Rape.docx

(Indian Penal Code 1860, Sections 375,376) Introduction: The word ‘rape’ is derived from the Latin term rapio, which means to seize. Thus, rape literally means a forcible seizure and that is the essential characteristic feature of the offence. In common parlance, it means intercourse with a woman, without, by force, fear or fraud. It is ‘the ravishment of a woman, without her consent, by force, fear or fraud’, ‘the carnal knowledge of a woman by force against her will’. Section 375 of the IPC defines rape. However, the original section 375 and the provisions providing punishment have witnessed a number of amendments. The amendments, carried out in the year 1983 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983, have overhauled the law relating to rape. These amendments were a result of countrywide criticism by all sections of the society including parliamentarians, women and social organizations against the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tukaram v State of Maharashtra, which is popularly referred to as the Mathura rape case. In this case, Mathura, an 18 year-old Harijan orphan girl, was living with her brother. Both of them worked as labourers to earn a living. Mathura developed a relationship with one Ashok and they decided to get married. Mathura’s brother filed a complaint of kidnapping in the Desai Ganj Police Station. On his complaint, Mathura, Ashok and two others, with whom Ashok was living, were brought to the police station. The statements of Mathura and Ashok were recorded and when they were about to leave, the accused asked Mathura to wait in the police station and told Ashok and others to move out. Immediately thereafter, Ganpat, one of the police constables on duty,

took Mathura to the toilet and raped her despite protest and stiff resistance. The second constable, Tukaram, then went to Mathura and sexually molested her. He also wanted to rape her, but was unable to do so for the reason that he was in a highly intoxicated condition. In the meantime, Ashok and others, who were waiting outside, saw that the lights of the police station were turned off and its entrance gate was closed from within. They went behind the police station and started shouting for Mathura. Tukaram then came out and told them that Mathura had already left. But, immediately thereafter, Mathura came out from the rear of the police station and informed others that the accused Ganpat had compelled her to undress herself and had raped her. The Bombay High Court convicted the accused Ganpat to rigorous imprisonment for five years and Tukaram to rigorous imprisonment for one year. The Bombay High Court had observed that there was a difference between ‘consent’ and ‘passive submission,’ and held that mere passive or helpless surrender of the body and its resignation to other’s lust, induced by threats or fear, cannot be equated with the ‘desire or will’, nor can furnish an answer by the mere fact that the sexual act was not in opposition to such desire or volition. The High Court also took note of the fact that there was a complaint filed by her brother, which was pending in the police station and she was alone in the police station in the middle of the night. Her subsequent conduct in immediately reporting the matter not only to her relatives but also the members of the crowd, also established that she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court, however, Mathura could not have been overawed in the police station, especially since her relatives were waiting outside. Further, no injuries were found on Mathura after the incident and the absence of injuries indicated that the alleged intercourse was a peaceful affair. The Supreme Court disbelieved Mathura’s version that she put up a stiff resistance and shouted loudly for help. They described it as a ‘tissue of lies’ and a concoction on her part. Accordingly, both the accused, Ganpat and Tukaram, were acquitted of the charges of rape. The project, consisting ss.375, 376, 376A to 376D deals with ‘rape’. Section 375 defines ‘rape’, while ss. 376 and 376A to 376D stipulate punishment for rape.

Rape Section 375: A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under any of the six following descriptions:1. Against her will. 2. Without her consent. 3. With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. 4. With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. 5. With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through any other of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. 6. With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation:-Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception:-Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age.

Essential Ingredients: Section 375 defines the offence of rape, while s 376 prescribes the punishment for rape. The following are the ingredients of the offence of rape: 1. There must be sexual intercourse with a woman by a man. 2. Such a sexual intercourse should be under any of the following circumstances: (a) Against her will; (b) Without her consent; (c) With consent obtained under fear of death or death; (d) With consent given under misconception of fact that the man is her husband; (e) Consent given by reason of unsoundness of mind, intoxication or under influence of any stupefying or unwholesome substance; (f) With a woman under 16 years of age.

