Politics

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ARISTOTLE

S

POLITICS TRANSLATED BY

BENJAMIN JOWETT WITH INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INDEX BY

H. W.

C.

DAVIS, M.A.

FELLOW OF BALLIOL

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON 1908

PRESS

HENRY FROWDE,

M.A.

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH,

NEW YORK

TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION THE

life

of Aristotle, so

far as

it

illustrates this treatise,

He was by birth a Greek, but a native of the small city of Stageira which stood upon the fringe of the Greek world ; he was therefore well be summarized in a few words.

may

fitted by his origin to be an impartial, yet sympathetic critic, of the more famous city-states of Greece. In his youth he studied philosophy at Athens under Plato, thus coming at the

most impressionable period of his life into close relations with the profoundest thinker whom Greece had yet produced. After the death of Plato (347), he quitted Athens to spend some years in the service of the new race of monarchs whose mission at the

it

was

to diffuse

same time

most valuable and

At city

Greek

culture through the East and

to complete the destruction of all that

was

characteristic in the political life of Greece.

the court of Hermias, the obscure tyrant of the obscure of Atarneus, Aristotle had the opportunity of observing

the once great, but then decadent, despotism of Persia, to In 343 or which he makes some references in the Politics.

342 he migrated to Macedonia, joined the court of Philip, and acted for three years or so as tutor to the youthful Alexander. The results of his experience in Macedonia, and the

of the political teaching which he gave to his perhaps be inferred from the comments which, in several passages of the Politics, he passes on monarchies and tyrannies. About the year 335, on the eve of Alex pupil

drift

may

ander s great campaigns of conquest, the philosopher turned his back on Macedonia we may infer from what he says of ;

empires, that while he realized their possible services to

civili-

2

Introduction

zation,

he was

still

more

alive

which beset the path of a His sympathies were with the

other,

to

past,

and

dangers, moral

the

military

and aggressive

not the future

;

state.

with

with Plato Sparta and Athens rather than with Macedon rather than with Alexander. down at he Athens, Settling became the leader of a philosophic school, the director of ;

a brilliant

academy

;

Demosthenes.

odium

but he incurred the

of Macedon was

friend

naturally

exposed

in

to

the

which

a

city of

In 323, after the death of his pupil and patron,

he was driven into exile by a prosecution for impiety which, he had faced it, would probably have brought upon his head

if

the

Chalcis, a

whose

died in

future he doubted, had been

to interpret

the

following year

The

Macedonian stronghold.

the Greeks,

Of

He

of Socrates.

fate

at

semi-barbarians, of

more generous to him than it had been his life-work

whose highest thought and to vindicate.

his literary

work

It is

in

general this

to say that

is

not the place to

he aimed

at expounding in enough speak. the light of his own philosophic principles all the sciences which were then recognized, and that he followed consis

method, of which the Politics are a conspicuous illustration, of combining induction with deductive reasoning tently the

from

first

principles,

and

of testing

his

own

conclusions

by a comparison with popular opinions and those of other Encyclopaedic knowledge has never, before or since, gone hand in hand with a logic so masculine or with But it is in dealing with the moral speculation so profound.

teachers.

rather than the natural sciences that he

is

greatest,

most ade

quately equipped with facts, and most interested in his subject. Of his work in the moral sciences the final results are

The incorporated in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. two treatises are intimately connected. In the Ethics he

Introduction

3

discusses the nature of individual happiness or well-being ; in the Politics he treats of the state as one of the chief means

through which the individual attains to happiness. object of the Politics is both practical and speculative

The ;

to

explain the nature of the ideal city in which the end of happi ness may be completely realized ; to suggest some methods of making existent states more useful to the individual citizen

than they were in Aristotle s time, or had been in the past. Aristotle is not, strictly speaking, the founder of political In the age of Pericles, and earlier still, statesmen science.

and philosophers had theorized about the origin of society, the relative merits of various constitutions, and other kindred topics.

Though

was more concerned with

Socrates

ethics

than with politics, he applied the powerful solvent of his dialectic to many of the political ideas which were fashionable

The conceptions of utility as the ideal which the statesman should pursue, and of scientific knowledge as the indispensable equipment of the statesman, would seem to have in his day.

had

their birth in the Socratic circle. Plato, the pupil of Socrates, not content with developing the suggestions of his

master and with giving to the Socratic formulae a deeper meaning, essayed a more systematic discussion of the nature

of the

state

and

its

describes the state as

right organization. it

In the Republic he

founded and governed he offered to the statesmen of

would appear

if

by philosophers ; in the Laws his age a model more practicable and more nearly related to the experience of the past a model which the legislator for ;

a

new colony might

follow without undue violence to

Greek

Although the views of Plato are prejudices and opinions. sharply, and not always justly, criticized by Aristotle, the influence of the Republic and the Laws is perceptible in many places of the Politics

where they are not mentioned. B 2

Introduction

4 The

Politics, in fact, would not be so valuable as they are they expressed the views of an individual man of genius and nothing more. Here as elsewhere it is not the least of if

Aristotle s merits that

he epitomized the best thoughts of

a nation and of a stage in

human

history.

He

respected the

of the past, both the statesmen and the theorists 5 he was loth to admit that any institution or polity which had stood the test of time could be altogether bad. political

thinkers

Hence he appears before us as a mediator in the controversies own and the preceding ages. It is his wish to lay bare

of his

the grain of truth which exists at the core of every political practice and belief. interprets even those ideals with which

He

sympathy. And so we learn from him what the various types of the city-state signified to the Greek mind ; we are admitted under his guidance to the penetralia of their

he

is least in

political thought.

The

history of the Greek city-state we can study for our with fewer sources of information, it is true, than Aristotle had at his command, but also with a more critical selves,

appreciation of their value and a

more

scientific

method of

interpretation than was to be learned in Athenian schools of the fourth century. are too in a better position than

We

Aristotle to see the true place of the city-state in the evolution

of society, to appreciate

its

and to draw the moral from

limitations, to its failure.

condemn

We

its

evils,

know, what he

does not appear to have suspected, that the careers of his Macedonian patrons had sealed the death-warrant of the

community which he regarded as the highest that human was capable of framing. Ampler experience has shown

skill

us that slavery

is

not the indispensable basis of a civilization,

nor commerce always degrading to the individual and destruc In the modern world we have tive of national morality.

Introduction

f

before us communities which, in defiance of his prophecies, have become extensive without becoming disunited. By his

own methods of induction and comparison we can refute some of the laws which he regarded as immutable. His account of the Still we must start from Aristotle. be supplemented and corrected, but not super governing ideas of any polity are always best expressed by those to whom they stand for the absolute and of final truth ; and there is no form of polity which the student

may

city-state

seded.

The

political science

Just because

should study with more care than the city-state. comparatively simple, just because it is unlike

it is

we

the states with which

are personally acquainted,

it

contains

the key to many modern problems. Aristotle is the best inter preter of an essential link in the chain of political development.

But he

who

is

something more than case of Greece.

states the

and a student of human nature.

this,

He

more than

is

a

Greek

also a philosopher

His views

as to the origin

and ultimate structure of society, as to the aims of civic life, as to the mutual obligations of the state and the individual, as to the

nature of political justice,

all

have a value which

is

It is often difficult to independent of his historical position. follow his discussions of these and cognate subjects. His extreme are stated with and the train conciseness, arguments

of thought which leads him from one topic to another is often But those who have the patience to wrestle far from clear. with his text will find refutations of fallacies

in

it

which

theories of perennial value, and are always re-emerging.

Nor

is

merely from his more abstract disquisitions that such lessons are to be extracted. While there could be no greater mistake it

than to apply his criticisms of democracies and aristocracies to modern governments which go by the same names, without stopping to enquire

how

far the

names have changed

their

6

Introduction

meanings, criticisms,

on the other hand often apparent that these

is

it

when

the necessary qualifications have been made,

are as true of the present as they

an illustration their causes

The work.

may

Of

were of Greece.

this

be found in the account of revolutions and

which forms the

book of the

fifth

Politics.

should probably be regarded as an unfinished There are not infrequent repetitions ; some subjects

Politics

which the author promises

to treat are never treated

;

and we

are sometimes at a loss for the connecting link between suc

cessive books or The traditional parts of the same book. order of the books is probably not that which Aristotle con

The pre templated, and has been altered by most editors. sent translation follows the order of Bekker s first edition ; the numbering of the books in his octavo edition of

been given

in

brackets wherever

it

first.

None of

gested

are completely satisfactory.

differs

the rearrangements which

adopted, the reader

will

find

1878 has

from that of the have been sug

Whichever of them

positions assumed stage of the argument.

that

at

is

an

The only proved at a later should be treated as a quarry of arguments and theories rather than as an artistically constructed piece of earlier are

Politics

studied by the collection and com which bear upon the same topic. It is hoped that for this purpose the subject-headings in the Index, which is abridged from that of the translator, may

literature.

parison of

It

all

be of service.

is

best

the passages

A

brief analysis

is

prefixed to the translation

with the object of explaining the thread of the argument, where such a thread exists, of indicating the natural divisions of the text,

and of enumerating the chief topics of discussion. thanks of the editor are due to the Master of Balliol

The

for his kindness in revising the

proof of this Introduction.

H. W. C. DAVIS.

BOOK cc. I, 2.

The

state is the highest

How

the highest good. will appear if (c.

i).

The

and

Definition

we examine

it

I.

structure of the State.

form of community and aims at differs from other communities

the parts of which

it

is

composed

of villages which consist of households. founded upon the two relations of male and

It consists

household

is

female, of master and slave

The

it

;

man

exists to satisfy

s daily

wider village, community, of needs all the of needs. The state at aims range satisfying men. Men form states to secure a bare subsistence; but the needs.

a wider

ultimate object of the state

of the

satisfies

the good

is

The

life.

a

naturalness

proved by the faculty of speech in man.

state is

In

the order of Nature the state precedes the household and the individual.

It is

founded on a natural impulse, that towards

political association (c. 2).

cc.

Household economy.

3-13.

Children

Let us discuss the household, of households

(c.

3).

a piece of property

rather than

The Slave.

since the state

First as to

which

Property.

and Wives.

is

slavery.

is

composed

The

slave is

animate, and useful for action

for

production (c. 4). Slavery is natural ; in the of natural universe we find the relation every department of ruler and subject. There are human beings who, without possessing reason, understand

it.

These

(c. 5).

But we

find persons in slavery

slaves.

Hence

slavery

they are wrong. a master (c. 6).

itself

is

are natural slaves

who

are not natural

condemned by some

;

but

The natural slave benefits by subjection The art of ruling slaves differs from that

to

of

8

Analysis

ruling free

who

men

but calls for no detailed description; any one

a natural master can acquire

is

As

it

for himself (c. 7).

modes of

property and the

to

acquiring

subject concerns us in so far as property

substratum to the household

This

sake.

is

8).

(c.

which accumulates wealth

that form of finance

This

it.

an indispensable But we do not need is

for its

own

been made possible It accumulates money by

It has

unnatural finance.

by the invention of coined money. Natural and unnatural finance are often

means of exchange.

treated as though they were the same, but differ in their aims (c.

9)

;

also in their subject matter

only concerned with the (c.

Natural finance

10).

fruits is

;

and animals

to the

householder;

necessary

he must therefore know about

for natural finance is

of the earth

live stock, agriculture, possibly

about the exchange of the products of the earth, such as

wood and exist, (c.

minerals, for money. Special treatises on finance and the subject should be specially studied by statesmen

ii).

we must

Lastly,

husband

discuss and distinguish the relations of

to wife, of father to child (c. 12). call for

management persons persons for more than inferior kind

of

trained

in

slaves.

virtue.

The

education of the free

To

man

will

be

(c. 13).

BOOK 1-8.

free

;

Slaves are only capable of an

kinds of virtue.

subsequently discussed

cc.

In household

attention than things

Socrates was wrong in denying that Still the slave must be

virtue.

there are several

more

Ideal Commonwealths

II.

P/alo, P/jaleas, Hippodamus.

ascertain the nature of the ideal state

by examining both the best

states of history

we should

start

and the best that

9

Analysts

Otherwise we might waste our have imagined. time over problems which others have already solved. Among theorists, Plato in the Republic raises the most theorists

fundamental questions.

He

desires to abolish private property

and the family (c. i). But the end which he has in view is all his citizens absolutely alike ; make He wishes to wrong. There but the differentiation of functions is a law of nature. can be too

much

And

unity in a state (c. 2).

which he would promote unity

the means by

The

are wrong.

abolition

of

Communism

property will produce, not remove, dissension.

of wives and children will destroy natural affection (c. 3). Other objections can be raised ; but this is the fatal one

To descend to details. The advantages to be (c. 4). expected from communism of property would be better secured if private property were used in a liberal spirit to the wants of others.

relieve

happier,

and

enables

them

Private to

men

property makes

such

cultivate

virtues

as

The

generosity. Republic makes unity the result of uni the The citizens, which is not the case. formity among been has sense of mankind against Plato, and good always

experiment

would

show

that

his

idea

is

impracticable

(c- 5)-

Plato sketched another ideal state in the Lavus

meant

to be

more

practicable than the other.

;

In the

it

was

Laws

he abandoned communism, but otherwise upheld the leading ideas of the earlier treatise, except that he made the new state

larger

relations,

and too

and to

large.

fix a limit

the increase of population,

He

forgot

to

discuss

foreign

of private property, and to restrict

and to distinguish between

ruler

The form of government which he proposed and subject. was bad (c. 6).

r

o

Analysis

Phaleas of Chalcedon made equal distribution of property feature of his scheme. This would be difficult

the main to

and

effect,

had

would

mind.

in

His

of wealth.

inequality

poor

state

In his

symmetry.

three kinds

and not

the rich

(c. 7).

Hippodamus, who was not a at

which Phaleas

evils

from deeper causes than would be weak against

His reforms would anger

foreign foes. satisfy the

meet the

not

Dissensions arise

practical

aimed

politician,

there were to be three classes,

state

He

of landed property, three sorts of laws.

also proposed to (i) create a Court of Appeal, (2) let juries qualify their verdicts, (3) reward those

of public

His

utility.

classes

who made

discoveries

and his property system were

badly devised. Qualified verdicts are impossible since jurymen may not confer together. The law about discoveries would

encourage

when

men

to

changes diminish the respect for law cc.

912. The

;

Sparta, Crete,

Their Spartans cannot manage their serf population. and too luxurious. Their property

are too influential

system has concentrated all wealth in a few hands. body has decreased. There are points to the

Ephorate, the

Senate,

The

meals, the Admiralty. fit

for war.

of a

Yet even

in

the

Kingship,

Spartan and his

war Sparta

is

the

Hence criticize

common

state are

only

hampered by the want

financial

The but

and

Greek lawgivers.

the citizen in

laws

but needless

(c. 8).

existent states

best

Carthage

The women

Now

tamper with the Constitution.

obsolete and absurd should be changed

are

system (c. 9). Cretan cities resemble Sparta

more

primitive.

in their

constitutions,

Their common meals are

better

Analysis

1 1

But the Cosmi are worse than the Ephors. managed. Cretan constitution is a narrow and factious oligarchy cities are

The the

;

saved from destruction only by their inaccessibility

ro).

(c.

The

is highly praised, and not without be compared with the Spartan it is an It lays stress upon oligarchy with some democratic features. wealth ; in Carthage all offices are bought and sold. Also,

Carthaginian polity

reason.

It

may

;

man may hold

one

These

several offices together.

But the discontent of the people

features.

schemes of emigration (c. n). Of lawgivers, Solon was the best

;

is

bad

are

soothed by

when

conservative

About Philolaus, Chapossible, and a moderate democrat. rondas, Phaleas, Draco, Pittacus, and Androdamas there is little

to be said (c.

1

2).

BOOK cc.

1-5.

How

are

denizen

;

The

we

III.

Citizen, civic virtue, and the civic body,

to define a citizen

private rights

?

He

do not make a

is

more than

citizen.

He

a is

mere ordi

sits on juries narily one who possesses political power ; who and in the assembly. But it is hard to find a definition which To define him as the son of applies to all so-called citizens.

citizen parents is futile (c. i).

must have been political

Some

justly acquired.

power, however acquired

say that his civic rights is a citizen who has

But he (c.

2).

Similarly the state

is defined by reference to the distribution of political power ; when the mode of distribution is changed a new state comes

into existence (c. 3).

The good citizen may not be a good man the good citizen who does good service to his state, and this state may ;

is

one

12

Analysis

be bad

in

principle.

knows both how is

who

one

In a constitutional state the good citizen

is

tional state learns to rule

ship in such a state

Mechanics

is

how

and

to rule

fitted to

The good man

to obey.

But the

rule.

citizen in a constitu

by obeying orders. Therefore

Extreme

will not be citizens in the best state.

democracies, and some oligarchies, neglect this

cumstances oblige them to do (c-

citizen

a moral training (c. 4).

But

rule.

They have no

this.

cir

choice

5).

cc.

6-13.

The

Classification

of Constitutions

and Oligarchy

The

and

to

him

fit

from that over slaves

of those

who

Of good

in

are ruled (c. 6).

according as the

common

Constitutions

Democracy

satisfy

aiming

man

social

s

Political

life.

primarily at the

rule

good

Constitutions are bad or good

welfare

there

Of

tocracy, and Polity.

to

;

the good

for

;

Kingship.

aims of the state are two

instinct,

differs

;

or

is,

three

are

is

bad there are also three

The bad

Oligarchy, Extreme Democracy.

their aim.

not,

Monarchy, Aris

:

:

Tyranny,

are perversions

of the good (c. 7). Democracies and Oligarchies are not made by the numeri cal proportion of the rulers to the ruled. Democracy is the rule

of the poor;

oligarchy

Democrats take Equality that political

which

rights

But both

wealth. is

virtue.

is

that

for their

Justice

;

rich

(c.

8).

oligarchs believe

should be unequal and proportionate to miss the true object of the state,

sides

Those who do most

deserve the greatest share of power principle,

of the

motto

is

(c.

to 9).

promote virtue On the same

not the will of the majority or of the

wealthier, but that course of action

which the moral aim of

1 3

Analysis But

the state requires (c. 10).

be the better rulers

likely to

give

the

faculty of

to

offices

highest

criticism

which

are the It

?

Many

or the

Few

would be unreasonable

the

Many.

fits

them

to

But they have a for deliberative and

The good critic need not be an expert ; power. experts are sometimes bad judges. Moreover, the Many have But the governing a greater stake in the city than the Few.

judicial

Few or Many, must be held in check by the On what principle should political power be

body, whether laws (c. n). distributed

;

Obviously those

?

be of service to the state in the

who who are equally able to Hence there is something

Granted that equals deserve equal shares

?

are these equals

(c.

12).

claims advanced by the wealthy, the free born, the

But no one of these classes should noble, the highly gifted. be allowed to rule the rest. state should consist of men

A

who

are equal, or nearly so, in wealth, in birth, in moral

The

intellectual excellence.

cism

is

But

plausible.

principle

in the ideal

individual be found, he should be

state,

made

1418. The Forms

cc.

Of Monarchy

and

which underlies Ostra if a

pre-eminent

a king (c. 13).

of Monarchy.

there are five kinds, (i) the Spartan, (2) the

Barbarian, (3) the elective dictatorship,

Absolute Kingship

14).

(c.

The

last

(4) the Heroic,

(5)

of these forms might

appear the best polity to some ; that is, if the king acts as the For he will dispense from the law in embodiment of law.

But

the spirit of the law.

reserved for the

of primitive society objectionable

(c.

subjects equals

;

it

15). to

the

this

power would be less abused if arose to meet the needs

Monarchy

Many. is

now

obsolete and on various grounds

tends to become hereditary; it rule of an equal. The individual It

1

4

Analysis

monarch may be misled by his passions, and no can attend to

all

the duties of government

1

(c.

alone can be imagined in which Absolute

6

single

man

One

case

).

Kingship would be

just(c. 17).

Let us consider the

now

that

best (c.

1

we have

origin

call

polity,

Absolute Kingship the

8).

BOOK cc. I

and nature of the best

agreed not to

IV

(VI).

Variations of the main types of Constitutions.

10.

Political science should study (i) the ideal state, (2) those

which may be the best obtainable under special circum For stances, and even (3) those which are essentially bad. states

the statesman must sometimes

Of

stitution (c. i).

make

the best of a bad

Con

our six main types of

state, Kingship Bk. Ill, c. 14 fol.). Let us begin by dealing with the other four and their divisions, enquiring also when and why they may be desirable (c. 2).

and Aristocracy have been discussed

First

as

(cf.

The common

Democracy and Oligarchy.

to

view that Democracy and Oligarchy should be taken as the main types of Constitution is at variance with our own view

and wrong

(c.

So

3).

tion of rulers to ruled

types

;

in a

is

Democracy

Oligarchy the

Few

the view that the numerical propor

makes the the

are

difference between these

Many

also

the distinction between rich

two

are also the poor, in an

In every state

the wealthy.

and poor

is

the most funda

Still Oligarchy and Democracy and their variations arise from differences

mental of class-divisions. are important types in the character

;

of the rich and the poor by

whom

they are

ruled.

Of

Democracies there

are

four kinds.

The

worst, ex-

i $

Analysis

treme Democracy, is that in which all offices are open to Of of the people overrides all law (c. 4). all, and the will the worst is that in are four too there kinds; Oligarchies

which

offices are hereditary

by law

These

(c. 5).

which may be

and the magistrates uncontrolled

variations arise under circumstances

briefly described (c. 6).

Of

Aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form, that in which the best men alone are citizens (c. 7). Polity

is

compromise between Democracy and Oligarchy, Many so-called Aris

a

but inclines to the Democratic side. tocracies

are

really

Polities

(c.

There

8).

are

different

ways of effecting the compromise which makes a Polity. The Laconian Constitution is an example of a successful com promise

(c. 9).

Tyranny and (2) the in

But

in

of three kinds: (i) the barbarian despotism,

elective dictatorship have already been discussed

both there

of one cc.

is

is

rule according to

;

law over willing subjects.

(3) the strict form of tyranny, there over unwilling subjects (c. 10).

is

the lawless rule

man

11-13.

Best State both

Of the

in

general and tinder special

circumstances.

For the average mean between the will be supreme.

city-state

No

the middle-class holds sway. in large

the best constitution will be a

of rich and poor ; the middle-class state will be well administered unless

rule

than in small states.

The Hence

middle-class in

Greece

it

is

stronger

has rarely

power ; especially as democracy and oligarchy were aided by the influence of the leading states (c. n). No constitution can dispense with the support of the strongest

attained to

class in the state.

Hence Democracy and Oligarchy

are the

1

6

Analysis

only constitutions possible the

should

legislator

Whatever form of to be noted

ticular

(a)

form

each

which may help

legislator

;

The of

some

But

states.

the

in these cases

middle-class

12).

(c.

constitution be adopted there are expedients

1416. How

cc.

The

in

conciliate

to

in preserving

proceed

it

in framing

1

(c.

3).

a Constitution.

must pay attention to three subjects in par Deliberative Assembly which is different in constitution

Here he must know what

14).

(c.

(I)

The

Executive.

offices are indispensable

and which

may be conveniently combined in the person of one also whether the same offices should be supreme magistrate

of them

;

in

every state

also

;

which of the twelve or more methods of

making appointments should be adopted in each case (c. 15). The Courts of Law. Here he must consider the kinds (f) of law-courts, procedure

spheres of

their

BOOK V cc.

14. Of Revolutions,

Ordinary

which lead

some

are

in

new

states are

to

made

modify the

methods of

their causes in general.

founded on erroneous ideas of

discontent and to

(VIII).

and

Of

revolution.

new

introduce a

justice,

revolutions

Constitution, others

to

working of the Constitution Democracy and Oligarchy contain

old, others to put the

hands.

inherent flaws

more

their

action,

16).

(c.

Both

which lead

to revolution, but

Democracy

is

the

of the two types (c. i). may distinguish between the frame of mind which

stable

We

fosters revolution, the objects for

provocative causes (c. 2).

account

(c.

3).

Trifles

The may

which

latter

it

is

started,

and the

deserve a more detailed

be the occasion but are never

1

Analysis the true

One common

cause of a sedition.

cause

is

7

the

aggrandizement of a particular class ; another is a feud be tween rich and poor when they are evenly balanced and there

no middle-class to mediate.

is

effecting a revolution

:

it

may

As

manner of

to the

be carried through by force or

fraud (c. 4).

5~ 12

cc.

Revolutions in particular States, and

-

revolutions

may

be avoided.

(a) In Democracies revolutions

of the rich

tion

when

when

or

;

may

arise

from a persecu

a demagogue becomes a general, or

compete for the favour of the mob

politicians

(c. 5).

In Oligarchies the people may rebel against oppression ; ambitious oligarchs may conspire, or appeal to the people, (3)

or set up a tyrant. by the feuds of

Oligarchies are seldom destroyed except own members ; unless they employ

their

a mercenary captain,

who may become

a tyrant

(c. 6).

(c)

In Aristocracies and Polities the injustice of the ruling class may lead to revolution, but less often in Polities. Aristo cracies

may also be ruined by an unprivileged class, or an man of talent. Aristocracies tend to become

ambitious

oligarchies.

which

is

The

Also they

are

liable

to

gradual

dissolution

;

true of Polities as well (c. 7).

best precautions against sedition are these

:

to avoid

and frauds upon the unprivileged ; to maintain good to watch destructive agen feeling between rulers and ruled cies to alter property qualifications from time to time ; to let illegality

;

;

no individual or

class

become too powerful

tracies be a source

of gain

In

we

all

tice

;

to

;

not to

let

beware of class-oppression

magis (c. 8).

should require loyalty, ability, and jus should not carry the principle of the constitution

magistrates

we

;

sis Analyst to extremes

;

we

should educate the citizens in the

spirit

of

a constitution (c. 9). (fi)

The

causes which destroy and the means which pre

Monarchy must be considered

serve a

Let us

separately.

distinguish between Tyranny and Kingship. combines the vices of Democracy and Oligarchy. first

is

exposed

to the

kinds of

these

Tyranny Kingship But both

same defects as Aristocracy.

by the

are especially endangered

Monarchy

insolence of their representatives and by the fear or contempt

which they inspire in others. Tyranny is weak against both external and domestic foes Kingship is strong against inva Moderation is the best sion, weak against sedition (c. 10). ;

preservative of Kingship.

Tyranny may

rely

on the

traditional

expedients of demoralizing and dividing its subjects, or it may imitate Kingship by showing moderation in expenditure, and courtesy and temperance in social relations, by the wise use of ministers, by holding the balance evenly between the But the Tyrannies of the past have rich and poor (c. n).

been short-lived. Plato quate

;

s

discussion of revolutions in the Republic

against a tyranny, and could not

do so on

he correct about the cause of revolution nor does

he distinguish between the

Oligarchy and Democracy

(c.

BOOK cc.

is

inade

e.g. he does not explain the results of a revolution

i8.

Concerning the

in

;

nor

is

an Oligarchy

different

varieties

;

of

12).

VI

(VII).

proper organization of Democracies

and

(A) Democracies

his theory

Oligarchies.

differ inter se (i)

of the citizen body, (2) according

according to the character

to the

mode

in

which the

1

Analysis

Liberty

the

is

of democracy are combined (c. i). The results of of democracy.

features

characteristic

first

principle

supreme, and that

liberty are that the numerical majority is

man

each

may

he

lives as

From

likes.

easily infer the other features it is

oligarchies

men,

who

numbers

But

and it

is

and harder

justice,

of democracy

Both these

are supreme.

influence.

these characteristics (c. 2).

we In

not the numerical majority, but the wealthier

the supreme authority

Both

9

is

if principles are unjust

to be absolute

wealth

should

and above the law.

have

their

share

hard to find the true principles of still

to

make men

act

upon them

of

political (c. 3).

The best Democracy (cf. Bk. IV, c. 4). is (i) an Agricultural Democracy, in which the magistrates are elected by, and responsible to, the citizen body, while has four species

each

office

importance.

by

has a property qualification proportionate to its These democracies should encourage agriculture

legislation.

Next comes (4) the

The

next best

is

(3) the Commercial

(2) the Pastoral

Democracy.

Extreme Democracy with manhood

Democracy.

Worst of all

is

suffrage (c. 4).

To found a Democracy. it we must the from preserve prevent poor plundering the rich ; we must not exhaust the public revenues by giving pay It is harder to preserve than to

performance of public duties ; we must prevent the of a pauper class (c. growth 5). The modes of founding Oligarchies call for little ex (B) Careful organization is the best way of preserving planation. for the

these

governments

(c.

6).

Much

depends on the military

arrangements ; oligarchs must not make their subjects too powerful an element in the army. Admission to the governing body should be granted on easy conditions. Office should be

made

a burden, not a source of profit (c. 7).

c 2

2O

Analysis

Both

and democracies the right arrangement of offices is important. Some kinds of office are necessary in state are others ; every peculiar to special types of state in oligarchies

(c. 8).

BOOK cc.

The

13.

VII

(IV).

Summum Bonumfor

individuals

the most desirable

for states

life

states,

we must know what

Before constructing the ideal state is

and

individuals.

True

wisdom and

virtue,

and

happiness flows from the possession of

and not from the possession of external goods. But a life must be equipped with external goods as

virtuous

These laws hold good of both

instruments. individuals (c.

But does the highest

i).

contemplation or in

action

The

?

states

and

virtue consist

in

of the past have

states

war and conquest. But war cannot be regarded as a reasonable object for a state (c. 2). virtuous life implies activity, but activity may be speculative

lived for action in the shape of

A

Those

as well as practical.

are

wrong who regard the life of But again they are wrong

a practical politician as degrading.

who

treat political cc.

We

4-12.

as the highest

good

(c. 3).

A picture of the Ideal State.

must begin by considering the population

The

territory.

make

power

former

should

be

as

small

as

and the

we can

without sacrificing independence and the capacity for a moral life. The smaller the population the more it

manageable

enough liberally

to

it

will be

supply

and

the

(c.

4).

citizens

temperately,

with

The with

an

territory

the

must be

means of

abundance

of

large living

leisure.

21

Analysis The

city

tion

with

reasons

;

should be in a central position the

sea

is

desirable

The

town should be

spirit

at

If the

some distance

mean between

that

intelligence

and

;

should be harmoniously blended as they are

some Greek of the

and military

city (c. 6).

character of the citizens should be a

of Asiatics and that of the northern races high

Communica

(c. 5).

economic

but the moral effects of sea-trade are bad.

state has a marine, the port

from the

for

races (c. 7).

from those

state

but no part of

provide food,

We who

are necessary as

practise the arts,

to

its

There must be men who

it.

to bear

servants,

are

we

different

should

and a subject nothing new. of

exercise

of

periods

confined to them

common

life.

(c. 9).

class,

It

meals

existed there.

to

religion,

But of

should exclude from the citizen body (i) the

mechanics, (2) the traders, (3) the husbandmen. rulers, priests remain as eligible for citizenship. persons

able

arms, to carry

on the work of exchange, to supervise the state to exercise political and judicial functions (c. 8). these classes

in

must distinguish the members

in

these

three

Warriors,

The same but

at

should

be

professions,

of land

Ownership Such a distinction between

a ruling

based on a difference of occupation, is in still exists Egypt, and the custom Crete and Italy proves that it formerly the valuable rules of politics have

Most of

been discovered over and over again in the course of history. In dealing with the land of the state we must distinguish

between public demesnes and private estates. Both kinds of land should be tilled by slaves or barbarians of a servile The site of the city should be chosen disposition (c. 10). with regard (i) to public health, (2) to (3) to strategic requirements.

The

political convenience,

ground-plan of the city

22

Analysis

should be regular enough for beauty, not so regular as to make defensive warfare difficult. Walls are a practical neces It is well that the arrangement of the buildings should be carefully thought out (c. 12).

n).

sity (c.

in the city cc.

The Educational System of the Ideal

13-17.

and early

The

State, its aim,

stages.

nature and character of the citizens must be determined

with reference to the kind of happiness which we desire them Happiness was defined in the Ethics as the perfect

to pursue.

exercise of virtue, the latter term being understood not in the

Now

conditional, but in the absolute sense.

a

man

acquires

by the help of nature, habit, and reason Habit and reason are the fruits of education, which

virtue of this kind 1

(c.

3).

must therefore be discussed.

The

rule

when they

and highest function. the

to obey when young Rule is their ultimate

educated

are

older.

Since the good ruler

is

the same as

good man, our education must be so framed as to produce

the good

man.

him

all

fit

be

should

citizens

and to

for

and the

It should

Laconian,

An

life

;

man

s

powers and

but the highest powers

must be the supreme care of education which is purely military, like the

highest

education.

all

develop^

the activities of activities

neglects this

14).

principle (c.

The

virtues

of

peace (intellectual culture, temperance, justice) are the most war is nothing but necessary for states and individuals ;

a

means towards securing peace.

the natural order of

body,

dealing

intellect

To

last

of

next all

But education must follow

human development, beginning with with (c.

the

appetites,

and

training

the the

15).

produce a healthy physique the

legislator

must

fix

23

Analysis

regulate the physical condition of the provide for the exposure of infants, and settle the

age of marriage,

the

parents,

duration of marriage (c.

He

16).

must also prescribe a

physical training for infants and young children.

moral

overseers

;

their associates,

From

see.

For

their

very young should be committed to these should select the tales which they are told,

education the

the pictures, plays, and statues which they seven years of age should be the period

five to

of preparation for

intellectual training (c. 17).

BOOK cc. 1-7.

VIII (V).

The Ideal Education

continued.

Its

Music and

Gymnastic.

Education should be under state-control and the same for all

the citizens (c. i).

It

should comprise those useful studies

which every one must master, but none which degrade the mind or body (c. 2). Reading, writing, and drawing have always been taught on the score of their producing

Music

valour.

serves a higher purpose. is

is

the highest aim which a

valuable for this purpose.

taught

The

utility

as a

;

gymnastic as

recreation,

but

it

noble employment of leisure

man

can pursue ; and music is be said of drawing,

The same may

and other subjects of education have the same kind of value (c. 3)-

Gymnastic is the first stage of education but we must not develop^ the valour and physique of our children at the Until puberty, expense of the mind, as they do in Sparta. ;

and for three years

after,

bodily

exercise

should be light

were a mere amusement, should not be taught to children ; they would do better by listening (c.

4).

Music,

if

it

24 to

Analysis professionals.

But music

rational

moral discipline and a learning music children become is

a

enjoyment (c. 5). By and are given a suitable occupation. age they should abandon music ; professional

better critics riper

for

them

(c. 6).

;

When skill is

of not

nor should they be taught difficult instruments various musical harmonies should be used for

The

different purposes.

Some

inspire virtue, others valour, others

The ethical harmonies are those which children The others may be left to professionals. The should learn. The Phrygian is Dorian harmony is the best for education.

enthusiasm.

bad; but the Lydian may be

beneficial to children.

Cetera desunt.

THE

POLITICS

BOOK EVERY

state is

good.

a community

act

But,

if

a view

order

in

of some kind, and every ! 1

some good for which they 1252 communities aim at some good,

established with

community mankind always think

is

I

all

to

the state or political community, which

and which embraces

all

the

rest,

to

obtain

is

;

that

the highest of

aims,

and

a

in

all,

greater

degree than any other, at the highest good. Now there is an erroneous opinion l that a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects.

example, the ruler over a few the manager

of a household

called a master

is

over

;

a statesman or king, as if there a great is

household and a small

made between

When

a

still

is

For

over more,

number, were no difference between

state.

The

larger

distinction

the king and the statesman

the government

;

2

personal, the ruler

is

is

which

as follows

a king

;

:

when,

according to the principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But

all

this is a mistake

;

for governments differ in kind,

be evident to any one who considers 2 which has hitherto according to the method as will

As

the

matter

guided

us.

departments of science, so in politics, the comshould pound always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. must therefore look at the in other

We

1

Cp. Plato, Politicus, 258 E

foil,

a

Cp.

c. 8.

I.

i

\

a

26

Logical Analysis of the State of which the

I. 1 elements

may

see

*

in

what they

He who

2

different

1

kinds of rule

2

drawn between the

distinction can be

scientific

any

composed, in order that we from one another, and whether

state is differ

.

thus considers things in their

origin,

whether

clearest

view of them.

a

who

a union of those

or

state

anything

In the

first

else,

growth and

first

will

the

obtain

place (i) there must be

cannot exist without each other

for

;

example, of male and female, that the race may continue ; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but

common

because, in

man

with other animals and with plants,

kind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of

And

themselves.

(2) there

must be

a union of natural ruler

For he who can

and subject, that bdtlfrnay be preserved. foresee with Ins

master, 3

and he

mind

who

and by nature a slave

1252 b interest.

Nature,

is

can ;

who

his

body

however,

has

For she

a subject,

is

distinguished between is

not niggardly,

fashions the Delphian knife for

makes each thing

for a single

made when intended

best

work with

hence master and slave have the same

female and the slave.

smith

by nature intended to be lord and

for

many

like

uses

;

the the

she

and every instrument is one and not for many uses. use,

4 But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them :

they are a

community of

slaves,

male and female.

Wherefore

the poets say, It

is

meet that Hellenes should

rule

over barbarians

2 ;

Or, with Bernays, how the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and generally whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them. 1

3

Eurip. Iphig. in Aulid. 1400.

/

Growth of the State

27

thought that the barbarian and the

as if they

slave

were

2

I.

by nature one.

Out of

these

two

relationships between

master and slave, the family when he says,

first

arises,

First house and wife and an for the

ox

is

the poor

man

s slave.

ox

man and woman,

and Hesiod

for the plough

The

family

is

is

5

|

right

1 ,

the associa-

(

by nature for the supply of men s every-day \ wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas com and by Epimenides panions of the cupboard [o/iocriTrvovs], 2 2 the Cretan, companions of the manger [6/ioKa7rovy]. tion established

But when aims

several

families

are

united,

something more than

at

then comes into existence the village.

form of the

and the association j

of daily needs,

the supply

And

be that of a colony from the

village appears to

who

family, composed of the children and grandchildren,

suckled with the same milk.

said to be

reason

why

Hellenic

states

\

the most natural 6

were

And

originally

are

this is the

governed by

because the Hellenes were under royal rule before kings came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family they is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of ;

the family the kingly form of government prevailed because As Homer says [of the

they were of the same blood.

Cyclopes]

:

Each one

For they 1

gives law to his children and to his wives

lived dispersedly, as

was the manner

in

V

ancient

et Di. 405. Or, reading with the old translator (William of Moerbek) 6/*oKUTTVOVS, companions of the hearth.

Op.

2

3

Od.

ix. 1

14, quoted by Plato, Laws,

iii.

680, and

in

N. Eth.

x. 9.

1

3.

7

Ma?i a

28 I.

2

Animal

Political

Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, times. because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of

be like their

to

life

own.

When

8

several villages are united in a single

perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite

the state

of

comes

into existence, originating in the bare needs

and continuing

life,

And

life.

natural, so

therefore,

in

existence for the sake of a good

if

the

the state,

is

[completed] nature fully developed,

we

is

for

its

the end of them, and the

is

For what each

the end.

call

of society are

forms

earlier

it

the best, and to be self-sufficing

is

and the best. ?end Hence it is evident that and that man is by nature a

the state political

nature and not by mere accident

above humanity, or below

it

is

thing

when

whether we are speaking Besides, the final cause and

nature,

g of a man, a horse, or a family.

of a thing

community, self-sufficing,

;

he

is is

is

is

the end

creation of nature,

a

animal.

And

without a

who by

he

state, is

either

the

Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, 10

whom Homer

denounces

who

the outcast

is

a

lover of

he may be compared to an unprotected piece of draughts. game

war

;

Now

the reason

why man

is

more

as

we

only

often

animal 3

1 1

speech

Ml.

.

evident.

is

Nature,

makes nothing in vain 2 and man is the whom she has endowed with the gift of

say,

And

,

mere sound

whereas -

ix.63.

the

a political animal

of

than bees or any other gregarious animals

in

Cp.

c.

8.

12.

but an

is

3

Cp.

vii.

indication

13.

12.

Man

a

of pleasure or pain, and (for

their nature

pain and

is

to

attains

the intimation of

further),

inexpedient,

And

the perception of pleasure and

them

unjust.

another, and

to one

no

intended to set forth the

is

and likewise the just and the of

a characteristic

is

it

29

therefore found in other animals I.

the power of speech

expedient and

Animal

Political

man

that he

alone

evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a

has any sense of good and

family and a state.

Thus and prior

the

state is

the

individual,

to

the

to

part

the

if

example, no foot

family

of necessity 13 whole body be is

except in an speak of a stone hand ; for But things are destroyed the hand will be no better. there

destroyed,

be

will

as

equivocal sense,

when

whole

the

since

for

;

clearly prior to the

by nature

or hand,

we might

and we ought not working and power are the same when say they are no longer the same, but only that they have the same name. The 14 to the that the nature and state is a of creation proof prior defined

by

to

that they

their

;

that the individual,

individual

is

sufficing

and therefore he

;

whole.

But he who

no need because he beast or a

god

implanted in

he

perfected,

is

for himself,

who

must be

has

either a

A

social instinct is no part of a state. nature, and yet he who first founded

greatest of benefactors.

the best of animals, but,

justice,

isolated, is not self-

unable to live in society, or

is sufficient

is

when

like a part in relation to the

men by

was the

the state

law and

:

all

is

is

he

is

the worst of

all

;

For man, when

when separated from since

armed

the

use for the worst ends.

Wherefore,

if

he have not

I

injustice 16

more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may is

1

virtue,

he

\

2

The Parts of

30 I.

2

is

of lust and gluttony.

is

the

tion of

what

is

1

just

,

bond of men is

in

the determina

the principle of order in political society.

is

is made up of households, before we must speak of the 2 management The parts of the household are the

Seeing then that the state

persons

2 .

who compose

it,

everything

in its

least

and a complete household consists

Now we

of slaves and freemen.

a

justice

and the administration of justice, which

1253 b of the household

/

But

states,

speaking of the state

/

Household

the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most

full

3

the

elements

;

should begin by examining

and the

first

and

least parts

of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father We have therefore to consider what each and children. I mean the is and ought to be : of master and servant, of husband and wife, and thirdly of parent and child. [I say ya/juKr) and 76*1/07101777-1*17, there being no words for the two latter notions which ade-

of these three relations relation

And there is another element represent them.] of a household, the so-called art of money-making, which,

3 quately

household management, others, according principal part of it ; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us. according to some,

is

identical with

a

to

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better For some are 4 theory of their relation than exists at present. of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves,

and the set

8 ,

political

are 1

3 3

all

and royal rule, as I was saying at the out Others affirm that the rule of a master

the same.

Cp. N. Eth. v. 6. 4. Reading with the MSS. oiKOfo/^ cts. Plato in Pol. 258 E

foil.,

referred to already in c. I.

2.

over slaves

is

between slave

by nature

;

and that the distinction

to nature,

contrary

freeman

and

3 i

Necessary

Slavery

exists

by

law

and being an interference with nature

I.

3

and not

only,

therefore

is

unjust.

Property is a part of the household, and therefore the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household ; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all,

And

unless he be provided with necessaries.

which have a

definite sphere the

4

as in the arts

workers must have their

own

proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is

are

in the

management of a household. Now, instruments some are living, others lifeless in the ;

of various sorts

2

;

rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man,

a living

instrument

of instrument.

for

;

Thus,

for maintaining

in

the arts the servant a

too,

And

life.

possession

so,

in the

family, a slave is a living possession,

of such instruments

;

and the servant

which takes precedence of

is

all

an

is

a kind

instrument

arrangement of the

and property a number is

himself an instrument,

For

other instruments.

if 3

every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet

of their own accord entered the assembly of the

,

Gods

;

manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen if,

in like

would not want ever,

another

commonly

servants, nor

distinction

masters slaves.

drawn

must be

so called are instruments

a possession

is

Horn.

II.

xviii.

376.

Here, how- 1254

the instruments *

of production,

an instrument of action. 1

:

The

whilst

shuttle,

for

a

32 I.

4

//

Slavery

Natural?

also

it

example, is not only of use, but something else is made by whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use.

it,

as

Further,

and both 5

and action

production

are

different

in

kind,

instruments which

instruments, the

require

they

But life is action employ must likewise differ in kind. and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action

he

[for

ministers

master

his

to

s

Again, a

life].

possession spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not a only part of something else, but wholly belongs The master to it; and this is also true of a possession. is of the slave he the master does not belong to only is

;

him, whereas the slave 6 but

not only the slave of his master, him. Hence we see what is the

is

wholly belongs to and office of a slave

nature

own

he

;

but another s and yet a man,

he may be said also

is

being,

defined

as

an

is

is by nature not his by nature a slave and ;

belong to another who, being a

to

a

who

And

possession.

instrument

of

a

possession

action,

separable

human

may

be

from the

possessor.

5

But

is

and for

there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave,

whom

rather is not

There 2 i\

1

1

is

such a condition

all

no

expedient and right, or

is

slavery a violation of nature difficulty

in

answering

this

?

question,

on

For that some should grounds both of reason and of fact. rule and others be ruled is a thing, not only necessary, but from the hour of their birth, some are marked expedient ;

out for subjection, others for rule.

And

whereas there are many kinds both of rulers and

subjects, that rule

subjects

for

is

the better

example,

rule over wild beasts.

which

to rule

is

over

The work

is

exercised over better

men

better

is

better than to

which

is

executed

Justified

Slavery by

better

ruled,

workmen

parts,

and where one man rules and another

be said to have a work.

may

they

which form

;

3 3

whole and which

a composite

whether continuous or

In are

all

is I.

5

things

made up of

a distinction between

discrete,

Such a 4 the ruling and the subject element comes to light. not in them only ; duality exists in living creatures, but it

1

which have no

harmony

We

subject.

of the universe

there

life,

1

musical

in

the constitution

in

originates

things

is

a

ruling

even

;

principle,

But we are wandering from

.

restrict ourselves to the

will, therefore,

in

as

the

living

creature which, in the first place, consists of soul and body and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the But then we must look for the intentions other the subject. :

of nature

things which

in

retain

And

things which are corrupted.

man who

the

soul, for in

in the

is

him we

although in bad appear to

rule

or

most perfect

shall

over the

natures

both of body and

lect rules

And

it

;

First then

creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule soul rules the

two

often 1254 b

the body will

because they are in an evil we may observe in living 6

soul,

and unnatural condition.

state

see the true relation of the

corrupted

5

nature, and not in therefore we must study

their

body with

a despotical rule,

;

for the

whereas the

intel

the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. is

clear that the rule

of the soul over the body, and

of the mind and the rational element over the passionate is natural and expedient ; whereas the equality of the two or the

of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals as well as of men for tame animals have a better

rule

;

nature than wild, and

man

they are ruled by 1

DAVIS

Or,

all ;

tame animals are better off when

for then they are preserved. of harmony [in music].

D

Again,

7

Both Sides of the Question

34 Slavery I.

5 the male

by nature superior, and the female and the other is ruled ; this

is

one

the

rules,

8 necessity, extends to

all

Where

mankindo

inferior

and

;

principle,

then there

is

of

such

a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use

and who can do nothing better), the lower sort and it is better for them as for all

their body,

are

by

nature slaves,

For

9 inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master.

he who can

be,

and therefore

is

another

s,

and

he

who

I

i

I

participates in reason

Whereas

a slave by nature.

reason,

is

cannot

even

reason

the lower animals

obey their instincts. indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals

And is

to apprehend, but not to have,

enough

apprehend

not very different

10 the needs of

;

they

;

for both with their bodies minister to

Nature would

life.

the

bodies of freemen and

for

servile

labour,

like to distinguish

betweep.

making the one strong the other upright, and although useless slaves,

such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But this does not hold universally : for some slaves have the souls and others have the bodies of for

freemen.

And

men

doubtless if

much

in

1255 a

the body,

body

is

how much more

seen,

in the soul

that the inferior class

if there is a difference !

But the beauty of the

whereas the beauty of the soul

clear, then, that

some men

and that for these

6

And

should be slaves of the superior.

latter

are

by nature

slavery

is

in

as the statues of the

Gods do from men, all would acknowledge I 1

from one another

differed

the mere forms of their bodies as

free,

is

not seen.

and others

both expedient and

It is

slaves,

right.

But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in

two

senses.

There

is

a slave

Both Sides of the Question

Slavery

or slavery by law as well as I

is

The

by nature.

3

f

law of which

speak taken in war

But supposed to belong to the victors. an as orator who would they many jurists impeach, brought forward an unconstitutional measure they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence is

I.

a sort of convention, according to which whatever is

2

this right

:

and

is

superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave

Even among philosophers

and subject. of opinion.

The

there

the arguments cross,

is

as follows

:

is

a difference

and the reason

origin of the dispute,

Virtue,

when

why

3

furnished

be deemed to have the greatest power of and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power is thought to that is the imply virtue. But does it likewise imply justice ?

with means,

may

doing violence

And,

question.

some

:

in order to

make

a distinction between them, 4

assert that justice is benevolence

nothing more than the

:

to

which others reply

If of a superior. the two views are regarded as antagonistic and exclusive [i. e. if the notion that justice is benevolence excludes the idea of that justice

is

rule

a just rale of a superior], the alternative

[viz.

that

no one

has no force or

because plausibility, *] that even the to it not in virtue rule, or ought implies superior be master. Some, clinging, as they think, to a principle of 6

should rule over others

justice (for

law and custom are a sort of

war

justice),

assume that

by law, but they are not consistent. For what if the cause of the war be unjust ? No one would ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. slavery in

Were

is

justified

this the case,

men of

j I

the highest rank would be slaves

and the children of slaves

if they or their parents chance to Wherefore Hellenes do 6 have been taken captive and sold. 1

CP

D

a.

.

2

Q

3"

I.

6

not

to

like

themselves slaves, but confine the term to

call

barbarians.

in

Yet,

mean the

using this language, they really

whom we

must be spoke admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. 7 The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard them slave of

natural

deem

the

first

and not only

selves as noble everywhere,

but they

at

noble

barbarians

for

;

in their

only

it

own

when

country,

at

home,

thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and

freedom, the one absolute, the other

of Theodectes says

Who

The Helen

relative.

:

would presume to call me servant who am on both from the stem of the Gods ?

sides sprung

8

What

does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and noble and humble birth, by the two principles of

slavery,

1255 b good and evil

men and But

They

?

animals,

this is

what

men and animals beget a good man springs. men good

think that as

so from

though she may intend

nature,

it,

often fails

to accomplish.

9

We

see then that there

is

some foundation

for this differ

ence of opinion, and that some actual slaves and freemen are not so by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves

and the others

to be masters

:

the one practising obedience, the others exercising the autho10 rity which nature intended them to have. authority

is

injurious to both

;

The

abuse of this

for the interests of part

x

and

of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. Where the relation between them is natural they arc friends

whole

,

1

CP

.

c.

4.

5.

The and have a

common

The

where

interest, but

and force the reverse

it

is

merely on law I. 6

rests

show

that the

7

not a constitutional rule, and therefore that

some

the different kinds of rule are not, as

all

37

is true.

previous remarks are quite enough to

of a master

rule

of the Household

J(ule

same with each other

1 .

For

there

is

affirm, the

one rule exercised over

who are by nature free, another over subjects who by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head whereas constitutional rule subjects

are

:

is

The

a government of freemen and equals.

master

is

not

2

he has science, but because he is of and the same remark applies to the slave character,

called a master because

a certain

and the freeman.

and a science

Still

there

for the slave.

be such as the

may

be a science for the master

The

science of the slave

man of Syracuse

would

who made money by

taught,

instructing slaves in their ordinary duties.

And

such a know- 3

may be carried further, so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some duties are of the more neces

ledge

sary, others

slave

of the more honourable sort

before

slave,

;

as the proverb says,

branches of knowledge are servile.

There

is

wonderful

which the

;

for the master

slave

who

need only

must know how

are in a position

stewards

;

for the master

concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use Yet this so-called science is not anything great or

is

of them.

who

such 4

all

likewise a science

of the master, which teaches the use of slaves as such

But

master before master.

know how

to execute.

to order that

Hence

which places them above

those 5

have

toil,

attend to their households while they occupy

themselves with philosophy or with acquiring slaves, I

mean of justly

Plato Pol. 258 E

foil.,

politics.

But the

acquiring them,

referred to already in c. I.

art

differs 2.

of

both

3 8 I.

What

Property

7 from the

of the master and the

art

a species of hunting

between master and 1256

war

or

J

art

of the

Enough of

.

slave,

the

being

distinction

slave.

Let us now enquire

a

Place in the Household

and

into property generally,

into the

of money-making, in accordance with our usual method 2 been [of resolving a whole into its parts ], for a slave has shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether art

the art of money-making a household or a part of last,

whether

in the

way

is it,

the

same with the

art

or instrumental to

that the art of

it

2

is

shuttles is

making

instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the casting of bronze

of managing and if the ;

way

that the

instrumental to the art of the statuary, for

they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one provides tools and the other material ; and by material I mean the substratum out of which any

work

is

made

;

thus wool

is

Now

it

the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary.

easy to see that the art of household management is not identical with the art of money-making, for the one uses the is

material

which the other provides.

And

the art which uses

household stores can be no other than the

There

management.

money-making 3 art.

[They

is

is,

art

of household

however, a doubt whether the art of

a part of household

management or

appear to be connected]

;

for the

a distinct

money-maker

has to consider whence money and property can be procured; there is but there are many sorts of property and wealth :

husbandry and the care and provision of food 4 these parts of the there are

many

money-making

sorts

in general

art or distinct arts

?

;

are

Again,

of food, and therefore there are many men ; they must all have

kinds of lives both of animals and

food, and the differences in their food have 1

Cp.

vii.

14.

21.

made

a

Cp.

c.

i.

differences 3.

in

ways of

their

a Physical Basts 39

l{ests on

Property

For of

life.

others are solitary

they

;

beasts,

some

way which

live in the

are gregarious, I.

8

best adapted 5

is

to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or her

bivorous or omnivorous

jj

and

their habits are

determined for

in

greater facility

have

individuals

:

such a manner that they may obtain with the food of their choice. But, as different

them by nature

different

same things are not lives of

tastes,

the

them

and therefore the

naturally pleasant to all of

;

carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ

In the

selves.

The

laziest

lives

are

men

too there

who

shepherds,

is

among them

a great difference. 6

lead an

and get

idle life,

without trouble from tame animals

their subsistence

flocks having to

of

wander from place

;

their

to place in search of pas

they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of Others support themselves by hunting, which is living farm. ture,

of different kinds.

7

Some, for example, are pirates, others who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which

there are

fish,

;

the fruits of the

which

prevail

and others

are fishermen,

birds or wild beasts.

The

soil.

among

greater

Such those

live by the pursuit of number obtain a living from

are the 1

modes of

whose industry

subsistence 8

is

employed

1 immediately upon the products of nature , and whose food

not acquired by exchange and retail trade

there

is

is

the shep- 1258 b

herd, the husbandman, the pirate, the fisherman, the hunter.

Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employ ments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another : thus the

life

of a shepherd

may

be combined with that of

a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a hunter.

modes of needs of

life

are similarly

men may

require.

1

Or,

combined

Other 9

any way which the in the sense of a bare Property,

whose labour

is

in

peisonal.

4-Q

"Natural

Property

Acquisition

I. 8 livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both For 10 when they are first born, and when they are grown up.

some animals bring

much food of

forth,

together with their offspring, so

as will last until they are able to supply themselves

;

vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance ; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply

1 1

this the

of food for their young in themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, for the sake of

not 12

at least

all,

and that the other animals exist

man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if the greater part of them, for food, and for the

provision of clothing and various instruments.

makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in must be that she has made all animals and of man.

And

a natural

art

so, in

which we ought

it

if

nature

plants for the sake

one point of view, the

of acquisition, for

Now

vain, the inference

art

of war

is

includes hunting, an art

to practise against wild beasts,

and against

men who, though submit

Of

13

;

intended by nature to be governed, will not 1 for war of such a kind is naturally just .

"

the ait of acquisition then there

Either

we

viously,

14

They

them

although Solon

No 2

of

a

Cp.

for the

common

is

c. 7.

is

in

;

for the

state.

amount of

needed for a good life is not unlimited, one of his poems says that,

bound 5,

.

management must provide use of the family or

are the elements of true wealth

property which

1

which

a

is

or the art of household

a store of

one kind

2 part of the management of a household must suppose the necessaries of life to exist pre

and

natural

is

to riches has been fixed for

and

Or, with Bernays, household.

vii.

14.

man

V

21.

which by nature 3

is

a part of the

management

Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Solon, 13.

v.

71.

Property But there

is

41

Money-making

a boundary fixed, just as there

is in

the arts

the instruments of any art are never unlimited,

number or

in

!

8

5

and wealth may be defined as a number of

size,

And

instruments to be used in a household or in a state.

we

for I.

;

either

see that there

a natural art of acquisition

is

which

is

so

prac

by managers of households and by statesmen, and what the reason of this.

tised is

There

another variety of the art of acquisition which

is

is

9

of making money, and 1257 has in fact suggested the notion that wealth and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is

commonly and rightly called the

often identified with

it.

art

But though they are not very

neither are they the same.

The

different,

kind already described

is

gained by experience and art. Let us begin our discussion of the question with the fol- a

given by nature, the other

lowing considerations

is

:

Of

everything which we possess there are two uses : both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for

one

for

the proper, and the other the improper or secondary

is

use of

For example,

it.

exchange

a shoe is used for wear,

both are uses of the shoe.

;

and

is

He who

used gives 3

exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an a

shoe

in

The same may

object of barter. for the arises

that

be said of

all

possessions,

of exchange extends to all of them, and it 4 first in a natural manner from the circumstance

art

at

some have too

little,

others too much.

Hence we may

infer that retail trade is not a natural part

making

;

had

it

been so,

when they had enough.

men

of the art of moneywould have ceased to exchange

And

in the first

community, which

5

a

42 I.

9

is

the family, this art

to

Coined

Property

be useful

when

is

Money

obviously of no use, but only begins

For

the society increases.

the

members

of the family originally had all things in common in a more divided state of society they ] still shared in many things, but ;

l

which they had to give in ex change for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still 6 practised among barbarous nations who exchange with one they were different things

another the necessaries of

and nothing more; giving and exchange for corn and the

life

receiving wine, for example, like.

art

This

and

7 faction

in

sort of barter is not part of the

not contrary to nature, but

is

of men

s natural

wants.

The

is

money-making

needed for the

satis-

other or more complex

form of exchange grew out of the simpler. When the in habitants of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported

what they needed, and exported money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and hence men

8 the surplus,

agreed to employ

which was

in

their dealings

intrinsically

useful

with each other something

and

easily

applicable

to

the

Of purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. this the value was at first measured by size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon of weighing and to mark the value. 1257 b

When

it,

to save the trouble

the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the

barter of necessary articles

making, namely,

retail

trade

arose ;

the other

which was

art

at

of money-

first

probably

more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the

a simple matter, but became

10 greatest profit might be made.

the art of 1

money-making Or, more simply,

is

Originating in the use of coin, generally thought to be chiefly

shared in

many more

things.

Property: True Notion of Wealth

43

be the art which produces wealth I. it, and to having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, wealth is assumed by many to be only a quantity of

concerned with

and money

;

because the art of money-making and

coin,

retail

trade are

Others maintain that coined money

concerned with coin.

is

n

mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, which would have no value or use for any of the purposes of daily life if another commodity were substituted by the users. a

indeed, he

And,

necessary food.

that

Men

rich in coin

whose

in the fable,

was

is

may

often be in want of

But how can that be wealth of which a man

a great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like

may have Midas

who

him

set before

insatiable prayer turned everything

into gold

?

seek after a better notion of wealth and of the art of

1

2

making money than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural wealth and the natural art of moneyare a different thing

making

;

in their true

of the management of a household the art of producing wealth, not

And

exchange. coin

it

;

form they are part

whereas

retail

is

every

the starting-point and the goal of exchange.

is

trade

way, but by seems to be concerned with coin ; for in

And

13

no bound to the wealth which springs from this art of money-making As in the art of medicine there is no there

is

.

limit to the pursuit

no at

of health, and as in the other arts there

is

of their several ends, for they aim their ends to the uttermost ; (but of the accomplishing limit to the pursuit

means there

a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, of money-making there is no limit of the end, wealth of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of is

too, in this art

which money.

is

But the

art

of household management has a limit 1

Cp.

c. 8.

14.

;

14

9

I.

Excess Unnatural

44 ^Money-making

in

the unlimited acquisition of

money

therefore, in one point of view,

without

;

for

its

The

business.

their

[i.

e.

wealth]

is

;

hoard of coin

source of the confusion

the

is

15 connexion between the two kinds of money-making;

the instrument

And,

find the opposite to be

money-makers increase

all

limit.

not

wealth must have a limit

we

nevertheless, as a matter of fact,

the case

is

all

near

in either,

the same, although the use

is

for each is a use different, and so they pass into one another J of the same property but with a difference accumulation is ;

:

,

the end in the one case, but there

Hence some

is

a further end in the other.

persons are led to believe that making

money

is

the object of household management, and the whole idea of

ought either to increase their money The origin of it.

their lives is that they 1

1258

6 without limit,

or at any rate not to lose

a this disposition in

and not upon

men

that they are intent upon living only,

is

living well

;

and, as their desires are unlimited,

they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be Even those who aim at a good life seek the without limit.

means of obtaining bodily pleasures

; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in and so there arises the second species of making money :

17

For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they money-making. seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment and, if ;

they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of money-making, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a

manner contrary is

fidence

neither

;

physician s art 18 health.

to nature.

not intended to

example,

;

is

this

The

quality of courage, for

make money,

the aim of the

but to inspire con general

s

or of the

but the one aims at victory and the other at

Nevertheless, 1

some men

turn

Reading KTTjatws XF/ a

every quality or art y

means of making money

a

into

True IQnd

the

Money-making:

;

this

4?

they conceive to be I.

the end, and to the promotion of the end

all

things must

contribute.

Thus, then, we have considered the art of money-making, which is unnecessary, and why men want it and also the ;

necessary art of money- making, which

we

have seen to be

from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having different

a limit.

And we

have found the answer to our original question 1 , 10 Whether the art of money-making is the business of the

manager of a household and of the statesman or not their business ? viz. that it is an art which is presupposed by them. f

For

does not make men, but takes them from

political science

nature and uses

them

from the element of

;

and nature provides them with food

earth, air, or sea.

the duty of the manager of a household,

At

this stage begins

who

has to order the

he may be compared to the things which nature supplies weaver who has not to make but to use wool, and to know ;

what

of wool

sort

serviceable.

why of a

is

good and

serviceable or bad and un

this otherwise,

would be

it

difficult to see

money-making is a part of the management household and the art of medicine not ; for surely the the art of

members of have

Were

2

life

a household

must have health

or any other necessary.

And

just as they

must

as from one point 3

of view the master of the house and the ruler of the

state

have to consider about health, from another point of view not they but the physician ; so in one way the art of household

management,

in

another

way

1

Cp.

the

c. 8.

subordinate i.

art,

has

to

9

IQnds of Money-making

4<*

I.

But, strictly speaking, as I have 10 consider about money. already said, the means of life must be provided beforehand for the business of nature is to furnish food to

by nature that which ;

is

and the food of the offspring always l Wherefore the art of making and animals is always natural.

born,

4 remains over in the parent out of fruits

money

Of

two

of money-making one, as I have just

sorts

a part of household

is

said,

trade

the

.

management, the other

is

retail

the former necessary and honourable, the latter a kind

:

1258 b of exchange which

is

censured

justly

;

for

it

is

unnatural,

and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which

makes 5

of

of money itself, and not from the natural use For money was intended to be used in exchange, but

a gain out

it.

And this term usury [TOKO?], of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the Wherefore of all modes of making money this is parent. not to increase

at

which means the

interest.

birth

the most unnatural.

Enough has been

11

said about the theory of

money-making

;

2 The discussion proceed to the practical part. of such matters is not unworthy of philosophy, but to be

we

now

will

engaged

in

them

practically is illiberal

parts of money-making

useful

live-stock,

which

are

most

are,

and irksome

first,

profitable,

the

and

2 .

The

knowledge of where, and

how, as, for example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals are most likely to give a return. 2

A man ought to know which 1

Cp.

c. 8.

Or,

We

2

limited

of these pay better than others,

10. are free to speculate about

by circumstances.

(Bernays.)

them, but

in

practice

we

are

47

K^inds of Money-making and which pay best one place and some of

or fowl, or of any animals which

fish,

These

man.

some do

better in I. 11

Secondly, husbandry, which

in another.

tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and

be either

may

in particular places, for

may

be useful to

are the divisions of the true or proper art of 3

Of the other, which consists money- making and come first. the first and most exchange, important division is commerce commerce by sea, commerce (of which there are three kinds

in

by land,

selling

safer or

more

service

is

between

arts, still

this

these again differing as they are

shops

of

for hire

mechanical

There

in

the second

profitable),

one kind

this,

third

and the

sort

of money-making

or natural

first

usury,

the third,

employed in the 4 unskilled and bodily labour.

the other in

a

is

is

intermediate

mode which

is

partly

concerned with exchange of the fruits and Some of these latter, although other products of the earth. bear no are nevertheless fruit, they profitable ; for example,

natural, but is also

wood and

minerals.

are obtained, has

The

many

art

of mining, by which minerals

5

branches, for there are various kinds

of things dug out of the earth.

