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Security Threat Groups or Individual Factors: What Are the Major Causes of Prison Violence? William J. Morgan, Jr.* William J. Morgan, Jr. is ABD at Capella University, a criminal justice professor at Erie Community College, and a correction officer in the New York State Department of Correctional Services. Abstract: Violence generated by inmates impacts the administration of the correctional facility; individual factors are found to have a more compelling effect than institutional dynamics. Inmate behaviors that contribute to prison violence in the United States are identified. Illustrated are institutional and individual factors correlated to inmate violence. The methodology used is the examination of criminal justice text books and peer-reviewed journal articles on the phenomenon of prison violence. KEYWORDS: Gang activity, Inmates, Institutional factors, Individual factors, Prison violence

INTRODUCTION Prison is an institution that is rehabilitative and secure but not a panacea to the ills of man. Even the most secure of correctional facilities experience prison disorder and violence on a daily basis. Both individual and institutional factors were cited as problems that corrections experience, such as harms from gangs, architectural design, management philosophy, and expressive and instrumental violence. The most important causal features of prison violence are discussed, elucidated, and explained in the literature. A brief discussion of classical theory of criminology is followed by individual causative factors of prison violence and disorder.

Classical theory The classical school of criminology proposed three tenets of human nature, which assumed that people have free will, are hedonistic, and rational (Miller, Schreck, and Tewksbury, 2006). According to these basic principles, people make choices based on the pleasure/pain principle and calculate the beneficial outcomes including anticipation of the consequences of criminal action, cited by Miller, et al. The theory of social contract specific within the classical school assumed that “…people come together and form a society because the social stability and protection such and arrangement affords is worth ________________________________________ *Address correspondence to the author: William J. Morgan, Jr. Erie Community College 45 Oak Street Buffalo, New York 14203 (716) 851-1246 Email: [email protected]

more to them than the piece of personal freedom they must lose in exchange” (Curran & Renzetti, 2001, p. 6). Inherent in nature are the principles of right and wrong; crime is an immoral behavior that denigrates society and the quality of the bond formed (Schmalleger, 2006). Prison is a law-based institution with rules specific to the intended population for utilitarian purposes and based on a social contract. The discussion of prison gangs is based on basic principles of the criminological school, which is inclusive in the discussion. Prison gangs and the peripheral violence that perpetuates are individual factors and prerogatives that follow offenders from the street to prison and a major cause of prison violence.

Prison disorder Theories of prison violence elucidate problems that correctional organizations face on a daily basis. First, the importation model posits that small groups of inmates come to prison with a proclivity for gang behavior, subcultural values, the behavior increases with incarceration, and that disorder arises from the concentration approach (McCorkle, Meithe, & Drass, 1995; Mears & Reisig, 2006). Secondly, the deprivation theory assumed higher levels of disorder occur if inmates are dispossessed of security, heterosexual relationships, and goods/services as a matter of structural deprivation (Sykes, 1958; Mears and Reisig, 2006; Merton, 1957). In that vein, inmates are maladaptive to the prison environment and disorder results from conceptual deprivations. Third, a theory of criminal propensity using inmate misbehavior that is evident in proclivity of the life course (Blumstein, Cohen, & Farrington, 1988a, 1988b; Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, & Visher, 1986). Perhaps the most salient points about prison disorder are discussions on gangs and violence.

