Quasi-judicial-jesus.docx

QUASI-JUADICIAL Digests A. In General 1. SANTIAGO, JR. VS. BAUTISTA, MARCH 30, 1970 Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. The committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students". Santiago here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the court below did not err in dismissing the case on said grounds.

Whether or not the order of dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65. No. In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court.

In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations. (2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. (3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. Here, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions.

2. MONETARY BOARD VS. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, JANUARY 21, 2015

Respondent established a pension loan product for bona fide veterans or their surviving spouses, as well as salary loan product for teachers and low-salaried employees pursuant to its mandate under Republic Act (RA) Nos. 35183 and 71694 to provide financial assistance to veterans and teachers. As its clientele usually do not have real estate or security to cover their pension or salary loan, other than their continuing good health and/or employment, respondent devised a program by charging a premium in the form of a higher fee known as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) from said borrowers. Resultantly, Special Trust Funds were established by respondent for the pension loans of the veteran-borrowers, salary loans of teachers and low-salaried employees. These trust funds were, in turn, managed by respondent’s Trust and Investment Department, with respondent as beneficiary. The fees charged against the borrowers were credited to the respective trust funds, which would be used to fully pay the outstanding obligation of the borrowers in case of death. On April 30, 2002, an examination was conducted by the Supervision and Examination Department (SED) II of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). It found, among other things, that respondent’s collection of premiums from the proceeds of various salary and pension loans of borrowers to guarantee payment of outstanding loans violated Section 54 of RA No. 8791 which states that banks shall not directly engage in insurance business as insurer. Respondent complied with the BSP’s directive and discontinued the collection of fees for CRF. Petitioners issued Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 1139 directing respondent’s Trust and Investment Department to return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF in the amount of P144,713,224.54 as of August 31, 2004. Accordingly, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati City. In response, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the petition for declaratory relief cannot prosper due to respondent’s prior breach of Section 54 of RA No. 8791. Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper. No.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Decisions of quasijudicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court. In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions. Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers or functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It has the power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and others, needed in its examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in determining whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same. A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising quasi-judicial functions, then its decision in MB Resolution No. 1139 cannot be the proper subject of declaratory relief.

B. Jurisdiction 1. ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION VS. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, AUGUST 31, 1987 By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 (Subdivision Beautification) of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract

to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA through a letter-complaint. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss. NHA denied the motion to dismiss. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.

Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy. Yes. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute

administered" (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]). In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasijudicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." Section 3 of this statute provides as follows: National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree (emphasis supplied) Presidential Decree No. 1344 clarified and spelled out the quasijudicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite specific terms: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices:

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (emphasis supplied.) Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell.

2. BOISER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JUNE 24, 1983  The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other municipalities in the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and style of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu.  The arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the world.  Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio

operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement.  On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited "Interconnecting Agreement."  To avert serious consequences to the public and private hours resulting from any disruption of the petitioner's telephone network and, of course, to the long distance and overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. The jurisdictional issue raised by Premiere in this petition is tied up to the jurisdictional issue raised by PLDT on its petition filed with the Court of Appeals. According to PLDT, the principal issue in dispute is the propriety or validity of the "Circuit Authorization Order" it issued to its own employees corespondents Ramon Juezan and Wilson Morrell regarding the use of its own relay station by petitioner Boiser. PLDT emphasizes, and this is the main thrust of its case both here and below, that the order which cut off the TagbilaranMandaue phone connections is an internal transaction and business of PLDT, and that it relates to a purely technical matter pertaining basically to the operation of the communications network of a public utility corporation. According to PLDT, the CFI of Cebu has arrogated upon itself the authority of supervising or overseeing the operations of PLDT at its Cebu relay station. Respondent PLDT maintains that the National Telecommunications Commission is the body with jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from the operation of telephone systems or the interconnection

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Petitioner Boiser or Premiere, in turn, contends in the petition before this Court that the CFI of Cebu acted within its jurisdiction and there being no grave abuse of discretion, the challenge to its interlocutory order should not have been entertained by the Court of Appeals.

Is NTC has jurisdiction over the case? Paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting and Operating Agreement between PLDT and Premiere provides: Violation of any of the conditions or terms of this Agreement or of the Interconnecting and traffic Agreement attached hereto shall constitute sufficient cause for the cancellation of this Agreement and the severance of connection on May (30) days advance notice given in writing by either party unless such violation creates manifest hazard to life, property or to facilities of transmission and reception in which event severance may be made without notice. Section 2 of the Interconnecting and traffic Agreement mentioned in the above Paragraph 13, in turn, provides: Sec. 2. If either company defaults in the payment of any amounts hereunder or violates any other provision of this Agreement, and if such default or violation continues for thirty (30) days after written notice thereof, the other company may terminate this Agreement forthwith by written notice. It may be noted that the above provision mentions a default or violation continuing for thirty days after written notice and the termination of the agreement by another written notice. There is nothing in the provision about the period when such written notice should be given by the party wishing to terminate. Such period can be found in paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting

Agreement quoted earlier. Therefore, even granting that there was default on the part of the petitioner, the 30-day requisite notice should have been followed. Whether or not the requirement was followed calls for the presentation of evidence before the proper tribunal. PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the Commission's powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the private respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day prior notice provided by the Interconnecting Agreement. But even if they were, this question is one which should be clarified in the civil case for breach of contract. Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve "a purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated. In the petition now before us, we do not grapple with such issues as legalization of illegal services or compelling unwilling parties to enter into interconnection of services. We simply rule that pending final determination of the case before the trial court, the appellate court should refrain from acting on the petition now before it and from issuing orders that would punish the people of Bohol because Premiere and PLDT cannot see eye to eye.