Of

the several divisions of

now

money-making speak generally; a minute considera tion of them might be useful in practice, but it would be I

tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length now.

Those occupations

are

most

the is

body

is

truly arts in

is

is

g

;

the greatest use of the body, and the

there

which there

they are the meanest in which most deteriorated, the most servile in which there

the least element of chance

illiberal

in

which

the least need of excellence.

Works

have been written upon these subjects by various

by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting,

persons; for example,

7

Economic Tales

48

others have treated of other branches

I. 11 while

1259

a

cares

such

for

would be well

matters

refer

8 for

all

ways

There

is

application, but

for

is

who

amassing a fortune ; value the art of making in

the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and

his financial device,

9 tion

any one who It

this is useful to persons

money.

;

their

also to collect the scattered stories of the

which individuals have succeeded

in

to

writings.

may

which involves a

attributed to

principle

of universal

him on account of

his reputa-

He

wisdom.

which was supposed to

was reproached for his poverty, show that philosophy was of no use.

According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year ; so, having a little capital, he gave earnest-money for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid

When

against him.

them

the harvest-time came, and

once and of a sudden, he

many wanted

them out

at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if all at

10 they like, but that their ambition

is

let

of another

sort.

He

is

supposed to have given a striking proof of his I

was

saying,

application,

and

his device for is

wisdom, but, as getting money is of universal

nothing but the creation of a monopoly. by cities when they are in want of

It is an art often practised

11

money ; they make a monopoly of provisions. There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him, bought up all the iron from the iron mines ; after wards, when the merchants from their various markets came to buy, he

was the only

seller,

and without much increasing

Which when Dionysius he gained 200 per cent. heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but

12 the price

Household Government he must not remain

that

man had discovered injurious to his

Thales

;

selves.

he thought that the

I.

11

way of making money which was

a

He

interests.

had the same idea

as

they both contrived to create a monopoly for them And statesmen ought to know these things ; for a 13

much

state is often as

for

own

at Syracuse, for

49

obtaining

it

in

want of money and of such devices more so hence some

as a household, or even

;

men

devote themselves entirely to finance. household management we have seen 2 that there are 12

public

Of

three parts

one

the rule of a master over slaves, which

is

has been discussed already

A

third of a husband.

and children, both

s

free,

and the

another of a father,

,

husband and father

rules over wife

but the rule differs, the rule over

his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. 1259 b

For although

there

may be

exceptions to the order of nature,

by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and the male

is

more immature. rule

But

and are ruled by

in

most

constitutional states the citizens 2

turns, for the idea of a constitutional

of the citizens are equal, and Nevertheless, when one rules and the

state implies that the natures

do not other

is

differ at all

ruled

4 .

we endeavour

to create a difference of

forms and modes of address and

titles

outward

of respect, which

may

be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan 6 . The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but 3 there the inequality

is

The rule of a father over permanent. he receives both love and the respect

his children is royal, for

And

due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. 1

s 6

a

Reading tvprj^a with Bernays. 4

Cp. c. 3-7. Cp. Herod, ii, 172, and note on this passage. DAVIS

E

ii.

2.

Cp.

6;

therefore

c.

iii.

3.

j.

17.

4.

Virtue in the Subject Classes

jo 1.

12 Homer has

appropriately called

Zeus

father of

Gods and

For a king is the men, because he is the king of them all. natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such

is

the relation of elder and

younger, of father and son. Thus it is clear that household management attends more 13 to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to

human

excellence more than

which we 2 to

call

A

the virtue of slaves.

whether there

to the excellence of property

wealth, and to the virtue of freemen

is

question

any excellence

may

more than

indeed be raised,

at all in a slave

instrumental and ministerial qualities

beyond merely whether he can have

the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like

3

?

in reason, ,

|

or

;

freemen

.

;

whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from

On it

the other hand, since they are

seems absurd

A similar question

may

men and

share

say that they have no virtue.

to

be raised about

women and

children,

whether they too have virtues ought a woman to be tem and brave and a and is child to be called temperate, perate just, :

4 and intemperate, or not

?

So

in general

we may ask

about

the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For a noble nature is equally required in both, but if so, why should one of them always Nor can we say that rule, and the other always be ruled ? this is a question

and subject degree 5

;

yet

is

a

how

of degree, for the difference between ruler difference of kind, and therefore not of strange

is

the

supposition

that

the one

For if ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well ? !

Virtues not the same for All

how

f the subject,

and cowardly, he

can he obey well

will certainly not

do

If he be licentious I. 13

?

varying

once indicated by the soul,

and the other

is

which one

in

and the

subject,

virtue

virtue,

And

according to their various natures.

a

It is evident,

his duty.

of them must have a share of

therefore, that both

5-1

but

this is at 6

part naturally rules,

we main

of the ruler

be different from that of the subject ; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. tain to

Now,

it

is

obvious that the same principle applies generally,

and therefore almost

all

things rule and are ruled according to

But the kind of

nature.

rule differs

the freeman rules over 7

;

the slave after another manner from that in which the male

man

rules over the female, or the

over the child

although

;

the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are For the slave has no deliberative^ sent in different degrees.

pre-<|

faculty at

all

woman

the

;

and the child has, but

has, but

it

immature.

it is

J

is

So

l

without authority

y

must necessarily 8

it

be with the moral virtues also ; all may be supposed to partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by Hence the ruler ought each for the fulfilment of his duty. to have moral virtue in perfection,

that of a master artificer,

for

his

and the master

duty

is

artificer is

entirely

reason

;

the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of virtue virtue

which

is

Clearly, then, moral 9 proper to each of them. all of them ; but the temperance of a man

belongs to

and of a woman, or the courage and a

woman,

courage of a obeying.

clearly seen 1

man

And if

is

shown

this holds

we

Or, with Benuys,

in

of

2 ,

detail, for those 2

inconclusive.

2

woman

other virtues, as will be

look at them in

the

the same;

commanding, of a

all

E

of a man and of

justice

are not, as Socrates maintained

Plato

in

more

who

say

Meno, 71-73.

10

The Slave and

?2 I.

that

13 generally soul, or in

Far 1 1

consists

virtue

the Artisan

in

a

good disposition of the

doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves.

mode of

better than such definitions is their

who, like Georgias *, enumerate the must be deemed to have their special says of

speaking,

All classes

virtues.

attributes

as the poet

;

women, Silence

but this

is

woman

a

2

s

glory

,

The

not equally the glory of man.

child is imper and therefore to himhis virtue is not relative fect, obviously 3 12 self alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher and in is

,

manner the

like

Now we

virtue

determined that a slave

and therefore he

life,

of the slave

virtue as will prevent

him from

But

For the

to a master.

useful for the wants of

much

failing in his

Some

duty through one will ask whether, if

are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in

the artisans, for they often 13 duct.

relative

obviously require only so

will

cowardice and intemperance.

what we

is

is

is

fail in their

work through miscontwo cases?

there not a great difference in the

slave shares in his master s life

;

the artisan

is less

closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave, [i. e. is under the direction

of a master].

The meaner

sort

of mechanic has a special

1260 b and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, 14 not so the shoemaker or other artisan.

It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of excellence in the

slave

;

but not merely because he possesses the art which trains 4

Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ

him

1

8

in his duties

Plato

.

2

Meno, 71-73.

His father

who

guides him

Soph. Aj.

*

(Bernays),

Cp.

c.

7.

29.3.

4.

End of command

only

Preliminary Enquiry

for slaves stand even

*,

more

in

5-3

need of admoni-

I. 3.3

tion than children.

The

of husband and wife, parent and child, their 15 in their intercourse with one another is

relations

what

several virtues,

pod, and what escape the

and how we may pursue the good and have to be discussed when we speak of

is evil,

evil, will

For, inasmuch as every

the different forms of government. :

amily sarts

a part of a state,

is

of a family, the virtue

and these relationships are the of the part must have regard to

And

the virtue of the whole.

therefore

women and

children

must be trained by education with an eye to the state 2 if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference ,

in the virtues for

the

of the

children

state.

grow

persons in a state are

Of these let

women 3

we

will

a difference

and half the

vi.

make

2

777. 3

16

of what remains, 14 Regarding, then, our present a

new

;

Cp.

Plato Laws,

v. 9. vi.

781

11-15 B.

And,

beginning.

us examine the various theories of a perfect

Plato Laws,

:

free

.

us speak at another time.

first, let

make

they must

up to be citizens,

matters, enough has been said

enquiry as complete,

1

And

;

state.

viii.

i.

r.

BOOK OUR

II. 1

II

purpose is to consider what form of political commu of all for those who are most able to realize their

nity is best

We

must therefore examine not only this but ideal of life. other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states,

that

;

no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them x at all want to philosophize at the expense of truth we

let 1

and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem is good and useful may be brought to light. And

what

we

;

only undertake this enquiry because

which we are acquainted are

We

a

f must either have (i)

1261

a

the constitutions with

faulty.

will begin with the natural beginning

fThree alternatives are conceivable

f

all

all

:

of the subject. of a state

The members

things or (2) nothing in

common,

or

common and some not. That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the state is a community, and must at any rate have a common place one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who (3)

some things

in

3 share in that one city. all

things, as

not others

far as

For

?

But should a well-ordered

may

be,

the

Republic of Plato

condition, or the proposed 1

in 2 .

new

common,

Which

Rep.

v.

make

457

c.

state

have

some only and

as Socrates proposes is

better,

order of society

Or, as Bernays, taking irdfrajs with

are anxious to 2

common,

or

the citizens might conceivably have wives

and children and property in

in

ao<pifa6ai

a sophistical display at any cost.

our present

?

fiov\o^it cav

we >

False Conception of Unity There

are

many

difficulties

the

in

yj

community of women. II. 3

The

principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution does not appear to be established by his argu

ments

;

and then again as a means to the end which he ascribes it is impossible, and how we are to

to the state, taken literally,

and qualify

limit

it is

nowhere precisely

stated.

am

I

speak-

a

ing of the premiss from which the argument of Socrates pro that the greater the unity of the state the better. Is ceeds,

not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state ? since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from

it

being a state,

an individual

becomes a family, and from being a family, may be said to be more one

it

;

for the family

So

than the state, and the individual than the family.

that

ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is 3

we it

not

men

made up only of ;

for similars

so many men, but of different kinds of It is not like do not constitute a state.

of which the usefulness depends upon there is no difference in quality. where even quantity Foi in that mutual protection is the end aimed at; and the

a military alliance, its

question is

is

the same as about the scales of a balance

the heavier

:

which

?

In like manner, a state differs from a nation, whenever

in

a nation the people are not dispersed in villages, but are in the condition of the Arcadians ; in a state the elements out of

which the unity

is

formed

to be

the Ethics

and equals 1

2 ,

is

differ in kind.

*,

this is a principle

as I

which must be maintained, for a

Or,

Wherefore 4

have already remarked in And among freemen the salvation of states.

the principle of reciprocity

reciprocal proportion.

C/

o ^ ;

-4<.

\

(>

\

N. Eth.

v. 8.

6.

\j^

Plato s J(epublic:

f5 II.

2 they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of suc-

The result is that upon this plan they all govern manner of government is] just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters.

5 cession.

;

[but the

6

And

clearly better that, as in business, so also in politics

it is

same persons where

there should be continuance of the

1261 b

is

But where

possible.

this

by reason of the would be unjust that

this is not possible

and

natural equality of the citizens,

it

any one should be excluded from the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad *), then it is better, instead of

holding power, to adopt a principle of rotation,

all

equals giving place to equals, as the original rulers gave place

them

7 to

2

Thus

.

in turn, as if

manner there is

it

the one party rule and the others are ruled

they were no longer the same persons. is a variety in the offices held by them.

evident that a city

which some persons greatest

good of

8

Again, of the

and that what

;

in

is

in

state

is

clearly not

said to be the

destruction

;

but

which preserves them

that

another point of view,

is

their

reality

good of things must be

surely the

Hence

not by nature one in that sense

is

affirm

cities

In like

this

3 .

extreme unification

good for a family is more selfand a city than a family, and ;

sufficing than an individual,

a city only

enough

comes

into being

when

the

community

If then self-sufficiency

to be self-sufficing.

desired, the lesser degree of unity is

more

is

is

large to be

desirable than the

greater.

3

But, even supposing that 1

Cp.

PI.

Rep.

it

were best for the community to 2

i.

345-6.

Cp.

Cp.

Pi.

Rep.

i.

352.

i.

12.

2;

iii.

17.

4.

False Conception of ;

i

57

Unity

have the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means II. 3 indicated by the fact of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time, which, according to Socrates

word

is

vidual says

ambiguous.

mine

and

each

degree accomplished own son and his own wife, ;

that belongs to him.

;

it is

all

all

puzzles.

all

[i.

e.

or if the

;

way

in

but not

words

which

There

In like man- 3

each.

as belonging to them, is

an obvious fallacy odd,

both,

in

sense in which each does so impracticable

not the

wives and children in

may be a

fine

in

even,

argument becomes a source of persons call the same thing mine

ambiguous, and

That

is

their

some other words,

like

:

some

in

will call the

would be described

not severally but collectively. the term

may be

same person his and so of his property and of all

who had

they would say

ner their property

man

This, however,

people would speak

the 2

If the meaning be that every indi not mine at the same time, then

perhaps the result at which Socrates aims

common

For

the sign of perfect unity in a state.

is

*,

all

logical in the

thing, but

it

is

are taken in the other sense

the sense which distinguishes

all

from

each

],

such

no way conduces to harmony. And there is 4 unity another objection to the proposal. For that which is common a

in

number has the least care bestowed upon it. thinks one chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the Every common interest ; and only when he is himself concerned as

to the greatest

an individual. ,

more inclined fulfil

;

a few.

For

as in families

Each

besides other considerations, everybody

is

which he expects another

to

to neglect the duty

many

citizen will

attendants are often less useful than

have a thousand sons

who

will not 5

be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally the son 1

PI.

Rep.

v.

462

c.

Plato s Republic:

5-8

II.

3 of anybody, and a

therefore

will

be

neglected by

all

alike.

Further, upon principle, every one will call another mine or not mine according as he is prosperous or the this

reverse

however small a

;

fraction he

be of the whole

may

number, he will say of every individual of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the city, such a one is mine, such a one his tive

for

;

is

it

;

and even about

child, or whether, if

6

But which

is

he

this

will

one came into existence, to be able to say

better

it

mine

one of the two thousand or the ten thousand

7

use the

word

sense

For

?

his son

whom

mine

the ordinary and

in

usually the

not be posi

know who chanced

impossible to

about every citizens, or to

more

restricted

by one man brother or cousin or kinsman

same person

another calls his

to have a

has survived.

is

called

or blood-relation or connexion by marriage either of himself

or of

some

relation

of

his,

and these relationships he

distin

guishes from the tie which binds him to his tribe or ward and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody ;

Plato s fashion Nor is there any brothers and of children and fathers and preventing way mothers from sometimes recognizing one another ; for chil

8 than to be a son after

!

dren are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be 9 finding indications of their relationship to one another.

Geo

they say that in Upper graphers declare such to be the fact Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the chil ;

dren

who

are born are assigned to their respective fathers

the ground of their likeness

females of other animals

J .

for

And

some women,

on

like the

example mares and cows

have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their

1

Cp. Herod,

iv.

180.

Community of Women and Children was the case with the Pharsalian mare

as

parents,

$"9

called II.

Dicaea (the Just) 1 Other evils, against which

3

.

it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides,

voluntary as well

quarrels and

as involuntary,

slanders,

4

all

most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when which

there

are

is

no

Moreover, they are much more

relationship.

unknown, and, when they expiations of them cannot

likely to occur if the relationship is

have

occurred, the customary

be made.

Again,

having made

the

how

it

strange

is

that Socrates, after

common, should

children

2

hinder lovers

from carnal intercourse only, but should permit familiarities between father and son or between brother and brother, than

which

nothing

more unseemly,

be

can

without them, love of this sort too, to forbid intercourse for

is

even

since

How

improper.

strange, 3

no other reason than the violence

of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.

community of wives and children seems better husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they

This

4,

suited to the

have wives and children

in

common, they

will

)

be bound 1262 b

one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel 2 In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of that which to

.

good laws ought to have, and the in

making these regulations about

defeat

itself.

of states

3

of Socrates

children

would

believe to be the greatest

good friendship and the preservative of them against revolutions ; 1

Cp.

we

For

intention

women and

vii.

Cp. Hist. Anim.

10.

vii.

6, p. *

13.

586

a.

13.

Cp. N. Eth.

viii. I.

4.

5

6o II.

4

Plato

neither

the

Republic:

which Socrates so

there anything

is

s

which he and

unity of the state

all

greatly lauds as

the world declare

But the unity which he com by friendship. would be like that of the lovers in the Sympo

to be created

mends sium

2 ,

who,

as Aristophanes says, desire to

excess

the

in 7

*

their

"of

affection,

and from

grow

together

being two

to

become one, in which case one or both would certainly Whereas [the very opposite will really happen ;] in perish. having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say my son, or the son As a little sweet wine mingled with my father a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, a state

8

V

in

sort of

this

community, the idea of relationship which

based upon these names will be lost ; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or is

the 9

Of

two

the

father,

which

qualities

a thing

that f

about

son the

is

or brothers

chiefly inspire regard

your own and

can exist in such a state as

about

that

one another.

and

you love

affection

it

neither

this.

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank will be

very difficult to arrange

cannot but

whom.

10 to

assaults,

know whom

And

,

the givers or transferrers

they are giving and transferring, and mentioned evils, such as

the previously

homicides, will happen more often

unlawful loves,

amongst those

;

4

who

are

transferred

to

the lower

classes,

who

have a place assigned to them among the guardians for they will no longer call the members of any other class

or

1

Cp.

;

c.

2.

a

Symp. 189-193. 4

Rep.

iii.

415.

3

Cp.

c. 3.

6\

Community of Property and children, and

brothers,

and mothers, and

fathers,

will II.

4

not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and

children, let this be our conclusion.

Next

let

us consider what should be our arrangements 5

about property their

be

should the citizens of the perfect state have This question may in common or not ?

:

possessions

separately from

discussed

Even supposing

and children. belong

that the

to individuals, according to the

present universal,

may

using possessions in

women and

2

women

the enactments about

children 1268 a

custom which

is

at

there not be an advantage in having and

common

Three cases

?

are possible

:

may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is (l) the

soil

some

practice of

the

divided

among

common

of

barbarians.

Or

nations.

common, and may be cultivated

in

(2),

the

common,

individuals for their private use

property which

Or

(3), the soil

is

to

said

soil

may be

but the produce this is a

;

exist

among

form

certain

and the produce may be

alike

common.

When

the husbandmen are not the citizens, the case will 3

be different and easier to deal with

;

but

when

the citizens

till

the ground themselves the question of ownership will give a

If they do not share equally in enjoyments

world of trouble.

and

toils,

who labour much and get little will necessarily those who labour little and receive or consume

complain of

much. There having

things

common an the

>.

those

is

always a in

property.

difficulty in

common,

The

but

men

living together

especially

in

and 4

their having

partnerships of fellow-travellers are

for they generally fall out by example to the point way and quarrel about any trifle which turns up. So ;

|

6z

Plato s Republic :

II. 5 with servants

we

:

whom we

with

are

most

take offence at those

to

liable

most frequently come

contact in daily

into

life.

5

These

some of the disadvantages which attend of community property ; the present arrangement, if im it be by good customs and laws, would be as might proved far better, and would have the advantages of both systems. are only

the

i

<{

Property should be general interest

men

*,

his

own

things

ordered

And

business.

common,

V

yet

Even now

showing that

7 be carried further.

among

as a

but,

a

distinct

the good, and in

as the proverb says,

Friends,

will

have

For, although every

some things he

friends, while of others

all

of such a

are traces

not impracticable, but, in well-

is

it

there

already to a certain extent and

states, exists

property,

sense

every one has

progress, because every one will be attending

respect of use,

principle,

when

for,

;

not complain of one another, and they

will

common

certain

a

in

private

make more

will

to

rule,

will place

at

man

may own

has his

the disposal of his

The

he shares the use with them.

Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another s slaves, and horses and dogs, as if they were their own ; and when they happen to be

in

the

they appropriate in the fields

country,

8 whatever provisions they want.

It is clearly better that property

should be private, but the use of business of the legislator disposition.

1263 b

when is

a

a

man

Again, feels a

feeling

1

it

common and men this ;

create in

how immeasurably greater is thing to be his own for the ;

implanted

9 although selfishness

is to

is

by

nature

and

rightly censured

Cp. Rep.

ii.

374. 3

Cp. N. Eth.

ix. S.

benevolent

the pleasure, love of self

not given this,

;

2

the special

however,

Cp. Rep.

6.

in

iv.

424

3

vain, is

A.

not

63

Community of Property the mere love of

self,

the miser s love of

but the love of self in

money

;

for

money, and other such objects there

man has

a

excessive

it

is

property.

any

of property l

state.

Two"

;

lost

by 10 are

virtues

matter

liberality in the

example

all

of

things in liberality

:

ofj

common,

or

which

do any is

made

.

;

men

believe that

may have

denouncing

a

readily listen to

specious it,

and are

appearance of easily induced

some wonderful manner

in

become everybody heard

II. 5

further,

temperance towards women abstain from another s wife

secondly,

set an

is

advantage

for liberality consists in the use

legislation

benevolence to

first,

when men have

one,

longer

liberal action

Such

:

an honourable action to

No

The

of the

unification

for temperance sake);

will

love

which can only be rendered

private property.

annihilated in such a state (for

like

men

And

in a measure.

friends or guests or companions,

the

excess, all,

the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to

is

when

or almost

all,

s

everybody will 2 is friend, especially when some one

the

evils

now

existing

in states,

iji :

.

suits

about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. different cause

These

\

however, are due to a very ia the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, evils,

we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have

.

private property.

Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they are to lead appears 1

Cp. N. Eth.

iv. i.

I.

a

Rep.

v.

464, 465.

13

64 5

II.

^

;

\v y

I*

I

to

Plato

s

Republic:

The

be quite impracticable.

Unity there should but in

some

a state

may

be,

from which he

starts.

both of the family and of the

For

respects only. attain

must be

error of Socrates

attributed to the false notion of unity

there

is

a point at

state,

which

such a degree of unity as to be no longer a without actually ceasing to exist, it will

state, or at which,

become an

inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, has been The which reduced to a single foot. rhythm a as I was is a should be which state, saying, plurality

15 or

,

made

united and is

into a

community by education

;

strange that the author of a system of education,

and

it

which

he thinks will make the

state virtuous, should expect to by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which and Crete respecting common meals, whereprevail at Sparta

improve his

1264

a

by the

1

6

common.

citizens

legislator

has [to a certain degree] made property that we should not disregard the

Let us remember

experience of ages

;

in the multitude

of years these things,

if

for they were good, would certainly not have been unknown almost everything has been found out, although sometimes do not use the they are not put together ; in other cases men ;

17

knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on we could see such a form of government in the for the legislator could not actual process of construction this subject if

;

form a

state at all

without distributing and dividing the citizens

into associations for tribes.

But

agriculture to

all

common

this

meals, and into phratries and

legislation

the guardians,

ends

only

a prohibition

in

forbidding

which the Lace

daemonians try to enforce already. 1

8

Again, Socrates has not 1

said,

Cp.c.

2.

nor 2.

is

it

easy to decide,

Miscellaneous Criticisms what

such a community

in

The

state.

citizens

and about them

have his

be

have

things in

all

what

or

been

has

determined

are

:

the

have their property in common ? Or, land which he tills, is each individual

common own ? and individual or common ?

besides the to

be the general form of the II. 5

will

are not guardians are the majority,

nothing

too, to

husbandmen,

who

65

are

their

and children to

wives

If, like the guardians, they are to 19

common,

will

what do they

in

differ

from them,

submitting to their

they gain by government ? Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans,

who

the same institutions as their own, them gymnastic exercises and the possession of

give their slaves

but forbid

arms.

on the other hand, the inferior classes are too of marriage and property, what will

If,

2o

like other cities in respect

be the form of the community ? Must states in one *, each hostile to the other

of the

consist

guardians,

who

a

are

it

not contain two 2

?

sort

One

class will

of watchmen

;

another, of the husbandmen, and there will be the artisans and

the evils

2

But

[if so]

which Socrates

affirms

the other citizens

exist equally

.

among them.

good an education, the

the suits and quarrels, and all 21 to exist in other states, will

8

He

says indeed that, having so

citizens will not

need many laws, for

4 example, laws about the city or about the markets ; but then he confines his education to the guardians. Again, he makes 33

husbandmen owners of the land upon condition of their paying a tribute *. But in that case they are likely to be much the

1

Cp. Rep.

iv.

422

E.

Or (with Bernays), He makes the guardians into a mere occupying while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real garrison, a

citizens *

;

Rep. DAVIS

see note. v.

464, 465.

*

Rep.

iv.

F

425

D.

Rep.

v.

464

c.

66 II. 5

Plato

more unmanageable

s

and

Republic: than

conceited

the

or

Helots,

And

]

whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, or slaves in general

23 Penestae,

what the is

.

will be the education, form of government, laws of lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined neither easy, though very important, to discover what should :

it

be the character of the inferior classes, the guardians 1264 b 24

Again,

is to

private

house

common

life

of

will 2

see to

the

what

will

And

retains

who

fields, but

the happen have both their property and their wives it is absurd to argue, from Once more

the

to

agricultural

?

if

class

common 2

in

men

property, the

will see

the

women common, and

Socrates makes the

if

if

be maintained.

?

;

analogy of the animals, that men and women should 3 for animals have not to manage follow the same pursuits

the

;

The

household.

government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger ; for he makes the same

25 a

I

26

And

persons always rule.

among

spirited

warriors

God

But

?

that

must be the same

rulers

mingles

if

this

the meaner sort,

turbance

is

in the souls

is

often a cause of dis

how much more among

the persons

evident

of men

;

is

whom

he

high-

makes

which the

for the gold

not at one time given to

one, at another time to another, but always to the

same

:

as

he says, God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth but brass and iron in those who are 27 meant to be artisans and husbandmen Again, he deprives the guardians of happiness, and says that the legislator ought ;

V

make

to 1

8

Cp.

the whole

2

2.

c. 9.

Cp. Rep.

state

v.

451

D.

*

6

happy

But the whole cannot

.

These words

Cp. Rep.

iii.

are bracketed

415

A.

5

Rep.

by Bekker. iv.

419, 420.

Criticisms

6j

be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy II. 5 1 In this respect happiness is not like the even happiness .

numbers, which may exist only none of the parts ; not so happiness.

principle

but

in

common

discourses

has

people. all

the whole,

And

who are ? Surely not the The Republic of which

guardians are not happy, or the

in

in

these

difficulties,

and

others

if the 28

artisans,

Socrates quite

as

great.

The later

same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato

s

6

Laws, and therefore we had better examine In the the constitution which is therein described.

work, the

briefly

Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in

a

all

few questions

only; such as the community of women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state.

The

population

is

divided into two classes

men, and the other of warriors a third class of counsellors and

;

from rulers

one of husband-

this

is

taken

state.

But

latter

of the

2

3

Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artisans are to have a share in the government,

they,

too,

are to carry

He

arms and share

in

and whether

military service,

women ought to share of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the

or not.

certainly thinks that the

in the education

education of the guardians.

anything but laws

;

not

In

much

is

the

Laws

there

is

hardly

said about the constitution.

1265 a "*

This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary the other or ideal form. type, he gradually brings round to

For with property,

the exception of the community of women and he supposes everything to be the same in both 1

Cp.

vii.

9.

F 2

7.

5

6% II.

6

Plato s

states

there

;

both are to

from

live free

common

be

be the same education

to

is

meals

Laws: the citizens of

;

and there are to

servile occupations,

The

in both.

only difference

that in the

is

1 and Laws, the common meals are extended to women 2 the warriors number about 5000 but in the Republic only IOOO 3 ,

,

.

6

The

discourses of Socrates are never commonplace

always exhibit grace and originality and thought tion in everything can hardly be expected.

;

We

overlook the fact that the number of

5000

;

they

but perfec

must not

citizens, just

now

mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylonia, or some other huge country, if so many persons are to be sup ported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, 7

who

be a multitude

will

an ideal]

many times we may assume what we

as great.

[In framing wish, but should avoid

4

impossibilities It is said

.

the

[in

his eye directed to

But neighbouring him 6 if the state ,

that the legislator ought to have

the people and the country 5 countries also must not be forgotten by points,

for

which he

For

.

legislates is to

have a true

must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbours, and not merely useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to life

political

8

7

Laws]

two

.

a state

be the best, either for individuals or states

8 ,

still

a city should

be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating. There is another point Should not the amount of pro be defined in some clearer perty way ? For Socrates says :

1

s

*

Laws,

Rep.

vi. iv.

Cp.

vii. 4.

Cp.

c. 7.

6

2

781.

423 A (but

see note 6

2. 7

14.

on

Laws,

v.

737

E.

this passage).

Perhaps Laws, 703-707 and 747 D (?). 8 vii. 6. Cp. vii. c. 2 and 3. 7.

Cp.

Criticisms

man should have

that a

to live temperately

well

But

this

;

a

much

so

\ which

only a

is

6y

property as will enable

way of

would be the higher or more general conception. better 9 live temperately and yet miserably.

A

man may

definition

him II. 6

to live

saying

would be

as will enable

him

that a

man must have

much

so

property

to live not only temperately but liberally

2 ;

combine with luxury toil be associated with temperance. For liberality and tem

two

if the

will

are parted, liberality will

perance are the only virtues

of property.

A

3

;

which have

man cannot

courage, but temperately and liberally he

the practice of these virtues

There

do with the use

to

use property with mildness or

may

;

and therefore

inseparable from

is

property.

an inconsistency, too, in equalizing the property and 10 * not regulating the number of the citizens ; the population is to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently is

equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be 1265 b But [in Plato s imaginary state] n the case in existing states. greater care will be required than

whatever

now

;

for

among

be the number of citizens, the property

may distributed among them, and

therefore no one

is in

ourselves, is

always

want ;

but,

were incapable of division [as in the Laws], the supernumeraries, whether few or many, would get nothing. if the property

One would have

thought that

limit population than property;

it

was even more necessary

and that the

to

1

2

limit should be

fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children,

and of ject, 1

sterility

which

in

married persons.

in existing states is so

The

neglect of this sub- 13

common,

is

"

a never-failing

i. v. 737 D. Cp. vii. 5. and reading apfrai with the MSS., or, reading with Omitting * But see Laws, v. 740. Bekk. ttts alptrai, eligible qualities. 3

Laws,

fs

3

6 cause of poverty among

II.

the citizens

one of the most ancient

and the number of

hereafter

us

been of different sizes

principle

but in in our

be explained

.

is

how

Laws

another omission in the

Socrates does not

;

the rulers differ from their subjects

that they should be related as the 15 are

;

What

maintained.

is

1

There tell

the parent

thought that the families

the right arrangement will have to

is

is

ought to remain the same, although

may have

Laws, the opposite

opinion

legislators,

citizens

originally all the lots

and poverty

;

Pheidon the Corinthian, who was

of revolution and crime.

14 the

Laws:

Plato s

7o

made out of

wools

different

whole property may be increased

;

he only says

warp and the woof, which

He

2 .

fivefold

allows that a 3 ,

his land also increase to a certain extent

but

why

man

s

should not

Again, will the

?

good management of a household be promoted by his arrange ment of homesteads ? for he assigns to each individual two 1

6 homesteads in separate places

4

and

,

it is

difficult to live in

two

houses.

The whole

system of government tends to be neither demo nor cracy oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, usually called a polity, and

which

is

armed

soldiers.

which would

Now,

Cp.

first

Lacedaemonian,

tocratic government.

vii.

5.

i

;

states,

he was very

he meant to say that this constitutional

form came nearest to his

1

number of

suit the greatest

likely right, but not if

17 prefer the

is composed of the heavy he intended to frame a constitution

if

Some, ii

10.

or ideal state

or, possibly,

;

;

for

many would

some other more

aris

indeed, say that the best consti16.

15

;

but the promise

is

hardly

fulfilled. a

A.

Laws,

v.

734

Laws,

v.

745, but cp. infra,

1

E,

735

3 vii.

10.

II.

Laws,

v.

744

E.

The Form of Government tution is a combination 1

Lacedaemonian

of

because

71

existing forms, and they praise the II.

all

it is

made up of

oligarchy, monarchy,

democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders

the

element

while the democratic

oligarchy,

represented by the Ephors

for the

;

Ephors

are selected

is

from

however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common In the Law 2 , it is meals and in the habits of daily life. the people.

Others,

maintained that the best state tyranny,

which

worst of

many forms

is

which

better

The

more numerous elements.

Laws

all,

or are the

who combine

are nearer the truth

for the state

;

made up of democracy and

are either not constitutions at

But they

all.

is

"

made up of

is

.

(

j

constitution proposed in the

has no element of monarchy at

all

;

it

is

nothing but

This oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy. s for is seen in the mode of although appointing magistrates

19

;

among those who have

the appointment of them by lot from

been already selected combines both elements, the way in * which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly

and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavour to have

number of the magistrates appointed out of the and the highest officers selected from those

the greater

richest classes

who have

the greatest incomes, both these are

features.

The

oligarchical

choice of the council

6 ;

for

principle all

oligarchical 20 also

prevails

in

the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the 1

a

Cp.

iv.

3 * 8

7

;

4

7.

;

9.

Laws,

vi.

755, 763 E, 765.

Laws,

vi.

764 A

Laws,

vi.

756 B-E.

;

and Pol.

7-9-

iv. 9.

the

are compelled to choose, but

2

;

14.

vi -

75 6 E 12.

;

C P- iv - 7

first

1(5-

P/afo

72 6

II.

class,

Laws:

j

and of an equal number out of the second class and out

of the third

class, but

not

in this latter case to all the voters

of the third and forth class out of the fourth class

l

is

Then, he says

21 second.

number of each

and the selection of candidates

;

only compulsory on the first and there ought to be an equal

that

Thus

class selected.

a preponderance will

who

be given to the better sort of people,

have the larger

many of the lower classes, not being compelled, will not vote. These considerations, and others which will be adduced when the time comes for examining similar

incomes, because 22

polities,

tend to

show

that states like Plato s should not be

There

composed of democracy and monarchy. in

danger

the

electing

themselves elected

for, if

;

which

is

a

who are number choose to com

but a small

bine, the elections will always go as they desire.

constitution

also

is

magistrates out of a body

described

in

the

Such

is

the

Laws.

Other constitutions have been proposed ; some by private others by philosophers and statesmen, which all

7

persons,

come nearer Plato

to

No

s.

community of women and 2

other

ones than either of

established or existing

one else has introduced such novelties as the

legislators

begin

children, or public tables for

with

what

is

necessary.

opinion of some, the regulation of property I

,

3

1266

of

all,

that being the question

upon which

is

all

women In

:

the

the chief point

revolutions turn.

This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions.

b equalization

easily

when

the shortest 1

He

thought that

in

a

might be accomplished without a

state

was already established

new colony

the

difficulty, not so ;

and that then

way of compassing the desired end would be for

Omitting either rov rtraprov or rav rtrdprttiv,

Phaleas

73

Equality of Properly

the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for II. 7 the poor not to give but to receive them.

Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, 4 accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed \ any citizen to possess more than five times the

minimum

But those who make such laws should

qualification.

remember what they are apt to forget who fixes the amount of property should of children

;

for, if

the children are too

the law must be broken. law,

it

is

a

become poor

;

on

also fix the

many

for the property,

the equalization of property exercises an 6

was

clearly understood even

Laws were made by

legislators.

others prohibiting an individual from possessing as ;

and there are other laws

the sale of property is

i

I

besides the violation of the

And,

political society

some of the old as he pleased

number

5

bad thing that many from being rich should for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up

That

revolutions.

influence

that the legislator

a law that a

man

:

among is

the original lots.

Such

land

his property unless he can

sell

some misfortune has

Again, there have been laws

much

which forbid

in states

the Locrians, for example, there

not to

prove unmistakably that

by Solon and

befallen him. 7

which enjoin the preservation of

a law existed in the island of Leucas,

and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification. Again, where there

is

amount may

equality of property, the

be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be Clearly, then, the legis living either in luxury or penury. lator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, 8 but at moderation in their amount. this

moderate amount equally to 1

c.

6.

all,

15.

And he

yet, if

will be

he prescribe

no nearer the

74 II.

7 mark t

Phaleas^ ;

which

for

it

is

not the possessions but the desires of mankind

require to be equalized

l ,

and

this is impossible, unless

But Phaleas by the state. and precisely what he means

a sufficient education is provided will probably reply that this is that, in his opinion, there

9 property, but equal education. will be the

men

Still

all, if

not only equal

in states,

he should

character of his education

having one and the same for 10 poses

;

ought to be

it is

;

there

tell

us

what

no use

is

in

of a sort that predis-

to avarice, or ambition, or both.

Moreover,

civil

troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but

out of the inequality of honour, though in opposite ways. 1267 a the

For

common people

quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honour ; as the poet says

The bad and good There

1 1

are crimes of

alike in

honour share

which the motive

is

want

V ;

and for

these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to 12

be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want not the sole incentive to crime ; men desire to gratify some

is

passion which preys upon them, or they are eager to enjoy the pleasures which are unaccompanied with the pain of desire, and therefore they commit crimes. Now what is the cure of these three disorders ? Of the first,

moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance ; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires 13

we

nowhere but

are dependent

in

philosophy

on others.

The

;

for

all

other pleasures

fact is that the greatest

crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. 1

Cp.

c. 5.

12.

a

II.

ix.

Men 319.

do

Errors and Omissions

His

not become tyrants in order that they

may

75

not suffer cold

;

II. 7

and hence great is the honour bestowed, not on him who kills Thus we see that the a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. of Phaleas

avail only against petty crimes. another objection to them. They are chiefly But the state. the internal welfare of to designed promote

institutions

There

is

the legislator should consider also

and to

nations,

all

who

must be organized with a view he has said not a word.

this

perty

:

its relation

are outside of

l

it

.

to neighbouring

The government

to military strength

And

M

;

and of

so with respect to pro- 15

there should not only be enough to supply the internal

wants of the

state,

but also to meet dangers coming from

The

property of the state should not be so large that more powerful neighbours may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders ; nor yet so small without.

that the state is unable to maintain a

war even

against states

Phaleas has not iG of equal power, and of the same character. 2 that a cer laid down any rule ; and we should bear in mind tain

amount of wealth

2

is

The

an advantage.

best limit will

probably be, not so much as will tempt a more powerful neigh There bour, or make it his interest to go to war with you. a story that Eubulus,

is

besiege Atarneus, told tion

would

take,

when Autophradates was going

him

to

consider

how

i

7

to

long the opera

and then reckon up the cost which would

be incurred in the time.

For,

said he,

I

am

willing for

These sum than that to leave Atarneus at once. on words of Eubulus made an impression Autophradates, and a smaller

he desisted from the

One that 1

it

Cp.

siege.

advantage gained by the equalization of property prevents the citizens from quarrelling. c.

6.

2

7.

Or reading

o TI,

Not

is

that the

what amount of wealth.

18

Phaleas and Hippodamus

76 II. 7 gain

this direction is very great.

in

they do not due; and this is

dissatisfied because

they think their j

9

of sedition and revolution

.

will be

which

often found to be a cause

And

J

For the nobles

receive the honours

mankind

the avarice of

one time two obols was pay enough, but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end ; for it is of the nature insatiable

is

at

;

of desire not to be the gratification of o

much

to

2

The

more

that

;

is

to

and

to say, they

train

to

2

only for not so

is

the nobler sort of

prevent the lower from

must be kept down, but not

Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas

at illtreated.

is

he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abun

for

imperfect; rich also in

dance of what are called his movables.

22

live

beginning of reform

property as

equalize

natures not to desire more, getting

and most men

satisfied,

it.

Now

either

all

these

things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on It would appear that them, or they must all be let alone.

is legislating for a small city only, if, as he supposes, the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a part But if there is a law that 23 of the population of the city.

Phaleas all

artisans are to be public slaves,

it

should only apply to those

8 as at Epidamnus, or engaged on public works the plan which Diophantus once introduced. ,

From

these observations any one

was wrong or

8

may judge how

1

Cp.

Athens on

far

Phaleas

right in his ideas.

Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a

2

at

native of Miletus, the

10.

Or, reading with Bernays

3

Putting

a

comma

after

a/trj,

eircu

remedy for such evils. and removing the comma

the

after

His

Hippodamus

same who invented the laid out the Piraeus

him

led

tinction

Constitution

art

of planning

a

made some think him

cities,

and who also II. 8

whose fondness

a strange man,

into

and Laws 77

of

general eccentricity

affected (for he

for dis

life,

which

would wear flowing

hair

and expensive ornaments and yet he dressed himself in the same cheap warm garment both in winter and summer) he, ;

;

besides aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature,

was the

first

person not a statesman

who made

enquiries about

the best form of government.

The

city

of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens one of artisans, one of husbandmen,

2

divided into three parts

and a third of armed defenders of the

He

state.

also divided 3

the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third : the first was set apart to maintain the customary worship of the gods, the second was to support the warriors, He also 4 the third was the property of the husbandmen.

private

divided his laws into three classes, and no more, for he main there

tained

that

injury,

and homicide.

are

three

He

subjects

of

lawsuits

insult,

likewise instituted a single final

which all causes seeming to have been decided might be referred ; this court he formed improperly He was further of opinion 1268 of elders chosen for the purpose. court of appeal, to

that the decisions of the courts ought not to be given

5 by the

use of a voting pebble, but that every one should have a tablet

on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal but, if he partly ;

acquitted and partly condemned, he

To

was

to distinguish accord

the existing law he objected that it obliged the be guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. judges to He also enacted that those who discovered anything for the 6 good of the state should be rewarded ; and he provided that ingly.

a

78 II.

8

His

Hippodamus

the children of citizens tained

at

who

died

the public expense, as

Confusions

in

battle

should be main

such an enactment had

if

never been heard of before, yet it actually exists at Athens l As to the magistrates, he would have 7 and in other places. them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes already mentioned, and those

who were

elected were to watch

over the interests of the public, of strangers and of orphans. These are the most striking points in the constitution of

There

Hippodamus.

The

is

not

much

else.

of these proposals to which objection may be division of the citizens. is the threefold The artisans, 8 taken, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the first

But the husbandmen have no arms, and the arms nor land, and therefore they become all

government.

artisans neither

That they should share in an impossibility ; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must

9 but slaves of the warrior class. all

the offices

is

be taken from the class of those

who

two other classes have no share

government, how can be said that those who have

they be loyal citizens

It

?

may

carry arms.

Yet,

arms must necessarily be masters of both the other

;

the

classes,

not so easily accomplished unless they are numer and if they are, why should the other classes share in the

but this ic ous

if

in the

is

at

government

all,

or have power to appoint

Artisans there must be, for these are wanted

and they can

bandmen,

live

by

their craft, as elsewhere

magistrates in

;

every

?

city,

and the hus

too, if they really provided the warriors with food,

But in the have a share in the government. to have of are land of republic supposed Hippodamus they might their

fairly

own,

which

they 1

cultivate

Cp. Thuc.

ii.

for c.

46.

their

private

benefit.

Courts of Again, as to this

Law:

common

Inventions

79

land out of which the soldiers are II.

maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen,

make

although the legislator intended to

them.

a distinction

between

there are to be other cultivators distinct

again,

If,

8

1 1

who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands and those of the both from the husbandmen,

12

well, they will have a difficulty in supplying the of and 1268 b quantity produce which will maintain two households be in this should there for case, why, any division, they

public as

:

might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same lots ? There is surely a great confusion in all this. Neither

is

the law to be

when a simple

judges,

issue

commended which is

laid before

tinguish in their judgment; for the judge

an

into

arbitrator.

Now,

in

an

says that the 13

them, should dis is

thus converted

arbitration,

although the

many, they confer with one another about the but in courts of decision, and therefore they can distinguish law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains arbitrators are

;

to prevent the judges

one another.

Again,

from holding any communication with will there not be confusion if the

thinks that damages should be given, but not so suitor

demands

?

He

asks, say,

much

for twenty minae,

judge 14 as the

and the

judge allows him ten minae, or one judge more and another In this way they will go less ; one five, another four minae. on apportioning the damages, and some will grant the whole

and others nothing how is the final reckoning to be taken ? 15 Again, no one who votes for a simple acquittal or condemna :

tion

is

compelled to perjure himself,

if

the indictment

is

quite

8o

Should

Laws

be

Changed?

for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not

II. 8 simple and in right form

owe

;

He

the twenty minae.

is

only

who

guilty of perjury

thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, yet 1

To

6

and

condemns him. reward those

safely

who

discover anything which

is

useful to

proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot be enacted by law, for it may encourage informers, and

the state

is a

This question perhaps even lead to political commotions. It has been doubted whether it is or is not involves another. expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even another law be better. Now, if all changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus for,

17 if

;

under pretence of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution. iS perhaps

But, since

we had

there saying,

is

better

we

go

have touched upon this subject,

a

little

into detail,

a difference of opinion,

and

it

for,

as

1

was

may sometimes

Such changes in the other desirable to make changes. and sciences have certainly been beneficial medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art and science have

seem arts

;

And, if politics be an art, departed from traditional usage. must be necessary in this as in any other art. The need of improvement is shown by the fact that old customs

19 change

For the ancient exceedingly simple and barbarous. Hellenes went about armed * and bought their wives of each

are

20 other.

The

remains of ancient laws which have come

1269 a to us are quite absurd

;

for example, at

about murder, to the effect that

if

number of witnesses from among 1

Cp. Thucyd.

i.

c.

Cumae

there

is

down a

law

the accuser produce a certain his

own kinsmen,

5 and 6.

the accused

Should Laws be Changed?

81

shall be held Again, men in general desire the good, II. 8 guilty. and not merely what their fathers had. But the primaeval 21 1 inhabitants , whether they were born of the earth, or were

the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary foolish people among ourselves 1 2 (such is certainly the tradition concerning the earth-born

men)

and

;

it

would be ridiculous

to rest contented with their

Even when laws have been

notions.

ought not always to remain unaltered.

making a

constitution,

precisely set

down

it

written

As

impossible that

is

in writing

all

things should be

must be uni

for enactments

;

concerned with particulars 8 Hence we that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed ;

versal, but actions are

infer

but

when we look

great caution lightly is

down, they

other arts, so in 22

in

.

at the

would seem

matter from another point of view, to be required. For the habit of 23

changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better

small,

be

left

;

will lose

the citizen will not gain so

much by

by the habit of disobedience.

arts is false

;

a change in a law

the change as he

The

analogy of the 24

a very different thing from

is

For the law has no power

a change in an art.

to

command

j

obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the

Even

power of the law.

if

we admit

that the 25

laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in And are they to be changed by anybody who every state ? 1

Or, referring

<5/io/ous

to

"frj-fevtTs,

earth or were the survivors of (o/joj ovs)

than earth-born men,

some

may

whether they were born of the who were no better

destruction,

be supposed to have been ordinary

foolish people. 2 3

Cp. Plato, Laws, Cp. Plato, DAVIS

Polit.

iii.

295

677 A;

Polit.

271 A; Tim. 22

A.

O

c.

82 II.

8

the

Sparta:

likes, or

only by certain persons

questions

Helots;

?

These

are very important

and therefore we had better reserve the discussion

;

of them to a more suitable occasion. In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed governments, two points have to be considered ; first,

9

in all

whether any

|

particular

law

good or bad, when compared

is

with the perfect state ; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set

;!

!

2

before his citizens

That

*.

in a

well-ordered state the citizens

should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in seeing slaves,

how

this leisure is to be attained.

they are liable to rebel.]

[For, if you employ Thessalian Penestae

The

have often risen against their masters, and the Helots

manner against the Lacedaemonians,

for

in like

whose misfortunes

3 they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however, of this 1269 b k| n d has as the reason probably yet happened to the Cretans ;

is

that the neighbouring

cities,

even when at war with one

another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions

not being for their interest, since they themselves have a de 2 Whereas all the neighbours of the pendent population .

Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, are their enemies [and the Helots are always revolting to In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the slaves them]. occurred at a time when the Thessalians were still at war with the

neighbouring Achaeans,

Perrhaebians,

and Magnesians.

4 Besides, if there were no other difficulty, the treatment or

management of

slaves is a troublesome affair

;

for, if

their masters, and, 1

Or

if

not kept

and think that they are as good as harshly treated, they hate and conspire

in hand, they are insolent,

himself (Bernays).

a

Cp.

c. 10.

5.

Women

Licence of the

Now

against them.

clear

is

it

when

that

8 3

these are the re- II.

of a state have not found out the secret of

suits the citizens

i

their subject population.

managing

Again, the licence of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the

5

For a husband and a wife, being jood order of the state. each a part of every family, the state may be considered as about equally divided into men and women those states in which the condition of the the city

l

may

what has

;

and, therefore, in

women

be regarded as having no laws.

happened

actually

make the whole

at

Sparta

is

bad, half

And

this is 6

the legislator wanted to

;

hardy and temperate, and he has carried the case of the men, but he has neglected

state

out his intention in

women, who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly the

ealued,

the citizens

if

especially

after the

their wives,

manner of

all

7

under the dominion of

fall

warlike races, except the

and a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting 8 Celts

Ares and Aphrodite, for ove either of

men

:he Spartans in the

warlike races are prone to the

all

women. This was exemplified among

or of

days of their greatness

mnaged by their women. But what whether women rule, or the rulers are result is the

same.

ase in daily life,

Even and

is

in

;

many

ruled by

regard to courage,

needed only

things were

difference does

it

which

The

is

of no

in war, the influence

:he

Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous.

jvil

showed

women

itself in the

Theban

make

?

women

other

invasion,

cities,

when,

1

Cp.

i.

G

13.

2

16.

I

of

The

unlike the

they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy. This licence of the Lacedaein

9

10

9

84

Sparta: Inequality of Property

9 monian women

II. 1270

a

existed from the earliest times, and

what might be expected. first

daemonians,

;

was

against the Argives, and afterwards again

the Arcadians and Messenians, the

men were

long away from

home, and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves the legislator s a soldier s

life

hand, (in

12

says,

wanted

which there

to bring the

many elements of virtue) when Lycurgus, as traditio

are

But,

women

and he gave up the attempt. for what then happened, and

under his laws, they resisted he, are to blam

They, and not

this defect in the constitution

We

clearly to be attributed to them.

sidering 13

what

is

or

is

infr

already prepared by the discipline o

to receive his enactments. ;

onl

For, during the wars of the Lace

i

are not, however, con

not to be excused, but what

is

right o

and the disorder of the women, as I have already said not only of itself gives an air of indecorum to the state, bu

wrong

;

tends in a measure to foster avarice.

The

mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on th While some of the Spartan citizens 14 inequality of property. have quite small properties, others have very large ones ; henc the land has passed into the hands of a few. And here is another fault

laws

in their

;

although the legislator rightlj

for,

holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he 15 allows

anybody who

likes to give

practices lead to the

same

the whole country are held by

number of heiresses and tomary. dowries at

It

and bequeath

result.

women

it.

Yet both

nearly two-fifths

oi

this is

owing to the dowries which are cus

to the large

would surely have been

all, or, if

And ;

better to have given nc

any, but small or moderate ones.

As

the

law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege ol 1

6 giving her

away descends

to his

heir.

Hence, although

the

Criticism

of the Ephoralty

85-

1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, II. 9 number of Spartan citizens [at the time of the Theban invasion] fell below 1000. The result proves the able to maintain

is

country

the whole

faulty nature

of their laws respecting property ; for the city the want of men was their ruin. ;

sank under a single defeat

There

is a

tradition that, in the

days of their ancient kings, 17

they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to

and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of indeed, at one time population was experienced by them is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens. Sparta Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have strangers,

;

been better to have maintained their numbers by the equaliza tion of property. Again, the law which relates to the pro- 18 creation of children is adverse to the correction of this

For the

inequality.

Spartans as he could, families

;

and there

is

legislator,

wanting

have

to

as

who

sons shall be exempt from military service, and he four

from

all

the burdens of the state.

Yet

it is

there were many children, the land being distributed many of them must necessarily fall into poverty.

The Lacedaemonian in

;

I

constitution is

mean the Ephoralty.

defective

all

in

as

it

is,

another

chosen from the

office is apt to fall into the

hands of very

being badly off, are open to bribes.

poor men, who, have been many examples

has

This magistracy has authority

the highest matters, but the Ephors are

the people, and so

1270 b

obvious that, 19

if

point

many

encouraged the citizens to have large a law at Sparta that the father of three

There

Sparta of this evil in former times ; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin at

And so great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to court them through the state.

;

2}

86 Sparta: Criticism of the Council of Elders; II.

9

their

21

being

the

influence

an

has

constitution

has turned

aristocracy

deteriorated,

into

a

and from

The

democracy.

Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office,

and the

whether due

result,

For

22 chance, has been advantageous.

a constitution

the parts of the state must wish that

all

permanent,

the legislator or to

to if

exist and be maintained

1

This

.

is

is to

it

be

should

the case at Sparta, where

the kings desire permanence because they have due honour in

own persons ; the nobles are represented in the council of elders (for the office of elder is a reward of virtue) and

their

;

23 the people in the Ephoralty, for

election of

are eligible to

all

Ephors out of the whole people

is

it.

The

perfectly right,

but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which

is

Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men. and therefore they should not determine them merely on their own judgment, but accordtoo childish.

Their way of

24 ing to written rules, and to the laws. is

not in

accordance with the

spirit

have a deal too much licence

;

away from the law

in

whereas,

other citizens, the excess of strictness

they run

into

life,

too,

of the constitution

the

is

they the case of the

so intolerable that

secret

indulgence of

sensual pleasures. 25

Again, the council of elders

may

manly

virtue

and

;

state in having

a

not free from defects.

grows old educated

But life

is

It

well trained in

advantage to the

that judges of important causes

not a good thing, for the mind

And when men

as well as the body. in

men and

that, therefore, there is an

them.

should hold office for 1271

is

be said that the elders are good

have been

such a manner that even the legislator himself 1

Cp.

iv. 9.

10

;

v. 9.

5.

Further Criticisms cannot trust them, there

known

are well

in

partiality

is

of the elders II. 9 have been guilty of 2 ^ therefore they ought not to

real danger.

and

to have taken bribes

And

public affairs.

be irresponsible

87

Many

to

;

But

yet at Sparta they are so.

;

may be

(it

All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors. replied), Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we main tain that the control should be exercised in some other manner.

mode

Further, the childish

;

and

in

which the Spartans

improper that

is

it

should canvass for the office; pointed, whether he chooses or clearly indicates the

same

1

elect their elders is 27

the person to be elected

the worthiest should be ap

And

not.

intention

here the legislator 28

which appears

other

in

parts of his constitution ; he would have his citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the

elders

for

;

no one would ask to be elected

Yet ambition and

avarice, almost

if

he were not.

more than any other

passions,

are the motives of crime.

Whether kings

are or are not an advantage to states, I will 29

consider at another time

2

they should at any rate be chosen,

;

not as they are now, but with regard to their personal

The

life

and

himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men ; at least he shows conduct.

legislator

3

For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state. a great distrust of their virtue.

Neither did the phiditia,

first

regulate

have been provided 1

introducer of the

them

well.

at the

The

public

Reading TO avrov, not rov,

as

common

cost,

as

Bekker, 2nd

in

edit.,

a misprint. 2

Cp.

iii.

14

foil.

s

Cp.

c.

10.

meals, called

entertainment ought to 3

7, 8.

Crete

8 ;

but

apparently by

1

8 8 II.

Sparta :

9 among bute,

Further Criticisms

the Lacedaemonians every one

and some of them

is

expected to contri

are too poor to afford the

32 thus the intention of the legislator

is

expense

;

The common

frustrated.

meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing For the manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular. very poor can scarcely take part in them ; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.

The

33

law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, it is a source of dissension, for the kings are ;

and with justice

perpetual generals

and

*,

this office

of admiral

is

but the setting

up of another king.

The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws 2 against the 1271 b 3* intention of the legislator, is likewise justified ; the whole con,

And

the soldier, which gives victory in war.

were

at

,

nothing, and had never engaged 35 than war.

they have

by

There fallen.

they

err in

ferred to the virtue

36

Once more

:

in

any employment higher

another error, equally great, into which Although they truly think that the goods

is

which they contend vice,

so long as they

war, their power was preserved, but when they had s fell for of the arts of peace they knew

attained empire they

for

the virtue of

has regard to one part of virtue only

Istitution

are to be acquired by virtue rather than

supposing that these goods are to be pre

which gains them.

the revenues of the state are ill-managed

;

no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spar there

is

tans, they

do not look closely

1

Reading

into

one another 2

di Si ois. 3

Cp.

vii.

14.

22.

s contributions.

Laws,

i.

630.

Sparta and Crete The

result

beneficial

;

which the

legislator has

made

for he has

89

produced

is

the reverse of II.

and

his city poor,

his

9

citizens 37

greedy.

Enough

respecting the Spartan constitution, of

which these

are the principal defects.

The

constitutions of the Cretan cities nearly resemble the

Spartan, and in

most

some few

points are quite as

The

part less perfect in form.

good

said to be,

and probably

is,

in a

10

but for the

older constitutions are

generally less elaborate than the later, and the is

;

Lacedaemonian

very great measure, a copy

2

Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charilaus, went abroad and spent a long time in Crete. For the two countries are of those

in Crete.

According

to tradition,

nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the

Lacedae

monians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing among the inhabi-

Even

3

day the Perioeci, or subject population of are Crete, governed by the original laws which Minos enacted. The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in tants.

to this

Hellas, and to be well situated

;

it

extends right across the

sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are settled ; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and 4

Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the sea, sub duing some of the islands and colonizing others ; at last he invaded Sicily, where he died near Camicus. 5 The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the 1272 and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common

other,

which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not and the Cretans have the same word, andria phiditia but

meals,

;

a

Crete

90 II.

10

and Sparta

the use of which proves that the

6 originally

came from

are similar

[in

many

common

meals [or syssitia] Further, the two constitutions

Crete.

particulars]

;

for the office of the

Ephors

the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in is

The

number.

elders, too,

answer to the elders

in Crete,

who

termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in are

7

the ecclesia, but

can only

it

decrees of the elders

ratify the

and the Cosmi.

The common

meals of Crete are certainly better managed for in Lacedaemon every one pays

than the Lacedaemonian so

much

explained, forbids 8

But all

;

per head, or, if he

him

fails,

the law, as I have already

of citizenship.

to exercise the rights

Crete they are of a more popular character. There, of the fruits of the earth, of cattle, of the public revenues, and in

of the tribute which

is

paid by the Perioeci, one portion

assigned to the gods and the

another to 9 children are

all

common

to

the service

meals,

so

supported out of a

that

of the

men,

common

state,

is

and

women, and stock

1 .

The

many ingenious ways of securing moderation in he which conceives to be a gain ; he likewise encourages eating the separation of men from women, lest they should have too legislator has

many

children,

whether

and the companionship of men with one another good or bad thing I shall have an oppor

this is a

tunity of considering

common

at

another time

2

But

.

that the Cretan

meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian

there can be no doubt.

On

the other hand, the 1

Cp.

vii.

10.

10.

Cosmi

are even a worse institution 2

vii.

1

6

(?).

Cretan Cosmi

and Elders

91

than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the II. I0 Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in good. Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of advantage.

1O

the people, having a share in the highest office, want the state *. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of to be

permanent

and not out of the whole people, and the who have been Cosmi.

certain families,

elders out of those

The same has

been

Their

may be made about the Cretan, which made about the Lacedaemonian elders.

criticism

already

and

irresponsibility

life

tenure

is

too great a privilege,

and their arbitrary power of acting upon their and dispensing with written law, is dangerous.

own judgment,

It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not For there is no discontented at being excluded from it.

be

profit to

made

out of the office

the Cosmi, being in an island, are

The remedy

;

n

1

2

and, unlike the Ephors, 1272 b

removed from temptation.

by which they correct the

evil

of this

institu- 13

tion is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy

than to a constitutional pelled

by

state.

a conspiracy of their

individuals

;

For

own

the

Cosmi

are often

ex

colleagues, or of private

and they are allowed also to resign before

their

has expired. Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is

term of

office

Worst of

a very unsafe rule. office

of Cosmi,

recourse

when they

all

is

the suspension of the 14

device to which the nobles often have

a

will

This shows

not submit to justice.

that the Cretan government, although possessing

characteristics

of

constitutional

a

state,

oligarchy. 1

Cp. supra,

c.

9.

21.

is

some of the

really

a

close

Merits and

Carthage: II.

The

10

Cretans have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they

get together a party their friends !5

What

is this

dissolution of society

when as

I

those

who

;

people and gather

A

?

dangerous condition

a

in

city is

are willing are also able to attack her.

have already

situation 1

common

the

among

and then quarrel and fight with one another. but the temporary destruction of the state and

of Crete

said, the island

But,

saved by her

is

distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian

6 prohibition of strangers

This

dominions.

is

and the Cretans have no foreign

;

the reason

the Perioeci are contented

why

But whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough

in Crete,

of the government of Crete. 11

The

Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent

form of government, which state in

differs

several respects, though

Lacedaemonian.

Indeed,

all

2

are very different

ginian

institutions

constitution

is

like

the

the Lacedaemonian,

nearly resemble one another,

from any others.

are

some very

in

three states

the Cretan, and the Carthaginian

and

from that of any other is

it

Many

The

excellent.

of the Cartha-

superiority

of their

proved by the fact that, although containing an

the Carthaginians element of democracy, it has been lasting have never had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have ;

never been under the rule of a tyrant. 3

Among

the points in which the Carthaginian

resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following

mon

tables of the clubs

their magistracy of the

Ephors

answer

104

to the

to the

:

constitution

The com

Spartan phiditia, and

Ephors

;

but,

whereas the

are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Cartha

ginians are elected according to merit

this is an

improvement.

Defects of the Constitution

93

They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of II. 11 who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta.

elders,

Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same 4 family, and this an ordinary one, but if there is some dis tinguished family they are selected out of this

is

by seniority power, and therefore,

far if

a great deal of harm,

it

Such

better.

and not appointed

officers

they are persons of

little

have great worth, do

and they have already done harm

at 1273

Lacedaemon.

Most of

the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for 5

which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we have men

But of the

tioned.

deflections

from aristocracy and constitu.

government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine

tional

whether they but

will or will not bring a matter before the people,

when

they are not unanimous, the people may decide And 6 whether or not the matter shall be brought forward.

whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes

may oppose

it

now

;

this is not permitted in Sparta

and Crete.

who

have under them many be matters should important co-opted, that they should choose the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than

That

the magistracies of five

other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and after they

hold

office)

these are oligarchical features

being without salary and not elected by as the practice of having

points, such

magistrates

\ and not some by one

and some by another, as 1

Cp.

iii.

1.

at

lot, all

;

their

suits

tried

by the

class of judges or jurors

Lacedaemon,

10, II

;

and any similar

are characteristic of

and see note

at end.

7

a

Carthage a Plutocracy

94

The

II. 11 aristocracy.

:

deviates

constitution

Carthaginian

aristocracy and

inclines to oligarchy, chiefly

popular opinion

is

For men

on their side.

from

on a point where general think

in

that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth

9

:

a

he has not the their wealth

man, they

leisure.

say,

who

is

poor cannot rule well

then, election of magistrates for

If,

be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for

merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage

is

comprehended

;

for the

Cartha

ginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them their kings and generals with an eye both to merit

and 10

to wealth.

But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from Nothing is aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in

office,

but

when

and not demean themselves

in

out of office, should have leisure

any way

Even

tion should be first directed.

wealth, in order to secure leisure,

;

and

to this his atten

you must have regard to yet it is surely a bad thing if

that the greatest offices, such as those of kings 11

The law which

should be bought.

of more

wealth

becomes

account than virtue, and the whole state

avaricious.

For, whenever the chiefs of the state

deem anything honourable,

the other citizens are sure to follow

1273 b their example; and, where virtue has not the 12

and generals,

allows this abuse makes

first

place, there

Those who have aristocracy cannot be firmly established. been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves

a poor and honest a lower not.

man will man who

;

and

it is

absurd to suppose that

be wanting to

make

gains,

and that

has incurred a great expense will Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best

stamp of

Preserved by Occident

And

[d/H0Ta/Jxu"J.

even

if

9 y

the legislator does not care to II. 11

protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for those in office

It

would seem

1 .

bad principle that the same 13 which is a favourite practice

also to be a

person should hold

many

offices,

is better done by should see to this and should not

Carthaginians, for one business

among the one man 2

The

.

legislator

appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker.

Hence, where the

state is large,

it is

more

in

accordance both 14

with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I was saying, this arrangement

is

more popular, and

any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner per have a proof in military and naval matters the formed.

We

;

command and of

duties of

extend to

obedience in both these services

all.

The government

of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but 15 they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by their wealth, which enables them from time to time to send out some portion

of the

s

people

to

their

colonies.

This

is

their

panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. Accident favours them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents.

As

things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the people 16

revolted from their rulers, there

would be no way of restoring

peace by legal methods. 1

Cp. 8

c.

9.

*

2.

