Scenario Based Planning As A Tool For Conflict Resolution

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Scenario-based Planning as a Tool for Conflict Resolution

Andrés Álvarez Castañeda

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Resolution

Department of Peace Studies University of Bradford

2006

Table of Contents

I. Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 2 II. Introduction.................................................................................................................. 3 III. Scenario Based Planning ............................................................................................. 5 A. General Definition.................................................................................................... 5 B. History ..................................................................................................................... 6 C. General Description of the Technique..................................................................... 10 D. Critical Perspectives of SBP and Critical Theory within SBP ................................. 19 IV. Scenario Based Planning in Post-conflict and Conflictive Societies........................... 22 A. Case Study: South Africa....................................................................................... 22 B. Case Study: Guatemala.......................................................................................... 26 C. Other Applications.................................................................................................. 30 V. Problem-solving and Scenario Based Planning ........................................................... 34 A. Problem-solving ..................................................................................................... 34 B. Epistemology.......................................................................................................... 37 C. Theory.................................................................................................................... 40 D. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 43 E. Case Study: The Fermeda Workshop...................................................................... 47 F. Case Study: The Belfast or Sterling Workshop ....................................................... 49 G. SBP and PS: a complimentary relationship............................................................. 51 VI. Critical Issues ........................................................................................................... 53 VII. Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 57 VIII. Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 60

“As for the future, your task is not to foresee it, but to enable it” Antoine de Saint-Exúpery.

“Scenarios are a tool for helping us to take a long view in a world of great uncertainty”

Peter Schwartz.

“Al final del viaje, estamos tú y yo, intactos. Quedamos los que puedan sonreír en medio de la muerte, en plena luz”.

Silvio Rodríguez

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I. Abstract

Scenario-based Planning (SBP) is a tool used by governments, private companies and NGOs for envisioning possible future outcomes.

The general principle of this

framework is to consider the possibility of change and to empower its users in the creation of a path towards the transformation of current realities.

SBP shares

methodological, theoretical and epistemological similarities with the Problem-solving (PS) methods used within the Conflict Resolution (CR) field. Furthermore, SBP has been used in several post-conflict and conflictive societies to create a common agenda for the future of a whole nation. Although much can be said about certain critical issues in the use of SBP, like representation, sustainability, applicability, lack of a concrete theory, re-entry problems, cultural generalization and the phenomena of group think, the case studies in Guatemala and South Africa show its great potential within the field of CR, especially if it is framed within the general idea of PS.

Keywords:

Conflict Resolution, Scenario-based Planning, Prospective Studies,

Futurology, Problem-solving, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Guatemala, South Africa, Stirling Workshop, Fermeda Workshop.

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II. Introduction

This dissertation was written based on a transformative approach to human reality, one that considers the potentials of change inherent to every single human being and that seeks to transcend the restrictions imposed by current unjust realities. As part of this enterprise of transforming society towards the ideal of Peace, imagining the future can be a powerful tool, both as a utopian possibility for change and as the inherent calamity of the continuation of the status quo. Scenario-based Planning (SBP) is a form of envisioning the future used by a wide range of political actors in the world, and the point will be made in this dissertation that this framework can be applied in the construction of Peace and the transformation of conflict.

SBP has been used by a diverse range of individuals and institutions for several purposes. This dissertation will argue that SBP is not only an important tool for planning, but it can also become an integral part of a conflict manager’s tool kit. Although SBP was not originally designed to be applied in conflictive situations, it has been used in several occasions (two of them discussed later on in this essay). The basic idea is that people involved in a conflict can get together and imagine a common future that benefits all the actors equally.

Including a new methodology in a well established field like CR is not a simple matter. First of all, the utility of the methodology should be assessed. Second, the method should be related to a wider theoretical and epistemological framework. After that, the method should be validated through a “lessons-learned” process. In this dissertation,

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the point will be made that there are enough elements that can be taken from a “lessonslearned” approach so as to prove the actual and potential utility for the field of CR.

SBP shares many theoretical and practical features with past developments in CR. The most important ones are discussed in the following pages of this dissertation, but some deserve mention at this introductory state of discussion. First, SBP is very similar to Problem-solving (PS), in the sense that it requires a creative effort by the part of the participants. When the conflict is defined in terms of practical problems that need a solution, participants get involved and committed with the process, allowing them to think in a different way than how they’re used to. Second, SBP requires a close collaboration between conflicting parties so as to the creation of a future common national (or regional or local) project.

This approach allows for the creation of

empathy, an eventually helping to change conflictual attitudes (both at an individual and societal level). Finally, SBP helps to unleash the potential of thinking in terms of the future.

This characteristic is shared not only with PS but by the more general

epistemological foundations of CR.

The dissertation will first present a brief explanation of the general principles of SBP. Then, two case studies of the use of SBP in post-conflict societies will be then be analyzed. After that, the theoretical and practical potentials for the use of SBP will be exposed, specifically in relation to previous efforts within the Problem-solving (PS) framework. Afterwards, a couple of critical issues surrounding the use of SBP in CR will be explored. Finally, some general conclusions are drawn.

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III. Scenario Based Planning

A. General Definition

Plainly put, SBP is a method for envisioning the future, the main idea is to imagine several possible future outcomes for a given company, governmental institution, country, etc.. Imagining possible and plausible future scenarios allows managers to consider both opportunities and threats as a basic part of planning for the future: “Scenarios are tools for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative future environments in which today’s decisions might be played out. In practice, scenarios resemble a set of stories, written or spoken, build around carefully constructed plots” (GBN: www.gbn.com/AboutScenariosDisplayServlet.srv).

In this same line, Schwartz considers SBP to: “…provide a context for thinking clearly about the impossibly complex array of factors that affect any decision. It gives a common language for talking about these factors, starting with a series of ‘what-if’ stories, each with a different name. Then it encourages participants to think about each of them as if it had already come to pass” 1996:xiv).

These stories have been constructed on the basis of “hard” facts, though. This is a constant tension within the method itself: on the one hand, the users are stimulated to think about every possible outcome, on the other, a careful evaluation of all of the outcomes should necessarily result in the selection of the most probable and plausible scenarios. SBP is not about predicting the future; if the method works it is precisely because the future is unpredictable. Mojica (2001) reminds us that the basic underlying

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principle of SBP has to do with the belief that social reality is constructed. As such, it is shaped by actors (individuals, nations, communities) and it can be modified in the future. It is this potential for future change that makes the method so appealing to most people.

Scenarios are basically used for preventing the surprise of emerging events, questioning conventional wisdom about the future, recognizing the signs of change and evaluating different strategies under various circumstances.

The team behind the creation of

scenarios should be able to understand current events and identify the predictable and unpredictable events in the future (GBN, 1992:3).

B. History

The idea of imagining alternate futures has been present for a long time: “Ancient philosophers used to argue that duplicate worlds were necessary for assessing the consequences and hence the merits of alternative courses of action. It was said that only by observing the courses of events unfolding in each world could it ever be possible to make valid comparisons between the alternatives and to select the most desirable” (Chandler and Cockle, 1982:1). But the method as we know it today was first used by the military during towards the middle of the twentieth century as part of new ideas in Strategic Studies. It eventually migrated towards private companies, which used it in order to overcome “paradigm paralysis”1, i.e. the inability to adapt to changes in the market, mainly technology and customer preferences (Schwartz, 1996). 1

Paradigm paralysis refers to Thomas Kuhn’s idea of scientific paradigm. Kuhn (1962), an epistemologist and historian of science developed the idea that science advances through “revolutions”. These revolutions consist in a radical change relating to the most basic scientific premises. For example, the change from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian physics would represent a scientific revolution. 6

Relating to this point, Roubelat

(2005:520) reminds us that:

“To adapt Kuhn’s

conceptual framework to explain the role of scenario planning in the strategy process, we first have to identify the community at work in the process. Actually, scenario planning stresses the contact between differential and complementary views to produce different logics for the future. Thus, the methodology of scenario planning leads to a more or less formal system interacting people in order to gather visions, e.g. images of the future produced through imagination, and beliefs about the future. These visions and beliefs are then used to set up scenarios”.

Later on, the method was refined by social scientists, to the point that currently certain computer programs have been developed to aid in the construction of scenarios through the assignment of different values to indexes and variables (see for example, the Mic/Mac

program

developed

by

the

French

Prospective2

School:

www.3ie.org/lipsor/micmac.htm).

