Search-and-seizure-case-digest.docx

Stonehill vs Diokno 20 SCRA 383 Facts: Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.” The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation. Held: No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure ispurely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

People vs. Damaso The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Dagupan City. They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant. Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house. The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which they confiscated. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated. Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms. Whether the evidence is admissible? NO. The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless search is present in this case. Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence. Being a helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in representation of her employer. Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is inadmissible.

Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997 Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants. Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence Held: Yes. Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002

FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be “shabu,” the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.

But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid HELD: YES The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against

transgression committed by the government or its agent. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply. There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican “Alex” Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. No witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No L-64261 December 26, 1984 Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

PEOPLE vs. INTING 187 SCRA 788

Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OICMayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

Soliven vs Makasiar Post under Immunity from Suit , Political Law Case Digests , Warrant of Arrest

● While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.

● Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually filehis counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavitsif he is so minded.

● What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

Facts:

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltranargues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

Issues:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Held:

(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probablecause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988)

Esteban Morano V. Hon. Martiniano Vivo, 102 Scra 562 (1967) Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond. Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional. Ruling: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a nonimmigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act..

Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an order of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. It is also held that the requirement of probable cause is not applicable in deportation proceedings, which are not criminal in nature. The order of deportation is purely administrative, its purpose being not punishment but the return to his country of the alien who has violated the conditions for the admission to the local state.

SALAZAR vs. ACHACOSO AND MARQUEZ FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER. The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery. On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved. ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles: 1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

Mata vs. Bayona G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984 ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter. ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?

HELD:YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to

attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Alvarez vs. CFI 64 Phil. 33 (1937) ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void. Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable. Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search

warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts

PEOPLE VS TEE

FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.

Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias “Estoy Tee,” with illegal possession of marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says “an undetermined amount of marijuana,” was too general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness.

HELD: SC held that the appellant’s contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.

PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988 Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.

Issue: Whether said warrant is valid Held: No. Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.” [30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided. WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further appropriate action.

PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT

FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu, and the second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.

The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same was left unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began to force their way inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the search and began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.

Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance to review the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate their food and took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.

The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is inadmissible as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that the marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed unnecessary force in executing the warrant.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was inadmissible in evidence against him. 2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to plain view doctrine.

HELD:

1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied. 2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in plain view when it was seized.

RATIO: 1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or uses are punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify what provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.

2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991] Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. Theseactivities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Issues: (1) (2)

Whether Whether

or or

Not Not

arrest evidence

without from

such

warrant arrest

is

lawful.

is admissible.

Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activitiesof the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

hi galling ata tong digest sa former student ni atty. hahaha look may notes pa- treb

People vs Recepcion At about one-thirty on the morning of 28 July 1999 in Sabungan Fastfood and Videoke Pub, Diosdado Recepcion, Alfredo Baracas, Joemari delos Reyes, Bernardo Ranara, Dominador Recepcion, Robert Alfonso and Audie Dona, entered the pub. The men occupied table 12 and ordered beer from waitress Eliza Bautista. A few minutes later, three men from the group transferred to table 10. Just as Marie (waitress) was approaching table 13 to get the microphone from a customer, one of the men stood up and fired his gun at another customer. Another from the group pull out a gun and shot a customer, Rodolfo Ortega, while on his knees. The group gone berserk and started shooting indiscriminately inside the pub. Even when the group are about the last of the group who left the pub, was still firing his gun. When the shooting finally stopped, five lifeless bodies of men were found sprawled on the floor, - Benjamin Valdez, Augusto Billodo, Renato Cleofas, Rodolfo Ortega and Ruperto San Juan. Ruben Labjata, a jeepney driver, was waiting for passengers at Dagohoy Street, Caloocan City, when he heard gunshots. When, unexpectedly, 8 men arrived and ordered all the passengers to get off the vehicle. The gun men told Labjata to go north until they finally reached, hours later, Paniqui, Tarlac. When the group reach Paniqui, Tarlac they alighted, four of the men rode Conrado Marquez tricycle, while the other four took two more tricycles. Marquez brought the group to Brgy. Coral, Ramos, Tarlac. Around lunchtime on 29 July 1999, the Bulacan Police invited Ruben Labjata for questioning. Taken by police authorities to Tarlac, he pointed to the exact place where the armed men got off from his vehicle. Conrado Marquez, likewise invited by the police for interrogation, readily informed the police of the place where he brought the men who hired his tricycle. The police promptly cordoned the area and the group, surrendered after several calls by the police. The group were charged with multiple murder, violation of P.D. No. 1866, and robbery in band before the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City. Issue: WON the warrantless arrest made by the police was valid? (ginawa kasi yung warrantless arrest almost 1 and a half day pagkatapos ng insidente) Held: Yes. The arrest of appellants has been made in hot pursuit, an exception from the rule that warrantless arrests are illegal. (Ito lang ang sinabi ng SC about hot pursuit, pero nadiscuss na natin to kay Atty. Gallant, and doctrine daw ng kaso na to ay na kahit isang araw na nakalipas nung ginawa yung crimen valid pa rin yung warrantless arrest dito na hot pursuit)