Or, removing the

comma

after

Cp. Plato, Rep. ii. 374 A. wXovrew, and adding one after pfpos,

by enriching one portion of the people after another whom they send to colonies. Cp. vi. 5. 9, which tends to confirm this way of

their

taking the words.

96

Solon

Such

II. 11

is

and

Athenian Constitution

the

the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and

Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.

Of

12

those

who

have treated of governments, some have all in public affairs, but have passed

never taken any part at

their lives in a private station

worth

givers, either in their

2

;

about most of them, what was

Others have been law

telling has been already told.

own

or in foreign cities,

whose

affairs

they have administered ; and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions ; for example, Lycurgus and Solon did both. Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I

have already spoken.

As

to Solon,

he

is

thought by some

who

put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different to have been

a

good

elements of the

state.

legislator,

According

to their view, the council

of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, the elected magis1274 a tracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy 3 existed before the time of Solon,

and were retained by him,

but that he formed the courts of law out of

thus creating the democracy, which

sometimes blamed.

For

is

all

the citizens,

the very reason

why he

in giving the

supreme power to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have When the law courts 4 destroyed the non-democratic element. is

grew powerful,

to

please the people,

the tyrant, the old constitution

who were now

was changed

playing

into the existing

Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the they also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the

democracy.

Areopagus 5

;

democracy until it became what we now see. All this is true; it seems however to be the result of circumstances, and not to

Famous Lawgivers For

have been intended by Solon.

97

the people having been II.

instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian

War

began to get a notion of

*,

whom

and followed worthless

itself,

Solon himself demagogues, to have the Athenians that appears given only power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates, which was the better class opposed.

2

for without it they would have been ; of slavery and enmity to the government. All the 6 magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of

absolutely necessary in a state

wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the class called zeugitae (because they kept a yoke of oxen), or

of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth who had no share in any magistracy. Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epi-

from a third class

class

were labourers

own

city

Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in

Italy

and

Sicily.

zephyrian,

s

legislation

,

persons attempt

first

and that

trained in Crete,

3

Some

Onomacritus was the

person

to

who had any

make out

that ^

special skill in

he,

although a Locrian by birth, was

where he

lived in the exercise of his prophetic

art ; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of But their account is quite inconsistent with 8 Zaleucus.

chronology.

There was Philolaus,

also

Theban

a

legislator,

whose name was

This Philolaus was one of the

the Corinthian.

family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the victor, 1

8

who

Cp.

v. 4.

left

8;

Corinth viii. 6.

Or (with Bernays),

in

Olympic

horror of the incestuous passion a

u. make

Cp.

iii.

II.

8.

out an unbroken series of great legis lators, Onomacritus being considered the first. DAVIS

to

H

12

Famous Lawgivers II. 12 which his mother Halcyone had conceived for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. 9

The

inhabitants

still

point out their tombs,

which

are in full

view of one another, but one looks towards Corinth, the other not. this

Tradition says that the two friends arranged them in way, Diocles out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the

land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb 1274 b that [

it

This

is

the reason

;

they settled

why

Philolaus

at

Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of might.

These Laws of Adoption. children, which they call the laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to preserve the number of the lots. 11

In the legislation of Charondas there except the laws about false witnesses. instituted actions for perjury.

more

nothing remarkable,

He

His laws

than even

precisely expressed

is

are

those

is

the

who

first

more exact and of our modern

legislators.

12

Characteristic of Phaleas

is

the equalization of property; of

community of women, children, and property, the common meals of women, and the law about drinking, that Plato, the

1

the sober shall be masters of the feast soldiers to acquire

by practice equal

that one should be as useful as the other

13

Draco has

left

also the training of

;

with both hands, so

skill 2

.

laws, but he adapted them to a constitution

which already existed, and there is no peculiarity which is worth mentioning, except the greatness and

in

them

severity

of the punishments.

was only

Pittacus, too,

a constitution 1

;

Cp. Laws,

ii.

671 0-672

and not the author of

a lawgiver,

he has a law which A.

is

peculiar to him, that, if a

Cp. Laws,

vii.

7940.

j

Famous Lawgivers a

drunken man strike another,

he

shall

99 be

more heavily II.

1 punished than if he were sober ; he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expedi ency, for drunken more often than sober people commit acts

of violence.

Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws

Some of them

Thrace. but there

And

is

relate to

to the Chalcidians of

homicide, and to heiresses

;

nothing remarkable in them. let us conclude our enquiry into the various con

here

stitutions

which

either actually exist, or have been devised by

theorists. 1

Cp. N. Eth.

H

2

iii.

5.

8.

14

2

BOOK III. 1

HE who would government must

III

enquire into the nature and various kinds of

first

of

all

done a

certain act

or the tyrant.

;

what

is

At

?

,

but the oligarchy is

concerned

a constitution or government being an

But a

state.

state is

com

any other whole, made up of many parts

these are the citizens,

1275 a fore, that

is a state

say that the state has

the legislator or statesman

arrangement of the inhabitants of a posite, and, like

Some

others, no, not the state

;

And

entirely with the state a

What

determine

present this is a disputed question.

we must

who compose

it.

begin by asking,

the meaning of the term

?

;

It is evident, there-

Who

is

For here

the citizen, and again there

may

He who is a citizen in a demobe a difference of opinion. 3 cracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen manner, we may

say,

that

first,

in

any other accidental

a citizen

is

not a citizen

4 because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and nor is he a citizen who has no legal slaves share in the place ;

right except that of suing

and being sued

;

for this right

may

Even resident be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. aliens in many places possess such rights, although in an for they are obliged to have a patron. imperfect form ; 5

Hence they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the 1

CP

.

c. 3.

i.

The

of Citizenship in Theory 101

Definition or to old

register,

men who have been

Of these we

duties.

from

relieved

do not say simply that they

state

III. 1

are citizens,

but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the

of that sort

other, that they are past the age, or something

the precise expression

is

immaterial, for our meaning

Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned raised and answered about deprived citizens

But the

citizen,

whom we

and

be

exiles.

are seeking to define, is a citizen in

the strictest sense, against taken,

may

and about

;

clear.

is

whom

no such exception can be he shares in the

his special characteristic is that

Now of offices

administration of justice, and in offices.

some 6

have a limit of time, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval ; others have no limit of time for example, the office of dicast or ecclesiast 1 It may, indeed, be argued that these are not 7 .

magistrates at all, in the

those

and that

their functions give

But

them no share

ridiculous to say that

government. surely have the supreme power do not govern.

who

which

dwell further upon

this,

what we want

common term

is

Let

ecclesiast.

terminate office,

such

is

it

office

definition

a

citizen,

This

and best

to

including both dicast and

of distinction, and we will assume that those

us, for the sake

are citizens.

of a

Not

a purely verbal question,

is

is

call it

who

inde

share in

the most comprehensive 8

suits all those

who

are generally

so called.

But we must not

forget that things of

notions differ in kind, one of them being

another third, have,

when regarded

Dicast

ecclesia or

= juryman

and judge

assembly of the citizens.

in

one

:

first,

another second,

in this relation, nothing,

or hardly anything, worth mentioning in 1

which the underlying

common.

ecclesiast

Now we

= member

of the

9

102 The Definition of Citizenship

in Practice

kind, and that

some of them

III. 1 see that governments differ

in

1275 b are prior and that others are posterior or

are

perverted

necessarily

;

those which are faulty

posterior

to

(What we mean by perversion perfect. The citizen then of necessity explained *.) 10 form of government 1

and our

;

citizen

of a democracy

For

some

in

those which are will

be

hereafter

under each

differs

definition is best adapted to the

but not necessarily to other states.

;

states the people are not

acknowledged, nor have and ;

they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones suits are distributed in turn

At

the magistrates.

among

Lace-

daemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about con tracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, 11

A

by other magistrates. 2

thage

;

and other causes

are decided

similar principle prevails

there certain magistrates decide

all

causes.

at

Car

We may,

indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include

these states.

In other

[But

states

it

strictly is

indeterminate, office

or

all

taken

it

only applies in democracies.]

the holder of a determinate, not of an

who

legislates

such holders of determinate

and judges, and to some

offices is reserved the right

of deliberating or judging about some things or about all The conception of the citizen now begins to clear up. He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or

j2 things.

judicial administration of

of that !

2

state

;

any state is said by us to be a citizen and speaking generally, a state is a body of

citizens sufficing for the purposes of

But

life.

in practice a citizen is defined to be

the parents are citizens

;

one of

whom

both

others insist on going further back

;

two or three or more grandparents. This is a short and practical definition ; but there are some who raise the say to

1

Cp.

c. 6.

ii.

a

Cp.

ii.

ii.

7.

Difficulties further question

:

Created by Devolutions

How

this third or fourth ancestor

103 came

to III.

2

Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, said Mortars are made by the and the citizens of Larissa are also a manu mortar-makers, be a citizen

?

name

factured article, made, like the kettles which bear their

the magistrates [Xapio-atot], by for

simple,

if,

V

Yet the question

is

really 3

according to the definition just given, they

shared in the government 2 they were citizens. [This is a better definition than the For the words, born of other.] ,

a father or mother, the

first

who

is

cannot possibly apply to

a citizen,

inhabitants or founders of a state.

There

is

a greater difficulty in the case of those

who have

been made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in tribes a

The

number of strangers and

doubt

in these cases

is,

not

and

slaves

who

s

resident aliens.

but whether he,

is,

who

4

ought to be a citizen ; and there will still be a further 1276 doubt, whether he who ought not to be a citizen is one in fact, for what ought not to be is what is false and is not. is,

there are

Now, hold

some who hold

whom we

and yet ought not to

office,

although they rule unjustly. And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or office he who holds a judicial or legislative office,

office fulfils

call rulers,

our definition of a citizen.

fore, that the citizens about 1

An

either 2 3

a

untranslatable play a magistrate

Cp.

c.

i.

or

an

whom

upon the word kjiuovpyol, which means artisan.

12.

Inserting KOI before pfToiKOvs with is omitted, as in all the MSS., we

metics, both strangers

tribes

many

many

strangers,

It is evident, there

the doubt has arisen must

and metics

and

Bekker must

slaves

who had been

in his second edition.

translate :

or,

slaves.

If

he enrolled in

he enrolled

in tribes

5

a

1

When

04

III. 2 be called citizens

which

a question

A parallel

3

a certain act

a State the Same

is

whether they ought

;

is

or

to be so or not is

bound up with the previous enquiry is

question is

f

is

1 .

raised respecting the state whether

not an act of the state

for example, in

;

the transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. 2

In such cases persons refuse to

fulfil

their contracts or

any

other obligations on the ground that the tyrant, and not the state, .

contracted them

established

3

they argue that some constitutions are

But

good. too

by

;

and not for the sake of the common

force,

may

this would apply equally to democracies, for they be founded on violence, and then the acts of the

democracy will be neither more nor less legitimate than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This question runs up into

When

another

when

shall

we

say that the state

is

the same, and

would be a very superficial view which considered only the place and the inhabitants ; for the soil and the population may be separated, and some of the inhabitants different

It

?

live in one This, however, place and some in another. not a very serious difficulty ; we need only remark that the

4 may is

word

state

ambiguous, meaning both state and

is

It is further

asked

:

When

to be regarded as a

place,

with

Peloponnesus

single

city, for

a wall.

But a

would contain

living in

what

city

of the

5 Certainly not the wall

circuit,

are men,

is

city.

the same

the limit

you might surround having

city,

?

all

such vast

a nation rather than a state, like

Baby

2

which, as they say, had been taken for three days before 6 some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. This lon

,

difficulty

may,

another occasion 1

Cp.

c.

i.

however, ;

with

advantage

be

deferred

3

to

the statesman has to consider the size of 2

i. 3

Cp.

vii. c.

4 and

c. 5.

Cp.

ii.

6.

6.

When

a State the Same?

is

the state, and whether

it

should consist of more than one III. 3

nation or not.

Again,

shall

we

say that while the race of inhabitants, as

well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city

also

is

the same, although the citizens are always dying and being

we

born, as

call rivers

and fountains the same, although the

Or shall always flowing away and coming again ? say that the generations of men, like the rivers, are the

water

we

is

same, but that the state changes

?

For, since the state

is

1276 b

community of citizens united by sharing in one form of government, when the form of the government changes and a

becomes

different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And 8

manner we speak of every union or composition elements, when the form of their composition alters in

this

;

example, harmony of the same sounds

is

ot

for

said to be different,

Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state 9 consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and may

accordingly as the

be called or not called by the same name, whether the inhabi tants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another

whether a state ought or ought not to ments when the form of government changes.

fulfil

question,

There

is

a point nearly allied to the preceding

the virtue of a

not

1 .

obtain

good man and

some general notion of the

the sailor, the citizen sailors

a good citizen

But, before entering on this discussion,

is

a

same or

virtue of the citizen.

member of

Cp. N. Eth.

Whether

we must

a community.

have different functions, for one of them 1

:

the

is

engage

v. a.

ii.

is

first

Like

Now,

a rower,

2

The Good III.

4

another a

pilot,

is,

them

all.

same

at the

similar

all

3 is safety in navigation.

term

business of them |

all.

fourth

common

object,

one citizen

community

This community

him,

definition applicable to

of them a

Similarly,

is

and while the precise

common

another, but the salvation of the

I

;

s virtue applies exclusively to

time, a

For they have

and

a look-out man, and a

third

of each individual

definition

there

a

by some

described

Man

is

is

which from

differs

common

the

the state

;

the virtue

of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of

which he

is

a member. it

is

If,

then, there are

many forms

of

evident that the virtue of the good citizen

government, cannot be the one perfect virtue. But we say that the good man is he has virtue. who Hence it is evident that 4 perfect the good citizen need not of necessity possess the which makes a good man.

5

virtue

The same question may also be approached by another road, from a consideration of the perfect state. If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and each citizen is expected to

do

his

own

1277 a inasmuch as

all

business well, and must therefore have virtue, the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the

and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen thus, and thus only, can the citizen

state

be perfect

man, unless

;

but they will not have the virtue of a

we assume

that in the

good

state

all

good

the citizens

must be good. 6

Again, the state may be compared to the living being as first elements into which the living being is resolved are :

the

soul

and body, as the soul

is

made up of

reason and appetite,

the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, so out of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state

is

composed

;

and,

therefore,

the

virtue

of

all

the

Good

the

possibly be

cannot

citizens

107

Citizen

the

any more than the III.

same,

excellence of the leader of a chorus

is

the same as that of the

performer

who

show why

the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and

stands by his side.

I have said

to 7

enough

always the same.

But good this

no case

will there then be

citizen

and the

we answer

virtue

in

which the

virtue of the

of the good man coincide

To

?

the [not that

good citizen, but] that the good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man. And some persons say that

8

even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind ; for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and military exercises

No As

As

?

Euripides says

:

me, but what the

subtle arts for

state

requires

V

though there were a special education needed by a ruler.

If then the virtue of a good ruler

man, and

we assume

is

the same as that of a

good 9

further that the subject is a citizen as

well as the ruler, the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue

of the good

man cannot be always

the same, although in

some

cases [i.e. in the perfect state] they may; for the virtue of a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this difference

was not

that he felt hungry when he meaning that he could not endure to live in But, on the other hand, it may be argued 10

which made Jason say

a tyrant,

a private station.

that

men

is

able to

man

are praised for

and he

to obey,

is

do both.

to be that

knowing both how to

Now

which

if

rules,

include ruling and obeying, 1

rule

and

said to be a citizen of approved virtue

we

how who

suppose the virtue of a good virtue of the citizen to

and the it

cannot be said that they are

Fragment from the Aeolus, quoted

in Stobaeus,

45. 13.

4

The Good Man and

io8 III.

4

equally worthy of praise.

11

that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things and

it is

Since, then,

occasionally held

not the same things, and that the citizen must in both

the inference

;

rule of a master

which

master need not

know how

is

There

.

know and

to perform these, but

share

indeed, the

is,

concerned with menial offices

2

the

,

may employ

them anything else would be degrading; and by anything else I mean the menial duties which vary much in character and are executed by various others in the execution of

12

1

obvious

is

:

classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, as their

1277 b under

name

these

signifies, live

mechanic

the

who, by the labour of their hands :

among some

nations, the

share in the government

a privilege

times, and

13 under the extreme democracy.

the statesman and the

good

in

ancient

working classes had no which they only acquired

Certainly the citizen

of inferiors except for their

crafts

Hence

included.

is

good man and

ought not to learn the

own

occasional use

8 ;

if

they habitually practise them, there will cease to be a distinc tion between master and slave.

This

14

is a rule

is

not the rule of which

of another kind, which

is

we

are speaking

a constitutional rule,

equals by biith

;

but there

exercised over freemen and

which the

ruler

must

he would learn the duties of a general of the orders of a general of cavalry, or under cavalry by being the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders learn by obeying, as

of a general of infantry, or by having had the command of a company or brigade. It has been well said that he who 15 has never learned to obey cannot be a 1

Viz. that

ruler. 2

some kind of previous subjection

Cp. infra,

Cp.

i.

7.

good commander. is

The

an advantage to the

14.

2-5.

Cp.

viii. 2.

5.

Good

the

two are not the same, but the good of both

how

to obey like a freeman

from those of a

include both

;

citizen ought to be capable III.

to govern like a freeman,

and

these are the virtues of a citizen.

the temperance and justice of a ruler are dis- 16

And, although tinct

how

he should know

;

109

Citizen

for the

subject, the virtue

good man, who

is

of a good man will and also a subject,

free

have one virtue only, say justice, but he will have of virtue, the one qualifying him to rule, the

will not

distinct kinds

other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage of 1

men and women

differ . For a man would be thought a 17 he had no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than the good man ; and

coward

if

indeed their part different, for the

other to preserve. the ruler

a :

it

management of the household is is to acquire, and of the

the

in

duty of the one Practical

would seem

wisdom only

is

characteristic

of

other virtues must equally The virtue of the subject is

that

all

belong to ruler and subject. certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion ; he may be com pared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user

From

of the

flute

these considerations

8 .

may be

gathered the answer to

the question, whether the virtue of the good as that of the

and

how

There

good

citizen, or different, and

far different still

man

is

the same

how far the

same,

4 .

remains one more question about the citizen 6 who has a share of office, or is the :

Is he only a true citizen

? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this virtue of

mechanic to be included

1

*

2

Cp.

i.

Cp.

c. 5.

13.

l%

9.

10

;

c.

Cp. Rep.

18.

i

;

iv.

iv. 7.

3

428. a

;

vii.

Cp. Rep. x. 601 D, 14.

8.

E.

4

no

Are Mechanics

Citizens ?

l l And if none of III. 5 ruling and obeying which makes a citizen the lower class are citizens, in which part of the state are .

they to be placed 1278

a 2

?

are not foreigners.

there

is

For they

To

are not resident aliens,

this objection

no more absurdity

in

may we

and they

not reply, that

excluding them than in excluding

and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes ? must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be

slaves It

who are necessary to the existence of the state ; for example, children are not citizens equally with grown up men, who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being grown up, citizens

Doubtless

3 are only citizens in a qualified sense.

in ancient

times, and among some nations, the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority of them are so now.

The

best form of state will not admit

them

to citizenship

;

but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of a citizen will apply to

4 not to those

whom

who work

toil is a

some

citizens

and freemen only, and

for their living.

necessity, are either slaves

The who

latter class, to

minister to the

wants of individuals, or mechanics and labourers who are the servants of the community. These reflections carried a little further will explain their position

;

and indeed what has been

said already is of itself explanation enough. 5

Since there are

many

many forms of government

must be

there

of citizens, and especially of citizens who are so that under some governments the mechanic and

varieties

subjects

;

the labourer will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example, 1 Or, for this man (i.e. the meaner sort of man) is a citizen and does oi OVTOS jroAtTT;?). not exercise rule (see below, 3, d 5 According to the way of taking the passage which is followed in the text, euros =

o t\ wv T ty Toiavrrjv dptTrjv Pdvavcros.

:

according to the second way,

it

refers to

iQnds of

Different

in aristocracy or the so-called

1 1 1

Citizens

government of the best

(if there

III.

be such an one), in which honours are given according to virtue and merit ; for no man can practise virtue who is living the

of a mechanic or labourer.

life

cation for office is high,

a citizen

In oligarchies the

many of them

but a mechanic may, for

;

At Thebes 1

there

qualifi-

6

and therefore no labourer can ever be are rich.

was a law that no man could hold

office 7

who had

not retired from business for ten years. In many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens ; for in

some democracies a man

a citizen though his mother only and a similar principle

is

be a citizen [and his father an alien] is

applied to illegitimate children

there

a dearth of population.

is

;

;

the law

citizens increases, first the children of a

at last

fathers

relaxed

when

8

male or a female slave

then those whose mothers only are citizens ; the right of citizenship is confined to those whose

are excluded

and

is

But when the number of

;

and mothers are both as

Hence, and he is a

is

citizen

honours of the

citizens.

evident, there are different kinds of citizens

;

9

who shares in the of Homer [Achilles poems

in the highest sense

state.

In the

complains of Agamemnon treating him] like some dishonoured 2 for he who is excluded from the honours of the stranger ; state is

no better than an

concealed, then the object

alien. is

But when

this exclusion is

to deceive one s fellow-country

men.

As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the 1278 same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already I0 adduced prove that in some states the two are the same, and in others different.

virtue

When

of every citizen which 1

Cp.

vi. 7.

they are the same it is not the is the same as that of the good a

4.

II. ix.

648.

b

Government True and Perverted

ii2

III. 5 man, but only the virtue of the statesman and of those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the

conduct of public affairs. 6 Having determined these questions, we have next to con sider whether there is only one form of government or many,

and

if

many, what they

are,

and

how many, and what

are the

differences between them.

A constitution \

the arrangement of magistracies in a state 1 ,

especially of the highest of

where sovereign 2

is

in the state,

The government is every all. and the constitution is in fact the

For example,

government.

in

democracies the people are

supreme, but in oligarchies, the few

two forms of government

that these

;

and, therefore,

are different

:

we

and so

say in

other cases. First, let us consider

how many 3 society is

what

is

the purpose of a state, and

forms of government there are by which human have already said, in the former regulated.

We

8

when drawing a distinction between and the rule of a master, that man is household-management animal. nature a And therefore, men, even when by political part of

this

treatise

,

they do not require one another s help, desire to live together all the same, and are in fact brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure

This

4 of well-being. viduals

and of

which there

is

certainly the chief end, both of indi

is

And

states.

possibly

of mere

also for the sake

life

(in

some noble element) mankind meet

together and maintain the political community, so long as the

of existence do not greatly overbalance the good 3 And see that men cling to life even in the midst of

5 evils

we

.

all 1

Cp.

c. I.

i

;

iv. i. 3

10.

Cp. Plato, Polit. 302

3

A.

Cp.

i.

2.

9, 10.

Government True and Perverted seeming to find

misfortune,

in

it

a

natural

113

sweetness and III.

6

happiness.

There

no

is

kinds of

difficulty in distinguishing the various

authority; they have been often defined already in popular works 1 The rule of a master, although the slave by nature 6 .

and the master by nature have

in reality the

same

interests, is

nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of

the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the

On

slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him.

7

the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of a household,

which we have

exercised in the

first

called household-management, is

good of the governed or

instance for the

common good of

both parties, but essentially for the of the as see to be the case in medicine, 1279 a we governed, good and the in arts gymnastics, general, which are only accidentally for the

concerned with the good of the artists themselves 2 . (For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practise The 8 gymnastics, and the pilot is always one of the crew.) trainer or the pilot considers the

his care.

But,

when he

is

good of those committed

one of the persons taken care

to of,

he accidentally participates in the advantage, for the pilot is also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training.

And

when the state is framed upon the prin- 9 : of equality and likeness, the citizens think that they In the order of nature every ought to hold office by turns. one would take his turn of service ; and then again, somebody so in politics

ciple

else

would look

had looked

But nowadays, 1

Or,

after his interest, just as he, while in office,

after

theirs*.

[That was

originally the

for the sake of the advantage a

in our popular works.

Cp.

ii.

a.

which

Cp. Plato, Rep.

6, 7.

i.

way.]

is to

341

D.

be IO

ii4

of Governments

Classification

III. 6 gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office. One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office; case

that

in

which have in

we may be

The

ii after places.

a regard to the

would be hunting

evident: that governments,

is

common

interest, are constituted

of justice, and are there but those which regard only the interest of

accordance with

fore true forms

sure that they

conclusion

;

strict principles

defective and perverted forms, for they are a state is a community of freemen. whereas despotic, 7 Having determined these points, we have next to consider

the rulers are

all

how many forms of government

2

in

are

determined the

the

apparent.

first

there are, and

what they

place what are the true forms, for

and

of them

perversions

The words

will

are

;

when they

at

once

be

constitution and government have the

same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of many.

The

true

forms of government, therefore, are

those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule

with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions *. For citizens, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in the advantages of a state. Of forms of government in which one rules, we 3 call

that

royalty

;

which regards the common interests, kingship or that in which more than one, but not many, rule,

aristocracy [the rule of the best]

;

and

it

is

so called, either

because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But

when

the citizens at large administer the state for the 1

Cp. Eth.

viii.

10

common

,

the government

interest,

constitution

virtue there are

becomes more

the

masses.

there

or a few

many kinds difficult for

kind, though they

called

is

And

[n-oAirtta].

One man

language.

may

by the generic name is a

excel in virtue

may

a

to attain

Of

the :

it

perfection in every 1279 b

constitutional

found

in

government the

fighting-men have the supreme power, and those

follows

who

possess

citizens.

above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as of aristocracy, oligarchy ; of

of royalty, tyranny

of monarchy which has

in

5

;

constitutional government, democracy.

For tyranny

is

a kind

view the interest of the monarch

;

only oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy ; democracy, of the needy : none of them the common good ;

of

all.

But there are and

difficulties

about these forms of government,

will therefore be necessary to state a little

it

a

more

8

at

For he who would make

length the nature of each of them.

philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not

regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything, but to set forth the truth in every particular. I

was

saying,

is

monarchy exercising the

over political society

;

the

their

government

when

in

the indigent,

rulers.

And

oligarchy

hands

here arises the

first

of our

said to be the i

a

difficulties,

For democracy But what

property and have the power is

2

;

be the government of the many.

manner oligarchy

Tyranny, as of a master

democracy, the opposite, and not the men of property, are the

relates to the definition just given.

men of

rule

when men of property have

is

7

but of 4

;

and as the number increases

:

them

in

a III.

reason for this use of

in military virtue, for this is

Hence,

arms are the

up

of Governments

Classification

in their

if

the

hands

is

and

many ?

it

said to

are

In like

government of the few; but

3

ii6 III. 8 what

Oligarchy if

in their

and Democracy Defined

the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power In these cases the hands because are stronger ?

they

distinction

which we have drawn between these

different

forms

of government would no longer hold good. 4 Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many, and name the governments accordingly an oligarchy

is

said to

be that in which the few and the

wealthy, and a democracy that in which the 5 poor are the rulers

there will

still

be a

many and

difficulty.

the

For,

if

the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned,

how

shall we describe those other governments also just mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their re

spective states

6

?

The argument seems or in democracies, the

to

show

that,

whether

in oligarchies

number of the governing body, whether

the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich

everywhere are few, there 7

1280

a

is

and the poor numerous.

a misapprehension

But

if so,

of the causes of the difference

For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a demo

between them.

cracy.

But

as a fact the rich are

few and the poor many

:

few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the for

oligarchical

and democratical

parties respectively claim

power

in the state.

9

Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and democracy, and what is justice oligarchical and

Political Justice For

democratical.

all

men

cling to justice

of some kind, but III. 9

and they do not express the For example, justice is thought by them to be,

their conceptions are imperfect

whole and

idea.

is,

And

equality,

however, for

not,

inequality is thought to be,

this for all,

omitted,

all,

and

but only for unequals.

men judge

then

,

t

but only for equals, f

f

is,

justice

When

erroneously.

neither

;

is 2

the persons are

The

reason

is

that

they are passing judgment on themselves, and most people are

bad judges

in

own

their

case.

And

whereas justice 3 and a just

implies a relation to persons as well as to things,

have already said in the Ethics

distribution, as I

1 ,

embraces

and things, they acknowledge the equality of the but things, dispute about the merit of the persons, chiefly for because they are bad the reason which I have just given alike persons

own

judges in their parties to the justice, justice.

affairs

argument

;

and secondly, because both the and partial

are speaking of a limited

but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute

For those who

are

unequal

in

one respect,

for 4

example wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all ; and any who are equal in one respect, for example freedom, But they leave out consider themselves to be equal in all. the capital point. regard

to

For

wealth only,

if

men met and

their

share in

associated

out of 5

the state would be

proportioned to their property, and the oligarchical doctrine would then seem to carry the day. It would not be just that he who paid one mina should have the same share of 2 hundred minae, 2 whether of the principal or of the profits But a state 6 as he who paid the remaining ninety-nine.

a

,

1

N. Eth.

3

Or, with Bernays,

v. 3.

or their successors.

4.

either in the case of the original

contributors

1 1

The End of

8

III. 9 exists for the sake of a good

life,

State

the

and not for the sake of

life

only were the object, slaves and brute animals only form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share might in or in a life of free choice. Nor does a state happiness if life

:

and security from injustice 1 nor for then yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse the Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who have exist for the sake of alliance

,

;

commercial

with one another, would be the citizens of

treaties

True, they have agreements about imports, and en gagements that they will do no wrong to one another, and But there are no magistracies 1280 b written articles of alliance. 7

one

state.

common

to the

contracting parties

who

will

enforce their

engagements; different states have each their own magistracies. Nor does one state take care that the citizens of the other are such as they ought to be, nor see that those

who come

under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness at but only that they do no injustice to one another. all, 8

Whereas, those who care for good government take into consideration [the larger question of] virtue and vice in states.

Whence

it

may

be further inferred that

which

serious care of a state this

[without

which

alliance

members

the

2

virtue

truly deserves the

name 2

:

for

ethical

end] the community becomes a mere

differs

only in place from alliances of which

live

apart

;

and law

is

only a convention,

surety to one another of justice/ as the sophist says,

must be the

and has no

real

power

to

make

a

Lycophron

the citizens good and

just.

This

9 1

2

Cp. Or,

is

c.

obvious

i.

virtue

;

for

suppose

distinct

places,

such

as

4.

must be the care of a state which

not merely in name.

is

truly so called, and

The End of

the State

119

HL

Corinth and Megara, to be united by a wall, still they would even if the citizens had the right to 10 city, not

not be one intermarry,

of

which

states.

if

not so far off as to have no intercourse, and

but

another,

among them

there were laws

each other

one of the rights peculiarly characteristic men dwelt at a distance from one

is

Again,

that they should not wrong exchanges, neither would this be a state.

in their

Let us suppose that one man

a

is

carpenter,

another a

husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand nevertheless, if they have nothing in :

common

but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not

Why

constitute a state.

is

this

Surely not because they for even supposing that

?

from one another

are at a distance

:

r i

such a community were to meet in one place, and that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his state,

and that they made

against evil-doers

alliance with

this to be a state, if their intercourse

the

same character

then that a state

not, a

mere

of exchange.

These

cannot exist;

but

which

is

society,

It is clear

\i

common

1

having a

of crime and for the sake

are conditions without

which a

2

1

state

of them together do not constitute in families and

all

a

deem

with one another was of

after as before their union. is

place, established for the prevention

a state,

one another, but only

an accurate thinker would not

still

;

community of well-being

aggregations of families, for the sake of a perfect and selfsufficmg^

among Hence

arise

common They

life..

those

Such

who in

are created

community can only be established in the same place and intermarry.

cities

sacrifices,

of society.

a

live

family

connexions,

brotherhoods,

amusements which draw men together.

by friendship,

The end

is

for friendship is the motive

the good

life,

and these are the

13

9

I2O

Sovereignty

III. 9 means towards

M villages

a

the state

end

having for an

which we mean

/ Our

And

it.

the union of families and

is

and

a perfect

happy and honourable is

conclusion, then,

self-sufficing life,

by

life *.

that political society exists for the

And i5*sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. most to such a a who contribute have greater they society share in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom them

or nobility of birth but are inferior to or than those

by them

who exceed them

in

in

political virtue

;

wealth but are surpassed

in virtue.

From what

has been said

it

partisans of different forms of

will be clearly seen that all the

government speak of a part of

justice only.

10

There power

Or

in

the good

of these

doubt as to what

a

also

is

the state:

Is

Or

?

it

the one best

seems to

alternatives

to be the

is

Or

the multitude?

man

Or

?

involve

supreme

the wealthy?

a tyrant

?

disagreeable

Any conse

If the poor, for example, because they are more in among themselves the property of the rich,

quences.

number, divide is

2

not this unjust

No, by heaven

?

the lawful authority

not

[i.

e.

(will be

the people] willed

it.

the reply), for

But

if this is

Again, when [in the first pray what is ? has been taken, and the majority divide anew the

injustice,

division]

all

property of the minority, is that they will rain the state ruin of those

a state

2 ;

3 be just.

who

it

?

not evident,

Yet

possess her, nor

and therefore If

it

were,

surely, is

if this

goes on,

virtue is not the

justice destructive of

law of confiscation clearly cannot the acts of a tyrant must of necessity

this

all

he only coerces other men by superior power, But is it just, then, the as multitude coerce the rich. just be just

1

Co.

;

i.

for

2.

8; N. Eth.

i.

7.

6.

2

Cp. Plato, Rep.

i.

351. 352.

121

the People Sovereignty of that the

what

if

few and the wealthy should be the rulers ? And III. 10 is they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people

this just

If so,

?

the

case

other

[i.

the

e.

case of the

But 4

majority plundering the minority] will likewise be just. there can be no doubt that

wrong and

these things are

all

unjust.

Then ought But

the good to rule and have supreme power

in that case

everybody

For the

will be dishonoured.

honour; and

if

else,

man should

for

the

rule

Nay, that

?

number of those who

Some one may

increased.

subject as he

is

to

of a

offices

is

are

more

still

of

it

is

5

oligarchical,

dishonoured

say that

the accidents of

all

state are posts

men always hold them, the rest Then will it be well that the one

one set of

must be deprived of them. best

?

being excluded from power,

is

thereby

bad for a man,

human

passion,

to

have the supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the law itself be democratical or oligarchical, how will that help us out of our difficulties

*

Not

?

at

all

;

the same conse

quences will follow.

Most of occasion.

these questions

The

principle

be

may

that

the

supreme rather than the few best

reserved

multitude

is

for

ought

another 11 to

be

capable of a satisfactory

explanation, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to

For

contain an element of truth.

individual is but an ordinary person,

the many, of

whom

each

when they meet together

may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is purse.

better than

For each

a

individual

dinner provided out of a single among the many has a share

of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together they 1

Cp.

c.

ii.

20.

1281 b

Reasons for and against

122 III. 11 become

in a

and senses 3

Hence

;

the

manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, that is a figure of their mind and disposition.

many

are better judges than a single

man of music

and poetry for some understand one part, and some another, There is 4 and among them, they understand the whole. ;

similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of a

from

art

because in them the scattered elements are

realities,

if

combined, although, or 5 in

some other

taken separately, the eye of one person

feature in another person

Whether

the picture.

democracy, and to

all

would be

by heaven, in some cases

it

is

impossible of application

the argument would equally hold about brutes it

will be asked,

may

do some men

be bodies of

6 less true. raised,

And

than

fairer

principle can apply to every bodies of men, is not clear. Or rather, this

men

about

differ

whom

;

for

and wherein, from brutes ? But there ;

our statement

is

neverthe-

the difficulty which has been already

if so,

and also another which

is

akin to

viz.

it

what power

who

should be assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens,

and have no personal merit are both solved. still a danger in allowing them to share the great

are not rich 7

There

is

offices

of

letting

8

them

way of

escape

give

is

to assign to

For

is

them

and

into error,

a danger also in not

which many poor men

office will necessarily

judicial functions. legislators

But there

share, for a state in

excluded from only

lead

state, for their folly will

their dishonesty into crime.

be

full

of enemies.

them some

this reason

Solon

them the power of

x

deliberative

are

The and

and certain other

electing to offices, and

of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not allow 1

Cp.

ii.

12.

5.

the People Sovereignty of them

123

When

they meet together their III. 11 and combined with the 9 are perceptions quite good enough, to hold office singly.

better class they are useful to the state (just as impure food when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the

pure would be), but each individual,

On

an imperfect judgment.

form of government involves it

place,

healing heal

his

and make him whole

disease,

by their peers.

and so

:

men

there

arts

all

the power of judging to

of the

who

For a

?

have

is

In the

first

all

that

is,

professions

in

other

and

arts.

1282

are of three kinds:

such

is

them

man who has a

class

quite as

not

studied the

and we

;

much

attribute

as to professors

the same principle apply to 12

right election can only be

a

there ir

the physician of the higher

intelligent

Now, does

art.

elections

in

But physicians

and thirdly the in

the popular 10

ought to be called to account by in general to be called to account

the apothecary, and there

class, art

;

then, the physician

physicians, so ought

is

certain difficulties.

might be objected that he who can judge of the of a sick man would be one who could himself

words, the physician

As,

himself, forms

left to

other hand,

the

made by those

for

example, will choose rightly in matters of geometry, or a pilot in matters of steering and, even if there be some occupations and arts with which private persons are familiar, they certainly

knowledge;

geometrician,

;

cannot judge better than those

who know.

to this argument, neither the election calling

So

that,

according 13

of magistrates, nor the

of them to account, should be entrusted to the many. 14

Yet possibly these objections our old answer, that

if the

are to a great extent

met by

people are not utterly degraded, although individually they may be worse judges than those

a.

Reasons for and against

124 III. 11

who or

have special knowledge

are judged of solely, selves, but

by those

the

;

user,

in

or,

them

the best manner, not by

or in

who do

not possess the art

the knowledge of the house

only

a body they are as good some artists whose works

as

Moreover, there are

better.

for example,

;

not limited to the builder

is

the

other words,

master,

of the

house will even be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than the carpenter,

15

and the guest will judge better of a This difficulty seems now to be

feast than the cook. sufficiently

That

answered, but

persons should have authority in greater matters than the good would appear to be a strange thing, yet the election and calling to account there

of the I

was

another akin to

is

is

magistrates

it.

of

the greatest

saying, are functions

which

inferior

in

And

all.

some

these,

as

states are assigned

is supreme in all such matters. and having but a small property the assembly and deliberate and judge,

to the people, for the assembly

16

Yet persons of any in

sit

qualification,

age,

although for the great officers of generals, a high qualification

is

such as controllers and

state,

This

required.

difficulty

may

be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the present practice of democracies may be really defensible. 17

For the power does not or

ecclesiast,

assembly,

few

only

many may ;

in

of which

18 dicasts, are

the

but

the

reside in

court

individual

parts or

the

and

senators,

members.

or

senate,

senator,

and the

or ecclesiasts,

And

claim to have a higher

for the people,

dicast,

the

for

or

this reason

authority than the

and the senate, and the courts consist of

many persons, and their property collectively is greater than the property of one or of a few individuals holding great offices.

But enough of

this.

and

Equality The

discussion of the that laws,

clearly as

the

that

Inequality *

shows nothing so III. 11

question

when good, should be supreme; and or

magistrate

first

should

magistrates

!

9

those

regulate

matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle 2 But what are good laws has ao embracing all particulars not yet been clearly explained ; the old difficulty remains 3 . .

The

goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws is of necessity relative to the constitutions of states. But if so, true forms of government will of necessity have just laws,

21

and perverted forms of government will have unjust laws. In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and especially and 13 above

all

in the highest

of

all

4

this is the political

science j

words, the common All men think justice to be a sort of equality ; and

of which the good interest.

to a certain extent

B

which have been

is

justice, in other

they agree in the philosophical distinctions down by us about Ethics 6 For

laid

.

they admit that justice is a thing having relation to persons, and that equals ought to have equality. But there still re-

difficulty

Here

equality or inequality of what?

mains a question

which the

political

philosopher has to resolve.

is

3

a

For

very likely some persons will say that offices of state ought to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence, in

whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other between him and the rest of the community ; for

difference

that those

who

and claims.

differ in

But, surely,

height of a man, or any 1

3 *

any one respect have

Cp.

c.

10.

i.

Cp.

c.

10.

5.

Cp.

c. 9.

if this is

other advantage, will be a reason 2

Cp. N. Eth.

v. 10.

4

I.

different rights

true, the complexion or 3

Cp. 6

i.

i.

i

Cp. N. Eth.

;

4.

N. Eth.

v. 3.

i.

I.

I.

12.6 III. 12 for

Claims

Conflicting

obtaining a greater share of political

his

4 error here lies

the other arts

are equal in their art, there is no reason

who

The

rights.

upon the surface, and may be illustrated from When a number of flute-players and sciences.

why

those of them

them

are better born should have better flutes given to

on the

for they will not play any better

flute,

who

instrument should be reserved for him

am

If what I

artist.

is

saying

we proceed. For who was far inferior

obscure,

if there

5 clearer as

player

still

in

birth

;

and the superior the superior

is

will be

it

made

were a superior fluteand beauty, although

may be a greater good than the art of fluteand playing, persons gifted with these qualities may excel the either of these

flute-player in a greater ratio than

1283

he excels them

in his art,

he ought to have the best flutes given to him, unless the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence

a still

6 in flute-playing, principle any if a

which they do

Moreover upon

not.

good may be compared with any

may be measured excels in Thus if

given height, then height in general

either against height or against freedom.

height more than excellent

[which

is

than

in virtue, all

virtue,

absurd]

than some other, 7

B

for

;

is

it

if

and height

things a

will

certain

clear that

this

For

other.

A

in

general

be

magnitude

some other

is

more

commensurable is

greater

will be equal.

But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality any more than

there

the arts.

is

no reason

much 8

For

in

;

it

rewarded.

is

why in

if

some be slow, and others

the one should have

gymnastic

Whereas

contests

little

swift,

that

and the others

that such excellence

is

the rival claims of candidates for office

can only be based on the possession of elements which enter

to into the composition

And

Power

Sovereign of a

[such as wealth, virtue,

state,

the noble, or freeborn,

therefore

good reason claim office a freemen and tax-payers

or

etc.].

III. 12

may with

rich,

holders of offices must be

for

;

state can be

:

127

no more composed

But if wealth 9 entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valour are J for without the former a state cannot exist equally so ;

at all,

without the

latter not well.

If the existence of the state it

would seem that

are just

but, if

;

already said

2

we

at least,

As, however, those who

virtue

have

life,

as I have claims.

superior

are equal in one thing ought not to

be equal in all, nor those who are unequal in one thing to be unequal in all, it is certain that all forms of govern-

ment which

on either of these principles are perversions. in a certain sense, as I have already

rest

13

of these claims

take into account a good

education and

,

alone to be considered, then

is

some

or

all,

All men have a claim

|

2

admitted, but they have not an absolute claim. The rich claim because they have a greater share in the land, and land is the

common

element of the state

trustworthy title

are

as the noble

;

;

also they are generally

The

contracts.

in

free claim

for they are nearly akin.

citizens in a truer sense

more

under the same

And

than the ignoble,

the noble

since

good

man s own home and country 8 those who are sprung from better

birth is always valued in a

Another reason

that

is,

.

ancestors are likely to be better men, for nobility

of race.

Virtue, too,

1 8

it

implies

Cp.

iv.

Cp.

i.

all

be truly said to have a claim, for

6

Again, the

.

8

12-16.

4. 6.

others

*

7.

Cp.

i.

3

excellence

been acknowledged by us to be a social

justice has

and

may

is

3.

16.

6

many may

*

virtue,

urge their 4

Cp. c. 9. 14, 15. 15. Cp. N. Eth. v. i.

128

Conflicting

III. 13 claim

few

the

against

when taken

for,

;

Power

claims to

and

collectively,

compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and 1283 b better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, and the other classes

who make up

the same city 5

who

will there,

;

shall rule

No

?

a state, are

doubt

at all in

who ought forms of government.

determining

to rule in each of the above-mentioned

For

living together in

all

or will there not, be any doubt

states are characterized

by differences in their governing one of them has a government of the rich, another of the virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all

bodies

6 these elements coexist.

the virtuous to be their

are

numbers

are

we

in relation to their duties,

make up

a state

?

7 the aspirants to political

Objections

power.

to decide

number

:

?

Suppose

may we

consider

and ask whether they

must they be so many as

to administer the state, or

enough

will

How

very few in

may be urged

against

For those who found

all

their

claims on wealth or family have no basis of justice; on this

any one person were richer than he ought to be the ruler of them.

principle, if

clear that

he

who

is

all

the rest,

it is

In like manner

very distinguished by his birth ought to have the

all those who claim on the ground that they are In an aristocracy, or government of the best, a like for if one citizen be better than difficulty occurs about virtue the other members of the government, however good they may be, he too, upon the same principle of justice, should rule

superiority over

8 freeborn.

;

over them.

And

if

the people are to be supreme because they

are stronger than the few, then if one

man, or more than one,

but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule, and not the many. 9

All the

these considerations

appear

to

principles on which men claim to

show rule,

that

none of

and hold

all

Claims

Conflicting

of their virtue or their wealth, the that they themselves

few

I

129

in subjection to them, are To III. 13 strictly right. claim to be the masters of state on the ground I0

men who

other

those

Power

to

many might

do not say

individually,

fairly

answer

and richer than the

are often better

but

collectively.

And

ir

another ingenious objection which is sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the justest laws

or of the

classes

mentioned occurs

Now

what

what

of

with a view to the good of the higher many, when the case which we have

to legislate

ought

is

is

a

when

just or right

equal

of being equal advantage of the

And

e.

[i.

citizen

He

state,

and the

who

1

].

to be interpreted in the sense 12

is

and that which

;

elements coexist

the

to be considered

is

is

all

is

right in the sense

with reference to the

common good

of the citizens.

governing and being under different forms of government, 1284 he is one who is able and willing to be

one

shares

in

differs

governed. but in the best state

governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue. If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, 13 although not enough to make up the full complement of a state,

whose

virtue

political capacity

of

is

so pre-eminent that the virtues or the

all

the rest admit of no comparison with

his or theirs, he or they can be

a state

;

for justice will not be

no longer regarded as part of superior, if he is

done to the

reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in virtue and in political capacity. Such an one may truly

be deemed a

God among

men.

Hence we

see that 14

necessarily concerned only with those who are legislation in birth and in power ; and that for men of pre-eminent equal is

1

DAVIS

Cp.

K

4.

a

Man

The One Best

130

III. 13 virtue there is no law they are themselves a law. Any one to make laws them be ridiculous who for would attempted :

the

lions

when 15

said

hares

the

to

in the council

where are your claws

aim, and

therefore

any other

the Argonauts

they the

above

is

all

things

from

to predominate too

much

number of

political influence.

their friends,

Mythology

tells

or

us that

Heracles behind for a similar reason

left

],

and banish

ostracise

who seem

or

through their wealth, 6 through

?

latter

began haranguing for this reason democratic

the city for a time those

1

[

of the beasts the

and claiming equality for all. And states have instituted ostracism ; equality their

of Antisthenes,

retort what, in the fable

they would probably

;

the

ship Argo would not take him because she feared that he would have been too much for the rest of the crew. Wherefore

who denounce tyranny and blame the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus cannot be held altogether just in

those

17

their censure.

was

The

story

is

that Periander,

when

the herald

sent to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off

he had brought the field to a level. the meaning of the action, but came and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the

the tallest ears of corn

The

x

g state

or in

1

and

;

this is

till

know

herald did not

a policy not only expedient for tyrants

practice confined

oligarchies

same kind, which 19 prominent

to them,

and democracies.

but

necessary in

equally

Ostracism 2

is

a measure of the

by disabling and banishing the most Great powers do the same to whole

acts

citizens.

and nations, as the Athenians did to the Samians, no sooner had they obtained a firm Chians, and Lesbians

cities

;

grasp of the empire, than they humbled their 1

Cp.

v. 10.

a

13.

Cp.

v. 3.

allies

3.

contrary

Ostracism to treaty

;

131

and the Persian king has repeatedly crushed the

Medes, Babylonians, and other

nations,

when

HI. 13

their spirit has 1284 b

been stirred by the recollection of their former greatness. The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns

all

20

forms of government, true as well as false ; for, although perverted forms with a view to their own interests may adopt this policy, those which seek the common interest do so likewise. The same thing may be observed in the arts 21

and sciences

1

for the painter will not allow the figure to

;

have a foot which, however beautiful, is not in proportion, nor will the ship-builder allow the stern or any other part of the vessel to be unduly large, any more than the chorusmaster will allow any one

who

sings louder or better than 3

the rest to sing in the choir.

compulsion

and

still

Monarchs,

too,

harmony with

live in

may

their

all

practise

cities,

22

if

2 Hence government is for the interest of the state there is an the where argument in acknowledged superiority favour of ostracism is based upon a kind of political justice.

their

It

would

.

certainly be better that the legislator should

from the 23

so order his state as to have no need of such a remedy. But if the need arises, the next best thing is that he should

first

endeavour to correct the

evil

by

this or

some

similar measure.

The

been fairly applied in states ; principle, however, has not for, instead of looking to the public good, they have used ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that under perverted 24

forms of government, and from their special point of view, such a measure is just and expedient, but it is also clear that In the perfect state there would be it is not absolutely just. 1

6 9. vii. 4. 10 Rep. iv. 420. 7 Cp. v. 3. Or, Monarchies do not differ in this respect (i. e. the employment of compulsion) from free states, but their government must be, etc. ;

;

;

2

K

2

III. 13 great doubts about the use of in strength,

wealth,

against

with him

is

the like,

pre-eminent

Mankind

?

when

not

popularity, or

some one who

25 be done

it,

in

applied to excess

but

virtue,

not say

will

when used what

is

to

that such an

one is to be expelled and exiled ; on the other hand, he that would be as if men should ought not to be a subject claim to rule over Zeus on the principle of rotation of office.

The

such a

ruler,

should joyfully obey of

all

like

him should be kings

in their state

life.

The

14

that

is

according to what seems to be the order

and that men

nature, for

only alternative

preceding

discussion,

by a natural transition, leads which we admit to be one

to the consideration of royalty,

of the true forms of government 1 Let us see whether in order to be well governed a state or country should be under the rule of a king or under some other form of government ; .

1285

and whether monarchy, although good for some, may not be But first we must determine whether there is

2

bad for others.

a

It is at/ easy to see that one species of royalty or many. there are many, and that the manner of government is not the

same

in all

Of

(i)

3

thought to

of them. royalties according to law, the

Lacedaemonian

answer best to the true pattern

but there the royal

;

is

except when the kings go on an then they take the command. Matters of 4 religion are likewise committed to them. The kingly office is in truth a kind of generalship, irresponsible and perpetual. is

power

not

absolute,

expedition, and

The

king has

not the power of

life

and

2

death,

except

1 ii.

2

edit.

9.

29.

Omitting tv

rtvi

BacnXdq, which

is

bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd

Varieties of I^ingly l^ule when upon

a campaign and in the field

which

is

described in

when he

is

attacked in

the ancients is

patient

133

after the

;

manner of III. 14

Homer. For Agamemnon the assembly, but when the

goes out to battle he has the power even of

army

Does he

death.

When

not say

I find a

and 5

man

him from

shall save

life

?

skulking apart from the battle, nothing the dogs and vultures, for in my hands is

V

death

a generalship for life This, then, is one form of royalty and of sucli royalties some are hereditary and others elective.

There

(2)

among

is

another sort of monarchy not

uncommon

servile

is legal

and hereditary.

character

in

Europeans, do not

than

For

Hellenes,

more

barbarians, being

and

6

But

the barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny.

even this

:

than

Asiatics

Such

rebel against a despotic government.

7

royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the people are 2 by nature slaves ; but there is no danger of their being Wherefore overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal.

such as a king and not such as a tyrant employ, that is to say, they are composed of 3 For citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenaries also their guards are

would

.

kings

rule

according

to

tyrants over involuntary

;

law over

voluntary

subjects,

and the one are guarded by

but their

fellow-citizens, the others are guarded against them.

These

are

two forms of monarchy, and

which existed

third (3)

netia or dictatorship.

a

II.

ii.

Cp.

i.

391-393. 2.

4.

an

was

The

last clause is

monarchy,

as an

is legal,

not found in our Homer. Cp.

v.

10.

a 8

Aesym-

This may be defined generally

elective tyranny, which, like the barbarian 1

there

in ancient Hellas, called

10.

j

/

%J ngs

134 III. 14 but

differs

from

it

in

the

Heroic Sometimes the

not being hereditary.

in

sometimes for a term of years, or For example, have been performed.

until

Mitylenaeans elected Pittacus leader against the exiles, 10 were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet.

who

9 office is held for

duties

certain

life,

Alcaeus himself says

in

one of his

l

irregular songs

and he reproaches

chose Pittacus tyrant,

*,

the

And

They

his fellow-citizens

for

having

made

the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless

1285 b and ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises. 1 1

These forms of government have always had the character of despotism, because they possess tyrannical power ; but inasmuch as they are elective and acquiesced in by their subjects,

(4)

they are kingly.

There

a fourth species of kingly rule

is

which was hereditary and

heroic times

For

12 cised over willing subjects.

factors of the people

2

in arts or

the

arms

legal,

first

that of the

and was exer-

chiefs were bene

they either gathered them into a community, or procured land for them ; and thus they became kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was ;

inherited by their descendants. They took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices, except those which

required a priest.

They

also decided causes either with or

and when they swore, the form of the oath was the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient times their !3 extended to all things whatsoever, in city and country, power without an oath

;

foreign parts ; but at a later date they relin quished several of these privileges, and others the people took

as well as in

from them,

until

in

1

Or,

banquet-odes,

some

states nothing

fftfdXta.

a

was Cp.

left

v. c. 10.

to

them 3.

Good?

Is Monarchy a but

13 f

sacrifices ; and where they retained more of the III. they had only the right of leadership in war beyond

the

reality

14

the border.

These, then, are the four kinds of royalty.

monarchy of the heroic ages

this

;

First the 14

was exercised over volun

tary subjects, but limited to certain functions

;

the king

was

and a judge, and had the control of religion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary

a general

despotic government in accordance with law.

A third

power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator;

The

elective tyranny. is

in

fourth

a generalship,

fact

four forms differ from

is

is

the

this is an

the Lacedaemonian, which

hereditary and

one another

in

perpetual.

the

These 15

manner which

I have described.

There

is

disposal of

a fifth form of kingly rule in all,

which one has the

just as each tribe or each state has the disposal

of the public property; this form corresponds to the control of a household. For as household management is the kingly rule

of a

of a house, so kingly rule is the household management or of a nation, or of many nations.

city,

Of

we need

these forms

only consider two, the Lacedaefor most of the others lie in ;

monian and the absolute royalty a region between them, having

more than the points

:

first.

first, is it

Thus

less

power than the

the enquiry

is

last,

15

and

reduced to two

2

advantageous to the state that there should

be a perpetual general, and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or open to the citizens in turn ? Secondly, is 1286 a it

well that a single

things

?

The

first

man should have question

falls

the supreme power in all under the head of laws

rather than of constitutions

equally exist under

for perpetual generalship might ; any form of government, so that this

3

1 3

Is not the J(ale of

6

III. 15 matter

may

royalty

We

is

and

sider,

Better

Many

The other kind of we have now to con

be dismissed for the present.

a sort of constitution briefly to

this

;

run over the

involved in

difficulties

by enquiring whether

will begin

it

in

1 by the best man or by the best laws The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances ; and .

that for any science to abide in

Egypt the physician

is

by written

allowed to

rules is absurd.

alter his

Even

treatment after

Hence

the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes the risk.

5

it.

more advantageous

is

to be ruled

4

?

it is

argued that a government acting according to written laws is Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with plainly not the best. the general principle which exists in law

who

;

and he

is a

better

from passion than he who is passionate. Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man. ruler

6

is

free

Yes, some one will answer, but then on the other hand an individual will be better able to advise in particular cases.

whom we

in

turn

make

reply

:]

A

[To

king must legislate, and

laws must be passed, but these laws will have no authority when they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their

7

[Yet a further question remains behind

authority.

When

the law cannot determine a point at

should the one best

man

or should

all

our present practice assemblies meet,

decide

all,

:]

or not well,

According to

?

judgment, deliberate and decide, and their judgments all relate to individual cases. Now any member of the assembly, taken separately, is cer But the state is made up of tainly inferior to the wise man.

many

individuals.

contribute

is

And

sit in

as a feast to

which

better than a banquet furnished

1

Cp. Plato,

Polit. pp.

293-295.

2

by

all

the guests

a single

Cp. supra,

c.

n.

man 2.

2 ,

Constitutional History of Greece so a multitude

a better judge of

is

137

things than any

many

HI. 15

individual.

Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few are like the greater quantity of water

rupted than a

The

little.

individual

which

necessarily perverted

but

;

it

they 8

be overcome

is liable to

by anger or by some other passion, and

;

easily cor

is less

then his

judgment

is

is hardly to be supposed that a

number of persons would all get into a passion and go Let us assume that they are 9 wrong at the same moment.

great

if

the filling up such virtue is

we need

only suppose

freemen, never acting in violation of the law, but

gaps which the law

is

obliged to leave.

scarcely attainable by the

multitude,

Or,

good men and good citizens, and ask be the more incorruptible, the one good ruler, or

that the majority are

which the

will

many who

are

all

good

Will not the many

?

But, you 1286 b

?

may be parties among them, whereas the one To which we may 10 not divided against himself.

will say, there

man

is

answer that their character

is

as

good

If

as his.

we

call

the

of many men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for rule

states than

whether the government

royalty,

force or not

x ,

is

supported by

provided only that a number of

men

equal in

virtue can be found.

The

governments were kingships, probably for this when cities were small, men of eminent

first

n

reason, because of old, virtue

men.

They were made

were few.

benefactors

2 ,

and

kings because they were can only be bestowed by good persons equal in merit arose, no longer

benefits

But when many

enduring the pre-eminence of one, they desired to have a

commonwealth, and 1

Cp.

The

set up a constitution. 2

infra,

15.

Cp.

c.

I2 ruling class 14.

12.

Constitutional History of Greece

138

III. 15 soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public treasury

j

riches

chies naturally

became the path

grew

up.

tyrannies into democracies classes to

was always tending

strengthen

and

masters 13 increased

the

masses,

in

into

for love of gain

;

to diminish their

who

in

oligar

tyrannies and

the ruling

in

number, and so

the end set

Since

democracies.

established

and so

to honour,

These passed

upon

their

cities

have

no other form of government appears to

size,

be any longer possible 1 Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power is the best thing for states, how about the family of the .

king

?

Are

14 better than

his

children to succeed

anybody

that

else,

will

him ? If they are no be mischievous. But

[says the lover of royalty] the king, though he might, will

not hand on his power to his children. That, however, is is too much to ask of human to be and hardly expected, nature.

There

1

is

also a difficulty about the force

5 aid

will

;

he administer his kingdom

still

16 In the case of a limited

answering

will

?

Even

if

he be the lawful

who does

nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, he must have some force wherewith to maintain the law.

sovereign

in

which he

employ should a king have guards about him by whose he may be able to coerce the refractory ? but if not, how

is to

monarchy there is not much difficulty the king must have such force as

this question

;

be more than a match for one or more individuals, but

The ancients observed not so great as that of the people. this principle when they gave the guards to any one whom Thus, when Dionysius they appointed dictator or tyrant. asked the Syracusans to allow him guards, somebody advised that they should give him only a certain number. 1

Cp.

iv. 6.

5; 13.

10.

The At

One

J^ule of

this place in the discussion naturally follows the enquiry

who

respecting the king will

thought Unnatural 139

is

The

he has now to be considered.

;

to

acts solely according

his

III. 16 a

own

so-called limited

monarchy, or kingship according to law, as I have already 1

remarked

,

not a distinct form of government, for under

is

governments,

as, for

example,

in a

all

democracy or aristocracy,

may be a general holding office for life, and one person often made supreme over the internal administration of

there is

A

2 magistracy of this kind exists at Epidamnus , and also at Opus, but in the latter city has a more limited

a state.

Now,

power.

absolute

a sovereign over

rule

of

3

the citizens, in a city which consists of

all

thought by some to be quite contrary to nature ; it argued that those who are by nature equals must have the

equals, is

monarchy, or the arbitrary

is

same natural right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal share, or for equals to have an unequal share, in the offices

of

state, is as

bad as for

different bodily constitutions

have the same food and clothing or the same different. Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals every 3 one be ruled as well as rule, and that all should have their

to

turn.

We

thus arrive at law

And

implies law.

of any individual.

for an order

;

the rule of the law

On

is

of succession

preferable to that

the same principle, even if

it

made only

for certain individuals to govern, they should be

guardians and ministers of the law.

For

must

men

this is admitted

be,

authority to any one

may indeed

;

but then

man when

all

are equal

magistrates there

say that to give is

unjust.

There

be cases which the law seems unable to determine,

but in such cases can a

man

law trains

express purpose, and appoints them

1

Cp.

officers for this

c.

\

be better 4

15.

2.

?

Nay, a

Cp.

it

v. i.

will be replied, the 5

10, ii

;

4.

7.

Law

140

the

True

III. 16 to determine matters which are

Further

best of their judgment.

amendment of the

~Ruler undecided by

left

to the

make any

which experience

suggests.

permits them

it

existing laws

it

to

He who they are only the ministers of the law.] bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God and Reason still

[But

alone rule, but he beast

minds of 6 law

bids

man

adds an element of the

rule

and passion perverts the The even when they are the best of men.

rulers,

We are told

reason unaffected by desire.

is

should J

who

for desire is a wild beast,

;

call in

a physician

;

doctored out of a book. clearly not in point

that a patient

he will not get better if he But the parallel of the arts

is is

for the physician does nothing contrary

;

from motives of friendship he only cures a patient fee whereas magistrates do many things from

to reason

;

and takes a

;

indeed, if a man suspected the his enemies to destroy him with league 8 for a he rather have recourse Even would to the book. bribe, spite

and

1287 b

And,

partiality.

physician of being

in

when they are sick, call training-masters when they are in

in

physicians

other physicians, and

training,

other training-

own case Hence it is

masters, as if they could not judge truly about their

and might be

influenced

by their

evident that in seeking for justice 9 neutral

1 ,

and the law

is

feelings.

men

the mean.

seek for the mean or

Again, customary laws

have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer than the customary law.

Again,

many nates

it

things ;

is ;

by no means easy for one man to superintend he will have to appoint a number of subordi

and what difference does

it

make whether

ordinates always existed or were appointed by 1

Cp. N. Eth.

v. 4,

7.

these sub

him because he

needed them

?

as

If,

one: this

said

I

he

a right to rule because

better than

One

better than

Many

is

is

J

before

,

the

141

good man has III. 16

then two good

better,

men

are I0

the old saying,

two going together

2 ;

and the prayer of Agamemnon,

would

And

4

is

who

,

had ten such counsellors

s !

day there are some magistrates, for example have authority to decide matters which the law

this

at

judges

that I

unable to determine, since no one doubts that the law would

command and

decide in the best manner whatever

But some things

it

could.

and other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule.

For matters of included in

such

judges well

men deliberate cannot be Nor does any one deny that the

about which

;

must be

man, but it many judges, and not one who has been trained by the law

matters

For every

only.

n

left

to

there should be

argued that

is

detail

legislation.

of

decision

can,

and

ruler

B

would

it

surely seem strange

12

that a person

should see better with two eyes, or hear better with two ears, two hands or feet, than many with many ;

or act better with it

indeed, selves

make

is

already the practice of kings to

make

to

them

For they eyes and ears and hands and feet. friends of the themselves of those who are colleagues

many

and their governments. They must be friends of the monarch 13 and of his government ; if not his friends, they will not

do what he wants equality 1

Cp.

;

c.

;

but

2

13.

25. 5

Cp.

II.

x.

and

he thinks that friends ought to 3

224.

for similar

likeness

implies

friendship

and, therefore, if

II. ii.

arguments

c.

4

372.

15.

<5

9.

SiKaarrjs.

Yet there

142 III. 16

be an Exception

may

rule,

he must think that those

like

himself ought to

troversies relating to

But may not

17

^or

others? relation

who

are equal to himself

These

rule.

are the

principal

monarchy. be true in some cases and not

this

all

there

and con

is

natural justice

a.

of a master to his servants,

or,

in

and expediency in the again, of a king to his

subjects, as also in the relation of free citizens to one another

1288

a

2

;

no such justice or expediency in a tyranny \ or in any other perverted form of government, which comes into being contrary to nature. Now, from what has been said, whereas there

it is

is

manifest that, where

men are alike and equal, it is neither man should be lord of all, whether

expedient nor just that one

there are laws, or whether there are no laws, but he himself in the place

is

Neither should a good

of law.

man be

lord

over good men, or a bad man over bad nor, even if he excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular ;

case, 3

which

I

have already mentioned, and to which I will 2 But first of all, I must determine what

once more recur

.

natures are suited for royalties, and

what

for an aristocracy,

and what for a constitutional government.

A

4

people

who

government

;

and

for there

Or,

are

expedient

;

3

them capable of

virtue renders

men who

master, others to be ruled tutional government,

talent are fitted for kingly submitting to be ruled as free

political

and a people

men by men whose 1

by nature capable of producing a race

are

superior in virtue

and

by

for

but there are no

are

whom

men

by nature

a king,

fitted to

political

be ruled by a

others to live under a consti

these several relations are just and

naturally fitted to be ruled by a tyrant,

etc. 8

c.

13.