2

There are several schools of SBP, one of which is the French School, also known as the Prospective School. Other regional perspectives are the Anglo-American School, known as the Futures or Futurology School. An incipient Latin-American School can also be identified. 7

Figure 1 Generic Model of a Mathematical SBP Process

Source: Godet, 2000:7

Today SBP is part of every day life in companies and governmental intelligence and planning agencies alike. Even NGOs are currently using the method in order to prepare for future outcomes. “Thus, scenario planning plays a sense-making role to challenge strategic paradigms of organizations and to rethink their internal and external borders” (Roubelat, 2005:519).

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A form of illustrating the history of SBP is to analyze the French case, where much of the ideas surrounding scenario thinking were developed. In the 1960s, Sema (an aircraft engine company) used SBP to emerge from the quickly changing European business world. During the late 60s and early 70s, Elf (an oil and chemical company) used SBP in its transformation of the oil market. Lastly, during the 1980s and early 1990s confronted the European deregulation through scenario techniques.

Figure 2 Historical Evolution of SBP in France (Prospective School)

Source, Roubelat, 2005:522.

In general, the analysis of the French case shows the existence of two distinct phases: “The first phase ran from the end of WWII until the eighties and may be linked to the design and implementation of long-term public programs to equip and support the national infrastructure, e.g. electricity, rail transportation and telecommunications. All of these programs required a long-term vision beyond sectorial or technological definitions that include macro-economics and, especially in the case of energy, geopolitics. The second phase, begun as the eighties ended, is linked not only to this programming effort but also to a change in the institutional environment of public sector

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corporations, called deregulation. For these companies, whose status, legal constitution and area of activity were all regulated, the change of strategic paradigm grew particularly complex and was based on time lags” (Roubelat, 2005:524).

Recently, SBP has “gone global”, through the promotion and diffusion of prospective thought by a world-wide network of scholars, politicians and business men. Global Business Network (GBN) has been behind the application of SBP techniques en Postconflict societies like South Africa and Guatemala and conflictive societies like Colombia and México. Their website, www.gbn.com contains not only the Mission of this network, but also a series of documents produced by their “Future Planners”, relating to a great diversity of topics.

C. General Description of the Technique

SBP usually begins with the selection of a group of people to participate in a series of workshops. Special effort should be made so that the participants represent different areas or sectors within a company or institution. The rationale behind this is that different people can imagine different future scenarios based on their specific line of work, personal experiences, etc.

Once the main group of participants is defined, the workshop begins with a series of icebreaking and confidence building techniques. Basic ground rules are also set, mainly that everybody has a right to be heard, and that all opinions should be considered seriously. After that, the current social, economic and political reality surrounding the institution in question is analyzed by the group.

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This analysis may take several days, and it must be condensed through a Strengths / Opportunities / Weaknesses / Threats matrix. This allows the participants to visualize the “big picture” in a couple of pages. A future refinement of the analysis is done by the choosing of 5 to 10 main variables by the group. These variables are the ones that are considered the most important ones in shaping the future.

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Figure 3 Example of a Strengths / Opportunities / Weaknesses / Threats Matrix Analysis of Latin America 2025

Latin America 2025

Strengths • Strong human resource base

Weaknesses • Pervasive levels of poverty and discrimination,

• Privileged geographical and

especially

among the rural and indigenous

environmental situation

populations. Low educational

• Relatively stable democracies

levels and unequal access to

in the last 10 years

health and medicine • Growing levels of violence and insecurity, especially relating to drug trafficking • Lagging specially

infrastructure, relating

to

telecommunications Opportunities

• Free trade treaties • Globalization targeting the Region because of its many competitive advantages •

Threats

Strong cooperation ties to developing countries

• Challenges by the emerging Asian market • Unwelcome foreign intervention for “security reasons” • Global environmental degradation

Source: elaborated by the author based on inputs and perspectives by Mojica (2001)

After the elaboration of the analysis matrix, the participants are required to map the actors or processes that intervene in the situation being analyzed. Mapping techniques 12

are not unique to SBP; there is a long tradition of using political maps in Political Science and International Relations. For the example used in Figure 2, a corresponding map could be exemplified in Figure 3.

Figure 4 Political Map

Nationalism, ethno-nationalism, terrorism, fundamentalism

Asian Market Pressures

Environmental Pressures

Analysis of Latin America 20253

Source: elaborated by the author.

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Some explanations should be made about the reading of the map. It is composed of three different levels of actors / processes. At the top level are the global processes common to every country and the international system as a whole. The second level is composed by international actors such as nations or global movements or institutions. The third level (in green) is composed by Latin America’s inner political and social actors. All actors are positions based on a left-right political continuum. A further elaboration of this map would require a series of continuous and dotted lines denoting different types of relationships between actors and processes. Because of its utility as an example, this map will be left at this basic level. 13

The next step in the workshop requires a great deal of creativity from the participants. They have to collectively write down 3 to 4 future scenarios based on the variables and the actors map. These should be short, and they should reflect the different possible outcomes of each of the variables that were previously selected.

SBP workshops

usually end with the selection of an underlining metaphor to describe the scenarios. Scenarios are written based upon three main plots (Schwartz, 1996:135-157). The first plot is that of winners and losers. Through this perspective, the future is envisioned thinking of who will win and who will lose if Change A or Change B occurs. Another important plot is that of challenge and response, and is based on the way different institutions and social and economic groups respond to challenges. Finally, a plot of evolution considers slow change over time, based upon past trends. These plots do not cover all situations, and other ones used include:

revolutionary change, historical

cycles, infinite possibilities and the lone ranger (this one relating to changes predicted by few but that affect many).

A final product, which both systematizes the results and describes the process by which the results were achieved, is considered as a sort of prelude for future policy making and should be distributed within the institution. It is the narrative effect of SBP that has a special impact on all those who have been in contact with the method. By taking part in the building of a great collective story, the participants achieve a new sense of commitment with the process.

The final scenarios are summarized using literary metaphors, and sometimes even images. The idea is to make the final analysis available to a broad scope of people. For

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example, figure 5 shows the way in which future scenarios for the US were presented in a post 9/11 project4:

Figure 5 Four Post 9/11 Scenarios

Source: Kennedy, Perrottet and Thomas; 2003:10.

There are several variations depending on the school of thought and the immediate objectives of the participants.

Schwartz (1996:241-248) describes a more generic

approach towards scenario building, with seven steps. The first move should be to identify focal issue or decision. Then the key forces in the local environment should be described. In third place, the driving forces of the global situation should be considered.

4

9/11 2001 was an important date not only for the general state of peace and security in the world (many see it as a turning point after which international security policies hardened) but also for SBP. While some attributed the failure to predict the event to scenario-based techniques in general others argued that it was precisely the lack of use of SBP that allowed the event to happen without any possibility of prediction. 15

These forces should be ranked by importance and uncertainty. Fourth, scenario logics should be selected (answering the question: what will the scenarios be based upon?). Then the scenarios should be fleshed out. Future implications should be considered, and finally, leading indicators and signposts should be selected in order to know if reality is heading towards one scenario or another.

The use of quantitative or qualitative variables can also determine the nature of SBP. Some prefer to feed the variables into analysis software, which automatically produces economic, political and social scenarios. Others prefer a less technical approach, and emphasize the more “artistic” aspects of imagining the future. The following quote from Flowers5 (2003:32) illustrates this point:

“My continuing attempts to give

scenario writing the intense, imagistic brevity of poetry has become an elusive goal –to make each aspect of the scenario a facet that reflects the whole. For example, one of the seed images for the future of biotechnology was Aesop’s fable hare-and-tortoise race. Wherever possible, the hare and tortoise were evoked in headings or through race analogies so that the over-arching theme of the scenario would not be lost even when the focus was on specific details of biotechnology development.

The “whole” of

course, was the story itself, in which slower technologies beat out futuristic ones. But within the sub stories, I inserted headlines with the “sticky” images and phases to provide a kind of ongoing outline of the story)”.

The general structure of scenarios usually includes three generic types. A scenario that describes more of the same, but better (a slow changing reality but with a generally positive outcome. The other type is the worsening and depressive scenario, in which the 5

Besides being a successful academic in the area of poetry and literature, Flowers has done consultancy work in scenario planning for NASA, GM, The USA’s Navy and Shell Corporation. 16

general situation tends to decay with time. The last type is one of change towards a more positive outcome, one of fundamental change (Schwartz, 1996:19).