3. TAULE VS. SECRETARY SANTOS, AUGUST 12, 1991 The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case. On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay Councils in their

respective municipalities, convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales as President, VP, Secretary, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively. On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,* protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the FABC denied the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC, the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that under Article IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials. On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation of the guidelines as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest upon the Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto. Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Local Government has jurisdiction to entertain an election

protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils. No. Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, ** the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units." Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code, to wit: (3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects; Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-making power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law. Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and consequently declare an election null and void. It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations.

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary over local governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand. Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.

4. DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS (COSLAP), JUNE 8, 2005  Subject of the instant petition is a huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849 hectares situated at Sto. Niño, Tugbok, Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger landholding belonging to the late Roman Cuison, Jr.  The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank), which, after emerging as the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its ownership over the property and subdivided the land into two parcels.

 Sometime in 1989, the government acquired the Cuison property for distribution to the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Among the beneficiaries were herein private respondents who are members of the Sto. Niño Farmers Cooperative (SNFC), Association of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBA) and Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie (NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private respondents were individually issued with certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs).  After compulsory acquisition proceedings, the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. CL-850 issued in the names of the aforesaid organizations.  Claiming that the disputed property had already been classified as "urban/urbanizing" and therefore beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator.  Respondent officials therein and SNFC stood by their assertion that the Cuison property was agricultural.  The Provincial Adjudicator granted the Bank’s prayer to nullify the compulsory acquisition proceedings with respect to the Cuison property and directed the Register of Deeds of Davao City to cancel the CLOAs issued to the beneficiaries and to reinstate TCT No. T-162664 in the name of the Bank. After reinstatement of the Bank’s title over the Cuison property, herein petitioner Davao New Town Development Corporation acquired the property and caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-162664 and the issuance of TCT No. T-210500 in its name. Respondents appealed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB).  The DARAB rendered a decision in DARAB Case No. 2362, partially affirming the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93. The DARAB also ordered the Bank and petitioner to solidarily pay the disturbance compensation in favor of the beneficiaries.

 According to the DARAB, since the Cuison property had been classified by the city government as a site for human settlements and relocation prior to June 15, 1988, the Cuison property cannot be categorized as an agricultural land. Herein private respondents, who are members of SNFC, again referred their complaint with another agency, this time, COSLAP.  COSLAP issued the assailed Resolution upholding its jurisdiction over the case and declaring the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator in the second DARAB case as not binding upon the Republic and private respondents who were not impleaded in said case. Petitioner mainly argues that respondent Commission was without jurisdiction in entertaining private respondents’ complaint and in promulgating the assailed Resolution because the matter falls within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the DARAB. Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the matter No. COSLAP has jurisdiction only if the land belongs to public domain. A reading of private respondents’ Position Paper submitted to the COSLAP and the assailed Resolution in relation to the laws creating the COSLAP compels the Court to declare the nullity of the COSLAP proceedings, including the assailed Resolution which was issued in excess of its jurisdiction. First. The dispute between petitioner and private respondents over the Cuison property is not cognizable by COSLAP. Second. COSLAP is not empowered to review decisions of the DARAB or the Provincial Adjudicator or any other quasi-judicial agency for that matter. Third. COSLAP exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of the government’s title over the Cuison property.

C. Administrativc Procedure 1. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, OCTOBER 14, 1975  ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade mark and trade name. ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases” as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings.  Said Rule likewise provides that “all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him.”  These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.  Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes case.  Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel the Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process. Yes. It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary

or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. 4 There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail." Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. For so long as the administrative officer will be the one to exercise his own judgment and discretion, does not preclude him from

utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. 15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 17 In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings.

2. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION, JANUARY 18, 2000  Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country".  Then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of

the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty).  The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.  On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069.  Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof.  Private respondent filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the government’s ironclad duties under a treaty.

Former. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasijudicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons

or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64). The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution. In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.

3. PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION VS. AGRAVA, FEBRUARY 16, 1959

 On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office.  According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination.  It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165,

otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law.

Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of

technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

4. DARAB VS. LUBRICA, APRIL 29, 2005  On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation under Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the Land Bank of the Philippines. Subject of the case was Suntay’s landholdings covering a total area of 948.1911 hectares situated in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro.  The DAR and Land Bank determined its value at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and 50/100 (P4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation according to Suntay, was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of property without due process of law.  After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Suntay, ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100 (P157,541,951.30) as just compensation for the taking of a total of 948.1911 hectares of Suntay’s properties.

