Sp - Session 11 Transition 2

Session 11: Transition II: Transitions to Democracy as a model for reconciliation ► Politics

in Spain: Processes and Institutions

► IES

Barcelona ► FALL 2007 PROGRAM

► Instructor:

Andrew Davis ► e-mail: [email protected]

1

Democratization in Multinational Polities ► Democratization

is considered inherently more difficult in multinational states. ► John Stuart Mill – ‘Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities’. ► Historically, this was taken to be a given. 2

Primordialists ► This

was ‘proven’ by a group later called ‘primordialists’. ► In plural societies there are always political entrepreneurs who wish to take advantage of the ‘natural divisions’. ► So you might have political parties who wish to construct a state-wide identity but this is not stable because the identity issue will eventually bring it down.

3

Primordialists ► Primordialism

– assumes that people are born into particular cultural identities and that their most strongly held values are determined by the inherited identities. ► In other words, while social mobility is possible, cultural mobility is not.

4

Counter-argument ► Others

counter this argument: ► Common cultural roots are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for ethnic or national membership. ► Nations are not direct descendents of ancient families, rather they are modern political movements that rely on myths of common ancestry in order to legitimate their domination over society via the state. 5

Counter-argument ► The

theory that multinational democracies are inherently unstable is less convincing than it might seem. ► Belgium, Canada, Spain and Switzerland. ► Good examples of democratic failures were Germany, Japan, Italy in 1930s, all culturally homogenous. 6

Counter-argument ► Author

uses the example of Somalia to show how ‘homogenous’ states can get broken up.

► Country

is ethnically, culturally and linguistically homogenous. Opposition to the dictator in 1991 began divide between inter and even intra clan civil war. 7

Counter-argument ► Primordialism

re-appeared during the breakup of Yugoslavia. ► Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and Bosnians had lived together peacefully since WWII. ► With the breakup – they suddenly began to tear each other apart. ► How to explain this? 8

Explaining ‘instability’ ► Institutional

failure – the failure of Yugoslavia meant that one of its main raisons d’etre – a successful union of the Slavic people - was a failure. ► This gave way to entrepreneurs like Slobodan Milosovic the opportunity to take advantage of the pre-existing historical narratives regarding the differences between Serb, Croat, etc. 9

Institutional failure ► When

institutional failure happens when a peripheral territory has a successful economy, there are incentives to mobilize for separation or autonomy. ► This is easier if there is a ‘historical narrative’ to base this project on. ► From what you know about Spain – how much does this apply? 10

Institutional failure can be part of dictatorship or democracy ► And

rejection of the state has taken place during dictatorships: Spain and Czechoslovakia and in full-fledged democracy: Quebec and Flanders.

► So

clearly this type of peripheral nationalism is a reaction to something specific, and is not just applied to democracy. 11

Multinational Democracy is not inherently unstable ► Overall

point: regionally based nationalisms do not cause institutional failure at the center; rather, institutional failure at the center provides a context in which regionally based nationalists can effectively mobilize to promote an autonomy movement. 12

How to solve the multinational question ► Lijphart

– suggests ‘consociational democracy’. ► First, you recognize different groups ► Second, you empower them, but together. ► In other words, you create institutions which force agreement (such as, no policy moves forward unless all groups agree). ► This forces ‘consociationalism’ and compromise.

13

Criticizing Lijphart ► It

sounds good in theory, but it is difficult to implement in extremely divided societies. His case study was the Netherlands. ► So when it becomes negative it creates complete gridlock, stalemate, frustration and at times, return to conflict (Lebanon). 14

Criticizing Lijphart ► 2.

Also, is consociationalism democratic?

► Imagine,

if one group has twice the population than the other, why should the smaller group have a veto? Shouldn’t the person who wins the elections simply govern? 15

Criticizing Lijphart ► 3.

What do you do when the population changes?