‘Sexual Intercourse’ and ‘Penetration’: ‘Rape’, as outlined in s 375 of the IPC, in essence, involves a coercive nonconsensual (as well as consensual in a set of specified circumstances) sexual intercourse with a woman ‘without her consent’ or ‘against her will’. Sexual intercourse implies penetration of male organ into that of female. By virtue of explanation to s 375, mere slightest or partial penetration of the male organ within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda is sufficient to constitute ‘sexual intercourse’. The depth of penetration is immaterial. The slightest degree of penetration is enough. Penetration, not ejaculation, is the sine non qua for the

offence of rape. It is, therefore, not necessary to prove the completion of sexual intercourse by the emission of seed. Intercourse is deemed complete upon proof of penetration only. The Supreme Court, in State of Uttar Pradesh v Babulnath, while delving into the essential ingredients of rape, observed:

From the explanation reproduced above it is distinctly clear that ingredients, which are essential for proving a charge of rape, are the accomplishment of the act with force and resistance. To constitute the offence of rape neither section 375 of the IPC, 1860 nor the explanation attached thereto require that there should necessarily be complete penetration of the penis into the private part of the victim/prosecutrix. In other words to constitute the offence of rape it is not at all necessary that there should be complete penetration of the male organ with emission of semen and rupture of hymen. That being so it is quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape even without causing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. In Smt Jhaku v KCJ and Others, the Delhi High Court was urged to interpret the terms ‘sexual intercourse’ and ‘penetration’ used in s 375 in such a way as to bring within their ambit not only penile-vaginal penetration but also penetration of any part of his body (like fingers) or any foreign object (like a stick or a bottle) into bodily orifice (vagina, anus or mouth). The Court ruled that ‘sexual intercourse’ and ‘penetration’ mean only the penile-vaginal penetration. It held that these terms cannot be interpreted to bring within their fold the vaginal penetration by fingers or any other object. The Court also stressed that it would not be permissible for it to strain these words and there hitherto well-understood and well-entrenched meaning to bring within their fold certain acts that do not come within reasonable interpretation.

‘Against Her Will’: The first clause of s 375 stipulates that a man is said to have committed rape, if, he has sexual intercourse with a woman ‘against her will’. Though every act done ‘against the will’ of a person will also mean that it is done ‘without the consent’ of the person, an act done ‘without the consent’ of a person does not necessarily mean ‘against the will’. So, if sexual intercourse is done with a woman who is asleep, then it would amount to being ‘against the will’.

‘Without Her Consent’: The second clause of s 375 stipulates that if a man has sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, then it amounts to rape. Consent involves a voluntary act and conscious acceptance of what is proposed to be done by another and concurred in by the former. Consent for the purpose of s 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but also after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. In this connection, it is necessary to recall here s 90 of the IPC, which states as to what does not amount to ‘consent’ under the code. It runs as under: Section90: Consent known to be given under fear or misconception; A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of the code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception.

Consent Obtained Under Fear of Death or of Hurt: Clause (3) of s 375 stipulates that the consent obtained by putting the woman or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt is not consent and hence, the act would amount to rape. In State of Maharashtra v Prakash, the victim was a village girl who had gone to her parent’s village to attend a fair. The first accused was Prakash, a police constable. He was deputed for bandobust duty to that village. The second accused was a businessman. Both the accused had called out the victim from her parent’s house, took her to the house of the second accused, threatened her that her husband would be placed in custody she did not sign some papers. Thereafter, both of them committed rape on her. The victim was threatened not to report this matter to the police. Afraid of them, she went back to hr parent’s house and spent the rest of the night there. The next morning, she met another constable and narrated to him what happened the previous night. He asked her to report the matter to the police. The Bombay High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that the victim was a willing partner in the act of sexual intercourse, in view of the fact that there were no marks of violence on her body. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that at the relevant point in time, the constable was in uniform and was on bandobust duty. The woman was a poor rustic villager. She was threatened that her husband would be arrested. So, it was case where she had surrendered herself involuntarily under duress and threat held out by the first accused. The Supreme Court held that this case would fall under clause 3 of s 375, IPC. The accused were convicted to rigorous imprisonment for 3 years.

Consent Obtained By Fraud: By virtue of clauses (4) and (5) of s 375 consent obtained by fraud is no consent. For instance, if a woman gives her consent for sexual intercourse on the bona fide assumption that a professional medical practitioner, through sexual intercourse,

is medically treating her ailment; or a girl gives her consent for sexual intercourse to a professional singer teacher on the assumption that he, through sexual intercourse, is treating her breathing to enable her to sing properly; or, if a woman consents for sexual contact under the belief that he is her lawfully married husband, then such consent is not valid consent under law. To attract the provisions of clause 4, it is, therefore, necessary to prove that the consent was given by the victim under belief that the accused was the other person to whom she believed herself to be lawfully married.

