Saddam

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Bennett McCutcheon HIS277 – 4 December 2008 Research Paper Saddam Hussein’s Path to Power History’s record of civilization often seems to be simply a listof one ruler after the next. Indeed, the vast majority of names known from ancient times are the ones who ruled their people. However, what is often omitted is the story of how those rulers came into power, and the actions they took to stay there. In The Prince, Machiavelli states that “the innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order,and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new” (24). One innovator who rose to power quite effectively in the Middle East, and stayed there for a long time, was Saddam Hussein in Iraq; therefore, the actions he took to achieve this deserve a closer look. Saddam rose to power in Iraq by effectively building a large power base within the country, limiting the power of opponents both internal and external to Iraq, and ultimately outmaneuvering President Al-Bakr to force a resignation. Once in power he demanded ultimate loyalty from his subjects, and ruled effectively for almost 25 years. One of the most important factors ofSaddam Hussein’s rise to power was his strong power base within the country’s leadership. Throughout the 1970’s, Saddam had placed members of his family and close friends into positions of power. These positions reported directly to Saddam. Most importantly, the control of Iraq’s fully mechanized, powerful army rested with Adrian Khairallah. It is no coincidence that Khairallah was a cousin, brother-in-law, and long-time friend of Saddam Hussein since childhood, and was unwaveringly loyal to Saddam despite being married to President Al-Bakr’s

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daughter. In control of a major department of internal security, the mukhabarat, was Saddam’s half-brother Barazan. Additionally, Saddam’s cousin Sa’adoun Shaker was head of the National Security Office, his half-brother Watban was head of the Tikrit province, and yet another half-brother, Sabawi, was deputy chief of police. The popular army, which was separate from the national army, was under the control of Izzat Douri, who was also very loyal to Saddam. Furthermore, Saddam also had the heads of the military office, propaganda office, labor office, peasant office, student office, office of professional organizations and office for relations with the party reporting officially to the Ba’ath party and unofficially to him and his family directly It was with this very tight-knit power base that Saddam controlled the Ba’ath party, and with the Ba’ath party controlled Iraq itself. It was well known by most that although Al-Bakr served as official President, he was little more than a figurehead. Said K. Aburish described the system well, saying “it was a merger between the family and the party, with the former using the latter as a vehicle to control the country” (Saddam Hussein Reader, 43). Saddam’s solid foundation within the party, which also included the founder of the Ba’ath party, Aflaq, would prove instrumental in cementing Saddam’s power in the country, and served as a tool for him to depose Bakr. His channels of communication were powerful, and his reach within Iraq was all-encompassing. It became clear that in order to rise to a position of power in Iraq one needed to demonstrate loyalty to Saddam. However, Saddam was not without opposition, and would not be able to secure total leadership in Iraq with his strong support base alone. Through many factors, some a direct result of his policies and some a result of world events, the power of Saddam’s

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opposition was crippled in the late seventies and provided a window for him to seize control. Saddam had opponents within Iraq itself, namely the religious Shi’as, the Kurds, the Communist Party within Iraq, and Ba’ath party members loyal to Bakr. In the late seventies, the Shi’a religious community was under the charismatic leadership of Khomeini. Although this did unify the Shi’as and strengthen them somewhat, in the end Khomeini would limit their power within Iraq rather than bolster it. Traditionally Iran had been very sympathetic to the Shi’a community within Iraq, and provided support to radical Shi’a groups and political support to the community as a whole; however, Khomeini was fiercely opposed to the Shah of Iran, which meant that no support for the Shi’a would come from the Shah and his country. In addition to this, Saddam maintained close ties with the Shah, and at one point the Shah’s wife, Empress Farah, toured Shi’a holy sites within Iraq. This resulted in amplified dissolution of the Shi’a opposition to Saddam. The Kurds were not necessarily opposed to Saddam specifically, but hungered for their own autonomous state of Kurdistan. They had been fightingto achieve this for decades, and were opposed to all rulers of Iraq and the other countries they were distributed in, such as Turkey and Syria. In the past, there had been some strong Western support for the Kurds, but with a lack of any cohesive leader and the loss of the unifying presence of Mulla Mustapha Al Barzani in 1975 the West was much less enthusiastic about the dream of Kurdistan than before. Thus, the Kurds had limited power within Iraq in the late 1970’s. The communist presence in Iraq was also waning in this time period. As the Cold War began to draw to a close, the Soviet Union began to provide increasingly less