► This

is particularly thorny when the ‘minority’ group is growing faster than the majority group. This has been problematic in Northern Ireland, Israel, and in other territories. 16

But there are lessons from Consociational School ► Often,

these lessons need to be applied on a case by case basis. ► You can build electoral systems to encourage groups and political parties to mix. ► If you give incentives (usually in the form of power) for parties to build inter-ethnic coalitions, you deemphasize the ethnic and emphasize state-wide answers. 17

Electoral Systems ► As

I mentioned from a previous lecture. The timing of state-wide versus regional elections during transitions is also a key variable in peaceful democratic transitions. ► What happened in Spain?  Statewide votes first  Constitution written before statutes of autonomy ► By

contrast – in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, regional elections mobilized regional sentiment. 18

► 1.

Strategic Problems with Transition in Multinational States

Center must show regional interests that it will not cave in lightly to demands for secession. ► 2. Center must make credible promises that if regional interests compromise regarding the transition, they will not take advantage of the situation later, and recentralize. 19

► 3.

Strategic Problems with Transition in Multinational States

Regional activists want to make sure that it is understood that there will be strong consequences if autonomy is not granted. ► 4. Regional leaders need to make credible promises that if they are given autonomy, they will not escalate demands later, nor maltreat minorities within their own regions. 20

Lessons for transition in multinational states ► If

we deny primordiality, we are left with four options ► 1. Do not acknowledge groups based on a ‘historic identity’. This means that any minority group – Turks in Germany, Russians in Estonia, Algerians in France, have no political rights because they are not part of the autochthonous group. 21

Lessons for transition in multinational states ► 2.

This also means that that you should not give specified regional groups enumerated constitutional rights. ► The Spanish Constitution provides for the creation of autonomies but does not create them itself. ► This provides for changing realities on the ground. 22

Lessons for transition in multinational states ► 3.

Recognize that people have multiple identities. Poll after poll, for example, shows that most people in Catalonia feel both Spanish and Catalan. ► The system can therefore be ‘normal’. In other words, system can be ‘conflictual’ without revolutionary implications. 23

Lessons for transition in multinational states ► Most

important – The return of violent nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and in Africa, was never ‘pre-ordained’ and requires political explanations. ► Most often, it is the failure of the project at the center which causes or allows nationalist movements to be created. 24

The late transition and the Socialist years ► THE

FOLLOWING SLIDES ARE FOR USE AS BACKGROUND REGARDING THE POST-TRANSITION YEARS OF THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s.

► THE

SLIDES THAT FOLLOW FROM HERE ON IN WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE ON THE MIDTERM EXAM. 25

Success of the Transition ► In

the short time from November 1975 to October 1982, Spain had managed to do what nobody thought it capable of doing: it had transformed itself from a Fascist dictatorship into a stable, modern democracy. ► The world breathed a sigh of relief, applauded, and invested heavily in Spain's future. 26

Socialist Spain ► Elections

were called for October 1982, and the Socialist Party, lead by Felipe González, was given an overwhelming mandate. ► Ten million Spaniards voted to let the onceillegal Socialist party lead them into the 1980's and 90's. ► At the time of the election, he was 40 years old, represented the NEW Spain: he was modern, youthful, charismatic, and intelligent. 27

The bright side - La movida ► Spain

was suddenly perceived as modern, with it, exciting, expensive, chic, and exotic. ► "La movida"— was a complex array of cultural and social ferment stimulated by, among others, the film director Pedro Almodóvar, began to capture the attention of the world press, the jet set, and the culture mavens. ► Money flowed freely, clothes were shed, and all rules seemingly suspended in an orgy of creativity and excitement as Spain liberated itself from its repressive past.

28

The dark side - Political Disillusion ► Even

as the 1980's crescendo of prosperity and spending kept up, many Spaniards were already becoming disillusioned with what they perceived to be:  the growing indifference of their political leaders  rising incidence of corruption at high levels  and an increasing threat to their daily security.