A more systematic way of classifying prospective methods is by the modes of thinking identified by Voros (2006:44). E mode is based on an evolutionary framework, where changes are seen as subtle and occurring in the long-term. R mode, on the other hand, considers revolutionary changes happening in short lengths of time. As ideal types, none correspond with actual exercises of SBP, they are more of ideal types at either end of a continuum. “In addition, mode E prospection appears to be the mode of choice for creating images of probable and plausible futures, whereas mode R prospection appears to be the mode of choice for possible and preferable futures” (Voros, 2006:45).

Figure 6 Schematic Representation of Mode “R” and Mode “E” Prospection

Source: Voros, 2006:45

Another way of classifying SBP methods has to do with Layers of Reality. Voros (2006:46) notes that there are 5 distinct layers of reality when applying prospective 17

analysis: events; constructs of thinking; contents of thinking; capacities of thinking; and conditions of existence. Each of these layers corresponds to a specific analysis focus: events, trends, systems, worldviews and history.

Prospective methods also difference themselves because of the actual technique used to imagine the future. The Wildcard approach forces participants to imagine a future scenario based on a single, unexpected event (a nuclear catastrophe, a sudden change in the technology market, etc.). Prospective techniques are more about casting certain trends identified in the past into the future. Visioning has to do with a very free-spirited way of thinking, through which future possibilities are imagined without any regards to economic, political and technological restraints. A similar technique is that of Back casting, which consists of an imagined ideal future, which is then set on “rewind” in order to reconstruct the steps necessary to reach that future from today’s starting point. Macro history, an approach closer to classic social science methods, involves the analysis of past trends in order to predict possible future outcomes. Finally, recent trends in SBP techniques are Counterfactuals and Alternative Histories. Both rely on the construction of divergent versions of history. Of course, Scenarios are the best known of techniques (Voros, 2006:).

Finally, SBP can be classified based on the overall ideological underpinning of thought that drives the use of the technique. Thus, “techno-utopian”, “eco-utopian”, “integrated technology” (this perspectives tries to condense both technological and ecological utopias with a deep-rooted humanistic thought, i.e., the type of proposals brought forth by Bono, the singer and Human Rights activist) are some of the possibilities (Voros, 2006:51).

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Even though SBP has many different methodological and even theoretical approaches, one basic aspect should never be forgotten: SBP should always be a collective effort of thinking creatively about future possible outcomes.

D. Critical Perspectives of SBP and Critical Theory within SBP

Shoemaker (1999), one of the proponents of the “globalization” of scenario planning warns us of certain dangers in the use of this perspective, some of which are summarized in the following lines. First, he thinks that even the best scenario planning processes are rendered inoperative if the effort isn’t made to influence top-level decision makers. Another important point to be avoided is to underestimate the informative value that outsider perspectives can bring in to the SBP technique, this means to allow the results of the workshops to be known and analyzed by other people besides the participants. Third, unrealistic expectations should not be attributed to the SBP process. Even though it can have a great transformative effect, SBP is not an all-encompassing solution for every single problem.

The capacity to change mindsets should also be

considered. If SBP is to have the transformative effect that is expected from it, then a concerted effort should be made to use this technique in the actual modification of people’s attitudes and behavior.

Glenn and Gordon (1999:453) created a very optimistic world scenario for 2025, based on the inputs of at least 550 futurologists (another name for SBP experts) and the general assumption that the Millennium Project Goals will be met by that date. The scenario “… describes how technological success, human development and economic /

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political policies achieved a global economy that appears to be environmentally sustainable while providing nearly all people with the basic necessities of life and the majority with a comfortable living. The resulting social stability has created a relatively peaceful world and allowed the existence of possible futures for the second half of the 21st. century”.

This kind of approach could be seen as a terrible weakness of SBP, the excessive emphasis that is given to the best-possible or normative scenario. Although some social sciences, like Anthropology and Sociology have a long tradition of studying human reality in function of what it really is, others, like Political Science and International Relations have some traditions (although not by any means the dominant trends) of dealing with idealistic or normative aspects.

The real strength of the SBP method

actually is that it considers all possible outcomes, not only the good or bad ones. Pessimistic scenarios are constructed form a realist viewpoint, as a starting point from which a better future can be imagined.

Schwartz (1996:164) identifies a series of critical uncertainties that challenge any planning process, including SBP. The first characteristic of the contemporary world is a situation of continuing shuffling of political alignments. The changes produces by the end of the Cold War have had a long-term and unpredictable effect. Another important source of uncertainty is the technology explosion occurring at a global scale. The third important point noted by the author is a trend of global pragmatism. Under the slogan of “whatever works”, political boundaries are blurred and egalitarian utopias lose ground and give way to the widening of the gap between rich and poor. Demographics pose another challenge to any planning process. Whatever decision made relating to

20

scarce resources will necessarily pass through the important filter of demographic trends. Fourth, energy will be a growing concern and an even more important source of uncertainty. Closely related to energy is the use and management of the environment. Global environmental degradation can have unpredictable consequences. Finally, the global information economy is a source of risk and uncertainty.

Besides the critical approaches towards SBP that can be identified, there is also an unusual and unexpected relationship between prospective thought and Critical Theory. Through critical thought, a state of current affairs is described in which all the factors of the dominating hegemonic structure are considered. After that, plausible alternatives are imagined, through a Counter-hegemonic framework (Voros. 2006:52).

Some might think that a method that had its origins in the transnational corporate world could hardly be described as Critical or Counter-hegemonic. The recent use of SBP by local NGOs, including those involved in social transformation (Peace-building, Human Rights and Indigenous Advocacy Groups, etc), shows the possibilities of using the method with very different political ends than those of the great Oil and Defense Corporations.

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IV. Scenario Based Planning in Post-conflict and Conflictive Societies

A. Case Study: South Africa

SBP was used for the first time in a post-conflict scenario in South Africa in 1991-92, before Apartheid officially ended but well into the democratic reform process. A consultancy team (Global Business Network) was hired by the international community, mainly the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation and the Swiss Development Agency to experiment with SBP. They selected a small group of political figures, ranging from government officials, representatives of all political parties, church leaders, entrepreneurs, etc.

The experience was named “the Mont Fleur Scenarios”, and became an example in nation planning. For the first time in South Africa’s history, a blue print for correct governance was created in a participatory manner; in effect, a consensus was reached among the different participants about what type of country everyone wanted to see in the future. The purpose of Mont Fleur was “not to present definitive truths, but to stimulate debate on how to shape the next 10 years” (GBN, 1992:2).

The team at GBM was very clear about what Mont Fleur was not about: it was not about changing the reality of South Africa with just one document, it was not about dealing with deep-underlying differences on the ways in which political change would be brought upon the country. It was exclusively about imagining the future of South

22

Africa based on different plausible scenarios, and arriving to a consensus about which of the scenarios was the most desirable one.

The firs task at hand for the scenario-building team was to analyze South Africa’s situation at that moment in time. They concluded that the country was undergoing a political crisis characterized by: a general lack of legitimacy of the system, a deeprooted distrust of the armed forces, and the judicial system, an ever-growing ethnic division, the collapse of local authorities, and a general feeling of repression, intimidation, intolerance and political violence. The social and economic situation was also discouraging: underdevelopment, poverty, lack of confidence for investments, and a general breakdown in the health and educational systems (GBN, 1992:4).

After analyzing the general situation of South Africa and choosing the main variables for the construction of scenarios, many different possible stories about the future of the country were created. Of these, four were chosen as the most representative: The Ostrich Scenario, The Limp Duck Scenario, The Icarus Scenario and The Flight of the Flamingos Scenario (GBN, 1992:5).

The Ostrich Scenario describes a government that will not confront the reality of its country. As Ostriches do in the wild, the government hides6 its head under the ground every time it sees danger in the horizon. In this scenario, the democratic transition is hindered by a growing confrontation between the old powers and the Liberation Movement, with a rapid radicalization of their positions and growing international pressures. The government calls for an alliance with more moderate positions, and this

6

As a stylistic resource, scenarios are usually written in present-tense. 23

is harshly resented by the Liberation movement. government decides to repress them violently.

Mass protests erupt and the The economy does not grow

significantly, and violent episodes keep investments away. The social situation also worsens, with growing social injustice and liberalizing tendencies that only contribute to a general feeling of despair among the population.

