Scandal.docx

MIRANDA VS. AGUIRRE [G.R. NO. 133604. SEPTEMBER 16, 1999] TOPIC: GENERAL PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS, STATE POLICIES ON LGU’S, DELEGATION OF POWERS TO LGU’S FACTS: On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.2 They alleged as ground the lack ofprovision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. The Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite is required in reclassifying the City of Santiago from an independent city to a component city. HELD: We agree with the petitioners.In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected.

It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units.

CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLINE CO., INC. vs. BERCILLES [GR. NO. L40474, August 29, 1975] TOPIC: THE LOCAL GOVERNENT CODE (RA 7160); GENERAL ATTRIBUTES AND POWERS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS; POLICE POWER Facts: On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. The lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00. By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered. On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Hence, cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. After hearing the parties, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner’s application for registration of title. Hence this instant petition for review.

Issue: WON the sale to the petitioner is valid and be allowed to have its title to the land registered?

Held: The withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC [248 SCRA 569, September 18, 1995] TOPIC: Qualifications and terms of office of local elective officials

FACTS: On March 8, 1995, petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the said district and a candidate of the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner lacked the one year constitutional residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry “seven months” to “since childhood” but it was not accepted by the Provincial election Supervisor on the ground that iit was filed out of time. The COMELEC found merit on the disqualification of petitioner’s candidacy. Likewise, it denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. After the Election, on May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation if she should obtain the highest number of votes. On the same day, the COMELEC issued a second Resolution directing the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation if she obtains the highest number of votes. ISSUE: W/N Imelda Romualdez-Marcos satisfies the one year constitutional residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. HELD: Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of the petitioner for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte because of: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought back their family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he/she has lived and maintained residences in different places. The court directed respondent COMELEC to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative if the First District of Leyte.

BUNYE vs. ESCAREAL [G.R. No. 110216 September 10, 1993] TOPIC: THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (R.A. 7160); GENERAL ATTRIBUTES AND POWERS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS; POWERS OF LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODIES; QUORUM FACTS: Public officers of municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro manila, Philippines enact Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 on August 1, 1988, and on the basis thereof, forcibly took possession of the new Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter took over the operation and management of the aforesaid public market starting August 19, 1988, despite the fact that, there was a valid and subsisting lease contract executed on September 2, 1985 for a term of 25 years, between the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, represented by the former Municipal Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr. and the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod and mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (Kilusang Magtitinda for brevity) had caused undue injury to the aforesaid Cooperative members, and gave the Municipal Government unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official functions considering that, the Cooperative members had introduced improvements, including the construction of the "KBS" building, RR Section-Phases I and II, asphalting of the roads surrounding the market place, and for the purpose, the cooperative had invested Thirteen Million Four Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P13,479,900.00). On the motion of Public Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan issued on May 11, 1993 a resolution suspending them pendente lite from public office pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. According to petitioners, the sole objective of an administrative suspension is "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other evidence" and "to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official," the petitioners insists that as no such reason for their suspension exists, then the order suspending them should be set aside as a grave abuse of the court's discretion. ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners. HELD: The Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the petitioners. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. In Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, this Court ruled that such preventive suspension is mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it. Petitioner at the outset contends that Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, as amended, is unconstitutional as the suspension provided thereunder partake of a penalty even before a judgement of conviction is reached, and is thus violative of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent. We do not accept the contention because: firstly, under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory (People vs. Albano, G.R. Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511). . . xxx xxx xxx All told, preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty. In fact, suspension particularly under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019

is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined (People vs. CA, 135 SCRA 372). The fear of the petitioners that the municipal government of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for ninety (90) days when they (petitioners) are preventively suspended, is remote. There will still remain eight (8) councilors who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, will surely know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions of mayor, vice-mayor and six councilors in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code, R.A. No. 7160 (Samad vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 107854 and Samad vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 108642, July 16, 1993; Sanchez vs. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454).