Securing Your Windows Server Systems

Securing Your Windows Server Systems

a Jupiterweb Security eBook ™

Securing Your Windows Server Systems ike the Windows desktop operating system, the Windows Server System suffers from its share of bad press related to its security. Whether you think it's an inherent problem with the code, or whether you believe the popularity of Microsoft's products makes them a target, the fact remains that the Windows Server System is a popular choice for server computing for small businesses and large enterprises alike.

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Microsoft built its server software with many of the same goals of its desktop operating system. One of the keys of the Windows Server System's popularity is its ease of administration. But in trying to make computers easy to use, both the desktop and server operating systems leave some security gaps. Microsoft made security a major priority of its Windows Server 2003 release. The company added a Common Language Runtime software engine, which reduces the number of vulnerabilities for attackers to exploit. There's a software-based firewall, a RADIUS server, and support for wireless security protocols. Other improvements include a credential manager, increased Web server security, and software restriction policies. In this guide we're going to examine how to make the most of the security features included as part of the Windows Server 2003 System. (Windows Server 2003 is the current version of the system, and thus is our focus. For more information on securing Windows 2000 servers using security templates, visit http://www.intranetjournal.com/windows-servers/.) We're going to cover the use of software restriction policies in Windows Server 2003, highlight simple practices you can use to secure your system, discuss malware, and look at securing IIS and SQL Server.

Eight Steps to a More Secure Windows 2003 Server Securing a Windows Server 2003 system can be a complex task, even though Microsoft provides the operating system in a locked down state. There are still many security weaknesses and loopholes that can be exploited, and while basic security measures like file permissions and password policies do a great job of making your server secure, it's often the more obscure loopholes that allow unauthorized access to the system. Here are just a few simple strategies and practices that you can use to increase the security of your Windows Server 2003 system, and subsequently your network. 1. Change Port Numbers Many Windows Server 2003 applications, such as Remote Desktop and Internet Information Server (IIS), use TCP/IP ports to receive and send traffic. Changing the default port numbers used by these applications may be all that is needed to thwart some of the more rudimentary worms, and less sophisticated attackers. In some cases, you can change the default port number in the management tool that comes with the application. With other applications, like Remote Desktop, you'll need to edit the registry. What you change the port number of applications to is largely up to you, but make sure that you are not encroaching on a port used by another application. A complete list of port numbers used by Windows applications and services can help (there's one available at http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;832017), but there may be other, non-Windows (or Microsoft) applications on your server that use other port numbers. 2. Check Logon Auditing By default, a Windows Server 2003 domain controller implements a basic set of logon auditing. However, if you don't check the Security Event Viewer logs where related events are recorded, you'll have no way of knowing whether there have been log-on related issues or not. Get into the habit of checking the Security Event Viewer log on a weekly–or even better, daily–basis to look for occurrences that might be of concern.

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Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems 3. Isolate Domain Controllers Because of the function they perform on the network, domain controllers are worthy of extra attention when it comes to security. Not only are hackers more likely to go after a domain controller because they hold the user account information, they are also crucial to the operation of the network. For this reason, domain controllers make an attractive target for a hacker who is trying to perpetrate a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. If you have an environment with more than one server, consider not running any applications (other than Active Directory, of course) on your domain controllers. You can then implement a packet-filtering firewall so that only Active Directory related traffic is allowed to and from that server. 4. Disable Unnecessary Services Each and every service that runs on a Windows Server 2003 system increases the attack surface of the system. Of course, many of the services are essential and should not be disabled. Others, though, can often be disabled without any negative effect on the operation of the server. Exactly which services you can disable will depend on what applications and functions the server is supporting. A server that is only providing file and print server services, for example, does not need the Routing or Remote Access Service, or the Remote Access Connection Manager service. Likewise, a server acting as a dedicated remote access gateway will most likely not need the Spooler service. Be aware, though, that some services have dependencies, which means that they won't run unless another service is also running. If you do choose to disable unnecessary services, do it one service at a time, and keep an eye and ear out for any unexpected results. 5. Run MBSA Regularly The Microsoft Baseline Security Advisor (MBSA) is a free tool from Microsoft that will scan your Windows Server 2003 system for a range of vulnerabilities, including excessive permissions and accounts without a password. But perhaps the most significant feature of MBSA is that it will scan the system to see what security updates have been installed. It compares this list to one from Microsoft's Web site that details the updates available for the operating system. Any updates that are not installed are flagged, and you can subsequently install them. In addition to your server, you can scan Windows 2000 and Windows XP systems across the network. You can download MBSA from Microsoft's site at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/mbsahome.mspx. Considering that MBSA is free, there really is no good reason not to use it on a regular basis. 6. Configure Account Lockout Policy Considering the ease with which the Account Lockout Policy is configured, it is surprising at how many networks do not have it configured. The Account Lockout Policy defines what actions the system will take if an incorrect password for a user account is entered more than a specified number of times. It is accessed through the Account Policies Node of the Domain Security Policy, which you can access from the Administrative Tools menu. The appropriate lockout policy will depend on the environment. A small business application without sensitive data can be protected with a simple password. A large business application with sensitive data should use strong password policies and have account lockout enabled. 7. Rename the Administrator Account Again, a very basic measure, but you would be surprised at how many networks still have the Administrator user ID in place, relying instead on a complex password to secure the account. In reality, such measures are relatively ineffective. The administrator account is purposely not covered by the Account Lockout policy mentioned earlier. For