The tale of the Limp Duck Scenario is one of a long and treacherous road towards development and well-being. The main image is that of a Duck with a broken wing that has to exert great energy in flying. In this scenario, political factions agree on a slow transition, fearing the excesses that could occur if a more radical agenda is applied. The international community, sharing the general fear of things “getting out of hand”, decide to continue fostering the transition process. Society in general, and particularly The Liberation movement, decide to accept small concessions by the government fearing that more radical changes could hinder the transition process, giving way to the return of a restrictive and authoritarian system. The general economic and social ambiance is one of uncertainty and disillusion.

The Icarus Scenario uses the old Greek myth about the incarceration of Dedalus and Icarus by King Minos. Searching for a way to escape their captor, they decide to build wings, which they attach to their shoulders with wax. Dedalus warns Icarus about the dangers of flying too close to the sun, but he can’t resist himself and flies too high; the wax melts and Icarus plummets to his death. Applying the myth to a concrete future reality for South Africa, the scenario can be described as follows. Populism begins to dominate the transition process, with a democratic government too eager to implement change. Too much is being done with scarce resources. “Quick fixes” overshadow the

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implementation of long-term strategies, resulting in rapid economic growth followed by financial, monetary and budget crisis. An economic crisis ensues, and fears grow of a movement to overthrow the government.

Finally, the Flight of the Flamingos Scenario is based on the way these bird fly; the usually take-off slowly but achieve great altitude, and they fly as a group. In this scenario, the basic political agreement for the transition is a solid one.

Although

economic growth is slow at first, it gradually increases because of ever-growing levels of confidence. Sound investments in social areas of interest are also made, promoting higher educational and health indicators. Social violence is thus reduced, feeding the virtuous circle of economic and social development.

After the selection of the optimal scenario, a checklist of pre-conditions was elaborated by the participants, which included: a culture of justice, a complete break-up with previous authoritarian traditions, a solid constitution, and effective political participation. They also considered fiscal and monetary discipline, and a certain level of free market. Socially, they included a robust social system with strong health and education components. Much attention was paid also to the reduction of violence and the prevention of the –then emerging- AIDS epidemic.

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Figure 7 Possible Paths to South Africa’s Future

Source: GBN, 1992:5.

B. Case Study: Guatemala

Some years later, the experience was repeated in Guatemala, with three main objectives: the development of a dialogue process, the creation of a shared vision for the future of the country and the diffusion of strategic information within Guatemalan society. (Díez, 2004). The workshop’s participants were all important political figures, and they have been heard referring publicly to the experience on several occasions; SBP has become a

26

part of their every day work, they have used similar methods in a whole range of venues.

Between 1998 and 1999 a team of promoters from GBN and paid for by the International Community (UNDP, among others), organized four workshops that had the final objective of creating scenarios for Guatemala. Besides the evident outcomes of the workshops (a written document, a video documentary and a children’s book) other, less visible and collateral goals were achieved. For example, a series of workshops with local authorities were held relating to strategic thinking. Other dialogue and planning instances, like Foro Guatemala, Grupo Barómetro, Q’onojel, Futuro Democrático, Diálogo y Ciudadanía and Visión Educación were all deeply influenced by the SBP workshops (Visión Guatemala, 2005:7)7.

Visión Guatemala was envisioned from the beginning as a Nation-building proposal that included perspectives from a diverse range of actors in Guatemalan politics, business and social scenes. The process began only a year and a half after the signing of the Peace Accords that put an end to 36 years of a gruesome civil war that killed more than 300,000 people (mostly rural and indigenous) and displaced millions.

The team established 7 main objectives for the process. First, the scenarios would help to improve the quality of strategic dialogue and debate. Another objective was to question dominant mental models of reality. Third, they would create a shared space for learning. Another goal was to foster confidence and empathy. Fifth, they would help

7

All of these instances were created to promote an open dialogue about Guatemala’s main problems. Some of them were governmental initiatives, while others were created around Civil Society, the Business Community, or a mix of two or three of these sectors. 27

imagine the future. They also sought to create more robust and innovative strategies. Finally, they would help create a feeling of hope about the future.

Participants found a very appropriate metaphor, one that involved insects8. Three scenarios were created based on this metaphor: The Illusion of the Moths, The Zigzag Flight of the Beetle and the Flight of the Firefly9.

Moths fly around blindly looking for light. Their intention is the right one, but without a concrete flight plan, their flight is perilous. They spend most of their energy flying from one source of light to the next, without ever really advancing. After a while, they eventually fly into the light of a candle, burning themselves. Thus, the worst was the Moth scenario, one in which Guatemalans fly blindly into the candle-light of peace, too quickly and without preparing before-hand. This scenario involves many cosmetic reforms which don’t tend to the country’s unjust structures. Real peace is an illusion, and long-term economic prosperity does not occur for most Guatemalans. Intercultural relations do not improve, and discrimination pervades society. Few advances are made in the area of reconciliation, and the authoritarian temptation appears within the political society. Job instability, fiscal crisis and unemployment characterize Guatemala. There is no rule of law and mediocrity and pessimism dominates the mentality of most citizens.

8

Insects are very important in the worldview of both main ethnic groups in Guatemala. After the Spanish conquest, two main groups have conformed, one that emphasizes its indigenous origin, the Maya or Indigenous group (composed of more than 20 linguistic sub-families of the Maya, Xinka and Garífuna families)) and the Ladino group, which emphasizes its European or mixed origins. Insects are of common use in popular narratives (legends, fairy-tales, jokes), and were readily accepted by the participants as the main actors for the Scenario-building process. 9 In Spanish: La Ilusión de las Palomillas, el Zigzagueo del Ronrón and El Vuelo de las Luciérnagas. 28

Beetles fly erratically, bumping once and again with walls, windows and worse obstacles. Their flight is heavy and slow, though they persist on flying to matter what obstacles they encounter. This Scenario describes the erratic flight of a country that, while implementing some aspects of the Peace Agenda, still lags in the basic construction of a socially and economically just society.

Advances are counter-

balanced with many policy obstacles and even some forms of regression to a previous state of affairs. Reconciliation and dialogue coexist with profound social divisions and fear.

Environmental problems worsen, and citizens in general are apathetic and

government lacks legitimacy.

Lastly, Fireflies have found creative ways to beat their two main problems: gravity and darkness. They fly in a decided manner, using both their physical strength as well as taking advantage of subtle wind currents. At the same time they produce their own light, which they share with others, illuminating paths to a better future.

In this

Scenario, Guatemala projects its bright light onto its neighbors. A strong national identity is created, through the acceptance of past history, but also with a strong emphasis on strategic thinking. Tolerance and a profound educational reform promote a more just society were all forms of discrimination are abolished. The main axis of development is the idea of Integral Development, with equal emphasis on social, economic and political issues. Rule of law is a reality for all Guatemalans, and poverty is reduced drastically. Participation and consensus dominate the political scene, and the general ambiance of optimism produces increased foreign and inner investment.

Participants of Visión Guatemala also collaborated with a later evaluation of the project. Most of the limitations of the SBP workshops identified had to do with the lack of

29

funding and time for the realization of more workshops and related activities (like promotion of the project within the wider society). More participation by women and young people would have also been desirable, and some political expressions were not represented (dissident left and right parties, for example). Frustration ensued because of high expectations from the participants about the scope of the project. But in general, participants expressed positive opinions about SBP workshops in general, and the Visión Guatemala project in particular.

C. Other Applications

The method has also been used in other contexts that cannot be described as postconflict. For example, another similar process was fostered during 1997 by a civic group in Colombia, a country with an on-going internal war which is worsened by the influence of drug cartels and strong paramilitary groups. The project was called Destino Colombia (Destiny: Colombia) and also drew participants from a great diversity of social, economic and political strata.

The process was very similar to the other case studies, and the scenarios were called We’ll Wait ‘till Morning (Amanecerá y Veremos; the worst-case scenario), A Mediocre Deal is Better than a Good War (Más Vale Pájaro en Mano que Ciento Volando; the conservative scenario), Everyone March! (¡Todos a Marchar!; a hard-line military intervention scenario) and United we are Stronger (La Unión Hace la Fuerza; the ideal democratic scenario).

The Colombian process is of special importance because it

transformed into a viable alternative proposes by society as a whole to the dominating polarized opinions usually present during Civil Wars.