Gang activity The issue of gangs, or security threat groups, in prison is a major concern for correctional organizations that consume peripheral misbehavior and violence in correctional facilities as individual factors to include gambling, assault, extortion, rape, and murder (Fong and Buentello, 1991). The early formation of prison gangs was based on racial/ethnic ideologies, protection from other groups, which later developed the intent to commit acts of violence and formed crime syndicates. A study conducted by Griffin and Hepburn (2006), hypothesized that 50% of prison disorder, gangs perpetrate violence, and that approximately 3% of the prison population is involved in gang activity. A good predictor of violent conduct and calculated risk taking is age where young people tend to engage in risk taking behavior, which is especially true of young inmates with a history of incarceration and violence. When controlling for the structural and deprivation effects of incarceration, the predictors of violent conduct are prior violence, age, ethnicity and race, age, and prior incarceration (Bottoms, 1999; Ellis, 1984; Gendreau, Goggin, & Law, 1997; Griffin & Hepburn, 2006; Harer & Steffensmeier, 1996; Wooldredge Griffin, & Pratt, 2001). The main finding of the Griffin and Hepburn study concluded that gang-affiliated inmates were twice as likely to perpetrate assault within the first three years of incarceration when the factors of age, commitment offense, prior incarceration, security length, and sentence length when compared to inmates nonaffiliated to a gang. Prison gangs generally originated from Illinois or California Street gangs and emigrated to the Federal and State correctional departments (Bartollas, 2002).Classified as security threat groups, gangs in the prison system originated in institutions in the 1950s became more organized since that time, competed for profit through violence, little is known about prison gangs due to avoidance detection, and the secretive nature. According to Fleisher and Decker (2001), the following is a definition of prison gangs: …an organization which operates within the prison system as a self-perpetuating criminally oriented entity, consisting of a select group of inmates who have established an organized chain of command and are governed by an established code of conduct. The prison gang will usually operate in secrecy and has as its goal to conduct gang activities by controlling their prison environment through intimidation and violence directed toward non-members (p. 2)

At the individual and intra-group level, gangs pose security threats to correctional facilities and undermine the goal of rehabilitation (Jacobs, 2001). Jacobs further asserted that anti-social values, terrorism, and criminal activities are committed and coordinated between institutions and the streets in the quest for domination of both environments. For example, Gaes, Wallace, Gilman, Klein-Saffran, and Suppa (2002) examined gang membership and violent acts compared to peripheral members. The study used two dependant variables of violence, which were violent misconduct and other misconduct category; the former included assault, homicide, aggravated assault, etc., and the latter sexual misconduct, drugs, and property crimes. Based on a “threat index,” the rate of gang misconduct was compared to the general inmate population of violence to other forms of misconduct (p. 363). The study concluded that most gang violence and other misconduct increased because of gang affiliation. The study additionally cited that violent misconduct with gang embeddedness decreased; a possible explanation is that with time, gang members joined the leadership of gangs and authorities scrutinized and evaluated their security levels, therefore, a decrease in individual member violence. In the United States today, 2,500 distinct gangs are reported in every state and most cities. Street gangs demand respect, where revenge on rivals is appropriate, which accentuates the reputation. In street gangs, youth join gangs for several reasons to include structure, nurturing, belonging, economic opportunity, and excitement; risk factors to the community include disorganization, low commitment to positive peers, low commitment to school, and externalizing behaviors (Hess & Wrobleski, 2006). These and other factors find synthesis with prison gangs, generally drawn along racial lines and commonly homogeneous in nature according to neighborhood affiliation, nationality, religion, cultural factors, or gang membership in mainstream society, that bring values and attitudes from the streets (Bjerregaard, 2003; Davis & Flannery, 2001). Organizational similarities are common in prison gangs, such as the hierarchy structure similar to their street organized crime counterparts. Further similarities included signs, dress, mottos, tattoos, and a membership requirement of “blood in, blood out;” working in groups is further similarity of gang affiliation and philosophy that rarely differs between gangs in the United States today (Bjerregaard, 2003; Fleisher & Decker, 2001; Hess & Wrobleski). The structure of gangs would not be complete without a correlation between street and prison gangs. Several subgroups exist as individual inmates align with prohibited groups for cultural, religious, and/or for protection. Racial and ethnic divides are dominant influences on prison population but second only gang membership, which are also drawn along racial and