25, and

5, infra.

3

Omitting the words irXijOos repetition from the previous clause. t>

irt<pvK(

(ptptiv,

which appear to be a

The Rule of

the

Man

Best

command are adapted for an aristocracy who are suited for constitutional freedom :

whom rule

there naturally exists

and to obey

in turn

1

some

virtue as to

while the people III. 17 are those among

a warlike multitude

2

able to

by a law which gives office to the

But when

well-to-do according to their desert. family, or

143

a

whole

5

happens to be so pre-eminent in others, then it is just that they

individual,

surpass

all

should be the royal family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation. For, as 6 3 I said before , to give them authority is not only agreeable to that

ground of right which the founders of or

aristocratical,

or

oligarchical,

all states,

whether

democratical,

again

are

accustomed to put forward (for these all recognize the claim of excellence, although not the same excellence), but accords 4

For it would not 7 with the principle already laid down be right to kill, or ostracize, or exile such a person, or The require that he should take his turn in being governed. .

whole

naturally superior to the part,

is

pre-eminence if so, the

is

in the relation

only alternative

is

and he who has

of a whole to a

part.

this

But 8

that he should have the supreme

power, and that mankind should obey him, not in turn, but always. These are the conclusions at which we arrive respect ing royalty and

its

question, whether whom, and how.

We

various forms, and this is the answer to the it is

or

is

not advantageous to states, and to

maintain that the true forms of government are three,

and that the best must be that which best,

and 1

* 4

in

which there

Omitting Kal Cp. Or,

c. 9.

is

iv.

is

administered by the

one man, or a whole family, "

Cp.

c. 7.

15.

but differing in the

manner already

laid

down.

4.

18

The

144 III. 18 or many persons,

Perfect State in

excelling

and both

virtue,

rulers

subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ruled

and *,

in

We

showed such a manner as to attain the most eligible life. 2 that the virtue of the at the commencement of our enquiry good man

is

same as the

necessarily the

of the perfect

virtue

of the citizen

Clearly then in the same manner, and

state.

by the same means through which a man becomes truly good, he will frame a state [which will be truly good] whether 1288 b aristocratical, or under kingly rule, and the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a good

statesman and king. 2

arrived at these conclusions,

Having

speak of the perfect being and

is

1

He who

established.

enquiry in due manner.

we must proceed

and describe how

state,

it

comes

to

into

would proceed with the

3 .

.

Omitting KOI ap\ttv, which s 2nd edit.

.

is

inserted,

without MS. authority, in

Bekker 2

Cp.

c.

4.

3

Retaining avrrjs

Bekker

the words of

TroirjoaaOai in his

2nd

rrp>

edit.

the"HVISS.,

irpoCTjitovaav

AvayKr) ffKf\f/iv,

5?)

rciv fj.t\\ovra

ntpl

which are omitted by

BOOK IN

and

arts

all

any subject, province of

a

single

modes of

science

or

the

only

to

suitableness

training to different bodies (2),

best (i)

absolutely the

(for

it

consider

the

is

all

For example, the

subject.

not

gymnastic considers

which embrace the whole of IV. 1

restricted to a part only,

art

single

a

to

appertains

sciences

and are not

IV

that

of

art

of different

but what sort

must

the absolutely best

is

suit

by nature best and best furnished with the and also what common form of training is And if a man adapted to the great majority of men (4). does not desire the best habit of body or the greatest skill in that

which

means of

is

life),

3

gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer or the teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart any

The sa"me principle equally holds lower degree of either (3). in medicine and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and in the arts generally

Hence

it

of a single

1 .

obvious that government too

is

science,

which has

to

is

the subject 3

consider what

kind of

government would be best and most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were no external impediment, and also

For

what kind of government the best

legislator

is

often

and statesman ought

with (i) that which 1

The numbers

numbers

in

is

in this

the next.

is

adapted to particular states.

unattainable, to

and therefore the true be acquainted,

best in the abstract,

not only

but also with

paragraph are made to correspond with the

1

Political Problems

46

IV. 1(2)

that

which

best

is

how

the supposed state being so is

it

far

may

We

be constituted

a state

may how it

both

under any given conditions (3);

formed and, when formed, how

circumstances.

to

relatively

4 should be able further to say

is

originally

be longest preserved

from the very best that

;

it

unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the very neither is it the best under the circumstances, but of an ;

best

inferior type.

5

He

ought, moreover, to

ment which

is

know

(4) the form of govern

best suited to states in general

for political

;

writers, although they have excellent ideas, are often un6 practical. should consider, not only what form of

We

government

is

but also what

best,

easily attainable

all.

by none but the most perfect

There ;

are

for this

is

possible and

what

is

some who would have natural advantages

many

Others, again, speak of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the constitution under which they

1289 a are required.

are living, they 7

the

extol

Lacedaemonian 1

.

some one

in

for example of government which

particular,

Any change

men

has to be introduced should be one which willing and able

to adopt, since there is quite as

in the reformation

of an old constitution as

ment of a new one,

And

in

will be both

much

trouble

the establish

just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn.

therefore, in addition to

the qualifications of the states

man

already mentioned, he should be able to find remedies 8 for the defects of existing constitutions 2 This he cannot .

do unless he knows how many forms of government there are.

It

is

often

supposed that there

is

only one kind of

democracy and one of oligarchy.

But

and, in order to avoid such mistakes,

we must

1

Cp.

ii.

6.

16.

this

is

a mistake

ascertain

2

Cp.

4.

;

what

there are in

differences

how many ways

the constitutions of states, and in

The same

they are combined.

man

insight will enable a

know which laws

to

and which are suited to different constitutions are,

and ought to

offices in a state,

are the best, for the laws

;

be, relative to the constitution,

A constitution

constitution to the laws.

and determines what

and not the

the organization of I0

is

is

IV. 1

political 9

to be the governing

But * laws body, and what is the end of each community. are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitu 1

: they are the rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders. So that we must know the number and varieties of the ir

tion

forms of government, if only with a view to making the same laws cannot be equally suited to all

several

For

laws.

and

oligarchies

to all democracies,

and there

is

certainly

more

than one form both of democracy and of oligarchy. In our original discussion 2 about governments we divided

them

three

into

constitutional

versions rule

:

discussion of the

perfect

three

and

oligarchy,

of aristocracy we into the

kingly rule,

and

government,

tyranny,

and

enquiry

forms

true

aristocracy, and

corresponding

Of

democracy.

per

kingly

have already spoken, for the is the same thing with the

state

two forms thus named,

a principle of virtue provided

with

since both imply

external

We

means.

have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the latter should be established

3

In

.

what follows we have

so-called constitutional 1

Or

,

laws, though

in

to

describe

themselves

distinct,

show

the character of

the constitution. 2

Book

iii.

7

;

N. Eth.

the

government, which bears the common

viii

3

10.

L

2

Cp.

iii.

17.

8.

2

148 IV. 2 name of

2

all

constitutions,

and

the other

forms, tyranny,

oligarchy, and democracy. It is obvious which of the three perversions is the worst, That which is the and which is the next in badness.

of the

perversion

And

1289 b worst. exist

and most divine

first

necessarily the

is

just as a royal rule, if not a

mere name, must

by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily

so tyranny,

the farthest removed from a well-constituted form is

a little better, but a long

is

the

most

A

writer

3

way from

aristocracy,

oligarchy

;

and democracy

tolerable of the three. *

who preceded me has

distinctions, but his point of view

is

made

already

these

not the same as mine.

For he

lays down the principle that of all good constitutions which he would include a virtuous oligarchy and the (under like)

democracy

but the

the worst,

is

Whereas we

maintain

one oligarchy

is

best of

bad ones.

that they are all defective,

and that

not to be accounted better than another, but

only less bad.

Not

4

to pursue this question further at present, let us begin

2 how many varieties of states there by determining (i) are (since of democracy and oligarchy there are several) ; (2)"

what

what

constitution

is

the

the most generally acceptable, and 4

next

after the perfect or eligible degree other aristocratical and well-constituted form of govern any

ment

if

adapted 1

in

is

states

Plato, Polit.

*

Or,

which

is

which

any other there be

to

303

in

general

;

2

A.,

5

4

c.

(3)

4-6.

is

the

at

same time

of the other forms of 8

c.

7-9 and u.

the perfect state; and besides this what other there is aristocratical and well constituted, and at the same time adapted after

to states in general.

5

c. 12.

A

Table of Contents

149

For democracy may IV. 2 government to whom each is suited. meet the needs of some better than oligarchy, and conversely. 5 1

In the next place (4) a

man ought

among these

we have to consider in what manner who desires to establish some one

to proceed

various

whether of democracy or of

forms, 2

and

having briefly discussed these 6 the best of our to subjects power, we will endeavour to

oligarchy

;

ascertain

whence

lastly,

arise

(5)

the

and preservation of

ruin

states,

both generally and in individual cases, and to what causes they are to be attributed.

The

reason

that every

is

place

we

why

see that

there

all

many elements. In the first made up of families, and in

states are

the multitude of citizens there poor, and

some

in a

and

husbandmen,

There

are

also

and property

must be some

middle condition

armed, and the poor not are

many forms of government 3

are

contains

state

Of

3 .

some

among the

3 ;

common

the

notables

for example, in the

some

people,

some

and

traders,

and some

rich

the rich are heavya

artisans.

of wealth

differences

number of horses which

they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are rich. And therefore in old times the cities whose strength 3 lay in the cavalry

were

wars against their neighbours

in

and they used cavalry 4 as was the practice of the

oligarchies, ;

Eretrians and Chalcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the river

Maeander, and of other peoples

in

1

3

2

Book

Besides 4

Asia.

differences of wealth there are differences of rank

and

merit,

Book

vi.

Or,

and again both of rich and poor some are armed and some are

v.

unarmed. 4

Reading

either iro\if*ovs with v. tr.

TToAtfuous with the

Greek MSS.

;

cp.

(Moerbek) and Bekk. 2nd c.

13.

10;

vi.

c.

7.

i.

edit.,

i 5-0

IV. 3 and 1290

a

w h cn

in

of

sometimes have

some other elements which were mentioned

are

there

by us

essentials

5

of Government Differ

Why forms treating state

a

the

l .

lesser

of aristocracy

Of

and sometimes

share in the government.

a

we enumerated

the

sometimes

all,

these elements,

the

It

greater

number,

evident then that

is

many forms of government, differing in kind, parts of which they are composed differ from

there must be

the

since

each other

For

kind.

in

of offices which

a constitution

the citizens distribute

all

is

an organization

among themselves,

according to the power which different classes possess, for example the rich or the poor, or according to some common them or some power common to equality subsisting among

There must

6 both.

therefore be as

many forms of government

as there are

modes of arranging the

superiorities

and other

offices, according to the the different parts of of inequalities

the state. generally thought to be two principal forms : of the winds that there are but two north say and that the rest of them are only variations south

There and

7

are

men

as

of these, so of governments there are said to be only two forms For aristocracy is con democracy and oligarchy. be

kind of oligarchy,

sidered

to

a

and the so-called

few,

really a

west

a

wind.

a

Similarly

of the scale are

of harmonies

there

in

either 1

case

Not

;

rule

of

are

in

said

to

be two

the other arrangements

comprehended under one

About forms of government But

the

government to be democracy, just as among the winds we make the variation of the north, and the east of the south

kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian

8

as being

constitutional

of these

two.

this is a very favourite notion.

the better

and

more exact way

what has preceded, but

cp. vii. 8.

is

to

Democracy and Oligarchy distinguish,

as

true forms,

and

have

I

to

one or two which

the

done,

if i are

IV. 8

regard the others as perversions, whether

of the most perfectly attempered harmony or of the best form of government we may compare the oligarchical forms to the severer and more overpowering modes, and the demo ;

more relaxed and

cratic to the It

must not be assumed, is

democracy

some

are fond of saying, that

form of government

that

simply

gentler ones.

as

the greater number are sovereign

1

indeed

majority rules

is

in

every government, the

,

for

in

oligarchies,

and

nor again

;

which

oligarchy that form of government in

a

few are

the whole population of a city to be

Suppose 1300, and that of these 1000 are

sovereign.

the remaining

300 who

respects their

equals,

a

rich,

2

and do not allow

are poor, but free,

share of the

4

which

in

and

in all

government

other

no one

In like manner, if the 3 say that this is a democracy. poor were few and the masters of the rich, who outnumber them, no one would ever call such a government, in which the rich majority h ;e no share of office, an oligarchy. will

Therefore we should rather say that democracy is the 1290 b form of government in which the free are rulers, and it is oligarchy in which the rich only an accident that 4 the free are the many and the rich are the few. Otherwise ;

which the

offices were given according to be the case in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, would be an oligarchy ; for the number of tall or good-

a

government

in

stature, as is said to

looking

men

is

small.

And

yet oligarchy and

democracy by these two charac Both of them contain

are not sufficiently distinguished merely teristics

many

of wealth

other

and freedom.

elements,

and

1

Cp.

iii.

therefore 8.

3-7.

we must

carry

our

5

if2 The State Compared IV. 4

to

Animal

the

and say that the government is not a de which the freemen, being few in number, rule over the many who art not free, as at Apollonia, on the analysis further,

mocracy Ionian

in

and

Gulf,

the nobles,

at

who were

Thera

in

(for

each

of these

also the earliest settlers,

states

were held

in

chief honour, although they were but a few out of many). Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government,

because they exceed in number ; as was the case formerly at Colophon, where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed

6 of large But the form property before the Lydian War. of government is a democracy when the free, who are also

poor

and the majority,

govern,

in 7

and oligarchy when the at the same time few

and the noble govern, they being number.

rich

I

have

have said that there are many forms of government, and explained to what causes the variety is due. more than those already mentioned, and what they

Why

there are are,

and whence they arise, I will now proceed to consider, from the principle already admitted \ which is that

starting

8 every state consists, not of one, but of

were going to speak of the should

first

of

all

many

different species

parts.

If

of animals,

we we

determine the organs which are indispens example some organs of sense

able to every animal, as for

and instruments of receiving and digesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach, besides organs of locomotion. As suming now that there are only so many kinds of organs, but that there

may

of mouths, organs

be differences

and

the possible

necessarily furnish

in

them

I

mean

different kinds

and perceptive and locomotive

stomachs,

combinations of these differences will

many 1

varieties

CP

.

c. 3.

of animals. i.

(For animals

Essential Elements of the State

1^3

cannot be the same which have different kinds of mouths or

of

And when

ears.)

there will be as

many

all

sorts

of animals as there are combina

In

tions of the necessary organs.

like

manner the forms of 9

government which have been described, as

men

;

is

a second, a class

grace of

elements.

the food-producing class,

without which a city cannot exist absolutely

have repeatedly

I

One many who are called husband of mechanics, who practise the arts

said, are composed, not of one, but of

element

necessary,

life.

I

mean those

in

commerce

others

;

contribute

to luxury or to the

A fourth class

or in retail trade.

The

warriors

make up

the

is

to the

name be of

a slavish nature

independent and self-sufficing, but a slave pendent.

Hence we

is

?

i

that of the

fifth class,

and

they are as necessary as any of the others, if the country is not to be the slave of every invader. For how can a state which title

1291

of these arts some are

The third class is that of traders, and by traders who are engaged in buying and selling, whether

serfs or labourers.

has any

IV. 4

combinations are exhausted,

the

The

n

state is

the reverse of inde

see that this subject, though ingeniously,

has not been satisfactorily treated in the Republic a . Socrates 12 that of a state is made of four sorts says up people who are these are a weaver, a husbandman, and a builder afterwards, finding that they shoemaker, are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman, to absolutely

necessary;

a

;

look after the necessary animals ; then a merchant, and then a retail trader. All these together form the complement of the first state, as if a state were established merely to supply the necessaries of

life, rather than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in need of shoemakers and of husbandmen. But he does not admit into the state a military class until the 1

Rep.

ii.

369.

1

3

a

i

Essential Elements of the State

f4

IV. 4 country has

increased in size, and

is

beginning to encroach on

Yet even whereupon they go to war. amongst his four original citizens, or whatever be the number of those whom he associates in the state, there must be some its

who

one 14

s

neighbour

And

land,

is

just.

be said to be more truly part of an animal than the body, so the higher parts of states, that is to say, the warrior class, the class engaged in the administration

of of

soul

and

justice,

may

in

deliberation,

common

political

state than the parts

15

and determine what

will dispense justice

as the

Whether

which

is

these are

sense,

which minister

the special business

more

essential to the

to the necessaries of

life.

their several functions are the functions of different

citizens, or

of the same

same persons

for

it

are both warriors

may often happen that the and husbandmen is imma

to the argument. The higher as well as the lower elements are to be equally considered parts of the state, and if so, the military element must be included. There are also

terial

the wealthy 1

6 these

who

minister to the state with their property

form the seventh

class.

magistrates and of officers rulers.

And

;

The

able to take office

17 serve the state, either always or in turn.

the class of those

who

is

;

that of

for the state cannot exist without

some must be

therefore

eighth class

and

and to

There only remains

who

judge between dis If the fair distinguishing them. just putants ; and equitable organization of all these elements is necessaiy to 1291 b states, then there must also be persons who have the ability of

we were

J

8 statesmen.

deliberate

now

1

Many are of opinion that different functions can be combined in the same individual 1 ; for example, the war rior may be a husbandman, or an artisan ; or again, the coun sellor a judge. 1

Or,

And

all

claim to possess political

ability,

Different functions appear to be often combined,

etc.

and

Varieties of Democracy

iff

But think that they are quite competent to fill most offices. the same persons cannot be rich and poor at the same time.

For

and the poor are regarded

this reason the rich

in

IV. 4

an 19

a state. Again, because the rich especial sense as parts of are generally few in number, while the poor are many, they the other prevails appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or arises the common Hence form the government. they of kinds that there are two government democracy opinion

and oligarchy. l that there are many differences 20 I have already explained Let of constitutions, and to what causes the variety is due.

me now show

that there are different forms both of

and oligarchy, as ceded.

For both

democracy

indeed be evident from what has pre

will

in the

common

various classes are included

people and in the notables 21

of the

;

common

people, one class

another traders,

who

are husbandmen, another artisans

;

employed in buying and selling class, whether engaged in war or

another are the seafaring in trade, as ferrymen or as

fishermen.

(In

;

are

places any one of these classes forms

many

for example, fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, crews of triremes at Athens, merchant sea men at Aegina and Chios, ferrymen at Tenedos.) To the

quite a large population

;

classes already mentioned

those who, leisure, or

there

owing

those

may be

to

who

may be added

their

needy

are not free of birth

other classes as well.

day-labourers,

The

and

have no

circumstances,

;

and

notables again

may

on both sides

be divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue, education,

and similar differences.

Of

forms of democracy

first

be based strictly on equality. 1

Cp.

comes

that

which

is

said to

In such a democracy the law iii.

c. 6.

22

i

IV. 4 23

Extreme Democracy

$6

says that be rich l

For

nobody

to be poor,

found

in

democracy, they

is

majority

is

all

And

to the utmost.

government and the opinion of the such a government must necessarily be

the people are the decisive,

majority,

Here then

24 a democracy.

when

will be best attained

persons alike share in the since

and for nobody to

and that neither should be masters, but both equal. are chiefly liberty and equality, as is thought by some,

if

to be

just for

it is

;

is

There

one sort of democracy.

another in which the magistrates are elected according to

a certain property qualification, but a

low one

;

who

he

has

the required amount of property has a share in the govern-

1292

a

ment, but he

kind

is

who

that in

Another

loses his property loses his rights.

which

all

the citizens

who

are under

no

dis

government, but still the law is In another, everybody, if he be only a citizen, is 25 supreme. admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before. share in

qualification

A

fifth

the

form of democracy,

in other respects the

same,

is

that

which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme This is 26 power, and supersede the law by their decrees. in

For in of affairs brought about by the demagogues. democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens a state

hold the

first

place,

and there are no demagogues

;

but where

the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one and the ;

many have 27 collectively.

the power in their hands, not as individuals, but

Homer

says that,

it is

not good to have a rule

1 that the poor should no more Or, reading apxtw with Victorius, The emendation is not absolutely necessary, govern than the rich. though supported by vi. 2. 9, law yap TC) [irjOtv fj.d\\ov dp\tiv rovs

airopovs tear

rj

TOVS fvirupovs

dpidfj.6v.

/J.i)Se

Kvpiovs tlfat /*wovs

dAAu

iravras

(

iffov

Extreme Democracy

if?

*

of many , but whether he means this corporate rule, or the IV. rule of many individuals, is uncertain. And the people, who is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot

relatively

held in honour

;

of democracy being to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms

the flatterer

is

The

of monarchy.

spirit

;

this sort

of both

is

the same, and they alike 28

exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens.

The

decrees

of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant ; and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other.

Both have great power demagogue

with

describing.

the flatterer

democracies

The demagogues make

override the laws, and refer

And

of the

therefore they

grow

with the tyrant, the kind which we are

the decrees of the people 29

things to the popular assembly. great, because the people have all all

things in their hands, and they hold in their hands the votes

of the people, who are too ready to listen to them. Further, 30 those who have any complaint to bring against the magis trates

say,

the people be judges

let

;

the people are too

happy to accept the invitation ; and so the authority of every office is undermined. Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all ; for where the laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law 31 to be over and the ought all, supreme magistracies and the

So that if government should judge only of particulars. be a real the constitu form of sort of democracy government, which

tion in a

democracy

all

in

things are regulated by decrees

only to particulars

1

II. ii.

is

clearly not

the true sense of the word, for decrees relate

204.

a .

*

Cp. N. Eth.

v. 10.

7,

4

Varieties of Oligarchy

iy 8 These then

IV. 5

oligarchies,

Of

the different kinds of democracies.

are

where the

one

are different kinds

there

too,

office is so high that the poor, qualification for although they form the majority, have no share in the govern

property

ment, yet he 1292 b

Another

who

sort

is

acquires a qualification

when

there

is

may

obtain a share.

a qualification for office, but

a high one, and the vacancies in the governing

If the election

by co-optation.

is

made

out of

body

are filled

the qualified

all

persons, a constitution of this kind inclines to an aristocracy, 2 if

Another

out of a privileged class, to an oligarchy.

oligarchy

is

when

the son

a fourth form, likewise hereditary, in

sort of

There

succeeds the father.

is

which the magistrates

are supreme and not the law. Among oligarchies this is what tyranny is among monarchies, and the last-mentioned

form of democracy among

democracies

sort of oligarchy receives the

name of

;

and

in

fact

this

a dynasty (or rule of

powerful families). 3

These It

cies.

are the different sorts of oligarchies

should however be remembered that

and democra

in

many

states

1

the constitution which

is established by law, although not democratic, owing to the character and habits of the people,

be administered democratically, and conversely in other

may

states the established constitution

4 but

may

may

incline to

be administered in an oligarchical

often

happens change at once

after ;

democracy,

This most

governments do not the dominant party are content with

a revolution

at first

spirit.

:

for

The laws which upon their opponents. existed previously continue in force, but the authors of the

encroaching a

little

revolution have the

6

From what

power

in their hands.

has been already said 1

Cp.

v. i.

8.

we may

safely infer that

i

Stages of Democracy there

are so

oligarchies.

f9

many different kinds of democracies and of IV. 6 For it is evident that either all the classes whom

we mentioned must

some only and

share in the government, or

When

not others.

the class of husbandmen and of those

2

who

possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the For the citi government is administered according to law.

zens being compelled to live by their labour have no leisure ; and so they set up the authority of the law, and attend assemblies only

when

fication

which

is

Since they

necessary.

share in the government

when they have

fixed by the law,

all

obtain a 3

acquired the quali

nobody

is

excluded

the

exclusion of any class would be a step towards But leisure cannot be provided for them unless oligarchy. absolute

revenues to support them. This is one sort of and these are the causes which give birth to it. democracy, Another kind is based on the mode of election, 1 which there are

naturally

comes next

birth there is

government

if

in order

l ;

in this, every

one to whose

no objection is eligible, and may share in the he can find leisure. And in such a democracy 4

the supreme power

is

vested in the laws, because the state has

A

no means of paying the citizens. third kind is when all freemen have a right to share in the government, but do not actually share, for the reason which has been already given ; so that in this form again the law must rule.

of democracy is that which comes latest In our own day, when cities have states. original size,

and

their revenues

in

far

have increased,

A

fourth kind 5

the history of 1293 a

outgrown all

their

the citizens

have a place in the government, through the great prepon derance of their numbers ; and they all. including the poor

who

receive pay,

and therefore have 1

Or,

which

is

leisure to exercise their

proper to

it.

i

IV. 6

do

Stages of Oligarchy

Indeed, when they are have the most leisure, for they are people not hindered by the care of their property, which often fetters share in the administration.

rights,

6 paid, the

common who

the rich,

assembly or 7

who

poor,

are thereby prevented

from taking part

and so the

in the courts,

state is

So many

and not by the laws.

are a majority,

in the

governed by the

kinds of democracies there are, and they grow out of these necessary causes.

Of

oligarchies,

the citizens have is

the

that in

is

which the majority of much and this

property, but not very

form, which allows to any one

first

8 required

one form

some

amount the

;

who

obtains the

right of sharing in the government.

sharers in the government being a numerous body, that the law

it

The

follows

must govern, and not individuals. For in pro removed from a monarchical form

portion as they are further

of government, and

much little

in

respect of property have neither so

as to be able to live without attending to business, nor so as to

need

state support,

they must admit the rule of law But if the men of property

9 and not claim to rule themselves.

former case, and

own more

property, there arises a second form of oligarchy.

For the

in the state are

fewer than

more power they

claim, and having this themselves select those of the other view, they

stronger they are, the object in classes

in the

who

are to be admitted to the

being as yet strong

enough

10 the law represent their wishes. sified

government

;

but, not

to rule without the law, they

by a further diminution of

When their

this

is

make inten

power numbers and increase

of their property, there arises a third and further stage of oligarchy, their 11

own

succeed

which the governing class keep the offices in hands, and the law ordains that the son shall

in

the

father.

When,

again,

the

rulers

have

great

Aristocracy

the Pure

s

and

Mixed

the

161

wealth and numerous friends, this sort of dynastia or family despotism approaches a monarchy ; individuals rule and not

This

the law.

the fourth sort of oligarchy, and

is

is

IV. 6

analogous

to the last sort of democracy.

There

are

one of them

still

two forms besides democracy and oligarchy

;

7

universally recognized and included among the four principal forms of government, which are said to be is

(l) monarchy, (2) oligarchy, (3) democracy, and (4) the socalled aristocracy or

a

which

fifth,

tional

government of the

retains the generic

government

this is not

;

But there

best.

name of

is

also

polity or constitu

common, and

therefore has not

been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the dif ferent kinds of government ; like Plato in his books about the 1293 b

The term aristocracy they recognize four only. form of government which is de

state, is

2

rightly applied to the

scribed in the first part of our treatise : for that only can be rightly called aristocracy [the government of the best] which is a government formed of the best men absolutely,

and not merely of men who are good when standard.

same as the good citizen

and also

whereas

states

from the

differing

government

is

in

relatively to his

is

by any given absolutely the

other states the good

own form

differing

of govern from oligarchies

polity or

so-called

these are termed aristocracies,

;

them magistrates are wealth and according ment

;

only good But there are some

ment.

tional

citizen

is

tried

man

In the perfect state the good

3

constitu

and

in

certainly chosen, both according to their to their merit. Such a form of govern

not the same with the two just

now

mentioned, and

For indeed in states which do not 4 termed an aristocracy. make virtue the aim of the community, men of merit and is

virtue reputation for DAVIS

may

be found.

M

And

so where a govern-

1

Mixed

62

IV. 7 ment has 1

thage

,

regard to wealth, virtue, and numbers, as at Car

that

is

aristocracy

two out of the

to

Constitutions

and also where

;

as at

three,

it

has regard only

Lacedaemon, to

and

virtue

and the two principles of democracy and virtue There are these two forms of aristocracy temper each other. in addition to the first and perfect state, and there is a third numbers,

5

form, viz. the polities which incline towards oligarchy. I have yet to speak of the so-called polity and of tyranny. 8 I put

them

in this order, not is

government above-mentioned fall

aristocracies.

a

truth

2

that they

is,

in

of

constitutions

all

and so

and other forms

(sc.

of these, as

are perversions

I

speak of tyranny, which the series because I am enquiring into the

Last of

.

last

place

perversions,

perverted forms)

really

said before I

The

short of the most perfect form of government,

they are reckoned among the

because a polity or constitutional any more than the

to be regarded as a perversion

states,

I

will

and

this

all

the

is

very

reverse

of

a constitution.

Having explained why I have adopted this order, I will of which the proceed to consider constitutional government nature will be clearer now that oligarchy and democracy ;

3

have been defined.

For

polity or constitutional

government

may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy ; but the term is usually applied to those forms democracy, and the term aristocracy to those which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompani4 ments of wealth. Moreover, the rich already possess the of government which incline towards

external advantages crime, and 1

the want of which

is

a temptation

to

hence they are called noblemen and gentlemen.

Cp.

ii.

II.

*

5-10.

Cp.

iii.

7.

Mixed

Constitutions

163

And

inasmuch as aristocracy seeks to give predominance to IV. 8 of the citizens, people say also of oligarchies that they are composed of noblemen and gentlemen. Now 129 4 a the

it

best

be an impossible thing that the

appears to

which

state

5

governed by the best citizens should be ill-governed *, and equally impossible that the state which is ill-governed should is

be governed by the best. But we must remember that good laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good govern

For

ment. is

there are

two

parts of

good government

part is the goodness of the laws

which they obey

And

may obey bad laws as well as good. a further subdivision

which

;

one 6

obedience of citizens to the laws, the other

the actual

;

may obey

they

there

;

they

may be

either the best laws

are attainable to them, or the best absolutely.

The

distribution of offices according to merit is a special 7

characteristic of aristocracy, for the principle of an aristocracy is

as wealth

virtue,

is

of an oligarchy,

and freedom of a

of them there of course exists the right democracy. of the majority, and whatever seems good to the majority of In

those

who

all

share in the government has authority.

however, a state of this kind

is

Generally, g

called a constitutional govern

ment [not an aristocracy], for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich, who commonly take the place of the noble.

And

as there are three grounds on

an equal share

in the

(for the fourth or

being only

ancient

government

good

freedom, wealth, and virtue

birth is the result

wealth and virtue)

admixture of the two elements, that

and poor,

is to 1

which men claim

it

is

to

of the two is

last,

clear that the

say,

of the rich

be called a polity or constitutional government Omitting dAXd

novrjpoKpa.rovp.tvrjv.

M

2

;

9

and

Aristocracy IV. 8 and

the

union

of the three

Thus

far

called

aristocracy

more than any other form

government, except the true and name. 10

be

to

is

the government of the best, and

Polity

ideal,

or of

has a right to this

have described the different forms of states

I

monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, what they are, and in what aristocracies differ from that the two one another, and polities from aristocracies

which exist besides

and

latter are

9

not very unlike

obvious.

is

how by the side of oligarchy and democracy the so-called polity or constitutional govern ment springs up, and how it should be organized. The nature of it will be at once understood from a comparison of Next we have

to consider

oligarchy and democracy

we must

;

ascertain their different

and taking a portion from each, put the two the parts of an indenture. Now there are three

characteristics, 2

together, like

modes

in

which fusions of government may be

made

nature of the fusion will be

effected.

The

by an example of the manner in which different governments legislate, say con In oligarchies they cerning the administration of justice. intelligible

do not serve as judges, and but in democracies they give fine the rich. 3 pay to the poor and do not (i) the union of these two modes * is a common or middle term between impose a

on the

fine

rich if they

to the poor they give

no pay

;

Now

1294 b them,

and

is

therefore

characteristic

of a

constitutional

This is one government, for it is a combination of both. mode of uniting the two elements. Or (2) a mean may be taken between the enactments of the two : thus democracies require no property qualification,

members of the assembly, 1

CP

.

or only a small one, from

oligarchies c. 13.

6.

a

high

one

;

here

Polity neither of these

(3) There

is

the

is

common

mean between them. IV. 9

term, but a

a third mode, in which something

is

borrowed 4

from the oligarchical and something from the democratical For example, the appointment of magistrates by principle. lot

is

democratical,

democratical again

when

oligarchical tional state,

and the election of them oligarchical; there is no property qualification,

when there

In the aristocratical or constitu-

is.

from

one element will be taken from each

5

oli

garchy the mode of electing to offices, from democracy the Such are the various modes of 6 disregard of qualification. combination.

There same

is a true

those

union of oligarchy and democracy when the either a democracy or an oligarchy ;

may be termed

state

who

names evidently

use both

Such a

is

complete. both extremes appear

fusion there in

such a manner as to make

it

poor to be educated like them.

who

of

in the following period

to

manhood

life,

rich

youth

of the

similar equality prevails 8

and when the

the same rule

grown up no distinction between the

7

has

are educated

possible for the sons

A

it

the sons of the poor

are brought up with the sons of the rich, in

for

;

constitution,

place the

first

For

fusion

mean

democracy, because

In the

democratical features.

receive a democratical education.

the

that

The Lacedaemonian

it.

for example, is often described as a

many

feel

also in the

is

is

citizens are

observed

;

there

is

In like manner

and poor.

they all have the same food at their public tables, and the rich wear only such clothing as any poor man can afford. Again, the people elect to one of the two greatest 9 offices

of

states,

and

in the

the Senators and share 1

other they share the Ephoralty.

in

Cp.

ii.

9.

21.

l ;

for they elect

By

others the

1

66

Tyranny

IV. 9 Spartan

constitution

to be

said

is

an oligarchy, because

it

has many oligarchical elements. That all offices are filled election and none is one of these oligarchical by by lot, characteristics

ment

power of inflicting death or banish and there are few persons is another

that the

;

rests with

a

;

10 others.

In a well attempered polity there should appear to be both elements and yet neither ; also the government should rely on itself, and not on foreign aid, nor on the good will of a

majority of foreign

when

disposed

there

is

states

they might be equally wellform of government but on

a vicious

the general willingness of

all

classes in the state to maintain

the constitution.

Enough of and

Of

10 a

in

that

it

the manner in which a constitutional government,

which the so-called

aristocracies ought to be framed.

the nature of tyranny I have

may

have

still

to speak,

in

order

place in our enquiry, since even tyranny is

its

reckoned by us to be a form of government, although there is not much to be said about it. I have already in the former part of this treatise to

the

J

most usual

discussed royalty or kingship according meaning of the term, and considered

whether

it is or is not advantageous to states, and what kind of royalty should be established, and whence, and how it

arises. 2

When speaking of royalty we also spoke of two forms of tyranny, which are both according to law, and therefore easily pass into royalty. Among Barbarians there are elected monarchs who exercise were also elected

3 dictators.

another,

in

a

despotic

power;

despotic rulers

called

Aesymnetes or

ancient Hellas,

These monarchies, when exhibit

certain differences. 1

iii.

14-17.

compared with

And

they

are,

one as I

167

Polity said before,

in

royal,

so

in so

far as

he

There

fancy.

most

and

is

their will.

No

freeman,

is

the

and governs

betters, with a view its

if

own

is

counterpart of the perfect just that arbitrary power of an 4

responsible to no one,

alike, whether equals or advantage, not to that of

IV. 1O

the

is

This tyranny which

individual

which

also a third kind of tyranny,

typical form,

monarchy.

rules accord-

but they are tyrannical

;

despotic and rules according to his

is is

monarch

as the

far

ing to law and over willing subjects

to

its

all

own

and therefore against

subjects,

he can escape from

it,

will

endure

such a government.

The

kinds of tyranny are such and so many, and for the

reasons which I have given.

We

have

most

for

now

states,

to enquire

and the

what

best

assuming a standard of virtue which nor an education which

is

in general

called, of which lie

and to

constitution 11

men, neither

above ordinary persons,

which

is

an aspiration

which the majority the form of government which states

As

can attain.

is

ideal state

but having regard to the

are able to share,

most

for

exceptionally favoured by nature

and circumstances, nor yet an only,

the best

is

life

we were

in

life

to those aristocracies, as they are a

now

just

speaking, they either

beyond the possibilities of the greater number of states,

or

they approximate to the so-called constitutional govern And in ment, and therefore need no separate discussion. fact the

conclusion at which

we

arrive respecting all these

forms rests upon the same grounds. said in the Ethics J that the happy to life

unimpeded virtue, and that which is in a mean, and in 1

N. Eth.

vii.

For

virtue a 13.

is

mean 2.

if

is

life

it

the

has been truly 3 life

according

a mean,

then the

attainable

by every

The

1(58

IV. 11 1295

b

must be the

one,

Now

4

to cities

a figure the

is in

in

And

best.

and vice apply both constitution

of the Middle Class

T^ule

and a third

one class

;

a mean.

in

in

to

ready

the gifts of fortune

clearly be best to possess

will

it

moderation

;

listen

for

that

in

life

But he who

reason.

to

condition of

men

is

very poor, or very weak, or very

follow reason

difficult to

into violent

Of

2 .

much

The

disgraced, finds

or

civil,

it

these two the one sort

grow rogues and

and great criminals, the others into And two sorts of offences correspond

rogues

petty

military

in

hand who

petty rascals.

the one committed

most

are

greatly excels

beauty, strength, birth or wealth, or on the other

them

to

8 ,

from violence, the other from roguery. are disinclined to hold office, whether

and

two

these

their aversion to

duties

is

great an injury to the state as their tendency to crime.

as

6 Again, those

who have

wealth,

strength,

too

friends,

much of

and

when they

for

The

evil

willing

home

begins at

are boys, by reason of the luxury in

they are brought up habit of obedience. are in

the goods of fortune,

the like, are neither

nor able to submit to authority.

7

is

It

admitted that moderation and the mean are best, and there

fore

5

for the

;

*.

states there are three elements

all

of virtue

criteria

constitutions

to

of the city

life

very rich, another very poor, is

same

the

and

*,

they never learn, even

On

at

school, the

the other hand, the very poor,

So

the opposite extreme, are too degraded.

:

which

who

that the

one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically ; the other knows not how to command and must be ruled like slaves.

and

Thus

1

Cp. 3

arises a city, not

slaves, the iii.

Laws,

3. viii

of freemen, but of masters

one despising, the other envying 7, 8.

831

E.

2 4

Cp.

PI.

Cp.

v. 9.

Rep.

;

iv.

13.

and nothing 421

c,

D

ff.

The can be more than this

to friendship

fatal

for

:

of the Middle Class

J^ule

and good fellowship

good fellowship tends

to friendship

;

in states

IV. 11

when men

they would rather not even 8 city ought to be composed, as far

are at enmity with one another,

same

share the

But a

path.

and

as possible, of equals

middle

of middle-class are, as

we

similars

citizens

is

necessarily best governed

say, the natural elements of a state.

the class of citizens which

do

and these are generally the city which is composed

;

Wherefore the

classes.

is

most secure

;

they

this is

in a state, for

they

goods nor do 9 as the poor covet the goods of the rich ;

not, like the poor, covet their

others covet theirs,

And

neighbours

;

and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves life

plotted against, they pass through

safely.

Wisely then

did Phocylides pray things are best

Many

a middle condition in

Thus

it

formed by

is

my

in

mean

the

of

manifest that the best political community is 10 of the middle class, and that those states

citizens

and larger

large,

to be

city.

are likely to be well-administered, in is

I desire

;

if possible

or at any rate than either

which the middle

class

than both the other classes,

singly

;

for

the addition of the

scale, and prevents either of the Great then is the good extremes from being dominant. fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and

middle

class

sufficient

turns the

property

a

pure

extreme

;

oligarchy

;

where some possess much, and the 1296 may arise an extreme democracy, or

for

there

others nothing,

n

or a

tyranny

may grow

out

of either

most rampant democracy, or out not so likely to arise out of a middle

either out of the

of an oligarchy

;

but

it is

and nearly equal condition.

I will explain

the reason of this 12

a

The Middle

170 IV. 11

when

Class is rarely

Supreme The

hereafter, speak of the revolutions of states *. mean condition of states is clearly best, for no other

from faction

I

and where the middle class

;

large, there

is

For a

and dissensions.

13 are least likely to be factions

free

is

similar

reason large states are less liable to faction than small ones, because in them the middle class is large ; whereas in small states

it is

easy to divide

are either rich or poor,

*4

And

democracies

all

and

are

the citizens into

safer

2

two

and

have a middle class which

oligarchies, because they

who

classes

nothing in the middle. more permanent than

to leave

more

is

numerous and has a greater share in the government for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an ;

A

15 end. is

that

tion

proof

of the

superiority

of

middle

the

class

legislators have been of a middle condi and for example, Solon, as his own verses testify

the best

;

;

Lycurgus, for he was not a king

;

and Charondas, and almost

all legislators. 1

6

These

considerations will help us to understand are

governments reason

is

party,

transgresses the

17

to itself,

There

is

why most The

democratical or oligarchical.

that the middle class is

and whichever

ment

either

whether the

seldom numerous rich or the

in

common

them,

people,

mean and predominates, draws the govern

and thus

another reason

arises either oligarchy or

democracy.

the poor and the rich quarrel with

one another, and whichever side gets the

better, instead

of

establishing a just or

T

g

popular government, regards political supremacy as the prize of victory, and the one party sets up a democracy and the other an Both the parties oligarchy.

which had the supremacy 1

Cp. Bk.

v.

in

Hellas a

Cp.

looked v.

i.

only to the

15;

7.

6.

The Goodwill of interest

of their

the

171

Stronger

own form of government, and

established in

states, the one, democracies, and the other, oligarchies

thought of their

own

advantage, of the public not at

IV. 11

they

;

For

all.

19

these reasons the middle form of government has rarely, if

who

all

One man

and among a very few only. was induced

ever, existed,

ever ruled in Hellas

But

constitution to states.

has

it

now become

seeking for dominion,

if

or,

middle

among 1296 men

a habit

the citizens of states, not even to care about equality are

alone of

to give this

all

;

are willing to

conquered,

submit.

What

then

the best,

it

there are

is

the best form of government, and

evident

is

;

and of other

many kinds of democracy and many of

not difficult to see which has the

is

or any other place

in

nearest

to

which

that

is

the

best

furthest

absolutely and

not

For

must of necessity be from

it

worse,

to

relatively

say that

oligarchy,

it

and which the second

the best.

is

relatively to given conditions,

may

first

what makes ao

we

now

the order of excellence,

we have determined which is

states, since

if

we

that

which ai

that

and

better,

are

judging

given conditions

I

:

say

since a particular government

be preferable for some, but another form

may

be better

for others.

We ment

have

is

now

suitable to

by assuming,

to consider

what and what kind of govern- 12

what and what kind of men.

as a general principle

common

I

may

to all

begin

govern

ments, that the portion of the state which desires permanence ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse.

Now

is composed of quality and quantity. By mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by

every city

quality

I

numbers. quantity, superiority of the classes

which make up the

Quality state,

may

exist in one of

and quantity

in

the

a

b

The Goodwill of

172 IV. 12

For example,

other.

the

the

Stronger

meanly-born

may be more

in

number than the well-born, or the poor than the rich, yet they may not so much exceed in quantity as they fall short in and therefore there must be a comparison of quantity Where the number of the poor is more than quality.

3 quality

and

;

proportioned to the wealth of the rich, there will naturally be a democracy, varying in form with the sort of people who If, for example, the husbandmen compose it in each case. exceed in number, the first form of democracy will then

arise

;

if

the artisans and labouring class, the last

the intermediate forms.

exceed

in

quality

But where the

more than they

rich

;

and so with

and the notables

short in quantity, there

fall

oligarchy arises, similarly assuming various forms according to the kind of superiority possessed

The

4

by the oligarchs.

always include the middle class in he makes his laws oligarchical, to the

legislator should

his

government; if middle class let him look

;

if

he makes them democratical,

he should equally by his laws try the state

1

There only can

.

1

to attach this class to

the government ever be stable

1297 a where the middle class exceeds one or both of the others, and 5 in that case

there will be no fear that the rich will unite with

the poor against the rulers. willing to serve the other,

government more than

this, for

For and

if

neither of

them

will ever

be

they look for some form of

suitable to both, they will

find

none better

the rich and the poor will never consent to rale

The arbiter is turn, because they mistrust one another. always the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an 6 arbiter. The more perfect the admixture of the political in

elements, the 1

Or,

if

to his laws.

more

lasting will be the state.

irpoadytaOai can govern Tofs

vuftots,

to

Many win

even of

this class

over

The who

those

form

desire to

much power

to the rich, but

There comes

attempting to overreach the people.

when

governments make IV. 12

aristocratical

a mistake, not only in giving too in

173

of Oligarchies

Policy

out of a false good there arises a true

evil,

a time

since the

encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the

state

than those of the people. The devices by which oligarchies deceive the people are five in number; they relate to (l) the assembly; (2) the magistracies; (3) the courts of law; (4) the use of arms (5)

gymnastic exercises. to

open

As

either

much

or a

attendance, (2)

but

all,

the

to

The

(l)

the

rich

larger

who

those

magistracies,

non-

fined for

are

inflicted

is

are

;

thrown

assemblies are

only

fine

13

upon

them.

by

qualified

2

property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poor may. (3) In the law-courts the rich, and the rich only, are fined if they do not serve, the poor are let off with impunity, or, as in the laws of Charondas, a large fine

and

rich,

citizens

one on

a smaller

who

the

inflicted

some

on the

states all 3

have registered themselves are allowed to attend

the assembly and to try causes

do not attend

is

In

poor.

;

but

if after registration

they

assembly or at the courts, heavy fines are The intention is that through fear imposed upon them. of the fines they may avoid registering themselves, and then cannot

they

in the

in

sit

the

law-courts

(4) Concerning the possession

or

in

the

assembly.

of arms, and (5) gymnastic 4

exercises, they legislate in a similar spirit.

For

the poor are

not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not having

them for

;

and

in like

manner no penalty

non-attendance

having nothing to are liable to a fine,

at

fear,

is inflicted

on the poor

gymnasium, and consequently, do not attend, whereas the rich they the

and therefore they take care to attend.

174 Military Basis of These

IV. 13

of oligarchical

devices

the

are

the Constitution

democracies they have counter devices.

5 in

no

on

penalty

the

who would

obvious that he

pay the poor

assemblies and the law-courts, and they

attending the

for

6 inflict

and

legislators,

They

rich

duly

non-attendance.

for

mix

the

two

It

is

principles should

combine the practice of both, and provide that the poor should be paid to attend, and the rich fined if they do not attend, for then

take part

all will

;

no such combina-

if there is

1297 b tion, power will be in the hands of one party only. ? government should be confined to those who carry arms.

The

no absolute rule can be

laid

to

the

property qualification,

down, but we must see what

is

the highest

sufficiently comprehensive to secure that the

who

As

qualification

number of those

have the rights of citizens exceeds the number of those Even if they have no share in office, the poor,

8 excluded.

provided only that they are not outraged or deprived of their property, will be quiet enough.

But

to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy

is not always humane. And of war the poor are apt to hesitate unless they are fed

9 thing, since a ruling class

fed, they

are is

government serving,

enough

willing

those

in

In

fight.

not only in

vested,

but also

to

those

who have

some

who

served

time

in

when

;

states the

are actually

;

among

the

example, the governing body consisted of the while the magistrates were chosen from those actually

Malians, for latter,

10

on

service.

And

the earliest government which existed

among

the Hellenes, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the

up

knights

(for

strength

depended on cavalry

*)

1

Cp.

and superiority ;

indeed,

iv. 3.

3:

in

war

at

that

time

without discipline, infantry vi - 7-

!

The

Power 17?

Distribution of Political

are useless, and in ancient times there

ledge or tactics, and therefore

But when

in their cavalry.

the

cities

was no

military

know- IV. 13

strength of armies lay increased and the heavy

armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government ; and this is the reason why the states, which we call con-

n

governments, have been hitherto called democracies. Ancient constitutions, as might be expected, were oligarchical stitutional

and royal ; their population being small they had no consider able middle class ; the people were weak in numbers and and

organization,

were therefore

more

contented

to

be

governed. I

have explained

ment, and

why

there are

why

there are various forms of govern-

more than

is

generally supposed

r2

;

for democracy, as well as other constitutions, has more than one form : also what their differences are, and whence they arise, and what is the best form of government, speaking

generally,

and

are best suited

whom

to ;

all

this

the various

Having thus gained an appropriate will

proceed to

order.

We

explained.

basis of discussion

we 14

speak of the points which follow next in

will consider the subject not only in general but

with reference

to

elements, and

the

particular states.

expedient for each state is

forms of government

now been

has

All

good law-giver has

states

to

have three

regard

what

is

When

they are well-ordered, the well-ordered, and as they differ from one another, state.

What

element first (i) which secondly (2) which is concerned with the magistrates and determines what they should be, over whom they should exercise authority, and what constitutions differ.

should be the

has

judicial

mode of

power

?

the

is

deliberates about public affairs

a

;

electing

them; and

thirdly (3)

which

3

Forms of the Deliberative Power

IT 6

The

IV. 14

deliberative element has authority

and peace, inflicts

in

making and unmaking alliances

in

death,

exile,

confiscation,

audits

matters of war

;

it

the

passes laws,

accounts

of

All these powers must be assigned either to all magistrates. the citizens or to some of them, for example, to one or more magistracies 4

;

some of them

or different causes to different magistracies, or to all, and others of them only to some. That

all things should be decided by all is characteristic of this is the sort of democracy equality which the people desire. But there are various ways in which all may share ;

in the

government

they

;

may

one body,

deliberate, not all in

but by turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian.

There

are

meet and

other states in which the boards of magistrates but come into office by turns, and are

deliberate,

elected out of the tribes and the very smallest divisions of

one has obtained

the state, until every

The

citizens,

on

the other

hand,

are

office

in his

turn.

assembled only

for

purposes of legislation, and to consult about the conand to hear the edicts of the magistrates. In stitution,

the 5

another variety of democracy the citizens form one assembly, but meet only to elect magistrates, to

make

about war and peace, and to

are referred severally to special magistrates,

6 by

vote or

citizens

by

lot

meet about

out

of

all

the citizens.

election to offices

deliberate concerning

war or

Other matters

who Or

and about

alliances,

to advise

pass laws,

scrutinies.

are elected again,

the

scrutinies,

and

while other matters are

administered by the magistrates, who, as far as is possible, are elected by vote *. I am speaking of those magistracies in 7

which

special

democracy

is

knowledge

when

all 1

is

required.

A

fourth

form

of

the citizens meet to deliberate about Cp.

vi. 2.

5.

In Democracies and Oligarchies

177

everything, and the magistrates decide nothing, but only

the preliminary enquiries

and that

;

is

the

way

in

make IV. 14

which the

and worst form of democracy, corresponding, as we maintain, to the close family oligarchy and to tyranny, is

last

All these modes are democratical.

present administered.

at

On

the other hand, that

This again

oligarchical. cratical,

has

many

a

deliberate about

mode which,

When

forms.

elected out of those

some should is

who have

like the

all is

demo-

8

the deliberative class, being

a moderate qualification, are

numerous and they respect and obey the law without alter ing it, and any one who has the required qualification shares government, then, just because of this moderation, the oligarchy inclines towards polity. But when only selected in- 1298 b dividuals and not the whole people share in the deliberations

in the

of the the

state, then,

law, the

although, as in the former case, they observe a pure oligarchy.

is

Or, again, 9 of deliberation are selfpower elected, and son succeeds father, and they and not the laws are supreme the government is of necessity oligarchical.

government

when those who have

Where,

the

again, particular persons

matters

for example,

when

have authority

in particular 10

the whole people decide about

peace and war and hold scrutinies, but the magistrates regulate everything else, and they are elected either by vote or by lot there

And by

*

the form of government

if

vote,

some questions

are

is

an aristocracy or polity

and others by magistrates elected by

absolutely or out of select candidates,

vote and by lot 1

*.

decided by magistrates elected lot,

either

or elected both by

these practices are partly characteristic of an

Reading with several of the MSS. apiaroKparia rj ttoXntia, and (Jiiv. Or, with Bekker s text, apiaroKparia p\v r) no\tr(io,

omitting

the government DAVIS

is

an aristocracy.

N

In Democracies and Oligarchies

178 IV. 14

aristocratical

government, and partly of

pure constitutional

a

government.

These

1 1

are the various forms of the deliberative

body

;

they

And the correspond to the various forms of government. of each state is administered according to one or government 1

2

Now

other of the principles which have been laid down.

of democracy,

the interest

for

is

to

the

it

most

according speaking of that extreme form of which the people are supreme even over the

prevalent notion of

it

(I

am

democracy, in laws), with a view to better deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting courts of law. For in oligarchies the rich

who

are

wanted

under pain of a

And

attend.

to

fine,

to be judges are

compelled to attend democracies the poor are paid practice of oligarchies should be

whereas this

adopted by democracies will advise better if

plan that

good

by

those all,

those

;

who have

But

lot.

many

in

as

who

should

deliberate

the people It is also

be elected

appointed

pay should not be given to

would balance the number of the

number

in

excess should be eliminated

oligarchies either certain persons should be

chosen out of the mass,

probuli

deliberate together

political training,

but only to as

notables, or that the 14 by

all

or by lot in equal numbers out of the different and that if the people greatly exceed in number

vote

classes

assemblies, for they

in their public

they

and the notables with the people.

13 with the notables

a

in

such as exist

or in

a

class

some

and guardians of the law

of

states, ;

officers

who

should be are

termed

and the citizens should

occupy themselves exclusively with matters on which these have previously deliberated for so the people will have ;

a share in the deliberations of the state,

*5 to

disturb

the

principles

of the

but will not be able

constitution.

Again,

in

The Executive

179

either the people ought to accept the measures of the government, or not to pass anything contrary to them ; or, if all are allowed to share in counsel, the decision should

oligarchies

The

with the magistrates.

rest

opposite of what

done

is

IV. 14

in

governments should be the rule in oligarchies ; the veto of the majority should be final, their assent not final, constitutional

should be referred back to the magistrates.

jut the proposal

Whereas course

governments they take the contrary 16

in constitutional

the few have the negative not the affirmative power

;

;

the affirmation of everything rests with the multitude.

1299 a

These, then, are our conclusions respecting the deliberative, that

the supreme element in states.

is,

Next we offices

;

will

this, too,

to

proceed

the

consider

distribution

being a part of politics concerning

What

many

questions arise

what

shall they preside,

:

shall their

and what

shall

number be

?

of 15

which

Over

be their duration

?

Sometimes they last for six months, sometimes for less ; sometimes they are annual, whilst in other cases offices are held for

still

Shall they be

longer periods.

a long term of years

for life or for

a short term only, shall the same persons hold them over and over again, or once Also about the appointment to them from whom only ? are they to be first

chosen,

be in a position to

them, and then

if for

or,

;

by whom, and how ? say what are the possible

we may

suited to different forms

of government. offices

quite so easily answered.

For

many

;

?

varieties

But what

That

a political

and not every one who

by

lot is

to be regarded as a ruler.

are

the

who must

priests,

should

proceed to determine which

included under the term

officers

We

is

is

2

are to be

a question not

community requires chosen by vote or

In the

be distinguished

N

of are

first

place there

from

political

2

What

i8o IV. 15

officers

an

Office?

masters of choruses and heralds, even ambassadors,

;

3 are elected

Some

Constitutes

by vote [but

they are not political officers]

still

duties of superintendence again are political, extending

either

to

the citizens

all

a single sphere of action,

in

like

the office of the general who superintends them when they are in the field, or to a section of them only, like the

women

of

inspectorships

of youth.

or

Other

are

offices

concerned with household management, like that of the corn measurers who exist in many states and are elected officers

There

to

Speaking

which the duties

rich have executed

which the

are also menial offices

4 their slaves.

by

generally, they are to be called offices

are assigned of deliberating about certain

measures and of judging and commanding, especially the last; for to command is the especial duty of a magistrate. But the question is not of any importance in practice ; no one has ever brought into court the meaning of the word, although such problems have a speculative interest.

What

5

kinds of

offices,

and how many, are necessary to the

existence of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet conduce to

its

well-being,

6 affecting

much more important more

it

For

in

is

numerous, many may hold vacancies occur in

the office

is

some

office.

held once only

;

And

attention of the worker.

But

so

it

happens that

only after long intervals, or

offices

and certainly every work is 1 and not the divided,

1299 b better done which receives of the sole 7

considerations,

especially small ones.

possible, and indeed necessary, that every should have a special function ; where the citizens are

great states office

are

states, but

all

in

,

small states

it

is

necessary

2 since the small combine many offices in a few hands number of citizens does not admit of many holding office

to

,

:

1

Cp.

ii.

a.

6,

2

Cp.

vi. 8.

What for

who

is

for

same

offices

Hence

there

is

?

1 8 1

And

?

and laws

want them

that the one

after long intervals.

of many

Office

be to succeed them

will there

states at times require the

the difference

an

Constitutes

yet

small

as large ones

IV. 15

;

often, the others only

no reason

why

the care 8

should not be imposed on the same person, not interfere with each other. When the

offices

they will is

population

small, offices should be like the spits

serve to hold a lamp

We

1 .

must

first

which

ascertain

magistrates are necessary in every state, and also

also

how many how many

not exactly necessary, but are nevertheless useful, and then there will be no difficulty in judging what offices can be are

combined

We

in one.

should also

are to have jurisdiction over

many

know when

local tribunals

different matters,

9

and when

should be centralized

: for example, should one in the market and another in some other order person keep or should the same person be responsible everywhere ? place, Again, should offices be divided according to the subjects

authority

with which they deal, or according to the persons with whom I mean to say, should one person see to good they deal :

order in general, or one look after the boys, another after the

women, and so on the

should

example,

in

democracy,

there be

should

Further, under different constitutions, be the same or different ? For

?

magistrates

oligarchy,

aristocracy,

monarchy,

same magistrates,

the

although they are elected, not out of equal or similar classes of citizens, but different constitutions in aristocracies, for differently under example, they are chosen from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, and in democracies from the free or are -.here

different offices proper

1

Cp. Note on

i.

a.

"to

different constitutions 2 ,

a

3.

See note.

and

i

1

The Executive under

82

IV. 15 may For

the same be suitable to some, but unsuitable to others

some

in

states

it

may

should have a more extensive, 11 sphere.

are

offices

Special

?

be convenient that the same office other

in

states

peculiar

narrower

a

forms

certain

to

of

for example, that of probuli, government [to oligarchies] which is not a democratic office, although a bule or council is. :

There must be some body of men whose duty measures for the people

from

their business

;

both

is

to prepare

not be diverted

these are few in number, the state

or rather the probuli must always be

exist in

institutions

on the council

;

a

But when

state, the probuli are a check

for the counsellor is a democratic element,

council disappears

j

:

may

and are therefore an oligarchical element.

but the probuli are

1300

order that they

when

inclines to an oligarchy

12 few,

in

Even the power of the

oligarchical.

when democracy has

taken that extreme

form, in which the people themselves are always meeting and This is the case when the 3 deliberating about everything. a

members of the assembly

are wealthy or receive pay for they have nothing to do and are always holding assemblies and deciding everything for themselves. magistracy which controls the boys or the women, or any similar office, is ;

A

suited to an aristocracy rather than to a

democracy

;

for

how

can the magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors ? Neither is it an oligarchical office ; for the

wives of the oligarchs are too fine to be controlled. 14

Enough of

these matters.

appointment of

offices.

I

There

now

will

three

are

enquire into the

questions

to

be

answered, and the combinations of answers give all possible differences first, who appoints ? secondly, from whom ? and :

15 thirdly,

three

how?

ways:

Each of

these three

(i) All the citizens,

or

may

further

only some,

differ

in

appoint;

Different Constitutions

183

(2) Either the magistrates are chosen out of

some who or

by

are distinguished either

or

birth,

or

merit,

all

or out of

IV. 15

a property qualification,

some

for

reason,

special

who had

only those were eligible

Megara

by

as

at

returned from exile

and fought together against the democracy

They may

(3)

;

be appointed either by vote or by lot. Again, these several 16 modes may be combined ; I mean that some officers may be all, and some again out of some, and some by vote and others by all, of these differences admits of four variations.

elected by some, others by

and others out of

Each

lot.

(i) Either all

lot

by

;

all

elect out

may

and either out of

for example,

by

all

by vote, or

collectively or

and wards, and

tribes,

citizens have been

all

of

gone through

be elected by vote, and

some

appoint, they

in

may

some by

as,

may be

in

some cases they may

lot.

Again, (2)

appoint out of

all

by

vote,

if

only 18

or out

some by lot, and one way and some in another ; I mean if they are appointed by all they may be Thus there will appointed partly by vote and partly by lot be twelve forms of appointment without including the two of

all

by

some

lot

;

offices

or out of

some by

by sections,

or the citizens

;

17

out of

phratries, until all the

cases eligible indiscriminately, and in

all

all

vote, out of

be appointed

may

in

1

.

combinations

in the

mode of

election.

are democratic forms, namely,

the people out of say,

all

by vote or by

Of these

the choice lot,

is

varieties

two 19

made by

or by both, that

is

all

to

and some by vote. The cases in which they appoint at one time, but some appoint out of all or

some by

do not

all

when

lot

some by vote or by lot or by both (I mean some by and some by vote), or some out of all and others out

out of lot 1

i.

partly

e.

by

partly out of

all

lot (see infra c.

and partly out of some, and partly by vote and 16.

6).

The Executive

184 IV. 15 of some both by

and

lot

vote, are characteristic

out of

more

all

by vote or by

oligarchical

some out of some, 1

300 blot,

lot or

by both,

when some

is

oligarchical,

from

are elected

That some should be

from some.

of a polity or

That some should be appointed

20 constitutional government.

elected

all

and

still

and some

out of

all

and

some by vote and others by

or again

of a constitutional government, which an aristocracy. That some should be chosen out of some, and some taken by lot out of some, is oligarchical 1 l though not equally oligarchical ; oligarchical, too, is the characteristic

is

21 inclines to

appointment of some out of some in both ways, and of some out of all. But that all should elect by vote out of some is aristocratical.

These

22

and

in

ways of

are the different

manner

this

constituting magistrates,

correspond to

officers

different

forms

of government : which are proper to which, or how they ought to be established, will be evident when we determine the nature of their powers

2

By powers

.

mean such power

I

as a magistrate exercises over the revenue or in defence of

the country

;

for there are various kinds of

of the general, for example,

is

power

:

the power

not the same with that which

regulates contracts in the market.

Of

16 to

the three parts of government,

considered, and

be

There

this

we

shall

the

judicial

divide on

remains

the

same

the varieties points on which principle. the persons from whom they are of law-courts depend appointed, the matters with which they are concerned, and the

manner of taken from 1

2

are three

their appointment. all,

or from

I

some only

mean, (l) are the judges (2) how many kinds of

?

are bracketed by Bekker in both editions. Omitting noi with some MSS. and the old translator.

These words

Different

Modes of Appointing Judges

185*

law-courts are there? (3) are the judges chosen by vote or lot

by

IV. 16

?

let

First,

there are.

me

determine

They

how many

are eight in

number

kinds of law-courts

One

:

2

the court of

is

a second takes cognizance of [ordinary] offences against the state ; a third is concerned with treason

audits or scrutinies

;

against the

government; the fourth determines disputes re specting penalties, whether raised by magistrates or by private persons ; the fifth decides the more important civil cases ; the sixth tries cases of homicide, which are of various kinds, 3 (a) premeditated, (&) unpremeditated, (c) cases

confessed but the justice

guilt is

is

in

which the

and there may have fled from

disputed be a fourth court (d) in which murderers who justice are tried after their return ; such as the Court of

Phreatto

is

;

But cases of

said to be at Athens.

this

sort

The different kinds happen at all even in large cities. of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different courts. of these there 4 (7) There are courts for strangers : rarely

are

two

subdivisions, (a) for the settlement of their disputes

with one another, (b) for the settlement of disputes between them and the citizens. And besides all these there must be (8) courts for small suits about

drachmas, or a

little

they do not require

sums of a drachma up

more, which have

many

to five

to be determined, but

judges.

Nothing more need be said of these small suits, nor of the courts for homicide and for strangers I would rather speak :

of

political cases,

which, when mismanaged, create division and

disturbances in states.

Now which

if all

the citizens judge, in

all

the different cases

have distinguished, they may be appointed by vote or by lot, or sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote. Or I

5

6

1 8

IV. 16 when

Different certain

a

Modes of Appointing Judges who

class of causes are tried, the judges

de

them may be appointed, some by vote, and some by lot. These then are the four modes of appointing judges from the cide

1301

a

6

whole people, and there will be likewise four modes, if they from a part only for they may be appointed from

are elected

;

some by vote and judge in all causes or they may be or they appointed from some by lot and judge in all causes ;

;

may be

elected in

by

or

lot,

some

some cases by

vote,

and

in

when judging

courts, even

some cases taken same

the

causes,

be composed of members some appointed by vote and some by lot. These then are the ways in which the aforesaid

may

may be appointed. Once more, the modes of appointment may

judges 7

be combined,

some may be chosen out of the whole people, for example, the others out of some, some out of both same tribunal may be composed of some who were elected I

mean, that

;

out of

all,

and of others who were elected out of some, either

by vote or by lot or by both. In how many forms law-courts can be established has 8 been considered.

The

first

form,

judges are taken from all the causes are tried, is democratical

posed of a few only third, in

some from tional.

who

which some courts certain

try

viz.

that

citizens, ;

and

in

which

the second, which

all

causes,

are taken

all

classes only, aristocratical

all

com

is

oligarchical

from

now

which the

in

;

classes,

the

and

and constitu

BOOK V THE

design which l

completed

.