30

GBN also participated in a SBP workshop in México, a country with many social and political problems but a general stability in relation to armed conflict and guerrilla warfare. The country was going through a transition, though. The 60 year reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had come to an end, with both the leftist and rightist parties contesting the PRI’s hegemony.

In this case, GBN facilitated a

workshop called The Future of Civil Society in México, with financial support from the David & Lucile Packard Foundation.

Following the same basic structure as the two SBP workshops described before, the participants arrived to four different scenarios, summarized in the following figure:

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Figure 8 Scenarios for México

The Mexican Miracle

civic

The Return of Quetzalcóatl

participation

Democratic

Reactive

Proactive

McMex

towards globalization Social conscience and

Mexico’s attitude

The Divided Country

Paternalistic

Source: GBN, 2002.

The Mexican experience included two important differences with the other SBP workshops analyzed before. First, the quadrant approach allows the interaction of two main processes, that of civic participation and the attitude towards globalization. Second, the way the stories / scenarios were presented was very original. Instead of constructing stories, the participants wrote old-fashioned letters, in which close relatives would tell the experiences they were living depending on each of the four scenarios.

32

Currently, efforts are being made towards the application of SBP at a more grass-roots level of society in Latin America, through NGO / government / international / community fostered projects. Similar approaches which emphasize the future are being used by development agencies like GTZ (the German Development Agency)10.

As was shown by the case studies and the potential future applications, SBP could be an important tool for contemporary conflict managers.

The main problem would be to

“validate” the type of knowledge produced by SBP with the standards used by the Conflict Resolution field. A first way of bridging the gap between CR and SBP would be to and SBP would be to explore the many similarities that this method has with Problem-solving (PS), a well established and important

they share in their

epistemological, methodological and theoretical frameworks.

10

GTZ uses several prospective approaches in its Rural Participative Diagnoses (Diagnóstico Rural Participativo, or DRP). The DRP approach seeks to involve communities in the planning of their future development. Techniques like “the bridge” involve creative Problem-solving. Participants draw a problem on one side of a black-board, and draw an ideal solution on the other side, then they have to imagine a bridge to fill the gap. Future maps of the community are also used to investigate the different priorities of different gender and age groups. 33

V. Problem-solving and Scenario Based Planning

A. Problem-solving

The main barrier in CR is that the parties involved in a conflict have a pre-defined mental framework programmed to view conflicts as a zero-sum game. One of the most important approaches of the CR field has to do with a theoretical, methodological and epistemological framework known as a whole as Problem-solving. Some authors, like de Reuck (1990:186) believe that humans have a psychological predisposition towards framing conflicts as zero-sum games. The role of PS facilitators is to provide a safe and open environment in which creative solutions to common problems can be envisioned.

The most important founder of the Problem-solving approach was John Burton. He was a psychologist with postgraduate studies in economics and international relations. He founded the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at University college London during the 1960s. Much of his experience came from his work in the Australian Foreign Service, so when he finally dedicated himself entirely to academic endeavors, his perspectives were strongly influences by his pragmatic experience in the international realm. In close collaboration with other important authors like de Reuck, Doob and Kelman, he began a series of workshops to tend to historical, deep-rooted conflicts in many parts of the world (Fisher, 1997:29-35).

An important heir to Burton’s ideas is Leonard Doob, who organized a series of Problem-solving workshops, the most relevant being the Fermeda workshop relating to the Horn of Africa conflict and the Stirling workshop relating to the conflict in Northern

34

Ireland. The main contribution that Doob brought to the PS arena was the realization that any theory surrounding Problem-solving or interactive perspectives had to be a theory of practice.

This is, a theory built upon experience and with a transformative

agenda (Fisher, 1997:52-53).

The product of these workshops was a new understanding about CR, especially in relation to the role that workshops can play as a methodological tool. A new theoretical and philosophical perspective of CR was also adopted, one that “… addresses how human aspirations can be satisfied in the context of the social good, and as such provides an alternative or at least supplement to authority-based political systems” (Fisher, 1997:36).

Mitchell (1993:78) defines Problem-solving (PS) exercises as “processes through which informal, powerless, and – usually – academic third parties can affect the course of protracted and deep-rooted conflict, by providing parties to such conflicts with opportunities to interact in an analytical rather than coercive manner as well as giving scholarly insights into the parties’ mutual predicament”. The author notes that problemsolving exercises are externally oriented, triangular in structure and

small-group

phenomena.

By externally oriented, the author means to say that the exercises have the objective of transforming the conflict and the relationships surrounding it, instead of emphasizing the results of the exercise itself.

They are triangular because they involve the

participation of two (or more) parties in conflict, as well as a third party functioning as a facilitator. And PS exercises are clearly small-group phenomena because the idea is to

35

change the mentality of a few representatives, who will then function as multipliers of the experience when they return to their respective groups (Mitchell, 1993:79-80).

Foltz (1977:203-204) and Mitchell (1993:80) consider that a differentiation between Problem-solving and Process-promoting exercises must me made. The first type are intended to have a direct effect on the conflict, through a process very similar to a negotiation session, but within a more open environment and with more willingness to examine radical solutions to the conflict. The second type could be framed in the longer-term, and seek to promote indirect changes, through changes in the ideas and actions of the participants of the workshops11.

Another sub-category of a PS approach to CR is the interactive one. For Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR), Fisher understands a process “…involving small-group, problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third party of social scientist-practitioners. In a broader manner, ICR can be defined as facilitated face-to-face activities in communication, training, education, or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problem solving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner that addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice and equality” (1997:8).

Kelman (1990:200) considers three main differences between the interactive approach and the -dominant- realist framework. First, ICR considers a broad range of process, not only the negative (threat-based) aspects of conflict, but considering its 11

Although not a separate type of workshop, there is a very distinct use for PS as a phase of prenegotiation. A fuller discussion of this topic can be found in Kelman, (1990). 36

transformative potential. negotiation.

Second, this approach has a broad vision of goals for a

Emphasis is made on transformation processes, not only on results.

Finally, the ICR approach focuses on a multi-level analysis. Many different types of interactions are considered and then related among each other.

Fisher (1997:12) considers that ICR has a special position within the newer approaches to peace. Within the domain of a peace that is achieved through cooperation, (or alternate security) ICR can be conceived as an integral part of peace-building, a parallel effort to Track Two Diplomacy and Unofficial Diplomacy, a previous effort to Conflict Resolution and Transnationalism.

Independently of the various types and sub types that could be derived from the basic idea of PS, there is a basic goal that is aspired. “The aim must be therefore to help the parties to redefine their situation so that they both perceive it as a shared predicament to be solved jointly, and to equip them with a common language for communication: it is, in short, to enable the parties to create for themselves a common frame or universe of discourse in order to cooperate” (de Reuck, 1990:186).

B. Epistemology

Behind every methodology there is an epistemology. This is an often ignored aspect of science.

Simply defined, it is the study of the way in which we can approach

knowledge, and the definition and classification of “good” or “valid” knowledge. Epistemology is the lens through which the world is analyzed, and thus it is closely related to a political and cultural framework.

37

Until now, Western thought has been dominated by a scientific, positivistic epistemology.

This viewpoint is characterized by a rigid classification of valid

knowledge, closely related to statistical data, a hypothesis-testing model and a generally inflexible model of methods and techniques.

Some epistemologists,

proponents of a more open way of viewing science, believe that knowledge, and especially valid knowledge, can also come from other sources, like every-day life experiences and empowering processes (see for example Freire, 1997; and Maffesoli, 2005).

In a previous study about the uses of PS in relation to more conceptual and abstract frameworks and the way that trainers use theory, some authors have noted that: “Each individual training program thus offers a case study of how this trainer relates theory to practice in making pedagogic choices.

Essentially, each training program has an

internal epistemology or underlying theory of knowledge that supports it – what Donald Shön and Chris Argyris call a ‘theory of action’. A related concept is Michael Polanyi’s ‘tacit knowledge’, which often resides only in our unconscious; as Polanyi stated, ‘we can know more than we can tell’” (Macfarlane and Mayer, 2005:261).

This theory of action can be closely related to the more general philosophy behind SBP, which emphasizes the power of change.

When used within the private sector,

companies are able to envision their futures as if technological restraints didn’t exist. Governments are able to identify the main strengths that their countries and inhabitants have, as well as the potential threats that they may encounter in the future. Helping to

38

break the chains posed by current realities is the principal feature that SBP can provide to the CR field.

Another important epistemological aspect of both PS and SBP is the collapse of categories.