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Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems that reason, a hacker who gains access to the system can try as many passwords on the Administrator account as they like without triggering a lockout. Renaming the account will make this, the most important of accounts, considerably less vulnerable as an attack point. Also, remember to change the password for the Administrator account (or whatever you have renamed it to) on a regular basis, and always use a complex password. 8. Password Protect Backups Whether you use the back-up utility that comes with Windows Server 2003 or a third-party product, password protecting your backups is a simple way to provide an increased level of protection for your data. Backups represent a big risk because they often contain a complete set of data from your server. If the backup media were to be lost or stolen, there is little to prevent someone from examining the tape and looking at the data. The need for backup security is even more acute than normal if, as you should, you store backup tapes offsite for disaster recovery purposes.

How Software Restriction Policies Work Some of the most significant threats to your network's security and stability come from worms and trojan malware. These network threats can be transmitted through executable files attached to e-mails, via Internet downloads, or from Web pages. Although virus checkers are increasingly effective at protecting against threats embedded in executable files, there are still other measures you can use to protect the systems on your network. One of the most effective is to simply prevent people from opening unknown executable files in the first place. Windows Server 2003 provides a feature called Software Restriction Policies that allows you to do just that. In simple terms, Software Restriction Policies allow you to define what applications can or cannot be run on a computer. The restrictions are configured and applied through Group Policy, so there is no additional software to install, nor is there any major reconfiguration of Active Directory. First we're going to examine how you can use software restriction policies to provide an additional level of protection to your network. Then we'll look at how you go about configuring and implementing software restriction policies on your network. Policies can be applied in one of two modes - "unrestricted" or "disallowed." After configuring the default mode for the policy, you can then create exceptions for software you do or do not want to run. For example, if you configure a software restriction policy with a default level of "unrestricted," you can configure exceptions that define those kinds of applications you don't want users to run. Conversely, if you configure a default level of "disallowed," you can specify exceptions for the applications you do want users to run. As you can imagine, the "disallowed" setting involves considerably more administrative overhead than "unrestricted," but it also provides a much more restricted, and thus secure, environment. Which applications can be run in a "disallowed" environment, or cannot be run in an "unrestricted" environment, are defined through a set of rules. These rules provide different evaluation criteria by which a file that is attempting to be opened can be evaluated. There are four types of rules that can be created–hash, certificate, path, and Internet zone. Each takes a different approach to determining whether a file will be permitted or prevented from running. Hash Rule The hash rule works by using a hashed value of the executable file as criteria to determine if it should run. When an attempt to start the executable is made, the hash value for the file is calculated and compared to the hash value stored when the rule was created. If the two match, then the file is allowed or disallowed based on the default security level that is configured. If the hash value does not match because, for example, a virus has infected it since it