Is Promise to Marry the Victim a Misconception of Fact Vitiating her Consent? If a full-grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant, it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact. Consent by the victim to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love that he would marry her on a later date cannot be said to be given under misconception of fact. Sexual intercourse with a girl above 16 years, who voluntarily agrees for sexual intercourse on assurance of marriage, does not amount to rape. A deliberate representation by the accused with a view to eliciting the assent of his victim without having any intention or inclination to marry her vitiates the consent. Hence, consent for sexual intercourse induced by the promise of marriage is not a true consent, if it is proved that the accused from the very inception of making the promise had no intention to marry her.

Consent of an Insane or Intoxicated Woman: In Tulshidas v State of Goa, wherein the accused ravished a mentallychallenged girl on occasions more than once that resulted in her pregnancy, the apex court categorically held that consent given by mentally-challenged girl cannot said to be ‘consent’ for sexual intercourse as she is incapable of understanding the consequences of her consent. It observed: An act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-resistance or passive giving in when the faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated by duress or impaired due to mental retardation or deficiency cannot be considered to be consent. A girl, whose mental faculties are undeveloped, cannot be said in law, to have suffered sexual intercourses with consent. It also ruled that a rapist by sexually assaulting a mentally underdeveloped girl not only physically ravishes her but also exploits her mental non-development and helplessness. Similarly, sexual intercourse under influence of drink cannot be said to be intercourse with consent.

Consent of a Woman under 16 years of Age: Clause (6) provides that sexual intercourse with a woman under 16 yrs of age will amount to rape, whether it is done with or without her consent. This is because the consent of a minor is no consent. In Harpal Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, the contention of the defence was that the victim was used to sexual intercourse and no injury was detected on the private parts of the girl. It was contended that it was a case of

consent. However, the Supreme Court held that once it was proved that the girl was below 16 yrs of age, the question of consent becomes wholly irrelevant.

(Exception- an exception to the section 375 states that non-consensual sexual intercourse by a man with his wife, if she is over 15 yrs of age, does not amount to rape. It is believed that the husband’s immunity for marital rape is premised on the assumption that a woman gives forever her consent to the husband for sexual intercourse.)

Punishment For Rape Section 376: (1)Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for a life or far a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the woman raped is his own wife and is under twelve years of age, in case, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. (2)Whoever,(a)Being a police officer commits rape*within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or *in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or *on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him; or (b)Being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of public servant subordinate to him; or

(c)Being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman’s or children’s institution takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or (d)Being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or (e)Commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or (f)Commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; or (g)Commits gang rape, Shall be punished with rigorous punishment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable for fine; Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years. Explanation 1: Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this sub-section. Explanation 2: ‘Women’s or children’s institution’ means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a widows’ home or by any other name, which is established and maintained for the reception and care of women or children. Explanation 3: ‘Hospital’ means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation.

Section 376 provides the punishment for rape. The section consists of two clauses. The first clause is in respect of rape generally. The second clause deals with instances of custodial rape. According the first clause of the clause of the section, a person who is convicted of the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may be life or for a term which may extend to ten years and fine. If the woman raped is the wife of the man who is below 15 yrs, but above 12 yrs of age, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. From the above, it is clear that unlike most other offences, as far as rape is concerned, a minimum sentence of seven years has been prescribed. The proviso to the section states that if a court wants to impose a sentence which is less than seven years, than the court will have to state adequate and special reasons in the judgment, as to why it is choosing to a lesser sentence. The proviso to s 376(2) stipulates that if a court decides to impose a lesser sentence than the stipulated period of ten years rigorous imprisonment, then there is a duty cast upon the court to record ‘adequate and special reasons’ for awarding lesser sentence. The question as to what amounts to ‘adequate and special reasons’ came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v Krishnappa. In this case, a 49 year-old man raped a 7-8 year old girl. The trail court convicted him and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. But the Karnataka High Court reduced the sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four years on the ground that the accused was ‘unsophisticated and an illiterate’ citizen belonging to a weaker section of society and that he was a ‘chronic addict to drinking’. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court, observing that the reasons given by the high court were ‘neither special nor adequate’. The Court held that:

“The measure of punishment in a case of rape cannot depend upon the social status of the victim or accused. It must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the sexually assaulted female and gravity of the criminal act. Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through the imposition of appropriate sentence by the court……, which may serve as a deterrent for the commission of like offences by others.” It seems that the courts in India are more inclined to record conviction and to impose stern punishment for committing rape. In State of Punjab v Ramdev Singh, setting aside the order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court acquitting a rape convict and restoring the conviction order of the trail court, the Supreme Court observed: “An unmarried acquittal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making out a convicted case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty, the court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof when none reasonably exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for a finding in favour of acquittal. An unmarried acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on the prowl for easy prey, more so when the victims of crime are helpless females or minor children.”