By transcending current situations, frames of analysis and dominant

paradigms, these future-centered approaches allow a creative and dialectical process of destroying old categories and creating new ones (de Reuck, 1990:193).

In this sense, Roubelat (2005:526) reminds us the general that within the SBP process, the general “To challenge strategic paradigms, scenario planning uses primarily trendbraking uncertainties which can be based on emerging ideologies, considered as sets of beliefs which could explain the action of a group of actors. The creation of these scenarios relies primarily on subjective data, generated when experts and decision makers are brought together to compare their visions and beliefs with the future, which can reveal emerging ideologies. In such a process, the most interesting issue is often to see how different actors accept a scenario and its possible impacts both on the business environment and on the company itself, e.g. in most cases how they can live with an emerging ideology which could become the framework for a new dominant paradigm”.

The main strength that SBP has in relation to CR is that it helps unleash the creative capacity of people in relation to the future. The Chilean philosopher Zemelmann (1996) considers that all human beings have the capacity and need for strategic thinking, and that it is through the imagining of better futures that humanity reaches its true potentials. But these better futures are not plausible unless humans have access to different choices. SBP is a process that naturally elicits choices (GBN, 1992:3).

In this sense, the

39

parallelisms with PS are evident: this particular framework of thought within CR emphasizes creativity, interaction and the construction of new, viable and positive solutions to current problems.

C. Theory

Mitchell’s analysis of the relationship between PS and theory, although mostly centered on the relationship between theory testing and problem-solving workshops, also considers the value of PS as a source of theoretical thought: “It is also the case that there exists a third way in which theory building might well be related to practical problem-solving exercises, apart from the use of theories in conducting such exercises and the testing of theories by using participant reaction and evaluation as a form of ‘crucial test’.

Many practitioners have remarked on how their own involvement in problem-solving exercises has, through the almost unique opportunity for direct involvement with and observation of participants interacting, generated new ideas and insights into (a) the psychology of ‘being in conflict’, (b) the dynamics of conflictual interaction, and (c) the opportunities for and obstacles to processes such as confidence building, entrapment, or de-commitment, to name only a few” (Mitchell, 1993:90).

Other authors try to prove the soundness of their theory-related suggestions with the success that a given PS exercise has, success that can be evaluated based on the impact that the exercise has on the participant, the output of the workshop (in the line of

40

proposals) and the outcome of the exercise, in the sense of a long-term change in the conflict, with a reduction in the level of conflict and coercion (Mitchell, 1993).

Mitchell (1993) also considers three forms of theorizing in relation to PS. At a Microlevel, some generalizations can be made about group dynamics, the nature of the participants, the procedure that should be followed throughout the workshop, the functions of the facilitators, and the sequence of events during the event. At a Mesolevel, there is also some sort of experimental work being done, mainly through the evaluation of the outcomes of the exercises as a whole, and not only the different components (as in the Micro-level). Finally, the Macro-level of theorizing consists of general hypothesis about the nature of conflict, its phases and the best ways to transform them. All three levels involve some sort of hypothesis testing, but until now, only the Micro-level has had concrete, validated results. In the words of Mitchell: “…it seems important to emphasize that problem-solving exercises do appear to provide a variety of levels, from micro-level hypotheses about ‘within exercise’ relationships to macro-level propositions about the effects of the exercise output on the subsequent course of the conflict” (Mitchell, 1993:89).

41

Figure 9: Theorizing and Problem-solving

Source: Mitchell, 1993:89

Another insight to the problem of theory in PS was proposed by Macfarlane and Mayer (2005:260), who studied the way in which trainers use theoretical frameworks: “Some training programs explicitly promote particular theoretical or philosophical models of practice (transformative mediation, stakeholder consensus building), while others reflect a more personal or ‘folksy’ orientation derived from the trainer’s own experience”.

The authors interviewed 25 trainers in the field of CR. Their study shows that there is a divorce between the theoretical elements that the trainers say they use and the actual contents of their courses. The main explanation given by the trainers as to the reason of that divorce has to do with the perception of theory as an “intimidating” aspect of academic life. Others also believe that their knowledge as CR practitioners comes more from their practical experience than from theoretical insights. This is why storytelling

42

was found to be the number one method used by trainers in order to introduce theoretical elements into their classes (2005:263-266).

In this sense, Macfarlane and Mayer recommend a general re-appropriation of theory by practitioners and trainers through paying attention to three key issues. First, they must find a way to translate the complex language present in CR theoretical writing and translate and communicate it to the trainees. carefully selected.

Second, reading material should be

Finally, trainers should consider that material does not readily

“translate” into training exercises. In this sense, trainers should take responsibility in bridging the gap between theory and training, especially in relation to the teaching of PS (Macfarlane and Mayer, 2005:271-272).

D. Methodology

There are many variations within the PS framework, especially relating to methodology. Some approaches have rigid structures, others use relaxed and semi-improvised techniques. But above all: “The essence of the problem-solving procedure is this: that representatives of the parties in a dispute should meet in the presence of a small panel of disinterested consultants, professionally qualifies in the social sciences, in order to analyze and possible also to resolve their conflict, in conditions of total confidentiality. The parties should be enabled by the panel to negotiate not by bargaining in the conventional manner, but by collaborating in the solution of their joint predicament through the discovery of accommodations affording net advantages to all concerned. Their joint predicament is the problem to be solved” (de Reuck, 1990:183). Specifically relating to ICR, Kelman (1990:201) proposes that even though the general workshop

43

method emphasizes changes in the individual, the final objective is the influence on the larger conflict.

Thus, the most important building block of PS methodology is the workshop. “Such exercises invariably involve informal, week-long meetings of conflict in an informal, often academic, setting that permits the re-analysis of their conflict as a shared problem and the generation of some alternative courses of action to continued coercion, together with new options for a generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution, involving agreement and a new relationship between erstwhile adversaries” (Mitchell,1993:79). Workshops provide not only a methodological function, but also elements for social and psychological analysis (de Reuck, 1990:187).

One of the main advantages of the workshops in comparison with negotiation sessions, for example, is their apparently chaotic nature. PS workshops are very ambiguous in the sense that the actors are constantly switching from an open analysis of the problem to a more negotiation-centered style of discussion. Facilitators can use this to switch from one role to an other whenever tempers flare or when the process seems to stall (de Reuck, 1990:187)

A disclaimer should be stated at this point. Workshops have been used in many different contexts, and are not exclusive to the CR discipline: “There are many applied variations on this theme, too numerous to catalogue. In the managerial setting they are often referred to as management development workshops, or labs; in the educational setting, educational development labs; in a more general cross-discipline setting, human relations labs. The structured content of these workshops is, of course, designed to be

44

relevant to the background and work of the participants at that particular workshop” (Wickes, 1970:27).

Kelman (1990:204-205) describes workshop participants as corresponding to three basic types. The first category is of the pre-influentials, political influentials and political actors.

The first type of participants don’t have the ability to influence political

processes directly. However, they are in a position of continuous professional growth; they are students or low-level government officials, people how will eventually achieve a real position of political influence. The second category is that of the political influentials; i.e. academics and officials with a real level of influence in the political processes. Finally, the political actors are the people of the utmost influence in political systems; party leaders, senators, etc.

Malhotra and Liyanage (2005) have written about the long-term effect of peace workshops in protracted conflicts. They consider that empathy is a basic element for effective conflict resolution. Peace workshops (much in the manner of PS exercises) can have the long term effect of producing higher levels of empathy from one group towards another. The authors describe peace workshops as events in which participants, usually from different sides of a deep-rooted protracted conflict, share a common space during several days. They engage in discussions, role-playing activities, group projects, etc.

The authors indicate that most previous research around peace workshops has explored the causal relationship between inter-group contact and attitude change.

This

hypothesis is too simplistic, and has been contested by several studies where mere

45

contact has not resulted in attitude changes. Furthermore, most of the research has been made in relatively peaceful environments (Malhotra and Liyanage, 2005:909).

In their critical assessment of previous studies of the contact hypothesis, Malhotra and Liyanage (2005:911) state two important points. First, they believe that an excessive emphasis has been given to outcomes, distracting the attention from the processes behind peace workshops. Second, most success evaluations have been centered in the short term, ignoring the long-term effects of such workshops.