 Land Bank filed a petition for just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro against Suntay, DAR, and RARAD.  The petition prayed that just compensation for the taking of Suntay’s landholdings be declared in the amount of Four Million Two Hundred Fifty One Thousand, One Hundred Forty-One Pesos (P4,251,141.00).  Suntay moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of capacity to sue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata. 

After Land Bank filed its comment on Suntay’s motion to dismiss, the RTC, sitting as a special agrarian court, dismissed Land Bank’s petition for failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period.9



The special agrarian court also denied Land Bank’s Motion for Reconsideration for being pro-forma.10 Thereafter, Land Bank appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal with the special agrarian court.

While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special agrarian court, upon motion of Suntay, the RARAD issued an Order12 on May 22, 2001, declaring its January 24, 2001 Decision as final and executory after noting that Land Bank’s petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period.

Whether or not the DARAB has to take cognizance to act in the Certiorari petition of the LBP with regard to the writ of execution issued by the RARAD against the LBP. No. DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Bank’s petition for certiorari. Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist

as a matter of law.26It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law.27 It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated. In the case at bar, the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasijudicial body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Bank's petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of authority

D. Due Process in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings 1. ANG TIBAY VS. CIR, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) The right to a Hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2) The Tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) It must have Something to support its decision. (4) The Evidence must be "substantial (5) The Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his Own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not

simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can Know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

2. DANAN VS. ASPILLERA  Petitioner spouses were holders of a certificate of public convenience for the installation, maintenance, and operation of a 4-ton ice plant in Orion, Bataan, issued to them by the Public Service Commission in 1958, which ice plant was acquired by purchase from third persons.  However, for abandonment or non-operation for almost three years, the said certificate was cancelled and revoked by the Public Service Commission.  Two days thereafter, or on 4 February 1960, the Commission, granted to respondent Cortisan & Co., Inc., a certificate of public convenience to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant in the same municipality of Orion, Bataan, after trial and with due notice to herein petitioners.  The latter failed to appear during the hearing on 4 February 1960 due to an alleged accident they met on their way to Manila. In this connection, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on 12 February 1960, for which reason the permit granted to Cortisan & Co., Inc., remained in full force and effect.

WON the Commission violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner for not giving due notice and hearing. Yes. The practice of the Public Service Commission of revoking certificates without giving the operator previous notice and opportunity to explain his side, violates the due process clause of the Constitution, the express provisions of section 16 (n) of the Public Service Act, and the doctrines of the Supreme Court (Bohol Land Trans. vs. Jureidini, 53 Phil., 560; Pangasinan Trans, vs. Halili, 95 Phil., 694; Collector vs. Buan, G. R. No. L-11438, 31 July 1958). The Public Service Commission is an agency of the government, and should, at all times, maintain a due regard for the constitutional rights of parties litigant. Also, the Commissioners (who are not judges in the true sense) would do well to ponder the implications of Article 32, No. 6, of the New Civil Code on the individual responsibility of public officers and employees who impair a person's right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The petition for review is hereby denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, the orders complained of having thereby become final. Costs against petitioners.

3. MONTOYA VS. VARILLA, DECEMBER 18, 2008  Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), was assigned to the Central Police District (CPD) in Quezon City, when the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044 dropping him from the rolls for failure to attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course (LEEC) at the Special Training Unit, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.  Montoya had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days. Four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration

thereof addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR), explaining that on 22 January 1998, he went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave Form approved by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not approved.  Montoya averred that his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from arthritis with on and off symptoms of severe body pain.  Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No. 990 canceling Special Order No. 1044. Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days, from 8 June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings of his administrative liability. The 67 days when Montoya went on absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately deducted from his leave credits.  The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro of the Central Police District Office (CPDO), and based on his findings, the NCR Regional Director rendered a Decision dismissing Montoya from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective immediately.

Whether or not the right to due process of petitioner was violated. Yes. The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar. Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural

principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable to administrative proceedings. In particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were flawed from the very beginning when these were conducted without due notice to him. The NCR Regional Director, through Manere, never contested the fact that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his investigation without giving notice to Montoya. Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the hearings, present written or oral arguments, and submit evidence in his favor; he was completely deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges against him and was irrefragably denied due process.

4. FABELLA VS. CA, NOVEMBER 28, 1997 Then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a return to work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walkouts and strikes. Secretary Cariño filed administrative charges against the striking teachers. The Secretary also placed

the teachers under preventive suspension. The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit. However, the trial court did not issue a restraining order. The teachers amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. The DECS Secretary through the Solicitor General, contended that in accordance with the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court should not interfere in the administrative proceedings. Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision finding the striking teachers guilty as charged and ordered their dismissal. The trial court also dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court's order of dismissal and reinstating the action, even as it ordered the teachers' reinstatement pending decision of their case. The trial court rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of the teachers null and void. The trial court held that Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers," is the primary law that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. As a result, the committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against the teachers was illegally constituted and all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever. From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them. Hence, this petition for review. Whether or not private respondents were denied due process. YES. In administrative proceedings, recognized to include the following:

due

process

has

been

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the

essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them. The Court ordered the DECS to reinstate the private respondents and award all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal.