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support for the Communist Parties within the Middle East. The USSR was more focused on maintaining control in the important regions of the Middle East, such as Afghanistan, thanto focus efforts on countries unlikely to turn communist. This fact, coupled with Iraq’s official position blatantly opposing the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, meant that the Communist Party within Iraq was severely limited in power. In 1977 Saddam expelled many Communist leaders without repercussion, a move that not only decreased the power of the Party significantly but also earned him respect from the West. Within Saddam’s own party, there were many members who opposed his leadership. However, with Saddam so firmly entrenched within the party’s inner circle and important decisions, it was difficult for those party members to assert themselves. In 1978 Iraq, it was decidedly unpopular to openly denounce Saddam. In fact, many of them were very secretive in their opposition, and opted instead to attempt coaching AlBakr to limit Saddam’s power rather than openly attempting it themselves. In addition to their own individual troubles, all of the major opposition groups within Iraq were hindered by a crucial fact: Iraq was more successful in 1978 than it had ever been, both economically and militarily, and was emerging as a dominant force within the Middle East. The economy was booming, and many Kurds and Shi’as owed their success to the state and to policies put in place by Saddam. This made even the poorer populations difficult to recruit support in. The middle class had also grown several times the size that it was in the 1960’s, and was very supportive of Saddam and the Ba’ath party for their widespread land reforms, modern educational system, and universal healthcare system.

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However, even though the Ba’ath party had a firm grip on Iraq internally, there still lurked outside forces that threatened to interfere with its affairs, especially those concerning Saddam. Traditionally, outside influences had been major players in Middle Eastern affairs, and Saddam was well aware of this. He sought to limit the power of those that opposed him, and gain as much support from outside entities as he could. There were several nationsthat served as possible threats to Saddam taking power, and many of them were reduced in strength or influence in the late seventies. Egypt had traditionally been unfriendly towards the Ba’ath and Saddam; however, the Camp David treaties during Jimmy Carter’s administrationmeant that Egypt was not going to meddle in foreign affairs. Arafat and the PLO were also not opposed to the Ba’ath, and in many cases supported them fairly openly. Furthermore, many smaller countries that would have liked to assert themselves in changing Iraq’s course were embroiled in revolutions or upheavals of their own, and as a result would be unorganized or slow in any response to Saddam’s actions. Saddam also tried hard to keep good relations with most neighboring countries. As stated before, Saddam had a close relationship with the Shah and therefore prerevolution Iran acted very favorably towards him. In addition, Saddam kept good relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In the early 1970’s there was a small border conflict with Kuwait, and Saddam resolved it in one day, greatly pleasing the Kuwaiti government. Also, with Iraq’s economy booming Saddam gave financial aid to poor countries in the Middle East and Africa, namely Somalia and Sudan. These countries would then have a vested interest in keeping Saddam in power, as Iraq was providing them much-needed aid when other countries were not.

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The last and most important external source of power that Saddam intended to satiate was the Western Powers, especially the United States. In the seventies, the United States under Jimmy Carter had adopted what was called the Two-Pillar Strategy in the Middle East, and had chosen Saudi Arabia and Iran as those “pillars.” The United States would put forth great effort in maintaining solid alliances with these countries, and in return the countries could be counted on when the United States needed to get things done in the Middle East. As mentioned previously, Saddam was very friendly and supportive of Saudi Arabia – this gave the United States good reason to support him. Also, Saddam was strongly opposed to Khomeini, eventually expelling him. Since Khomeini was openly opposed to Iran’s Shah, a key United States ally in the region, Saddam’s opposition to Khomeini was viewed favorably by the West. This opposition was also a key factor in separating Saddam from Al-Bakr, as Al-Bakr attempted to congratulate and make an ally out of Khomeini, an ill-fated affair. In addition to his support of the United States’ allies in the region, Saddam had other policies that elicited support from the West. Saddam was in favor of a market economy, something that separated him from other leaders in the Middle East and bolstered support from the West. Also, his openly anti-Communist stance was popular in the Cold War era, and his actions against them were viewed favorably as well. IsraelArab opposition, another source of conflict in the Middle East during the seventies, was also kept to a minimum by Saddam. Even though he personally despised Israel and the Zionists, Saddam made sure to keep his actions in check in order to maintain his positive relations with the United States and other Western Powers. It seemed that all was going well in Saddam’s quest to rule Iraq, but there remained one obstacle: Al-Bakr. It eventually dawned on the current President Al-Bakr

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that his position of power within the country wassoon to be swept away. He made one last attempt at consolidating his own power within the country, and this came in the form of a proposed unification with Syria. Many countries within the Middle East were favorable to this merger, as it would provide a strong ally to combat Israel’s growing power. Al-Bakr knew that if this merger were to succeed, Saddam’s power base within Iraq would be largely dissolved as the entire internal structure of the country would have to be reorganized. He proposed to have a joint ruling party set up, with him as President and Syria’s leader Assad as his deputy andsuccessor. However, while AlBakr wanted the merger to go through right away, Assad, who was a very intelligent and thoughtful leader, wanted to go about the process slowly over a few years. Assad was also wary of being deputy and wanted to be the head of the unified country himself. Although this proposed merger didnot seem on the surface to have much to do with Saddam, it was indeed a great threat to his power, and he would need to act decisively to stop it. In the unified country’s governmental structure, there would beno concrete place for Saddam, and many of the Iraqi departments that he had so firmly under his control at the time would be merged with their Syrian counterparts, dissolving his control over them. In addition, Saddam was opposed to the merger because it would mean a dramatic change in military policy and leadership, a change that once again threatened to shake loose Iraq from his steadfast grip. The merger would be difficult to openly oppose, however, as it was extremely popular within Iraq and Syria’s civilian population. Saddam would have to go about thingsa different way, and he did so methodically. The fact that Assad wanted to slow the process was a major help to Saddam as it gave him precious time to formulate a plan and counter Al-Bakr’s power play.