Despite these facts, Malhotra and Liyanage (2005:910) admit that, even in situations where all four of the “ideal” characteristics (as defined by Allport) of a positive contact between conflicting groups are not present12, usually interaction produces a reduction in the levels of prejudice between the groups.

The authors consider that follow-up

interventions should be implemented after the original workshop. They also believe that future research should consider a wide range of conflicts, different stages of conflict, and the influence of contact on other attitudes besides empathy (Malhotra and Livanage, 2005:920). Thus, the basic contact between conflicting parties is paramount to the methodology of the PS framework.

At the time of publishing his seminal article (199?:13), Mitchell identified no more than 100 properly documented cases of PS exercises. In this dissertation, two paradigmatic cases in very different parts of the world will be analyzed; the Belfast workshop (tending to the conflict in Northern Ireland) and the Fermeda workshop (relating to

12

Allport (1954) defined four requisites for a positive inter-group contact that can help reduce prejudice: an equal status among the participants, a common goal, the need to cooperate to achieve this goal, and the sanction of authority figures. 46

Ethiopia / Kenya / Somalia). This analysis will help to deepen the knowledge about the methodological similarities between PS and SBP.

E. Case Study: The Fermeda Workshop

In early August, 1969, Doob and a team of CR specialists began a workshop that took years of preparation which involved participants from Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia13. The objective was to apply a new technique, called Sensitivity Training, in protracted conflict: “The objective of the workshop that was to last almost two weeks was to known to all the participants: to determine whether in idyllic surroundings it might be possible for men of good will to evolve a solution for unresolved border disputes that have produced the misery associated with war and the preparation for war” (Doob, 1970:1).

Doob (1970:X) stated that (referring to sensitivity training techniques): “through them it is hoped that the participants will gain a greater self-knowledge and will learn to communicate their views more effectively than is the case in most formal meetings”. The idea was to bring together people from three different countries and cultures in the pursuit of a common goal: a better understanding of each other and of the conflict that was destroying their region: “The basic feature of this approach is that participants

13

A good summary of the conflict is presented by Fisher (1997:38): “In 1960, the colonies of British and Italian Somaliland gained independence as the Republic of Somalia, which continued the historical claim to incorporate areas of Ethiopia and Kenya populated by ethnic Somali majorities. In the early sixties, guerilla attacks by Somalis in the disputed areas were paralleled by an escalating diplomatic offensive on all sides and eventually armed conflict between regular forces. The conflict continued through the mid-to late sixties, with alternating periods of confrontations and accommodation, but without any resolution of the underlying problems”.

47

learn through analysis of, and generalizations from, their own experience and that of others with whom they interact” (Wickes, 1970:26).

As with many workshops, the final results were controversial. In the words of one of the participants: “What did we learn from the experience at Fermeda? I learned that we – the African participants- had imbibed uncritically so much of white man’s concepts of social and political organizations that we spend all our time parroting outdated and mischievous, nineteenth-century European fictions like sovereignty, without being original or even intelligent about them” (Ali Duhul, 1970:54). Considering the general objectives of all problem-solving endeavors, at least the testimony of Ali Duhul tells a story of paradigmatic change: after many years of an uncritical approach to the idea of sovereignty, the African participants were finally in a position to challenge certain dominant ideas and categories.

Doob (1970:163-164) adds to this that: “From our standpoint, the first stumbling block to a solution of the disputes is the emotional commitment to the abstract concepts of self-determination and national sovereignty.

If ever one regrets the influence of

European history and practice on African thought, it is indeed in connection with the reification of these doctrines, product themselves of European nineteenth-century politics and exported to the Horn of East Africa as part of Europe’s futile attempt to resolve its contradictions at the expense of others”

In the end, there was an attempt of creating a joint proposal for the resolution of the Horn of Africa’s conflict. The idea of a Joint Administration Area (JAA) managed to

48

transcend old paradigms and provided a new framework for the analysis of the problem. Besides the controversial aspects of the workshops, Doob considers that it was a worthwhile experience: “Perhaps, I sometimes tell myself late at night when I try to comfort myself for going on this wild trip which I am not enjoying, perhaps we might suggest to everybody that here is a tool – the workshop – that could be used to help resolve other international conflicts, much bigger ones” (Doob, 1970:18).

F. Case Study: The Belfast or Sterling Workshop

Doob and Foltz (1973) participated in the design, execution and later analysis of a workshop that involved 56 Catholic and Protestant citizens of Belfast during August 1972.

The main idea behind the workshop was to provide the participants with tools

for intercommunal cooperation that could eventually be socialized within their own communities.

The Northern Ireland conflict has been vastly analyzed in other works within the Conflict Resolution Field. It could be simply described as a destructive and longranging conflict that involves social, cultural, religious and political aspects. At the time of the publication of the article, the conflict seemed mostly intractable, although developments in recent years have shed some light to the general problem.

The workshop was based on two premises. First, the existence of decision makers within both communities, i.e., the communities had a clear social and political structure which could be influenced through reaching decision makers. Second, the decision makers should have at least a minimum interest in avoiding or reducing conflict. Any

49

intervention in a conflict that does not comply with both these premises, is not viable (Doob and Foltz, 1973:491).

The process began with the selection of candidates, trying to cover all the spectrum of political and religious opinions. The goals of the workshop was to bring together persons of influence to create mutual trust, avoiding central leaderships; to provide a space in which these persons could learn from each others experience; to promote a realistic understanding of the points of view of the other side; to provide opportunities of common interest,; to promote the exploration of cooperative strategies; and to promote a wider change in the conflict through the transfer of the lessons learned in the workshop towards the wider communities (Doob and Foltz, 1973:492-493).

The workshop used primarily Tavistock and National Training Laboratory (NTL) methodologies.

The first method consists in the promotion of a teaching-learning

process about the ways in which people function in organized groups. The idea is to force the participants “to confront directly the ways in which they respond to authority and the challenges of cooperative and competitive work” (Doob and Foltz, 1973:496497).

People are organized into different groups, and forced to share a series of

experiences within different types of groups (age, sex, nationality, task oriented groups, etc.). The second method, the NTL or Bethel approach, guides participants into the design of back-home activities, both to foster certain planning capabilities and to aid in the actual realization of the plans.

The main results of the workshops can be organized in three different categories: learning about process, learning about others, and project development. Within the first

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category, the workshop promoters conclude that the participants learned amply about authority, power and leadership. They were stimulated to think critically about the way their communities are organized around power.

They also learned to question

established leaderships and authority structures. Specifically, the participants learned to identify the irrational elements of their ideas and reactions to power and authority structures. Above all, they learned about their multiple identities, which in turn helped them view the conflict through a different lens. The participants also learned about others. After the workshop, they were able to identify the divisions within the “other side”, as well as to engage in empathetic attitudes. Finally, the workshop resulted in a couple of projects that could be jointly implemented by both sides (Doob and Foltz, 1973:500-505).

Fisher (1997:46-48), although expressing a general approval and admiration of the Stirling workshop, does note a couple of criticisms towards the general process. First, the participants were not adequately informed about the goals and overall nature of the process. Second, the methods used were considered too harsh, especially the Tavistock model, which calls for a pain-staking learning process, which might be considered too extreme for citizens coming from a war-torn society. It must be said though, that follow-up workshops had much more positive reactions by the participants.

G. SBP and PS: a complimentary relationship

Based on the previous discussion, many similarities between the PS method and the uses of SBP can be drawn. First, relating to methodology, SBP is a way of re-framing conflict. This procedure is common in many theoretical postures of the CR field. By

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emphasizing the future, actors in conflict can concentrate on strategic, long-term issues and forget the immediate (and sometimes petty) disagreements regarding positions. The creation of future scenarios allows the participants to think more in terms of needs and interests.

The scenario process is based on facts and logic, leaving little or no space

for positions or values (GBN, 1992:3).

SBP also promotes empathy through contact.

Participants of SBP workshops go

through similar processes than those in PS exercises.

Although the proximity

hypothesis has been recently criticized in CR, something should also be said about the way the workshops (both in SBP and in PS) bring ex-enemies together, helping to bridge certain differences that used to divide them. The participants not only learn a new way of thinking about the future, through collective thought and collaborative thinking, they also multiply the effects of the workshops by taking the experience to with them to different social and political venues.

Second, relating to theory and epistemology, SBP and PS share many ideas about the transformative nature of human creativity. Current realities are not unchangeable, and collective processes can bring about positive change.

Above all, both types of

workshops give participants a hope for the future.