ethnic lines (Trulson, Marquart, and Kawucha, 2006). Prison gangs exist for protection from other gangs; however, correctional systems find that gangs are involved in extortion, murder, gambling, prostitution, and drug-trafficking and considered crime syndicates (Fong & Buentello, 1991). Correlations are attributed to gang violence and the overall increase in violence in mainstream society and prison (Howell, 1994). Proposed by Alarid and Cromwell (2002) common myths is that prison gangs are unorganized, street gangs and prisons gangs are separate entities, and transferring prison gang members will eliminate gangs within the prison. Conversely, gangs are organized with rules of conduct, a hierarchy, gang members retain full connection while in prison as street gangs exist within the institution, and transferring gang members expands gang recruiting and membership. Therefore, a synthesis of street and prison gangs emerges for preservation of the group, the individual and illicit activities. For example, Howell (1994) stressed that many gangs are involved in drug trafficking in correctional facilities and the streets. Some gangs, such as the Latin Kings, Nation of Islam, Bloods, and Crips, originated as street gangs and synthesized into prison gangs. Other gangs, such as NETA and the Aryan Brotherhood, originated as prison gangs and synthesized into street gangs. Because the reach of gangs extends beyond prison walls, it makes them especially treacherous as business is conducted while incarcerated, such as contract murder, drugs, and other gang activity. Extensive communication systems coordinated between inmates, criminal activity, and street gangs are common as violent and organized individuals are brought to the attention of correctional administrations (Carlson, 2001). The point was reinforced by Seiter (2001) that gangs are more sophisticated, have well-established connections to street gangs, have an extensive membership, and money rival of many successful businesses or by Coughlin and Venkatesh (2003) who established that the rational, illicit, organized gang activity structure is a reflection of the intricacies that corrections must contend. Postulated by Carlson (2001), illicit activity and an established communication system between prison and street gangs found that gangs are more violent, sophisticated, and organized, which leaves correctional agencies to devise new strategies to contend with nefarious conduct. Seiter (2001) asserted that gangs are more sophisticated, have wellestablished connections to street gangs, an extensive membership, and money. Understanding consistency of gangs how they contribute to racial tensions, higher rates of violence, and present challenges to correctional administrators is paramount to understanding the extent of the problem (Anti-

Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 2002; Camp & Camp, 1985; Ross & Richards, 2002; Ruddell, Decker, & Egley, Jr., 2006). Factors exist for individual violence not related to gang activity.

Other individual factors Gang activity has been noted as the main reason for prison violence; there are other perceived reasons that inmates engage in violence and points to dispel these myths are elucidated. For example, Gaes (1991) cited that violence due to overcrowding exists for several reasons: litigation due to poor conditions, the institution can no longer deliver services or protect inmates, and that inmate density parallels a decline in the quality of life that occurs. Gaes further asserted a lack of evidence in the literature exists and that correctional administrators have stated these reasons are suspect; the institution must make accommodations for crowding such as increased use of inmate grievance procedures, increase in staffing, and tighter institutional controls. Cited is that individual factors have a more prevalent than institutional factors for staffing-to-inmate ratios, type of institutional control, and type, age, and size of facility. Gaes suggested that individual dynamics should be examined independent of institutional factors. Examples provided by Welch (1999) found that individual factors contributing to violence fall into two categories: Instrumental and Expressive. Expressive violence is the spontaneous, irrational emotional response to stimuli conducive to the psychological state of mind or the spontaneous release of tension by the group or individual also known as patterned spontaneous attack. In the correctional setting, one might find that female inmates use that type of violence compared to males. Male inmates tend to use instrumental violence that involves rationality, calculation, and planning for acquiring power in prison, such as inmate-on-inmate assaults, gang activity, and rape. Expressive types of violence, according to Welch, are also known as spontaneous attacks, which are premeditated, difficult to anticipate, and perpetrated on both staff and inmates. Spontaneous attacks are justified and rationalized by the inmate population by creating peer admiration, fear, protection, concealing attacks/creating opportunities, and assaulting inmates by providing challenges, temptations and provocations, even for inmates who are nonviolent (Welch, 1999). These aspects are sometimes known as prison survival strategies. Prisons are violent places because they house the violent offenders, which is true in any security-type institution. Inmates attempt to settle disputes and seek power in a way in which they are accustomed to: violence. The literature is weak on drawing correlations between assaults/disturbances, overcrowding, and other institutional factors. Many factors of prison gang

violence are correlated to the power and economics to that of the street gang. As a group of convicted felons with a propensity for criminal thinking, their actions cause the facility to become hotbeds of crime especially in the discussion of gang activity. Moving away from individual factors, several institutional factors are identified as causative factors for prison violence, such as prison management and use of the Supermax.