Gang Rape: One of the instances for which the enhanced punishment of 10 years rigorous imprisonment is provided under clause 2 of s 376, is the instance of gang rape. Explanation 1 to the section states that where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape, when the offence is committed in furtherance of their common intention. In Bhupinder Sharma v State of Himachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court held the appellant, one of the accomplices of gang rape, guilty under s 376(2) even though he, unlike other members of the group, could not sexually assault the victim as she escaped from the place of incident before he could perpetrate the act. However, the trail court convicted and ordered him, without giving any adequate and special reasons, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years while it sentenced the perpetrators of actual rape to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. The high court by issuing suo moto notice of enhancement of punishment, enhanced the appellant’s sentence from rigorous imprisonment for four years to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. The Supreme Court, in the special leave to appeal against the high court’s judgment, ruled that every member of such a group, acting in furtherance of common intention of the group, by virtue of the deeming explanation, per se deserves the minimum sentence stipulated in s 376(2). Involvement of a group of persons is not necessary.

Section 376-A.Intercourse by a man with his wife during separation: Whoever has sexual intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately from him under a decree of separation or under any custom or usage without her consent shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 376-B.Intercourse by public servant with woman under his custody: Whoever, being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and induces or seduces, any woman, who is in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him, to have sexual intercourse with him, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 376-C.Intercourse by superintendent of jail, remand house, etc.: Whoever, being the superintendent or manager of a jail, remand house or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force of a women’s or children’s institution takes advantage of his official position and induces or seduces any female inmate of such jail, remand house, place or institution to have sexual intercourse with him, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation: “Superintendent” in relation to a jail, remand house or other place of custody or a women’s or children’s institution includes a person holding any other office in such jail, remand home, place or institution by virtue of which he can exercise any authority or control over its inmates.

Section 376-D.Intercourse by any member of the management or staff of a hospital with any woman in that hospital: Whoever, being on the management of the hospital or staff of a hospital takes advantage of his position and has sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

Evidence of Prosecutrix: In every rape case, the evidence of the prosecutrix or the woman who has been raped, is a very crucial piece of testimony to prove the case against the accused. Every rape victim in our country is viewed with a lot of suspicion and is also humiliated. More than the culprit, it is the rape victim who faces social stigma. Unfortunately, under s 155 of the Indian Evidence Act, when the woman is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish, it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally immoral character. Very often, it is used as a pretext to harass or humiliate the prosecutrix in the course of cross-examination. In this context, the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh, held: The provisions of evidence act regarding relevancy of facts notwithstanding, some defence counsel adopt the strategy of continual questioning of the prosecutrix as to the details of the rape. The victim is required to repeat again and again the details of the rape incident not so much as to bring out the facts on record or to test her credibility, but to test her story for inconsistencies with a view to attempt to twist the interpretation of events given by her, so as to make then appear inconsistent with her allegations. A victim of rape, it is must remembered, has already undergone a traumatic experience and if she is made to repeat again and again in unfamiliar surroundings, what she had been subjected to, she may be too ashamed and even nervous or confused to speak and her silence or a confused stray sentence may be wrongly interpreted as “discrepancies and contradictions” in her evidence. In the same case, the Supreme Court also observed that the testimony of victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons, which necessitate looking for corroboration for her statement, the court should not find any difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault only. It is now well settled that conviction for an offence of rape can be based on the sole testimony of prosecutrix, if it is found to be natural, trustworthy and worth being relied on.

