Praveen Kumar Policing The Police > Gun Speaks

THE GUN STILL SPEAKS

Complacency and loopholes in the security system have contributed to giving terrorism in Punjab a fresh lease of of life, writes Praveen Kumar.

The complacency over peace in Punjab was shattered by the bomb blast that killed Punjab chief minister Beant Singh in front of the Punjab and Haryana secretariat building at Chandigarh on August 31, 1995. The assassination vindicated the axiom that superficial calm in a situation of serious conflict can be deceptive.

Complacency on the part of the general public is understandable; complacency even on part of ordinary government functionaries can be accepted. But how authorities responsible for security functions ignored the prime tenets of internal security, and slackened their guard in respect of Punjab terrorism is something difficult to answer.

Firstly, it is unreasonable to presume that the blaze of terrorism which raised its head with the Akali-Nirankari clash of April 13, 1978, reached its crescendo in 1985 and continued with undiminished vigour upto 1992, died down immediately after an elected government came to power. A bomb blast near the Indian Youth Congress office in Delhi on September 11,1993 killed eight persons though Youth Congress president

M.S.Bitta survived the attempt and the son of Ram Niwas Mirdha was kidnapped by the Khalistan Liberation Force.

A minor blast in a car in proximity to chief minister Beant Singh near Dholewas Chowk in Ludhiana, the hub of previous terrorist activities, preceded the more daring venture. Thirdly it is rather foolish to believe that a movement which dug deep roots in countries like Pakistan, the USA, the UK and Canada through committed cadres withered away just because an elected government was restored, or militants were overpowered.

It was often claimed by political observers that terrorism in Punjab in general and the activities of the Babbar Khalsa International in particular came to a virtual end with the death of Babbar Khalsa leader, Sukhdev Singh Babbar, after being caught at patiala in August 1992 Such assessments are far from ground realities.

No militancy having deep roots depends for its survival on a few leaders, the fear of the government or the resolution of minor issues. Such developments may only bring about an ephemeral lull in their activities. It is simplistic to presume that transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and settlement of water and territorial disputes of Punjab with Haryana and Rajasthan would have banished militancy. Terrorism has its own cycles of rise and fall, before it finally withers away with a loss in emotional fervour.

A lull in militancy for a few months or years should not lead to conclusion that terrorism is out. Ironically, Beant Singh as chief minister knew this better than anybody.

He often spoke about the continued threat of militants and called for a joint security zone to fight them.

The fact remains that there was no social base to militancy in Punjab even at the best of times. The close family links of Sikhs and Hindus with often both religions coexisting in a single home and family render the demand for

Khalistan

rather

unrealistic and shallow. Issues like Chandigarh and water and territorial disputes with neighbouring states scarcely arouse the passions of the hoi polloi among Sikhs. Lives, finance and peace having been shattered by 15 years of insurgency and insecurity, they are keen to establish themselves in an

atmosphere of peace. The murders, extortions

and rapes which the terrorists indulged in rubbed off the sheen of martyrdom from their names.

There are reports of a working relationship of late among the militants and their Pakistani masters. Sukhdev Sing Babbar confessed during interrogation in 1992 to the toal disillusion of Sikh militants about intelligence of Pakistanmet its cul de sac

Pakistani intentions.

The Inter-Services

in recruiting Sikhs

after antiinsurgency

operations were strengthened in 1992. Most of the top terrorist leaders fled Punjab in fear. Prominent leaders like Pritam Singh Sekhon of the Khalistan Liberation Force, Wadhawa Singh of the Babbar Khalsa International and Wassam Singh Zafarwal of the Khalistan Commando Force are still hiding in Pakistan. Some other leaders operate from the USA, the UK or Canada.

Pakistan’s efforts to persuade Khalistani

leaders hiding there to resucitate

terrorism in India failed badly. The ISI deputed Parmjit Singh Panjwar of the Khalistan Commando Force to Punjab in 1994, to recruit youths from Ludhiana and surrounding areas. The KCF leader made no headway in his efforts. In a desperate bid, the ISI mobilised

about 1,500 Sikh immigrants from Europe and trained them, but the

immigrants lacked the enthusiasm to carry out tasks in India at the behest of the ISI.

This lull in terrorism cannot be presumed to be the end of terrorism, which is the handiwork of a few activists who form a farthing part of the local population. It is wrong to presume that these activities represent the aspirations and fervour of the common people around them. This silent majority becomes a hostage under inevitable pressures. Once, the people of Punjab found that they were not under terrorist pressures, they collected courage to express their disinclination towards terrorism. It is a blunder to interpret this disinclination as signs of terrorism being uprooted from Punjab.

To trained eyes, signs of terrorism lurking in shadows were already there. There were no signs of Pakistan beating the retreat. Rather, there was every indication of Pakistan going radical in rousing Sikh passions. Virulent attacks of Pakistan’s government controlled electronic media on the Indian government’s alleged repression of minorities and popular movements, human rights violations and its efforts to rouse Sikh sensibilities by its programmes on Sikh traditions and culture give evidence of Pakistan’s dishonest intentions.

The continued terrorism after restoration f popular government in 1992, though in reduced frequency, should have lead those in charge of anti-insurgency operations to conclude that terrorism was alive and may come out of its shell.

Failures on the fronts of analysis, research and use of intelligence also contributed to the complacency over Punjab. Indian security agencies did intercept Sikh militants crossing the Indo-Pak border in 1994, and seized from them a document called ‘ Policy paper’ of Punjab militants, wherein plans to resuscitate terrorism were laid down in detail.

Intelligence agencies had information about plants to use human bombs to eliminate those involved in the 1984 anti-Sikh riots and leaders like Beant Singh and Bhajan Lal.

Sikh militants crossing over to

India were arrested and subjected to

interrogation. Through this process, intelligence agencies should have possessed vital information about the future of militancy. It is a dismal commentary on anti-insurgency operations that Indian security forces could derive no benefit from it.

Beant singh being perceived as extremely valuable to terrorist strikes, was provided the highest

grade of security cover available-‘Z plus’. His security

arrangements were next only to that of the Prime Minister.

It is a shocking commentary on the security system that chauffeurs of such heavily protected personages as Beant Singh used to drive his official cars to their houses for lunch. His security chief was transferred out sans measures in advance to expose the incumbent chief to existing security compulsions.

The new chief took charge of the post just the previous evening of the assassination, after the post being vacant for a period, as the officer originally transferred to the post was reluctant to hold charge and went on leave.

These developments do not speak highly about administration in a security apparatus. The very fact that the human bomb, a rank outsider in a police constable’s uniform, could reach Beant Singh, speaks volumes about what really our ‘ A plus’ security cover is.

Once terrorists strike, the police do make appreciable head-way in investigating and detecting the case. Indian police always do it; they did it in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, the Indira Gandhi assassination case and the Mahatma Gandhi assassination case. However, good investigations cannot compensate the provision of adequate protection.