Rodrigo V. Sandiganbayan

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Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan Facts: Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, while Alejandro A. Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer of the same municipality. In June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas, thru Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas, for the sum of P486,386.18, requiring the installation of the 2 units diesel power generator, battery starter and other related installations. In September 1992, Mejica, the Planning and Development Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project was 97.5% accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. On the basis of said report, the municipal treasurer effected payment to Philwood Construction. In August 1993, Rodrigo et. al. received a Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found that as per COA evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project was actually accomplished. The Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46. Rodrigo et. al. requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of disallowance and to reinspect the project. They reiterated their plea in a letter to the Provincial Auditor attaching therewith a "Certificate of Acceptance and Completion" signed by Clemente Arquero, Jr., Barangay Captain of Caboloan, Eusebio Doton, President of the Cabaloan Electric Cooperative. The Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on their requests. On 10 January 1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman against Rodrigo et. al., Larry Lu and Ramil Ang of Philwood Construction. In 1995, the Ombudsman approved the filing of an information against Rodrigo et. al. for violation of Anti-Graft Law before the Sandiganbayan. Rodrigo et. al. filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan granted it. The Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending that the charges against Rodrigo et. al. be maintained. The Ombudsman approved said memorandum. Rodrigo et. al. then filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information alleging, as grounds therefor that (1) the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense, and (2) the same information charged more than one offense. Motion to quash denied. The prosecution moved to suspend Rodrigo et. al. pendente lite. Rodrigo et. al. opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over them and ordered their suspension pendente lite. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether there was violation of due process by the filing of the complaint by the Provincial Auditor Held: No. Rodrigo et. al. argues that it is the duty of the auditor, by virtue of its issuance of disallowance, to decide on their written explanation. And the auditor’s hasty filing of criminal complaint against them denied them due process. However, Sec. 82 of State Audit Code states that the suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily explained within ninety-day period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for good cause shown. It must be noted that disallowance and suspension are two distinct concepts. A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable officer's accountability due to non-compliance with law or regulations. Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper. A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with certain requirements. A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of

supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned. Rodrigo et. al. misinterpreted Section 44.6.4 of the Code. The auditor actually issued a disallowance and not a mere suspension and that the "written explanation" was "for the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance. In fact, under COA Circular No. 85-156-B, the Provincial Auditor is duty-bound to file a complaint before the Ombudsman when, from the evidence obtained during the audit, he is convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted." The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due process of Rodrigo et. al. to the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution. They will still have the opportunity to confront the accusations contained in the complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may still raise the same defenses contained in their motion to lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the preliminary investigation. Should the Provincial Auditor later reverse himself and grant respondent's motions, or should the COA, or this Court, subsequently absolve them from liability during the pendency of the preliminary investigation, the respondents may ask the prosecuting officer to take cognizance of such decision. The prosecuting officer may then accord such decision its proper weight. Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Rodrigo et. al. Held: Yes. Although RA 7975 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those government officials having Salary Grade 27 or higher, municipal mayors were re-classified from Salary Grade 24 to Salary Grade 27 by virtue of RA 6758 which took effect on July 1, 1989. Rodrigo however, claim that at the time of the commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September 1992, Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public official impleaded in this case, was receiving a monthly salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly equivalent to a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758. This argument is too simplistic. Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that the Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State "to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to take into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions of government officials and employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar salaries. This scheme is known as the "Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985 as including all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation. The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that that may be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation." Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed the Salary Grades34 ["Salary Grade" is "the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class.

That Rodrigo received a salary less than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by Sections 10 and 19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758 which provides that a local government official's actual salary may be less than what the Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official's Grade. An official's salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his position - the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work. To give credence to petitioners' argument that Mayor Rodrigo's salary determines his Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the constitutional and statutory policies behind said law. Rodrigo’s position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975

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