Searches-and-seizures-case-digests-pool P1a.docx

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Scope of Protection In re: Harvey v. Santiago, G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988

FACTS: American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, and Adriaan Van Elshout, 58, a Dutch citizen, are all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of

Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for some time now. Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation. Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which the CID denied.

Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had “finally agreed to a selfdeportation” and praying that he be “provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country.” However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition. Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A

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Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Immigration Commissioner violated petitioners’ constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures

RULING: NO. The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and are therefore admissible in evidence. The fact that petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal. The Court rejects petitioners’ contentions and upholds respondent’s official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General. The Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Constitution is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it

must be based upon probable cause. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.” What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport 2

aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to

be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquillity of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.

People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991. FACTS: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport

number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried

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marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed. ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's

constitutional rights, be invoked against the State HELD: NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and

look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. 4

People v. Asis y Fonperada, G.R. No. 142531, October 15, 2002 FACTS: Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an Information dated 18 February 1998; the information stating "That on or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; one (1) wristwatch' one (1) gold necklace; and undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death." When arraigned on 9 July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although

none of them had actually seen the crime committed, strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted to link both accused to the crime. After due trial, both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8 March 2000, held that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code," ruled that "although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved that the two (2) x x x committed the crime," and

appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do not question the legality of their arrest, as they made no objection thereto before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the 5

bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a warrant. ISSUE: Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of the bloodstained pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless search. HELD: NO. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to so on his or her behalf. In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was not present when the search was made. Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at that moment. There was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de

Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law," becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal. 6

Exclusionary Rule Villamor y Tayson v. People, G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017 The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are instances where arrests and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at bar.

This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which affirmed the October 25, 2006 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of Virac, Catanduanes in Criminal Case Nos. 3463 and 3464, convicting both petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1602 as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9287, otherwise known as "An Act Increasing the Penalties for Illegal Numbers Games Amending Certain Provisions of PD 1602 and for Other

Purposes." Petitioner Martin T. Villamor (Villamor) was convicted as a collector of bets in the illegal numbers game of "lotteng" under Section 3(c) of RA 9287, while petitioner Victor G. Bonaobra (Bonaobra) was convicted as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) of the said law

FACT:

Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash. The charge stemmed from the following Information:

That on or about the 17th day of June 2005 in the morning, in barangay Francia, municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused with intent [to] gain thru illegal means did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully 7

and feloniously engage, collect [and] solicit x x x bets for illegal numbers game locally known as "Lotteng" by having in his possession [a] calculator, cellphone, [list] of various numbers and

money and lotteng paraphernalias.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Domingo Tejerero (Tejerero), Provincial Director, Police Superintendent Francisco Peñaflor (PD Peñaflor), SPO4 Severino Malasa, Jr., and PO1 David Adrian Saraspi (PO1 Saraspi). Culled from the records were the following facts:

On June 17, 2005, at around 9:00a.m., PD Peñaflor received a call from an informant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO1 Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report.

Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets.

When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to P1,500.00 in different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Version of the Defense

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The defense presented six witnesses, namely Villamor, Bonaobra, Demetrio Bonaobra, the brother of Bonaobra, Florencio Bonaobra (Florencio), the father of Bonaobra, Juan Vargas, and

Jonah Bonaobra (Jonah), the wife of Bonaobra. Their testimonies are summarized below.

On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to the latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Florencio inside their house. Villamor gave Bonaobra P2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table. Bonaobra then went outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man later identified as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in the act ka!" Florencio went outside and

asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more men entered the house and took the money from the table. Petitioners were then made to board the service vehicle and brought in for investigation at the police headquarters.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 25, 2006, the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment finding

petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng," a variant of the game Last Two, respectively as a collector or agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287.

The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng," a variant of Last Two. The RTC held that petitioners were seen by the arresting officers in the act of counting bets before the arrest was made inside Bonaobra's compound. The petitioners were also caught holding "papelitos," which contained the three rows of twonumber combinations. Since the winning combination in "lotteng" is taken from the first two numbers of the winning combinations in the daily draw of the lotto in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, the RTC held that the number combinations shown in the "papelitos" were meant to correspond to the lotto results.

