in it. The debate gets messier and messier, with less and less agreement and more and more frustration. The director coils his arms and legs and slumps into defensive non-verbal behaviour. He has not, and will not reveal his underlying personal agenda which is to save the embarrassment of going back to the managers who have put their very trust in him, to defend their case, and their jobs. . A retail company is undertaking scenario development. One manager invited because of his technical knowledge becomes more and more grumpy. He is moody because the subject matter is too broad to help him on his own very speci®c functional issues. The rest of the team confront him with the problem, and one says: ``If you really don't see this as adding value to you personally, feel free to leave''. He did, and the team then began to make progress again. The two examples above illustrate the profound e€ect of behaviour on the evaluation of strategy. One might indeed characterise the ®rst example of one of ``Managers Behaving Badly'', except that would be too normative. Certainly the word `dysfunctional' seems applicable to the ®rst example and partially also to the second example. Whilst strategy formulation is clearly of some emotional and territorial sensitivity, this is likely to be greatly magni®ed during strategy implementation. For during strategic action, strategy creates turbulence in the everyday fabric of the organisation. Frequently the main vehicle for that strategic action is the Strategic Project, and it is precisely here that much behavioural turbulence (or `BT') is felt. Coincidentally, our research site was British Telecom (BT). The study focused on the strategic behaviour of a senior team within BT whose remit was to understand the implications (market and technological) of major changes in BT's external and internal environment. This key department was charged with de®ning strategic projects which would then form a central plank of BT's technological migration. As these projects had a multi-business impact they were frequently fraught with complexityÐnot merely at a territorial level but also organisationally. The study examined the team's patterns of strategic behaviour whilst discussing these strategic projects over a period of several months. This was part of an action research process, the main point of which was to see if managers could harness their strategic beha-

viour more e€ectively than before. The study produced some most interesting and positive behavioural shifts suggesting that there is at least some potential elsewhere for increasing the degree of harmony of strategic behaviour. This shift may or may not directly result in measurably improved team performance (as other variables are likely to intrude). However, at least this study gives us a ®rst stage in exploring how strategic behaviour might ultimately impact on individual and business performance. Indeed, the BT team found that a number of tools (contained in this paper) were extremely useful for helping them cope with their own behavioural issues, as they set about crystallising these strategic projects. This paper is split into three main parts: . A quick overview of past literature on strategic behaviour (drawing out implications for strategic projects) . Techniques for understanding strategic behaviour . Illustrations from the BT research . Lessons and conclusion.

2. A quick overview of past literature on strategic behaviour Prior to this research there have been relatively few ®eld studies explicitly focusing on strategic behaviour. For example, Johnson [3] says: ``It is perhaps surprising that . . .there are so few systemic (systematic) studies of the way in which the interaction of individuals contributes to strategic decision-making.'' As mentioned in my previous paper, [1] it is widely accepted that managers tend to make strategic decisions in an incremental fashion, often making the end result look somewhat disjointed, with limited logic. [4] Strategic projects su€er from the same diculty, making it arduous to manage interdependencies or to establish coherent programmes to steer implementation over time. Management decision-making has been characterised as having `bounded rationality' [4] or focuses on `muddling through'. [5] In its extreme form, `decisions' cannot easily be detected at all. [6] Even when they are made, they are often subject to a half-hearted or `weak implementation'. [7] Although organisational learning might hopefully come to the rescue, [8] sadly this is very likely to become bogged down in defensive routines, [9] especially where strategic projects threaten existing territorial barriers and existing organisational mind-sets.

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Fig. 1. The surface strategic project iceberg.

The consequence of this is that a `rational' approach to strategy implementation, along the lines of my previous paper [1] is abandoned in favour of muddling through. [10] Unfortunately, the muddling through can result in profound strategic errors and misjudgements [10] due to `bias' or `gross omissions' (for instance, in considering alternatives). In e€ect, conventional project management thus focuses on a very small part of the total `strategic project iceberg' (see Fig. 1), particularly its:

3. Techniques for understanding strategic behaviour Our techniques for understanding the strategic behaviour associated with strategic projects break into three levels of behavioural diagnosis, agenda analysis and dynamic analysis (Fig. 3). In each case we critique the potential problems and diculties which might arise when implementing themÐtogether with their possible solution.These techniques include: 3.0.1. Behavioural diagnosis

. rational tasks . resources . timescales. Although strategic project management tries to address the ®t of the project with both external and internal strategic breakthroughs, and strategic vision (the apex of the iceberg) it still does not address the deeper more behavioural issues (see Fig. 2).

