Soft Determinism Philosophy Overview

Soft determinism Hospers and Taylor agree that soft determinism is not a good theory: if our inner states cause our actions, and our inner states are caused by things external to us, then our actions are ultimately caused by things external to us…so, they can’t be free. Holmstrom tries to answer this objection to soft determinism. One possibility: we could distinguish between a “free action” and “free will” and say that an action caused by our inner states is free, but the will that lead to that action is not. But Holmstrom says that this won’t work because if the will is not free, then the act can’t be free, either. [A] Soft determinism and control Homstrom: most soft determinists think of freedom in terms of what is required for the agent to be the source of his/her actions Instead, what we need to ask is what is required for the agent to have control over the source of his/her actions, i.e. over his/her beliefs and desires. This means that: 1) the agent is part of the causal process 2) control can occur to a greater or less extent, which also means that: 3) there is a continuum between free and unfree “What I want to argue in this paper is that people can have differing amounts of control over what they desire and what they believe.” “The key question, then, is whether this idea of having control over one’s beliefs and desires makes any sense and whether we do in fact have such control” (p. 324). [B] Beliefs, desires and freedom Some actions can be caused by our beliefs and desires but still not be free (e.g. a heroin addict stealing money to buy heroin) -in this case, there is a conflict among the addict’s beliefs and desires -second-order volitions (Frankfurt) But consistency with second-order volitions is not enough for an action to be free (e.g. brainwashing) – so, where our second-order volitions come from is important. -coercion -ignorance In some cases, beliefs and desires that were deliberately instilled in us by others can still be freely held (Bach example) -exposure vs. conditioning -consciousness of motives and causes also matters: “People are less free to the extent that they operate on unconscious motives” (p. 329)

-but conditioning doesn’t necessarily result in beliefs that are not freely held: “It is where knowledge about the causes [of our beliefs or desires] would have made a difference that ignorance makes the causes coercive” (p. 329). [C] Freedom and the self “What we have come up with is what we started with – and that is, to the extent that the causes of one’s actions are themselves caused by things over which people have no control (even with knowledge of them), to that extent that one’s actions are unfree. What I have tried to do is to make sense of the idea of having control over one’s desires. In order to say that one has control over one’s desires it is necessary that what we identify as the self determines what one desires and what desires one acts on” (p. 330). Taylor: the agent/self causes actions Holmstrom: the agent/self chooses beliefs/desires to act on. Because of this, for Holmstrom, a person “is most free when there is an integrated set [of beliefs and desires] which is in accordance with his/her second order volitions. Then we can say that this is a self-determining person” (p. 330). But what is the self? “Dimensionless point” vs. “narrative self” [D] Objections to Holmstrom’s views 1) In order to have control over our beliefs and desires, we need to have control over their causes, as well. (Hospers) 2) Holmstrom’s argument can easily lead to an infinite regress of beliefs/desires. Replies: 1) All we need is to have (a) control over our beliefs and desires (which we can have because we have second order volitions) and (b) control over our second order volitions 2) An infinite regress of beliefs and desires is possible in theory, but in practice all we really need is a strong enough second order volition/ [E] Freedom and society How free someone is depends in part on the society they live in [and also on how they were raised] Greater knowledge  greater control. But there may well be limits to control, so there’s no “absolute” freedom.

Study Questions 1. Why does Holmstrom say that it makes no sense to say that our actions are free but our will is not? 2. Explain what Holmstrom shows about free will with her example of the heroin addict who steals money to buy drugs. 3. What is a second order volition? 4. Explain the difference between exposure and conditioning and how this difference is relevant to free will. 5. When can a belief or desire that arises through conditioning still be free? 6. Explain the difference between the kind of freedom had by Taylor’s “agent/self” and by Holmstrom’s “self.” 7. Explain the difference between (a) the self as a dimensionless point and (b) the narrative self. 8. What would Hospers say in objection to Holmstrom’s view? How does Holmstrom reply to this objection?