Disclosure of Identity of Rape Victim: Section 228-A.Disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences, etc.: (1)Whoever prints or publishes the name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an offence under section 376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D is alleged or found to have been committed (hereinafter in this section referred to as the victim) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. (2)Nothing in sub-section (1) extends to any printing or publication of the name or any matter which may make known the identity of the victim if such printing or publication is: (a) by or under the order in writing of the officer-in-charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation into such offence acting in good faith for the purposes of such investigation; or (b) by, or with the authorization in writing of, the victim; or (c) where the victim is dead or minor or of unsound mind, by, or with the authorization in writing of, the next-of-kin of the victim. (3)Whoever prints or publishes any matter in relation to any proceeding before a court with respect to an offence referred to in sub-section (1) without the previous permission of such court shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. This section has been inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983, with a view to protect identity of rape victims from public glare. In our country, the stigma attached a rape victim is much more than the stigma attached to a person accused of rape.

The Supreme Court, keeping in view the legislative intent of s 228A and the social victimization and ostracisation of the victim of sexual assault, on occasions more than one, has advised the high courts and lower courts not to indicate the name of the victim of sexual assault in their judgments even though the statutory restriction is not applicable to printing or publication of their judgments.

Assistance To Victims of Rape: In Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v Union of India and Others, the Supreme Court, highlighting ordeals of victims of rape and defects in the present criminal law system vis-à-vis victims of rape, outlined a set of broad parameters to assist them. They are: (1)

(2)

(3)

The complainants of sexual assault cases should be provided with legal representation. It is important to have someone who is well-acquainted with the criminal justice system. The role of the victim’s advocate would not only be to explain to the victim the nature of the proceedings, to prepare her for the case and to assist her in the police station and in the court, but to provide her with guidance as to how she might obtain help of a different nature from other agencies, for example, counseling through medical assistance. It is important to secure continuity of assistance by ensuring that the same person who looked after the complainant’s interests in the police station, represents her till the end of the case; Legal assistance will have to be provided at the police station, since the victim of sexual assault might very well be in a distressed state upon arrival at the police station, the guidance and support of a lawyer at this stage and whilst she is being questioned, would be of great assistance to her; The police should be under a duty to inform the victim of her right to representation, before any questions were asked of her, and that the police report should state that the victim was so informed;

(4)

(5)

(6) (7)

(8)

A list of advocates willing to act in these cases should be kept at the police station for victims who did not have a particular lawyer in mind or whose own lawyer was unavailable; The advocate shall be appointed by the court, upon application by the police at the earliest convenient movement, but in order to ensure that victims were questioned without undue delay, advocates would be authorized to act at the police station before leave of the court was sought or obtained; In all rape trails, anonymity of the victims must be maintained, as far as necessary; It is necessary, having regard to the directive principles contained under article 38(1) of the Constitution of India, to set up Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Rape victims frequently incur substantial financial loss. Some, for example, are too traumatized to continue in employment; Compensation for victims shall be awarded by the court on the conviction of the offender and by the criminal injuries compensation board, whether or not a conviction has taken place. The board will take into account the pain, suffering and shock, as well as loss of earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of childbirth, if this occurred as a result of rape.

The court also directed the National Commission for Women (NCW) to formulate such a scheme within six months from the date of judgment (i.e. October 19, 1994) and the Union of India to examine it and to take necessary steps for its implementation. However, neither the NCW nor the Union of India has taken any steps in formulating the recommended scheme. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in the absence of compensatory scheme, has resorted to public law remedies to compensate victims of rape.

Crimes Against Women

(Rape) Submitted by: Fahimuddin Ahmed Khan B.A.LLB(H) 3rd semester

Table of contents:  Introduction……  Rape……  Punishment for Rape…….  Gang Rape……  Evidence of Prosecutrix…..  Disclosure of identity of Rape victim….  Assistance to Victims of Rape…….

Table of Cases:  Tukaram v State of Maharashtra.  State of Uttar Pradesh v Babulnath.  Smt Jhaku v KCJ and Others.  State of Maharashtra v Prakash.  Tulshidas v State of Goa.  Harpal Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh.  State of Punjab v Ramdev Singh.  State of Karnataka v Krishnappa.  Bhupinder Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh.  State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh.  Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v Union of India and Others.

Acknowledgement: Through this acknowledgment, I express my sincere gratitude to all those people who have been associated with this assignment and have helped me with it and made it a worthwhile experience. Firstly I extend my thanks to the various people who have shared their opinions and experiences through which I received the required information crucial for this assignment. Finally, I express my thanks to PROFFESSOR ROSE VARGHESE who gave me this opportunity to learn the subject in a broader approach and gave me valuable suggestions regarding the project report.

Bibliography:  K.D. Gaur, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials  P.S. Achuthan Pillai, Criminal Law  S.N. Mishra, The Indian Penal Code