Rule 23 To 30.docx

Santiago Land Dev’t Corp vs CA G. R. No. 106194

allegedly be promoted considering that the civil action was purportedly without basis and was purely for harassment.

PLAINTIFF: Santiago Land Development Corp DEFENDANT: CA DATE: January 28, 1997 PONENTE: TOPIC:

Section 5, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court warrants the dismissal of the complaint when the plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the written interrogatories. If plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can justify such failure or refusal. It should be noted that it is discretionary on the court to order the dismissal of the action.

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In Arellano vs. CFI, it was held that –

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Respondent, Komatsu Industries (Phil.), failed to pay its 27M debt to PNB thus the latter initiated the foreclosure proceedings of the Respo’s mortgaged property Komatsu filed a case to stop the foreclosure thus a TRO was issued but the property was, extrajudicially foreclosed by the PNB. Thereafter, respondent Komatsu Industries filed an amended petition for the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. During the pendency of the case, SLDC purchased the property for 90M from PNB. SLDC filed a motion for intervention alleging that any ruling or decision adverse to PNB would necessarily bind SLDC as transferee pendente lite and was allowed to intervene. Petitioner SLDC served written interrogatories on respondent Komatsu Industries counsel. The interrogatories were not, however, answered by the respondent by reason of which petitioner SLDC filed a motion to dismiss the action with prejudice based on Sec. 5, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court. An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by respondent Komatsu Industries alleging inter alia that there was no valid service of the written interrogatories inasmuch as the service was made on the respondents counsel and not directly upon any of the respondents officers who were competent to testify in its behalf, pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. SLDC filed an MR but was denied. CA found out that the private respondent itself admitted that the interrogatories were served upon its counsel of record Emerito Salva and Associates. There is, therefore, a valid service of the interrogatories upon private respondent CA held that there was a valid service and the failure of the respondent to answer the interrogatories would warrant the dismissal of the case

ISSUE: WON the case should have been ordered dismissed with prejudice because of private respondents deliberate, knowing, and continued refusal to answer the written interrogatories. HELD: (Na dismiss yung kaso kasi mali ang remedy ni SLDC.. HINDI Certiorari ang remedy *see the underlined sentence) NO. SLDC said that the dismissal of the civil action would allegedly be the proper sanction to respondents refusal to answer the interrogatories. Moreover, justice would

The dismissal of an action for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the same rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of abuse. The burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon appellant since every presumption is in favor of correctness of the courts action. We agree with the respondent court that although there was an error of judgment in denying the motion to dismiss, nevertheless, such cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion and therefore, correctable by certiorari. Certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge’s findings and conclusions and that certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law and fact. Furthermore, the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari, it cannot be subject of appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered. Considering the foregoing premises, a petition for a review by certiorari in the case at bar does not lie. In Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Lucero, it was lucidly stated that For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions. The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. Absent any arbitrary or despotic exercise of judicial power as to amount to abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court, the instant petition cannot prosper.

 Vda de Manguerra vs Risos G. R. No. 152643 PLAINTIFF: Concepcion Vda. de Manguerra, Hon. Codilla DEFENDANT: Raul RIsos, Susana Yangco, Atty, Bonje DATE: PONENTE: TOPIC: FACTS: 

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Respondents were charged with Estafa through falsification of public document before the RTC which arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastrointestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment. Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil Case, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved which the motion was granted This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the RTC orders. The case remains pending before the appellate court to date. The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. The RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age. After several motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken at her residence. Respondents assailed the RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari before the CA CA rendered a Decision favorable to the respondents CA observed that there was a defect in the respondent’s petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.

CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.

ISSUE: WON Rule 23 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure applies to the deposition of petitioner. HELD: NO. The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer. BUT At this point, a query may thus be posed: Were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein, the examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be done only before the court where the case is pending. Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the

court may not introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated. When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases. It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Solidbank vs. Gateway Electronics G. R. No. 164805 PLAINTIFF: Solidbank now known as Metrobank DEFENDANT: Gateway Electronics, Jaime Hidalgo, Ismael Maducdoc DATE: April 30, 2008 PONENTE: TOPIC:

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That Gateway Electronics obtained 4 foreign currency denominated loans with Solidbank to be used as working capital for its manufacturing operations – covered by Promissory Notes To secure the loans, Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds of its Backend Services Agreement o Still failed to pay $1.9M despite demands Solidbank filed a collection for sum of money case against Gateway o Amended the complaint to implead the officers/stockholders of Gateway who signed in their personal capacity a Continuing Guaranty to become to sureties for any and all existing indebtedness of Gateway to Solidbank o Solidbank, also filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents on the basis of an information received from Mr. David Eichler Chief Financial Officer of Alliance, that Gateway already received from Alliance the proceeds/payment of the Backend-Services Agreement  Trial court granted the motion for production and inspection of documents Gateway wanted to reset the date of production in order to gather the documents needed – GRANTED Solidbank filed a Motion for Issuance of a Show Cause Order due to Gateways failure to comply with the Order of the Trial Court, to produce the said documents. o In response, Gateway filed a manifestation that they appeared before the trial court to present the documents in their possession, however, Solidbank’s counsel failed to appear on the said date o Also expressed their willingness to make available for inspection at Gateway’s offices any requested document Trial Court issued an Order setting aside the production and inspection of documents; on the said date, Gateway presented the invoices representing the billings sent by Gateway to Alliance in relation to the Back end services Agreement Solidbank was not satisfied with the documents produced by Gateway o Filed a Motion to cite Gateway and its responsible officers in contempt for their refusal to produce the documents – DENIED to cite Gateway in Contempt, but Trial Court chastised Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to produce the documents evidencing

the payment received by Gateway from Alliance in relation to the Back end services Agreement Gateway filed a certiorari case before the CA CA: ruled that both Motion for Production of Documents and the Order of the trial Court failed to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 27, ROC  Held that the Triacl Court committed grave abuse of discretion in ruing that the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to be produced but which were not produced by Gateway shall be deemed established in accordance with Solidbanks claim

Issue: W/N Solidbank’s Motion for production and inspection of documents and the Order of the Trial Court failed to comply with Section 1, Rule 27, ROC, YES Ruling: YES. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides the mechanics for the production of documents and the inspection of things during the pendency of a case. It also deals with the inspection of sources of evidence other than documents, such as land or other property in the possession or control of the other party. This remedial measure is intended to assist in the administration of justice by facilitating and expediting the preparation of cases for trial and guarding against undesirable surprise and delay; and it is designed to simplify procedure and obtain admissions of facts and evidence, thereby shortening costly and time-consuming trials. It is based on ancient principles of equity. More specifically, the purpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigant to discover material information which, by reason of an opponent's control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial scrutiny, and to provide a convenient and summary method of obtaining material and competent documentary evidence in the custody or under the control of an adversary. It is a further extension of the concept of pretrial. The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment. Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits fishing for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved in the action. The lament against a fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying his opponents’ case. Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. However, fishing for evidence that is allowed under the rules is not without limitations. In Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the requisites in order that a party may compel the other party to produce or allow the inspection of documents or things, viz.: (a) (b)

The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or things, showing good cause therefor; Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;

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(d) (e) (f)

The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things which the party wishes to be produced and inspected; Such documents, etc., are not privileged; Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action, and Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or control of the other party.

Neither can it be said that Gateway did not exert effort in complying with the order for production and inspection of documents since it presented the invoices representing the billings sent by Gateway to Alliance in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement. Good faith effort to produce the required documents must be accorded to Gateway, absent a finding that it acted willfully, in bad faith or was at fault in failing to produce the documents sought to be produced. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

In the case at bench, Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance . By virtue of the assignment, Gateway was obligated to remit to Solidbank all payments received from Alliance under the agreement. In this regard, Solidbank claims that they have received information from the Chief Financial Officer of Alliance that Gateway had already received payments under the agreement. In order to ascertain the veracity of the information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under Rule 27. The purpose of Solidbanks motion is to compel Gateway to produce the documents evidencing payments received from Alliance in connection with the Back-end Services Agreement. Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of the documents. It had also shown that the said documents are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action. However, Solidbanks motion was fatally defective and must be struck down because of its failure to specify with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. Solidbanks motion for production and inspection of documents called for a blanket inspection. Solidbanks request for inspection of all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement was simply too broad and too generalized in scope. Furthermore, Solidbank, being the one who asserts that the proceeds of the Back-end Services Agreement were already received by Gateway, has the burden of proof in the instant case. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Throughout the trial, the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom it is imposed, until he shall have discharged the same. The trial court held that as a consequence of Gateways failure to exert diligent effort in producing the documents subject of the Order dated January 30, 2001, in accordance with Section 3(a), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court, the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to be produced but which were not produced by Gateway, shall be considered as having been established in accordance with Solidbanks claim. We hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforesaid Order. It is not fair to penalize Gateway for not complying with the request of Solidbank for the production and inspection of documents, considering that the documents sought were not particularly described. Gateway and its officers can only be held liable for unjust refusal to comply with the modes of discovery if it is shown that the documents sought to be produced were specifically described, material to the action and in the possession, custody or control of Gateway.

