Pubcorp Cases Updated.docx

1. MMDA vs. Bel-air Village Association 328 SCRA 836 p19 - 20 2. Ganzon vs CA 200 SCRA 278 p.51 3. The Province of Batangas vs Romulo 429 SCRA 736 4. Mathay vs. CA 320 SCRA 703 p. 13 5. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. CA 181 SCRA 495 p. 15 p. 16 6. Ordillo vs. COMELEC 192 SCRA 100 p16 7. Abbas vs. COMELEC 179 SCRA 287 p16 – 17, p33 8. Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong 187 SCRA 432 p. 17 9. Torralba vs. Municipality of Sibagat 147 SCRA 390 p. 23 10. Tobias vs. Abalos 239 SCRA 106 p. 32 11. Republic of the Philippines vs. City of Davao 389 SCRA 691 (2002)

1. MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc. March 27, 2000 Puno, J. Facts Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members arehomeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered ownerof Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. Actions Filed: 1.BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due hearing,trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has noauthority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolitionof its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. 3. MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse. Issues

1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory andpolice powers? 2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic? Held: A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate." 17 — one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. 18 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. 19 They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. 20 The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative innature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system andadministration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislativepower.The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local governmentunits, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. Inthe case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution orderingthe opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondentCourt of Appeals did not err in so ruling.The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately thepowers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of aprivate street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is notantithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Dispositive IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appealsare affirmed

2. Ganzon vs CA 200 SCRA 278

obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)

FACTS: The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials. The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively. The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days. In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5 Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in

On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court. On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions. In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto. Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746). ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials. Ruling: Yes. It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the

debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22 It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote: Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.23 The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly selfexecuting, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code,27 a local tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29 and a national representation law,30 and measures31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of

the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus: Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.32 The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held,34 xxx

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"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."36"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.37 As we held,38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate

the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government. case,54

As we observed in one decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "selfimmolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.55 The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges,

the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held:56 The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence.61 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny. As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion. We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor

Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence. In resume the Court is laying down the following rules: 1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide; 2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; 3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy; 4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials; 5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have); 6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided: a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)] b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a

bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.1âwphi1 The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ concur. 3. The Province of Batangas vs Romulo 429 SCRA 736 FACTS: In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds. Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for

the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.

GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.

HELD: Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down. According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Limdistinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them. The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without need of further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate. The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case. The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs. Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate lawand not through appropriations laws or

The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based. 4. Mathay vs. CA 320 SCRA 703 FACTS: During his administration, Brigido Simon appointed the three private respondents for the Civil Service Units pursuant to a Presidential Decree creating such units. It was later held in an opinion of the Ministry of Justice that the PD wasn’t published in the Official Gazette and therefore, didn’t become a proper law. Pursuant to this, the CSC issued an order for the revocation of same appointments. The then mayor Simon remedied this by issuing an ordinance calling for the automatic absorption of the appointees to the created Department of Public Order and Safety. The said department didn’t quite reach fruition due to insufficiency of funds and lack of regular and permanent positions to be filled. The mayor then issued contractual appointments, which was carried over by the next mayor Mathay. But at the expiration of the said contractual appointments, it was no longer approved, prompting the private respondents to file a complaint with the CSC. The CSC ordered Mathay to reinstate the private respondents pursuant to the previous ordinance issued. Issue: W/N the CSC has authority to direct the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. HELD: NO. Applying the old LGC, the CSC erred in applying the provisions of the ordinance in ordering the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. The questioned ordinance ordered the absorption of the personnel of the

defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions. Hence, the city council is in effect through the ordinance dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions. However, a review of the old Local Government Code shows that the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council through a simple expedient of enacting an ordinance that provides for the absorption of specific persons to certain positions. In upholding the provisions of the ordinance on the automatic absorption of the personnel without allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of the mayor, the CA in turn makes the sweeping statement that the doctrine of separation of powers doesn’t apply to local governments, which is wrong. The powers of the city council and the mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated in the old LGC. The power to appoint belongs to the city mayor while the power to create, consolidate, and reorganize city officers and positions supported by local funds belongs to the city council. By ordering petitioner to “reinstate” private respondents pursuant to Section 3 of the Ordinance, the Civil Service Commission substituted its own judgment for that of the appointing power. This cannot be done. In a long line of cases, 11 we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service Commission’s power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made. Once the Civil Service Commission attests whether the person chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its role in the appointment process necessarily ends. The Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

5. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA 181 SCRA 495 Ponente: Cortes Facts: In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA). After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13,