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The RTC further held that Villamor's participation in the illegal numbers game was that of a collector since he brought bet money to Bonaobra while the latter was that of a coordinator,

controller, or supervisor after it was shown that he received the money from Villamor.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 13, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. The CA brushed aside Bonaobra's argument that his right to due process was violated when he was convicted of a crime different from that with which he was charged. The CA held that the classification of a maintainer,

manager, or operator includes a coordinator, controller or supervisor.[10] The CA ratiocinated that to hold a maintainer guilty of the lesser offense of acting as a coordinator will not be violative of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation since the graver offense of acting as a maintainer necessarily includes being a coordinator.

With respect to Villamor, the CA gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers who were presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions. The CA held that Villamor's denials cannot prevail over the positive assertions

of the police officers who caught him in the act of revising and counting bets.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or agent under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld.

HELD:

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YES. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire "case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even

reverse the trial court's decision [based on] x x x grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors."

The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having

been obtained in violation of the said right.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. "Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and

should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree."

In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or caught in the act of committing an offense. PD Peñaflor and his team of police officers claim that petitioners were committing the offense of illegal numbers game when they were arrested without a warrant. Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even without

a warrant of arrest in the following instances: When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

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When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or

has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established petitioners had just committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners. Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless

arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalias. On the part of PD Peñaflor, he likewise admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could not determine the activities of the persons inside. It was only after he had illegally entered the compound, since he was not armed with a warrant, that he supposedly saw the gambling paraphernalia.

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The prosecution admitted that Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay his loan to Jonah. Thus, at the exact moment of the arrest, neither Bonaobra, who was answering his cellphone, nor Villamor, who was paying his loan, was performing any overt act constitutive of a crime. Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same does not satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and seizure of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there could be no valid search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra's house is inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree.

The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest especially when the accused actively participated during trial as in this case. However, we have clarified that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal arrest.

In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of illegal gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller,

or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. Under the said law, a collector or agent is "any person who collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in possession of gambling paraphernalia. On the other hand, a coordinator, controller, or supervisor is defined as, "any person who exercises control and supervision over the collector or agent." The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt acts that constitute the offense.

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All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the June 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30457 which affirmed the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 in Criminal Case Nos. 3463 and 3464 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Martin Villamor y Tayson and Victor Bonaobra y Gianan are ACQUITTED and are ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

Comerciante y Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015 Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813,

which affirmed in toto the Judgment[4] dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

FACTS: 14

On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of

Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:

That on or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Radan of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Calag were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence. In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to 15

another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The RTC Ruling In a Judgment dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.

The RTC found that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this relation, the RTC opined that there was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that PO3 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.

Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that PO3 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto; and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA, this was enough to draw a reasonable

suspicion that those sachets might be shabu, and thus, PO3 Calag had every reason to inquire on the matter right then and there. Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition.

In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal 16

warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.

ISSUE: The core Issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

HELD: NO. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of

such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a)

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,

or is attempting to commit an offense;

17

(b)

When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based

on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed

it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.

A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. PO3 Calag himself admitted that he was 18

aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements,"

with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. PO3 Calag's testimony on direct examination is revelatory:

On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act

could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.[31] That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to

create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu. Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first,

which does not obtain in this case. In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches:

19

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the

commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause: The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception: Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

20

In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances

are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.

In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.

Warrant of Arrest

*Meaning of Arrest

*Requisites a. Probable Cause

21

Ho v. People, G.R. Nos. 106632 & 106678, October 9, 1997 FACTS: On Aug. 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Theresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso, Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odono. The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. According to the information, Rolando Narciso, being the Vice President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or controlled corporation organized and operating under the Philippine law, and Doris Ho, the President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private corporation organized and operating under our Corporation law, was said to have entered without legal justification into a negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of 129.50Php/MT, from Iligan City to Manila. Such contract was entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LCSI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of 109.56Php and 123.00Php per metric ton, respectively, in the public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to NMC. Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution, filed by the Ombudman without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. They contend that a judge, in personally determining the existence of probable cause, must have before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed by the investigating prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest warrant. Such evidence should not be "merely described in a prosecutor's resolution." ISSUE: May a judge determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence which may have been submitted at the preliminary investigation? HELD:

22

The petitions are meritorious. Section 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. In explaining the object and import of the aforequoted constitutional mandate, particularly the power and the authority of judges to issue warrants of arrest, the Court elucidated in Soliven vs. Makasiar: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

b. Determined by a Judge

De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781 , October 10, 2017 FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the complaints against De Lima with the Department of Justice (DOJ) panel of prosecutors. The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016, and De Lima, through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice

23

("Omnibus Motion"). In the main, De Lima argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her. On January 13, 2017, De Lima filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her. Meanwhile, while waiting for the issuance of the restraining order from the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation and, in its Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2017, recommended the filing of Informations against De Lima. Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. On February 20, 2017, De Lima filed a Motion to Quash mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against her; the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information charges more than once; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay. On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner. HELD: RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER THE PETITIONER'S ARREST. Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law. In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days. Petitioner maintains that respondent judge failed to personally determine the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as stated in the assailed Order, respondent judge 24

based her findings on the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and not on the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. This hardly deserves serious consideration. Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required before a warrant of arrest may issue. The Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties."

c. After conduct of an examination of the complainant and witnesses, under oath or affirmation

People v. Grey, G.R. No. 180109, July 26, 2010 FACTS: On December 11, 2006, an Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son, respondent Francis Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge municipal government, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Gandara, Samar. The Information was accompanied by other supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.4

Accordingly, Judge Navidad proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the existence of probable cause, and, in an Order dated February 20, 2007, ruled that the finding of probable cause was supported by the evidence on record. He then issued warrants of arrest against respondents and all but one of their co-accused.14 The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for him to personally determine the existence of probable cause.20 According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed Order did Judge Navidad state his personal assessment of the evidence before him and the personal justification for his finding of probable cause. It found that the judge extensively quoted from the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and then adopted these to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause. The CA held that the Constitution commands the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest.21 ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Navidad erred in personally examining for the existence of probable cause?

25

HELD: NO, In Soliven v. Makasiar,49 the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. Thus, in Soliven, we said: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.50 What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.51 This means that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.52 The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause.53 Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

d. With particularity of description

26

Pfleider v. People, G.R. No. 208001 June 19, 2017 Facts: That on or about the 15th day of September 2010 or prior thereto, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and by offering a price, reward or consideration to Ryan O. Bautista (Crim. Case No. 2010-09-497) and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation, while Ryan 0. Bautista was armed with an unlicensed firearm, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Manuel Granados with the use of said unlicensed firearm and inflicting upon the said victim fatal wounds on different parts of his body, which resulted to his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause against petitioner in a Resolution dated September 5, 2011. Issue: Whether or not the determination of the presence of probable cause may be made by the Supreme Court? HELD: Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. It must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts. The determination of probable cause is and will always entail a ·review of the facts of the case. The CA, in finding probable cause, did not exactly delve into the facts of the case but raised questions that would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled that, "Questions remain as to why, among all people, Ryan would implicate Pfelider as the inducer and why the other witnesses would associate Pfleider to the crime." 12 From this query, the CA has raised doubt. Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information. 13

27

In this case, the judge of the RTC, not finding the existence of probable cause, outrightly dismissed the case. The contrasting findings of the CA and the RTC is well noted and from the very provision of the Rules of Court, 14 the remedy, in case of doubt, is for the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. Therefore, in the interest of justice, this Court finds it appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for a proper determination of probable cause based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. This is not the first time that this Court has remanded a case to the trial court for it to make a ruling on whether certain Informations should be dismissed or not. 15

*Warrantless Arrest a. In flagrante arrests Ongcoma Hadji Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534 , September 2, 2015 Facts: Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area. The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioner's body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu.

Issue: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest Held: There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.22 The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of 28

evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his

person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.32 The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines.30 The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible as evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due to the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful. This is notwithstanding the fact

that the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto for violating an ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers.

People v. Uzman y Betican, G.R. No. 229715 (Notice), November 20, 2017

b. When an offense has just been committed and there is probable cause to believe, based on

the personal knowledge of facts that the person to be arrested has committed the offense

Go y Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992 FACTS: An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of

29

the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful 2. Whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation

HELD: The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the

Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his

counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.

Reyes y Capistrano v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 6, 2018 30

FACTS: The case is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Leniza Reyes y Capistrano. This case

stemmed from information filed before the RTC charging Reyes with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5, 2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was blocked by two (2) civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She was then brought to the police station where the police officers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police

officers took her to Taytay for inquest proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of herein petitioner was lawful?