Fortune Corp vs CA FACTS:  

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Petitioner Fortune Corporation filed an action for breach of contract against respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation before the RTC After respondent had filed its Answer, petitioner served the former with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories were answered by respondent through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope. However, petitioner served upon respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the latter that on April 7, 1992, at San Pablo City, herein petitioner would take the deposition of said Juanito A. Teope, in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition alleging inter alia that : (a) herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case; (b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition; (c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr. Teope has no intention of leaving the country; and (e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits. RTC denied the requested deposition for the deposition of Teope appears unwarranted since the proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court; To allow the deposition will deprive the Court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the proposed deponent who appears to be a vital witness. Certiorari was filed by the Petitioners before the CA but was denied holding at least three (3) valid reasons for it not to order the deposition taken: First, that the proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written Interrogatories; Second, that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; and Third, that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the proposed deponent who appears to be a vital witness.

ISSUE: WON the CA is incorrect HELD: YES. Rule 24 of the Rules of Court provides Depositions pending action, when may be taken. The seeming unreceptive and negative attitude of lawyers and the courts towards discovery procedures has heretofore been observed and discommended by the Court.

It would do well, therefore, to point out the finer attributes of these rules of discovery, the availment of which, we are convinced, would contribute immensely to the attainment of the judiciary's primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases. The rules providing for pre-trial discovery of testimony, pre-trial inspection of documentary evidence and other tangible things, and the examination of property and person, were an important innovation in the rules of procedure. The promulgation of this group of rules satisfied the long-felt need for legal machinery in the courts to supplement the pleadings, for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and of affording an adequate factual basis in preparation for trial. The rules are not grounded on the supposition that the pleadings are the only or chief basis of preparation for trial. On the contrary, the limitations of the pleadings in this respect are recognized. In most cases under the rules the function of the pleadings extends hardly beyond notification to the opposing parties of the general nature of a party's claim or defense. It is recognized that pleadings have not been successful as fact-sifting mechanisms and that attempts to force them to serve that purpose have resulted only in making the pleadings increasingly complicated and technical, without any corresponding disclosure of the issues which it will be necessary to prove at the trial. Thus the rules provide for simplicity and brevity in pleadings, which in most cases will terminate with the answer; and at the same time adapt the old and familiar deposition procedure to serve as a device for ascertaining before trial what facts are really in dispute and need to be tried. Experience had shown that the most effective legal machinery for reducing and clarifying the issues was a preliminary examination, as broad in scope as the trial itself, of the evidence of both parties. Stated otherwise, the rules seek to make a trial less a game of blind man's buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent. The elemental purpose of the discovery procedure was pithily explained by the Court, speaking through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, in the recent case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, which opinion, we feel, should be reiterated through an extended reproduction, to wit: The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally. In Alonzo vs. Villamor, this Court described the nature and object of litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests are to be conducted in this jurisdiction.

The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue — fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.

expecting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in Sec. 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions ) which generally allows the examination of a deponent — 

Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the factual basis of a party's claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable . . . (an adverse party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading. It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings. The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and the policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial — should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.

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What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The depositiondiscovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, this reducing the possibility of surprise. The other principal benefits derivable from the availability and operation of a liberal discovery procedure are the following: 

As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary,

"regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party," as well as: o "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things" and o "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."

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It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury. The reasons for this are: o The witness (including a party) is examined while his memory is fresh: o The witness (including a party) is generally not coached in preparation for a pre-trial oral examination with the result that his testimony is likely to be more spontaneous. Where the examination is upon written interrogatories, however, it appears that some lawyers furnish the witness with copies of the interrogatories and thereby enable him to prepare his answers in advance. o A party or witness whose deposition has been taken at an early stage in the litigation cannot, at a later date, readily manufacture testimony in contradiction to his deposition; o Testimony is preserved, so that if a witness unexpectedly dies or becomes unavailable at the trial, his deposition is available. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.

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It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements out of court. It expediates the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting the trial. It facilitates both the preparation and trial of the cases.