Next

we

in

proposed to ourselves

now

is

nearly

V.

order follow the causes of revolution

states, how many, and of what nature they are ; what elements work ruin in particular states, and out of what, and

in

into

what they mostly change

;

also

what are the elements of

preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and

by what means each state may be best preserved questions remain to be considered. In the

first

place

we must assume

as

:

these

our starting-point

2

many forms of government which have sprung up 2 there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and that in the

proportionate

equality,

although

mankind

in

fail

attaining

have already explained 3 them, Democracy, 3 for example, arises out of the notion that those who are as indeed

I

.

equal in any respect are equal in

all

respects

;

because

are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. is

based on the notion that those

respect are in

all

respects unequal

;

who

men

Oligarchy in one

are unequal

being unequal, that

is,

in

property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely.

The

democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be 4 1

8

Cp.

iv. c. 2.

Reading xai with the MSS. and Bekker

8

Cp.

iii.

9.

1-4.

s

1st ed.

1

1 8 8

V.

Devolutions

1 equal in

all

they are

things

unequal,

their Causes

.-

while the oligarchs, under the idea that much, which is one form of

;

claim too

All these forms of government have

5 inequality.

kind of

a

by an absolute standard, they are faulty ; both parties, whenever their share in the

tried justice, but,

and,

therefore,

government does not accord with

their preconceived

ideas,

6 stir Those who excel in virtue have the best up revolution. 1301 b r jght of all to rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed 1

absolutely unequal)

do so

to

7 inclined

claimed by

but then they are of

,

2

There

.

men of rank

;

is

all

men

a superiority

also

the least

which

is

for they are thought noble because

z Here they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors 8 then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains .

of revolution

ments

and hence

;

arise

two

sorts of changes in govern

when men seek

the one affecting the constitution,

;

to

change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into demo

from

cracy, or

either of

them

aristocracy, and conversely

;

into constitutional

government or

the other not affecting the con

stitution, when, without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get 4 9 the administration into their own hands Further, there is .

a question of degree

more or cratical

an oligarchy, for example,

;

may become

and a democracy more or less demomanner the characteristics of the other

less oligarchical,

and

;

in like

forms of government

may be more or less strictly maintained. may be directed against a portion of the

10 Or, the revolution constitution a

1

3

e. g.

only,

particular

Cp. Cp.

office

:

iii.

13.

iv.

8.

as

the at

is

it

2

25. 9.

or

establishment

Sparta

Cp. Cp.

overthrow of

said that c.

4.

iv. 5.

12. 3.

Lysander

The Desire of Equality

189

attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausanias

At

the ephoralty.

For

Epidamnus,

change was

too, the

but

;

members of the

to

this

who

1

was

day the magistrates are the only

ruling class

V.

partial.

instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a council

appointed

1

1 1

go to the and the office of the

are compelled to

Heliaea when an election takes place, 2 single archon [survives, which] is another oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an in

which there

no proportion, for instance, a per petual monarchy among equals ; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion. equality in

Now by the

equality is of

first

I

is

two kinds, numerical and proportional or equality in number or size

mean sameness

by the second, equality of three

over two

is

ratios.

equal to the

whereas four exceeds two exceeds one, for two

13

;

For example, the excess of excess of two over one ;

in the

same

ratio

in

which two

the same part of four that one

is

;

is

of

As I was saying before 3, men agree 13 two, namely, the half. about justice in the abstract, that it is treating others according of opinion about the

to their deserts, but there is a difference

application of the principle

;

some think

that if they are equal

any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are Hence there 14 unequal in any respect they are unequal in all.

in

are

two

garchy

for

numbers are a

democracy and oli good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and 1302 a more common. In what city shall we find

principal forms of government,

;

hundred persons of good birth and of

poor everywhere abound.

That

virtue

?

whereas the

should be ordered, to either kind of equality, is not and wholly, according simply 1

Cp.

vii.

a

*

20.

14. 8

CP

.

state

2j

iii.

9.

Cp.

iii.

1-4.

16.

i.

1

V.

The Great Source of Involution

90

1 a 15

good thing the proof is the fact that such forms of government never last. They are originally based on a mistake, and, ;

as they begin badly, cannot

to

fail

end badly.

is

that both kinds of equality should be

in

some Still

and proportionate

cases,

democracy

For

.

;

inference

numerical

in others.

appears to be safer

16 lution than oligarchy

The

employed

and

in oligarchies

less liable to revo-

2

there

the double

is

danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also 3 with the people ; but in democracies there is only the danger

of a quarrel with the oligarchs. tioning arises

among

No

dissension worth

the people themselves.

further remark that a government

which

is

men

And we may

composed of the

middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to 4 and is the safest of the imperfect forms of oligarchy ,

government. 2 In considering arise,

we must

how

of them which

a

number

We

of each.

dissensions and political

all

want

revolutions

and causes

ascertain the beginnings

affect constitutions generally.

said to be three in line

of

first

and we have now

;

know

to

what

(l)

They may

be

to give an out

the feeling

is

?

and (2) what are the motives of those who make them ? The (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels ? universal

and chief cause of

already mentioned

;

this revolutionary feeling has been

viz. the desire

that they are equal to others or, again,

who

of equality, when

men

think

have more than themselves;

the desire of inequality and superiority,

when con

ceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have 3 not

more but the same or

1

3

Cp. Cp.

iv.

ii.

c. 5.

than their inferiors

less

which may and may not be

just. -

Cp.

14.

;

pretensions

Inferiors revolt in order c. 6.

4

Omitting

17

before

ruv

6\iycui>.

191

Devolutions may be

that they

Such

is

equal,

the state of

and equals that they may be superior. V. 2

mind which

The

creates revolutions.

motives for making them are the desire of gain and honour, the authors of them want or the fear of dishonour and loss ;

to divert

The

friends.

positions I

punishment or dishonour from themselves or their causes and reasons of these motives and dis- 4

men, about the things which one way, may be regarded as another as more than seven. Two of them 5

which

are excited in

have mentioned, viewed

seven, and in

have

been

already

men

manner, for

in

noticed

:

but

;

of gain and honour

different

they act in a

are excited against one another not, as in the

case

which

by the love have just

I

supposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, but at seeing 1302 b others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them.

Other causes

are 6

insolence, fear, love of superiority, contempt, disproportionate

increase in

some

part of the state

election intrigues, carelessness,

causes of another sort are

;

neglect about

trifles,

dissimi

of elements.

larity

What

share insolence and avarice have in creating revolu-

how

and

tions,

they work,

is

plain

magistrates are insolent and grasping

enough.

When

3

the

they conspire against

one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public. influence

who

honour exerts and how

It is evident, it is

are themselves dishonoured

honours deserved

rise in rebellion is

unjust,

;

again,

what an

a cause of revolution.

and who see others obtaining when un

the honour or dishonour

and just when awarded according

to

Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the

merit.

1

3

Men

Supra

2, 3.

3

1

V. 3

Causes of Devolutions

92

state

and the power of the government

;

this

is

a condition of

out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family

affairs

And,

oligarchy.

some

in

therefore,

as

places,

at

Athens

But how and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism *. much better to provide from the first that there should be no such pre-eminent individuals instead of into existence and then finding a remedy.

Another cause of

4

revolution

is

fear.

letting

them come

Either

men have

committed wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating their

2

enemy

Thus

.

Rhodes

at

the

notables

conspired

against the people through fear of the suits that were brought

them.

5 against

revolution

Contempt for

;

have no share

example, in

also a cause of insurrection

is

in

and

when those who

oligarchies

the state are the

majority, they revolt, because they think that they are the stronger. Or, again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state ; at Thebes, for example, where, after the battle of

Oenophyta, the bad administration of the democracy led to At Megara the fall of the democracy was due its ruin. to

a defeat occasioned

by disorder and anarchy.

And

at

Syracuse the democracy was overthrown before the tyranny of Gelo arose ; at Rhodes before the insurrection. 6

revolutions

Political

also

spring from a

increase in any part of the state.

a

disproportionate

as a

body

many members, and every member

up of

1303

For

proportion

its

nature if

,

body two spans 1

Cp.

made

grow ought symmetry may be preserved, but loses the foot be four cubits long and the rest of the 3

in

is

to

that

;

and, should the abnormal increase be one of 2

iii.

13.

Cp.

15. 3

Cp.

iii,

13.

21.

c.

5.

2,

Occasions of Devolutions well

quality as

another animal

even so a state has

:

some one may

often

number of poor

in

grow imperceptibly

democracies and

And

this disproportion

as at

Tarentum, from a defeat

were

slain

Persian

a

in

a

with

the lapygians

constitutional

democracy

for example,

;

or, as

;

after the losses inflicted in

the

constitutional states.

in

may sometimes happen by in which many of

battle

War, the

becoming

may even take the form of V. 3 many parts, of which

of quantity,

as

193

government

was the case

an accident,

after

just in

at

7

the notables

the

consequence

Argos, where

the Battle of the Seventh

Day

by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, the Argives were com and at pelled to admit to citizenship some of their perioeci :

of their infantry in the Athens, when, times of the Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced in number, because the soldiers had to be taken from the after frequent defeats

of

roll

citizens.

Revolutions

democracies as well as

in other

to so great an extent.

When

arise

from

cause

this

in 8

forms of government, but not the rich

l

grow numerous

or

properties increase, the form of government changes into an

oligarchy or a government of families.

Forms of government

sometimes even

without revolution, owing to election contests, as at Heraea (where, instead of electing also

change

took them by lot, because the electors of choosing their own partisans) or owing when disloyal persons are allowed to find

their magistrates, they

were to

in the habit

carelessness,

their

way

;

into the highest offices, as at

Oreum, where, upon was

the accession of Heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy

overthrown,

and changed by him into a constitutional and

democratical government.

1

Reading

O

tinttipcov.

9

1

V. 3 10

Occasions of Devolutions

94

the

Again, degrees

;

into the

for

was

first,

instance, the

Another cause of

growth of

Hence

the time

at

to

for office,

spirit

it

;

for a state

which do is

foundation or for example,

afterwards, has

the

Achaeans

the foundation of Sybaris,

in

being the more numerous, afterwards expelled them fell

upon

At

Sybaris.

Thurii

quarrelled with their fellow-colonists

;

belonged to them, they wanted too driven out. in

At Byzantium

a conspiracy,

people of Antissa,

not the

a multitude brought together

;

joined the Troezenians

curse

the

the reception of strangers in colonies,

of their

generally produced revolution

12 the

at

the

was much

difference of races

is

common

;

small

For

nothing.

a small qualification

a day, neither is

by accident.

who

accomplished by small change may sometimes slip

qualification

revolution

not at once acquire a

either

be

reduced

eventually

Ambraciots thought that same as none at all. 1 1

may

that a great

constitution through neglect of a small matter

Ambracia, at

revolution

mean

I

the

new

the

;

hence

Sybarites

thinking that the land

much of

it

and were

colonists were detected

and were expelled by force of arms ; the who had received the Chian exiles, fought

with them, and drove them out

and the Zancleans,

;

after

having received the Samians, were driven by them out of The citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, 13 their own city.

of a fresh body of colonists, had a Syracusans, after the expulsion of their

after the introduction

revolution

1303 b

tyrants,

;

the

having admitted

strangers

and mercenaries to the

the rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to blows of received Chalcidian colonists, people Amphipolis, having were nearly all expelled by them. ;

14

Now,

in

oligarchies the masses

make

revolution under the

Occasions of Revolutions

195-

idea that they are unjustly treated, because, as I said before, are

they

and have

equals,

an

not

equal

share,

and

V. 3

in

democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share.

Again, the situation of the country

of the

cities is a

when

cause of revolution

15

not naturally adapted to preserve the unity For example, the Chytrians at Clazomenae did

is

state.

not agree with the people of the island ; and the people of Colophon quarrelled with the Notians ; at Athens, too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are live

For

the city.

in

more democratic than those who

just

as

in

war,

the impediment of 16

though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a a ditch,

The

city.

and vice

greatest opposition

next comes

;

is

confessedly that of virtue

that of wealth

and poverty

there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of

one

is this

which

difference of place.

In revolutions the interests

and

;

are

occasions

stake.

at

Trifles

may are

be

trifling,

but

great

4

most important when

they concern the rulers, as was the case of old at Syracuse ; for the Syracusan constitution was once changed by a lovequarrel of

The

story

his beloved

two young men, who were in the government. that while one of them was away from home

is

was gained over by

his companion,

revenge himself seduced the other s wife. all

the

made

members of the

a revolution.

We

ruling class into learn

from

They

then drew

their quarrel

this story that

we

and

should 3

be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men. The mistake lies in the beginning as the proverb says,

Well begun

is

half done

so an error at the beginning,

O

2

a

and he to

1

V.

9

6

Occasions of

"Revolutions^

4 though quite small, has the proportion of a half to the whole In general, when the notables quarrel, the whole city 4 matter. is involved, as happened in Hestiaea after the Persian War.

The

occasion was

two brothers

division of an

the

inheritance

;

give an account of their

refused to

property and the treasure which he had found

so the poorer

:

of the two quarrelled with him and enlisted

who was

the popular party, the other,

one of father s

in

his cause

very rich, the wealthy

classes.

At

5

1304

a

Delphi,

beginning of

all

again, a quarrel about a marriage was the the troubles which followed. In this case the

bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride, and went away without taking her.

Whereupon her relations, thinking that they were insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure [among his offerings] while he was sacrificing, and then slew him, pretending that At Mitylene, too, a dis

6 he had been robbing the temple. pute about heiresses

and led

their city.

was the beginning of many misfortunes, in which Paches took

war with the Athenians

to the

A

wealthy

citizen,

named Timophanes,

left

two

daughters; Doxander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them his

for

7

but

sons,

he was rejected

in

his

suit,

whereupon

he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians (of similar quarrel about whom he was proxenus) to interfere. an heiress arose at Phocis between Mnaseas the father of

A

Mnason, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus this was the beginning of the Sacred War. marriage-quarrel ;

A

was

also

Epidamnus. to

a

the

cause

A

of a

certain

change

in

the

government of

man

person whose father,

fined the father of the girl,

bethrothed his daughter secretly having been made a magistrate,

and the

latter,

stung by the

insult,

and

Manner of

the

Effecting

Them

197

conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow the

V. 4

state.

Governments

change into oligarchy or into democracy 8

also

or into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or

some other

Thus

section of the state, increase in

Athens

at

the

by the court of seemed to tighten the War,

On

of government.

Salamis

which was

*,

served in the

fleet,

gained

reputation

the Areopagus, in the Persian reins

hand, the victory of

the other

common

gained by the

and won

power or renown.

for the

who

people

Athenians the empire of

the sea, strengthened the democracy.

At Argos,

the notables, 9

having distinguished themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the demo At Syracuse, the people having been the chief cracy. authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed the constitutional government into democracy.

At

the

Phoxus

the

At Ambracia 2

the

uniting

people,

tyrant,

with

the

notables,

and then seized the government.

killed

Chalcis,

,

people, in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in

expelling the tyrant Periander, transferred the government to

And

themselves.

those

who

citizens,

generally,

it

should be remembered that 10

have secured power to the

or

or

magistrates,

tribes,

state,

or

whether private

any other part or

section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions.

For

either

envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others.

when

Revolutions break out

and the poor, 1

8

are

opposite parties, e.g. the rich

equally balanced,

Cp. ii. 12. 5 Cp. supra c. 3.

;

viii.

6.

and there

II.

10, and infra

c.

10.

16.

is

little

n

or 1304 b

Occasions of Revolutions

198

V. 4 nothing between them

;

for, if either

party were manifestly

would not risk an attack upon them. reason, those who are eminent in virtue do not

12 superior, the other

for this

insurrections, being always a minority.

Such

And, stir

up

are the beginnings

and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable. Revolutions are effected fraud.

in

Force may be applied

two ways, by force and by

either at the time of

making the

Fraud, again, is of two kinds ; for the citizens are deceived into a change of sometimes (i) and afterwards government, they are held in subjection against

13 revolution or afterwards.

This was what happened

their will.

Hundred, who

in

the case of the

Four

deceived the people by telling them that the

would provide money for the war against the Lace daemonians, and when the deception was over, still endeavoured king

to retain the government.

persuaded

at

and

first,

(2) In other cases the people are

by

afterwards,

a repetition of the

persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained.

revolutions

which

affect

the above-mentioned causes

5

The

constitutions generally spring from *.

And

now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows from the principles already laid down. Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the in temperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay to

information

combine

men

against rich

common

(for a

until

they compel them

danger unites even the bitterest

enemies), or coming forward in public they

2

stir up the people them. The truth of this is remark against proved by a At Cos the democracy was overthrown variety of examples.

because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. 1

Cp. supra

c.

2.

I.

Revolutions in Democracies At Rhodes

the demagogues not only provided pay for the

but

multitude,

trierarchs the

and they,

in

against them, .

V. 5

them from making good to the sums which had been expended by them ; prevented

consequence of the suits which were brought were compelled to combine and put down the

The democracy

1

democracy

199

at

Heraclea was overthrown 3

shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came

back

in a

Much in 4 body and put an end to the democracy. 2 Megara was overturned ;

the same manner the democracy at there the

demagogues drove out many of the notables

in

order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and engaging and defeating the people, established an oligarchy. The same 1305 a thing happened with the democracy of

states the

Cyme which was

And we may

thrown by Thrasymachus.

over

observe that in most 5

changes have been of this character. For sometimes

the demagogues, in order to curry favour with the people, either wrong the notables and so force them to combine ;

they

make

a division of

their

property, or diminish their

incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate

Of

old, the

8 .

demagogue was

cracies

also a general, and then

Most of

into tyrannies.

demo-

changed were originally demagogues 4 They are not so now, but were then and the reason is that ; they they were generals .

and not

Whereas 1 3

orators, for oratory in

our day,

Cp. supra c. 3. Cp. infra c. 8.

when

had not yet come

2 *

into fashion.

the art of rhetoric has

4.

20.

Cp.

c.

Cp. 10.

c. 3.

4

;

6

the ancient tyrants

5,

and

iv.

Plato, Rep.

made such 15. viii.

15.

565

D.

7

The Demagogue and

2OO V.

the

Tyrant

5 progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents

them from usurping power at any few and slight. Formerly ;

8 rate instances to the contrary are

tyrannies were

more common than they

power was often placed

great

are

now, because

the hands of individuals

in

;

thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Pryl tanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters .

those days,

in

Moreover,

people dwelt in the 9 if

fields,

when

busy

cities

at their

were not

work

;

and

large,

the

their chiefs,

they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity,

and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain

2

and Theagenes

,

at

Megara slaughtered

the cattle

of the wealthy, which he found by the river side where they 10

had put them to graze. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich ; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the

Changes also take place from the ancient to the form of democracy for where there is a popular elec of the magistrates and no property qualification, the

people. latest

tion

;

aspirants for office get hold of the people, 11 last

even to set them above the laws.

plete cure

for this state of things

is

A

and contrive

more or

less

at

com

for the separate tribes,

and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates. These are the principal causes of revolutions

in

demo

cracies.

6

There

are

two patent causes of revolutions

in oligarchies

[one coming from without, the other from within the govern

ment] 1

:

(i)

Cp. infra

First, c.

IO.

when

the oligarchs oppress the -

5.

See Herod,

i.

59.

people,

201

Devolutions in Oligarchies

anybody is good enough to be their champion, V. 6 especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as 1305 b Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. But 2 revolutions which commence outside the governing class may then

for

be further subdivided.

Sometimes, when the government

the wealthy class

who

is

brought about by persons of are excluded, as happened at Massalia

very exclusive, the revolution

is

and Istros and Heraclea, and other cities. Those who had no share in the government created a disturbance, until first the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted

;

3

for

some places father and son, in others elder and younger At Massalia the oli brothers, do not hold office together. in

garchy became more like a constitutional government, but at Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was enlarged to

600.

At

Cnidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a con- 4

siderable change.

For

the notables

fell

out

among

themselves,

because only a few shared in the government ; there existed among them the rule already mentioned, that father and son could not hold office together,

and,

if there

only the eldest was admitted.

were several

The

people took advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who

brothers,

were divided, and division

is always a source of weakness. of Erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, and ruled well, by the Basilidae, but the people took offence at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the government.

The

city

5

of revolutions in oligarchies one is (2) Of internal causes the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of 6 play the demagogue.

two

sorts

:

either (i) he practises

upon the oligarchs them

selves (for, although the oligarchy are quite a small number,

202 V. 6

Their Causes External and Internal may be

there

a

demagogue among them,

as at

Athens

the

party of Charicles predominated among the Thirty, that of in the Four Hundred) or (2) the oligarchs may the the people. with This was the case at demagogue play the of where the citizens endeavoured to Larissa, guardians

Phrynichus

;

gain over the people because they were elected by

such

is

them

;

elected, as at

all

oligarchies in

but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they

7

and

which the magistrates are Abydos, not by the class to which they belong,

the fate of

may

be required to have a high qualification, or to be members of a political club or, again, where the law-courts are inde ;

pendent of the government, the oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a decision in their own favour, and so they

happened at Heraclea in Pontus. whenever Again, oligarchies change any attempt is made to narrow them for then those who desire equal rights are comchange the constitution

;

this

;

8 pelled to

call in

occur when

1306

a

the people.

extravagant

living

either try to

make

in the tyranny, as

as at

*

Amphipolis

cidian

Changes waste

the oligarchs

colonists,

the rich. 9 against

in the

oligarchy also

their

private property by then they want to innovate, and themselves tyrants, or install some one else

for

;

Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse, and a man named Cleotimus introduced Chal-

and when they arrived,

For

stirred

them up

a like reason in

Aegina the person who carried on the negotiation with Chares endeavoured to revolutionize the state. Sometimes a party among the oli sometimes they rob garchs try to create a political change the treasury, and then, either the other oligarchs quarrel with ;

the thieves, as happened at Apollonia in Pontus, or they with the

other

oligarchs.

But an oligarchy which i C P c. 3. 13. .

is

at

unity

Oligarchy , Dangers with

itself is not easily

may

see

in Peace

and War 203

destroyed from within

;

of

this

we V. 6

although the 10

an example at Pharsalus, for there,

few in number, they govern a large city, because have a good understanding among themselves. they Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy rulers are

is

created within the original one, that

whole governing body

is

is

to

when

say,

small and yet they do not

all

the

n

share

Thus at Elis the governing body was and very few ever found their way into it, because, although in number ninety, the senators were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the

in the highest offices.

a small senate

;

Lacedaemonian alike in

elders.

war and

trust the

Oligarchy

in peace

people, the

;

in

liable

is

to

revolutions 12

war because, not being

oligarchs are

able to

compelled to hire

mer

cenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth or if there are more one make themselves into than generals they ;

a

company of

tyrants

*.

Sometimes the

fearing

oligarchs,

government because And in time of peace, 13 hand over the defence

this danger, give the people a share in the their services are necessary to

from mutual

distrust, the

two

them. parties

of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two This happened factions who often ends the master of both. at Larissa when Simosand the Aleuadae had the government,

and

at Abydos in the days of Iphiades and the political clubs. Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead 14 to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another.

Of

quarrels about marriages I have already mentioned

2

some

another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras over ; turned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been instances

1

bwaoTtia.

2

Cp.

c.

4.

5-7.

Revolutions in Oligarchies

204

A

V. 6 wronged J

5

about a marriage. revolution at Heraclea, and another at Thebes, both arose out of decisions of law-courts

upon

a charge of adultery

;

in

both cases the punishment was

just, but executed in the spirit of party, at Heraclea upon

1806 b Eurytion, and at Thebes upon Archias ; for their enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the 1

6 agora.

Many

oligarchies

have

been

some

by

destroyed

members of

the ruling class taking offence at their excessive

despotism Chios.

for

;

Changes of

example,

the

constitutional

oligarchy

at

governments,

Cnidus and

and also of

at

oli

garchies which limit the office of counsellor, judge, or other magistrate to persons

having a certain

17 often occur by accident.

The

money

qualification

qualification,

may have been

originally fixed according to the circumstances of the time, in

such a manner as to include in

a

constitutional

in

an oligarchy a few only, or

But

government the middle class.

after

arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes many times as large, and then everybody participates in every office this

a time of prosperity, whether

;

happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes 18 quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions in oligarchies.

We

must remark generally, both of democracies and

garchies, that they sometimes change,

oli

not into the opposite

forms of government, but only into another variety of the same class I mean to say, from those forms of democracy ;

and oligarchy which are regulated by law arbitrary, and conversely. 7

into those

In aristocracies revolutions arc stirred up share in the honours of the state

;

a cause

when

a

which

are

few only

which has been

20 y

Involutions in Oligarchies shown

already

to

affect

oligarchies

although the few are the

of a few, wealthy

an aristocracy is the government

for

;

a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy,

virtuous

hence the two are often confounded.

;

most

V. 7

is

and not the

And

revo-

2

and must happen, when the majority of the people are high-spirited, and have a notion lutions will be

that they are as

likely to happen,

good

Thus

as their rulers.

the so-called Partheniae,

who were

the

at

Lacedaemon

[illegitimate] sons

of

the Spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being detected,

were sent away occur

when

colonize Tarentum.

to

great

men who

Again, revolutions

are at least of equal merit are

dishonoured by those higher in office, as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta or, when a brave man is excluded from

3

:

the honours of the state, like Cinadon, the Spartans under Agesilaus

;

who

or, again,

conspired against

when some

are very

poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most often the result of war, as at Lacedaemon in the days of the

Messenian entitled

War

;

this is

Good Order

;

proved from the poem of Tyrtaeus, 4 for he speaks of certain citizens who 1807 a

were ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of the land. is

great,

Again, revolutions arise when an individual who and might be greater, wants to rule alone, as at Lace

daemon, Pausanias, who was general like

Hanno

at

in

the Persian

War, or

Carthage.

Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the con stitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former,

the ill-mingling of the two elements democracy and oligarchy in

the

virtue,

;

of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and For to com but especially democracy and oligarchy.

latter,

bine these

is

the endeavour of constitutional governments

;

5

20 6

Devolutions in Aristocracies^

V. 7 and most of 6 differ

more and some

are

more

incline

which

the so-called aristocracies have a like aim

from polities by the addition of virtue

them

less

democracy

But the

they are contented.

two

them power, tion

it

are apt to be insolent

And

for the greater

;

are equal

government gives

and avaricious

whichever way the constitution

but

and those

when men

rich, if the

,

Those which

constitutional governments.

the number, the greater the strength, and

general,

;

to oligarchy are called aristocracies,

incline to

J

hence some of

permanent.

therefore the latter are the safer of the

7

etc.

and, in

;

inclines, in that direc

changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional

government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy, an oliBut the process may be reversed, and aristocracy 8 garchy.

may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea that they are being wronged, force the consti In like manner constitutional

tution to take an opposite form.

into oligarchies.

governments change ciple of government for every

9

What

man I

where the reduced,

is

The

equality according

to enjoy his

only stable prin

to proportion,

have just mentioned actually happened for office, qualification

and

the

and

own.

at first

though

increased

magistrates

at

in

Thurii

high,

2 ,

was

The

number.

had previously acquired the whole of the land for the government tended to oligarchy, and contrary to law But the people, who had been they were able to encroach. notables

;

trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those to

Again, since

all

who had

too

aristocratical

much gave up governments

garchy, the notables are apt to be grasping

mon, where property has passed 1

Cp.

iv. c.

a

7.

Cp,

c. 3.

into 12.

;

thus at Lacedae-

few hands 3

their land.

incline to oli

Cp.

3 ,

ii.

the notables 9.

14,

Involutions in much

can do too

Mixed Governments

as they like,

207

and are allowed to marry

whom v. 7

The

city of Locri was ruined by a marriage they please. connexion with Dionysius. but such a thing could never have

happened in a democracy, or in a well-balanced aristocracy. I have already remarked that in all states revolutions are Jr J In aristocracies, above all, they are of 1307 occasioned by trifles .

a gradual

giving up

and imperceptible nature.

some

The

part of the constitution,

citizens begin

by

and so with greater which is a little

ease the government change something else

more important, of the

they have undermined the whole fabric Thurii there was a law that generals should

until

At

state.

1 2

years, and some men who were with the soldiers high-spirited young popular of the guard, despising the magistrates and thinking that they

only be re-elected after an interval of

five

would

easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual commands ; for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to elect them.

Whereupon

who had

the magistrates

and who are called councillors,

charge of these matters, 13 determined to resist,

at first

but they afterwards consented, thinking that, if only this one

law was changed, no further inroad would be made on the But other changes soon followed which they in constitution. vain attempted to oppose and the state passed into the hands ;

of the revolutionists

who

established a dynastic oligarchy.

All constitutions are overthrown either from within or from without

;

the

latter,

when

there

some government

is

close at

hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenian and the Lacedaemonian supremacies

1

c.

4

.

;

the Athenians everywhere

r.

^

D

The Preservation of

208 V. 7

put

down

the

democracies

8

Lacedaemonians the

1 .

now

I have

explained what are the chief causes of revolu

and dissensions

tions

and the

oligarchies,

States

in states.

We

have next to consider what means there are of pre In the serving states in general, and also in particular cases. first

place

is

it

destroy states,

them

we know the causes which know the causes which preserve

evident that if

we

shall also

for opposites produce opposites,

;

and destruction

is

the

2 opposite of preservation In all well-attempered governments there is nothing which should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of .

2

more

obedience to law,

especially

matters

small

in

;

for

transgression creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence 3

up a fortune. and therefore fallacy

is

And

4

if

all

are not

a

In the

rely

first

upon the 3

spoken 5

time eats

is

little,

then the whole

one way, but not little,

in another, for

although they are

made up

littles.

,

political

men

should guard against the second place they should not devices of which I have already

then,

place,

beginning of change, and L308

each part

this is true in

the whole and the

of

in

change does not take place all at once, not observed ; the mind is deceived, as in the

which says that

is little.

of small expenses

The

in the

invented only to deceive the people, for they are Further we note that experience to be useless.

proved by

oligarchies as well

as aristocracies

may

last,

not from any

inherent stability in such forms of government, but because the rulers are on good terms both with the unenfranchised and 1

Cp.

iv.

ii.

2

18. 8

Cp.

iv. 13.

Cp. Nic. Eth. I.

v.

I.

4.

How

avoid Revolution

to

209

with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but introducing into it the

among them

leading spirits

1

should never wrong the

They

.

ambitious in a matter of honour,

V. 8

common

or the

people

in

money and they should treat one another and fellow-citizens in a spirit of equality. The equality 6

a matter of their

;

which the friends of democracy seek multitude if

Hence,

for the

establish

to

not only just but likewise expedient among equals. the governing class are numerous, many democratic

is

are

institutions

useful

;

for example,

tenure of offices to six months, that

the restriction of the

who

those

all

are of

Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore equal rank

may

share in them.

demagogues are very 2 already remarked .

garchies and

likely to arise

The

among them,

as

have

I

short tenure of office prevents

aristocracies

from

the

into

falling

oli- 7

hands of

not easy for a person to do any great harm his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession

families

when begets

it

;

is

tyranny

in

who

democracies

in

members of

are

ruling houses,

demagogues or those

and have a long tenure of them States are preserved

when

For

and democracies.

oligarchies

aspirants to tyranny are either the principal

who

men of

and

in

the

the state, oligarchies

hold great

offices,

3 .

their destroyers are at a distance, 8

and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them

makes the government keep ruler

who

hand the

in

state.

Wherefore the

has a care of the state should invent terrors, and

bring distant dangers near, in order that the citizens their guard, and,

their attention. 1

AVIS

vi.

like sentinels in a

He

4.

be on

should endeavour too by help of the laws 9 a

7.

may

night-watch, never relax

Supra

c.

P

6.

6.

8

Cp.

c.

5.

6.

How

210 V. 8

avoid Devolution

to

to control the contentions

prevent those

being drawn

of

J

evil

in.

and quarrels of the notables, and to

have not hitherto taken part in them from No ordinary man can discern the beginning

but only the true statesman.

,

As

10

who

in

to the change

produced

in oligarchies

and constitutional

2

governments by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises, not out of any variation in the census but only out of the

increase

of money,

well

is

it

to

compare the general

valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those cities

which the census

in

1308 b cities every third or greater or

many

fifth

is

year.

taken annually, and in larger If the whole is many times

when

times less than

the rates were fixed at

the previous census, there should be power given by law to

lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. absence of any such provision the standard is

raise or 11

Where

in the

government passes into an oligarchy, narrowed to a rule of families where

raised, a constitutional

and an oligarchy the standard

is

is

;

lowered,

constitutional

government becomes

democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or democracy. 12

It

common

a principle

is

to

3

democracy, oligarchy

,

and

every other form of government not to allow the dispropor tionate increase of any citizen, but to give moderate honour for a long time rather than great honour for a short time.

men

if this rule is

given

all at

;

once should be taken away by degrees and not

2

1

c.

Cp.

1-3.

4.

3

Or,

Bekker

adding s

all

Especially should the laws provide against any one

once.

at

For

not every one can bear prosperity. But not observed, at any rate the honours which are

are easily spoilt

first

at

edition.

fiovapxift

Cp.

c.

3.

monarchy,

8; with

c. 6.

16-18.

many MSS. and

and Democracy

Oligarchy having too

money

if

;

21

I

much power, whether derived from friends or V. 8 he has, he and his followers should be sent out of

And since innovations creep in through the 13 of individuals, there ought to be a magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the country

1

.

private life

the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other.

And

for a like reason an increase of prosperity in any part of

The

the state should be carefully watched. for this evil is

offices

of

always to give the

elements

state to opposite

proper remedy 14

management of

affairs

and

such opposites are the

;

and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another the and the in one combine rich way poor body, or to thus an end will be put to the increase the middle class virtuous

to

is

:

which

revolutions

But above

all

arise

from

inequality.

every state should be so administered and so 15

regulated by law that

its

magistrates cannot possibly

make

2

In oligarchies special precautions should be used this evil. For the people do not take any great 16 against offence at being kept out of the government indeed they are

money

.

rather pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their private

but what irritates them

ausiness

are stealing the public for

money

;

they lose both honour and

profit,

is to

think that their rulers

then they are doubly annoyed

;

If office brought no 17

profit.

then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be for both notables and people might have their 1309 ;

combined wishes

gratified.

All would be able to hold

office,

which

is

the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates,

which

is

the aim of aristocracy.

accomplished when there 1

Cp.

c. 3.

3;

iii.

is

And

a

13.

this

result

may be

no possibility of making money

15.

P 2

Cp.

c.

13.

14.

18

a

212 V. 8

Oligarchy

out of the offices

when

there

is

and Democracy Preserved want

for the poor will not

;

to have

be gained from them

nothing to

rather be attending to their

own

concerns

and the

;

them

they would

who

rich,

do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to take them and so the poor will keep to their work and grow ;

rich,

and the notables

will not be

governed by the lower

19 In order to avoid peculation of the public

class.

money, the transfer

of the revenue should be made

at a general assembly of the and duplicates of the accounts deposited with the And honours brotherhoods, companies, and tribes.

citizens,

different

should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation In democracies the rich should be incorruptible.

20 of being

spared their

not only should their property not be divided, but also, which in some states are taken from them

;

incomes

imperceptibly,

should be protected. even

prevent the wealthy citizens,

It is if

a

good thing to from

they are willing,

undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the giving of choruses, torch-races, and the like. In an oligarchy,

on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should

classes insult them, 1

severely

than one of their

Provision should be not by tance 21

;

go to them

;

if

any of the wealthy

the offender should be punished

made

own

class

more

for a like offence

that estates pass by inheritance

*.

and

and no person should have more than one inheri way properties will be equalized, and more

gift,

for in this

It is also expedient both in an oligarchy to assign to those who have less share in the government (for example, to the rich in

of the poor a

rise to

democracy and

competency.

in

a democracy and to the poor in an oligarchy) an equality or The latter of state. preference in all but the principal offices 1

Or,

than

if

he had wronged one of

his

own

class.

and Moderation

by Loyalty

213

should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the govern-

V. 8

ing class.

There to

fill

are three qualifications required in those

the highest offices constitution

established

capacity

the

(2)

;

first

(l)

of

who

greatest

;

for, if

what

is

just is not the

same

governments, the quality of justice must also differ. be a doubt however,

in the

9

administrative

(3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to each

;

form of government

may

have

loyalty to the

all,

when

same person, how the

for example, a

all

these qualities do not meet a

made

selection is to be is

in all

There

a bad

good general the constitution, and another man

man and is

loyal

;

suppose,

not a friend to 1809 b

and

which

just,

In making the election ought we not to consider two points ? what qualities are common, and what

should

we choose ? Thus

are rare.

of a general, we should regard for few have military skill, 3 In keeping watch or in any office of

in the choice

his skill rather than his virtue

but

many have

virtue.

;

stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge is of

observed;

a sort

which

all

men

possess.

may, however, be asked what a man wants with virtue if 4 he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities It

alone will

make him do what

j

may |

I

not

men have

is

for the public interest.

both of them and yet be deficient

in

But se!f-

control ? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the public ?

Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enact- 5 Iments are held to be for the interest of states, all these preserve [states.

And

the great preserving principle

is

the one which

Preservatives of

214 V. 9

lias

been repeatedly mentioned

to have a care that the loyal

outnumber the

6 citizens should

forget the mean,

which

Neither should we

disloyal.

the present day

at

perverted forms of government

for

:

is

many

of

lost sight

practices

in

which

appear to be democratical are the ruin of democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies. 7

Those who

think that

all

be found in their

virtue is to

party principles push matters to extremes

ideal

of straightness to

a

own

they do not con

A nose which varies

sider that disproportion destroys a state.

from the

;

hook or snub may

still

be

of good shape and agreeable to the eye but if the excess be very great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to ;

be a nose at

all

on account of some excess

defect in the other 8

;

The

human body.

and

in

one direction or

of every other part of the same law of proportion equally holds in this is true

Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, states.

but if any one attempts to push the principles of either to an

extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end by all. Wherefore the legislator and the states

9 having none at

man ought

to

know what

democratical measures

and

save

democracy, and what oligarchical measures save For neither the one nor the other an or destroy oligarchy. can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are

what

destroy a

included in 1310

a

it.

If equality of property

must of necessity take another form to excess

one or other element

;

introduced, the state

is

for

when by laws

carried

in the state is ruined, the

con

stitution is ruined.

10

There

is

democracies:

an error

common

1

Cp.

iv.

12.

both

to

oligarchies and

to

demagogues, when the multi-

in the latter the i

;

vi.

6.

2.

and Democracy

Oligarchy

2iy

two by V. 9 whereas they should always profess to

:ude are above the law, are always cutting the city in quarrels with the

rich,

be maintaining their cause

;

just as in oligarchies, the oligarchs

should profess to maintain the cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For

which they swear

there are cities in

the people, and will devise I can

the

all

I will be an

harm

against

n

to

enemy them which

but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very in the form of their oath there should be an

;

opposite feeling

;

I will do no wrong to the express declaration people. But of all the things which I have mentioned, that which

most contributes

to the

permanence of constitutions

adaptation of education to the form of government in

own day

our

this

1 ,

is

the

and yet

principle is universally neglected.

The

12

best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state,

of no

will be

avail unless the

education in the

young are trained by habit and

of the constitution,

spirit

if

the laws are

democratical, democratically, or oligarchically if the laws are

For

oligarchical.

there

be a want of self-discipline in

may

states as well as in individuals. in the spirit

of the constitution

which oligarchs or democrats

Now, is

to have been educated 13

not to perform the actions in

delight, but those

by which the

existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an oligarchy live in luxury

2 ,

but the sons of the poor are hardened

by exercise and toil, and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolution s And in democracies 14 of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of .

freedom which

is

contradictory to the true interests of the 2

1

Cp.

i.

13.

Cp.

15. 3

Cp.

PI.

Rep.

viii.

556

D.

iv.

IT.

6.

2

V. 9 15

1

6

state.

Origin of For two

Tyranny

principles are characteristic of democracy, the

Men think that government of the majority and freedom. what is just is equal and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will ; and that freedom and equality mean the ;

doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, according to his

But

fancy.

this

is

all

wrong

;

men should

not think

slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution is

for

;

it it

their salvation. I

have

now

discussed generally the causes of the revolution

and destruction of

states,

and the means of

their preservation

and continuance.

10

to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its and preservation. What I have said already of other forms government applies almost equally respecting to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the I

have

still

destruction

1310 b 2

and

nature of an aristocracy,

a

tyranny

is

compound of

a

oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms therefore evil

most

injurious to its subjects, being

;

it

is

made up of two

forms of government, and having the perversions and of both. These two forms of monarchy differ in their

3 errors

very origin.

The

appointment of a king

the better classes

them out of

their

his family excel

against the people,

own number, in

is

the resource of

and he

and virtuous actions

virtue

elected by

is

because either he himself or ;

whereas a

chosen from the people to be their protector against the notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured.

tyrant

is

4 History

shows

that almost

all

tyrants have been

who e

demagogues

gained the favour of the people by their accusation of the notables *. At any rate this was the manner in which the 1

Cp.

c. 5.

6; Plato, Rep. 565

D.

217

Origin of Tyranny tyrannies arose in the days

when

cities

had increased

in

power.

V. 10

Others which were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and

Others again grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates for in ancient times the civil or people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether

become despots.

;

religious,

which

had of making some if

difficulty,

had the power

individual

supreme over

1 In any of these ways an ambitious man 6 he desired, in creating a tyranny, since he

the highest offices.

had no

Others arose out of the custom

a long tenure.

oligarchies

in his

the officers of state

2

hands already, either as king or as one of Thus Pheidon at Argos and several .

others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants ; Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding great offices. Leontini, Cypselus sius at Syracuse,

were

tyrants,

And

and several others

at first

so, as I

Whereas Panaetius

at Corinth, Peisistratus at

was

who

at

Athens, Diony-

afterwards became

demagogues. saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for 7

based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his 3 or on these claims with family, or on benefits conferred is

it

,

power added to them. For all who have obtained this honour have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and nations

;

some, like Codrus, have prevented the

state

8

from

being enslaved in war; others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the

Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and Molossian kings idea of a king

is

Retaining TOVTOIS, which apparently by mistake. 1

2

Cp.

c. 5.

8.

4 .

The

9

to be a protector of the rich against unjust 1311 is

omitted in Bekker

3

Cp.

iii.

14.

12.

s

4

second edition,

Cp.

c. II.

2.

a

2i

8

Tyranny) Oligarchy , Democracy

V. 10 treatment, of the people

has no regard to any

public interest, but only to his private ends 10

sure,

the aim of a king,

desires they differ

And

of what brings honour.

but of a tyrant mercenaries

That tyranny has

TI

is

oligarchy is

wealth

;

his aim

is

plea-

also in their

desirous of riches, the king,

is

the guards of a king are citizens,

] .

the

all

;

Wherefore

honour.

the tyrant

;

Whereas

against insult and oppression.

as has often been repeated,

a tyrant,

both

vices

of democracy and

As

of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end wealth (for by only can the tyrant maintain either evident.

Both mistrust the people, and guard or his luxury). them of their arms. Both agree too in

his

therefore deprive

art

and driving them out of the city and tyrants have borrowed the

the people

injuring

12 dispersing

From democracy

them.

of making war upon the

notables and

secretly or openly, or of exiling

and stand

them

against 13

want

in the

their

power

2

are rivals

and also because plots

;

by men of

are contrived

to rule or escape subjection.

Thrasybulus

this

who

class,

Hence Periander

either

advised

to cut off the tops of the tallest ears of corn,

meaning that he

who

way of

destroying them

them because they

must always put out of the way the

And

overtop the rest.

citizens

so, as I have already intimated,

the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in

other forms of government

;

subjects attack their sovereigns

out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly

And

treated by them. is insult, r

4

The

another

ends

is

of

injustice,

most common form

the

confiscation of property.

sought

whether tyrannies or

by

monarchies,

against

conspiracies

royalties,

are the

same

as

the ends

sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. a

1

Cp.

iii.

14.

7.

Cp.

iii.

13.

16.

The Overthrow of Monarchies Monarchs have desire to

great wealth and honour

mankind.

all

against their lives,

sense of insult

is

The

attacks

which are

sometimes against the

219

are objects of

V. 10

made sometimes office

;

the motive, against their lives.

where the

Any

sort of 15

many) may up anger, and when men are angry, they commonly act out of revenge, and not from insult (and there are

ambition.

stir

For example, the attempt made upon

the Peisis-

of the public dishonour offered to the sister of Harmodius and the insult to himself. He attacked the tratidae arose out

tyrant

for his sister s sake,

attack for the sake of

and Aristogeiton joined in the conspiracy was also

Harmodius.

A

16

formed against Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because, when drinking with a favourite youth, he asked him whether 1311 b by this time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted

by Attalus and his friends, and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. Evagoras of Cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult ;

for his wife

had been carried off by Evagoras

conspiracies have originated in

son.

Many

shameful attempts made by

sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. attack of Crataeus upon Archelaus

;

Such was the

he had always hated the

connexion with him, and so, when Archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him

word and married the elder to when he was hard pressed in a war

either of them, but broke his

the king of Elymaea,

against Sirrhas and Arrhibaeus,

and the younger to his own son Amyntas, under the idea that he would then be less likely to quarrel with the son of Cleopatra Crataeus made this slight a pretext for attacking

Archelaus, though even a less

reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the estrange-

17

The Overthrow

220

the disgust which he felt at his connexion with the

V. 10 ment was 1

And

8 king.

of Monarchies

from

a like

motive Hellanocrates of Larissa con

spired with him ; for when Archelaus, who was his lover, did not fulfil his promise of restoring him to his country, he

thought that the connexion between them had originated, not in affection, but in the wantonness of Parrhon, too, power.

and Heracleides of Aenos, slew Cotys in order to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him

when

a child.

l

Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill

19

and royal princes by whom they have been Thus, at Mitylene, Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the Penthalidae, as they were going about and striking people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who of

officers

state

1

injured

.

had been beaten and torn away from

his wife

by Penthilus,

In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack ; he was

20 slew him.

enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged ; for the poet had been irritated at some remark

made by Decamnichus on

the foulness of his breath.

Many

other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies

which have Fear

21"

is

arisen

from similar causes.

another motive which has caused conspiracies as

more popular forms of government. conspired against Xerxes and slew him,

well in monarchies as in

Thus Artapanes

would be accused of hanging Darius against he being under the impression that Xerxes would

fearing that he his orders 1

Or

ment

:

Many

persons too, even of those connected with the govern taking TUIV irepi, etc. with the subject.

or the royal family,

caused by Insult, Fear, Contempt what he had

forget

would be

offence

said in the

221

middle of a meal, and that the V. 10

forgiven.

Another motive

is

contempt, as in the case of Sardanapulus, 22

whom some

one saw carding wool with his women, if the story-tellers say truly ; and the tale may be true, if not of him, of some one else *. Dion attacked the younger Dionysius 23 because he despised him, and saw that he was equally despised Even by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk. the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack

tempt

for the confidence

;

him out of con

which he reposes

in

them breeds

contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt 24 the assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing of the ;

danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands.

Thus

generals of armies attack monarchs

;

as, for

example,

Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life, and believing that his power was worn out. Thus, again, Seuthes the Thracian conspired general he was.

And

against

Amadocus, whose

sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, 25

who

like Mithridates,

conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly

out of contempt and partly from the love of gain.

Bold

position, are

most

tion of success

union

by their sovereigns

natures, placed

;

likely to

in a high military

make the attempt

in the

expecta

emboldened by power, and the them with the hope of an easy

for courage is

of the two inspires

victory.

Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise from other There are men who will not risk their lives in the 26 of gains and rewards however great, but who nevertheless hope

causes.

1

Cp.

i.

11.

8.

222 V. 10

regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action

which 27

Overthrow of Monarchies make them famous and honourable

will

in the

they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but a name.

however, to find such

men

who would

he

;

28 be prepared to lose his life if he

kill

He

fail.

world

;

It is rare,

a tyrant

must

must have the

resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying, that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed ; such a death would be

welcome

But

to him.

this is

a temper to

which few can

attain.

29

Once more,

like

tyrannies,

other

all

are

governments,

some opposite and more powerful That such a government will have the

1312 b destroyed from without by

form of government. will to attack them 30 principle

and

;

Democracy

is

clear

men,

if

;

also antagonistic to

alike

are

opposed

in

do

what they will. tyranny, on the principle of can,

because they are nearly akin,

extreme form of democracy

and aristocracy are both

two

the

for

they

Potter hates Potter,

Hesiod, for the

is

all

is

tyranny

opposed

they are constitutions of a different type.

to

and royalty

,

tyranny,

And

because

therefore the

Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well governed. 31

Again, reigning

tyrannies

are

destroyed

family are divided

when

from within,

among themselves,

as

the

that

of

Gelo was, and more recently that of Dionysius in the case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, flattered the ;

son of Gelo and led him into excesses rule in his

name.

Whereupon

in

order that he might

the family conspired to get rid

of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny

;

but the party

who

con-

Especially of

223

"Tyrannies

with them seized the opportunity and drove them all V. the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, 32

1

spired

10

In

out.

attacked and expelled

him with the

assistance of the people

;

he afterwards perished himself. There are two chief motives which induce men to attack

and

tyrannies

hatred

inevitable,

and contempt

2

inherited

have lost

,

it,

frequent

power, but those who have once ; for living in luxurious

their

almost

at

become contemptible, and

ease, they have

is

tyrants

cause of their

most of those who have 33

see that

have retained

acquired,

a

also

is

Thus we

destruction.

Hatred of

contempt.

offer

many oppor

Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes 34 even more ready to strike the angry are more impetuous in to

tunities

their

making an

assailants.

To

insulted.

Peisistratidae

but anger

is

listen to reason.

to their

way

cause

this

accompanied by

a word,

all

is

the

Hatred

pain,

more reasonable, 35

is

is

an impediment to

causes

.

which I have mentioned as

unmixed form of

oligarchy,

may be assumed

and

to affect

indeed the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies

distributed

among

several

Kingly

persons.

by external causes, and generally destroyed from within. affected

in

are

8

the extreme form of democracy, ;

passions

which

painless

destroying the last and most

tyranny

And men

when they

to be attributed the fall of the

is

and of many others.

reason, whereas hatred

In

do not

attack, for they

are very apt to give

is,

therefore,

And

1

Omitting 8

KO.-T

inserted by

Cp. Plato, Laws,

iii.

Cp. Rhetoric,

4.

ii.

695. 31.

Bekker

in

is

lasting

there are

which the destruction may come about; a

rule

(i)

2nd ed.

little ;

it

36

is

two ways

when

the 1313 a

Overthrow of Monarchies

224

V. 10 members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer the state too much and to extend

37 after the fashion of a tyranny,

contrary to the law.

There

where they

*

exist, are

are

now no

over voluntary subjects, and he matters

but in our

;

and no one

royalties

For the

tyrannies. is

own day men

their authority

rule

supreme

in

;

monarchies,

of a king all

important

more upon an

are

tion

will not, if they can help,

power by force or fraud

obtains 38 a tyrant. is

equality,

so immeasurably superior to others as to repre

is

sent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office.

mankind

is

at

is

Hence

and any one who once thought to be

endure

it,

In hereditary monarchies a further cause of destruc the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and,

although possessing not tyrannical but only royal power, are Their overthrow is then readily apt to outrage others. effected

;

for there is an

do not want like

him or

The

end

to the king

when

his subjects

but the tyrant lasts, whether they

not.

destruction of monarchies

and the 11

to have him,

is

to be attributed to these

like causes.

And

they are preserved, to speak generally, by the opposite or, if we consider them separately, (l) royalty is

causes;

The more re preserved by the limitation of its powers. stricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired ; for then they are more moderate and not so despotic in their 2 subjects.

so long

This

among

is

ways

;

and they are

the reason

why

the Molossians.

less

envied by their

the kingly office has lasted

And

for a similar reason

it

has continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards further 1

Omitting KCU with Bekker

s

2nd ed.

Preservation of Monarchies limited by

Theopompus

in various

respects,

more

He

by the establishment of the Ephoralty.

22.5 particularly

V. 11

diminished the

power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain sense not less,

but greater.

There

is

a story that

when

his wife

once

3

asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons a royal

power which was

less than

he had inherited from his

he replied, No indeed, for the power which them will be more lasting.

father,

to

As

to

I leave

they are preserved in two most 4 of them is the old traditional method in

(2) tyrannies,

One

opposite ways.

Of such government. have been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the There Persians in the administration of their government. which most tyrants administer

arts

are

Periander of Corinth

also

the ancient

their

said

is

to

a tyranny, in so far as this

is

the

for

prescriptions

possible

should lop off those who are too high men of spirit : he must not allow

;

viz.

;

preservation

5

of

that the tyrant

he must put to death

common

meals,

clubs,

he must be upon his guard against 1313 b education, and the like is to which likely inspire either courage or confidence anything among his subjects ; he must prohibit literary assemblies or ;

other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means

from knowing one another (for acquaintance Further, he must compel the 6 l l inhabitants to appear in public and live at his gates ; then

to prevent people

begets

he

will

mutual

know what

under, they practise

confidence).

they are doing

will learn

to be

if

they are always kept In short, he should

these and the like Persian and barbaric arts which

have the same object.

A

1

Or, PAVIS

;

humble.

all

tyrant should also endeavour to at their doors.

o

7

The

226 V.

11

Devices of Tyranny

know what each of employ

spies,

his subjects says or does,

like the

the eavesdroppers

female detectives

whom

Hiero was

and should

Syracuse, and

at

of sending to

in the habit

for the fear of informers any place of resort or meeting their from minds, and if they do, speaking prevents people ;

8

Another

they are more easily found out.

sow

to

quarrels

the

among

citizens

;

art

of the tyrant is should be

friends

embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the Also he should impoverish his rich with one another. subjects

;

he thus provides money for the support of his

1

and the people, having to keep hard at work, are The Pyramids of Egypt afford 9 prevented from conspiring. also the offerings of the family of an example of this policy guards

,

;

Cypselus, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean monuments at Samos all these works were alike intended to occupy the ;

10 people

and keep them poor.

to multiply taxes, after the

who

Another

practice of tyrants is

manner of Dionysius

at Syracuse, contrived that within five years his subjects should bring

into the treasury their

whole property.

The

tyrant

is

also

fond of making war in order that his subjects may have some And whereas thing to do and be always in want of a leader. the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the character istic

of a tyrant

that

all

is

men want

the power

to distrust his friends, because to

he knows

overthrow him, and they above

all

have

2 .

1

Reading r\ Tf with Bekker s 2nd ed. This, which is probably the meaning of the passage, cannot be The addition is required of some elicited from the text as it stands. 2

such phrase as avT^v Ka6f\ffv, which authority.

is

not wholly without manuscript

The Ways of Tyranny and of Tyrants 227 Again, the

evil

are

democracy

all

women

given to

practices of the last

and worst forms of V. 11

found

Such

in

tyrannies.

in their families

in the

are the

power

ir

that they will

hope

inform against their husbands, and the licence which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their masters ; for slaves

and

women do

not conspire against tyrants

and

are of course friendly to tyrannies

them they have

since under

would

the

good time.

to

For

;

and they

democracies, the people too

monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the flatterer is held in honour ; in democracies he

fain be a

the tyrant, is

a

also

demagogue

panions

who

;

flatter

12

and the tyrant also has his humble com him.

1314

Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a free

man

in

him

will

demean himself by

others, but they do not

flatter

are useful for bad purposes

;

; good men love Moreover the bad

flattery

anybody. nail knocks out

nail,

13

as the

It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every proverb says. one who has dignity or independence ; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his

independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is 14 that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with

them and

invites

them

to his table

;

for the one are enemies,

but the others enter into no rivalry with him.

Such

and the arts by which he no wickedness too great for him. All that we have said may be summed up under three heads, which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. These are, 15 (l) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a meanare the notes of the tyrant

preserves his power

spirited

man

;

there

is

will not conspire against

Q

2

anybody: (2) the crea-

a

228 V. 11

Preservation of Tyranny

tion of mistrust until

men

among them

;

overthrown

for a tyrant is not

begin to have confidence in one another

the reason

why

tyrants are at

;

war with the good

and

this

they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only because they will not be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and is

;

do not inform against one another or against other men

:

16 (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for

no one attempts what

impossible, and they will

is

not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be

summed

and

up,

one or other of them

to

referred: (l) he

sows

his ideas

may

be

among subjects; (2) he he them. humbles (3)

takes

17

all

his

distrust

away their power ; This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are preserved and there is another which proceeds upon ;

18 a

different

method may be gathered from which destroy kingdoms, for kingly power

is

to

make

nature of this

as

one

is to

make

it

mode of more

more

latter

of the causes

a comparison

the office of king

the salvation of a tyranny a king.

The

principle of action.

destroying

tyrannical, so

like the rule of

But of one thing the tyrant must be

careful

;

he

must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up 19 his tyranny.

But though power must be retained

as

the

should act or appear to act in In the first place he should pretend

foundation, in all else the tyrant

1314 b the character of a king.

a care of the public revenues, and not waste a sort presents of

when

money in making which the common people get excited miserable earnings taken from them and

at

they see their

lavished on courtesans and strangers and artists.

He

should

The give an account of

229

Beneficent Despot

what he receives and of what he spends V. 11

which has been adopted by some tyrants) ; for then he will seem to be the manager of a household rather (a practice

than a tyrant

;

nor need he fear that, while he

the city, he will ever be in want of money.

much more advantageous home, than

to leave

for the tyrant

is

Such

the lord of 20 a policy is

when he goes from

behind him a hoard, for then the garrison

who

remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power ; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the

one accompany him, but the others remain behind. In the second place, he should appear to collect taxes and to require public services only for state purposes

;

21

and that he may form

of war, he ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to him, but to the public. He should appear, not harsh, but dignified, and a fund in case

when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence, and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if

22

he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a states Neither he man, and produce the impression that he is one. nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least offence against

modesty towards the young of either sex who and the women of his family should observe

are his subjects,

a like self-control

women

towards other

women

;

23

the insolence of

many tyrannies. In the indulgence of he be the opposite of our modern tyrants, should pleasures

who

has ruined

not only begin at

but want other

men

happy and blessed

dawn and

pass whole days in sensuality,

to see them, that they lot.

may admire

their

In these things a tyrant should be 24

especially moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices

Preservation of Tyranny

230 V.

11 to the world

not so he

and drowsy tyrant is soon who is temperate and wide

awake.

His conduct should be

the very reverse of nearly

25

1315

a

drunken

a

for

;

despised and attacked

;

He everything which has been said before about tyrants. to adorn and his as not he were ought improve city, though a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the

men think

for if

for the

that a ruler

Gods, they

is

religious

Gods

;

and has a reverence

are less afraid of suffering injustice at his

hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to have the very Gods fighting on 26 his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought

And

foolish.

them think

he should honour men of merit, and make would not be held in more honour by

that they

The honour he the citizens if they had a free government. should distribute himself, but the punishment should be inby officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which taken by all monarchs not to make one person great ; but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they may look If after all some one has to be sharply after one another.

27 flicted is

made

great,

is

man of bold

he should not be a

most inclined

dispositions are ever

to be deprived of his power, let

28 not taken

from

all

from him

all at

outrage

in

;

once

1 .

property 29 virtuous

for as the lovers of is

touched,

when

their

so are

honour 1

Cp.

money the is

if

from personal violence and

particular

should be

are lovers of

are offended

when

lovers of honour

affected.

c. 8.

He

men who

especially careful of his behaviour to ;

for such

;

And

it

from wanton conduct towards the young. honour

spirit

any one be diminished gradually, The tyrant should abstain

to strike.

12.

their

and the

Therefore a tyrant

ought either not to use force

others

at all, or

he should be thought V. 11

employ fatherly correction, and not to trample upon and his acquaintance with youth should be supposed

only to ;

and not from the insolence of power, he should compensate the appearance of dis honour by the increase of honour. Of those who attempt assassination they are the most 30 dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched who do to arise

and

from

affection,

in general

not care to survive,

if

are led

less

of themselves.

away by passion

fight against anger

And and of

whereas

;

As for a

states

any

who

have been insulted

either they or their relatives

men

Therefore 31

they effect their purpose.

special precaution should be taken about

;

think that for

when

to assault others they are regard

Heracleitus says,

man

It is difficult to

V

buy revenge with life consist of two classes, of poor men 32 will

should lead both to imagine that they

rich, the tyrant

and prevented from harming one another by his and whichever of the two is stronger he should attach

are preserved rule,

his government ; for, having this advantage, he has no need either to emancipate slaves or to disarm the citizens ; either party added to the force which he already has, will to

make him

stronger than his assailants.

But enough of these policy of the tyrant

is

details

what should be the general 33

;

He

obvious.

ought to show himself to

his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but of the master of

a household is theirs,

and of

a king.

He

should not appropriate what 1315 b he should be moderate, ;

but should be their guardian

not extravagant in his

way of

life

;

he should be the com

For 34 panion of the notables, and the hero of the multitude. then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because 1

Fragm. 69

(ed.

Mullach).

Short Duration of Tyrannies

232 V. 11 he

men

will rule over better

men

over

to

whom

of

he

Let

lasting.

virtuous

whom

and

;

*

whose

he himself

be virtuous,

his disposition

he must be wicked,

if

spirits

are not crushed,

not an object of hatred, and

His power

not afraid.

is

is

let

too will be more or at

him be

least

half

half wicked

only.

12

Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy and tyranny. The tyranny which lasted longest was that of Orthagoras and his sons at Sicyon this continued for a hun ;

dred years. The reason was that they treated their subjects with moderation, and to a great extent observed the laws ;

and

ways gained the favour of the people by the which they took of them. Cleisthenes, in particular,

in various

care 2

was respected for his military ability. If report may be crowned the judge who decided against him in

believed, he

the games

;

and, as

some

say, the sitting statue in the

Agora

A

of Sicyon is the likeness of this person. similar story is told of Peisistratus, who is said on one occasion to have

allowed himself to be

summoned and

tried before the

Areo

pagus. 3

Next

in duration to the

tyranny of Orthagoras was that of

the Cypselidae at Corinth,

and six months forty-four, 4

man, who

had

a

was

a great soldier.

body-guard

;

:

three.

Cypselus was

during the whole time of his rule never

and Periander, although he was a tyrant, Third in duration was the rule of the

Peisistratidae at Athens, but tratus

Periander

Psammetichus the son of Gordius

Their continuance was due to similar causes a popular

5

and

which lasted seventy-three years

Cypselus reigned thirty years,

:

was twice driven 1

it

CP

.

was

interrupted

;

for Peisis

so that during three-and-thirty

out, i.

5.

2.

Criticism of Plato he

years

reigned

eighteen

Even

altogether

years.

sons reigned

his

Of

V. 12

other tyrannies,

at

Gelo continued

for

the eighth

and

;

Syracuse was the most lasting. was however, short, not more than eighteen years 6

this, ;

seventeen

thirty-five

Hiero and Gelo

that of

in all

only

233

tyrant for seven years,

Hiero reigned

;

was driven out

month.

in the eleventh

and died

in

and Thrasybulus

for ten years,

In

tyrannies

fact,

generally have been of quite short duration. I

now gone through all the causes by which consti- 7 governments and monarchies are either destroyed or 1316

have

tutional

preserved.

In the Republic of Plato but

for he

not well,

affects

peculiarly

the

J ,

Socrates treats of revolutions,

mentions no cause of change which

He

or perfect state.

first

that nothing is abiding, but that

only says 8

in a certain

all

things change and that the origin of the change is a base of numbers which are in the ratio of four to three, and this when com cycle

;

bined with a figure of

when

number of

the

five gives

two harmonies

becomes

this figure

to education

;

in

which

latter

be not far wrong, for there

solid)

men who

that nature will then produce bad

particular

may

well

(he means

he conceives

;

will not submit

he may very be some

cannot be educated and made virtuous.

likely

men who

But why

is

such 9

a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state, and not rather

common

to all

being at

all ?

states, 2

nay to everything which comes into

Or how

is

the

state

specially

the agency of time, which, as he declares,

change

And

?

2

together 1

a

Rep.

,

things

viii.

546. note

all

things

which did not begin together, change

for example, if something has

Placing a

changed by

makes

of interrogation

after

come

into being the

fj.tTa(3d\\fiv.

Or

:

And

a

Criticism of Plato

234 V. 12 day

before the completion of the cycle,

it will change with it. the state into the Spartan ? should Further, why change perfect 10 for governments more often take an opposite form than

one akin to them.

The same

remark

is

applicable to the

he says that the Spartan constitution changes into an oligarchy, and this into a democracy, and this again other changes

1 1

;

into a tyranny.

And

for a

is

yet the contrary happens quite as often ; even more likely to change into an oligarchy Further, he never says whether monarchy.

democracy

than into

a

tyranny is, or is not, liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them, or into what form it And changes. the reason is, that he could not very well have told : for there is

no rule

12 best,

;

according to him

it

and then there would be

should revert to the

a complete cycle.

But

first

and

in point

of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny, as that at Sicyon changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of Cleisthenes

Chalcis

;

into oligarchy, as the tyranny of Antileon did at

;

into

democracy, as that of Gelo did at Syracuse and the tyranny of Charilaus ;

into aristocracy, as at Carthage,

13 at

Lacedaemon.