5. PEFIANCO VS. MORAL, JANUARY 19, 2000

On 26 July 1994, former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief

and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library. After several hearings on the complaint, Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the administrative offenses and ordered the dismissal of respondent from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remuneration. Respondent did not appeal the judgment. Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report purportedly to guide her on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under the circumstances. Her petition was, however, denied. Respondent then instituted an action for mandamus and injunction against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case, but the trial court denied his motion. On appeal by Secretary Gloria, the Court of Appeals dismissed Secretary Gloria's petition holding that petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration. Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the order denying the motion to dismiss was interlocutory and thus not appealable. Secretary Gloria's motion for reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate court. Hence, the instant petition for review. Secretary Gloria was subsequently replaced by petitioner.

Whether the judge’s denial of the motion was proper. No. The challenged Order of the trial court was a patent nullity for failure to comply with the requirements prescribed in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of the Rules, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with and the

aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower court directly on certiorari. Respondent is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. Moreover, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she had a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it was the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Furthermore, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. Hence, the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss was not a mere error of judgment but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such instance, while the trial court's order was merely interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it was rendered with abuse of discretion. Hence, the Court granted the petition, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and dismissed the mandamus case.

6. GARCIA VS. MOLINA, AUGUST 10, 2010 Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two separate Memoranda dated May 23, 2002 from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct. Molina was charged for allegedly committing the following acts: 1) directly and continuously helping some alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest actions and/or illegal assemblies against the management and the GSIS President and General Manager; 2) leading the concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22, 2002 during office hours within the GSIS compound; and 3) continuously performing said activities despite warning from his immediate superiors. Velasco was accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on Office Decorum for leaving his office without

informing his supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination for persistently disregarding petitioner's instructions that Velasco should report to the petitioner's office. Petitioner required respondents to submit their verified answer within seventy two (72) hours. Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days without pay, effective immediately. The following day, a committee was constituted to investigate the charges against respondents. Respondents denied the charges against them. Instead, they averred that petitioner was motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for lack of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and judge. On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive Suspension Order. 10 They contended that the acts they allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave misconduct. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could not act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time, respondents filed with the CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to this Commission. CSC failed to resolve respondents' motions to lift preventive suspension order and to transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC. Respondents filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). CA rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Whether the respondents were fully accorded the requisite opportunity to be heard, were in fact heard and being heard, and whether the conduct of preliminary investigation in administrative proceedings is an essential requisite to the conduct of adjudication. The Supreme Court En Banc recently affirmed the Court of Appeals decision declaring the preventive suspension of two Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) lawyers null and void and awarding them their back salaries during the period of

their unjustified suspension. Respondents Maria Molina and Albert Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, were denied due process of the law when petitioner Winston Garcia, in his capacity as GSIS President and General Manager, sans the requisite preliminary investigation issued two separate Memoranda charging the respondents with allegedly committing acts constituting grave misconduct and ordering their preventive suspension for 90 days without pay. The Court held that although the Civil Service Rules do not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void, it is, however, “mandatory for the disciplinary authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his side.” The Court adds “this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required therein is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents.” No exception is provided by the CSC Rules, not even an indictment in flagranti, as claimed by the petitioner, held the Court. The Court explained that even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, he could comply with such requirement by issuing a “memorandum requiring the respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents' comments, petitioner would have properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against the respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges.” The Court stressed the cardinal precept “that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.”

E. Cease and desist orders 1. POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS. CA, MARCH 11, 1991  Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River.  Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar.  Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the river.  Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations.  Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.  Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and

remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled.

Whether or not PAB has the authority to issue ex parte cease and desist order. Yes. The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

F. Right to counsel 1. LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty

due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not

indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

G. Quantum of evidence 1. PRANGAN VS. NLRC, APRIL 15, 1998  Petitioner Eduardo B. Prangan questioned the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for dismissing his appeal for lack of merit.  The records of the case reveal that petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter against private respondent for underpayment of wages, non-payment of salary from August 16-31, 1993, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, night shift differential, uniform allowance, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from the year 1990 to 1993.  In its decision, the Labor Arbiter held that private respondents Masagana Security Service Corporation (MSSC) and/or Victor Padilla liable to petitioner for the amount of Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Two Pesos and Sixteen Centavos (P9,932.16) representing the premium pay for holiday and rest days, night shift

differential, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, uniform allowance and unpaid salary.  Not satisfied with the above-mentioned monetary award, petitioner appealed to the NLRC contending that the Labor Arbiter erred in concluding that he only worked for four hours and not twelve hours a day. The NLRC, however, dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this instant petition.