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Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems was created, the hash values won't match and the file will be prevented from opening. Certificate Rule Certificate rules use digital certificates to determine whether or not a file should be allowed to open. The certificate you use for the rule must be supplied to you by the software creator, and is then used to verify the validity of the executable when you attempt to use it. Like the hash rule, a certificate verifies that the software has not be altered or manipulated since it was created. Path Rule The path rule uses the location from which the executable is launched as the criteria for determining whether access is permitted. For example, if you were using the "disallowed" default rule, you could provide access to certain folders from which users are permitted to run an executable file. An attempt to run a file from another location would be blocked. To increase the flexibility of path rules, you can use folder variables such as %windir% and %userprofile%. Internet Zone The Internet zone rule uses the zones defined in Internet Explorer to identify from where a file is retrieved, and then determine whether a file can be executed. To view the zones and get an idea of locations and objects included in each zone, open Internet Explorer and click Tools --> Internet Options. Then choose the Security tab. By configuring rules based on Internet zones, you can override the default setting for the Software Restriction Policy on executables obtained from that zone. So, for example, if you configured an Internet zone rule when the default security level was "unrestricted," any software run directly from the Internet, perhaps as part of a Web page, could be prevented from running. It should be noted, though, that at this time only Windows Installer packages are covered by Internet zone rules. In some cases it is possible for an executable file to be subjected to more than one rule. When this happens, the rules are applied in order starting with the hash rule, followed by the certificate rule, then the path rule, and finally the Internet zone rule. Another configurable aspect of Software Restriction Policies is the specification of what files types are covered by the policy. By default a wide range of executable files types such as BAT, COM, VBS, EXE, and MSI are included. You can choose to add or remove file types as needed. The advantage of a configurable list is that as new programs become available or new threats are identified, you can add that file type to the list. 4

"Secure by Default" is one of the slogans describing Microsoft's design strategy applied to Windows Server 2003 and IIS 6.0, in particular. Unlike previous versions, which favored ease of use and out-of-thebox functionality over security, the new version of the Web server requires the admin to do some extra work to get all the features needed. To begin with, the IIS 6.0 component is not installed by default (with the obvious exception of Windows 2003 Web Server Edition). However, adding it is as easy as in the past, with the Add/Remove Programs Control Panel applet (IIS is listed as subcategory under Application Server item). Upgrade behavior has also been modified. World Wide Web Publishing service is disabled after upgrade from Windows 2000, as long as the IIS is configured with default settings. The default installation allows only static Web pages to be served. If the goal is to provide other functionality, you must install and enable it manually. This includes features related to serving dynamic Web content, such as Active Server Pages and Server Side Includes, as well as these simplifying development and Web server management, such as FrontPage Server extensions and Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV). In addition, by default, all unknown ISAPI and CGI extensions are prohibited. To modify this setting, use the Web Services Extensions node in the IIS Managers MMC snap-in. Like the previous version, IIS 6.0 offers two graphical interfaces for managing Web servers -- via Internet Information Services Manager MMC snap-in and via IIS Administration Web site. The first one is available as soon as the World Wide Web Service component is installed; the second one requires the installation of the Remote Administration (HTML) item listed as one of the subcomponents of World Wide Web Service in the Windows Components Wizard (which is invoked by running the Add or Remove Programs Control Panel applet). Once the installation is completed, you can administer the Web server remotely by connecting from a Web browser to https://servername:8098. More significant from an administrative point of view is the ability to control the installation of the IIS component with Windows 2003 Group policies. The relevant setting is located in the Computer Configuration --> Administrative Templates --> Windows Components -> Internet Information Services container. --Marcin Policht, ServerWatch

Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems A Word of Caution It should go without saying that implementation of Software Restriction Policies should only take place after considerable testing. The basic premise behind the technology is that it prevents people from opening files that they shouldn't. With this comes the inherent risk that a misconfiguration will result in people not being able to open files that they need. Also keep in mind that many complex applications, like Microsoft Office, invoke other smaller applications or components as they run. As a result, you should test all aspects of an application, not just the main program. Although the implementation of Software Restriction Policies can require a reasonable amount of administrative overhead, particularly on a large network, there are few other methods of providing such comprehensive control over what applications can be run and from where. We're going to look at the basic configuration process, and you can take the information provided here and use it as platform from which to plan your own software restriction policy deployment. Getting Down to Business To start the configuration process for a software restriction policy, first locate a group policy object (GPO) on a site, domain, or organizational unit for which you want to configure a policy. For the purposes of our demonstration, we'll configure the software restriction policy for computers within an organizational unit (OU). You can either use the properties of an existing GPO for your chosen object, or create a new GPO specifically for your software restriction policy. Creating a new GPO is a good idea, because if you have a problem with the policy settings, you can simply disable the entire GPO without affecting any of your other group policy settings. The software restriction policies node of the GPO is located under Computer Configuration --> Windows Settings -> Software Restriction Policies. When you first open the GPO to the software restriction policies node, you will see the screen shown in Figure 1. As you can see, there are no policies assigned by default. To create a policy, right click the Software Restriction Policies node and select New Software Restriction Policies from the menu. After the policy is created, you will see the screen shown in Figure 2. Figure 1