Often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny,

most of the ancient oligarchies

like

in Sicily

;

for example,

the oligarchy at Leontini changed into the tyranny of Panaetius

;

that

Rhegium

at

Gela

14 happened in

many

tyranny of Oleander ; that at of Anaxilaus ; the same thing has

into the

into the tyranny

other states.

And

it

is

absurd to suppose

that the state changes into oligarchy merely because [as Plato

in the period

of time which, as he says, makes

all

things change, things

which did not begin together change together. Bekker in his 2nd edition has altered the reading of the MSS. Sid re TOV xpovov to Sia ye TOV \povov. with either reading

;

The

rendering of the text agrees

that of the note with the reading of the

MSS.

only.

of Plato

Criticism

235-

1

of money, V. 12 says ] the ruling class are lovers and makers and not because the very rich think it unfair that the very poor 13 1 6 b should have an equal share in the government with themselves.

Moreover, in

money

in

oligarchies there are laws against

many

But

trade.

there is no such prohibition

had a

ginians have never

2

;

and yet

two

to this

cities,

day the Cartha

one of the

much

Is not this just as

.

making

a democracy,

is

It is absurd too for

revolution.

to say that an oligarchy is

other of the poor

which

at Carthage,

rich,

him

15

and the

the case in the

Spartan constitution, or in any other in which either all do not possess equal property, or in which all are not equally

good men ? Nobody need be any poorer than he was before, 16 and yet the oligarchy may change all the same into a demo and a democracy may cracy, if the poor form the majority ;

change into an oligarchy, if the wealthy class are stronger than the people, and the one are energetic, the other in

Once more, although the causes of revolutions are 17 he mentions only one 3 , which is, that the numerous, very citizens become poor through dissipation and debt, as though different.

he thought that

all,

or the majority of them, were originally

: though it is true that when any of the leaders lose their property they are ripe for revolution ; And an 18 but, when anybody else, it is no great matter.

This

rich.

is

not true

oligarchy does not

more often pass

any other form of government. of the honours of

state,

make

Rep.

viii.

550

Again,

democracy than if

men

their substance because they

a

E.

Rep. 3

into

are deprived

and are wronged, and insulted, they forms of government, even

revolutions, and change although they have not wasted

1

into a

Rep.

viii.

555

D.

viii.

551

D.

2

3

o"

V. 12 might do what

Criticism of Plato they liked

of which extravagance he declares

excessive freedom to be the cause Finally, although there are

*.

many forms of

oligarchies and

democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one form of either of them. 1

Rep.

viii.

564.

BOOK WE have

now

VI

considered the varieties of the deliberative

VI. 1

power in states, and the various arrangements of law-courts and state offices, and whicli of them are adapted or supreme

forms of government l the destruction and preservation of to different

.

causes they arise

many modes of

and it

all

other forms of government there are

will be well to assign to

them

a

severally

organization which are proper and advantageous

to each, adding over,

how and from what

.

and

;

the

have also spoken of

2

Of democracy kinds

We states,

we ought

what remains

More-

to be said about them.

3

to consider the various combinations of these

modes themselves

3 ;

for such combinations

make

constitutions

overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments incline to demo 4

cracies

.

When

I

considered, I

speak of the combinations which remain to be 4 far have not been considered by us,

and thus

mean such

as these

:

when

the deliberative part of the

government and the election of officers is constituted oligarthe law-courts aristocratically, or when the chically, and courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical,

and the election to

way I

offices aristocratical, or

a want of

when

in

any other

harmony composition of a state. have shown already what forms of democracy are suited

there

is

1

Bk.

3

Cp. Bk.

iv.

14-16. iv.

7-9.

in the

2

Bk.

Cp.

v. iv. 8.

3.

5

2

VI.

3

8

1 to particular

we

6 Further, is

cities,

and what of oligarchy to particular peoples,

whom

and to

each of the other forms of government is suited. must not only show which of these governments

the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to con

sider

1

how

these

and other forms of government are

to

be established. First of

all

let

us speak of democracy, which will also

form of government commonly we need

bring to light the opposite

For

7 called oligarchy.

the purposes of this enquiry

to ascertain all the elements

and characteristics of democracy,

since from the combinations of these the varieties of 8 cratic

government

arise.

There

demo-

are several of these differing

from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. One (i) has been already mentioned 2 differences of popu lation

for the popular element

;

may

consist of husbandmen,

or of labourers, and

or of mechanics,

if

the

first

of these

be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does the democracy become better or worse, but 9 very

nature

be mentioned

its

A

second cause (2) remains to changed. the various properties and characteristics of

is :

democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is

an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes some new form of democracy, or only to remodel

to establish 10 an all

existing one

3

Founders of

.

states try to bring together

the elements which accord with the ideas of the several

constitutions

remarked

4

1

3

;

but this

is a

mistake of theirs, as I have already

when speaking of

the destruction and preservation *

Cp.

iv.

2.

5.

Cp.

iv.

i.

7.

4

Cp.

iv. 4.

v. 9.

7.

21.

The Nature of Democracy of

We

states.

The basis of common

set

forth the requirements, ethical

1 .

ruled in

is

liberty

which, according

;

2

end of every demo

One

principle of liberty is for all to rule and be and indeed democratic justice is the application turn,

2

of numerical not proportionate equality ; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. it is

must have

said,

equality,

and therefore

Every in a

citizen,

democracy

more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to the poor have

be the principle of their

he

state.

Another

is

that a

3

man should

2

This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman ; and, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark

live as

of a

likes

if possible,

in turns

;

.

This

slave.

whence has

the second characteristic of democracy, 4

is

arisen the claim or,

if this

and so

is

of

men

impossible,

to be ruled to

rule

by none, and be ruled

coincides with the freedom based upon

it

equality [which was the first characteristic]. 3 Such being our foundation and such the nature of de3

the election mocracy, its characteristics are as follows : of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule over each, and each to

all offices,

1

3

in

or to

Cp. Plato Rep.

his turn over all

viii.

Or (taking apxh

foundation,

557

in

all

;

that the appointment

but those which require experience and 2

foil.

the sense of

Cp.

democracy

are as follows.

v. 9.

15.

Such being our which we start, the

beginning

and such being the principle from

characteristics of

1

opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such 1317 b

this they affirm to be the great

a state

VI.

states.

a democratic state

to the

cracy

now

will

and aims of such

character,

239

),

5

The

240 VI. 2

Characteristics of

Democracy

skill \ should be made by lot ; that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one ; that no one should hold the same office twice, or not often, except

of military

in the case

offices

;

that the tenure of

all

offices,

of as many as possible, should be brief; that all men should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all should judge in all matters, or in most, or in the greatest and most or

such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, that the assembly should be supreme ; or at causes, any rate over the most important, and

important

and private contracts over

all

2

6 the magistrates over none or only over a very few institutions, a council is the

most democratic

not the means of paying

the citizens, but

paid even this

draw 7

for

robbed of

its

power

;

Of

.

when

all

there

when they

is

are

for the people then

cases to themselves, as I said in the previous dis-

all

cussion

is

all

3

The

4 .

services

receives

when

pay,

be had for

next characteristic of democracy

assembly,

;

all,

then

it

it

is is

law-courts, to be

had

is

when

or

;

payment

everybody

magistrates,

is

it

not to

given to the law-courts and to the

stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at

any of them who are compelled to have their meals And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, together. least to

wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be 8 the opposite of these

Another note 1318

a

low

birth, poverty,

no magistracy

mean employment.

perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be

elected

by

common 3

to

lot all

is

that

and no longer by democracies

Cp.

iv.

14.

6.

Cp.

iv.

15.

II.

;

is

These

vote.

are

but democracy and 2 *

points

demos

See note.

Cp.

iv. 6.

5.

in

Democratical Justice

241

form are based upon the recognized

their truest

democratic justice, that

principle

of VI. 2

should count equally ; for equality implies that the rich should have no more share in the govern ment than the poor \ and should not be the only rulers, but that in

should rule equally according to their numbers

all

way men

this

freedom

.

think that they will secure equality and

the question,

How

is this

the qualification to be

Is

?

And

2

their state.

in

Next comes tained

all

hundred rich

shall be equal to a

equality to be ob-

thousand poor

?

and

shall

we

give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred or, if this is

same

not to be the mode, ought we,

ratio, to take equal

still

?

retaining the

numbers from each and give them s and of the courts ? Which,

the control of the elections

according to the democratical notion, constitution crats say

this

is

is

that to

decision should

Demo

?

which the majority

oligarchs that to which the wealthier class

the

agree,

in their opinion

;

be given according to the amount of

some

and

property.

In both principles there

is

injustice.

For

of the few, any one the rest of his class put

person

who

a

the juster form of the

or one based on numbers only

that justice

3

so distributed that five

if justice

is

inequality

3

the will

has more wealth than

all

together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the sole will

power

but this would be tyranny

of the majority, as

I

;

or if justice

was before saying

4 ,

is

unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority.

1

*

Transposing dtrupovs and tinropovs, with Bekker Cp.

iv. 4.

s

Cp.

iii.

DAVIS

10.

To

2nd ed.

22.

3 Reading with Bekker s 2nd ed. aiptatwv from conjecture See note. 5iatptauv. which is the reading of the MSS.

4

the

they will

I.

R

for

4

Democratical Justice

242 VI. 3

find a principle

of equality

in

which they both agree we must

enquire into their respective ideas of justice.

Now

in saying that whatever is decided by the of the citizens is to be deemed law. but Granted majority not without some reserve since there are two classes out of

they agree

:

;

which a

the poor and the rich, that composed, to be deemed law on which both or the greater part

is

state is

of both agree

and

if

5

they disagree, that which

is approved have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining ;

by the majority, that

by those

is

who

and the

four of the rich join with the party of the poor,

of the poor with that of the rich ; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides remaining

five

6 are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. out to be equal, there

1318 b

no greater

is

If they turn

difficulty than at present,

when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. But, although it

may be

difficult in

theory to

know what

is

and equal,

just

the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear if

is

encroach,

far

for

who

greater,

can,

the weaker

are

l

care

they always asking for equality and justice, but the stronger 1 for none of these things like,

.

4

Of the discussion

four kinds of democracy, as 2 ,

the best

is

that

was

which comes

said in the previous

order

first in

;

it is

am

speaking of them according For the best to the natural classification of their inhabitants.

also the oldest

material of 1

Or,

of them

democracy

all.

is

I

an agricultural population 2

care nothing for the weaker. *

Cp.

iv. 6.

2.

Cp.

3

iv.

;

4.

there 22.

is

The no

difficulty in

best I(ind

243

of Democracy

forming a democracy where the mass of the VI.

people live by agriculture or tending of

cattle.

Being poor,

2

they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having the necessaries of

life they are always work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed, they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of govern

at

ment or

where no great gains can be made out of them, x many are more desirous of gain than of honour . is that even the ancient were endured proof tyrannies patiently office

for the

A

3

endure oligarchies, if they are allowed by to work and are not deprived of their property ; for some of them, as they

still

them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. Moreover they have the power of electing the magistrates 4 and calling them to account 2 their ambition, if they have ;

any,

is

thus satisfied

do not

all

;

and

in

some democracies, although they

share in the appointment of offices, except through

representatives elected in turn out of the

whole people, as

at

Mantinea, yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government may be 5

Hence regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. both expedient and customary in such a democracy that

it is

all

should elect to

offices,

and conduct

election

and from persons having a

and

sit in

filled

up by

scrutinies,

the law-courts, but that the great offices should be qualification

;

the greater

requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for

which a

qualification is required, then those

who

are

marked

Under such a 6 ability should be appointed. form of government the citizens are sure to be governed well the offices will always be held by the best persons ; the (for

out by special

people are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of 1

iv.

13.

2

8.

R

2

Cp.

ii.

12.

5.

4

The Agricultural Democracy

244 VI. 4

The good and

the good).

the notables will then be satisfied,

by men who are

for they will not be governed

and the persons elected 7

them

their inferiors,

will rule justly, because others will call

Every man should be responsible

to account.

to others,

nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases ; for where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to restrain 1319

a

which

the evil

is

the right persons rule 8

and the people have

which

and

why? because the

The

ancient laws of

people are drawn states

many

making the people husbandmen were excellent. provided either that no one should possess more than a aimed

at

quantity of land, or that, within a certain distance 9

Formerly

in

many

attributed to

town or the

from the

states there

was

of land

Oxylus, which

be a certain portion of every

which

They certain

he did, the land should not be

if

to sell his original allotment

;

from doing wrong,

It is evident that this is the

their due.

class.

principle of

the greatest good in states

is

are prevented

best kind of democracy, and

from a certain

But the

inherent in every man.

responsibility secures that

is

acropolis.

a law forbidding any one 1 .

There

is

a similar law

to the effect that there should

man

s

property on which he could

A

useful corrective to the evil of which borrow money. I am speaking would be the law of the Aphytaeans, who, although they are numerous, and do not possess much land, are

10 not

of them husbandmen.

all

For

their properties are

reckoned

the census, not entire, but only in such small portions

even the poor 11

Next

may have more

are a pastoral people, Cp. 2

rich.

Or,

ii.

than the amount required

best to an agricultural, and in

7.

7

who

live

many

2

in

that

*.

respects similar,

by their flocks

;

they are the

.

that the

qualification

of the poor

may

exceed that of the

The

inferior t^inds

The

4

people of

nferior to them, for their life is inferior

;

there

no room for

is

any of their employments, whether they mechanics or traders or labourers. Besides, people of this 13

moral excellence je

24 j

of any for war, robust in body and able to camp VI. whom other democracies consist are far 12

aest trained

out.

of Democracy

in

come to the assembly, because they are con about in the city and in the agora ; whereas tinually moving lusbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet, class can readily

Where

or equally feel the want of assembling together.

the 14

is no territory extends to a distance from the city, there excellent or constitutional in an making democracy difficulty

government, for the

and even

country ought not to meet ;

people are compelled

if there is a

when

nave thus explained

;

the is

it

first

excluded will

at

the

We

15

and best form of democracy

clear that the other or inferior

sorts will deviate in a regular order, is

settle in

the country people cannot come.

how

should be constituted

to

town population the assembly

and the population which 1319 b

each stage be of a lower kind.

The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long The more general unless well regulated by laws and customs. causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government

have

now been

pretty fully considered

l .

In order to constitute 16

such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit of including as many as they can, and making

who are legitimate, but even of the who have, only one parent a citizen,

citizens not only of those illegitimate,

and of those

whether father or mother 2

for nothing of this sort cornes ; amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in which dema- 17 gogues proceed ; whereas the right thing would be to make 1

CP

.

v. 5.

Cp.

iii.

5.

7.

The

246 VI. 4 no more

when

additions

and

Construction

the number of the commonalty exceeds

that of the notables or of the middle class,

When

beyond

this not

excess of this point the state becomes dis orderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the to go.

in

democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene ; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. 1

8

Measures

like those

which Cleisthenes 1 passed when he wanted

power of the democracy at Athens, or such were taken by the founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of democracy. Fresh tribes to

increase the

as

19

and brotherhoods should be established families should be restricted

;

the private rites of

and converted

into public ones

;

adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and get rid of old connexions.

in short, every contrivance should be

20 Again, the measures

them

which

to be democratic

mitted to slaves (which

and

also that of

body

are taken by tyrants appear

may 2

children,

Such

a

and the allowing every will have many

government supporters, for most persons would rather live than in a sober manner.

5

The mere

.

establishment of a democracy

is

in a disorderly

not the only or

principal business of the legislator, or of those

create such a state, for any state,

may 2

last one,

two, or three days

preservation of

it.

The

of

be to a certain extent advantageous)

women and

to live as he likes

all

such, for instance, as the licence per

;

;

who wish

however badly

to

constituted,

a far greater difficulty is the

legislator should therefore

endeavour to

have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states 3 ;

he should guard against the destructive elements, and should 1

CP

.

iii.

2.

3;

v. 3. 3

2

5.

Cp. Bk.

v.

CP

.

v.

ii.

ii.

Preservation of Democracy make all

laws, whether written or unwritten,

the preservatives of states.

He

which

247 will contain

must not think the

truly

VI. 5 1320

democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will

make them

last longest

*.

The demagogues

day often get property confiscated to please the people.

2

in the

of our

own

3

law-courts in order

But those who have the welfare of the

state at heart should counteract

them, and make a law that the

property of the condemned which goes into the treasury should Thus offenders will be as much not be public but sacred.

they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as 4 afraid, for

few as possible, and heavy penalties should be those

who

bring groundless accusations

;

for

it is

inflicted

on

the practice

to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens ought to be all equally attached to the state, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies. Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the 5

citizens are very

unless they are

numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble paid,

and

to

pay them when there are no

revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by a property-tax and confiscations and cor rupt practices of the courts, things

which have before now

overthrown many democracies) ; where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of

days only.

do not selves

many

but

persons,

This system has two advantages

:

sit

for a

first,

fear the expense, even although they are unpaid

when 1

the poor are paid

Cp.v.

u.

;

them

and secondly, causes are better 2

2, 3.

few

the rich 6

CP

.

v.

5.

5.

a

A

248 VI. 5

Patriotic

tried,

Nobility

although they do not like to be

for wealthy persons,

own affairs, do not mind going for a few Where there are revenues the dema law-courts.

long absent from their 7

days to the gogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus

the poor are always receiving and always wanting

;

more and more, cask. Yet the

for such help is like water

poured into a leaky of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of 8 the democracy ; measures also should be taken which will give

of

them

true friend

lasting prosperity

classes, the

all

;

and as

this is equally the interest

proceeds of the public revenues should be

accumulated and distributed among them, quantities as

1320 b rate,

make

may

enable them to purchase a

a beginning in trade

if possible, little

farm, or, at any

And

and husbandry.

9 benevolence cannot be extended to

such

in

if this

money should be dis

all,

tributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in

the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies

;

and should

excused from useless public services.

By

in return be

administering the

state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections

people 10

them

;

their policy

of the

from time to time to send some of

is

into their dependent towns,

where they grow

rich

J .

It

worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work.

is

also

The example of imitation, 1 1

of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving by sharing the use of their own property with

for,

the poor, they gain their all

their offices into

two

good

will

2 .

Moreover, they divide

classes, one-half of them being elected

by vote, the other by lot the latter, that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better ;

1

"

Cp.

ii.

ii.

15.

Cp.

ii.

5.

S.

The various I^inds of Oligarchies 249 A like result may be gained by dividing the administered. same

offices

\ so as to have

two

VI. 5

classes of magistrates, one

chosen by vote, the other by lot. Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies 6 ought to be constituted.

From ing

these considerations there will be no difficulty in see

what should be the constitution of

oligarchies.

We

must

put together in our minds each form of oligarchy by reasoning

from

its

opposite, calculating the structure of each in relation

to that of the opposite democracy.

The

first

and best attempered of oligarchies

is

akin to a con- 2

government. In this there ought to be two standards the lower of qualification ; the one high, the other low stitutional

qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the

higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed should have the rights of citizenship. The nature qualification of those admitted should be such as will make the entire 3

governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out of the better class of the

The

people.

principle,

narrowed

a

little,

gives another form

of oligarchy ; until at length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy,

which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its 4 For as healthy bodies and ships well provided with

badness. sailors

may undergo many mishaps and

survive them, whereas

and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by mistake, so do the worst forms of government 1321

sickly constitutions

the very least

require the greatest care.

generally preserves

them

The (for

populousness of democracies 5

number

place of justice based on proportion) 1

Reading

rfjs avTijs a.px^s

;

is to democracy in the whereas the preservation

with Bekker

s

and ed.

a

Hoiv VI. 6 of an

Organise an Oligarchy

to

oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle, viz.

good order.

As

7

there are four chief divisions of the

husbandmen,

retail

mechanics,

traders,

there are four kinds of military forces infantry,

the

light-armed

the

troops,

common

labourers

people so also

;

the cavalry, the heavy J

navy

.

When

the

country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely

For the

to be established.

security of the inhabitants depends

upon a force of this sort, and only rich men can afford to keep The second form of oligarchy prevails when there horses. are heavy infantry 2

2 ;

for this service is better suited to the rich

But the light-armed and the naval element are wholly democratic and nowadays, when they are so the if two numerous, parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often than to the poor.

;

A

worsted by them in the struggle. remedy for this state of things may be found in the practice of generals who combine

3

a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed. And this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil contests being lightly armed, they An fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry. ;

oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes raises a

power against

And

itself.

therefore, since the ages

of the citizens vary and some are older and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, taught the agile movements of light-armed troops ; and some, when they grow up, should be selected out of the youth, and 4

become light-armed warriors also yield a share in the

said before, to those 1

Cp.

iv. 3.

in reality.

government

who have 2

2, 3. 3

The

oligarchy should

to the people, either, as I

a property qualification

Reading dir\iTi)v with Bekker Cp.

c. 6.

2.

s

3 ,

or, as

1st ed.

in

Thebes

the case of

certain

to those

,

who have

abstained for a

number of years from mean employments,

men of

Massalia, to

merit

who

or, as

VI. 7

at

are selected for their worthi

The magistracies ness, whether [previously] citizens or not. of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the

5

governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the people will not desire them and will take no offence at the privileges of their rulers when they see that It is fitting also that 6 they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or erect in

participate

some

public edifice,

the entertainments,

and then the people who

and

to

like

see

the city

decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire

an alteration in the government, and the notables will have

memorials of their munificence. but the fashion of our

modern

of gain as they are of honour

This, however,

oligarchs,

who

is

anything 7

are as covetous

oligarchies like theirs

;

may

be

Enough of the manner 1321 b which democracies and oligarchies should be organized. Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their 8

well described as petty democracies. in

number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have 2 No state can exist not having the necessary already spoken .

offices,

and no

offices

which tend

be well administered not having the

state can

to preserve

harmony and good

small states, as

we have

many of them, and we should

carefully consider

already remarked

s ,

order.

In

2

there need not be

but in larger there must be a larger number,

which

offices

may

properly

be united and which separated. First

among necessary i

CP

offices is that

which has the care of 2

.

iii.

7.

5. 3

CP

.

iv. 15.

5-7.

CP

.

iv.

15.

3

2^2

the Criminal Executive

Offices

VI. 8 the market

;

and

inevitably be buyers

wants

and so 4 state

For

in

who

sellers

this is the readiest

;

con

a magistrate should be appointed to inspect

and to maintain order.

tracts

to

way

every state there must

one another

will supply

make

s

a state self-sufficing

the purpose for which men come together into one second office of a similar kind undertakes the super

fulfil

A

1 .

and embellishment of public and private buildings, the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes about boundaries and other concerns of a like nature. vision

5

This

is

called the office of City-warden,

commonly

various departments, which, in

among

more populous towns,

and has

are shared

example, taking charge of the

different persons, one. for

There

6 walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbours.

another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the is

country

the

:

Wardens of

who

magistrates

hold this

office

are

the country, or Inspectors of the woods.

these three there

is

called

Besides

a fourth office of receivers of taxes,

who

have under their charge the revenue which they distribute among the various departments ; these are called Receivers or

Another

7 Treasurers.

officer registers all private contracts,

decisions of the courts,

all

This

preliminary proceedings. divided, in

These

which case one

officers

are

public indictments, office again is

officer is

called

and also

and all

sometimes sub

appointed over

all

the rest.

Recorders or Sacred Recorders,

Presidents, and the like. 8

Next

to these

comes an

office

of which the duties are the

most necessary and also the most difficult, viz. that to which is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of 1

Cp.

i.

2.

8

;

Nic. Eth.

v. 6.

4;

PI.

Rep.

ii.

369.

Offices

Military and Civil

fines from those who are posted up according to the registers VI. 8 and also the custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office 1322 a arises out of the odium which is attached to it ; no one will ;

undertake

does

it

who

unless great profits are to be made, and any one

loth to execute the law.

is

Still

the office

for judicial decisions are useless if they take

no

society cannot exist without them, neither can

out the execution of them.

It is

is

necessary

effect it

and

;

;

if

exist with

an office which, being so 10

unpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but divided several taken

among

from

different courts.

In

like

manner

should be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are registered as public debtors.

an

effort

Some

sentences should be executed by officers

functions offices

;

;

penalties for

new

who have

other

new

offences should be exacted by

and as regards those which are not new, when one

court has given judgment, another should exact the penalty

;

for

example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed

by the wardens of the agora, and others again should exact the fines imposed by them. For penalties are more likely to be exacted

when

less

odium attaches

but a double odium

is

incurred

to the exaction of

when

passed also execute the sentence,

and

the judges if

executioners, they will be the enemies of

them

who

ir

;

have

they are always the all.

In many places one magistracy has the custody of the prisoners, while another executes the sentence, as, for example, It is well to separate off the jailorthe Eleven at Athens.

12

and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioner but

ship,

;

good men do

they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it ; for they themselves require a all

guard, and are not

fit

to

guard others.

There ought not

there- 13

2^4 VI. 8

Offices

Military and Civil

fore to be a single or

but

it

permanent officer set apart for this duty ; should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are

organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn

should take charge of

These first

:

it.

and should be ranked

are the indispensable officers,

next

14 higher rank,

in

order follow others, equally necessary, but of

and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such which are committed the guard of the city,

are the offices to

and other military functions. Not only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to In some states there are muster and marshal the citizens.

many such 1

offices

;

in others there are a

one

5 states are content with

1322 b or commanders.

Again,

;

few only, while small

these officers are called generals

if a state

has cavalry or light-armed

troops or archers or a naval force,

it

will

sometimes happen

that each of these departments has separate officers,

who

called admirals, or generals of cavalry or of infantry.

are

And

there are subordinate officers called naval and military captains,

and captains of horse

;

having others under them

!6 are included in the department

of war.

all

:

these

Thus much of military

command. But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the money, there must of necessity be another office which

public

examines and audits them, and has no other functions. officers are called T~

by various names

Accountants, Controllers. another which

is

Besides

Scrutineers, all

Such

Auditors,

these offices there

supreme over them, and to

this,

which

is

in a

democracy presides over the assembly, is often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of measures. For that

power which convenes the people must of necessity be the In some places they are called probuli, head of the state.

of Religion

Offices

Summary

because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy VI. more commonly councillors 1 These are the chief political 18

8

.

offices.

Another

set

of

officers is

concerned with the maintenance

and guardians see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in of religion

;

priests

larger ones there are a great

many

besides the priesthood

;

19

for

example, superintendents of sacrifices, guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these 20 there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the public

sacrifices,

priests

;

of the

city.

2

kings

such

,

except any which the law assigns to the from the public hearth

officers derive their dignity

They

are

sometimes called archons, sometimes

and sometimes prytanes.

These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows : offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbours, with the country

;

21

also with the

courts of law, with the records of contracts, with execution of

sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies

and accounts of magistrates

;

lastly,

there are those which pre

side over the public deliberations of the state.

There

are like- 22

wise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order

such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of

:

the laws, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics

;

also superintendents of gymnastic

and Dionysiac contests, and 1323 Some of these are clearly not 23

of other similar spectacles. democratic offices ; for example, the guardianships of 1

Cp.iv. 15.

ii.

2

Cp.

iii.

14.

women

14.

a

Summary

2f6 VI. 8 and

children

both their 24

1

the poor, not having any slaves, must employ

women and

Once more

:

offices in states

children as servants.

there are three forms of the highest elective

guardians of the law, probuli, councillors,

of these, the guardians of the law are an

aristocratical, the

the council a democratical institution. probuli an oligarchical,

Enough of

the different kinds of offices. 1

Cp.

iv.

15.

13.

BOOK

VII

HE who would duly enquire about the best form of a state while ought first to determine which is the most eligible life this remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be

VII. 1

;

uncertain

for, in the

;

natural order of things, those

may

be

expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner of which their circumstances admit. ought there-

We

fore to ascertain, first of life,

all,

which

and then whether the same

is

2

the most generally eligible or

life is

is

not best for the state

and for individuals. that

Assuming

enough has been already said

discourses concerning the best

we

in exoteric

now

will

life, only repeat the statements contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute 3 the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them

\ viz. external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have all three. For no one would maintain that he is happy who 4 has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice into three classes

who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice his dearest or prudence,

friend for the sake of half a farthing,

mind

in

as a child or a

universally 1

and

is

Op. N. Eth.

Omitting

i.

8.

liia-ntp,

and

as feeble

These

false

propositions are 5

acknowledged as soon as they are uttered

2

edition.

madman.

2

but

,

men

2.

which

is

bracketed

by

Bekker

in

his

second

Goods of Fortune, and Goods of VII.

1 differ about the quantity which superiority of this or that good.

moderate amount of virtue

To whom we

relative

think that a very

no

set

limit to their

reply by an appeal to facts,

mankind do not acquire or preserve

which

easily prove

by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or that

1323 b

Some

and the like. property, power, reputation,

desires of wealth,

6

desirable or the

is

enough, but

is

the Soul

both,

is

more

often found with those

cultivated in their

mind and

virtue

who

are

a moderate share of external goods, than

most highly

and have only

in their character,

among those who

possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in

higher qualities

;

and

this is not only matter

of experience, but,

upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any

if reflected 7

reason.

other instrument \ and that where there

is

too

things useful are of such a nature

all

much of them they must

either

do harm,

or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every the soul, the greater 8

useful

proof in

is

as well as

it is,

noble

required to

relation to

another

is

show is

good of

also of greater use, if the epithet

is

appropriate to such subjects.

No

that the best state of one thing

proportioned to the degree of excel

by which the natures corresponding so that, if the separated from each other lence

:

to those states are

soul

is

more noble

than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either 9 has a similar ratio to the other.

Again,

for the sake of

it is

the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all,

and

all

wise

men ought

to choose

them

for the sake of

the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them. 1

CP

.

i.

8.

15.

Virtue the Source of Happiness Let us acknowledge then

that each one has just so

279 much of VII.

happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and

God

wise action. is

in

a witness to us of this truth

is

l ;

for

Ic

he

happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but himself and by reason of his own nature. And herein of

necessity lies the difference between for external

good fortune and happiness; come of goods themselves, and chance is the author

2 is just or temperate by or through chance . In like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the happy state may be shown to be that which is [morally] best and

of them, but no one

which

acts rightly

right actions,

and rightly

;

cannot act without doing state can do right actions

it

and neither individual nor

Thus

without virtue and wisdom.

wisdom of

u

a

the courage, justice, and 12

have the same form and nature as the

state

qualities

which give the individual who possesses them the

name of

just,

or temperate.

wise,

Thus much may

by way of preface: for I could not 13 avoid touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the arguments affecting them ; these must be reserved for suffice

another discussion.

Let us assume then the

states, is

life

of

the performance of

good

we

actions.

There remains

?

will in this treatise pass

who

them

con- 1324 over,

Here

Cp.

Whether

to be discussed the question, is

c. 3.

10

For those who hold ;

a

the

2

the same as that of the state, or

again there can be no doubt

that they are the same. 1

If there are any

their objections hereafter.

happiness of the individual different

both for individuals and

life,

virtue, having external goods enough for

trovert our assertion,

and consider

that the best

N. Eth. Ethics

x. 8.

i.

S 2

9.

7 6.

;

no one denies

that the well-being

Met.

xii.

7.

2

a

1

26 o VII. 2 of

Is Contemplation best^ or Action ?

the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches

make

who

the happiness of the whole state, and those

value

most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city 3

the happier

is,

that of a citizen alien

who

Two

is.

it

for consideration

:

first

who

(i),

a

is

has no political

here present themselves

points

which

is

member of ties

the

and again

;

more

eligible life,

a state, or that of an

which

(2),

is

the

best form of constitution or the best condition of a state, either

on the supposition that

political privileges are given to all,

4 that they are given to a majority only state

and not of the individual

is

or

Since the good of the

?

the proper subject of political

thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political dis cussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our enquiry. 5

Now

is

it

evident that the form of government

which every man, whoever he is, can But even those who agree happily. of virtue

is

is

best in

and

live

thinking that the

life

the most eligible raise a question, whether the

life

of business and politics

which

is

is

or

is

act for the best in

not more eligible than one

wholly independent of external goods,

a contemplative life,

which by some

is

I

mean than

maintained to be the

one worthy of a philosopher. For these two lives the of the philosopher and the life of the statesman appear to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in

6 only life

the pursuit of virtue,

Which

7

is

the better

is

both in our

own and

a question of no small

in

other ages.

moment

;

for

the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life according to the best end. There are some who think

The

War and

of

Policy

261

Oppression

that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over

VII. 2

them, even though not

impediment to a man s individual well-being. Others take an opposite view they maintain that the true life of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits

unjust, is a great

;

of being practised, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as Others, again, are of opinion that by private individuals. arbitrary *

indeed,

and tyrannical in

some

rule alone consists with

states the entire

aim of the laws

happiness *

is

;

to give

men

And, therefore, 9 despotic power over their neighbours. in the laws said most cities be may although generally to be in still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the maintenance of power system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed

a chaotic state,

:

with a view to war

And

2 .

in all nations

which

are able to 10

power is held in esteem, for ex ample among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate Celts. gratify their ambition military

the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where obtain the honour of wearing as

many

we

are told that

men

armlets as they have served

There was once a law in Macedonia that he who campaigns. had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the

1 1

Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast.

Among the Iberians, whom a man has slain are fixed in the earth 1

Or, inserting

translator),

in

KOLL

a warlike nation, the number of enemies indicated by the number of spits which round his tomb ; and there are numerous

is

before vufjuav (apparently the reading of the old entire aim both of the constitution and the

some cases the

laws. 2

Cp. Plato, Laws,

i.

633

ff

12

War

262 VII. 2

among

practices

End

not the Supreme

mind

13

some of them

other nations of a like kind,

Yet

established by law and others by custom.

to a reflecting

must appear very strange that the statesman should be how he can dominate and tyrannize over considering always How can that which others, whether they will or not. it

not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the

is

legislator

The is

?

Unlawful

it

certainly

is

to rule without regard to

may be might where

there

for

justice,

other arts and sciences offer no

there

no

is

parallel

right.

a physician

;

not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot

Yet many appear

14 the passengers in his ship. a despotic government

ashamed of

for themselves, but

justice

own

others

case they are

they

;

demand

where other men are concerned

Such behaviour is irrational; nothing about it. is born to command, and the other born

care

15 they

their

to think that

and what men

a true political form,

and inexpedient in practising towards

affirm to be unjust

not

is

unless the one party to

to

1

1325

their

all

be

subjects

fellows,

;

just

but only

whether for food or

sacrifice,

or

happy (for

for

as

food

in isolation,

it is

those

And

which we

who

are

intended

hunt mankind,

not to

but only the animals which are that

sacrifice,

are eatable.

command, not

a right to

we ought

as

intended 6 animals a

which case men have

serve, in

indeed

is

say, such

to

surely there

will

assume

may

wild

be a

city

to be well-governed

quite possible that a city thus isolated

might be well-

administered and have good laws) ; but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of Hence all that sort of 17 enemies thing must be excluded.

we

see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally

to

be

things,

deemed honourable, but

only

means.

are

not the

And

supreme end of

the good

all

lawgiver should

The

how

enquire

may

False

and True Idea of a and

states

participate in a

of men

races

good

life,

and

in the

26$

T(uler

communities VII. 2

and

happiness which

is

His enactments will not be always the by them. and where there are neighbours J he will have to deal

attainable

same

;

18

with them according to their characters, and to see what The end at which duties are to be performed towards each. the best

made

form of government should aim may be properly

a matter of future consideration

2 .

Let us now address those who, while they agree that the 3 about the manner life of virtue is the most eligible, differ of practising

For some renounce

it.

think that the

life

of the freeman

the statesman and the best of

who

does

all

;

cannot do

nothing

power,

political

different

from the

of the

well,

latter

and of

life

but others think the

The argument

of the statesman best.

he

is

is

life

that

and that virtuous

To both we say with happiness. you The first class are right and partly wrong. in affirming that the life of the freeman is better than the life of the despot; for there is nothing grand or noble activity is identical

:

are partly right

in

having the use of a

slave,

commands about

or in issuing

in

so far as he

is

But

necessary things.

a

a slave; it

is

an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference

between the

freemen and the rule over slaves as

rule over

between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I have said enough at the commencement of there

this

is

treatise

And

3 .

it

equally a mistake to place inac- 3

is

above action, for happiness is activity, and the actions of the just and wise are the realization of much that is noble. tivity

1

Cp.

ii.

6.

a

7;

7. 3

14.

Cp.

i.

c.

5,6,7.

CP

.

c.

14.

VII. 3

But perhaps some one, accepting these premisses, may maintain that supreme power

the best of

is

all

still

things, because

the possessors of it are able to perform the greatest number If so, the man who is able to rule, 4 of noble actions. instead of giving up anything to his neighbour, ought rather to

take

away

his

power

and the father should make no account

;

of his son, nor the son of his father, nor friend of friend they should not bestow a thought on one another in com parison with this higher object, for the best is the most ;

There might be some eligible and doing well is the best. 1325 b truth in such a view if we assume that robbers and plunderers But this can never be ; and hence we 5 attain the chief good. infer the view to be false.

For

really be honourable, unless he

men

as a

husband

the actions of a ruler cannot

is

much

as

superior to other

to a wife, or a father to his children,

is

or a master to his slaves.

And

therefore he

who

violates

the law can

never recover by any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For equals share alike in the honourable and the just, as is just

6

and equal. But that the unequal should be given and the unlike to those who are like, is contrary and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. fore, there is

any one

l

superior in virtue

performing the best actions,

and

to equals, to nature, If,

there

power of follow and

in the

him we ought

to

7 obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as virtue.

If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for 8 the Not that a life city collectively, and for individuals. of

action

must necessarily have 1

Cp.

iii.

13.

relations to others, as

25, ana

1

7.

7.

some

The

Conditions of the Perfect State nor

think,

persons

which

as practical

ideas

only

to

be

regarded

VII. 3

are pursued for the sake of practical results,

the thoughts and contemplations which are

much more

but

those

are

2.65

independent and complete in themselves; since virtuous is an end, and even in the case activity, and therefore action,

of external actions the directing

mind

is

most

truly

said

necessary that states which are 9 cut off from others and choose to live alone should be inactive ; to act.

Neither, again,

is it

be activity also in the parts ; there are many ways in which the members of a state act upon one another. The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this 10 for there

may

God

were otherwise,

who

and the universe,

actions over and above their

1

own

have no external

would be

far enough energies Hence it is evident that the same life is from perfection. best for each individual, and for states, and for mankind ,

collectively.

Thus I

far

have

In what has preceded of government ; in what point to be considered is what should be the

by way of introduction.

discussed

remains, the

first

other

conditions of the ideal or perfect state

for the perfect state

;

cannot exist without a due supply of the means of

we must

therefore tions

2

but

,

number

presuppose

is

nobler),

which

better prepared,

so the

for his

2

And

life.

purely imaginary condi

There

the weaver or shipbuilder

must have the material proper as this

many

nothing impossible.

of citizens, a country in

As

like.

4

forms

be

a

certain

to place them,

and the

will

any other

or

work (and

in

artisan 3

proportion 1326 a

so will the result of his art be

statesman or legislator must also have the

materials suited to him.

First 1

Cp.

among c. i.

the materials required 10.

by the statesman 2

Cp.

ii.

6.

7.

is

4

The Number of

266 VII. 4

population

he

:

will consider

the Citizens

what should be the number and

character of the citizens, and then

state in order to be

are right, they have

what should be the

size

Most persons think

that a

happy ought to be large but even no idea what is a large and what

a small

and character of the country.

;

if

they

For they judge of

the size of the city by the number whereas ; they ought to regard, not their has but their number, power. city too, like an individual, a work to do ; and that city which is best adapted to the

5 state.

of the inhabitants

A

of

fulfilment

its

work

is

to

same sense of the word great called greater, not as a

be

deemed

greatest,

in

the

which Hippocrates might be man, but as a physician, than some one in

who was taller. And even if we reckon greatness by we ought not to include everybody, for there must

6 else

numbers,

always be foreigners

of the

in cities ;

state,

a multitude

of slaves and sojourners and

we should include those only who are members and who form an essential part of it. The number

but

proof of the greatness of a city ; but a city artisans and comparatively few soldiers cannot be great, for a great city is not to be confounded

of the

latter is a

which produces numerous

7

with a populous one. Moreover, experience shows that a very can rarely, if ever, be well governed ; since all populous city cities which have a reputation for good government have a limit

8 the

of population.

same

We

may

result will follow.

argue on grounds of reason, and

For law

is

order,

and good law

but a very great multitude cannot be orderly : to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine

is

good order

power 9

;

of such a power as holds together the universe.

Beauty

number and magnitude *, and the state which com bines magnitude with good order must necessarily be the most is

realized in

1

Cp. Poet.

7.

4.

The Number of To

beautiful.

the Citizens

the size of states there

2.67

a limit, as there

is

is

to

VII. 4

other things, plants, animals, implements ; for none of these 10 retain their natural power when they are too large or too small,

For

but they either wholly lose their nature, or are spoiled.

example *, at all,

a ship

which

is

only a span long will not be a ship

nor a ship a quarter of a mile long

;

may be

yet there

a ship of a certain size, either too large or too small, which will

In like manner a state 1326 b be a ship, but bad for sailing. composed of too few is not as a state ought to be, self-

still

when

sufficing

;

when of

necessaries,

it is

too many, though self-sufficing in

For who can be

able of constitutional government.

of such a vast multitude, or voice of a Stentor ?

A

state then

all

mere

a nation and not a state, being almost incap

who

the general

the herald, unless he have the

only begins to exist

when

it

has

attained

good life in the political com But, munity : it may indeed somewhat exceed this number. as I was What should be saying, there must be a limit. a population sufficient for a

the limit will be easily ascertained by experience.

2

For both

governors and governed have duties to perform ; the functions of a governor are to command and to judge. if

1

special

But

13

the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices to

according characters

both will

are

the

merit,

where

;

election

go wrong.

then

When

manifestly settled

not to be.

they

must know

each

other s

they do not possess this knowledge, to offices and the decision of lawsuits the

at

population

haphazard,

is

very large they

which

clearly

ought

Besides, in an overpopulous state foreigners and 14

metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out ? Clearly, then, the best limit of the population 1

Cp.

v. 9.

7.

The

268 VII. 4 of

a state

poses of

5

the largest

is

number which

and can be taken

life,

suffices for the

in at a single view.

pur

Enough

concerning the size of a city. Much the same principle will apply to the territory of the state is

every one would agree in praising the

:

most

which

2

Situation of the City

entirely self-sufficing

is

all-producing,

;

for to

state

which

and that must be the have

all

state

things and to want

In size and extent

should be such

nothing

is

as

enable the inhabitants to live temperately and liberally

may

sufficiency.

it

of leisure *. Whether we are right or down this limit we will enquire more precisely 2 hereafter when we have occasion to consider what is the a matter which is much right use of property and wealth disputed, because men are inclined to rush into one of two in

the enjoyment

wrong

in

laying ,

:

3

extremes, some into meanness, others into luxury. It is not difficult to determine the general character of the territory which

is there are, however, some required which on should be heard authorities points military they tell us that it should be difficult of access to the enemy, and Further, we require that easy of egress to the inhabitants. ;

;

13 27 a

the land as well as the inhabitants of

whom we

were just now

speaking should be taken in at a single view, for a country which is easily seen can be easily protected. As to the position of the city, if

we could have what we

wish,

4 be well situated in regard both to sea or land.

it

should

This then

one principle, that it should be a convenient centre for the protection of the whole country : the other is, that it should is

be suitable for receiving the fruits of the soil, and also for the bringing in of timber and any other products.

6

Whether 1

Cp.

communication with the sea

a ii.

6.

a

9.

Cp.

c.

is

8-10

beneficial infra

(,?).

to

Proximity of the Sea, Good, or Evil? a well-ordered state or not

is a

question

269

which has often been VII. 6

argued that the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the increase of population, will be adverse to good order (for a maritime people will always have

asked.

a

It is

crowd of merchants coming and

by sea

inimical

is

it

considerations, a view to safety

going), and that intercourse

good government *. Apart from these would be undoubtedly better, both with to

and

to the provision

2

of necessaries, that the

and

territory should be connected with the sea ; the 3 defenders of a country, if they are to maintain themselves city

and

against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by land

and even

they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, they will have less difficulty in doing mischief to their assailants on one element, if they themselves can use

by sea

both.

;

Moreover,

if

it is

necessary that they should import from 4

own country, and that they should export what they have in excess ; for a city ought to be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself. abroad what

is

not found in their

Those who make themselves do so desire

for the sake of revenue, profit

emporium.

of this kind

Nowadays we

it

a market for the world only and if a state ought not to

ought not

to

have such

an

often see in countries and cities 5

dockyards and harbours very conveniently placed outside the and they are kept in dependence by city, but not too far off; walls and

similar fortifications.

Cities thus situated

mani

of intercourse with their ports ; and likely to accrue may be easily guarded

the benefit festly reap

any harm which

is

against by the laws, which will pronounce and determine

who

hold communication with one another, and who may not. There can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate 6

may

1

Cp. Plato, Laws,

iv.

704

ff.

The Character of

270 VII. 6 1327 b

naval force

such be

advantageous to

formidable

own

their

to

their

The

a

city

them by

citizens require

in

cases

certain

or,

*,

sea as well as by land.

proper number or magnitude of this naval force is for if her function to the character of the state

relative

;

2

her naval power should with the scale of her enterprises. The

to take a leading part in politics

is

the

;

needs, and they should also

neighbours

necessary, able to assist

if

7

is

force for

a

the Citizens

be commensurate

.

need not be much increased,

population of the state

since

the no necessity that the sailors should be citizens marines who have the control and command will be freemen,

8 there is

:

and belong

the

to

also

infantry;

and wherever there

is

a dense population of Perioeci and husbandmen, there will Of this we see always be sailors more than enough. The city of Heraclea, for instances at the present day.

example, although small in comparison with many others, can Such are our conclusions respect 9 man a considerable fleet. of the its harbour, its towns, the its state, ing territory

and

relations to the sea,

7

its

maritime power.

Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will This is proceed to speak of what should be their character. a subject his

casts

which can be eye

on

the

easily

understood by any one who states of Hellas,

more celebrated

and generally on the distribution of races 2

Those who

world.

Europe skill

no

;

are full

they

but wanting in

keep

in

the habitable

climate and in [northern]

their

intelligence

freedom,

but

and have

and are incapable of ruling over Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and

political

1

Cp.

spirit,

and therefore

others.

2

of

live in a cold

ii.

6.

organization,

7.

Reading noXtrtKuv with the MSS. and Bekker

s first

edition.

The

Character of the Citizens

271

and therefore they are VII. 1 But the Hellenic 3 of subjection and slavery. situated between them, is likewise intermediate

inventive, but they are wanting in spirit,

always

in a state

which

race,

is

being high-spirited and also intelligent

in character, it

continues free, and

if it

l

Hence

.

the best governed of any nation, and,

is

could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the

There

world.

of Hellas

;

are also similar differences in the different tribes 4

some of them

for

and

are of a one-sided nature,

are intelligent or courageous only, while in others there is a

And clearly those whom happy combination of both qualities. the legislator will most easily lead to virtue may be expected say

that

whom

the

guardians

they know, fierce

know.

Now,

is

passion

more

is

who

are despised

by them

are

unknown ;

Plato

2

]

5

the quality of the soul which begets 1328 ;

notably the spirit within us

and acquaintances than

against our friends

stirred

[like

should be friendly towards those towards those whom they do not

friendship and inspires affection

against those

Some

and courageous.

to be both intelligent

for

to us,

when we

think that

we

which reason Archilochus, com- 5

plaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these

words,

For wert thou not plagued on account of

The power

of

men based upon Nor invincible. fierce

command and this quality, is it

towards those

iv.

3 ?

the love of freedom are in

for passion

is

all

commanding and

right to say that the guardians should be j

whom

they do not know, for

not to be out of temper with any one 1

friends

;

and a lofty

A.

we ought

spirit is

*

not

Rep. 375. 435 , 436 Cp. Plato, Rep. Or : For surely thou art not plagued on account of thy friends ? The line is probably corrupt. Better to read with Bergk, av -yelp Sr/ wapit. ii.

8

<]>i\cav

dir&yx*o,

for

thou indeed wert plagued by

friends.

a

The Passionate Nature

272 VII. 7

by nature, but only when excited against evil-doers.

fierce

And

this, as

I

was saying

a feeling

is

before,

which men

show most

8

strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a wrong at their hands as indeed is reason :

able

for, besides the actual

;

injury,

they seem to be de

who owe them

prived of a benefit by those

one.

Hence

the

saying,

Cruel

a

the strife of brethren

is

;

and again,

They who love Thus we have nearly

9

of the citizens of our their territory.

I

in

excess also hate

As site

in

and also the

state,

say

nearly,

for

.

size

and nature of

we ought

not to require

2 .

other natural compounds the conditions of a

whole

1

determined the number and character

the same minuteness in theory as in fact

8

excess

in

are not necessarily organic parts of

it,

compo

so in a state

or in any other combination forming a unity not everything 2 is

a part,

an

which

is a

necessary condition

have

association

necessarily

The members

3 .

of

some one thing the same

and common to

all, in which they share equally or unequally ; But where example, food or land or any other thing. there are two things of which one is a means and the other

3 for

an end, they have nothing in common except that the one what the other produces. Such, for example, is the

receives

relation in

the 4 the

house art

which workmen and and

the

of the builder

is

beings are included in

it

4 ,

is

no part of a 2

Eurip. Frag. 51 Diiulorf. 3

Cp.

iii.

work

;

5.

2.

even though living

but property,

so states require property,

1

tools stand to their

have nothing in common, but And for the sake of the house.

builder

state

Cp. 12.

*

Cp.

i.

4.

for a state is

;

9, infra. 2.

The Necessary not

community of

a

of equals, aiming happiness

is

of

reason

why

best

life

which some

attain,

while others have

men

of

5

men

for different

;

ways and by

different life

seek

little

are clearly the

there are various kinds of states and

themselves different modes of

We

Now, whereas

possible.

the various qualities

it,

of government different

community VII. 8

beings only, but a

living

at the

273

the highest good, being a realization and perfect

practice of virtue,

or none

Conditions of a State

after

many forms happiness in

means, and so make for 1328 b and forms of government.

must see also how many things are indispensable to 6 we call the parts of a state

the existence of a state, for what

be

will

Let us then enumerate the

found among them.

functions of a state, and First, there

we

must be food

shall easily elicit

what we want

;

many instruments thirdly, there must be arms, members of a community have need of them in

for

;

maintain

both

authority

against external assailants

amount of revenue, purposes of war of religion, which ;

most necessary of is

is

disobedient

internal

or rather

commonly

first,

subjects

and

needs there

and

and what

for

the

must be a care

called worship

there must be a

for the public interest,

the

order to

fourthly, there must be a certain

both for

fifthly,

all,

against ;

:

secondly, arts, for life requires 7

;

sixthly,

and

power of deciding what

is

just in

men

s dealings

with one another.

These need.

are the things

For

which every state may be said to 8 mere aggregate of persons, but

a state is not a

l

a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life ; and if any of these things be wanting, it is simply impossible state then 9 that the community can be self-sufficing.

A

1

DAVIS

Cp. supra,

X

c. 5.

I.

The Necessary

274 VII. 8 should

be

Conditions of a State

framed with a view to the fulfilment of these

There must be husbandmen

functions.

Having determined these

9

whether

points,

and

to procure food,

artisans, and a warlike and a wealthy class, and l judges to decide what is just and expedient.

we have

and

priests,

in the

next place

of occupa ought Shall every man be at once husbandman, artisan, coun

to consider tion.

to share in every sort

all

judge, or shall we suppose the several occupations just mentioned assigned to different persons ? or, thirdly, shall some employments be assigned to individuals and others common to cillor,

2

The

all

?

as

we were

saying,

all

may be shared by

some by some

but only states,

question, however, does not occur in every state

2

and hence

;

for in democracies

all

all,

or not

all

by

arise the differences

share in

all,

;

all,

of

in oligarchies the

we are here speaking of the best form of government, and that under which the state will be most happy (and happiness, as has been already said,

3 opposite practice prevails.

Now,

since

s

clearly follows that in the

cannot exist without virtue state

which

),

it

best governed the citizens

is

who

are absolutely

and not merely relatively just men must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical 4 Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is 4 to virtue .

1328 a

necessary both for the development of virtue and the perform

ance of

political

Again, there of councillors,

duties. is in a state

who

a class of warriors, and another

advise about the expedient and determine

matters of law, and these seem in an especial manner parts of a state.

Now,

should these two classes be distinguished, or

5 are both functions to be assigned to the 1

2

Cp.

iv.

Reading SiKai&v with Bekker 3 4 and 14. Cp. c. 8. 5.

in his *

same persons

?

Here

second edition.

Cp. Plato, Laws,

xi.

919.

The Governing again there

is

no

difficulty in seeing that

one way belong to the same,

To

Classes

other strength.

life,

both functions will

VII. 9

employments are suited wisdom, and the

for the one requires

But on the other hand, since

possible thing that those

in

in another, to different persons.

different persons in so far as their

to different ages of

27?

who

it

is

an im

are able to use or to resist force

should be willing to remain always in subjection, from this same ; for those who carry

point of view the persons are the

arms can always determine the

fate

of the constitution.

It 6

remains therefore that both functions of government should be entrusted to the same persons, not, however, at the same time,

who has given to young men wisdom. Such a distribution

but in the order prescribed by nature,

men

strength and to older

of duties will be expedient and also just, for it is in accordance with desert. Besides, the ruling class should be the owners of

7

property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should

be

in

class

whereas mechanics or any other good circumstances whose art excludes the art of virtue have no share in the ;

state. This follows from our first principle, for happiness can not exist without virtue, and a city is not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in regard to them all *.

And

clearly property should be in their hands, since the hus- 8

bandmen

Of the

of necessity be slaves or barbarians or Perioeci 2 . classes enumerated there remain only the priests, and

will

the

manner

No

husbandman or mechanic should be appointed

in

which

their office is to be regulated is obvious.

to

it ;

for 9

should receive honour from the citizens only. Now since the body of the citizens is divided into two classes, the

the

Gods

warriors and the councillors

worship of the

Gods

1

Cp.

ii.

5.

27,

and it is beseeming that the ; should be duly performed, and also a 2

28

T

3

Cp.

infra, c. 10.

13, 14.

2 VII. 9

Warriors

j6

rest

provided

in

Councillors

who from age have men of these two classes should

service for those

their

to the old

given up active life

Priests

be assigned the duties of the priesthood.

We

10

have shown what are the necessary conditions, and parts of a state husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers

what the of

:

kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the And these parts of the state are the warriors and councillors. all

are distinguished severally

being in

from one another, the

some cases permanent,

distinction

in others not.

1O

It is no new or recent discovery of political philosophers 1329 b that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the

warriors should

The

separated from the husbandmen.

be

system has continued in Egypt and in Crete to this day, and

was

by a law of Sesostris

established, as tradition says,

in

2

The institution of common Egypt an d of Minos in Crete. tables also appears to be of ancient date, being in Crete as

3

old as the reign of Minos, and in Italy far older.

was

historians say that there

from

whom

name of

The

Italian

a certain Italus king of Oenotria,

the Oenotrians were called Italians, and

who

gave

promontory of Europe lying between the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are distant from one the

Italy to the

4 another only half a

day

s

They

journey.

say that this Italus

converted the Oenotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and besides other laws which he gave them,

was the founder of

our day some who are derived from him retain this institution and certain other laws of his.

their

5

On are

common

meals

;

even

in

now,

as of old, called

Ausones

;

and on the side towards

lapygia and the Ionian Gulf, in the district called Syrtis 1

who

the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the Opici,

Retaining the reading of the MSS., which Bekker

edition has altered into Stpiris, a conjecture of Goettling

in s.

his

! ,

the

second

Ancient Egypt-) Crete, Italy

From this part VII. 10 common tables

Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian race. of the world originally came the institution of the separation into castes [which for the reign of Sesostris is

was much

277

;

older] from Egypt,

of far greater antiquity than that and many other things 7

It is true indeed that these

of Minos.

have been invented several times over * or rather times without

men

to have taught

number

;

in the

for necessity

course of ages,

may be supposed

the inventions which were absolutely re

and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by quired,

And we may

degrees.

same

rule holds.

infer that in political institutions the

Egypt

2

witnesses to the antiquity of

things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the

ancient

;

all

8

most

and they have laws and a regular constitution [existing

We

should therefore make the best from time immemorial]. s and try to supply use of what has been already discovered ,

defects.

have already remarked that the land ought to belong to 9 who possess arms and have a share in the government *, and that the husbandmen ought to be a class distinct from them ; I

those

and I have determined what should be the extent and nature

Let me proceed to discuss the distribution of the territory. of the land, and the character of the agricultural class ; for I

do not think 1

Pol. 2

that property ought to be

Cp. Plato, Laws, ii.

5.

iii.

676

;

Aristotle,

Metaph.

common,

xi. 8.

1074

as

b.

some

10; and

l6(note).

Cp. Metaph.

22 B; Laws,

i.

I.

16; Meteor,

i.

14.

352

b.

19; Plato, Timaeus,

656, 657. 3 Reading, with Bekker in his second edition, tvprjutvots which may have been altered into flprjfj.fvots from a confusion of (iprjrcu irpintpov ii.

:

in

9

infra.

4

Cp. supra,

c. 9.

5-7.

VII. 10 1330

a

maintain a

Common

Private Landholders

278

l ,

common

hleals

but only that by friendly consent there should be use of

it

;

and that no

want of

citizen should be in

subsistence.

As to common meals, 10 ordered city

what

there

is

should have them

own

are our

a general

agreement that a well-

and we

will hereafter explain

;

reasons for taking this view.

however, to be open to

all

the citizens

2 .

easy for the poor to contribute the requisite

They

ought,

And

yet

sum

out of their

is

it

not

The and to provide also for their household. likewise be a of should public charge. expense religious worship The land must therefore be divided into two parts, one public private means,

11

and the other

private,

and each part should be subdivided,

half of the public land being appropriated to the service of to defray the cost of the while of the private land, half should be near the border, and the other near the city, so that each

Gods, and the other half used

the

common

meals

citizen having

places

;

there

;

two is

lots

justice

they

may

all

and fairness

of them have land in

such a division

the

1

2

in s ,

both

and

it

border

tends to inspire unanimity among people wars. Where there is not this arrangement, some of them are too ready to

come

to

blows with their neighbours, while others quite lose the sense of honour.

that they

so cautious

are

in their

Wherefore there

is

a

law

in

some

places

which forbids those

who

dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations about wars with neighbours, on the ground that their interests 13 will pervert their

then, the land 1

:!

in

judgment. For the reasons already mentioned, should be divided in the manner described.

C P ii. 9. 31. 745, v/here the same proposal is found. Aristotle, 15, condemns the division of lots which he here 2

Cp.

ii.

5.

Cp. Plato, Laws,

Rook

adopts.

ii.

6.

.

v.

The Land and The

very best thing of

be slaves, not

they have no

all

its Cultivators

would be

that the

of the same race

all

1

279

husbandmen should VII. 10

and not

spirited,

for if

they will be better suited for their work, and there will be no danger of their making a revolution. The spirit

next best thing would be that they should be Perioeci of foreign race 2 , and of a like inferior nature ; some of them should be 14 the slaves of individuals, and employed on the private estates

of

men of

property, the remainder should be the property of

the state and employed on the explain what

is

common

land

s

I will hereafter

.

the proper treatment of slaves, and

why

it

them

expedient that liberty should be always held out to

is

as

the reward of their services.

We

have already said that the city should be open to the 11

land and

to the

sea

4

and

,

be to find a situation for

whole country as far itself our wish would

The

fortunate in four things.

it,

this is a necessity

health

first,

the

to

In respect of the place

as possible.

which

cities

:

towards the

lie

2

and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, next in healthfulness are those which are are the healthiest

east,

;

sheltered from the north wind, for they have a milder winter.

The

site

of the

should likewise be convenient

city

latter

should

it

at the

afford

easy

to

a

the

5 .

in the

great reservoirs

town

may be

citizens,

established fail

when

for

the

of them,

collection

ii.

7.

vi.

Cp.

777.

Cp.

23. 5

Repetition of

c. 5.

of

the inhabitants are cut *

Cp. Plato, Laws, Cp.

and

difficult

or, if there is a deficiency

rain-water, such as will not

3

both 1330 b

view to the 3

of capture to There should be a natural abundance of springs

and fountains

1

egress

same time be inaccessible and

enemies

With

and for war.

for political administration

3.

c. 9.

8.

c. 5.

3.

The

28 o

Conditions

City: Sanitary

VII. 11

off from the country by war. Special care should be taken 4 of the health of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on

the healthiness of the locality and of the quarter to

which they

and secondly, on the use of pure water this latter point is by no means a secondary consideration. For the elements which we use most and oftenest for the support are exposed,

;

of the body contribute most to health, and among these water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is

5 are

a

want of pure water, and the supply

is

not

all

equally good,

the drinking water ought to be separated from that which

is

used for other purposes.

As

to strongholds,

government

varies

what

is

suitable to different

thus an acropolis

:

is

or a monarchy, but a plain to a democracy 6

aristocracy,

but

rather

a

forms of

suited to an oligarchy ;

number of strong

neither to an

The

places.

arrangement of private houses is considered to be more agreeable and generally more convenient if the streets are regularly laid out after

damus

1

introduced

mode of out

building,

;

the

modern fashion which Hippo-

but for security in war the antiquated

which made

it

difficult for strangers to get

of a town and for assailants to find their

A

7 preferable.

building

:

is

it

way

in,

is

should therefore adopt both plans of possible to arrange the houses irregularly,

city

what are called clumps. should not be laid out in straight lines, but only certain quarters and regions ; thus security and beauty will be combined. as

husbandmen

plant their vines in

The whole town

8

As

to

walls,

those

2

who

say

that

cities

making any

pretension to military virtue should not have them, are quite

out of date in their notions 1

Cp.

ii.

8.

i.

;

and they may see the Cp. Plato, Laws,

vi.

cities

778, 779.

Military Requirements which prided themselves on

this

281

.

fancy confuted by facts.

True, courage shown in seeking for safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in character but the superiority of the and not much superior in number there

is

little

VII. 11 9

;

may be and and too much

besiegers resist,

beyond the power of men to the valour of a few ; and if they

often for

is

and to escape defeat and outrage, the strongest 1331 be the best defence of the warrior, more especially

are to be saved

wall will

now

that

and

catapults

to such perfection.

as to choose a site for a level

the heights

;

house unwalled,

Nor must we by walls

which

siege engines have been brought have no walls would be as foolish 10

To

town

in

an exposed country, and to

or as if an individual were to leave his

lest

the

inmates

should

who have

forget that those

either take advantage of

may

are unwalled have

become cowards.

their cities

them or

surrounded

not, but

11

cities

no choice.

If our conclusions are just, not only should cities have walls, but care should be taken to make them ornamental, as well as useful for warlike purposes,

modern all

For

inventions.

as

the

and adapted to resist of a city do

assailants

12

they can to gain an advantage, so the defenders should

make use of any means of defence which have been discovered, and should devise and invent others,

men

are well prepared

already

for

when

no enemy even thinks of attacking

them.

As built

be

the walls are to be divided by guardhouses and towers

at

suitable intervals,

distributed

occur that

we

at

common

tables,

the

idea

should establish some of the

in the guardhouses.

the principal

and the body of

common

The

citizens will

12

must

naturally

common

tables

arrangement might be as follows tables of the magistrates will occupy :

2

a

282 VII. 12

Public Buildings

a suitable place,

and there also

will be the buildings appro

priated to religious worship except

which the law or the

The

1

locality

3 special

.

in the

case of those rites

Pythian oracle has restricted to a site should be a spot seen far and

wide, which gives due elevation to virtue and towers over the Near this spot should be established an neighbourhood. agora, such as that

4 agora

from

;

which the Thessalians trade should

this all

be

freemen

the

call

s

and no

excluded,

mechanic, husbandman, or any such person allowed to enter, It would be unless he be summoned by the magistrates. a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of

men were performed

5 the elder

ages should be

different

practice

2

For

there.

2

separated

in

this noble

some of

and

,

the magistrates should stay with the boys, while the grown

up men remain with the magistrates [i. e. for the presence of the magistrates ;

agora]

the freeman s

in is

mode

the best

There should of inspiring true modesty and ingenuous fear. also be a traders agora, distinct and apart from the other, in a

situation

which

convenient for the reception of goods

is

both by sea and land.

But in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget another section of the citizens, viz. the priests, for whom

7

public

tables

place

near the

should

likewise be provided in

The

temples.

magistrates

their

who

proper

deal

with

summonses, and the like, and those who have the care of the agora and of the city respectively, contracts, indictments,

ought to be established near the agora and in some public place of meeting ; the neighbourhood of the traders agora the upper agora we devote to will be a suitable spot ;

1

-

Cp. Plato, Laws,

Or

v.

738

;

this institution should

viii. vi. 759, 778 848. be divided according to ages. ;

The End of the

of

life

the State

leisure, the other

and

the

Means

283

intended for the necessities of

is

VII. 12

trade.