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The plan began with a cleansing action within the Ba’ath party initiated by Saddam. Although the party was overall very loyal to Saddam as a whole, he had the Security Department depose or imprison many members of the party whose loyalty was questionable, and even government workers. The cleansing action went so far as to fire several teachers who were decidedly anti-Saddam. This purge helped ensure that Saddam’s power within the party itself would be strong, although there were still several high-ranking members that were keen to Saddam’s goals and attempted, through counseling Al-Bakr, to stall him. When Khomeini started rebellions in Iran, Saddam and the majority of the Ba’ath party had a different viewpoint than Syria and Al-Bakr. While Syria was mostly secular, they still openly praised Khomeini and the Shi’a revolution for wresting control of Iran from the Shah. Al-Bakr at one point sent a congratulatory message to Khomeini as well. Meanwhile, Saddam and the Ba’ath party were overwhelmingly against Khomeini and had a long history of good relations with the deposed Shah. This seemingly unrelated incident provided Saddam a stance he could take to stop the unification without losing the support of the populace. Saddam presented Assad an ultimatum on behalf of the Ba’ath party: either Syria goes through with the unification immediately, or Iraq will stop negotiations immediately. While this seemed to be in concordance with Al-Bakr’s interests, a fact that must have helped get official support for the ultimatum, Assad was a wise ruler and saw through it as Saddam knew he would. Assad knew that Saddam would not let such an ultimatum be presented unless he was sure that he could depose Al-Bakr, and subsequently Assad, and achieve control of the Syrian-Iraqi nation himself. Therefore, Assad did not reply to the ultimatum and Saddam and the Ba’ath party ended negotiations regarding

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the merger. Thus, Al-Bakr’s last attempt at consolidating his own power had been thwarted. But before Saddam could ensure success in his coup of Al-Bakr, he went to a few neighbors and allies to further limit possible interference. He visited King Hussein of Jordan, and made sure that the King approved of his coup. The King and Saddam then talked to the leader of Saudi Arabia and it was agreed upon there as well. Also, there are several sources that claim Saddam had meetings with CIA agents at this time, and although they cannot be proven, it is very likely given Saddam’s support from the United States and prior involvement with the CIA (he worked with the CIA in an attempted overthrow of the Iraqi government in 1959). Now, with the last of the roadblocks out of the way, Saddam had Al-Bakr’s house surrounded by loyal troops. On July 16th, 1979, Al-Bakr announced to the Iraqi public that he was stepping down from power, claimed that it was for personal reasons, and officially appointed Saddam Hussein to be President in his place. Once he was President, Saddam wasted no time in cementing his position, systematically eliminating all remaining members of the Ba’ath party who were a threat to him. In a meeting on July 18th, just two days after Al-Bakr’s resignation, Saddam called over 400 members of the party to a conference hall in Iraq. In a meeting he ordered videotaped, Saddam smoked a cigar and described a vast traitorous plot against the party, and began naming people involved. Those who were called were taken by armed guards, never to be heard from again. In a move reminiscent of Hitler’s “Night of the Long Knives,” Saddam quickly and effectively consolidated his control of the party. Machiavelli said that “a prince must not worry if he incurs reproach for his cruelty, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal” (The Prince, 70);he also says

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that “it is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both” (The Prince, 71). These two statements were no doubt taken to heart by Saddam, and his actions after assuming the Presidency reflect that. He demanded unquestionable loyalty from his subjects, and through fear he achieved that. His power was never once shaken, even after a disastrous war with Iran in the 1980’s, and Saddam continued to rule the country until its occupation by the United States began in March of 2003.

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Works Cited

Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press, 2004. Knox, Kathleen. “Iraq: The Rise And Fall Of Saddam Hussein.” Globalsecurity.org. 15December 2003. 4 December 2008. Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. Moore, Jessica. “Saddam Hussein's Rise to Power.” PBS.org. Accessed 4 December 2008. . Munthe, Turi, ed. The Saddam Hussein Reader. New York: Thunder Mouth Press, 2002. “Saddam Hussein.” Wikipedia.org. Last modified 3 December 2008. 4 December 2008. .