Supermax An institutional factor of inmate violence is the use of the Supermax prison, which is defined as, “…free-standing facilities, or a distinct unit within a facility, that provides for the management and secure control of inmates who have been officially designated as exhibiting violent or seriously disruptive behavior while incarcerated” (Pizarro, Stenius, & Pratt, 2006, p.7). Inmates that perpetrate the greatest amount of disruption and violence, although few in number, may be housed in administrative segregation from the general inmate population. These perpetrators of crime within the prison walls cause assault, rape, murder, extortion, and fear for both staff and inmates. Alarid and Cromwell (2002) hypothesized the common assumptions and realities for use of the Supermax, that is, myths found that inmates are placed in that environment due to the crime of commitment and the level of privileges inmates receive parallel that of inmates in general population. The realities of Supermax institutions are that inmates are sent here for violent/predatory behavior within other institutions, identified as gang leaders, high escape risks, and inmates incarcerated in the Supermax do not have the freedoms allowed inmates in general population because of security status/institutional disciplinary record. Supermax facilities are used to segregate known dangerous gang members and leaders for utilitarian purposes but not always based on actual prison crimes or infractions in suppression techniques (Tachiki, 1995). Pizarro, et al; Mears and Reisig (2006) hypothesized several myths and realities existed for the use of Supermax; the myth of novelty found a general deterrence to the general inmate population with specific deterrence model through selective incapacitation, long term solitary confinement, and that solitary confinement is not a new phenomenon in prison. In addition, Pizarro, et al, evidences the myth of public safety and appearing to be tough on crime that snowballs into a decrease in prison violence. The assertion is supported in a study conducted by Briggs, Sundt, and Castellano (2003) that used an interrupted time series design that found assaults on staff were lowered although overall inmate-to-inmate violence was not

reduced in three states with the use of Supermax. However, it must be noted that administrative segregation for violent/disruptive/predatory inmates or gang leaders help to maintain one facet of corrections, which is the safe and secure operation of correctional facilities. Although there is no evidence to support that Supermax inmates suffer from mental illness due to deprivation or lack of human contact, it was stressed by Pizarro, et al. that Supermax may exacerbate preexisting mental conditions and violence despite measures taken by prison administration. A criticism of Supermax revisits the arguments of the concentration and importation models and that Supermax should be used for all gang members and violent/predatory inmates, thus, normalizing prisons and making the goal of rehabilitation for the general population achievable (Mears & Reisig, 2006; McCorkle, Meithe, & Drass, 1995). The problem lies in that only so much space exists in these facilities and only the most violent and behavioral problem inmates can be incarcerated at one time; therefore, the assertion is unrealistic in expectation. Inmates with subcultural values and/or violent tendencies do not come to the attention of correctional management until an inquiry, investigation initiated, or a precipitating incident occurs. The crux of the Supermax is reduction in prison violence from violent and predatory inmates. Related to the discussion of Supermax are prison administration and managerial style and correlation to prison violence. A criticism of the Supermax is that it does not stop gang activity/predatory behavior/violence; conversely, the Supermax is not designed to stop system-wide disorder but to take the worst of the worst offenders in prison and selectively incapacitate. A peripheral benefit is the general deterrence to the general inmate population to the consequences of violent behavior.