1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA a ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220). The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera people shall have been substantially granted. On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state: Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras. Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order. Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3]. EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created to accelerate economic and socialgrowth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in theCordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs andservices in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as withthe executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and inidentifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It shall alsomonitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the

region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policyformulating body and a CordilleraExecutive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized.In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organicact and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Issue 1: Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional Ruling: A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatoryt o the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions. Issue 2: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is itvested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sueand be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning andimplementation of programs and services in the covered areas Issue 3: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces. It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it

being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]

The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions. 6. Ordillo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990 Gutierrez, J. FACTS: January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite. Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population,and as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas. February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.” March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991. Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220. March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220

were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act. Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. Petitioners therefore pray that the court: a.declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 andprohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending publicfunds for the purpose. b.declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and thesame is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units. ISSUE: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for thecreation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute suchregion. HELD: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. a. The keyword in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities,municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution,as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, populationwise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V,sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial

organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXIsec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces and cities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical. 7. Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 673 4 on thefollowing grounds:1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case doesn’t say)2) R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a plebiscite as provided in the Constitution3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite by all voters residing in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says “by a majority or votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite and only those provinces andcities where a majority of votes cast in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the Autonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural and historical heritage and other relevant characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions run counter to the Koran6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrary to the constitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of the plebiscite7) R. A. 6734 says “…that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administr ative regions: Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. This provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, “No province city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established with the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the units directly affected.” (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution)

Issue: Whether or are unconstitutional.

not

certain

provisions

of the

Organic

Act

that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such removal. He asked that the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.

Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional. The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

Issue 2: W/N President has the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions. 8. Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong 187 SCRA 432 Facts: The original complaint was filed with the said court on August 10, 1989, by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate, of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta. He questioned the petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally parked but, more importantly,

Judge Arsenio M. Gonong issued a temporary restraining order on August 14, 1989, and hearings on the writ of preliminary injunction were held on August 18, 23, and 25, 1989. The writ was granted on this last date. The parties also agreed to submit the case for resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. The parties then submitted simultaneous memoranda in support of their respective positions, following which the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision. In ruling for the complainant, Judge Gonong held that LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At any rate, he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605. Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act. On the allegation that the practice was "the root cause of graft and corruption or at the very least the equivalent of street racket among defendant's deployed agents. Issue: Whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing Petitioner for removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. Held: The Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.

9. Torralba vs. Municipality of Sibagat 147 SCRA 390 Facts: Batas Pambansa 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution: Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Petitioners argued that the LGC must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation of any province, city, municipality, or barrio and since no LGC had yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the latter could not have possibly complied with any criteria when the Municipality was created. The Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was not yet in existence. Issue: W/N the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio. Held: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created. 10. Tobias vs Abalos Gr No. L-114783. December 8, 1994 Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675, President Ramos signed it into law. Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect. Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule. They also alleged that the subject law embraced two principal subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. Issue: 1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional. 2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may increase. 3. Whether or not the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district

Ruling: 1. No. The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city – one representative” as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution. The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural ang logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequence of the proposed law and its operation. 2. Yes. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. 3. No. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

11. Republic of the Philippines vs. City of Davao 389 SCRA 691 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the decision 2 dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor of respondent, the City of Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The trial court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage in favor of respondent.

Facts: On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. Attached to the application were the required documents for its issuance, namely, a) detailed location map of the project site; b) brief project description; and c) a certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area (ECA). The EMB Region XI denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise known as the Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS), in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No, 1151, also known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its project. Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, docketed as Civil Case No. 28,133-2000. It alleged that its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMBRegion XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires local government units (LGUs) to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. A local government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The trial court also declared, based on the certifications of the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It therefore

becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondents application for CNC after it has satisfied all the requirements for its issuance. Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue the CNC, if it refuses to do so. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review. Issue: WON the LGU’s are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one which requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) Held: Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,5 otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally.6 Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit.7 When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government.8When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs.9cräläwvirtualibräry Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology.10 Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, cannot claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586. The trial court, in declaring local government units as exempt from the coverage of the EIS law, failed to relate Section 2 of PD 1586 Section 4 of the same law. Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance

Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.13 The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units14 are juridical persons.15 Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586. Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development. The above-quoted first paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system. 16cThe foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which an Environmental Compliance Certificate is necessary, is environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical area. In the case at bar, respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact because it is not an environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally critical area. The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of them. It is clear, therefore, that the said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 28,133-2000, granting the writ of mandamus and directing the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue in favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction of the Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.