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Petitioner claims that since the very purpose of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court is to authorize the taking of a deposition in a pending action, either to make a discovery in preparation for or to be used as evidence upon the trial of such action, the taking of the deposition in the case at bar should be done and finished before trial In fine, as we have earlier clarified, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. In the present case, private respondent failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken, for several reasons.

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The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition. The mere fact that the court could not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent does not justify the denial of the right to take deposition. As we have already explained: The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not observe the behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of the deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. In other words, the order of respondent Judge cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to take depositions, and therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1 of Rule 18 (now Rule 24) of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not intended by the framers of section 16 of the same rule. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition. Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.

Petitioner had previously availed of the mode of discovery, which is by written interrogatories supposedly covering all claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case, cannot be considered "good cause" because: (a) the fact that information similar to that sought had been obtained by answers to interrogatories does not bar an examination before trial, and is not a valid objection to the taking of a deposition where there is no duplication and the examining party is not acting in bad faith; and (b) knowledge of the facts by the petitioner concerning which the proposed deponent is to be examined does not justify a refusal of such examination.

Once a party has requested discovery, the burden is on the party objecting to show that the discovery requested is not relevant to the issues, and to establish the existence of any claimed privilege. These, private respondent has failed to do so. Consequently, its objection to the taking of the deposition cannot be sustained.

In actual effectiveness, interrogatories are far inferior to the oral examination. Their defects are quite obvious. In the first place, they give the party to whom they are addressed more time to study their effect, which furnishes a better opportunity to frame protective answers which conceal or evade.

Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. No doubt, private respondent and its representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all parties when required to submit to examination — but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process. The mere fact that an officer of private respondent would be required to attend the examination and thereby absent himself from some of his usual business affairs during the taking of the deposition is utterly insufficient to justify the court in ruling that he is being annoyed, embarrassed or oppressed, within the meaning of this language. Something far beyond this is required in this connection to grant a party relief. At any rate, petitioner has

The obvious advantage of interrogatories over a deposition is that they are much less expensive. There is no significant expense for the party sending the interrogatories except for the time spent in preparing the questions.

Furthermore, the fact that the deposition is to be taken in San Pablo City, whereas the proposed deponent lives in Manila, is not sufficient to establish private respondent's theory that the requested deposition was intended to annoy and harass the proposed deponent.

signified its willingness to select a suitable office in Manila for the taking of the deposition in order to accommodate the proposed deponent. On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in affirming the same.

As for the revival of judgment: Continental Bank vs. Tiangco G. R. No. 50480 PLAINTIFF: Continental Bank DEFENDANT: Hon. Tiangco, Star Life Corporation DATE: December 14, 1979 PONENTE: TOPIC: Facts: 

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CFI Manila rendered a decision dated September 26, 1967 ordering Income and Acceptance Corporation, Star Life Insurance Corporation and Primitivo Domingo to pay solidarily to Continental Bank 46k with 12% per annum from June 1, 1967 until the principal has been fully paid o Rendered on the basis of the evidence presented before the deputy clerk of court – who was commissioned to receive the same after the defendants were declared in default for non appearance at the pre-trial o No appeal to the judgment was interposed – became final August 30. 1968 Sherriff stated in his return that e served the writ of execution upon Domingo o Manifested that he would comply within 60days o After 60days, the judgment was not satisfied On March 17, 1977 through the Statutory Receiver o Filed a complaint for the revival of the said judgment o Alleged that Domingo made partial payments from 16, 1977 o Prayed that the judgment be revived Defendants – filed MTD – GRANTED

Issue: W/N the evidences presented before the deputy clerk of court is admissible, YES Ruling: The contention that the action for revival of the judgment had prescribed is manifestly devoid of merit. "A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action." (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.) The prescriptive period for enforcing a judgment is ten years (Art. 1144[3], Civil Code). In this case, the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment had not yet expired when the action for its revival was filed on March 17, 1977 because, as already stated, the judgment was rendered on September 26, 1967.Respondents' contention that between September 26, 1967 and March 17, 1977 a period of ten years, five months and twenty-one days had elapsed is a palpable error.

The contention that the action for revival of the judgment had prescribed is manifestly devoid of merit. "A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action." (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.) The prescriptive period for enforcing a judgment is ten years (Art. 1144[3], Civil Code). In this case, the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment had not yet expired when the action for its revival was filed on March 17, 1977 because, as already stated, the judgment was rendered on September 26, 1967.Respondents' contention that between September 26, 1967 and March 17, 1977 a period of ten years, five months and twenty-one days had elapsed is a palpable error.