In any event, appellants can no longer assail the illegality of their arrest since such a claim has not been brought up before or during the arraignment. The failure to timely move for the quashal of the Information on this basis operates as a waiver of the right to question the supposed irregularity of the arrest.

PEOPLE vs RECEPCION FACTS: on July 28, 1999, eight persons allegedly conspired to kill and actually killed 5 customers of Sabungan Fastfood & Videoke A waitress in said bar testified as to the incident and identified the accused as the persons responsible Another witness who worked as a waitress in a restaurant across the scene of the crime testified and identified the same offenders After the shooting, the accused boarded a jeepney owned by Ruben Labjata and made him drive to Tarlac where they freed the driver and boarded a tricycle driven by Conrado Marquez Both drivers positively identified the perpetrators Around lunchtime on 29 July 1999, after the police invited the jeepney driver and the tricycle driver for questioning, the area was cordoned off the group, along with FO1 Felipe dela Cruz, surrendered after several calls by the police Taken into custody were Felipe dela Cruz, Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Robert Alfonso, and Dominador Recepcion; Diosdado Recepcion, then a special agent of the Narcotics Command, was intercepted at the national highway of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on board a tricycle At the police station, Labjata identified his passengers, namely, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Diosdado Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara, Eduardo Palacpac, Dominador Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes and Robert Alfonso. The accused were charged with multiple murder, violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, and robbery in band in three separate accusatory Informations The indictees, when arraigned, pled "not guilty" to all the charges and interposed alibi as a defense

the court a quo found the several accused guilty of multiple murder but acquitted them in the charge of illegal possession of firearm and robbery in band because of insufficiency of evidence ISSUE: whether or not the arrest made without a warrant was valid HELD: YES The arrest of appellants has been made in "hot pursuit," an exception from the rule that warrantless arrests are illegal. In any event, appellants can no longer assail the illegality of their arrest since such a claim has not been brought up before or during the arraignment The failure to timely move for the quashal of the Information on this basis operates as a waiver of the right to question the supposed irregularity of the arrest.

Go vs CA G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992 Facts: Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.

Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

Issue/s: Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan in respect of petitioner Go;

Police

Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation

Held: 1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: “Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.” Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not, however, constitute “personal knowledge.” It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. 2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.” In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

PEOPLE VS. GERENTE FACTS: The Valenzuela Police Station received a report about a mauling incident. Upon learning at the hospital that the victim died on arrival and being informed of the cause of death, the policemen proceeded to the crime scene where they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. After being told by the eyewitness the identity of one of the three assailants, the policemen went to appellant’s house where they introduced themselves, and apprehended him and confiscated dried marijuana leaves. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the search of appellant’s person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid. RULING: YES. The policemen arrested appellant only some three (3) hours after he and his companions had killed the victim. They saw the victim dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death. The eyewitnessreported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, the appellant, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that appellant and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest him without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on appellant’s person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. Appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification.

people vs. omaweng FACTS: A checkpoint was put up and all vehicles that went through it were stopped and checked. The officers flagged down the car driven by the accused and asked permission to inspect the vehicle to which he acceded. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. The officers again asked permission to see the contents of the bag. appellant consented to the request. Inside, the officers found forty-one plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances which was later identified as marijuana.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the search and seizure was unreasonable and a violation of the appellant’s Constitutional right.