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Figure 2

Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems Figure 3

The first step in configuring your actual software restriction policy is to set the default security level from within the Security Levels subfolder. A black circle with a tick mark, as shown in Figure 3, indicates the currently selected security level. As you can see the level is set to "Unrestricted," which is the default. After configuring the default security level, you can now set up the exception rules. As mentioned earlier, the exception rules determine which software will be allowed to run if the default level is "Disallowed," or not to run if the default security level is set to "Unrestricted." For the purposes of this discussion, we'll leave the level as "Unrestricted," and configure an exception that will prevent a specific application from running.

Figure 4

Creating an Exception Rule The rule creation process is very straightforward, so for the purposes of this discussion we'll just look at creating a hash rule. To create a hash rule, first locate the "Additional Rules" subfolder under Software Restriction Policies node. As you can see in Figure 4, a number of path rules are created by default.

Figure 5

Right-click the "Additional Rules" subfolder and select New Hash Rule from the menu. The "New Hash Rule" dialog will appear. For our new rule, we'll prevent the Calculator program (Calc.exe) from being run. First, use the Browse button to find the executable associated with the file you want to block. When you have selected the file, the hash value of the file is created and listed in the "File Hash" field. In addition, properties like the name, version, etc. of the file will automatically appear in the "File Information" field. The completed rule should look like the own shown in Figure 5. Once you click OK, the exception rule will be created. The process for creating the other rules is essentially the same, though in each case you configure the appropriate criteria (certificate, path, or Internet zone name) for each of the respective rules. Once

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Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems you have configured all of the required exceptions, you are ready to configure the Enforcement rules, and the Designated File Types.

Figure 6

Enforcement rules, which again are configured from within the software restriction policies node, allow you to configure whether local administrative users are exempted from the policies, and also to define whether library files (such as dynamic link libraries [DLLs] are included in the policy. The key consideration here is that if you do include DLLs, and the default rule is "Disallow," you will need to create an exception for each and every DLL associated with the applications you use. Considering that a single application can have hundreds of associated DLLs, this would be a daunting task. Alternatively, you can exclude DLLs from the rule. This means you only need to concerned with the applications themselves. You can see the "Enforcement" configuration dialog in Figure 6. Designated File Types Like enforcement rules, the "Designated File Types" dialog is accessed through the main software restriction policies node. The configurable list allows you to specify the types of files that will be affected by the software restriction policy. This list is of less concern if you are using the Unrestricted default security level, as the exceptions explicitly define what applications cannot be run.

Figure 7

In contrast, when using a default security level of disallowed, the designated file types list becomes critical, as it determines whether or not an application is subjected to the software restriction policy. The default list of file types is very comprehensive, but if you do want to add or remove a file type you can do that from within the "Designated File Types" dialog shown in Figure 7. Once you have completed your configuration, you can test your policy by attempting to run the blocked application. Remember, though, that as software restriction policies are applied through Group Policy, you must either wait for the policy to be refreshed automatically, or trigger a manual update using the Gpupdate.exe command line utility. If the policy is configured correctly and refreshed, an attempt to run a blocked application will result in an error message like the one shown in Figure 8 (next page). As we discussed earlier, implementation of software restriction policies should only be completed after exten-