The same

order should prevail

too the magistrates, called by

1

in the country,

for there 8

some

Inspectors of Forests, of the Country, must have guard

and by others Wardens houses and common tables while they are on duty

; temples should also be scattered throughout the country, dedicated,

some

to

But

it

Gods, and some to heroes. would be a waste of time

details like these.

carrying

them

out.

The

We

difficulty

may

is

for

us to linger

over 9

not in imagining but in

talk about

them

as

much

as

we

but the execution of them will depend upon fortune. Wherefore let us say no more about these matters for the present. like,

Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to 13 determine out of what, and what sort of, elements the state

which

is

There

are

them

is

to be

happy and well-governed should be composed. in which all one of well-being consists

two things

;

2

the choice of a right end and aim of action, and

the other the discovery

of the

actions

which are means

means and the end may agree or disagree. Sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they

towards

it

;

for the

to attain it ; in other cases they are successful in all the means, but they propose to themselves a bad end, and some times they fail in both. Take, for example, the art of medicine ; fail

physicians do not always understand the nature of health, and also the

In

means which they use may not effect the desired end. and sciences both the end and the means should be

all arts

equally within our control.

The desire,

happiness and

1

Reading

all men manifestly 3 but to others, from attaining,

well-being

some have the power of vtytfjojaffai

which

with Bekker

s first

edition.

284 The Good Life Requires External Goods VII. 13 some accident 1332

a

not granted in

goods,

;

a

or defect of nature, the attainment of for a

less

4 a greater degree

good

when men

degree

them

is

requires a supply of external

life

when they

are in a

are in a

lower

state, in

good

Others

state.

who

possess the condition of happiness, go utterly wrong from the first in the pursuit of it. But since our again,

is to discover the best form of government, that, namely, under which a city will be best governed, and since the city is best governed which has the greatest opportunity of obtaining happiness, it is evident that we must clearly

object

ascertain the nature of happiness. 5

We have said in the

J

Ethics if the arguments there adduced of any value, that happiness is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. ,

are

6

And

I

used the term

indispensable, and in

Take

itself.

to express that

conditional

to express that

absolute

the case of just actions

and chastisements do indeed spring from they are good only because it

7

would be

we

is

is

good

just punishments

;

a

which

which

good

principle, but

cannot do without them

better that neither individuals nor states should

need anything of the sort but actions which aim at honour The conditional and advantage are absolutely the best. action

the

is

only the choice

2

of a lesser

evil

make

whereas these are

;

A

foundation and creation of good.

good man may

the best even of poverty and disease, and the other

ills

but he can only attain happiness under the opposite ; 3 conditions As we have already said in the Ethics 4

of

life

.

1

2

3 1

,

Cp. N. Eth.

2 and cp. c. 8. i. x. 6. 15 7. Retaining the MSS. reading a peffis with Bekker s

N. Eth.

i.

N. Eth.

iii.

;

10. 4.

5, supra.

;

first

edition.

12-14. 4, 5

;

E. E.

vii.

15.

4

;

M. M.

ii.

9.

3.

The Good Life Requires External Goods the

good man

he to whom, because he

is

is

285"

virtuous, the

VII. 13

It is also plain that his use 8 good. of other goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense

absolute

his

is

good

This makes men fancy that external goods are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that a brilliant performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instru

good.

ment and not It

to the skill of the performer. follows then from what has been said that some things

the legislator must find ready to his

And

he must provide.

hand

we

therefore

in a

others

state,

can only

say May 9 our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed :

with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we acknow ledge her power) : whereas virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge

A

and purpose. city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state

the citizens share in the government

all

how

enquire

suppose

all

of

There

;

For even

virtuous.

would be

all is

we

could 10

better, for

in

the virtue of each the

involved.

are three things

which make men good and

these are nature, habit, reason

*.

In the

first

second place, he soul.

must have a

But some

certain

virtuous:

place, every

must be born a man and not some other animal

body and

us then

let

if

the citizens to be virtuous, and not each of them,

yet the latter virtue

man becomes

a

in

;

both

character,

qualities there is

no use

in

one

1 1

the

of

having

for they are altered by habit, and there are some 1332 b of nature which may be turned by habit to good or

at birth, gifts

bad.

Most

particulars

animals lead a

some

are 1

life

of nature, although

influenced Cp. N. Eth. x.

by habit as 9.

6.

in lesser 12

well.

Man

How Men

28 6 VII. 13 has

become Good man

reason, in addition, and

1

Wherefore

.

only

nature,

habit, reason must be in harmony with one another [for they

do not always agree]

men do many

;

them

reason persuades

13 nature, if

things against habit and

We

that they ought.

have

already determined what natures are likely to be most easily moulded by the hands of the legislator 2 All else is the work .

of education

we

;

learn

some

things by habit and

some by

instruction.

14

Since every political society is composed of rulers and let us consider whether the relations of one to

subjects,

the

other should interchange or

be permanent

3

For the

.

education of the citizens will necessarily vary with the answer 2

given to this question.

Now,

if

some men excelled others

same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general, having in the first place a great in the

advantage even in their bodies, and secondly in their minds, so that the superiority of the governors 4 over their subjects

was patent and undisputed 4 once for 3

But

all

since

,

would

it

clearly be better that

the one class should rule and the others serve this

is

and kings have

unattainable,

superiority over their subjects,

found among the Indians,

it

is

K .

no marked

such as Scylax affirms to be obviously necessary on many

grounds that all the citizens alike should take their turn of governing and being governed. Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand For [if the government 4 which is not founded upon justice.

be unjust] every one in the country unites with the governed 1

Cp.

i.

2.

3

10.

Cp. supra,

c.

3

7.

*

Or, taking rois dp\o/j,tvois with to their subjects. *

Cp.

i.

5.

8;

iii.

13.

13.

<pavfpdi> }

4.

Cp.

iii.

6.

9.

was undisputed and patent

Same Persons in the desire to

Jailers

and

have a revolution, and

287

Subjects

it is

an impossibility that

VII. 14

members of the government can be so numerous as to be Yet that governors stronger than all their enemies put together. the

should excel their subjects be effected, and in what

is

How

undeniable. will

way they

all

this is to

respectively share in

the government, the legislator has to consider. The subject has been already mentioned *. Nature herself has given the principle of choice when she made a difference between old

5

and young (though they are really the same in kind), of whom she fitted the one to govern and the others to be governed.

No

one takes offence at being governed when he is young, nor does he think himself better than his governors, espe cially if

he will enjoy the same privilege

when he

reaches the

required age.

We

conclude

and governed are

from one point of view governors 6 And and from another different.

that

identical,

same and

therefore their education must be the

For he first

of

who would all

learn

command

learn to to

As

2

obey

.

also different. 1333 a

well must, as

I

observed

in

men

say,

the

first

rule which is for the sake part of this treatise, there is one of the rulers and another rule which is for the sake of the

ruled

3 ;

the former

Some commands

is

a despotic, the latter a free government. 7

differ

not

in

the

thing

many

Wherefore, to

the

youth by whom they are performed ; for actions do not as honourable or dishonourable in themselves so much as

end and intention of them. of the citizen and ruler 1 8

is

c.

Cp.

iii.

9.

6.

5.

6.

free differ in

the

But since we say * that the virtue 8 the same as that of the good man, 2

Cp.

but

commanded,

with which they are imposed. apparently menial offices are an honour

in the intention

Cp.

iii.

4.

Cp.

iii.

4 and

*

14. 5.

10.

Who must Learn

288 VII. 14 and

that the

Rule by Obedience

same person must

first

be a subject and then

become good men, and by what means this may be accomplished, and what is the end of the perfect life. a ruler, the legislator has to see that they

Now

9

the soul of

which has reason in

good because he has

two

the virtues of these

which of them the end

more

is

who

doubt to those

10 matter of

divided into two parts, one of

is

itself, and the other, not having reason able to obey reason \ And we call a man

is

itself,

man

in

In

parts. is

no

for

in

be found

likely to

adopt our division;

the world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists for the sake

our ordinary 1 1

of the better or superior, and the better or The reason too, in which has reason.

that

is

superior

way of

is

speaking,

divided into two parts, for

and a speculative reason 2 and there must be a corresponding division of actions ; the actions of the there

is a

practical

,

naturally better principle are to be preferred

have

in their

it

power

by those

to attain to both or to

all,

who

for that

always to every one the most eligible which is the highest 13 attainable by him. The whole of life is further divided is

into

two

parts, business

actions into those 13

which

are

and

leisure

3 ,

war and peace, and all useful, and those

which are necessary and

And

honourable.

preference given to one

the

of actions must necessarily be like the preference given to one or other part of the soul and its actions over the other ; there must be war for the sake or the other

class

of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honourable. All these 1

Cp. N. Eth.

a

Cp. N. Eth. 3

i.

1

13.

vi.

i.

N. Eth.

8, 19.

5: ii.

x. 7.

6.

4.

The Spartan Ideal

when he frames

points the statesman should keep in view

laws

;

he should

consider the parts of the soul

functions, and above also

remember the

all

the better and the end

human

of

diversities

289

Criticised

;

and

his

VII. 14

their

he should 14

and actions.

lives

For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure 1333 and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and In such principles useful, but what is honourable is better. children and persons of every age

should

be

which requires education

Whereas even

trained.

the

Hellenes of the 15

who are reputed to be best governed, and the who gave them their constitutions, do not appear

present day, legislators

have framed their governments with a regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to to

all

the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those

which promised to be more useful and profitable. Many 16 modern writers have taken a similar view they commend the Lacedaemonian constitution, and praise the legislator for :

making conquest and war

his sole aim

*,

a

doctrine

which

may be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire in the hope of accumu- 17 goods of fortune

lating the all

those

tution

who have

have

monians,

by

praised

has

passed

their

a training

But surely they

;

and on

are not a

nor

away,

legislator,

in

ground Thibron and Lacedaemonian consti

this

written about the

because

hardships,

the

happy people now that

was

their

Lacedae

gained great

legislator

power.

their empire 18

right.

How

while they are continuing in the observances of his laws and no one interferes with them ridiculous

is

the result,

if,

they have lost the better part of

life.

These

1

Plato,

Laws,

i.

628, 638.

writers further 19

b

Spartan or Military Ideal

290 VII. 14

of government which the legislator should government of freemen is noble, and implies

err about the sort

approve, for the

more

virtue than despotic

government

Neither

.

a city to

is

be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised

he

because

his citizens to conquer and obtain dominion over their

trains

20 neighbours, principle

there

for

is

evil

great

in

On

this.

a

similar

who could, would obviously try to obtain own state the crime which the Lacedae

any citizen

the power in his monians accused king Pausanias of attempting 2 although he had so great honour already. No such principle and ,

no law having

this object is either statesmanlike or useful

For the same things

21 right.

are best both for individuals

or

and

and these are the things which the legislator ought Neither should men minds of his citizens.

for states,

to implant in the

study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved ; but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second 1334 a

good of the governed, and not

place obtain empire for the

for

the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third

who

should

they

place 22

seek

to

deserve to be slaves.

be

masters

over

only

those

Facts, as well as arguments, prove

that the legislator should direct

his

all

military

and other

measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of For most of these military states are safe only while peace.

war

they are

at

empire

like

And

;

3 ,

for this

fall

the legislator

taught them how

15

but

when they have acquired is

their

in

to lead the life of peace.

Since the end of individuals and of states 1

Cp.

i.

5.

their

time of peace. edge he never having to blame,

unused iron they lose

2

a.

Cp. s

Cp.

ii.

9.

34.

v.

i.

is

the same, the 10

;

7.

4.

Spartan or Military Ideal end of the best man and of the best the same

it is

;

and

must also be VII. 15

state

therefore evident that there ought to exist in

both of them the virtues of leisure often repeated,

291

;

for peace, as has been

the end of war, and leisure of

is

toil.

But

2

be promoted, not only by those in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to business *. For many neces leisure

saries

cultivation

which

virtues

of

life

are

may

practised

have to be supplied before

we

can have leisure.

Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able to endure There is no for truly, as the proverb says, :

leisure for slaves,

the

are

slaves

and those who cannot face danger like men invader. Courage and endurance

of any

are required for business and intellectual

3

for leisure,

virtue

temperance and justice for both, more especially in times of peace and leisure, for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure which comes with peace tends insolent.

Those, then, who seem

to

make them

to be the best off

and to be 4

of every good, have special need of justice and temperance for example, those (if such there be, as the poets say) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest ; they above in the possession

will

all

need philosophy and temperance and

more the more

the

of abundance.

There

is

no

they have,

it

be disgraceful in it is

life,

men

justice,

living in

difficulty in seeing

would be happy and good ought

that

If

leisure

and

all

the midst

why

the state 5

to have these virtues.

not to be able to use the goods of

peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use

them

in

to show excellent qualities in action and war, time of peace and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves. 1 i.

e.

not only by some of the speculative but also by some of the

practical virtues.

U

2

Need of a Higher

292

VII. 15 Wherefore we should not the Lacedaemonians

1

manner of

practise virtue after the

For

.

Ideal of Life

they, while agreeing wich other

1334 b rnen in their conception of the highest goods, differ from the

of mankind

rest

in

thinking that they are to be obtained by the

And

practice of a single virtue.

goods and the

since these

enjoyment of them are clearly greater than the enjoyment derived from the virtues of which they are the end, we must

now

how

consider

and

what means they

by

are

be

to

attained.

We have already determined that nature and habit and reason

7

2

are required

,

and what should be the character of the citizens

has also been defined by us. whether the training of early for these

habit,

But we have life

is

still

to consider

be that of reason or

to

two must accord, and when in accord they Reason may make

then form the best of harmonies.

will

mistakes and 8 there

may

fail

in attaining the highest ideal

be a like

evil influence

of habit

3

of

s

life,

and

Thus much

.

is

clear in the first place, that, as in all other things, generation starts

from

a beginning,

and that the ends of some beginnings Now, in men reason and mind are

are related to another end.

the end towards which nature strives, so that the generation

9

and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with In the second place, as the soul and body a view to them.

we

are two, rational

see also that there are

and the

irrational

4 ,

two

parts of the soul, the

and two corresponding

states

And as the body is prior in order of reason and appetite. the to soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. generation *

1

Cp. 8

Or,

ii.

9.

34.

and yet a

man may

be trained by habit as

so erred. 1

Cp. N. Eth.

i.

13.

9

ff.

if

Cp. 13

12.

the reason had not

Nature and Habit Prior The

proof

is

that anger

and

will

to

293

Treason

and desire are implanted

in

VII. 15

children from their very birth, but reason and understanding are as grow older. Wherefore, the care of the

developed they )ody ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow : none the less our care of it must >e

for the sake

of the reason, and our care of the body for the

sake of the soul \

Since the legislator should begin by considering how the 16 whom he is rearing may be as good as

rames of the children

his first care will be about marriage

>ossible,

should his citizens marry, and

on

egislating

heir relative ind that they

the case

woman

if

is

he man

who

fit

at

what age

to marry

?

In

3

he ought to consider the persons and there that ages, may be no disproportion in them, this subject

may not differ man is still

the

powers, as will be

in their bodily

able to beget children while the

unable to bear them, or the

is

are

woman

able to bear while

unable to beget, for from these causes arise quarrels

ind differences

between married persons.

Secondly, he must

consider the time at which the children will succeed to their for 3 ; there ought not to be too great an interval of age, hen the parents will be too old to derive any pleasure from heir affection, or to be of Nor ought they 1335 a any use to them.

>arents

o be too nearly of an age ; to youthful marriages there are many the children will be wanting in respect to their abjections larents.

who

will

seem

to be their contemporaries,

and disputes

management of the household. Thirdly, and 4 Jhis is the point from which we digressed, the legislator must nould to his will the frames of newly-born children. Almost

will arise in the

ill

these objects

may

be secured by attention to one point.

Since the time of generation

is

commonly

1

Cp. Plato, Rep.

iii.

410.

limited within the 5

The Physical Foundation

294

seventy years in the case of a man, and of fifty in the woman, the commencement of the union should con-

VII. 16 age of

case of a 6

form to these periods. The union of male and female when in all other is bad for the procreation of children ; animals the offspring of the young are small and ill-developed, too young

and generally of the female sex, and therefore also in man, as proved by the fact that in those cities in which men and

is

women 7

accustomed

are

and weak

in

;

to

marry young, the people are small

childbirth also younger

and more of them die

;

women

some persons say

suffer

more,

was the

that this

meaning of the response once given to the Troezenians Shear not the young field ] the oracle really meant that [ died because married too many they young it had nothing to ;

8

do with the ingathering of the harvest. temperance not to marry too soon ; for early are apt to be is

wanton

;

and

in

men

conduces to

It also

women who marry too the bodily frame

stunted if they marry while they are growing (for there

9 a time

when

marry when they are about eighteen years of l

seven-and-thirty 10 decline in children,

if

the powers of both will coincide. their

birth

takes

place at

the

and men

age,

then they are in the prime of

;

life,

in

the decline of

life,

at

and the

Further, the

time

reasonably be expected, will succeed in their prime, fathers are already

is

Women should

the growth of the body ceases).

that

may when the

and have nearly

reached their term of three-score years and ten. Thus much of the age proper for marriage the season of :

the year should also be considered

1 1

;

according to our present

custom, people generally limit marriage to the season of winter, and they are right. The precepts of physicians and natural philosophers about generation should also be studied by the 1

Omitting

ff

p.iicpov.

:

29?

Regulations Concerning Marriage

parents themselves ; the physicians give good advice about the right age of the body, and the natural philosophers about

the winds

What

of which they prefer the north to the south.

;

the offspring

is

a subject

which we

1335 b

most advantageous to

constitution in the parent is

VII. 16

12

will hereafter consider

when we speak of the education of children, and we will only make a few general remarks at present. The temperament of an athlete

is

not suited to the

life

of a

citizen, or to health, or

of children, any more than the valetudinarian or exhausted constitution, but one which is in a mean between to the procreation

A

them.

man

s constitution

not to labour which

should be inured to labour, but 13

excessive or of one sort only, such as is athletes be capable of all the actions ; he should practised by of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to both parents.

Women who

is

are with child should be careful of themselves

;

14

The they should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. first of these the will legislator easily carry into prescriptions by requiring that they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where they can worship the gods who preside over effect

1

. Their minds, however, unlike their bodies, they ought to keep unexercised, for the offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do from the earth.

birth

As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a 15 law that no deformed child shall live, but where there are too many

(for in our state population has a limit),

have children

in excess,

and the

exposure of offspring, let and life have begun ; what

may

or

may

these cases depends on the question of

And

couples

not be lawfully done in life

and sensation.

now, having determined at what ages 1

when

of feeling is averse to the abortion be procured before sense state

Cp. Plato,

Laws,

vii.

789.

men and women

16

Regulations Concerning Marriage

2p<5

VII. 16

are to begin their union, let us also determine

how

and bear offspring for the

shall continue to beget

long they

state

* ;

men

who are too old, like men who are too young, produce children who are defective in body and mind the children of very old men are weakly. The limit, then, should be the age which is the ;

17

prime of their intelligence, and this in most persons, according to the notion of some poets who measure life by periods of seven years,

about

is

2

fifty

;

at four or five years later,

they should

and from that time forward only cohabit with one another for the sake of health, or for some cease from having families

;

similar reason.

As

!g

or

to

adultery,

woman

let

it

to be unfaithful

be held disgraceful for any

when they

are married,

man

and called

1336 a husband and wife.

If during the time of bearing children of the sort occur, let the guilty person be punished anything with a loss of privileges in proportion to the offence s .

17

After the children have been born, the manner of rearing them may be supposed to have a great effect on their bodily It

strength.

would appear from the example of animals, and

of those nations the food ings 2

;

Also

who

desire to create the military habit, that

which has most milk

it is

all

best suited to

be

from

distortion,

But

some

if

in order to preserve their tender

nations

have had recourse to

appliances which straighten accustom children to the cold from their

mechanical

3

human

they would escape disease. the motions to which children can be subjected at their

early age are very useful.

limbs

in

but the less wine the better,

their

bodies.

To

earliest years is also

an excellent practice, which greatly conduces to health, and Hence many barbarians hardens them for military service. a

1

\tiTovpftii

.

3

Cp. Laws,

Cp. Solon, Fragm. 25 Bergk. viii.

41.

Education of Infants

297

have a custom of plunging their children at birth into a cold VII. 17 ; others, like the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper

stream

For human

only.

which by habit must be gradual. all

nature should be early habituated to endure

can be

it

And

made

to

next period lasts to the age of

demand should be made upon the

but the process

;

their natural

warmth, Such care should attend

be easily trained to bear cold. them in the first stage of life.

may

The

endure

from

children,

five

;

during this .no 4

child for study or labour, lest

growth be impeded ; and there should be sufficient motion to This can be secured, prevent the limbs from being inactive. its

but the

among other ways, by amusement, be vulgar or tiring or riotous.

The

amusement should not

Directors of Education, as 5

they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the children hear

the

way

for the sports of children are designed to prepare

*,

for the business of later

sue in earnest

life,

and should be for the most

of the occupations which they will hereafter pur

part imitations 2

Those

.

are

wrong who

[like Plato]

in the

Laws

6

attempt to check the loud crying and screaming of children, for these contribute towards their growth, and, in a manner, 3

exercise their bodies similar to that

violent

.

Straining

the

voice has an effect

produced by the retention of the breath in

exertions.

Besides other duties,

the

Directors

of

7

Education should have an eye to their bringing up, and should take care that they are left as little as possible with slaves.

For

until

they are seven years old they must

and therefore, even

at this early age, all that is

live at

home

;

1335

mean and low

should be banished from their sight and hearing. Indeed, 8 there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to 1

Plato, Rep.

ii.

377

a

ft.

3

Plato,

Laws,

Plato, Laws, vii.

792.

i.

643;

vii.

799.

1>

Maxima

298 VII. 17

drive

Debetur Pueris Reverentia

away than indecency of speech

of shameful words

is

;

for the light utterance

akin to shameful actions.

The young

never be allowed to repeat or hear anything of especially should freeman who is found saying or doing what is the sort. 9

A

if

forbidden,

he be too young as yet to have the privilege of

a place at the public table, should be disgraced and beaten, and

an elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves. And since we do not allow improper language, clearly we should 10 also banish pictures or tales rulers take care that there be

which

are indecent.

Let

the

no image or picture representing the temples of those Gods at

unseemly actions, except in festivals the law permits even

whose

ribaldry,

and

whom

the

law also permits to be worshipped by persons of mature age But on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives. 1 1

the legislator should not allow youth to be hearers of satirical

Iambic verses or spectators of comedy until they are of an age to sit at the public tables and to drink strong wine ; by that time education will have armed them against the evil influences

12

of such representations. have made these remarks in a cursory manner

We

-they

1 enough for the present occasion ; but hereafter we will return to the subject and after a fuller discussion determine

are

whether such 13

liberty should or should not be granted,

what way granted,

and

in

Theodorus, the tragic actor, was that he in would not allow any other actor, right quite saying not even if he were quite second-rate, to enter before himself, if at all.

because the spectators grew fond of the voices which they first heard. And the same principle of association applies universally to things as well as persons, for

H comes

And

first. 1

we always

like best

whatever

therefore youth should be kept strangers to

Unfulfilled promise ,?), but cp.

viii. 5.

21.

The Impressions of Early Tears that is bad,

all

When

hate.

299

and especially to things which suggest vice or VII. 17 two

the five years have passed away, during the

following years they must look on at the pursuits which they are hereafter to learn.

which education has puberty, and

poets]

who

There

are

onwards

two periods of

to the age of one-and-twenty.

divide ages by sevens

*

into 15

life

from seven to the age of

to be divided

are not always right

*

[The we

1337 a

:

should rather adhere to the divisions actually made by nature ; what art and education seek

for the deficiencies of nature are to

fill

up.

Let us then

down

first enquire if any regulations are to be laid 16 about children, and secondly, whether the care of them

should be the concern of the state or of private individuals which latter is in our own day the common custom and in the third place, 1 2

what these regulations should

Cp. supra, c. 16. 17. Reading ov /mAcDs, with the

MSS. and Bekker

or, reading ov KO.KWS, a conjecture of Muretus, in his etc.

second edition,

are in the

be.

main

right

;

s

first

edition

:

which Bekker has adopted but

we

should also observe,

BOOK VIII.

No

1

one will above

attention 2

VIII

doubt that the legislator should direct his to the education of youth, or that the

all

harm

neglect of education does

The

to states.

citizen should

be moulded to suit the form

he

l

lives

which

For each

.

originally

The

it.

character

of government under which government has a peculiar character

formed and

which continues

to

preserve

character of democracy creates democracy, and the

of oligarchy creates

oligarchy

;

and always the

better the character, the better the government.

Now

for

and

training 3 for the

not

it is

for as

exercise of any

all,

4

faculty or

required

And

;

art

a

clearly

previous therefore

since the whole city has

manifest that education should be one and the

and that

at present,

children separately, sort

are

habituation

practice of virtue.

one end,

same

the

should be public, and not private

it

when every one looks after his own and gives them separate instruction of the

which he thinks best

common interest should we suppose that any one

;

the training in things which are of

be the same for

all.

Neither must

of the citizens belongs to himself, for belong to the state, and are each of them a part

they all of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. In this particular the Lacedaemonians are to be praised,

children, and

2

for they take the greatest pains about their

make education

the business of the state

2 .

That education should be be an

affair

1

Cp.

v. 9.

of state

is

11-16.

regulated by law and should not to be denied, but what should a

Cp. N. Eth.

x. 9.

13.

What

a Liberal Education ?

is

301

be the character of this public education, and how young persons should be educated, are questions which remain to be

For mankind

considered.

are by no means agreed about the whether we look to virtue or the best life.

things to be taught,

Neither

is

whether education

clear

it

is

more concerned

is

The

with intellectual or with moral virtue. tice

existing prac-

should proceed

no

;

three opinions have been entertained.

means there

is

a

one knows on what principle we should the useful in life, or should virtue,

perplexing

or should the higher knowledge, be the aim of our training all

VIII. 2

no agreement

for different persons,

;

;

Again, about the 1337 b start

ing with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally

disagree about the practice of

There can be no doubt

it.

3

should be taught those useful things which thaf are really necessary, but not all things ; for occupations are divided into liberal and illiberal ; and to young children children

should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge as will And any 4 to them without vulgarizing them. or makes the or which soul or art, science, body occupation,

be useful

mind of the freeman of

is

virtue,

which tend ments, for

vulgar

;

less

for

fit

wherefore

the practice or

we

call

those

exercise

arts

vulgar 5

deform the body, and likewise all paid employ There are they absorb and degrade the mind. to

also

some

liberal

but

only

in

a

arts quite proper for a

certain

and

degree,

if

freeman to acquire,

he

attend

to

them

too closely, in order to attain perfection in them, the same effects

will

sets

before

him makes

learns friends,

anything

The

follow.

evil

for his

or with a view 1

a great

own

object

sake

*

Cp.

4.

13.

;

which a man 6 if

he does or

or for the sake of his

to excellence, iii.

also

difference

the

action

will

not

What

302 VIII. 2 appear

illiberal

same

action

a Liberal Education?

is

but if done for the sake of others, the very

;

be

will

and

menial

thought

The

servile.

received subjects of instruction, as I have already remarked \ are partly of a liberal

3

and partly of an

illiberal character.

The

customary branches of education are in number four ; (i) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, they are Of (3) music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing.

and writing and drawing are regarded as useful of life in a variety of ways, and gymnastic

these, reading

for the purposes

Concerning music

exercises are thought to infuse courage. 2

a doubt

may

be raised

for the sake of pleasure,

education,

because

requires that

own day most men

in our

but originally

nature

use leisure well

said,

for,

;

of

be able not only to work well, but to 2 as I must repeat once and again , the

all

action

is leisure.

leisure is better than occupation

must be asked

for

been often

has

it

in

we should

3 first principle

leisure

as

herself,

cultivate

was included

it

in

good

earnest,

we ought

;

Both

are required, but

and therefore the question

what ought we

not to

to

do when

at

be

amusing ourselves, But if this is then amusement would be the end of life. ?

Clearly

4 inconceivable,

and yet amid serious occupations amusement at other times (for he who is hard

needed more than

is

work has

at

need

of relaxation,

amusement

and

gives

relaxation, whereas occupation is always accompanied with exertion and effort), at suitable times we should introduce

1338

a

amusements, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and Leisure of itself gives from the pleasure we obtain rest. pleasure

and

5 experienced,

happiness

a

1

3 supra.

and enjoyment

not by the busy man,

As

in vii. 15.

of

life,

but by those I,

2,

which

who

and N. Eth.

are

have

x. 6.

The Use of Music For he who

leisure.

he has not attained

deem

to be

This

pleasure,

;

is

occupied has

but happiness

303

view some end which VIII. 3

in

an end which

is

all

men

accompanied with pleasure and not with pain.

however, is regarded differently by different and varies according to the habit of individuals ; the persons, the man is the best, and springs from of best pleasure It is clear, then, that there are branches 6

the noblest sources.

of learning and education which we must study with a view to the enjoyment of leisure, and these are to be valued

own

for their

sake

whereas those kinds of knowledge which deemed necessary, and exist

;

are useful in business are to be

And

sake of other things.

for the

therefore our fathers 7

admitted music into education, not on the ground either of necessity or

it is utility, for

its

not necessary, nor indeed useful

in

the same manner as reading and writing, which are useful

in

money-making,

in

the

management of

and in acquisition of knowledge

a household, in the

nor like drawing, of the works of artists, judgment nor again like gymnastic, which gives health and strength ; for neither of these is to be gained from music. There useful for a

more

political life,

correct

remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure

which appears

;

tion, this

to have been the reason of its introduc

being one of the ways in which

a freeman should pass his leisure

How

good

is

it

to invite

and afterwards he speaks

men

as

;

is

it

Homer

thought that says

to the pleasant feast

of others

whom

,

he describes as

inviting

The 1

Or,

possibly

bard

who would

delight

them

intended

by

Aristotle,

2

meaning.

all

V

an interpretation of the passage though of course not the original

to invite Thalia to the feast,

Od.

xvii.

385.

Educational Studies

304 VIII. 3 And

in

passing

another place Odysseus says there life

Men

s

It

is

no better way of

hearts are merry and the banqueters in the hall,

V

hear the voice of the minstrel

sitting in order,

TO

is

when

than

that there

evident, then,

which parents should

is

a

Whether

or noble.

liberal

it is

in

not as being useful or

train their sons,

necessary, but because

sort of education

this is

of one kind only, or of more than one, and if so, what they are, and how they are to be imparted, must hereafter be 1 1

Thus much we

determined.

the ancients witness to us

from the

music

fact that

branches of education.

should be instructed reading and writing

because 12 them.

many With

1388 b or

of

;

in a

position to say that

may

be gathered

one of the received and traditional

is

it

Further,

some

is

clear

useful things

that

children

for example, in

not only for their usefulness, but also

making mistakes

order that they selling

now

other sorts of knowledge are acquired through a like view they may be taught drawing, not

to prevent their in

in

are

for their opinion

may

articles,

in their

own

purchases, or

not be imposed upon in the buying but

rather

because

it

makes them

To be always judges of the beauty of the human form. seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted 13 souls

2 .

Now

it

is

clear

that in

must go and therefore

education habit

before reason, and the body before the

mind

;

boys should be handed over to the trainer, who creates in them the proper habit of body, and to the wrestling-master,

who

4

teaches them their exercises.

Of those

states which in our own

care of children,

some aim

habit, but they only injure their 1

Od.

ix. 7.

day seem to take the greatest

producing in them an athletic

at

2

forms and stunt their growth. Op. Plato, Rep.

vii.

525

ff.

Physical Education Lacedaemonians have not

the

Although

into

fallen

this

VIII. 4

mistake, yet they brutalize their children by laborious exercises

which they think as

we have

But

make them courageous.

will

in truth, 2

often repeated, education should not be exclusively

And

directed to this or to any other single end.

even

we

if

suppose the Lacedaemonians .to be right in their end, they do not attain it. For among barbarians and among animals courage

found associated, not with the greatest ferocity, but

is

There

with a gentle and lion-like temper.

who

are

ready enough to

kill

and

Achaeans and Heniochi, who both and there are other inland

eat

live

are

races 3

many

such

men,

the

as

about the Black Sea

tribes, as bad or worse,

who

1 ;

all live

It is notorious that the 4 by plunder, but have no courage. while were themselves assiduous Lacedaemonians, they

in their laborious drill,

are beaten both in

were superior to others, but now they

war and gymnastic

ancient superiority did not

first

time

a

at

infer that

what

place

parents

is

when

mode of

their

training

not.

Hence we may

is brutal,

should have the

others did

noble, not

what

no wolf or other wild animal

;

noble danger

For

exercises. their

but only on the circumstance that they trained

their youth,

them

depend on

;

who

5

face a really

will

such dangers are for the brave man *. devote their children to gymnastics

And

6

while

they neglect their necessary education, in reality vulgarize them ; for they make them useful to the state in one quality only,

and even

to others.

argument proves them to be inferior should judge the Lacedaemonians not from

in this the

We

what they have been, but from what they ave rivals

who compete

are

with their education

for

;

;

now

they

formerly they

ad none. Cp. N. Eth. 5AV1S

vii.

.5.

2

2.

X

Cp. N. Eth.

iii.

6.

8.

7

306 VIII. 4

Gymnastic

an admitted principle that gymnastic exercises should be employed in education, and that for children they should It is

be of a lighter kind, avoiding severe regimen or painful the

8 lest

The

growth of the body be impaired.

excessive

in

training

1339 a the example of the or three of

early

Olympic

is

years

proved

strikingly

of

by

more than two

for not

victors;

toil,

evil

them have gained a prize both as boys and as men ; and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted

their early training

When

9 their constitutions.

is

boyhood

over,

three

years

should be spent in other studies ; the period of life which follows may then be devoted to hard exercise and strict regimen. their

Men

ought not to labour at the same time with a their bodies ; for the two kinds of

minds and with

the labour of the body

labour are opposed to one another

impedes the mind, and the labour of the

5

mind the body.

Concerning music there are some questions which we have already raised ; these we may now resume and carry further ;

and our remarks 2

will serve as a prelude to this or

discussion of the subject.

It

is

any other

not easy to determine the

any one should have a knowledge of Shall we say, for the sake of amusement and relaxation,

nature of music, or it.

why

like sleep or drinking,

and

are pleasant,

at

which

the

2

3 as

Euripides

music, and

says

?

make use of

are not

And all

therefore

three

in themselves, but

good

same time

make

men s

sleep

,

care

to

cease,

rank them with

drinking, music

which some add dancing. Or shall we argue that music conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can form our minds to

and habituate us 1

to

true pleasures as our bodies are 2

made by

vii. 537 B. Bacchae, 380. Reading (with Bekker s 2nd ed.) virvy, a correction which seems necessary, and is suggested by vnvov uai fj,fOi]s above.

Cp. Plato, Rep.

3

Music

$07

Or shall we say that VIII. 5 gymnastic to be of a certain character ? * it contributes to the enjoyment of leisure and mental cultivation,

which

is

a third alternative

Now

?

obviously youth are

not to be instructed with a view to their amusement, for learn

Neither accompanied with pain. of that age, for it boys

ing is no pleasure, but

is

intellectual

suitable to

enjoyment

the end, and that which

is

imperfect cannot attain the perfect may be said that boys learn music for 5 is

But perhaps it amusement which they

or end.

the sake of the are

is

grown

If so,

up.

why

will have when they should they learn themselves, and

Persian and Median kings, enjoy the pleasure is derived from hearing others ? (for 6

not, like the

and instruction which surely skilled

persons

and profession of those

who

who have made music

their lives

will

practise only to learn).

the business

be better performers than If they must learn music,

on the same principle is

they should learn cookery, which even granting that music may form the the objection still holds why should we learn

And

absurd.

character,

ourselves a correct

monians

Why

?

we

cannot

attain

and form 1339 b

the Lacedae

like

for they, without learning music, nevertheless can

good and bad melodies.

correctly judge, as they say, of again,

true pleasure

judgment from hearing others,

?

if

7

:

music

and refined

should

be

used

to

promote

enjoyment, the objection learn ourselves instead of

intellectual

should

we

Or 8

cheerfulness

still

remains

enjoying the performances of others ? may illustrate what we are saying by our conception of the Gods ; for in the poets Zeus does not himself sing or play on the lyre. Nay, we call

why

We

professional

performers vulgar

;

no freeman would play or But these matters 9

sing unless he were intoxicated or in jest.

may be

left for

the present.

X

2

The Pleasure of Music

308 The

VIII. 5

first

question

Of

of education.

which

sion,

is

enjoyment, for

is

it ?

it

whether music

may

intellectual

and seems

not

is

is

universally

three,

for the

is

of necessity sweet, for

acknowledged

of the noble but of the

only

all

Amusement

of them.

remedy of pain caused by

the

is

not to be a part

be reckoned under

sake of relaxation, and relaxation

enjoyment

is

Education or amusement or

10 to share in the nature of all

it

or

is

the three things mentioned in our discus

and

toil,

to

intellectua

contain an elemen for

pleasant,

happiness

All men agree that music is one o the pleasantest things, whether with or without song ; as

11 is

made up of

Musaeus

both.

says,

Song

Hence and

is

to mortals of

with

things the sweetest.

all

is introduced into socia good it makes the hearts o and because entertainments, gatherings men glad so that on this ground alone we may assume tha

reason

it

:

12 the

young ought

are not only in

to be trained in

it.

life,

pleasures

but they

And

whereas men rarely attain the by the way and amuse themselves, not only

also provide relaxation.

end, but often rest

For innocent

perfect end of

harmony with the

with a view to some good, but also for the pleasure s sake, it may be well for them at times to find a refreshment in music. 13 It

for

sometimes happens that men make amusement the end, the end probably contains some element of pleasure,

though not any ordinary or lower pleasure

;

but they mistake

the lower for the higher, and in seeking for the one find the other,

action

since every pleasure *.

which we

has a likeness

to

the

end of

nor do the pleasures have described exist, for the sake of any future

For

good but of the

the end

is

not eligible,

past, that is to say, they are the alleviation of 1

Cp. N. Eth.

vii.

13.

6.

Music and Morals

reason

And we may

and pains.

past toils

why men

But music

is

seek

pursued,

infer

only as

to be the

this

common

happiness from

not

309 VIII. 5

pleasures. 14

an alleviation of past

And who can say 15 whether, having this use, it may not also have a nobler one ? In addition to this common pleasure, felt and shared in by all 1340 toil,

but also as

(for the pleasure

recreation.

providing

given by music

is

and therefore

natural,

and characters), may it not have also It must 16 some influence over the character and the soul ?

adapted to

all

ages

have such an influence that

are

they

the songs of

so

if characters are affected

affected

is

proved

the

by

Olympus and of many

question they inspire enthusiasm, an emotion of the ethical part of the soul.

men

And

it.

power which

others exercise

beyond is

by

;

Besides,

when

even

hear

for

and enthusiasm 17

or

imitations, unaccompanied by melody Since, then, music rhythm, their feelings move in sympathy. is a and virtue consists in pleasure, rejoicing and loving and is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good dispositions

hating aright, there

and noble actions

*. Rhythm and melody supply imitations 18 of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance and of virtues and vices in general, which hardly fall short of

the actual affections, as

we know from

our

own

experience,

for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a change.

The

habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations 19 2 not far removed from the same feeling about realities ; for

is

if

example, its

beauty 1

any one delights only,

it

in

necessarily

Cp. Plato, Rep.

iii.

Cp. Plato, Rep.

iii.

the

sight

follows

401, 402; Laws,

7

395.

of a statue

that ii.

the

sight

658, 659.

for

of

a

The Harmonies

310 VIII. 5

No

the original will be pleasant to him.

other sense, such

has any resemblance to moral qualities in sight only there is a little, for figures are to some extent of a moral character, and all participate in the feeling [so far]

20 as taste or touch,

;

Again, figures and colours are not imitations, of moral habits, and these signs occur only when the

about them. 21 but signs is

body

The

under the influence of emotions.

them with morals

is

but in

slight,

so

connexion of

as there is any,

far

young men should be taught to look, not at the works of Pauson, but at those of Polygnotus \ or any other painter

who

or statuary

the

modes

musical

Some

differ

from

essentially

one

another,

who

hear them are differently affected by each. of them make men sad and grave, like the so-called

and those 1340 b

On the other hand, expresses moral ideas. 2 there is an imitation of character, for

mere melodies

22 even in

others

Mixolydian, harmonies,

others,

the

enfeeble

produce

again,

mind, a

like

the

moderate and

relaxed settled

temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian

;

The whole subject Phrygian inspires enthusiasm. has been well treated by philosophical writers on this branch

23 the

of education,

The same

and they confirm

their arguments by facts. 3 some have a rhythms others of motion, and of these latter again,

principles

character of rest,

24

some have

a

more

has been said to

apply

to

:

vulgar, others a nobler

show

that music has a

movement.

Enough

power of forming the

character, and should therefore be introduced into the education 25 of the young.

young

The

study

persons will not, if

is

suited to the stage of youth, for

they can help, endure anything which

not sweetened by pleasure, and music has a natural sweet-

is

1

Cp. Poet.

2.

2

;

6.

2

15.

Cp. Plato, Rep.

3

Rep.

iii.

399

E,

400,

iii.

398, 399.

The Harmonies There seems

ness.

of

to be in us a sort

511 to harmonies

affinity

VIII. 5

and rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the soul is

a harmony, others, that she possesses

harmony.

And now we

the

been

has

have

determine

to

raised

already

,

whether

question

themselves taught to sing and play or not. a

made

considerable difference

practice of the art.

those

who do

if

difficult,

2

Besides, children should have something

.

was a

The

We

should be taught music

way

such a

in

or

is

answered

;

is

invention,

capital

rattle is a

toy suited

3

become not only

as to

not suitable for different ages

nor

meeting the objection of those is

2

performers.

question what

may be easily

who

for

rattle

for children of a larger growth.

music

not impossible,

mind, and [musical] education is a rattle or toy conclude then that they

to the infant

The

is

the character by the actual

in

breaking anything in the house, for a young thing cannot be quiet.

critics but

be

of Archytas, which people give to their order to amuse them and prevent them from

and the

children in

is

Clearly there

not perform to be good judges of the perform

ance of others to do,

It

which 6

should

children

vulgar.

We

reply (l)

must

is

who

there

in the

difficulty

in

the study

of

any

say that first

place, that they 4

and that they should begin to practise early, although when they are older they may be spared the execution ; they must have learned are to be judges

to appreciate

what

is

also be performers,

good and

to delight in

it,

thanks to

As

the knowledge which they acquired in their youth. effect (2) the vulgarizing

this

is

a

question

difficulty in

which music

[of degree],

determining,

to 5

supposed to exercise, which we shall have no is

when we have considered

to

what t

a

1 <

5-

5-8-

Cp. supra,

c. 5.

7.

The Gentleman Musician

312

VIII. 6 extent freemen who

are

trained

being

to

virtue

political

should pursue the art, what melodies and what rhythms they should be allowed to use, and what instruments should be 1341 a

6

employed in teaching them to play, for even the instrument makes a difference. The answer to the objection turns upon these distinctions for it is quite possible that certain methods ;

of teaching and learning music do really have a degrading effect. It is evident then that the learning of music ought not to impede the business of riper years, or to degrade the

body or render

unfit for civil or military duties,

it

whether for

the early practice or for the later study of them. 7

The

right measure will be attained if students of music stop

which

short of the arts

and do not seek

which 8

are

now

have passed

are practised in professional contests,

to acquire those fantastic marvels

of execution

the fashion in such contests, and from these

into

Let the young pursue

education.

their

studies until they are able to feel delight in noble melodies and

rhythms, and not merely in that common part of music in which every slave or child and even some animals find pleasure.

From

these principles

The

9 should be used.

equires great

skill,

we may

flute,

as for

also infer

what instruments

or any other instrument

which

example the harp, ought not

to be

admitted into education, but only such as will make intelligent students of music or of the other parts of education. Besides, the flute effect

when

;

it

is

is

not an instrument which has a good moral

The

too exciting.

proper time for using

it

is

the performance aims not at instruction, but at the relief

10 of the

1

passions

.

And

there

is

a

further objection; the

impediment which the flute presents to the use of the voice detracts from its educational value. The ancients therefore 1

CP

.

c.

7.

3.

Musical Instruments were right

in

313

the flute to youths

forbidding

and freemen, VIII. 6

although they had once allowed it. For when their wealth gave them greater leisure, and they had loftier notions of excellence,

u

being also elated with their success, both before and after the

Persian

War, with more

zeal than discernment they pursued

every kind of knowledge, and so they introduced the

At Lacedaemon

education.

the Chorus with a so

popularity

when he

most

that

popular is

flute,

and

at

freemen could play upon

shown by the

tablet

men

to judge

12

The

it.

which Thrasippus dedicated

furnished the Chorus to Ecphantides.

rience enabled

flute into

was a Choragus who led Athens the instrument became

there

Later expe

what was or what was not

really

conducive to virtue, and they rejected both the flute and several 13 other old-fashioned instruments, such as the Lydian harp, the

sambuca, and 1341 b triangle, heptagon, intended only to give pleasure to the There is hearer, and require extraordinary skill of hand *. a meaning also in the myth of the ancients, which tells how many-stringed the like

the

lyre,

which

are

Athene invented the not a

bad idea of

instrument because reason

may we

flute

and then threw

theirs,

it

made the

Athene we

ascribe

we mean

still

that

education in

which

the performer practises the

is

art,

the

more

the mind,

since

to

art.

reject the professional instruments

mode of

was 14

disliked

but with

;

It

away.

because the acquirement

it

nothing to

knowledge and

Accordingly we the professional fessional

face ugly

say that she rejected

of flute-playing contributes

it

Goddess

that the

music

and also 15

and by pro

adopted in contests, for in this not for the sake of his own

order to give pleasure, and that of a vulgar For this reason the execution of such sort, to his hearers.

improvement, but

in

1

Cp. Plato, Rep.

iii.

399

D.

The Professional Musician

314 VIII. 6 music 1

not the part of a freeman but of a paid performer, and

is

6 the result

is

that the performers are vulgarized, for the

which they aim

is

bad 1

The

.

end

at

vulgarity of the spectator tends

to lower the character of the music

and therefore of the per

he makes them what they are, and ; they look to him fashions even their bodies by the movements which he expects formers

them

to exhibit.

We

7

have also to consider rhythms and harmonies.

use them

all in

education or

distinction be that

which

education, or shall

it

is

make

a distinction

made by those who ? For we

be some other

?

and

Shall

we

shall the

are engaged in

see that music

produced by melody and rhythm, and we ought to know what influence these have respectively on education, and is

whether 2

we

should prefer excellence

in

melody or excellence

in

But as the subject has been very well treated by rhythm. many musicians of the present day, and also by philosophers who have had considerable experience of musical education, to these

we would

shall

only speak of

refer the it

more exact student of the subject we after the manner of the legislator, ;

now

having regard to general principles. 3

We

accept the division of melodies proposed by certain

philosophers into ethical melodies,

melodies of action, and

passionate or inspiring melodies, each having, as they say, a

mode

or

harmony corresponding

to

it.

But

we

maintain

further that music should be studied, not for the sake of one,

but

of many benefits, that

education, (2) purgation (the

is

to

word

say,

with a

we

purgation

view to (i) use at present

when hereafter we speak of poetry we music may also with more precision)

without explanation, but will treat the subject 1

2

Cp. Poet.

c. 6.

",

;

Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 700. though the promise is really

unfulfilled.

The Power of Music serve (3) for

intellectual

for relaxation

enjoyment,

recreation after exertion.

It is

317 and

for

all

the

therefore, that

clear,

VIII. 7

harmonies must be employed by us, but not all of them in the same manner. In education ethical melodies are to be preferred, but

we may

listen to the

melodies of action and passion when For feelings such as pity and 4

they are performed by others. fear, or, again,

enthusiasm, exist very strongly in some souls,

and have more or

less influence over

into a religious frenzy,

whom we

all.

Some

fall

persons

see disenthralled by the use of

mystic melodies, which bring healing and purgation to the soul

Those who

are influenced

.

by pity or fear and every emotional 5

nature have a like experience, others in their degree are stirred

by something which specially affects them, and all are manner purged and their souls lightened and delighted.

in

a

The

melodies of purgation likewise give an innocent pleasure to mankind. Such are the harmonies and the melodies in which 6

who perform music at the theatre should be invited to But since the spectators are of two kinds the compete. one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed those

of mechanics,

labourers

and the

like

there

ought

to

be

7

contests and exhibitions instituted for the relaxation of the

second class

minds

also.

And

the melodies will correspond to their

minds are perverted from the natural state, so there are exaggerated and corrupted harmonies which are

in like

what

for as their

;

manner a perversion.

A

man

receives pleasure from

and therefore professional musicians be to allowed may practise this lower sort of music before an audience of a lower type. But, for the purpose of education, g as I have already said, those modes and melodies should be is

natural to him,

employed which are

may

ethical,

such as the Dorian

;

though

we

include any others which are approved by philosophers

3

1

The Dorian, Phrygian,

6

VIII. 7 who have had 9

musical

a

The

education.

Socrates of the

*

Republic is wrong in retaining only the Phrygian mode along 1342 b with the Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute ; for the Phrygian

instruments 10

is

modes what

to the

of them

both

are

the flute

exciting

this, for

example,

is

The

acknowledged

things,

Tales

2

that Philoxenus,

many

having

as a dithyramb in the

among

proofs, saying,

attempted to

other

compose

Dorian mode, found

it

his

impossible,

back into the more appropriate Phrygian. All men agree that the Dorian music is the gravest and manliest. And whereas we say that the extremes should be avoided and the

and

fell

mean followed, and whereas the Dorian

is

a

mean between the

other harmonies [the Phrygian and the Lydian that our youth should be taught the 13

dithyramb, for which the

to be Phrygian, a fact of

connoisseurs of music offer

f2

emotional.

Bacchic frenzy and all similar emotions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to Poetry proves

the Phrygian than to any other harmony. 11

to musical

is

and

Two what

is

:

at

these every

it is

],

evident

Dorian music.

principles have to be kept in view

becoming

3

what

man ought

is

possible,

to aim.

But

even these are relative to age ; the old, who have lost their powers, cannot very well sing the severe melodies, and nature herself seems to suggest that their songs should be of the 14

more relaxed kind.

Wherefore the musicians likewise blame

Socrates, and with justice, for rejecting the relaxed harmonies in education under the idea that they are intoxicating ; not in the excite ordinary sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to And so men), but because they have no strength in them. 1

Plato, 3

Retaining the

MS.

Rep.

reading 3

Cp.

c.

iii.

399.

/j.v6ovs.

5.

22.

Cp. Poet.

c.

2.

7.

and Lydian Modes with a view to a time of

they ought

life

when men

to practise the gentler

317

begin to

grow

old,

VIII.

harmonies and melodies as

And if there be any harmony, such as the 15 all others above Lydian appears to be, which is suited to children of tender age, and possesses the elements both of order

well as the others.

and of education,

clearly

[we ought

should be based upon three principles the becoming, these three.

to

use

it,

for]

education

the mean, the possible,

INDEX 6, 13. Abydos, v. 6, Account, power of calling magis in trates to, Sparta exercised by

the Ephors,

ii.

26

9,

given

;

by Solon to the people, ib. 12, 8; and justly 5; iii. 11, claimed by them, iii. 1 1 when exercised by all, a mark of ;

democracy, 55

4-6

14,

vi. 2,

;

5-

4.

Achaea

iv.

v. 3,

[in Peloponnerus],

3. [Pthiotis], ii. 9, (in Colchis), viii. 4,

Achaeans, the 3-

Achilles,

iii.

5,

9.

Acquisition, the art of, (i) the i 1 2 ; 1 1 2 natural, i. 9, includes war [in certain cases] 12 and hunting, i. 7, 5 8, 21 a part of house vii. 14, ,

,

;

;

management,

i3-!5; 1-4; ii,

8,

i.

J

i

4,

-8

9>

;

I0

;

>

has a limit, ib.8, 14; 9, 13-18: (\\)that which is contrary to nature, in cluding (a) exchange which goes beyond the need of life, i2-55 Jo, 4; ",3; 2;

9>

4 ; ii, 3; usury, ib. 10, trade, ib. 9, 4; 10, 4; ii, 3 ; (d) service for hire, ib. ii, 3 : (iii) the intermediate

(/>)

(<:)

kind,

ib.

Adamas, Admiral, 9,

;

Agamemnon,

4. v. 10, office

King

Agesilaus,

of (at Sparta),

mankind,

Aegina, iv. 4, Aenos, in Thrace,

;

v. 6,

v. 10,

9.

18.

4;

14,

7,

i.

8,

7

works upon,

;

ancient legislation to encourage, vi. 4, 8-10. 7;

10. Alcaeus, iii. 14, Alcyone, mother of Diocles the 8. Corinthian, ii. 12,

Aleuadae, the, at Larissa,

v. 6,

13-

Aliens,

how

resident,

distin

guished from citizens, iii. i, obliged to have a patron,

4; ib.

;

enrolled by Cleisthenes in the tribes, ib. 2, 3; admitted to citizenship at Syracuse, v. 3, 13-

how

Alliance, an,

a

state,

ii.

3

2,

;

from

different iii.

6-8.

9,

Almsgiving, demoralizing effects of, vi. 5,

7.

Alternation in office, character istic of constitutional govern

ments, i. i, 4-7; iii.

2; 4,

16,

2,5;

Amadocus

(?

sians), v. 10, 21

;

3-

vi. 2,

33-

9

5,

of Sparta, v.

Agriculture, the employment fol lowed by the greater part of

9, 10; 18.

iii.

10.

16,

;

;

hold

ancient Hellas, iii. 14, 8-io, 14; iv. 10, 2 always received a guard, iii. 15, 16.

ib. Ii,

11.

Achaea

Aesymnetes, the, or dictators of

12,

2;

ii.

10, 14-17; 2,

3;

vii. 14,

17,

2,

6,

4;

1-5.

king of the Odry24.

Amasis, king of Egypt, i. 12, Ambition, a cause of crime, ii.

2.

7,

Index

320

28 encour 10-14, 18 9, aged by the Spartan law-giver, ;

ib. 9,

10,

a motive of revolu

28; ii.

tions,

;

10, 18

7,

;

v. 7,

4;

v. 3,

Ambracia,

10; 4,

9; 10,

16.

Amyntas

v. 3,

8. 13; 6, the Little (? father of

Amphipolis,

16.

Philip), v. 10,

Anaxilaus, tyranny

gium,

v. 12,

of,

at

Rhe-

13.

name of

ancient

common meals

the

at Sparta,

ii.

10,

Androdamas, of Rhegium,

ii.

12,

5-

HAnclros,

ii.

9,

20.

Animals, the, intention of Nature 10in denying speech to, i. 2, 12; under the dominion of man, ib7 5 tame better than wild, 5>

only differ from slaves in not being able to apprehend their various reason, ib. 9 ib.

;

;

modes

of

life,

ib.

8,

4-6;

supply their offspring with food in different ways, ib. 10; cre ated for the sake of man. ib.

9-12; produce offspring sembling their parents, ii. 3, cannot form a state, iii. 9, lead a life of nature, not

re

9

;

6 of ;

12; the parts reason, 13, of animals an illustration of the parts of the state, iv. 4, 7-9 ; the offspring of young animals often small and ill-developed, 6.

Antileon, tyrant at Chalcis,

v. 12,

12.

Antimenides, brother of Alcaeus, iii.

14,

9.

12. Antissa, in Lesbos, v. 3, Antisthenes, iii. 13, 14. Aphytaeans, the (in Pallene), vi. 4,

10.

ib. 6,

v. 3,

9.

Appeal, a court

of,

Hippodamus,

8,

ii.

allowed by 4.

Appetitive principle, the, of the soul, i. 5, 6; iii. 4, 6; 16, 5; vii. 15, 9, 10. Arbitrator, the judge should not be made into an, ii. 8, 13; the middle class the arbitrators of the state, iv. 12, 5.

3, II. Arcadia, ii. 2, 3; ib. 9, Archelaus, king of Macedonia, v. 10, 17-20. Archias of Thebes, v. 6, 15. 6. Archilochus, quoted, vii. 7, duties 20 the vi. 8, Archons, of, ;

the single Archon at Epidami 12. v. i, nus, iii. 16, Archytas, of Tarentum, viii. 6, ;

2.

Areopagus, the, at Athens (see Council of Areopagus). Argo, the, iii. 13, 16. Argos, use of ostracism at, v. 3, the political changes after 3 ;

ib. 3, the oli 7 garchical revolution after the battle of Mantinea, ib. 4, 9; the tyranny of Pheidon, ib. 10, 6 of the Argives to enmity the Lacedaemonians, ii. 9, 3,

Hebdome,

vii.

vii. 16,

5-

Apollonia (on the Euxine), 13;

5.

Andria,

Apollodorus of Lemnos, i. ii, 7. Apollonia (on the Adriatic), iv. 4,

;

;

ii.

Ariobarzanes, v. 10, 25. characterized Aristocracy,

by

election for merit, ii. ii, 9, i ; ii ; iv. 8, dis 7 ; v. 7, tinguished from the perfect state, as being a government of men who are only good relatively to 2 (but the constitution, iv. 7, 5) so called because cp. iii. 4, the best rule or the best interests of the state are consulted, iii. 7, ;

Index i 3; not a perversion, iv. 8, analogous to oligarchy (i) be cause the few rule, v. 7, I (2) because birth and education

321 13,14; Hi.

;

;

commonly accompany

wealth, to royalty as a of the best, ib. 10, government 2 ; preferable to royalty, be cause the good are more than 10; hcfw distin one, iii. 15, iv. 8,

3;

guished

from

oligarchy

and

constitutional government, iv. 7 ; 8; 14, 10; v. 7, 5~9(cp.ii. 1J

5-!);

>

iii.

7,

v. 7,

5

;

7;

causes of revolutions in 8, 7; aristocracies, v. 7 the means of their preservation, ib. 8, 5-7 ;

;

aristocracy less stable than con stitutional

government,

ib.

7,

6 ; liable to danger because the rich have too much power, ib. la, 6; might be combined

3, 7

5, ;

12; 5; vi.4, artisans some

times public slaves, ii. 7, 22 only admitted to office in de

;

often

12;

mocracies, iii. 4, acquire wealth, ib.

the

6; 5, question whether they are

citi

zens, 5 ; necessary to the existence of the state, iv. 4, 9, 21 ; not a part of the state, vii. ib.

6

4,

;

should be debarred from

Freemen

the

s

Agora,

ib. 12,

3-

Arts,

usually degener

ates into oligarchy, 11; iv. 2, 2; 15,

vii. 9,

the,

instruments,

require

both living and

i.

lifeless,

4

;

some

arts subservient to others, ib. 8, a 10, 1-4; the arts have a limit in their means ;

though not

in their end, ib. 8,

both the means to be within our control, vii. 13, 2 amount of knowledge which a freeman 14

;

9,

13

;

and the end ought

;

is

permitted

in the arts,

i.

ii,

with democracy if the magi strates were unpaid and office open to all, ib. 8, 17 (cp. vi. 4,

i; viii. 2, 5; cellence in them,

magistracies peculiar to 10; vi. 8, aristocracy, iv. 15, 22, 24; aristocratical modes of appointing magistrates and 20, 21 16, 8; judges, iv. 15, practice of trying all suits by the

18 ; iii. 15, tageous, ii. 8, 4 the analogy of, not to be ex tended to the laws, ii. 8, 24 ; iii. 15, 4; exist for the benefit of those under them, iii. 6, 79 by whom should the artist

same magistrates, aristocratical, ii. n, 8; iii. i, 10; the

be judged? ib. ii, 10-14 (cp. viii. 6, 1-4) the arts aim at some good, iii. 12, i; justice

6)

;

;

people naturally suited to an iii.

aristocracy, 17, 3-7. Aristogeiton, conspiracy of Harmodius and, v. 10, 15. 6. Aristophanes, ii. 4, Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyncestians, v. 10,

17.

Art, works of, wherein different

from

realities,

Artapanes,

v.

iii. 1 1

10,

,

4.

21.

Artisan, the employments of the, devoid of moral excellence, i. 1 3,

2 5>6;

>

degrees of ex i.

n,

changes

in,

6;

viii.

advan ;

;

;

of the different claims to political superiority illustrated from the arts, ib. 12, 4-8; law of pro 21 ; portion in the arts, ib. 13, the problems of the arts, an illustration of the problems ot politics, iv. i, 1-4; the arts have to supply the deficiencies of Nature,

vii.

17,

15.

iv. 3* the Asia, ii. 10, 3 3 Asiatics better fitted for slavery ;

;

Index

322

6 than the Hellenes, iii. 14, 2 cannibal tribes in vii. 7,

;

;

Asia, viii. 4, 3. .\ssembly, the, payment of, evil of the effects practice, ii. 7, 19;

6 vi. 2, how they 5 may be counteracted, vi. 5, 5; power monopolized by, in ex treme democracies, iv. 6, 5 iv. 6,

;

;

;

10

v. 5,

7;

i4>

vi. 2,

;

17; 9,

6,

5;

15 (cp. ii. 14; 4, 12, ii, 12); meet 4; v. n, ings should be infrequent, vi. 5, 5 (cp. iv. 14, 4, 5); charac ter of, in the different kinds of iv. 14, 4-7 vi. 5-7; in oligarchies, iv. 14, 8-1 1 (cp. iii. i, 10) pro

democracies, 2,

;

;

vision in case of equal voting in 6 : at Car assemblies, vi. 3,

n,

ii.

thage, ib. 10, ib. ii,

7

;

in Crete, at Sparta,

5-6; 6;

ii,

6.

viii. 6,

7,

17.

ii.

1

2,

;

6); evil effects of the practice, ii. 7, 19; plan introduced by Diophantus for the regulation of the public slaves, ib. 23 maintenance at the public ex the of of children citizens pense

;

fallen in battle, ib. 8,

the Solonian constitution, ; ib. 7, i-6; iii. ii, 6; 12, 8 the Areopagus (see Council of Areopagus) the Court of effect of Phreatto, iv. 16, 3 the Persian war upon Athens,

6

;

;

;

ii. 1

2,

5

;

v. 4,

8

;

viii. 6,

1 1

;

introduction of flute-playing at Athens after the Persian war, viii. 1 1 the legislation of Draco, 6, ii. 12, 13; the expulsion of the ;

citizens introduced by Cleisthenes, iii. 2, 3; the tribes redivided by him, vi. 4, 17 treatment of the subject cities by ;

;

Athens, 13, 19 democratical governments forced upon the allies by the Athenians, iv. ii, 1 8 v. 7, 14 great losses of iii.

;

;

;

the nobilityin the Peloponnesian War, v. 3, 7 difference of sen timent between the Athenians and the citizens of the Piraeus, ib. 15 origin of the war h ;

;

tween Athens and Mitylene. defeat of the Athe: to Sicily, ib. government of the Four

6

4,

;

expedition

dred, ib.

13

;

6;

6,

6

ib. 6,

;

rise

;

payment of the dicascommenced by Pericles, vi. 2, 4 (cp. iv. 6, 5

who had

new

ib.

Areopagus,

13.

;

teries

5;

;

21

Thirty,

Astyages, 24. Atarneus (in Mysia), ii.

v. 12,

3;

2,

the use of ostracism, v. 3, 3 number of (cp. iii. 13, 15) sailors in the population, iv. 4,

sistratus to the tyranny, i, 6 his trial befc 10,

v. 10,

Athene, Athens

iii.

tyrants,

12,

2;

spiracy of Harmodius anc togeiton,ib. 10, 15; magis of the Eleven, vi. 8, 1 1 Athlete, the temperament of au, not suited to the life of the .

citizen, vii. 16, 12; viii. 4. see Gymnastic Exer

Athletics

:

cises.

Attalus,

v. 10,

Ausones,

the,

16.

or Opici,

vii.

10,

5-

Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, ii7>

17-

Avarice, encouraged at Sparta, 11. 9, 13, 28, 37; at Carthage, ib. ii, ii a frequent cause of 28; of crime, ib. 7, 19; 9, ;

revolution, v. 2,

5; 3,

i.

Babylonia, ii. 6, 6; Babylon, iii. 3, 5; Babylonians, ib. 13, 19.

Index Bacchiadae.the, at Corinth,

ii.

12,

8.

Barbarians, the, do not distin guish the female and the slave, 4; generally under kingly 6 (cp. iii. 14, 6) ; regarded by the Hellenes as i-

2,

rule, ib.

6 ; their natural slaves, i. 6, nobility not recognized by the Hellenes, ib. 7; prevalence of barter among them, ib. 8, Barter see Exchange. 5.

citizenship in

ktreme democracies,

iii.

5,

7

;

*-4,i6. <:,thelslandsofthe,vii.i5,4.

r

n

;

4,

9-

Body, habit the citizen,

of, to vii.

be required in

16,

12

;

viii. 3,

7

;

iii.

i,

iv.

4,

21

;

v. 3,

10,

;

spiracy of custom of

v.

sending

7,

4

out

the

;

citizens to the colonies, 15 ; vi. 5, 9 ; treaties

poorer ii.

Hanno,

n,

between the Carthaginians and the Tyrrhenians, iii. 9, 6. 6. Catana, ii. 12, Cavalry, importance of, in the ancient oligarchies, iv. 3, 3 10 vi. 7, i 13, (cp. the government of the knights in ;

Eietria, v. 6, ii.