What is the quantum of evidence in an administrative proceedings? Substantial evidence. We find merit in the petition. To be sure, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded with respect even finality if supported by substantial evidence. 8 In this regard, we have defined substantial evidence as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Absent such quantum of evidence, the Court is not precluded from making its own independent evaluation of facts. 10 In the instant case, there is no dispute that matters concerning an employee's actual hours of work are within the ambit of management prerogative. However, when an employer alleges that his employee work less than the normal hours of employment as provided for in the law, he bears the burden of proving his allegation with clear and satisfactory evidence. The Supreme Court finds merit in the petition. The NLRC, in declaring that petitioner only worked for four hours, relied solely on the supposed daily time records of the petitioner submitted by the private respondent. The Court, however, is of the opinion that these documents cannot be considered substantial evidence as to conclude that petitioner only worked for four hours. Even as private respondent insists that petitioner worked for only four hours and

not twelve, yet no employment contract, payroll, notice of assignment or posting, cash voucher or any other convincing evidence was presented to bolster its own contention. When an employer alleges that his employee works less than the normal hours of employment as provided by law, he bears the burden of proving his allegation with clear and satisfactory evidence. All told, private respondent has not adequately proved that petitioner's actual hours of work is only four hours. In view thereof, the instant petition is hereby granted and the decision of the NLRC is set aside and vacated.

H. Decision, appeal and judicial review 1. GAUDENCIO D. DEMAISIP vs. CA G.R. No. L-13000 September 25, 1959 Facts:  The first applicant for a fishpond permit covering Lots Nos. 233, 236 and 237 of Dumangas Cadastre, Iloilo, was the late Geronimo Destacamento.  the Fishpond Permit granted to the late Geronimo Destacamento expired, because he failed to make any improvements on the lots and to pay the required rentals.  Before his death Geronimo Destacamento without the knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry k, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in questions in favor of Serafin Villanueva, an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit granted him.  the District Forester of Iloilo, notwithstanding the existence of the aforesaid deed of sale, requested Serafin Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots. Villanueva neglected and failed to file his application for a fishpond permit, such that no permit was ever granted to him before or after the expiration of the permit of the late Geronimo Destacamaneto.  complainant Gaudencio G. Demaisip filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit application which

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was given No. 2285 for the same lots Nos. 233, 236 and 237. when the fishpond permit in favor of Gaudencio Demaisip was ready to be issued, Serafin Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favor of the herein defendant Luis E. Buenaflor shortly thereafter or in the same month, the latter started to occupy the land, and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam, across the Balabag River. According to the result of an investigation conducted by a representative of the Fish and Game Administration, the dam deprives other fishponds leased from the government of fresh or flowing water and was illegally constructed because it violated a rule of that Office prohibiting the introduction of any improvements on the land applied for before the issuance of a permit. It was only 7 months after Demaisip had filed an application, that Luis Beunaflor also filed his application for the area in question with the Iloilo branch of the Fish and Game Administration. the Director of Fish and Game Administration was called upon to decide who of the conflicting claimants — Luis Buenaflor or Gaudencio G. Demaisip — had a better right to be regard as the lessee of the land in question pursuant to Section 63 of Act No. 4003.

Director Ruling  the application of the applicant respondent Gaudencio E. Demaisip be given due course. Luis e. Buenaflor appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources  the latter official reversed the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration and awarded the right of lease to the lots in question to Luis E. Buenaflor. Court of Appeals  the present action partakes of the nature of a petition for mandamus which should be verified as required by Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, and not having been so

verified it suffers from a fatal defect which cannot confer jurisdiction on the court a quo. Issue: WON plaintiff's action should not be entertained because he has failed to exhaust first all the administrative remedies available to him. Ruling: No. It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines when he reversed the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration, and ruled that the lease application of Demaisip should be denied and that of defendant Beunaflor be given due course upon compliance with certain requirements, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil., 451). It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff's action should not be entertained because he has failed the exhaust first all the administrative remedies available to him. Additional Information: This claim is meritorious for it appears that the instant case was filed on December 4, 1936 and at that time the procedural law that was in force was Act 190 because the present Rules of Court took effect only on July 1, 1940, and it is well-settled that the formal as well as substantial requisites of a pleading are governed by the law prevailing at the time of its filing. We also find correct the claim that the present action is not one for mandamus but an ordinary action wherein several reliefs are prayed for concerning the lease of certain lots which plaintiff desires to be granted, to him, and since the action is not one for mandamus, it is unnecessary to state in the compliant that the plaintiff has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law to entitle him to relief as required in special civil actions. With regards to the question whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has not acted properly or has abused his discretion in reversing the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration awarding the right to lease the lots in questions to Buenaflor as now contended by petitioner, we are not now in a position to pass judgement on the actuation of such official for we do not have before us a copy of his decision. 3. Tan vs. Director of Forestry Facts: This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss. 1. Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961. Petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application on May 5, 1961. 2. June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to convert the area to a forest reserve for watershed purposes. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources made findings that it would be more beneficial for public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions.