Prison administration Prison administration has been cited as a cause for inmate violence and disruption for several reasons. It was postulated by Craig (2004); Reisig (1998), that the management style of the correctional facility contributed to prison disorder as well as the type of disorder (e.g., less serious versus serious disorder). Based on DiIulio’s (1987) three managerial approaches, delineated were the control model, the responsibility model, and consensual model for prison governance. The control model manages every aspect of inmate life, authoritarian in manner, order maintenance, and rigid control is paramount to good corrections. The antithesis is the responsibility model where inmate selfgovernance and official control mechanisms are minimized thus order maintenance are pursued as a correctional management approach. A synthesis of the above models occurs in the consensus model where

neither inmate governance nor rigid controls are relied on as a managerial strategy. Craig further asserted that a prevailing theory of control, or “Theory X” (p. 98), has been evident in correctional models that rely on the assumption that inmates are unworthy of trust. Craig emphasized that a balance of multiple tasks is the crux of prison management to attain the goals of control, safety, punishment, and rehabilitation. Reisig (1998) noted that prisons which operate on the control model experienced higher occurrences of less and serious disorder than the either the responsibility or consensual model. Reisig further pointed out limitations to the study, such as the homogeneity of inmates and the small size of the responsibility model facilities that found shared characteristics of the inhabitants. In many of the older and larger institutions, it is often noted that order maintenance is used to control the inmate population, thus, it appears that more disorder is prevalent. On a more serious level of institutional violence, a study conducted by Reisig (2002) concluded that prisons experienced higher rates of gang-related homicide where the staff and administration experienced conflict for lack of authority. As the dependent variable, inmate-on-inmate homicide was reported during the study period and independent variables were administrative control measures (staff turnover, administrative sanction, etc.) and control variables (overcrowding, security type, etc.). Reisig addressed that overcrowding may result in increased homicide, which is an issue addressed for lack of evidence. Furthermore, inmate homicide, according to Reisig; Palermo, Palermo, and Simpson (1996), was a rare event not supported or related to staff turnover. A significant finding was the less prison administrators upheld misbehavior reports written by officers, the higher the inmate homicide rate, therefore, a higher increase in tension between frontline correctional staff and administration. The most significant finding was that members of prohibited groups experienced a higher homicide rate compared to the general inmate population. A more persuasive argument is individual inmate behavioral conditions as a response to the prison environment to assert control through violence. Although mental illness and a correlation to violence and murder are debatable, inmate psychology and psychopathology found that inmates revert to antisocial behavior in prison to control an otherwise uncontrollable situation (Palermo, et al., 1996). An example provided by Palermo, et al, found the murder of Jeffrey Dahmer in prison was not due to overcrowding, but the psychopathology of the killers combined with racial overtones. Furthermore, criticisms were that the correctional agency should have carefully screened the life sentenced inmates more carefully for patterns and propensity of violence.

Physical design A further cause for institutional violence and disorder is faulted in the physical design of prisons. In many older maximum-security facilities, the physical plan is indirect supervision where a correctional officer must constantly observe inmates actions and behavior from an enclosed booth and interaction with inmates takes place through an intercom system; it is through a physical barrier that staff safety is ensured. Officers control the opening and closing of gates and inmate safety comes in the form of individual cells; officers call for a response team for major incidents. (Farbstein & Wener, 1989). A personal perspective of the writer and correction officer is a feature associated with older maximum-security institutions was “blind spots” exist that allow inmates to conceal illicit activity from security staff. Conversely, direct supervision finds that physical layout is the same as direct supervision with that added management strategy of officers patrolling the cell block and interacting with inmates, as proposed Farbstein & Wener. Furthermore, officers intervene in minor altercations between inmates and correct nefarious behavior. The concept of direct supervision as an operational issue has led to decreased tension and stress of staff and inmates, contraband, vandalism, and sexual or violent assault (Wener, 2006). However, in direct supervision prisons, major incidents are less and minor incidents higher. The results are mixed on the effectiveness of these types of prisons because they restrict space that inmates have in non-direct supervision institutions, thereby causing a perceived deprivation for inmates (Wener, 2006).