. Cause of behaviour (`COBRA') analysis . Piranha analysisÐfor behavioural problems . Importance±in¯uence analysis. 3.0.2. Agenda analysis . Personal and strategic agenda (`PASTA' factor analysis)Ðand sub-personalities.

Fig. 2. The underlying strategic project iceberg.

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Fig. 3. Analysing strategic behaviour.

3.0.3. Dynamic analysis . Behavioural scenarios and `wishbone' analysis . Diculty over time, energy over time and frustration over time curves.

3.1. Cause of behaviour (`COBRA') analysis Cause of behaviour (`COBRA') analysis applies root cause or ®shbone analysis [1] to behavioural issues. Although initially this may not seem like a very major innovation, in practice this can be an extremely powerful technique for getting hold of the less tangible factors which may be at work in frustrating a strategic project (see Fig. 4). COBRA analysis (so named because of the slipperiness of behavioural drivers) can help to understand: . why a project team as a whole is behaving in an apparently dysfunctional way, or . the dysfunctional behaviour of a particular individual either within or outside the project team. Once the COBRA analysis has been done, it is then possible to prioritise which area to intervene with, for example by prioritising those behavioural drivers which are: . attractive to deal with . not too dicult to deal with. perhaps using a more formal attractiveness±implementation diculty analysis [1] (Fig. 5). Potential drawbacks of COBRA analysis might include: . Managers attribute the causes of behavioural problem to merely further symptoms rather than to their ultimate root causes.

. Crucially important root causes are missed either because these causes are taken-for-granted, hidden or mis-de®ned. . Having done the analysis no-one is prepared to use it because of its sensitivity, and due to the lack of knowledge and interpersonal skill in raising sensitive issues of this kind. Facilitation or self-challenge of the process is here very helpful: for example, one can always ask the question: ``Are these root causes both a necessary and sucient condition of creating this problem?'' 3.2. Piranha analysisÐfor behavioural problems A particular strategic project might be rife with behavioural problems. Here it is possible to apply a re®nement of the Fishbone technique by showing a number of small problems on the same sheet (Fig. 6). This is called `Piranha' analysis because each problem on its own, whilst being non-life-threatening to the project nevertheless eats in a major way into its likely success. (A shoal of piranhaÐactually a very small ®shÐis apparently sucient to strip a human being down to a skeleton in next to no time.) A potential concern here might be that we have misde®ned the various sub-problems that revolve around the main symptom. To genuinely get their arms around and underneath the total problem, managers need to be very careful in ensuring that there are no major dimensions of the problem missing. For example, one major insurance company faced a huge resource constraint in dealing with its Year 2000 IT problem. The piranha analysis highlighted not just one, but several sub-problems. One was that there was a severe shortage of IT skills in the marketplace. But a second problem was the cumbersome way in which IT projects were managed anyway in the organisationÐ showing itself as an `unable to prioritise e€ectively' symptom. A third dimension was added by the fact

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Fig. 4. Cause of behaviour (COBRA) analysis.

that the company was the last place at which good IT sta€ would choose to work. Each one of these symptoms requires its own, very separate, ®shbone.

actually mean by `in¯uence'. Ideally managers should expose their reasons for judging `low' versus`high' in¯uence.

3.3. Importance±in¯uence analysis

3.4. Personal and strategic agendas

Whilst COBRA and Piranha analysis are essentially initial diagnostic tools, Importance±in¯uence analysis helps us to prioritise behavioural interventions. Fig. 7 helps us to identify which behavioural issues it is most bene®cial to address (especially in the north-east quadrant). But also Fig. 7 may help to challenge thinking about behavioural issues in the south-eastÐhow can the team get more in¯uence over these? Diculties which might arise with the importance± in¯uence grid include, for example, not having clarity about what is most important versus least important criteria. Or, managers might not be clear what they

Coupled with the need to in¯uence behaviours (and underlying agendas) we may need to dig deeper into those agendas for speci®c individuals. My earlier paper [1] dealt with the more visible positions of key stakeholders. Personal and strategic agenda analysis allows us to go much deeper. Called the `PASTA' factor (because of our ®ndingÐ at BT that both personal and strategic agendas are often inextricably intertwinedÐ-almost like spaghetti) this analysis can yield some major insights. Fig. 7 shows a force ®eld analysis of one individual's personal and strategic agenda. The `enabling' forces are

Fig. 5. Attractiveness/implementation diculty ("AID") analysis.