3. On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the license of logging operations on a public forest land in Olongapo. 4. On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Director of Forestry to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares. 5. On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by the acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry by having the issuance of new licenses and amendments requiring the signature of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On the same day, the license for petitioner was signed by the Director of Forestry without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 6. On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations. This was granted by the secretary and Petitioner’s timber license was rendered void ab initio. 7. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Secretary. Petitioner then file a case in court, which was also dismissed due to not stating a sufficient cause of action. Issues:

1. Whether or not the timber license is void ab initio. Yes, the Director of Forestry had no longer authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner had not acquired any legal right under such void license. 2. Whether or not dismissal of the petition on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action. Yes, the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Furthermore, even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for- insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the complaint. 3. Whether or not petitioner has exhausted all his administrative remedies. No, Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitionerappellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and

prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy. In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines. Additional Notes: Naa say issues nga dili kaayo related sa topic heading: a. Doctrine of State Immunity, the petition cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued. Respondents were acting within the scope of its authority as State officers. b. Even if the timber license is still valid, Respondents can still revoke his license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require". The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power Bartulata vs. Peralta 59 SCRA 7 Facts:  In the case herein, petitioner began his service in the armed forces of the Philippines on January 15, 1924 upon his enlistment in the Philippine Constabulary.  When the Pacific war broke out in 1941, he held the rank of sergeant in the Philippine Constabulary.  When the order for surrender to the enemy was issued by the high command of the USAFFE, he refused to surrender and, instead, he joined the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, a guerrilla organization in Mindanao. This guerrilla outfit was recognized on February 13, 1943 by the Headquarters, Philippine Ryukyus Command of the United

States Armed Forces, which recognition was later revised to take effect as of September 16, 1942.  While in the service of the aforementioned guerrilla outfit, petitioner Bartulata was promoted to the rank of third lieutenant effective November 1, 1942, and to second lieutenant effective April 1, 1943. His name, rank (2nd Lt.) and serial number (0-24220 PA) appeared in the Roster of Reserve Officers in the Headquarters, Mindanao Zone Military Police Command, Philippine Army, per General Order No. 358, dated June 28, 1946, Army Headquarters APO 75.  After the war, petitioner still carrying the rank of 2nd Lieutenant, continued to render service under the postwar Philippine Army. He was assigned as Junior Officer of the 62nd Military Police Command (PA). As second lieutenant he was paid his salaries and allowances and was allowed to wear his uniform as such officer. His services ended when he was honorably discharged, effective January 31, 1947, as a second lieutenant.  On September 1, 1956, petitioner Bartulata filed an application for retirement pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 340, as amended. Since he had rendered more than 25 years of continuous military service, his application was approved and officially announced in paragraph 13, Special Order No. 126 of General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, dated December 19, 1957, retiring him with the rank of Staff Sergeant effective January 31, 1947, the date when he was separated from the service. Contending that he should be retired as second lieutenant instead of staff sergeant, petitioner Bartulata, on several occasions, requested readjustment of his retirement rank, but said requests were denied by General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and by the Secretary of National Defense, upon the ground that his name does not appear in the approved reconstructed roster of his guerrilla outfit, and as such it is "conclusive that his service was not recognized or that the recognition of his guerrilla status was revoked.” Thereupon, Bartulata sought relief from the lower court, but the latter, on the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties and the other documents admitted by them,

dismissed his petition as stated in the beginning of this opinion. Hence, this appeal. Issue: 1. Whether or not he should be retired with the rank of staff sergeant as contended by respondents, or with the rank of second lieutenant as claimed by petitioner? 2. Whether the petitioner must, “exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him before coming to court? Held: 1. No. This Court, speaking of the probative weight of the revised roster, said that the entries in the Army's roster of recognized guerrillas, assuming them to be the official acts of duly authorized public officers, are merely prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In other words, this roster or list is not to be considered the sole and exclusive evidence of the government's recognition of guerrilla services. As there is nothing in the law making inadmissible other proof of such recognition, where they are material and relevant. Further, this Court said that the recognized roster (drawn up primarily for backpay purposes) must yield to the initial roster (which in that case showed that Aragon was already serving six months before the Leyte landing of the liberation troops). In the case now before this Court, respondents' theory must be rejected. This Court holds that the Philippine Government had recognized not only herein petitioner's wartime and post-liberation services in the Army, but also his rank as 2nd lieutenant. The recognition was made when his name was included in the initial roster of the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District; when he was given backpay for services rendered as second lieutenant from April 1, 1943 to May 15, 1945; when he was paid his salaries and allowances as second lieutenant; when he was allowed to wear the uniform as such officer; and when he was honorably discharged with the rank of second lieutenant on January 31, 1947. Even the approval of petitioner's retirement application indicated a clear showing of the recognition of petitioner's guerrilla and post