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Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems Figure 8 Windows Server Longhorn is Microsoft's next-generation server platform, now slated for release in 2007. The most notable new features to be included concentrate on enhanced security and performance. New Longhorn features in the queue are "secure-atinstall," which is designed to help secure new installations of the operating system by automatically finding and applying security updates, and a "self-healing" filesystem in which the system will fix itself on the fly (e.g., if there is a bad sector on a hard disk). "Selfhealing" means Microsoft's defrag and chkdsk tools are always running in the background. Network Access Protection (NAP) is a new policy enforcement platform in Windows Server Longhorn. Network Access Quarantine Control, currently part of Windows Server 2003, is not the same as Longhorn's NAP. Network Access Quarantine Control provides only added protection for remote access connections. In contrast, NAP provides added protection for virtual private network (VPN) connections, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) configuration, and Internet Protocol security (IPsec)-based communication. NAP prevents unpatched devices from accessing the network. When a machine connects to the network, NAP performs a health check to make sure the system has the required security patches, virus signatures, firewall, and so on. If it doesn't, NAP can redirect the device to a quarantined network, where update servers either bring the PC into compliance and allow it onto the network or keep it quarantined. Windows Server Longhorn has the following enhancements compared to the current Windows Firewall: • Supports both incoming and outgoing traffic • New Microsoft Management Console (MMC) snap-in for graphical user interface configuration • Firewall filtering and Internet Protocol security (IPsec) protection settings are integrated • Exceptions that can be configured for Active Directory directory service accounts and groups, source and destination IP addresses, IP protocol number, source and destination Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ports, all or multiple TCP or UDP ports, specific types of interfaces, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and ICMP for IPv6 (ICMPv6) traffic by Type and Code, and for services. -Deann Corum, ServerWatch

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sive testing. However, even the most comprehensive test may hide an issue that becomes immediately apparent in a live environment. If you do find yourself experiencing problems, an easy way to get around the software restriction policy is to reboot into safe mode. The policies are not applied in safe mode, so at the very least you will be able to determine whether or not it is the policy that is causing a problem. If the problem appears to be with the software restriction policy, consider disabling the GPO. As discussed earlier, this is much easier to do if you have created a separate GPO for the software restriction policy.

Locking Down IIS and SQL Server Let's now cover some very specific recommendations for locking down IIS and SQL, both of which are often a large part of Windows-based distributed application environments. IIS Specific Security Configurations There is a programming 'hook' in IIS known as ISAPI that associates files having certain extensions with DLLs. These are known as ISAPI extensions. ISAPI extensions handle functions such as Active Server Pages, .NET Web services, and Web-based printer sharing. However, many of these extensions are not required, particularly if you're still using IIS 5.0 or earlier. The problem is that many of those extensions (filters) are exploitable. The notorious Code Red is an example of just one malicious program that takes advantage of these extensions. Enable only the ISAPI extensions the Web server and application need, and restrict the HTTP options that can be used with each extension by visiting Server Properties J WWW Service J Edit J Home Directory tab J Configuration. Most IIS installations include some sample applications and scripts that are designed to demonstrate the functionality of the Web server. They are not designed to operate securely, particularly

Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems in Version 5.0 or earlier. These can be exploited to allow overwriting of files or remote viewing, and even remote access to other sensitive server information, such as system settings and paths to binaries. You should at least remove the /InetPub/iissamples directory prior to putting any IIS server into production, and either remove, move or restrict access to the /InetPub/AdminScripts directory. The IIS Lockdown Tool, which you can find at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/locktool.mspx, is very useful for tightening IIS security. Any Web server installation that is not kept patched and up to date is a prime target for malicious activity. Regular and timely patching of publicly accessible Web servers is crucial. Web add-ons such as ColdFusion and PHP can introduce vulnerabilities in a Web server installation too. Carefully configure these and check the source Web sites and latest security bulletins for any needed patches or new exploits in these add-ons. IIS Security Checklist 1. Apply the latest operating system service packs and security updates for IIS and any applications loaded on the same host. Consider using Automatic Updates to automatically install patches. 2. Install host-based antivirus and intrusion detection software. Keep them current on patches and review the log files frequently. 3. Disable unused script interpreters and remove their binaries. For example: perl, perlscript, vbscript, jscript, javascript, and php. 4. Use logging and review the logs frequently, preferably through an automated process that summarizes the events and reports exceptions and suspicious events. 5. Remove or restrict system tools commonly used by attackers to compromise a system. For example; tftp(.exe), ftp(.exe), cmd.exe, bash, net.exe, remote.exe, and telnet(.exe). 6. Limit the services running on the Web server to the HTTP service and its supporting services. 7. Be aware of and minimize any type of connection into the inner network that enter through public Web server(s). Disable File and Printer Sharing and NETBIOS name resolution on Internet-facing systems. 8. Use a separate DNS server in a DMZ to service Internet-facing Web servers. Direct any unresolvable queries outside the DMZ to other public DNS servers or those of your service provider -- never to your internal DNS servers. 9. Use different account naming conventions and unique passwords on public facing systems than on internal systems. Internet-facing IIS servers should be in a DMZ behind a firewall, with a second firewall between the DMZ and the internal network. Internet-facing IIS servers should not be part of an internal Active Directory (AD) domain or use accounts that are part of an internal AD domain. 10. Block all TCP ports to the DMZ except 80 or 443, if needed. 11. Install the operating system on one drive and Web sites on a different drive to help thwart directory traversal attacks. 12. If you must use RDP (Terminal Services, Remote Desktop Protocol) to administer the server, change the default port of 3389 to something else hackers won't be looking for. (See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 187623 for details)