29

Political Corruption ►

►

►

The PSOE began to be referred to as corruPSOE— and statements such as "We lived better with Franco," - the streets of Madrid were impressively crime- and drug-free during the Franco years. In May 1983, RUMASA, a huge holding company which controlled 700 banks, construction companies, corporations, and other major industrial concerns in Spain, collapsed after it was revealed the level of corruption within its organization. This was the most serious banking crisis in postWorld War II Europe, and it was only the beginning of what would become the tidal wave of corruption with which Spain is dealing today. 30

ETA violence increases after democracy, why? ► Between

1968 and 1977, ETA killed on average 7 people a year. ► Between 1978 and 1980 it was 81 ► Between 1981 and 1990 it was 34 ► 1991 to 2000 it was 16 ► Overall, between 1977 and 1987 some 475 people were assassinated by ETA terrorists, a figure that had risen to 600 by 1988, and to more than 750 by 1996. 31

Nature of Spanish Transition ► Spanish

transition to democracy was ‘pacted’. ► It was peaceful, negotiated between elites. ► For the most part, the fear of another civil war or increased violence meant that Spanish populace supported this ► In BC, however, the nature of transition meant that many reforms took place too slowly, meaning that continued indiscriminate repression and misapplication of new legislation by police forces was taking place under ‘democracy’.

32

Nature of Spanish Transition II ► This

gave ETA measure of legitimacy. Half of all Basques considered ETA patriots or idealists in 1978, only 7 percent considered them terrorists. ► 2004, that had changed – 69% considered them terrorists, 17% criminals and murderers and 13% fanatics. 33

The end result of ETA’s actions ► This

created an action/repression/action cycle which never allowed normalization of political life in the BC. ► This does NOT mean that violence is an innate characteristic of the Basques. It emerged due to specific circumstances. 34

The ETA dilemma ► Felipe

had just been elected by 10 million votes in October 1982 and Spain seemed to be entering a period of hope and renewed stability. ► But ETA continued waging its bloody war against the government, the police, and, at times, the innocent population itself: between 1980 and 1982 it was killing a person per week. ► Something obviously needed to be done. Felipe's mandate that violence needed to be combatted "by all possible means" was interpreted by a small group of ultrarightwing cops, to mean "by all possible

35

What did PSOE do about ETA? ► As

it turns out, the Civil Guard's quasi-fascist organization, the Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberation, known as GAL, had been created in 1983 with the goal of using the techniques employed by ETA (assassination, kidnapping, bombings) against ETA itself.

► Grupos

Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) - were death squads illegally set up by officials within the Spanish (then Socialist) government to fight ETA. They were active from 1983 until 1987, under PSOE.

36

But Socialists maintain power ► Ironically,

however, Felipe and the Socialist Party made impressive gains in popularity during the mid-1980's because of their:  obvious dedication to social welfare concerns  their notable improvement in areas as diverse as education, health care, and the infrastructure.

► Spain

entered the NATO alliance in 1985 (thereby breaking a PSOE campaign promise) ► In 1986 it was admitted as a full member into the European Economic Community.

37

The Monarchy ► In

February 1986, on his 18th birthday, Prince Felipe was sworn in officially as the heir to the throne, insuring the continuity of Spain's constitutional monarchy. ► And in the June 1986 elections, the Socialist Party once again gained an absolute majority (44.3 percent) and continued to rule triumphantly. 38

Back to the dark side… ► Still,

one heard more talk about "Felipe's blunders" and "Felipe's deceits," and, for the first time in a decade, an opposition party began to achieve some coherence. ► There had been underground opposition parties during the Franco regime and legitimate opposition parties since the 1977 elections, of course, but neither the rightist Alianza Popular nor the leftist Izquierda Unida had posed any real threat to the rule of the Socialists for most of the 1980's. 39

The Right wing reorganizes ► Slowly,

however, the Alianza Popular transformed itself into the newly constituted Partido Popular, a rightwing coalition of technocrats, conservative businessmen, and disenchanted military and religious leaders, and began to position itself as a legitimate and stable alternative to the Socialist government. 40