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VI. Critical Issues

SBP, by definition, needs the participation of the people who have a certain decisionmaking capacity. This contradicts the most modern perspectives of CR which consider the necessity of a bottom-up approach, where the most significant transformation of a conflict will occur at a grass roots level. Both in Mont Fleur and in Guatemala, the participants of the SBP workshop were known political figures. Although some efforts have been made in the use of SBP at a local level, the actual applications are very diverse and there is currently no consensus about the different uses that the method could have in this milieu.

Even if the experience could be repeated at several different levels (national, regional, local) there would still be the issue of representation. In order for SBP to be effective in transforming conflicts, the actors involved should be legitimate and representative of their constituencies. They must then repeat the experience at a more local level, and this process could be very expensive and time consuming.

Another important issue has to do with the sustainability of the results of the SBP workshops. Both in Guatemala and South Africa, the final documents showed a real consensus about what all the actors wanted for the future of both countries. But the processes have been criticized because there wasn’t a plan to assure that the document actually became a part of public policy.

The results of the workshops weren’t

publicized enough in order to assure sustainability.

No further workshops were

organized, and at the time of writing this essay, there was no independent perspective that aspired to evaluate the experiences.

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The main critics of PS attack the method because of its applicability. They believe that the technique can be used in a very restricted range of conflicts. This is actually a false problem, because most critics have equivocally considered these methods as allencompassing substitutes for other measures, like negotiation. PS and SBP cannot be considered substitutes for other tools in CR, but should be viewed as useful tools (Fisher, 1997:197-204).

Another issue that could be raised has to do with the lack of a concrete theory relating both to PS and SBP. Even though they both share an “action based” epistemology, they still lack in a construction of a solid theory that relates not only to a wider CR referent, but also to more general sociological, political and anthropological framework. In the words of Fisher: “Furthermore, there is not much specification about the relationships among variables within the models, for example, between the attributes of the third party and the qualities of interaction between the delegates. Nor is there a detailed elucidation of how the outputs from a workshop are expected to flow from the participants into the policymaking process. What exists is a theory of practice that lacks an adequate theory of understanding, both about its internal functioning and its relationship to the phenomena it addresses” (Fisher, 1997:210).

An especially problematic issue relating to SBP has to do with the phenomenon called “groupthink”. This is, that an excessive emphasis on creating consensus might bring about self-censorship and eventually, cripple the capacity of the the participants of SBP workshops of viewing all the possible outcomes: “In such cases, futures thinking falters as the perspective shrinks to the consensual hypothesis only, e.g. often the core of the

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old paradigm, and reject all anomalies that would change the face of the company” (Roubelat, 2005:525).

Groupthink could eventually hinder the process of transforming a conflict, because the final outcomes of the workshops could be viewed by the participants and their constituencies as “wishful thinking” or “utopian thought” after the process is over. A tendency to disqualify the results achieved in PS workshops by some of the participants could be seen in the case studies of Fermeda and Sterling. The same could be said about SBP experiences in Guatemala and South Africa. The arguments exposed by the critics imply that groupthink happened at least in certain cases, where some individuals were forced into a certain mental framework by the group dynamic.

Cultural sensitivity and cultural appropriateness is a very delicate one in CR in general and in PS in particular. Fisher (1997:264) considers that the cultural issue should be taken much more seriously by PS practitioners and theorists alike. In this sense, an application of the knowledge exposed by Avruch (2003) about Type I and Type II errors in approaching culture and conflict could be useful, although the discussion is by no means closed14.

14

The Type I Error identified by Avruch is basically an underestimation of culture. Practitioners (and taking the concept further, maybe even the participants) consider that universal models can be applied to their specific case, and that local knowledge cannot provide insights into the CR process. The Type II Error is an overestimation of culture, or a process of “hearing voices that aren’t there” (Avruch, 2003:363). The author warns against the practitioner’s common sense, which might lead to believing that committing a Type II Error is not as grave as incurring in a Type I. This is a misleading chain of thought: “This is so because overvaluing cultural impacts can be deleterious for the weaker, disempowered, or subordinate parties in the conflict or dispute. It can affect the equity of the intervention’s outcome, its justice” (Avruch, 2003:366)”. The main danger, Avruch says, is that overvaluing culture, especially from an e/n perspective, can lead to the masking of underlying issued like class, racism and gender. It can also reify culture, turn it into a “thing” that is capable of actions in its own terms. Another important point is that Type II Error can lead to a false homogenization of group members, framing them into a closed behavioral stereotype. Last, there is a grave risk of replacing race and racial conceptions of the social world with culture. This is, thinking of the world in racial terms but with the “mask” of cultural terminology (Avruch, 2003:367). 55

Culture can be falsely labeled as the cause of conflicts, or where it can be used as the one and only factor to be considered in any type of conflictive situation. Culture can also be underestimated (as was the case for many years), and universal -mostly white, male-centered, upper middle class,

English-speaking-

models are applied

indiscriminately and with no consideration for local cultures or subcultures. Lederach (1995:5-6) identifies three common (and usually false) assumptions about culture. First, that culture is an aspect of CR that can be reduced to a technique, any cultural problems encountered during the process of CR can be fixed just by raising the level of cultural sensitivity of those involved. Second, that the general model of CR is transferable from one culture to another. Last, that most of the cultural issues should be aimed at the training of people who are already professionals in CR.

Finally, the re-entry problem should be addressed. Macauley (2002) has warned about the dangers of reintroduction. The author considers that long-term effects of the contact hypothesis might be overshadowed by the social stress that the participants are exposed to when they return to their respective communities after the workshops.

Their

constituencies might force theme to assume hard line ideas that were already overcome during the workshops.

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VII. Conclusions . There are several critical issues that should be addressed before SBP is completely adopted by the CR field, especially those that have to do with applicability, sustainability, representation, lack of theory, groupthink, cultural appropriateness and re-entry:



Relating to representation, both PS and SBP approaches still rely on political and social elites. Even if the workshops could be replicated at other levels of society, the problems of representation would still be present.



Lessons learned from the case studies show that both SBP and PS workshops share the common problem of a lack of sustainability. Products coming from SBP and PS techniques should be followed up in the medium and long term through more workshops, political incidence strategies and in general, a concerted effort for the diffusion of the main results and obstacles to a wider audience.



Applicability has been noted by some critics as a main flaw of PS (and by extension, of SBP).



A lack of concrete theory is also a common critique.



Groupthink is a very peculiar psychological phenomenon that could translate into a weakness of PS and especially SBP models.

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Cultural generalization of PS and SBP techniques is also a serious problem.



The re-entry problem should also be considered. ¿How will the results of the workshops be accepted by the participants and their constituencies once they return to their communities?

Some answers to these critiques are already available. The representation problem could be solved by replicating the experience in several other levels of society. The sustainability issue could be easily solved with a public relations strategy and a concerted effort by governments and NGOs to promote these techniques. Applicability is actually a false problem, because PS and eventually SBP are not substitutes to other CR perspectives, they are only complimentary options. The lack of theory is only relative, because of the different epistemological content action-based approaches. Group-think, cultural appropriateness, and re-entry are very serious problems that need more attention.

There are also many theoretical and practical aspects of the method, and especially the lessons learned from its application in specific post-conflict societies, that evidence the great potential that it has for CR.



The case studies show that SBP has great potential for the advancement in the resolution of large-scale conflicts, mainly because it helps to reframe the conflict in terms of the future.

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It also provides an infinite array of choices for the participants, which has a multiplying effect on their creativity and the possibility of reaching new potentials.



Finally, it provides an initial force for individual and societal change, through the construction of empathy, and eventually, of trust among conflicting parties.

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005:330), authors of a very important text relating to the current affairs of CR, through their own exercise of future visioning, believe that there are three possible outcomes for humanity in relation to the construction of Peace:

the revival of Hobbesian anarchy, “a new quasi-realist

dispensation” or the existence of a neo-Marxist world where everything is co-opted by the interests of global capital. A counter proposal from CR theorists and practitioners should be, the construction of a cosmopolitan future, based on the transformation of the deep-rooted and structural causes of conflict and violence (social injustice, environmental degradation, failing democracies, etc.). SBP, if considered within the framework of PS theory and epistemology, allows Conflict Transformation theorists, trainers, facilitators and enthusiasts in general to concentrate their efforts in a creative imagination of the cosmopolitan future, potentially unleashing a great force of social and individual change.

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