RULING: NO. Accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure.

The decision of the lower court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is AFFIRMED.

People vs Canton G.R. No. 148825

December 27, 2002

FACTS: Appellant Susan Canton was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, under an Information whose accusatory portion reads as follows: That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or license.

Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits of the “Terry search” doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights.

RULING: No, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, “ Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier

PEOPLE VS. SY CHUA [396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67; 4 Feb 2003] Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident.

Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the

scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.

Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and (2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”.

The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accusedappellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.

Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.

Manalili v CA (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997

Facts: At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.

Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated. The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence.

Held: The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding. The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to be searched.

Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent court.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991 Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: “Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another”

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched. When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

People vs. Chua Ho San Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, CID began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area he intercepted a radio call from ALMOITE requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed “sign language;” he motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. which was later found out that it was Shabu. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause impelling the police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person may

without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.

The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.

RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998 Facts: Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs. Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: “Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense . . . “ Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.

PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989] Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary andcommon sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The

government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; 2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;

HON. ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., and THE PHIL. NAVY, vs. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, and MORABE,DE GUZMAN & COMPANY,

FACTS: Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.- Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.

ISSUE : WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid. HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person(a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II.

THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?

III.

THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

CABALLES VS. CA FACTS:

On or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pangasinan, and/or elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above mentioned accused with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the National Power Corporation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630 kg of Aluminium cable conductors, valued at Php 27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corporation, in the aforesaid amount.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless search without consent is valid?

HELD:

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right, and (3) said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.

WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is reversed and set aside, and accused Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

People v. Libnao y Kitten Warrantless Searches and Seizures

FACTS

August 1996: Intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in

Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.

October 1996: Chief Inspector Arceo held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint.

The following day, PO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were identified as the Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga. 3 In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and their uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, officers invited them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the same barangay bringing with them the black bag. The two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the Libnao, Nunga and personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.

SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga stated it was owned by Libnao y Kitten. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present. The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the

articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. Of course, both accused denied the accusations against them. Nunga: testified that she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passenger's seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver.

Libnao y Kitten however did not appear in court and was only represented by her lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in the company's logbook. Gannod, however, was not presented in court to attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was Libnao y Kitten.

RTC: convicted Libnao y Kitten and Nunga finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.

Aggrieved by the verdict, Libnao y Kitten interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE/S 1. Whether Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and search was violated by the police officers who arrested both accused. 2. Whether Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately violated by the peace officers who apprehended and investigated the accused.

3. Whether Court miserably failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. HELD Supreme Court is not persuaded by the contentions of Libnao and Nunga (t/n: ang contentions nila ang isssue) and appeal must be dismissed.

1. In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, Libnao y Kitten capitalizes on absence of a warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. She also impugns search made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her. SUPREME COURT: Arguments failed to impress. General rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. Be that as it may, requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of impracticability of securing warrant under said circumstances as vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is

limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. In earlier decisions, probable cause is found under the following circumstances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously; (c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana; (d) where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong — that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; (f) where the arresting officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him;

(g) where police officers received an information that the accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila; and (h) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset. Warrantless search in the case has probable cause. Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, Libnao y Kitten and Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. Police receiving a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless

search and seizure of appellant's bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at the time Libnao y Kitten was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto: "Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

2. SUPREME COURT: Libnao y Kitten is incorrect and contentions deserve scant attention. In determining the guilt of the Libnao y Kitten and Nunga, the trial court based its decision on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana. We quote the relevant portion of its decision: “Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession extracted from both accused as evidence of their guilt, the court finds it needless to discuss any answer given by both accused as a result of the police interrogation while in their custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to be resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the prosecution's evidence, both accused can be convicted."