Other correctional responses Correctional administrations established various control mechanisms to combat gangs, control behavior, but can never prepare enough and implement new strategies (Carlson, 2001; Seiter, 2001). One example of policy is the New York State Department of Correctional Services (NYSDOCS) that does not recognize prison gangs but instead focuses on individual crimes committed in prison and deal with each case as separate from gang activity. The state believes that recognition empowers inmate gangs and does not provide information to the media or the public, although Carlson noted close monitoring of these groups. For example, New York utilizes a multiuse data base for identification of gang members created by several states known as the Northeast Gang Intelligence System. Because gangs are dangerous, well-organized, and multijursidictional, intelligence and open communication between police and correctional agencies is important; intelligence benefits both paradigms in response to effective gang management and identification. Other correctional paradigms have enlisted policies to control gangs and gang activities

verified; examples include the Texas Department of Corrections and the California Department of Corrections (CDC) that created gang intelligence units and opened special housing units where identified gang members are confined, debriefed, and disassociated from gangs. In addition, The Florida Department of Corrections (n.d.) validates and allows gang members to adjust to the correctional environment; if failure is achieved, these individuals are segregated. Examined are correctional paradigms that enlisted policies to control gangs and gang activities, which were verified through the courts (Carlson, 2001). In the past few years, inmates have filed gangrelated lawsuits in relation to protection from gangs and gang members, psychological injury from gang members, grooming policies as anti-gang measures, classification and placement of gang members in administrative segregation, and prohibited audio or written materials (Eckhart, 2001). Inmates filed lawsuits that correctional administrators did not protect them from gang members under Farmer v. Brennan (511 U.S. 825, 834 [1994]) where certain “conditions of incarceration pose a substantial risk of serious harm” (Eckhart, p. 59). For example, cases were dismissed because inmates could not show that correctional administrators deliberately ignored that plaintiffs were likely to be assaulted by gang members after taking several measures such as transferring the affected inmates to another part of the facility or placement in administrative segregation under involuntary protective custody. Inmates also filed lawsuits under the Eighth Amendment provision of cruel and unusual punishment due to psychological injury caused by housing individual inmates with known gang members who posed a threat to their well-being, in crimes such as assault, extortion, and terror (Eckhart, 2001). These cases were dismissed because it could not be assessed if inmates suffered damage and to the extent that damage was caused. Not limited to the general population, gang members filed lawsuits to advance group members and gang affiliation. Conversely, inmates filed lawsuits because of their gang affiliation and the measures that correctional administrations took to suppress gang activity. The precedent setting case of Turner v. Safely found that penological interests were advanced and validated in the identification, assessment, monitoring, reclassification, and segregation of gang members for the protection of staff and inmates (Eckhart, 2001). In the cases of Sandin v. Connor; Barnett v. Centoni; Russell v. Scully; In re Long Term Administrative Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters v. Moore (Eckhart, 2001) the Courts ruled that inmates rights were not violated because they were segregated in

special housing due to gang affiliation, including groups that claimed religious affiliation. As a rational response to gangs, Federal Courts have also ruled that maintaining order and discipline through grooming and clothing policies is not unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Furthermore, the Courts ruled that inmates can be denied “materials [that] fostered disruptive group activities…because of mere possession” by correctional administrators in Golden v. McCaughtry; George v. Sullivan, under the Turner Standard, which included written lyrics, or written material related to gangs (Eckhart, 2001, p. 63).

Conclusion Violence is often a serious component of prison life; it is a matter of context important to understanding the actors and place. Gangs cause the majority of disorder and violence as they vie for control of the inmate population through intimidation, extortion, assault, rape, and murder. Other causes of individual violence not gang related are instrumental or expressive violence, which are considered strategies to survive the prison experience. Institutional dynamics of Supermax, administration policies, and architectural designs are often cited as causes other than individual prerequisites that offenders bring to prison. Individual factors that are cited as causative of prison violence seem to far outweigh the institutional causes.

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