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ful for another manager (or managers) to tentatively suggest or hypothesise that someone `might have certain X, Y and Z agendas'. The awkwardness of doing this is signi®cantly alleviated if the enquiring manager(s) explicitly say that they are having the equivalent of an `out-of-body experience'. This is usually taken in a humorous vein, thus enabling the strategic intervention to become ¯uid again. Before we leave the topic of PASTA factors, it is also useful to see that an individual may not always have a coherent set of agendas. The very same individual may pursue one strategy one day, another strategy on another day (sometimes called `stratophrenia'). [11] A useful way of getting one's mind around this is to use the notion of `sub-personalities'. For example, a particular stakeholder might have several mini personalities: Fig. 6. Piranha analysis.

now called the `attractors' (what turns that stakeholder on) whilst the constraining forces are called the `repellers' (or what turns that stakeholder o€). In order to get a good handle on someone's `PASTA' factors, it is advisable to simulate the `outof-body experience' (OBE) which entails one imaginingÐand identifying withÐthe feelings, thoughts, habits and everyday concerns (and history) of that key stakeholder. PASTA factor analysis is an essential prelude to creating behavioural scenarios for your strategic project. One resistance to using PASTA factor analysis is likely to be the discomfort which managers experience when re¯ecting on their own agendas. Here it is help-

. A personality (A) that wants to be seen as being `very clever'Ðactually, the cleverest in the team. . A personality (B) which seeks to protect at all cost what has worked in the past, especially where the person has put their own stamp of approval on it. . A personality (C) (contrary to A and B) which is actually quite helpful and supportive of change. In doing the PASTA factor analysis you would need here to weigh up the likelihood of a particular sub-personality coming to the fore in this situation. 3.5. Behavioural scenarios and `wishbone' analysis Behavioural scenarios involve semi-structured storytelling about how the future of the strategic project

Fig. 7. Importance±in¯uence analysis.

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Fig. 8. Personal and strategic agendas (PASTA factors).

may develop. A ®rst technique [1] is to plot some key assumptions about the behavioural in¯uences in the project. Fig. 9 illustrates these, also identifying where certain behavioural assumptions which might have seemed to have been either of less importance or lesser uncertainty can quickly move into the south-east of the uncertainty gridÐits `danger zone'. Where one or more assumptions occur in this danger zone, it is at that point that a particular behavioural scenario can be drawn out. One scenario is that the project team leader resigns and is replaced by another team leader who then immediately conducts an entire review of the strategic project with the result being a radical change in its direction. Behavioural scenarios can be re®ned by story-telling. For example, one can pick out `transitional behavioural events' that will lead us from the current state of the strategic project to one which is quite di€erent. Or, one might start o€ with a particular future and then work backwards to de®ne the kind of behavioural story-line which might lead up to that scenario (as in the 1990s ®lm ``Back to the Future''). A potential problem with using behavioural scenarios is that it is very possible that the scenario turns out to be completely o€-beam. The very nature of scenarios makes the possibility of mis-judging the future a signi®cant risk. However the alternativesÐ either of not looking into the behavioural future or extrapolating from the behavioural pastÐdo not seem viable. If there is real doubt that one particular scenario fails to tease-out the main behavioural turning points, then develop a second or even a third one (Fig. 9). Or one might use the metaphor model of the uncertainty tunnel [12] to understand: . The behavioural antecedents of the projects. . The factors which might amplify or dampen behavioural change a€ecting the project.

. The ®rst, second or third order behavioural consequence of an event within or outside the strategic project. Finally, you might identify one ideal behavioural state of the project (or its behavioural vision) and then try to map out all the behavioural factors which would need to be aligned in order to deliver that behavioural outcome. This can be drawn as a `®shbone'-like picture, except this time starting from the left-hand side of the page and working forward into the future. Because the goal of this picture is not to diagnose a problem but to create an opportunity, and because it deals with the future rather than the past, we call this technique behavioural wishbone analysis (Fig. 10) [9]. Wishbone analysis is a powerful way of making sure that not only the necessary, but also the sucient conditions are created to achieve a behavioural outcome. With wishbone analysis the main area to guard against is that however imaginative managers are they may fail to capture the one or two factors which still need to be aligned but currently are not. Wishbone analysis is most e€ective when accompanied by scenario story-telling. This ensures that all the things which need to go right do go right.

3.6. Behavioural diculty, energy and frustration over time curves So far (with the exception of behavioural scenarios) we have looked primarily at the deeper drivers of strategic behaviour associated with strategic projects rather than with the dynamics of those behaviours. The following curves were piloted by companies including Amersham International and Nokia. Particularly at Nokia these curves have proved especially helpful in encouraging managers to anticipate future behavioural diculty.