Libnao y Kitten then faults trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter's failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible.

The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, Libnao's counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.

3. SUPREME COURT: Contentions lack merit. Alleged inconsistencies (as to who opened the bag, when the bag was opened, failure of police officer to identify name of tricycle driver) she mentions refer only to minor details and not to material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. They are inconsequential and do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of Libnao y Kitten. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may have different recollections of the same incident. To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against Libnao y Kitten, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting Libnao y Kitten. Against credible positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Libnao y Kitten's defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. Defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Sole proof presented in lower court by Libnao y Kitten to support her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.

PEOPLE VS. MUSA FACTS: A day after elements of the NARCOM team had conducted a surveillance and successful test buy on appellant pursuant to an information received that he is engaged in the sale of marijuana, a buy-bust operation was planned which resulted in appellant’s arrest. The team found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the search and seizure was lawful. RULING: YES. The NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. Appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

People vs. Figueroa 248 SCRA 679 Facts: The accused Arturo Figueroa was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions and and of RA 645 and subsequently convicted by the RTC Br. 23 of Trece Martires in Cavite. While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus the presence of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested appellant, as well as his brother and sister, to acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box containing an aluminum foil package with "shabu." Confronted, Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory was conducted by the PC team, attested to by Barangay Captain Bigornia, of the seized items. The accused questions the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and confiscated ammunition for it was discovered during a warrantless search. Issue: Whether or not there was an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. Held: No. the search and seizure of the articles sought is a valid being a search incidental to an arrest. The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained. While the SC might concede difficulty in readily accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search was conducted with consent freely given by appellant and members of his household, it should be pointed out, in any case, that the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest. As a doctrine in jurisprudence, the warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control. Objects in the `plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

Siz la na ako mahanap na iba PEOPLE VS. SALAZAR FACTS: Appellants were arrested without warrants after eyewitnesses implicated them as the perpetrators in a robbery with homicide incident. Trial on the merits ensued and they were convicted on the special complex crime on the weight of the eyewitnesses’ testimonies.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the illegality of their arrest rendered the eyewitnesses’ testimony inadmissible.

RULING: NO. Granting arguendo that appellants were illegally arrested, such arrest did not invest these eyewitness accounts with constitutional infirmity as “fruits of the poisonous tree.” Considering that their conviction could be secured on the strength of the testimonial evidence given in open court which are not inadmissible in evidence, the court finds no reason to further belabor the matter.

Assailed judgment is MODIFIED. Appellants are found GUILTY of the separate crimes of homicide and theft.

Rizal Alih et. al., vs Castro Facts: A group of more than 200 Philippine marines and home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners (Rizal Alih et. al.) is search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The people inside the compound resisted the invasion and a crossfire between the Philippine marines and the petitioner occurred, resulting in number of casualties. The petitioners surrendered the next morning and 16 occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated several M16 rifles, M14 rifle, rifle grenades and rounds of ammunition. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing being violative of their right against self-incrimination. Petitioner argued that the arms and ammunition were taken without a search warrant as required by law under Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, and it be declared inadmissible in relation to Sec 4 (2) of the 1973 Constitution. Respondent justified their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders and that the measures was necessary due to the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place. Issue: Whether or not the confiscated items shall be considered admissible. Whether or not the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-test is protected by the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Ruling: No, superior orders cannot countermand the Constitution. There is no excuse for the constitutional shortcuts done by the military. Also, the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place does not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure (Art III Sec. 2, 1973 Philippine Constitution).

The arrest does not fall also under the warrantless arrest provided for by Rule 113 Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings against petitioners. With respect to the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing, the acts are not covered by the protection against self-incrimination, for it only applies to testimonial compulsion.

Ramirez vs. CA FACTS: Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition. Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)” These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

GANAAN V IAC Facts: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari. Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200 Held: No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996 Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held: (1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.