liberation services. It will be noted that in Special Orders No. 126, which officially announced the approval of his retirement, it is stated that he had completed 23 years and 15 days of service. And it will also be noted that in the stipulation of facts, respondents admit that petitioner had rendered more than 23 years of continuous military service. These 23 years and 15 days of service cover the period from January 15, 1924 (date of original enlistment) up to January 30, 1947 inclusive, as the records do not show that he had rendered further military service. If the petitioner, as contended by the respondents, had not served under the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, nor was he a member thereof or that his guerrilla status was revoked, his wartime services, dating as early as October 1, 1942 and ending May 15, 1945, could not have been included in the computation of his military service. The inclusion of the period from October 1, 1942 to May 15, 1945 in petitioner's military service record simply means his guerrilla services with the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, the only guerrilla outfit he was known and shown to have served in, was duly recognized by the authorities of the Philippine Army. The fact that his name may not be included in the roster of recognized guerrillas of the Philippines that is kept by the authorities of the United States Government should not matter. What should matter are the records of the Philippine Government regarding his military activities, including his services in the guerrilla during the last World War II. We hold that on the basis of the evidence, amply and adequately showing the Philippine government's due recognition of petitioner's guerrilla services, it is but fair and legal, that he be accorded all the rights, the benefits and the privileges that are due him as a recognized guerrilla to be retired with the rank of second lieutenant, which was his rank when the afore-quoted Executive Order No. 121, confirming it, was promulgated, and which was the rank that he was holding when honorably discharged from the Army. 2. No. In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the doctrine requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as

an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. The present proceedings having been brought against the Secretary of National Defense, respondents' contention is clearly untenable. 4. Calo vs. Fuertes 5 SCRA 397; 115 Phil. 393 Appeal to the President is a final step in the administrative process and therefore a condition precedent FACTS:  The case is all about a Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City, entitled Francisco C. Calo, claimant- contestant, vs. H. A. No. 86871 (E-40476) Delfin C. Fuertes, applicantrespondent, the Director of Lands rendered on 12 April 1956 an opinion denying and dismissing former's claim and contest against the Homestead Application No. 86871 (E40476) of Delfin C. Fuertes, ordering him to vacate the premises within sixty days from receipt of a copy of the opinion, and stating that upon finality thereof homestead patent would be issued to Delfin C. Fuertes.  His request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands on 25 January 1957, Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case, docketed as DANR case No. 1549. On 28 February 1958 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources modified the opinion of the Director of Lands— . . . in the sense that Delfin C. Fuertes should reimburse Francisco C. Calo of the difference between the value of the improvements the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the value of the consequential benefits derived by him therefrom within thirty (30) days from advice by the Director of Lands who is hereby directed to determine the aforementioned difference within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision. Still dissatisfied with the above opinion, Francisco C. Calo asked the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to reconsider it but the latter denied reconsideration thereof. Hence, on 1 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo appealed to the

President of the Philippines, but on 8 August 1958 he withdrew it before the President of the Philippines could act thereon.  On 22 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writ of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined; that if a bond be needed for the purpose he was willing to file it; that after hearing the injunction be made final and permanent; that the respondent Delfin C. Fuertes pay him P18,000 as damages and attorney's fees and costs of the suit; that he be declared the owner entitled to possess the parcel of land subject of the litigation; and for any other just and equitable relief. ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable. HELD: The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case. The appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable. Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court lies only when "there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. The judgment appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed.

The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the petitionerappellant. 5.FORTICH VS. CORONA, APRIL 24, 1998 The issue in this case stems from a proposed agro-economic development of the disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. Expressing full support for the proposed project, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon on March 4, 1193 enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or reclassifying the subject 144-hectare land from agricultural to industrial/institutional use. It was intended to provide an opportunity to attract investors, who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people. Bukidnon Provincial Board also supported the said project.

Whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). No. Local Government Units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use. It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the province of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management and Development Corporations, and all others who should be benefited by the said decision. The issue here is not a question of technicality but that of substance and merit. Whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed the issue. Converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality.

Procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial purposes cannot be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local governments units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The motions filed by petitioners assailing the Resolution of this Court dated November 17, 1998 partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is clearly prohibited by Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in exceptional cases, the Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, but the same must be filed with express leave of court. Petitioners failed to secure the required prior leave from the Court and the issue raised had been settled in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. CA in the negative. A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution reveals that there is a distinction between "cases" and "matters", that "cases" are decided while "matters" are resolved. Therefore, only "cases" are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained and does not apply in the resolution of motions for reconsideration. Motions denied with finality.

I. Res judicata

1. DULAY VS. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, FEBRUARY 9, 1993 This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by the Office of the President, both of which have attained finality.

DANR Case No. 2898 (Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete): • By a barter agreement entered into between Quibete and Padios, the former exchanged his parcel of land for the latter's fishpond area. • In 1932, Quibete applied for a Fish and Game Special Permit over the area. It was later approved in 1949. • In 1958, Dico filed her fishpond application to occupy the area covered by petitioner's fishpond lease agreement -disapproved on the ground that the area she applied had already been awarded to Quibete. MR was denied. • Quibete meanwhile sold and/or transferred his rights and interests over the area to Retirado (whose heirs subsequently sold it to Petitioner Dulay). • Dico filed a protest with Commission. Protest dismissed.

the

Philippine

Fisheries

• Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dismissed her appeal. •

Appealed to the Office of the President. Appeal dismissed.