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Fig. 9. Uncertainty and importance mapping.

Fig. 11 plots behavioural diculty and energy over time for a typical strategic project. Note that as the behavioural diculty goes up, the energy of the team frequently does down. This reduction in energy is due partly to the decline in energy as the team gets less enthusiastic generally, and also as a direct response to cumulative behavioural diculty. (Clearly, if our earlier diagnostic tools are not used, and also the tools from our earlier paper [1] are neglected, this is highly likely to occur.) Fig. 11 helps us to explain why many strategic projects become bogged down, especially three to six months after inception. Finally, Fig. 12 draws together the two strands of energy over time and frustration over time curves. Again, as frustration mounts, this again saps the energy of the team unless it can somehow re-energise itself or reduce its frustrations (or both). Interestingly, managers experimenting (especially at Nokia) with drawing these curves found it quite a cog-

nitive revelation to uncover these patterns. This reinforces the impression that despite being extolled to do the contrary, managers involved in managing strategic projects manage from the `now' rather than `backwards from the future'. Clearly, these curves can help to ¯esh out the behavioural scenarios which are covered in the earlier section. Finally, if we want to extend this dynamic thinking from the `D', `E', `F' (diculty, energy and frustration over time curves) to A to F we can also draw curves for:

Fig. 10. Behavioural wishbone analysis.

Fig. 11. Diculty and energy over time curves.

. AÐactivity (i.e. its level) over time . BÐbelief (in project success) over time . CÐconfusion (i.e. its level) over time. The major concern with applying the techniques of plotting diculty, energy and frustration over time is likely to reside in potential subjectivity. The way to

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resolve this (besides getting the separate and/or independent input from di€erent managers) is to ask probing questions like: ``Why do you think it will be so dicult at time T?'' This in turn might invite a ®shbone analysis.

4. Illustrations from the BT research The action research process in the BT team involved a number of stages: 1. Initial interviews with the team. 2. Observation at an initial strategic workshop where the managers interacted in their usual style. 3. Debrief interviews with managers, re¯ecting on their behaviourÐand what was considered functional versus dysfunctional by them (and why). 4. Feedback by the researcher to the team on what its key behavioural patterns seemed to be (with discussion). 5. Facilitation by the researcher of a further strategic workshop sessionÐwould/could the team shift its behaviour? 6. Observation of a ®nal strategic workshop session where managers had the chance to try out di€erent behavioural patterns to those which were manifest in their previous state. 7. Feedback of the overall ®ndings (and discussion). The overall process took place over a four-month periodÐin order to allow any shifts in behaviour to occur and to allow data to be digested. The main ®ndings of the research [2] were as follows: First, the BT managers themselves were frequently frustrated at the slow progress of key strategic issues and projects. Their discussions were often too openended, inconclusive and di€use to produce more focused outputs. Their interactions were swayed by a number of behavioural factors which appeared to handicap their e€ectiveness. These ®ndings were generated by the phases 1) to 3) of the research. The cause-of-behaviour analysis (COBRA) which was a central part of the feedback to managers is shown in Fig. 14. This (tailored) ®shbone analysis proved to be a very powerful intervention in the management team (research phase 4), as there was apparently unanimous agreement `to see if we can try something better'. In the facilitated session (phase 5) the team again ran into diculties as old behaviours (not surprisingly) persisted. A most interesting ®nding was the tendency of key members of the team to focus on more microscopic issues (and often going o€ at a tangent) rather

Fig. 12. Energy and frustration over time curves.

than holding attention at a more `strategic level'. Subsequent feedback showing the level and dynamics of discussion (see Fig. 13) helped the team to understand the dysfunctional e€ects of excessive `picking apart' behaviour. Fig. 13 shows the discussion going through high, medium or low levels of generality, as categorised by the researcher. Although this was not, and could not be, coded with precision, it did prove helpful in discerning who in the team had the greatest tendency to `rabbit hole' the discussions. The team found it especially helpful to refer to Fig. 13 which contrasted strategic thinking from `rabbit-hole thinking'. As discussion proceeded the team members were able to re¯ect ``are we actually in the helicopter in our thinking, or have we gone down a rabbit hole?'' Another important ®nding came out of Phases 5) and 6). When the team had a narrower focus of attention and also when it was more able to share the cognitive maps and assumptions of key individuals, there seemed to be far greater momentum and harmony in its behaviours. So the more cognitive clarity exists within a team, ceteris paribus, the less behavioural turbulence is likely to exist.