HELD: The appeal is meritorious.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure [become] 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be

excluded

for

being

the

proverbial

fruit

of

a

poisonous

tree.26

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a

search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed.

Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should – as a general rule – be complied with: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant arrest a person:

31

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

c. Arrests of escapees

People v. Tokohisa Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004

FACTS: On 27 June 1994, Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki (respondents) were accused to transport and deliver 40,768 grams of Indian hemp (Marijuana) in Cash & Carry, Makati City. Respondents entered seperate pleas of NOT GUILTY. Prosecution Version of facts: In the morning of 27 June 1994, Maj. Anso, head of Delta Group, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) received information from a confidential informant that a certain Koichi Kish and Rey Plantilla were engaged in the selling of illegal drugs at the Cash and Carry Supermarket, Makati City. Acting on said information they conducted a surveillance of the area and launched

a buy-bust operation. At 03:00pm of the same day, the informant contacted the targets who told him their time of arrival in the parking area. At 08:00pm, after the exchange of marijuana between Koichi and the informant, PO3 Cadoy held the former by the hand while Rey scampered away to the direction of the South Superhighway. The team learned from Koichi that his friends/suppliers will arrive the same evening to fetch him. Several Minutes later, a white Nissan Sentra Car driven by Kimura and Kizaki arrived at the parking area. Koichi pointed to them as the ones who will fetch him 32

A certain Boy driving a stainless jeep, without a plate number, arrived and parked. Boy approached the Sentra car and opened its trunk. Kimura got a package wrapped in a newspaper

and gave it to Boy who walked back to his jeep. While Maj. Anso and SPO4 Baldovino, Jr. we’re approaching, Kumira ran but was apprehended while Boy was able to board his jeep and together with Kizaki sped off towards South Superhighways. Police found 3 Sacks of Marijuana. They brought Koichi and Kimura to the headquarters and turned over the seized marijuana to the investigator who made markings thereon. On June 29, 1994, Kizaki was arrested by another NARCOM group while he was having dinner with his friends at the Nippon Ichi Restaurant in Manila. Kimura's testimony:

On 27 June 1994, Kimura was in the house of Kizaki together with Koichi, Luis Carlos, Sally and Boy. Kimura borrowed the car of Kizaki in order to get his television from his house to bring it to a repair shop. Koichi requested Kimura to pass by Cash and Carry Supermarket because he needed to meet Rey who was borrowing money from him. When they arrived, Koichi handed something to Rey and shortly thereafter, Koichi and Carlose were grabbed by two men from behind, then four men approached the car and one guy ordered him to sit at the back together with Koichi and Carlos, they were wall brought to Camp Karingal allegedly for violating Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425.

Kimura was asked questions about the address and business of Kizaki. Kimura denied that there was marijuana in the car on the night of 27 June 1994 and claims that he saw marijuana being placed at the car trunk the following day at Camp Karingal. Kizaki was not with him that night, there was no stainless jeep. Kizaki testified that on 27 June 1994, he was in the company of his friends Mr. and Mrs. Takeyama, Kimura, Boy, and Joan at his house; that Kimura borrowed his car on that night to pick up Kimura's broken TV and bring it to the repair shop. He was arrested two days after the Cash and Carry incident, in the Nippon Ichi Restaurant while he was having dinner with his

friends who executed a joint affidavit and testified that they were about to leave the restaurant when a man got near Kizaki and asked for his passport whom they thought was from the Immigration. The trial court found Kizaki and Kimura guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation Section 4 of RA 6425. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Kizaki is legal HELD: No, the settled jurisprudence is that alibi is inherently a weak defense. Like the defense of alibi, denial by the accused of the offense charged against him is also inherently a weak 33

defense. It is also the settled jurisprudence that the defense of alibi and denial cannot prosper over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to

prosper, the accused must show that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene of the commission of the crime at the time of its commission. The illegality of warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability. Appellants claim that although the defense of alibi and denial are weak, it is still the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt to support a judgment of conviction; that the trial court mainly relied on the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution.

Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances: When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

None of the exceptions enumerated above was present to justify appellant Kizaki’s warrantless arrest.

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