2 Cracks in the Wall - 1988 ► Several

commissions were formed to investigate influence peddling and misappropriation of funds by high government officials and members of Congress. ► In July 1988, two policemen were arrested and charged with establishing a secret police hit squad whose sole mission was the elimination of Basque terrorists. 41

Cracks in the Wall ► These

arrests, while widely publicized, were not at the time seen to be a major threat to Spanish democracy. In hindsight, they appear to be defining moments - time bombs waiting to explode across the political face of Spain, as they would indeed do in 1994. ► The suspicion that government funds from the Ministry of the Interior had been used to finance this secret police organization remained at the time only that—a suspicion.

42

Positive Side ► Felipe

still could rightfully claim great strides in the improvement of the standard of living for most Spaniards. ► Spain was Western Europe's fastest growing economy. ► Industries had been modernized and the steel and shipbuilding sectors, which had fallen onto hard times a decade earlier, were once again prospering. 43

Positive Side ► People

seemed to live well, to spend money freely, to enjoy themselves with abandon. ► One-month summer vacations were not only possible, they were an absolute and immutable right of workers. ► Working hours shortened as mattress lengths lengthened (proving the real benefits of improved nutrition), corporate and banking profits tripled and quadrupled. ► Tourism set new records. 44

1992 ► Ironically,

exactly 500 years after Columbus: ► Olympic Games (Barcelona) ► the International World's Fair (Seville) ► the Cultural Capital of Europe (Madrid). ► Whereas in 1982 only 23 percent of Spaniards defined themselves as belonging to the middle class, by 1992 more than 52 percent did so. 45

Modernity ► As

William Finnegan wrote in The New Yorker in 1992, "for all the medieval images that still cling to the country, "the real Spain" is a thoroughly modern land, increasingly sexy and shockproof and rich."

46

Price for success high ► Spanish

prosperity benefited the rich much more than the poor, or even the middle class, and inflation began to run rampant. ► Unemployment, which in the U.S. hovered between 3 percent and 5 percent at the time, reached a catastrophic 20 percent in Spain by 1988, and has stayed there (or moved even higher) ever since.

47

Price for success high II ► The

country reacted by staging the largest national strike ever witnessed on Spanish soil in December 1988, a strike which in effect closed the country down. ► Even the king, in his traditional Christmas message, called for some serious talks among the competing sectors of a society he feared would unravel if left unattended. ► Public confidence in the leadership and the morality of the Socialist party was eroding. 48

Scandal starting to drown out positives ► In

March 1991 his long-time ally Alfonso Guerra (now openly called "henchman" by his enemies) was forced to resign as vice president, caused in part by a major scandal provoked by his brother Juan, who was accused of influence peddling and enriching himself illegally. ► The government of Felipe lost the people's confidence. As The New York Times put it in a not very subtle headline in July 1994 referring to Felipe: "Spaniards Grow Disenchanted With a Once-Charismatic Leader."

49

Summary of PSOE years ► Spain

has undergone monumental changes in the past 20 years. ► It must be kept in mind that in one generation Spain went from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society, from a predominantly agricultural to a predominantly industrial/service society (50 years ago Spain was 70 percent agricultural; now it is only 6 percent agricultural); ► Spain has moved, in one generation, from the 19th century to the 20th century. 50

Summary of PSOE years ► 1975

to 1995 have been the most important years in Spanish history in the past several centuries. ► This has been the longest democratic period Spain has ever witnessed. ► The changes have been dramatic and lasting, and Spain can never return to its agricultural, rural, 19th-century roots. 51

Summary of PSOE years ► With

all its problems accumulated by 1995, Spain remained a dynamic, tolerant, and exciting country which looked to the future as much as it did to the past. ► The party of the go-go 80's may have ended, but Spain’s democracy, most importantly, was consolidated during this time. 52