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Another interesting ®nding was that certain behavioural drivers had the tendency to govern the cognitive subject matter of the managers. The main drivers of this were the personal agendas of individuals. These agendas contained a mix of emotional, territorial and cognitive elements which were all highly intermingled. So, for example, one manager held certain views about the attractiveness of a particular technology with BT's strategy. His cognitive assumptions were imbued with considerable feeling. But at the same time those views represented a particular `ideas territory' which he had staked out as being `right and appropriate for BT'. This notion of `ideas territory' is likely to be very helpful elsewhere, especially when a particular strategic project is complex and where a particular idea of `how it will work or not work' can come to dominate the wider project team's thinking. And to challenge the dominant ideas territory is to make as much of a political challenge as it is to challenge the speci®c in¯uence and power of an individual. Finally, when managers were able to self-regulate their own behaviour and cognitive interplay, some very notable shifts in behaviours occurred. One particularly interesting change occurred when using the importance-in¯uence grid. As the BT managers began to discuss what issues they had high versus low in¯uence over, they became remarkably calmer and more ¯uid. Instead of operating at a predominantly low and microscopic level of debate they began to glide e€ortlessly up and down through the levels. In their own judgement, they delivered a good deal more (and in a shorter period of time) than in their previous sessions. To summarise, then, we found that:

them incorporating several of the techniques into future team sessions.

. Cause of behaviour analysis (COBRA) was a powerful and e€ective way of managers' re¯ecting on past behaviour, feeding into real behavioural shift. . The strategic thinking/helicopter picture helped provide some useful visual prompts to focus on certain behaviours more and on other behaviours less. . Narrowing the focus of strategic attention helped to gain more cognitive clarity which, in turn, calmed much of the behavioural turbulence. This was also facilitated by the use of the importance-in¯uence grid which helped to provide a stabilising, cognitive focus. . Re¯ection on personal agendas helped the team to challenge the dominant `ideas territory' which might have hindered more innovative thinking.

[1] Grundy AN. Strategy implementation and project management. International Journal of Project Management 1998;16(1):43±50. [2] Grundy AN. Harnessing strategic behaviour. Financial Times, 1998. [3] Johnson GJ. Strategic change and the management process. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. [4] Quinn JB. Strategies for changeÐlogical incrementalism. Illinois: Richard D. Urwin, 1980. [5] Cyert RM, March JH. A behavioural theory of the ®rm. Englewood Clift, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963. [6] Mintzberg H. Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science 1978, 934±48. [7] Hickson DH, Butler RJ et al. Top decisions: strategic decisionmaking in organisations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. [8] Senge P. The ®fth discipline: the art and practise of the learning organisation. Doubleday, 1990. [9] Argyris C. Strategy, change and defensive routines. Pitman, 1986. [10] Janis IL. Crucial decisions. New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1989. [11] Grundy AN. Breakthrough Strategies for Growth. Pitman, 1995. [12] Grundy AN. Exploring strategic ®nancial management. Englewood Cli€s, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998.

The team felt generally that the action research had been a very fruitful process, both for re¯ecting on and shifting their behaviours, and also for providing more shared structure in their cognitive debate. This led to

5. Lessons and conclusion Strategic projects have become a vital way of bridging strategic and operational management, but their very success is impeded by a lack of both analytical and behavioural techniques. Whilst the analytical techniques have already been addressed, [11] arguably it is equally important (and probably more dicult) to manage the behavioural drivers impacting on strategic projects. Hopefully managers of strategic projects everywhere can now experiment successfully with those practical techniques for channelling strategic behaviour for their projects. From research at BT (and related studies) a number of behavioural techniques now exist which provide managers with some very practical and in-depth ways of managing the strategic behaviour associated with strategic projects. A focus on strategic behaviour needs championing in the organisation as it represents a major shift in how things are done. This would require not merely input from internal human resources facilitators or from outside but also leadership executive or equivalent. For it is up to him/her ultimately if there is to be a new openness and incisiveness in the interaction within senior teams.

References

T. Grundy / International Journal of Project Management 18 (2000) 93±103 Dr Tony Grundy is a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Management at Cran®eld School of Management, and Director, Cambridge Corporate Development. He has worked with BP, ICI and KPMG, and is author of six books on strategy, ®nance and change management, including Breakthrough Strategies for Growth (Pitman, 1995), Exploring Strategic Financial Management (1998) (Prentice Hall) and Harnessing Strategic Behaviour (1998) (FT Publishing).

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