Republic V. Manalo.docx

REPUBLIC V. CA 132 SCRA 514 FACTS: Respondents sought the registration of land adjacent to their fishpond. T hey are the registered owners of parcel of lot bordering on the Bocaue and Meycauyan rivers. The lower and appellate court allowed registration but this was opposed by the government.

HELD: There is no accretion if by man-made causes.

IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO 108 SCRA 335 FACTS Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain

HELD: YES

1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the

present case because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea 2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores by accretions caused by actions of the sea form part of the pubic domain when they are no longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any said land is no longer necessary for public use. Until such declaration is made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership. There is no precise meaning of “public use” and the term is susceptible of myriad meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited meaning attached to “public use” is “use by the public” or “public employment”, that “a duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned.” The more generally accepted view sees “public use” as “public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable number of inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, which contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.” In this jurisdiction, “public use” is defined as “whatever is beneficially employed for the community.

Sources of Philippine Civil Law

1. Constitution 2. Administrative or general orders not contrary to the constitution.

3. Statutes, laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, or batas pambansa. 4. Jurisprudence and judicial customs. 5. Decisions of foreign courts if applicable. 6. Principles governing analogous cases. 7. Principles of legal hermeneutics. 8. Equity and general principles of law (morals). It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot depend on the “numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the community to be benefited.” The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use; provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals. Thus, the first essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, the Court explicated that expropriation ends with an order of condemnation declaring “that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law under Article III, Sec. 1. (Barangay Sindalan, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150640, March 22, 2007). The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good – which is public use – and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right to property as well. Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. This rule holds true when the property is taken before the

filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. In determining just compensation, all the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. (EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 305; NPC v. Dr. Antero Bongbong, et al., G.R. No. 164079, April 3, 2007).