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Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems Tools for Securing IIS Use Windows Update and Automatic Updates for single-server installations. Use Systems Management Server (SMS) or Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) for managed environments or where administrators that have responsibilities for multiple disparate systems. MBSA, which we mentioned earlier, assists the system administrator in scanning local or remote systems for current patches. This tool works on Windows NT 4, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows 2003. Use the IIS Lockdown Tool or Security Configuration Wizard (SCW) to harden your IIS installation and server. Use URLScan to filter HTTP requests. URLScan is part of the IIS Lockdown Tool and can be configured to reject maliciously formed HTTP requests, such as those in Code Blue and Code Red, before the server even attempts to process them. Download these tools to another machine and copy them to your IIS server before connecting it to the Internet. Avoid connecting your IIS server to the Internet until it is completely analyzed and patched. SQL Specific Security Recommendations The most widespread SQL attack isn't even covered by a security bulletin. It's a straightforward login attempt made on the SA account with a blank password. Microsoft SQL Server installs with a blank SA account password by default and this should be the first thing you change. Another common cause of the blank password is products. For example, some versions of Visio install Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Desktop Engine (MSDE) and never change the SA password. A user may not even know that they have MSDE running. SQL Server Security Checklist 1. Set a password on your SA account and restrict its use. Also, change the password periodically to keep it from propagating and being used by developers or too many administrators. Change the SA password if anyone who knows it leaves the company. 2. Place your SQL Server behind a firewall, separate from your IIS or Web servers. Only allow connections to the SQL server from those designated Web servers. Your SQL server should never be Internet-facing or publicly accessible. 3. Remove BUILTIN/Administrators from the sysadmin role and give sysadmin rights in SQL to specific domain accounts that need it. 4. Use Windows Authentication and Windows Only Mode if possible. This way, a potential hacker must authenticate to the domain first instead of just to SQL Server. 5. Do not run SQL Server on a Domain Controller. 6. Change the SQL Server service start-up account to something besides LocalHost. 7. Enable the Failed Login option (Server Properties J Security tab) so you can look for failed logins to see if an unauthorized person is trying to access the server. Monitor the SQL logs and set up alerts in SQL using NETSEND or email, if possible. 8. Keep up to date on patches and service packs for the operating system and SQL. See Tools for Securing IIS for some options. 10

Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.

Securing Your Windows Server Systems 9. Protect any Extended Stored Procedures. Control all data access through stored procedures and grant access to those instead of giving blanket db_datareader and db_datawriter permissions to the data itself. 10. Change the standard SQL Server port under the Server Network Configuration Utility and block the default port of 1433. Have your network administrator allow the new port instead. 11. Make sure the Everyone group doesn't have write access to SQL Server registry keys. This content was adapted from EarthWeb's Enterprise Networking Planet Web site. Contributors: Drew Bird and Deann Corum. Copyright 2006 Jupitermedia Corp.

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Securing Your Windows Server Systems, a JupiterWeb Security eBook. Copyright 2006, Jupitermedia Corp.