DANR Case No. 3447 (Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete): • While DANR Case No. 2898 was still pending, private respondent Angeles Dico filed with the Director of Lands a free patent application for a dry portion of Lot 489-C covered by Fishpond Permit of Quibete. • The Director of Lands rejected the application of private respondent Dico. • A motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondent Dico appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

• That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case No. 2898 aforesaid, the Secretary affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands. • Dico moved to reconsider the Secretary's decision but her motion was denied. A second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. • Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to the rights and interests over the area in question and was subsequently issued a fishpond lease agreement. • In 1977, Angeles Dico submitted a letter-petition to the respondent officials requesting for a `reopening of the fishpond conflict based on newly discovered evidence'. • It was there alleged that the Fishpond Permit of Juan Quibete did not cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C). She prayed that petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled. • Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res judicata. She argued that the two administrative decisions involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action, have already become final. • Private respondent Dico argues that res judicata does not apply in cases where the government has to exercise its inherent power to regulate. • Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to dismiss in abeyance and ordered that an investigation be conducted. • Petitioner filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order. TRO granted.

Whether or not res judicata applies in this case. Yes.

It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction. DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete," was decided by the office of the President on November 14, 1969. Since the same was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the same has long become final and executory. DANR Case No. 3447 not having been brought likewise to the courts for judicial review, has also become final and executory. The next step that private respondent should have taken from the Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case 3447 was to appeal the same to the office of the President within 30 days from receipt of said Decision. Private respondent received the Decision on September 21, 1970 and should have appealed the same by October 24, 1970. Instead she filed a motion for reconsideration only on November 3, 1970. Clearly, the July 9, 1970 decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 3447 had become final and executory. Moreover, a careful review of her alleged "newly discovered evidence" does not support the charge of fraud allegedly committed by Quibete and Retirado. The matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond and which rights he sold to Retirado was investigated TWICE. Both investigations - more than three years apart with investigators from different offices - showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved Lot 489-C although in the different documents, including maps, which make up this case, it was designated as Lot 487. Thus, no merit can be given to private respondent's alleged pieces of evidence as all these HAD already been studied thoroughly in separate investigations. The matter having become

final, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give due course to private-respondent's letterpetition requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved herein. The temporary restraining order is hereby made PERMANENT.

2. ENCINAS VS. AGUSTIN, APRIL 11, 2013 Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. They claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner – who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija – informed them that unless they gave him five thousand pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas. Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be transferred to the Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and respondent Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug Fire Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents came up short and managed to give only two thousand pesos (P2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively. Based on the abovenarrated circumstances, respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint (BFP Complaint) on 27 March 2000 for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990. The record is not clear as to why this Complaint was later docketed by the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City, their Joint Affidavit/Complaint (CSCRO Complaint). This time, they accused petitioner of violation of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

6.That we executed this affidavit to file a complaint against C. Insp. Carlito C. Encinas BFP for violation of Section 4 (C) R.A. 6713, that is "Justness and sincerity. — Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."

The CSCRO Complaint erroneously pertained to the abovequoted provision as Section 4 (c), but it should be denoted as Section 4 (A) (c). On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation was conducted in connection with his alleged extortion activities, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. He was required to file an answer within five (5) days from notice.

CSC Regional Office Ruling: Finding petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from service.

CSC Ruling: Petitioner's appeal was subsequently denied by CSC in its Resolution No. 080941 dated 19 May 2008 (CSC Resolution). 50 It ruled that there was no forum-shopping committed by respondents, and that substantial evidence existed to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

CA Ruling: Subsequently, the CA, in its assailed Decision, denied petitioner's appeal. The CA ruled that it was not the lettercomplaint filed by respondents that commenced the

administrative proceedings against petitioner; instead, it was the formal charge filed by Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The lettercomplaint merely triggered the CSCRO's fact-finding investigation. Considering that the Complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain a certification of non-forum-shopping.

I. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping. II. Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.

The Petition is devoid of merit. We rule that petitioner is administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service under the Administrative Code of 1987; thus, we affirm his dismissal from service.

I. Respondents are not guilty of forum-shopping. We rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents. Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays down the rule that an existing final judgment or decree on the merits, rendered without fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, on the points and matters in issue in the

first suit. In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action. A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;" or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point." In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality. The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluating evidence;

(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner. The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public prosecutor's preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed.

II. The CA was correct in ruling that there was substantial evidence to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. On the substantive issue, petitioner claims that the findings are based on a misapprehension of facts. The dismissal of respondents from service allegedly placed their credibility in question. We do not agree. We find petitioner administratively

liable for his act of demanding P5,000 from respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment. At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case they are accorded not only great respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before the latter to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion, had the evidence been properly appreciated. This rule is rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those matters. This Court will not disturb the factual findings of both the CSC and the CA, absent any compelling reason to do so. The conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved — after their own thorough investigations and hearings, as well as their consideration of the evidence presented before them and their findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the CA — must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this Court. We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from the service would not suffice to discredit them as witnesses. In view of the foregoing, we rule that petitioner's act of demanding money from respondents in exchange for their nonreassignment constitutes grave misconduct. We have defined grave misconduct as follows: Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules,

which must be established by substantial evidence. (Emphasis supplied) Considering that petitioner was found guilty of two (2) offenses, then the penalty of dismissal from the service — the penalty corresponding to the most serious offense — was properly imposed. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DENIED.