Celts, the, 17,

14). 7; vii. 2,

9,

and

cities,

Sicily), ib.

Thrace),

ii.

the (in Italy 6; (of 12,

14.

Chalcis, in Euboea,

iv. 3,

12. v.4, 9; Chares, the Athenian v. 6,

general,

9.

of Paros, a writer on Agri culture,

u,

i.

7.

Charicles, leader of a party among the Thirty at Athens, v. 6,

6.

u,

ii.

aiirvoi

for the

family,

i.

2,

10,

12.

Charondas, used the word

Camicus, ii. 10, 4. Carthage, the constitution of, analogous to those of Lacedaemon and Crete, ii. ii, i, 5 an aristocracy with oligarchical and democratical features, ib.

3;

ib. 12,

2; v.

1 2.

10;

3-

Chalcidian

Charilaus, king of Sparta,

13-

Byzantium,

;

inal cases, ib.

;

ruled according to re by the soul, i. 5, 4-7 ; body of the freeman not ays distinguished by nature n that of the slave, ib. 10; j beauty of the body more bvious than that of the soul, the interest of, identiib. ; cal with that of the soul, ib. 6, 10; the goods of, for the sake of the soul, vii. i, 8, 9; prior to the soul, ib. 15, 10; must not be educated at the same time as the mind, viii. 3, 13 the,

,

;

honours paid to military merit, vii. 2, 10; the con

Bequest, freedom of, at Sparta, ii. 9, 14; should be forbidden by law, v. 8, 20. ^irth, illegitimate, not a disinalification for

cp.v. 12, 12) the kingspartly chosen for ability, ii. 1 1, 4-9; influence of wealth, ib. 9-13; plurality of offices, ib. 13 the magistrates judges in crim 1 1

5.

:

Basilidae, the, v. 6,

5-10; iv. 7, 4; v. 12, 14; never had a revolution, ii. n, v. 12, 2, 15; 14; never under a tyranny, ii. ii, 2 (but

5;

o//o-

members of a legislated for

Catana and the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily, ii. 12, 6 said to have been the

;

;

disciple

Y 2

of Zaleucus,

ib.

7

;

Index

324 the

first

to

make laws

against

ii; famous for the accuracy of his legislation, ib. middle class, to the belonged iv. ii, 15; compelled the rich

perjury,

ib.

;

to attend the law-courts,

ib. 13,

3-

Child, the, relation of, 2 parent, i. 2, virtue of, ib. 13, like a king by

;

and the

the 3-12; ruled the elder or i

3,

;

2

ib. 6,

their toys. ib.

;

their

;

crying not to be checked,

vii.

6.

17.

Children, Plato

community

s

Women

and Children. Children, Guardians of, iv. 22. 9, 13; vi. 8, see

Chios,

iii.

v. 3,

12

;

16.

6,

the, in southern Italy,

Chones, vii.

19

13, ;

15,

21

iv. 4,

;

of,

10,

5.

i ; 6; 7, 12, parent, ib. 2, 3; has the deliberative faculty,

Chytrum, a part of Clazomenae,

but immature, I0 )IS.

Cinadon,

ib. 13,

7 (cp.vii.

resemblance to

their

by

the 3, parents, 9 children of citizens who died in battle reared at the public ex their

ii.

;

;

;

11-

v. 9,

4-8;

15; licence permitted to chil dren in democracies and tyran 20 nies, vi. 4, exposure of ;

deformed children, vii. 16, 15; way in which children should be 17; they should not see or hear anything indecent, ib. 19-21 7-11; viii. 5, what their education should reared, ib.

;

include, viii. 2 ; 3 ; ought to learn music

why

they

and draw

degree to which they should carry musical 1-8 must proficiency, ib. 6, not carry gymnastic exercise too must not labour with far, ib. 4 ing, ib. 3,

2 foil.

;

;

;

body and mind restlessness of

16;

at once, ib.

9;

young children,

5,

12; vi.

i

2

7

1 2,

;

;

3;

2,

5;

ii.

;

13,

4;

17,

4-8;

14,

must have 7

;

2,

io-

4,

9-11;

6, vii. 9,

a; ii, ;

iii.

and

rule 2

12,

;

14;

16,

2,

1-8

3-

must both

obey, i. I, 4-7; ii,

;

6; children, in pense, ib. 8, what sense citizens, iii. i, 5 2 education of the chil 5, 8 bad dren of kings, ib. 4, education of the children of the rich, iv. II,

15v. 7,

Citizen, the,

Children, ought to be educated with regard to the constitution, i. 13, 11-15; viii. 15; v. 9, i ; recognized in certain coun tries

y. 3,

ii.

leisure, 9, 10, 12; vii. 9, 4, to the state, belongs

viii. i,

necessityof defining 4; the word, iii. i, 2 foil. ; children and old men, in what sense citizens, ib.

5

5,

;

resi

2;

dence and legal rights, inade 4, 5; quate definitions, ib. i, not enough that the parents were citizens, ib. 2, 1-3 the citizen must share in the ad ;

ministration of the state, ib.

i,

3-5; 5; 13, 12; 5-12; 2, under each form of gov ib. ernment, i, 9; 5, 5; 13, 2 the question 12; iv. about citizens admitted after a differs

;

7>

revolution, iii. 2, 3-5 ; the is it virtue of the good citizen identical with that of the good :

man?

ib.

4;

5,

10;

18

;

vii.

8, the virtue of the citizen 14, in the perfect state, iii. 4, 5 ;

12 ; not all citizens who 13, are necessary to the state, ib. 5, vii. 10; the artisans 2; 9,

Index not to be citizens, iii. 5 ; 3; nor the sailors, vii. 6,

vii.

9,

tages, vii.

7,

ties,

of the citizen the 3 ; the character in the citizens, ib. 7 ! necessary their habit of body, ib. 16, 12; 8

is

;

best

the

?

life

2

ib.

viii. 3,

;

13; 4-

Citizenship, rights of, conferred on strangers in early times at Sparta, ii. 9, 17; lost at Sparta, by failure to contribute to the

common

10, meals, ib. 32 7 given to persons of ille gitimate birth in extreme de 16; mocracies, iii. 5, 7; vi. 4, exclusion from, sometimes con cealed, iii. 5, 9; easily pre tended in a large state, vii. 4, ;

!

14-

City, the

v. 3,

vii. 10, 1-8; they should be arranged, ib. 10-12 ; the young not allowed to share in them, ib. 17, of the magistrates, vi. 2, ; i of the priests, 7 ; vii. 12,

how

u

;

vii.

i, 12. vi. 4,

;

Cleomenes (king of Sparta),

v. 3,

7-

Cleopatra (the widow of Perdic-

ii.

15;

the original of the Spartan, ib. 10, 5 maintained at the public cost, ib. 7-10; (at Sparta), make property to some degree common, ib. 5, 15 ; badly regu lated, ib. 9, 31, 32; 10, 7; anciently called andria, ib. 10, ;

of

women and

i,

3;

arguments against,

of property,

3; 4;

chil

by Plato,

dren, the, proposed

ib.

5;

ii.

vii.

9.

Confederacy, difference between a, and a state, ii. 2, 3; iii. 9, 6-8. Constitution, regard must be had to the, in education,

i.

15;

13,

11-15; viii. i; the best constitution supposed by some to be a combination of all exist

v. 9,

17.

Cleotimus, leader of a revolution at Amphipolis, v. 6, 8. Clubs; at Carthage, ii. u, 3; at Abydos, v. 6, 6, 13; hated by tyrants, ii. n, 5.

Cnidus, v. 6, 4, 16. Codrus, king of Athens, v. TO, of Colonies, Carthage, ii. 1 1 ,

yi-

Carthage),

(at

(in Crete), ib. 5,

3;

10,

3

iii. 2,

18.

cas), v. 10,

6;

12,

",

11,

13-

the Athenian,

meals, hostility of the 5; first estab

tyrant to, v. n, lished in Italy,

5-

Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, v. ,

commercial trea

;

6.

Community

15.

Cleander, tyrant of Gela, v. 12,

12,

6

9,

Common

see State.

:

Clazomenae,

iii.

1

ing forms, ii. 6, 17 (cp. iv. I, 6; 7, 4; 9, 7); the per manence of a constitution only secured by the consent of all

8.

classes,

5 ; in

12,

ii.

9,

22;

6; v. 8,

iv. 9,

io;

5-10;

5; 9,

9 oligarchies formed colonies by the first settlers, iv.

vi. 6,

dissensions in, a cause of 5 4, revolutions, v. 3, 11-14.

contentment with a constitution not always a proof

i

5>

;

Colophon,

of,

iv. 4,

5

;

v. 3,

15-

Commerce, its

divisions of,

advantages

and

i. 1 1

,

3

disadvan

;

tions 11.

of

2

;

4

7,

more simple than

io,

its

iii.

later,

i;

excellence,

(but cp. c. ii, constitution the ent,

;

older constitu

i,

9;

2,

ib. io, 12 15); in each

citizen

5,55;

differ

13,

12;

Index iv.

2

7,

stitution i; 3,

I0

relation of the con

;

and the 956, i;

word,

iii.

i,

2; iv. i, 7, definition of the

55

3.

!

iii.

state,

i

i,

;

I

6,

iv. i,

;

2,6; called by the

ib. 10,

ob Cretans, avSpia, ii. 10, 5 ject of the institution ii. 5 15; better managed in Crete than at ;

,

Lacedaemon,

ib.

,

30-33;

9,

10; 3, 5; the constitution the life of the state, iv. n, 3; the people naturally suited to

10, 7-9; frequency of sedi tion in Crete, ib. 10, 14, 15 ; slaves in Crete forbidden

each constitution,

gymnastic exercises and the use of arms, ib. 5, 19; thePerioeci

iii.

unchanged

ally

tion, iv. 5,

after

the

17;

nomin

constitution sometimes

a revolu

4 (cp.v. i, 8); the encroachments of the rich 3,

often more dangerous to the constitution than those of the

6; life according constitution no slavery,

iv. 12,

poor, to the v. 9,

vii. 3,

15;

;

;

;

of caste in Crete,

Custom, power

vii. 10, ii.

of,

i.

5.

2,

7.

in Aeolis, v. 5, Cypselids, the, v. n,

Cyme,

Cos, v.5, Cosmi, the

2.

(in

4; v. 4,

Crete),

to

the

8;

12,

2.

Councillors and warriors, the two highest classes in the state, iv. 4, 10-17; vii. 4, 4-7J 8 75 4-10. 9, Crataeus, one of the assassins of >

Archelaus, v. 10, 17. Crete, favourable position of, ii. 10, 3,12,16; visit of Lycurgus 2 the Cretan constitu to, ib. tion the original of the Lace daemonian, ib. 1-3; analo ;

gous to the Carthaginian, ib. 1 1, i the attention of the legis lator directed solely to war, vii. ;

9

;

the

6

v. 10,

;

12,

Ephors, ii. 10, 6-14. Cotys, king of the Odrysians in v. 18. Thrace, 10, Council of Areopagus, the, ii. 1 2, 2,

4.

9; ib. 12,

3,4-

Cypselus of Corinth,

8.

24;

11-13; a

3; vii. 13, sort of justice, i. 6,

Cyclopes, the,

i.

8,

5>

iii.

;

2,

!o,

iv.

1-3.

9, 9; tyranny of Timophanes, v. 6, 1 2 tyranny of the Cypselids, ib. 10, 6; n, 9; its duration, ib. 12, 3,4; family of the Bacchiadae, ii. 1 2,

Corinth,

Crete well managed, ib. 9, 3; governed by the 15, 16 laws of Minos, ib. 10, 3 ana of the Perioeci with Cretan logy the Helots, ib. existence 5 in

common

tables in

troduced into Crete by Minos,

3Cyrene, vi. 4,

17, 18.

king of Persia,

Cyrus,

v.

10,

8, 24.

Daedalus, i. 4, Dancing, viii. 5,

3. 3.

of Syracuse,

Daphnaeus,

v.

5,

10.

son of Xerxes,

Darius,

v.

10,

21.

Decamnichus,

20.

v. 10,

Deliberation, the right to share in, essential to the citizen, iii. i ; 6-12; 2, 5; 13, 12 (cp. vii. 8,

Delphi, knife,

7). v. 4,

i.

2,

5

;

the Delphian

3.

Demagogues, the authors and flatterers of the extreme demo cracy,

ii.

25-31; 12; vi. 4,

4-6;

12, v. 9,

10

15-17;

;

ii,

iv.

4,

ii,

confiscate

Index the property of the rich, v. 5, 5; vi. 5, 3; often bring about revolutions, v. 3, 4; 5, !-5j in ancient times became

6-io; 10, tyrants, ib. 5, 4, 6 in oligarchies, ib. 6, 5.

327

means of their 12,

4; 13,

v.

vi. 4,

preservation, iv. 12 5-8; 14,

;

17; 5; democracy (especially the extreme form) apt to pass into tyranny, iv. n, 8;

ii

:

v.

;

6-io;

5,

8,

7

;

at Larissa,

30; Plato censured for supposing that the change is

Democracy, the government of

necessarily to tyranny, v. 12, Athens the champion of 10;

Demiurgi, magistrates iii.

2.

2,

the

many

iii.

7,

in their

own

interests,

2; iv. ir,

5; 8,

17;

10,

in

democracy

iv.

Hellas,

ii,

akin to tyranny, iv. 4, 27; v. 10, 11,30, 35; n, 12; the only possible government in 12; iv. 6, large states, iii. 15, 10 (cp. vi. 5, 5; 13, 5); the perversion of constitutional

14; the democratic principle represented at Sparta by the Ephoralty, ii. 6, 17 ; 10 iv. 9, 9; 21; lo, 9, characteristics of democracy

government, iii. 7, 5; iv. 2, i, 2; Plato wrong in calling democracy the worst of good constitutions, but the best of

8, 7; iv. 4. v. i, 3; 8,

bad ones,

iv. 2,

3

n,

22;

2

iv.

;

20; 12, 3; 13, 12; the forms enumerated,

22-31;

4,

3; 14, of the last

4;

12, iv-

4.

6,

iii.

1-7; 12,

6,

1-7; vi. 4; growth and worst form, ii. 4,

5;

v.

6,9-n;

12;

6-n;

5,

6,

6-8; 9, 10; vi. 3, 5-9; 15-20 (cp. v. 10, 12; n, 11)

democracy more stable

;

than oligarchy, 6 i, 15; 7,

n,

iv.

(cp^v.

14; v. 8);

3,

causes of revolution in democra cies

17 3,

anarchy,

:

;

v. 3,

4; 5;

9,

5

;

vi. 4,

practices, v.

demagogic

10

;

vi. 5,

5;

disproportionate increase, v. 3, 6-8 dissatisfaction of the ;

ib.

10, notables, 14 (cp. 7, 1 8); long tenure or greatness of office, v. 5, 8 the 8, 7 ii.

;

;

v. 7,

;

:

liberty

vi.

and equality

22, 23; 8,

iv.

3;

9>

ii.

45

iii.

7;

14, 15;

954,

1-4,

2,

for all,

6; 9,

use of the lot,

insuffici

;

ency of the common definitions iof democracy, iii. 8; iv. 4, more forms of democracy 6; than one, iv. i, 8 ; 4, 20 vi. i,

18;

20;

the

7;

12,

!95

vi.

ii, *5>

large

employment of a number of magistrates, ii

11,

14

8

2.

5>

v. 8,

;

.

;

short tenure of office, vi.

6; 2, 5, the citizens, ii.

8; pay

ment of

4;

12,

iv. 6,

*9;

7>

2;

5; 9,

vi.

6, 7 ; 5, 5 ; carelessness in the admission of artisans and 2

>

persons of illegitimate birth to 12 5, citizenship, iii. 4, 7, ;

8

vi. 4,

;

to

16; licence allowed

women and II

;

vi.

4,

children, v- ii,

20;

ostracism

oiiginally a democratic institu tion, iii. 13, 15; v. 3, 3; democratical tricks to keep the power in the hands of the

people, iv. 13, 5 suggestions for the improvement of demo 12; vi. 5, cracy, ib. 14, 51 1 the magistrates peculiar to ;

;

iv. 15, ii 17, 24; democratical

democracy,

;

vi. 8,

modes

of appointing magistrates and 8; judges, iv. 15, 19; 1 6,

Index

328

and powers of the

character

the 1-7 best material of a democracy, ib. 14,

assembly, ib.

2

6,

vi.

;

;

i

4,

the

;

position suitable to a democracy, vii. n, 5; democracy always supported by the sailors and i, 2. light armed, vi. 7, Derdas (? King of Elymaea),

Devices, political, of oligarchies

and democracies,

i-

iv. 13, 8 ; their inntility, v. 8, 4. Diagoras, an Eretrian, v. 6,

3,

13,

:

ii.

see

Aesymnetes. 8-1 1. 12,

i

13,

(cp. c. 9,

;

;

Dionysius the Younger, v. 23, 28, 31, 32.

Diophantus,

ii.

10,

23.

7,

4 (but cp. viii. 4, bad education of the

;

22.

Harmony, Harmony.

the

:

see

Dowries, ii. 7, 3 9, 15. Doxander, v. 4, 6. 13. Draco, ii. 12, Drawing, a branch of education, ;

i, 12.

Dynasty, or

1-7)

;

rich, iv.

6 v. 9, II, 13 ; hostility of the tyrant to education, v. n, education necessary to 5 ;

vii. 13, 13; the special business

supplement habit, 15

;

viii.

of

wrong notions

i

i,

;

education

prevalent in Hellas, vii. 14, 15 ; 6 ; the periods viii. i, 3 4, of education, vii. 17; viii. 4, 7~9 necessity of a common 3 system of education, viii. i, !

(cp.

ii.

Family Oligarchy

:

see Oligarchy.

8

7,

and

;

iv.

7

9,

;

should education have an ethical or a practical aim ? viii. 253; 5; should it include music? ib. 6 what instruments 3 5 and harmonies are to be used ? ib. 6, 8-16; 7; education not to be directed to a single ;

;

;

Directors of Education, vii. 17, of Gymnastics, vi. 8, 5, 7

Dorian

14,

;

Dion, v. 10, 23, 28, 31, 32. n, Dionysiusthe Elder, i. ii, iii. 16; v. 5, 8, 12; 15, 10 10. 6 TO; 7, 10, n,

viii. 3,

iii.

8, 9; iv. 8, 2-5); 15; 12, of the excellence Spartan iv. viii. education, 7 i, 9,

of the legislator, ii.

4-

Diocles,

state,

17,

9-

Dicasteries, the Athenian,

Dictators

;

;

14.

the Pharsalian mare,

Dicaea,

;

;

v.

16.

10,

of uniting the state, ii. 5, 1821 special, for the ruler, iii. 4, 8 (cp. vii. 14, confers a 6) claim to pre-eminence in the

2 ; the proper end, ib. 4, place of gymnastics in education, ib. 3, 13 4 the education of mind and body not to be carried ;

;

on together,

ib. 4,

9

writers

;

upon musical education,

ib.

5,

ii, 14; 2, 3, 8, 23; 7, musical education a kind of rattle to older children, ib. 6, 2 the three principles of edu ;

Ecphantides (the ancient comic poet),

Education, may be directed to a wrong end, ii. 7, 8, 9; must have regard to the constitution, ii

;

viii.

i

i.

;

13,

cation, ib.

15;

the great

v. 9,

means

Egypt,

iii.

15

7,

of Education,

12.

viii. 6,

vii.

15,

Directors

:

17,

4;

5, 7-

n,

9;

vi. 8,

1 1.

v.

1-6, 8. Eleven, the, at Athens, vii. 10,

Elis, v. 6,

Elymaea,

1 1.

v.

10,

17.

Index Empire, unnecessary to the hap piness of states,

253;

vii.

12-22.

;

;

limit in the arts, ib. 8,

14 9, agree or disagree

may

;

;

with the means, vii. 13, 2 contains an element of pleasure, ;

viii - 5,

ii.

12,

4.

Ephors, the, a democratic element at Sparta, ii. 6, 2017 9, ;

22; 10, 10; iv. 9, 9; their corruption and licence, ii. 9, 12; greatness 19-24; io, of their power, ib. 9, 20 v. n, 2; the mode of their ;

election childish, ii. 9, 23 ; have the right of calling the to ib. account, 26; magistrates try suits respecting contracts,

io (cp. ii. 9, u, 23 established by Theopomas a check on the royal pus 1-3; corre power, v. n, in to the Cosmi ii. Crete, spond 6, io, 12; to the magis 10, tracy of 104 at Carthage, ib. i,

7)

;

j

11,

ii.

23

7,

io, ii

i; v. i,

;

Epimenides, of Crete,

iii.

;

4, i.

16,

7.

2,

;

;

9, ;

longer

;

14; vii. 3, 5; 14, (the true kind) no desired in Hellenic

states, iv.

ii,

7

;

4,

22;

2,

attained

v. 6,

;

14.

5.

4.

Eubulus (tyrant of Atarneus), !? Euripides, v. io,

ii.

7,

i.

4;

2,

iii.

8

vii. 7,

20 8;

4,

viii. 5,

;

Europe, vii. 7, Euryphon, ii. 8,

quoted,

;

v. 9, 2.

15;

2. I.

Eurytion, v. 6, 15. Euthycrates, aPhocian, v. 4, 7. Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in v. 16. io, Cyprus, Evil,

i.

12.

2,

(i) according to nature (barter of necessaries), i9 3, 4! ( 2 ) 2-7; contrary to nature (retail trade),

Exchange,

i>

i.

1-4, 9-12

9,

io,

;

4;

n,

3;

Executive element, the, in the 2 state, iv. 14, 15; vi. 8. 16 ; Experience, value of, ii. 5, vii.

8,

3,

creates

io,

8.

Exposure of deformed children, justifiable, vii.

Extremes,

16,

danger

16-19;

15. iv.

of,

4-6;

12,

vi.

ii, 5,

1-4.

liberty iii.

7;

v.

8, i,

i3; 8, 6; 9>i45 vi. 2, 4, 9; the desire of equality a cause of sedition, v. i, 3-8 ; 3,

3

v. 6, iv. 4,

Erythrae, Ethiopia,

4-10, 19; v,

9, 5-10; equality and the aim of democracy, iv.

6.

vi. 3,

Equality of property, proposed 12. by Phaleas, ii. 7 ; 12,

;

5.

Equality, how related to justice, iii. v. i, 13, ii, 12 9; 12

1-6

;

strong,

3-

3-

Epidamnus,

2

;

Eretria, iv. 3,

13-

Ephialtes,

iii.

ib. 6 7, equality either numerical or proportional, iii. 128 iv. 12, 1-4; v. i, states must not be 16 ; vi. 3 based on one kind alone, v. i, 14 denied to the weak by the ;

14,

End, the, the completed nature of each thing, i. 2, 8 has no 13

329

when 2; contentment,

Faction, frequency of, in Crete, io, 14-16 ; evil effects of, in Hellas, iv. u, 16-18 ; a

ii.

cause of revolution chies, v. 6, in i,

in

less 9 democracies, iv. u, 6. 6; 7, 15. ;

oligar

common 14;

v.

Index

33

Family, the, the village a colony 6 of, i. 2, 5) ; (cp. c. 9,

;

composed of three relations which are sanctioned by nature, 2 foil.

ib. 2, J

X 3>

5

governed by the elder

!

who

or parent 6;

2,

1-3; 12;

3,

;

their king, ib. 12, 3; different

is

i;

7,

kinds of rule within the family, ib. 12 ; the family apart of the state, ib.

the

13,

ii. 5 ; 9, self-sufficient

15

;

more

state

8. than the family, ii. 2, Family oligarchy : see Oligarchy. Family quarrels, a cause of

revolutions,

J4; 10,

v.

4,

5-7

;

the slave, i. 2, 2-4 3, 4; 6 not always outwardly 5 distinguished by nature from 10 rule over him, ib. 5, freemen more noble than rule 2 vii. 3, 2 ; over slaves, ib. will never willingly 14, 19 submit to the tyrant, iv. 10, 12; has a natural 4; v. ii, 6 ; iii. 16, right to rule, ii. 2, 2, 3 ; must not be ashamed to obey his lawful superiors, v. ;

;

6,

;

;

;

;

2; 14, 11-14; vii. 3, 1-5 (cp. iv. ii, 6); may have a certain knowledge of the arts, viii. 2, 5,6; may be al

9,

lowed

3.

Father and child, relation of, i. i-3; J 2. i-5 3, 2, Female, the, by nature different from the slave except among 5

to share in the pleasures of music, ib. 5, 7Friendship, weakened by com the munism, ii. 4, 5-9 6 ; iii. motive of society, ib. ;

!3; iv7 (cp- vi. 5, 7-11); implies equality, iii.

barbarians, i. 2, 3,4; subject by nature to the male, ib. 5,

9,

i; 13, 7; tendency 7; 12, of the female to produce off like the parents, ii. 3, spring the union of male and 9

16, 13 ; friendship among the citizens hated by the tyrant, v.

:

female formed in obedience to a natural instinct, i. 2, 2 the relation of male and female part of the household, ib. 3, 2 ;

;

i.

12,

[See

Woman.]

Finance, importance of, to the the 13; statesman, i. ii, finances of Sparta badly man 36 aged, ii. 9, suggestions for the regulation of state ;

finances, v. 8,

15-19;

vi.

5.

Four Hundred, government of the, at Athens, v. 4,

13

;

6,

6.

Freedom, supposed by Hellenes not to exist i.

2,

4

;

iii.

2-5.

Freeman,

barbarians,

6 is a reason 6, claim authority in a 8; 13, 9, 14 12, ;

why men state,

among

;

[.Ste

Liberty.]

the, in his relation to

",.

n,

5

friendship at Sparta,

;

7-

" 5>

Gela, v. 12, 13. Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, v. 3, 10, 12, 5 31 5,6. General, the, learns command by ;

;

obedience,

iii.

4,

14; generals

often became demagogues in an cient times, v. 5, 6-10 ; have often attacked their masters, ib.

wise generals com 10, 24 bine light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy infantry, vi. ;

7,

2.

Generalship, 9,

a rare quality, v.

3-

Gerusia

:

see

Council of Elders.

God, happy by reason of

his

own

10 ; 10; 3, nature, vii. i, alone able to hold together the 8. universe, ib. 4,

Index the, supposed to be under a king because mankind origin 12, 3; 7 ally were, i. 2, their statues more beautiful than

22 ; gives the affirmative power 16 ; the to the many, ib. 14,

ordinary human forms,

is

Gods,

;

Good, absolute and

i

i,

ii.

;

2,

evil,

racteristic of

made

state,

man,

i.

of,

2,

cha 12;

the test of freedom and 8.

Goods, the three kinds of, vii. i, external goods not to 2-5 be preferred to virtue, ii. 9, 6; 35; vii. i, 5-9; 15, ;

not the cause of happiness,

vii.

10; 13, 8. Gordius, father of Psammetichus, i,

3. tyrant of Corinth, v. 12, 10 Gorgias of Leontini, i. 13, iii.

cracy,

1 1

iv. 13,

i

;

n,

(cp. c.

;

demo

its rarity, ib.

16)

one of

;

the true forms of government, i i-

( C P- iv. 8,

3

7>

i)

;

how

distinguished from aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy, iv. 7 ; 8; 14, 8-io; v. 7, 5-7; vi.

3

i,

(cp.

ii.

5-9);

ii,

composed of the heavy-armed 4;

17,

to

6,

I3,io;

whom

4

;

16

ii.

iv.

soldiers,

it is

;

iii.

4;

7,

the people

adapted,

iii.

17,

suited to a large country

population,

vi.

14; cha

4,

racterized by the alternation of 2 ; 12, rulers and ruled, i. i,

2; 4,

17,

ii.

2,

io,

4;

4-7; ii, 14; 14; 6, 9; 16,

vii.

14,

I

iii-

i)

6.

Government, forms be criticized,

T 5 (cp.

i.

;

of the magistrates, iv. 15,

ii.

how

of, i

9,

iv.

;

the legislator

must know

iv.

differ

5-8;

i,

iii.

to i

;

all,

according

to the character of the

supreme

13, 5; i are 2-4; based on partial justice only, iii. 9, 6; v. 1-4, 15; 17, 2; vi. 3, 1, 1-4; are all

authority, iv.

i;

6,

8,

14,

;

perversions of the perfect state, i ; may be divided into true forms or perversions, iii. I,

19-

6,

ii

7

;

;

18;

iv.

i their suc 1-3; 8, cessive changes in ancient times,

2,

;

iii. 1

2

iv. 13)

11-13;

15, ;

Plato

s

theory

9~

of change influence

v. 12,

5-18 ; wrong, of increased population upon forms of government, iii. 15, 11-13; iv. 6, 5; vi.5, 5; the worst forms the most pre

carious, vi. 6, 4; common error that forms of government

can be reduced to two oli garchy and democracy, iv. 3, 6-8 sense in which this is ;

true, ib. 4,

v. i,

19;

14 (cp.

the people adapted to each form of government, iii. 17; the magistrates suited to

vi. i,

6)

15, 11-13 ; vi. 8, 24; the judicial arrange

17,

ments, ii

;

;

iv.

each,

2;

by the combination of the vote and the lot in the election 7,

10, preservation, ib. 8, more stable than aristocracy,

;

8-io;

called in ancient times

6-8; 6, 5-9; means of

3,

7,

iv. 8,

Government, the Constitutional,

7,

ii

2.

2,

v.

16-18;

ib. 7,

7.

the sense

slavery, ib. 6,

;

subject,

its

aim of the

the, the

Good and

in which it arises, ib. 9 causes of revolution to which it

relative, vii.

5-8-

13,

Good, i.

10.

ib. 5,

mode

ii.

iv.

force,

ii, 1

6,

vi. 7,

7

;

iii.

i,

10,

8; the military i,

2.

Government, writers on, often un-

Index

33*

5 ; have ex practical, iv. i, tolled the Lacedaemonian con

Harbours, should be separated from the city, vii. 6, 1-6.

stitution, ib.

Harmodius, v. 10, Harmonies, the, iv. 5, 16-25 7-

16, 17.

6;vii.i4,

in Plato s the, Guardians, Republic see Plato. Gymnastic, like other arts, has :

undergone improvement,

ii.

8,

18; includes various kinds of training, iv. i, i, 2. Gymnastic exercises, forbidden to slaves in Crete, in discouraged

ii.

19;

5,

oligarchies

among the poor, iv. 13, 4; one of the recognized branches of education, viii. 3, i; carried to excess at Lacedaemon, ib. 4, 1-7 suggestions for their i-G arrangement, vii. 13, should be of a lighter kind for Directors children, viii. 4, 7 ;

;

:

22.

of, vi. 8,

soul said to be, or to possess, viii. 5, 25. Harmony, the Dorian, iii. 3, 8 ; i

y

7 produces a moderate settled temper, viii. 5, 22 ;

-

3>

and

>

7,

re 8-13: the Lydian 3 by I lato in the Republic, ;

jected ib.

Lydian

education,

viii.

v. 7,

3,

13.

4.

;

;

!

;

;

or on size, ib. 4, 4-11 happi ness implies virtuous activity, ib. 3, 1-3 ; is the worthy ;

employment of 3-6

;

5.

:

has a sad and grave 22 the Phry

;

effect, ib. 5,

:

8; iv. 3, 7; 2 2 ; inspires enthusiasm, viii. 5 should not have been 7, 9 iii.

gian,

3,

,

;

retained by Plato, ib. v. 3,

9-13.

7,

7.

of, at

Epidamnus,

ii.

v. i,

Hellanocrates of Larissa, v. 10, 18.

Hellas, influence of the climate of, on the national character, vii. 7) I natural superi ority of Hellenes to Barbarians, i.

leisure, viii. 3,

9~ r 5-

4;

2,

v

6;

6,

iii.

14,

6;

3 ; differences of the various Hellenic tribes, vii. 7, -

4

;

happiness propor tioned to virtue, vii. i, 10; 8, 3, 7; 13, 5 9. 5; the perfect happiness of the divine 10; 3, 10; the nature, ib. i, happiness of men and states the ib. 2 the happiness same, 3 of states not dependent on em pire over others, ib. 2, 14-18; 7

9,

15

~4>

Happiness, independent of exter nal goods, vii. i, 10 13, 8; the happiness of the whole de pendent on the happiness of the 10 ii. parts, i. 6, 27; 5, vii.

to the Mixo-

suitable

14;

9,

7,

children, ib.

;

Hanno,

viii.

;

Harmony, the

Heliaea, court

;

7

;

Hebdome,

Habit, the strength of law derived from, ii. 8, 24; one element of virtue, vii. 13, 11-13 15. must 7 go before reason in

15. 3,

7)

barbarous laws

s

among

the ancient Hellenes, ii. 8, 20; the Hellenes formerly under royal rule, i. 2, 6; iii. 15, 11.

10

iv. 13,

;

changes in govern

ment caused by the

increase of

11-13; iv. 10-12; vi. 5, 5J. J3, rise of the 5 heavy-armed in importance, iv. 13, 10; effects of the Persian war upon

population,

iii.

15,

6,

;

Hellas,

ii.

12,

5

;

v.

4,

8;

growth of the Athenian empire in Hellas, iii.

viii.

3)

ii

6, r

9

;

division of Hellas be>

Index tween Athens and Lacedaemon, 8 ; v. 7, 14 smallness of the middle class

n,

iv.

1

:

n, 7, 1619; lack of great men, v. 10, effects of the cultivation 37 of rhetoric, ib. 5, 7; wrong notions of education, iv. n, 6 in later Hellas, iv.

;

;

vii.

15; viii. i, 3; 2, rago for flute playing in Hellas after the Persian War, 2

14,

:

12.

viii. 6,

Helots,

ii.

22:9,

5,

2

10,

;

4, 16. viii.

3-

Hephaestus,

i.

4,

15;

2, 3, 7,

v. 5,

Heracleitus, v.

n,

Heracleodorus, Heracles,

iii.

(in

3

;

8.

vii. 6,

Heracleides of Aenos,v. 10,

Heraea

18.

Arcadia),

v. 3,

9.

boea, v. 3, 4, 4. 9 Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, v. 10, 31; n, 7; 12, 5, 6. 8. Hipparinus, v. 6, 5. Hippocrates, vii. 4, Hippodamus, of Miletus, ii. 8,

revolutions,

20;

;

vii.

n

g.

t

the father of i.

2;

12,

quoted, II.

ii.

ib.

v. ix.

ib. ib.

x.

v. 2,

of

10-13, J 82, 14; 4,

7,

2; 3,

the honours of the state, iii. 5, 4, 5); honour 9 (cp.c. 10, less desired by men than wealth, iv. I3,8; v. 8, 16; vi. 4, 3 7).

Household management, the art of, distinguished from the rale i

7,

iii.

;

i.

2

i,

ib. 3,

3

1-3

;

8,

money1,2;

10,

1-4;

;

13-18;

;

divided

into three parts, i. 3, i ; how related to 12, i,

4

3,

;

6, 7;

6,

quisition, ib. 4, J

15; 1-3;

-8

T

;

9>

has a 18;

14,

i

;

131-4; ii,

8,

,

ib.

limit,

9,

more concerned

is

with virtue than with wealth, i ; the ib. 13, parts of men

and

women

in, different,

iii.

4,

17; exists for the benefit of those under it, ib. 6, 6, 7.

Husband and wife, relation of. [See Male and Female. ] Husbandmen, are sometimes 8 would be hunters, i. 8, better suited for Plato s com munism than the guardians, ii. ;

204 372

; ;

iv. 4, iii.

16,

27

319

7

;

648 224 ib. 376 ;

iii.

;

;

5, 16, i.

4.

;

10

39 I ~3; ib. 14, 63; i. 2, 9;

xviii.

ii.

8-io; 12, 18; the remedy for this, v. 8, 26, 12; n, 27 ; the citizen must share in

;

Homer, calls Zeus Gods and men,

in

Homer. Honour, inequality in, a cause

includes the natural art of ac

16.

13,

viii.

our

9,

9.

also cited,

is

which does not occur

making,

31.

v. 3,

Hesiod,quoted,i.2,5; v.io,3o. Hestiaea (the later Oreus) in Eu-

i

8,

of a master,

3.

Heraclea, in Pontus, 6,

a passage 3,

(cp. vi. 7,

Heniochi, the, in Pontus, 4,

333

;

5J

4;

4,

make

democracy,

8-10

I0

vi. 4,

9; 10

sailors, vii. 6, ;

3

;

Odyss. ix. 7 ; viii. 3, 9 ib. 14; i. 2, 7; xvii. 385 ; viii. 3, 9 :

i,

the best form of

citizens, ib. 9,

14 ;

9,

;

2

iv. 6,

8

;

;

12,

furnish

;

3

;

good

should not be 8

;

10,

13,

nor admitted to office, ib. 9 should be excluded from ;

the Treemen sAgora, ib.i2,3. Husbandry, a part of the natural

Index

334 art of

money-making,

lapygia, v. 3, Iberians, the, India, vii. 14,

i.

3

8,

;

2.

3; ii,

10,

7

vii.

;

vii.

10, 11.

2,

5.

sists in equality, iii. 9,

i;

3.

7>

;

revolution, v. 4, Instruments, best i.

4.

when made for

3;

2,

may be

either

are 2 living or lifeless, ib. 4, used either in production or in ;

ib.

action,

4-6;

are never

unlimited in the arts, ib. 8, the slave a living 14, 15 instrument, ib. 4, 2, 6. ;

6.

v. 10,

Ionia,

Ionian Gulf, the, vii. 10, 5. leader Iphiades, a party

14. Abydos, 2. Istros, v. 6, of Italus, king Oenotria, vii. 10, 3>ii.

2-6.

10,

nicate with each other,

should not hold

;

life, ib. 9,

25

;

ii. 8, office for

necessary, even

beginnings of the iv. 4, state, 13, 14; the various modes of appointing ib. 16, them, 5-7 ; provision for an equal division of opinion 6 those vi. 3, among judges, who inflict penalties to be different from those who see to in

the

first

;

8-u.

their execution, ib. 8,

Justice, the sense of, peculiar to

man,

men

i.

2,

12

;

in states, ib.

the 16

bond of ;

iii.

12,

3; (cp. iv. 4, 9; J 13); sometimes denned as benevo 3<

I

vii.

;

12,

;

3

14,

;

cannot be the destruction of the 2 cannot be state, iii. 10, united with the love of conquest, ;

of 2, 7-18 the ordinary notions of justice, vi. 3, 6; vii. 2, 14; all claims to rule based upon partial and

vii.

selfishness

;

relative

only,

justice

1-6, 15

v.

;

i; vi. 2,

2;

iii.

2-6

i,

;

9,

9,

1-4.

3,

King, the, not the same with the a statesman, i. I, ought to be chosen for merit (as at ;

ii, Carthage), ii. 9, 4 29 receives a special education, iii. 8 in be 4, may justified put

;

;

down

ting 22

his

rivals,

ib.

13,

is the champion of the better classes against the people, v. 10, 3 ;

v.

;

often

Jason, tyrant ofPherae, iii. 4, 9. Judges, not allowed to commu 13

12

13,

;

at

v. 6,

Italy,

;

;

Inheritance, sale ofan, forbidden, 6 ; (at Sparta\ ib. 9, iithe divi 20) 14 (cp. v. 8, sion of an, may be a cause of

one use,

lence, i. 6, 4 different m men and women, ib. 13, in 3, 9 the ruler and the subject, ib. 16-18; con 2-8; iii. 4,

27

in

supreme

;

religious

13 ; vi. 8, should he have a military iii.

matters,

20

ii,

;

force?

14,

iii.

14-16;

15,

is

guarded by the 7

citizens, ib. 14, 10.

v. 10,

;

King, the true, or natural supe of

rior

the

citizens,

13, 24, 25;

6

3, v. 10,

;

iii.

13,

17, 5-8; vii. in later Hellas,

unknown 37.

[See Royalty.]

King, a, the Gods why supposed to be under, i. 2, 3. 7 ; 12, Kings, the, of Crete (in ancient of ii. 10, 6; Carthage, times), of Mace ib. n, 3-6, 9, 10 ;

donia,

v. 10,

sians, ib. viii. 5,

daemon]

;

;

5 :

8; oftheMolosn, 2 of Persia, of Sparta [see LaceKings, the ancient,

;

Index sometimes became tyrants, 10,

v.

5.

12>

Knights, the, at Athens, ii. 12, 6 ; at Eretria, v. 6, 14.

ii.

3, 10 (cp. v. 13, 14; v. 7, T 5) ! number of heiresses, in popu decrease 9, 15 ;

lation, ib.

14-19; encourage families, ib. 14; of strangers, ib. 10, expulsion admitted to 15 ; strangers

ment of large

Lacedaemon

frequent wars of the Lacedaemonians with their

neighbours,

;

ii.

3, 1

9,

with

difficulties

the

1

their

;

Helots, 22) ; the

2-4 (cp. ib. 5, 1 1 Messenian Wars, ib. v. 3. 4! the conspiracy of ib.

;

7>

2 ; of the Partheniae, v. 7, Pausanias, ib. i, ioj 7, 4; vii. 14, 20; ofCinadon,v. 7, of Lysander, ib. T, 10; 3 ; 2 ; the putting down of the 7, 30; the subject tyrants, ib. 10, cities governed in the oligar chical interest by the Lacedae

18; v. 7, monians, iv. n, 14 friendship among the Lacedaemonians, ii. 5, 7; agriculture forbidden to them, ;

17; simplicity of life among them, ib. 6, 17 ; iv. 9, 6-9; of the Lacedae excellence ib.

monian education, i, 4 {but cp.

viii.

i);

4,

iv.

9,

7

j

2,19; music not com

viii.

vii.

Lace it, viii. 5, 7 daemonian training only ad prised in

;

;

12

;

daemonians

error of the Lace in thinking the

ob

jects of their desire preferable to the virtue which gained them, ii.

35 (CP- vii distrust in the

-

9>

J

5)

!

monian women, ib. 5-13 the Lacedaemonian constitution :

a combination of various forms of government, ib. 6, 16, 17; 22 an aristocracy with an 9, ;

element of democracy, iv. 7, 4 re 20 ; 10, 10) (cp. ii. 9, garded by some as a democracy, iv. 9, by others as an oligarchy, ;

6-io; often considered the next best to the ideal state, ii. 6 its resem 16 ; iv. i, 6, blance to the Cretan, ii. 10, 4-7 ; to the Carthaginian, ;

1 1, 3-5 ; the arrangement of the law-courts at Lacedaemon,

ib.

an aristocratical

feature, ib.

spirit of

7

;

the attention of the legislator directed solely vii to war, ii. 9, 34. 35 iii.

10,

i,

ii

;

-

5

2,

9; 1-7

16-22

14,

viii. 4,

;

imperfections of the

:

Lacedaemonian monarchy,

vantageous while other nations did not train, ib. 4, 4-7 rage for flute-playing at Lacethe Persian after daemon War, ib. 6,

citizenship in ancient times, ib. 17 ; licence of the Lacedae 9,

n,

29, 30;

3,

ii.

9,

4; limited

powers of the kings,

iii.

3;

14,

an heredi 9, 33 iii. tary generalship, 1.2; l6 4. s, *4; i s 14. i origin of their power, 8 reason of its long v. 10, 2: the continuance, ib. n, 2; their office

v. ii,

ii.

;

:

;

Gerusia

criticized,

ii.

25-

9,

Lacedaemonian bad 30 government, ii. 9,

ii v.6, faults and merits of the Epho-

of the revenue, ib. frequency of corruption, ib. 12; accu 19, 26; 10, mulation of property, ib. 9,

ralty,

;

management 36

;

4, ii

29; ii,

26;

ii.

10,

:

;

17; 9,

6,

10, 12

;

19-24, 3;

ii,

Theopompus

as

a check on the royal power,

v.

established by

Index

33* IJ >

miral,

mon

3;

ii.

9,

tables,

5: 6

T 5. iv. 9,

as

2,

8

in

>

;

the office of ad the com 33

rule? iii. 15, i-io; 16 ; should the law ever be changed

:

why

instituted, ib.

J 7; 9, not so well ii.

Crete,

3 r ,32

;

managed 32

9,

10,

;

7, 8 -

Lamet.ic Gulf, the,

Land,

vii. 10,

two portions,

vii. :

owners? ib. 5, 3, 18, 19; 8, vii. 9, 8-13 1-4; 10, 1 at 3, 14 Sparta, had fallen into the hands of a few, ii. 9, ;

;

Larissa,

iii.

encour

2

2,

6, 13.

Law, the, of Oxylus, vi. 4, 9 Laws, the, of Androdamas, 14; of 6-8, ii

12,

;

ib.

Charondas, iv.

13,

2

ii.

of

;

13; of Lycurgus (see Sparta) ; of Minos, ii. 10, i of Phaleas, ii. vii. 10, 3 12 of Philolaus, ib. 12, 7 8-io; of Pittacus, ib. 12, of of Plato (see Plato) 13 1-6; iii. Solon, ii. 7, 6 1 2, n, 8; of Zaleucus, ii. 12, 6. Law, the, derives its force from 24 ; a surety of habit, ii. 8, 8 justice (Lycophron), iii. 9,

Draco,

ii.

12,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

may have

a party character, ib. 20; only exists 10, 5; II, for equals, ib. 13, 13, 14; must be supported J 6, 2, 3 by force in the ruler, ib. 15, is a mean, ib. 16, 14, 15 ;

;

8

;

is

order,

vii.

without passion, the rule 16,

of,

5 (cp.

4,

iii.

the rule of i.

2,

8

is

;

15,

5

God,

ib.

15, 16)

;

;

should the law or the monarch

iii.

their

19; 31

ii,

iv.

;

4,

16,

are

;

must be obeyed 9, 10 and must be good, iv. 4, 30 iv. i,

;

;

5,6.

8,

Law, the, or convention, by which prisoners of war become slaves, 6,

i, 5.

unwritten, importance of,

16,

9.

Laws, the, of Hellenic cities gene rally in

:

?

6,

15,

relative to the constitution, but distinct from it, iii. n, 20 ;

iii.

v. 6,

;

iii.

Laws, the, cannot

:

10-12

5,

Law,

8-10.

vi. 4,

aged,

to be

5)

interpreters,

i-

5-

I4>

Landowners, small,

16,

;

(cp.

provide for circumstances, ii. 8. 22; iii. n, 19; 15, 4-8; 16, 4-13; should be supreme,

n(but

10,

15) Hippodamus s cp. ii. 6, division of, ii. 8, 3, 12; it be cultivated by the should

T

7

16-25

8,

and the magistrates only

3.

should be divided into

the,

ii.

Laws,

Law and

a chaotic

state, vii. 2,

9.

the, of Plato (see Plato). Courts, the, oligarchical democratical tricks with,

2 2, 5; 13, 9, 14, 12; the rich should be encour to in even demo attend, aged used by the cracies, vi. 5, 5 iv.

;

;

demagogues

to ruin the rich, v.

1-5!

4; 5,

3,

Law courts, of, iv.

1

7;

6,

-

3-

5.

6.

Legislator, the, to the country ii.

vi

the possible varieties

7,

must have regard and the people, 14-17; must

pay attention to the foreign

re lations of the state, ib. ; ib. ; vii. 2, 18; must secure leisure for his citizens, ii. 9, 2 ; ii, 10, vii.

12;

12,

vii.

7);

9,

3,

must not

7 (cp. trust to

vii. n, 15, 17 8-io; must regard the iii. 12 good, 13, ought not to want such a princi as ib. ostracism, 23 v. 3, ple

accidents,

ii.

;

J3>

common

;

;

Index must know

all

3 ; possible 8 and state, iv. i , the causes of their preservation and destruction, v. 9, 9 vi. 5, 2 must be able to reform as well as to create a state, iv. i , should favour the middle 7 class, ib. 12, 4 ; must consider the deliberative, executive, and judicial elements in relation to the constitution of each state,

forms of

;

;

;

;

i ; ib. 14, his designs,

2

must be modest ii.

6,

aim of his must give all the

the in

7

viii.

;

4,

make conquest

should not

;

in

2

vii.

state,

;

citizens a share

the administration, ib. 14, 4 must have a care of edu ;

cation, ib.

8; 15,

i,

8; viii.

1,2; must not neglect i, i. physical education, vii. 16, Legislators, the best, belonged to the middle class, iv. u, 15. Leisure, the, of the citizens, the first object of the legislator, ii. 2

9,

n,

;

3,4>

citizen

10-12;

7 (cp.vii. 12,

vii.

9,

7); the

must know the right uses

of, vii. 14,

13-22

;

viii.

3

;

5,

337

of seven years, ib. 16, 17 ; 17, 15 simplicity of, at Sparta, :

ii.

17

6,

iv. 9,

;

7.

good, not desired by

Life, the

mankind

i. 16 9, the object of the existence of the

in general,

8

state, ib. 2,

12

iv. 4,

;

iii.

;

9, I

vii. I,

;

;

1 1 4, 8, 4 ; is it the same for states and for individuals ? ;

vii. i

;

2

10.

3,

;

Limit, a, necessary in the arts, i. 8, 21; 14; 9, 13; iii. 13, in population, ii. vii. 4, 10 10 6, 6, 7, 5; 9, 19; ;

;

vii.

4-11;

4,

15; iii.

3.

i.

ii.

9;

6,

vii.

4-7;

in wealth, 8,

i;

5,

in the state, 8,

ii.

13,

19.

14; vii. 5,

Locri (in Italy),

ii.

7,

iii.

8,

7

;

iv. 4,

22,

6; 3; 8, 7; v. i, 14, 15 ; vi. 2, 1-4, 9; 9, 20; must not be confused 4, with licence, v. 9, 15 ; should be held out as a reward to slaves,

23;

6; 12,

10. 6; v. 7, Lot, use of the, characteristic of democracy, ii. ii, 7; 12, 3 iv. 9, 45 J !9! vi. 2, 5, 8 modes in which it may be used in elections of magistrates, ;

5>

;

16-22.

iv. 15,

iii.

9,

8. ii.

10,

2.

Lycurgus,the author of the Lace

7.

Liberty, supposed to be the characteristic feature of demo cracy,

;

4-8;

Lesbos, Leucas,

7,

;

S 1

14; 9,

7,

Lyctus, in Crete,

ii.

7

5,

i.

Lycophron, the Sophist,

;

16,

6,

4.

4; needed for virtue, vii. 9, 4. 6 Leontini, v. 10, 12, 13. iii.

6-14; 2, 17;

8,

vii. 10, 14. Life, action, not production, i. 4, is 5 ; pleasure of, iii. 6, 5 ;

the speculative or the practical, better? vii. 2, 5-18; 3: divided by the poets into periods

daemonian 2

;

constitution, i

12,

;

of Charilaus,

10,

the guardian

ib.

2 his 10, his failure to

visit to Crete, ib.

bringthe

ii.

was

women

;

;

under his laws,

by some to have been a disciple of Thales, ib. 12, 7; belonged to the middle class, iv. n, 15. ib. 9,

1 1

,

12

;

said

Lydian Harmony, the see Har mony. Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, v. 6, :

i.

Lysander,

v. I,

10

;

7,

2.

Index

338 Macedonia, v. account

10,

8; vii.

power of

Magistrates,

[see

10.

2,

Account, power of

calling magistrates to] division of law-suits among the Lace ;

daemonians and Carthaginian ii. n, 7; iii. i, election 10 (cp. iv. 14, 3) of magistrates by merit charac teristic of aristocracy, ii. n, 10 for 7, 9! iv

magistrates,

;

-

!

I5>

wealth, of oligarchy, ii. 6, 19; iv. 15, 11, 10; choice by 9 lot, of democracy, ii. 6, 19 ; ;

iv.

19; vi. 2, must be taken from

3; 9

12, 5,

;

15,

who

those

carry arms, ii. 8, 9; 9; are very numerous ii. ii, democracies, 14; ought to be only the guardians

iv. 13,

in

and interpreters of the law, iii. iv. ii, 16, 5, 10-12 19 character and powers of 31 4, ;

;

;

the magistrates in aristocracies, 10 vi. 8, iv. 14, 15, 13 22 in constitutional govern in ments, iv. 14, 10, 16 ;

;

;

;

ib.

democracies,

1-7

15,

;

8 10-14; vi 2, 5-9 17, 24; in oligarchies, iv. 10-14; vi. 14, 8,9; 15, 8, 17, 24; the magistrates to each constitution, iv. peculiar 11-13; vi. 8, 17, 24; 15, definition of the term magis should he iv. trate, 15, 1-4; hold more than one office ? ii. -

13;

11, 2

8,

;

iv.

appointment, vi.

5,

15,

the various 11

;

!

5-10;

vi.

modes of

iv. 15,

14-21

;

popular election

10; 6, 6; dangerous, v. 5, the magistrates should not be allowed to make money, ib. 3, i

;

8,

15;

vi. 7,

5

(cp. v.

undue power ac 12, 14) quired by them a cause of revo ;

8-11 lution, v. 3, 3; 4, great authority of the ancient i; v. i, magistrates, iii. 16, vi. 2, 8; 10, 10; 5, 5 8 the magistrates may pre vent revolutions by prudence, v. 8 manner in which they 8, should act in oligarchies, vi. ;

calling to

;

;

;

10, ii

5,

54-7; enume

7,

;

of the different magis trates required by states, vi. 8 ; the magistrates must know the characters of their fellow-

ration

citizens, vii. 4,

13

;

must sup

10 press obscenity, ib. 17, Magistrates, certain, required law to take their meals to by :

gether, vi. 2,

7

vii.

;

2.

12,

Magnesia (on the Maeander), 3,

iv.

3-

Magnesians, the,

ii.

3.

9,

Majority, the (in a state), diffi culties about the power which should be possessed by, iii. 10 ; ii 13, 4-7; vi. 3. Male and female, reason ;

union

of,

i.

2

2,

;

for the the relation

part of the household, ib. 3, i. 2; 12, Male, the, intended by nature to rule over the female, i. 5, 7 ; of,

12,

i.

iv.

Malians, the,

13,

9.

Man

a political animal, i. 2, iii. 6, has 9, 14, 15 3 a natural wish for posterity, i. 2 alone has the faculty of 2, ;

;

;

speech,

ib.

the sense of

10;

12 the good and evil, ib. 12 ; power of reason, vii. 13, the worst of animals when not controlled by law and justice, T 16 imust allow 2, ;

5>

reason

to

;

direct

nature

and

habit, 11-13; should give the soul rule over the body, vii. 13,

i-

5i

4~7;

the plants and

Index animals created for his sake, 12

8,

from that of the

the, different

woman,

ib. 13,

16-18 19; are wicked by 12; are more 5,

8,

7,

i.

iii. 15 9 iv. 15, 9, 5; 5, 4, 9Messenian War, the (Second), v.

Megara,

9,

;

nature, ii. desirous of gain than of honour, 8 v. 8, iv. 13, 16; vi. 4, 3 ; are satisfied with a mode rate amount of virtue, vii. i, Men, the first, were or 5 ii.

people,

8,

of, v.

9

4,

;

government by representation at, vi. 4,

i.

Middle ii;

the best, ib.

4

;

v. 8,

n, 14

8-15; 6

9,

;

ness of the middle ancient states, iv. 13,

Might and

Minos,

i.

ii.

i.

right,

vii. 2,

Miletus,

12,

small-

;

class

in

n. 3

6,

vi. 3,

;

13.

9

ii,

8.

v. 5,

;

vii.

3;

10,

10,

2,

6.

4.

Marriage, regulations respecting, vii. 16 the marriage relation, i- 2, 2; 3, 1-3; 12; iii. 4,

Mithridates (?Satrap of Pontus), v. 10,

;

6.

Massalia, v. 6,

2,3;

vi.

7,

25.

Mitylene, iii. 14, 6 ; 10, 19.

10; v-4,

5,

the

see

Mixo-Lydian Harmony,

:

Harmony.

4-

in relation to the

Master, the, i.

slave,

interest with the slave,

for the salvation of the state, iv. 6 vi - 5. ii, 16-19; v

3,

;

;

12-14

7,

;

6 ; vii. 14, 10; 6, 6 ought to train the slave in the science virtue, i. 13, 14; ib. 6,

iii.

-

24 7, peculiar to, ib. 3, 14; the rule of, ib. 5 ; 13, 4 iii. 4, ii vii. 14, 6; 3, wrongly supposed [by Plato] to ;

;

2

ii

states,

Molossians, the, in Epirus, 2. 8; ii, against,

from

3,

;

education,

v.

;

viii.

6,

of

the,

in

9,

6

in

7

;

7,

Mechanic, the see Artisan. Medes, the, iii. 13, 19

;

15.

:

;

3,

9,

8

45

>

10, money, 5. Money-making, the

13, 17; 10, 18. (See

i,

v. 10,

i.

3,

12-18;

natural kind,

1-8; 2

19.

Z 2

;

10,

3

manage

8,

;

10, ib. 8,

1-4;

the unnatural,

how

art of,

related to household

viii.

Physician.)

Megacles,

n

ib.

ment, i.

King, Royalty,

8 ; its origin of, i. 9, conventional nature, ib. ; from not to be made ought

5-

Medicine,

15-17see

Money,

4.

1 1

:

and Tyranny.

political rule,

importance iv.

iii.

Monarchy

v. 10,

arguments for and

Monarchy,

;

different

;

9>

2.

;

Mean,

7.

Mnason, a Phocian, v. 4, 7. Moderation in politics, necessary

i; 13,

12,

Mnaseas, a Phocian, v. 4,

1-3 has a

2-5

2,

common

5,

ii. 9, class, virtues of the, iv. the middle-class state 12;

Midas,

6;

Mantinea, battle

n.

3,

9,

:

21.

be

3-

7,

:

foolish

;

Messenians, the, ii. Metics see Aliens.

;

dinary,

;

v. 3,

iii.

;

unlimited

are

in their desires, 11.

9-11

3,

Men

16:

4,

ib.

virtue of

Man, the

:

339

2

i,

;

9,

1-4; the 3-15 9, ;

n,

ib. 9,

i

i,

foil.;

Index

340

10, ii, 3; the inter 4, 5 mediate, ib. ii, 4; the un natural pursues its end without limit, ib. 9, 13-15. Monopolies, a common method ;

of gaining wealth, i. ii, 8-13. Multitude, the, their claim to the

Mytilene

see

:

Mitylene.

man a desire

Nature, implants in of posterity, i. 2,

and the 8

6,

ruled, ib.

12

;

2

makes a

;

between the ruler

distinction

;

13,

;

4,

4

;

6

;

5

;

between

; 10, better collectively than the in

the female and the slave, ib. 2, 3 her designs must be sought

dividual, ib.

in things

supreme power,

are

i

iii.

;

ii; 13, 4; 15; should have power only to elect and control the magistrates, ib. 11,

7-

ii. Musaeus, quoted, viii. 5, Music, subject to a ruling princi 4; better judged of ple, i. 5, by the many than by the indi

vidual, iii. ii, 3; useful (i) in education, viii. 3; 5 ; 7, 3; (2) for the intellectual employ

ment of 9

!

leisure, ib.

3

7>

(3)

w

i

an

8,

5, 3 tn a v i ;

purification, ib. 7,

3-6

W ;

upon morals, ib. 5, 6; 7, !5- 2 5; 6 3-7 not taught at Lacedaei>

>

;

ib. 5, 7 ; naturally plea sant to men, ib. 8, ii, 25; 6; produces enthusiasm, ib. 7, 16, 22 ; 7, 4; allays the 5,

mon,

5,

which areuncorrupted, does nothing in a

5

;

niggardly fashion, ib. 2, creates nothing in vain, ib.

3

;

10;

12 ii. 8; gives toman 5, the social instinct, ib. 2, 1016; iii. 6, 3-5 not always able to accomplish her inten 10 ; 6, 8 sup tions, i. 5, 8,

;

;

;

9-12; plies food for all, ib. 8, 10, 3 ; has given all freemen a right to rule, ii. 2, 6; iii. 16,

to

has

effect

7,

ib.

3

2,

the young to obey, command, vii. 9, 6;

fits

;

the old to

permits proper relaxation, viii. 2 herself suggests the pro 3, per harmonies for each age, ib. forms one element in 13 7, ;

;

vii.

virtue,

13,

11-13;

I5i

7, 9 4-6 ; passions, ib. 6, a rattle for children of a larger

must be supplemented by and education, ib. 17, 15. Naval force, the, which should be possessed by the state, vii.

2 cannot be growth, ib. 6, judged except by a performer,

Naxos,

;

;

7) 4 (but cp. c. 5, must not be pursued to the of point professional excellence, ib. 6,7, 15; includes a higher and a lower kind, ib. 8; 7, 6 is composed of melody ib.

;

;

and rhythm, 7,

ib. 5,

18

;

6,

5

;

23

;

i.

Music, writers upon, 2, 3, 8, ii,

7,

Musical

Harmony

Myron, tyrant 12.

viii. 5,

14. see

:

Harmony.

at Sicyon, v. 12,

7 art

;

6-9.

6,

v. 6,

Nobility,

i.

among Barbarians only

partially recognized by Hellenes, i. 6, 7; confers a claim to supe

the state,

riority in

12,

may

iii.

9,

15

;

2-5; iv. 8, 3 9; 13, be defined (i) as excellence

;

of race, iii. 13, v. i, 7 3 (2) as ancient wealth and virtue, ;

;

9 confused by mankind with wealth, ib. 4, 8; v. 7, iv. 8,

i

;

;

like virtue,

found,

v.

i,

is

not often

14.

Nobles, quarrels among, a cause

Index of revolutions,

v. i,

i

16; 4,

;

9 form a demo cracy among themselves, ib. 8, 6 should be humane to the 5

6>

8,

;

;

;

iv.

subject classes, 5,

vi.

8;

13,

v. 3,

inary to command, iii. 4, 6. 6; 14, 14; vii. 9, viii. 3,

10,

2,

5.

which iii.

i,

5.

mankind for, iii.

6,

the poor from, iv. 13, 1-4; justice of the various claims to,

10-13

:

Offices, the, of the

state, posts of honour, ib.

4 vi.

;

8

10, their distribution, iv. 15 ; their deter ; organization

mines

character of each 10 ; 3, constitution, iv. i, 5 ; in

the

com

small states must be ii,

8,

2

14; iv. 15, 5-7; vi. democracies restricted

in

;

to six months tenure, v. 8, (cp. vi. 2,

5)

6;

and rarely held

;

more than once by the same iii.

person,

should be

6

i,

vi.

;

divided

classes, v. 8, Offices, sale of,

21

;

5

2,

into

vi. 5,

6,

;

;

8,

3;

7 ; vi. 2,

n,

ib.

;

8,

i-6, 19;

8,

16-19; v

7; Plato

5

7,

wrong

i>

i 12, (cp. vi. 6, 4 ) the extreme form apt to pass into

v.

;

tyranny,

iv.

ii,

3;

in think

ii

;

v. 10,

5;

13; the causes of revo

12,

lutions

in

v.

oligarchies,

3,

the 6; 12, 14 15-18 means of their preservation, ib. ;

;

95 8

5-21

.

5

9;

vi.

6,

the Lacedaemonians the champions of oligarchy in 5

;

7

;

18; v. 7, Hellas, iv. ii, 14 the people to whom oligarchy ;

is suited, iv. 2,

4; 12, 3 the military strength of oligarchy derived from cavalry and heavy infantry, ib.

or, more correctly,

14,

governments, excepting tyranny,

vi. 7,

at

7-n;

6,

6; oligarchy less stable than democracy, iv. ii, 6; the 14; v. i, 15; 7, shortest lived of all forms of vi.

n.

and pluralism,

of the wealthy, 6, 7; iv. 4,

8-n;

two

10, 13. Carthage, ii. ii, Oligarchy, the government of the few for their private interests, iii. 2

i-35

5,

6,

bined, in large ones specialized, ii.

8; 4, 20-22; 12, 3; 13, the forms enumerated, ib. ;

12

10; oligarchical tricks to keep

iii.

;

best, iv. 8, 4; v. 14; analogous to tyranny 11 ; in love of wealth, v. 10, has more forms than one, iv. I ,

3-5.

Office, the indefinite, in all the citizens share, Office, lust of

ii,

ment of the

Southern

(in

Italy), vii. 10,

6-12;

ii.

i,

of, v. 3,

the

Oenotrians,

distinguished from

i 5-10; iv. 5, 10; v. 7, 2-10; 14, 5~8; popularly supposed, like aristocracy, to be a govern

9.

Oenophyta, battle

how

;

7; 8,

15.

Obedience, the necessary prelim

Odysseus,

;

2

2, it,

5-"-

Notium,

ing that an oligarchy can ever be called 3; oli good, iv. 2, garchy the perversion of aristo 12 ; iv. 5 cracy, iii. 7, 15,

I

;

;

3, 3; 13, 10; oligarchical modes

of appointing magistrates and judges,

ii.

7-u;

6, J

19,

20;

iv.

i4-;

14,

8; magistracies peculiar iv. 11 garchy, 14, 14; 15, vi. 8, 17, 24; luxury of the women in oligarchies, iv. I J3; bad education of the 5>

16,

to

oli

;

5>

children,

ib.

ii,

6;

v.

9,

Index

34*

1 the oligarchs sometimes 3 forbidden to engage in trade, v. :

14;

12,

the

power

their tricks to

keep

own hands,

in their

2 13, 1-4; 14, 9, 12; they ought rather to give the people a share in the go vernment, ib. 14, 14; vi. 5, ii 7, 4 they should not take oaths against the people, v. 9, 10, ii; they should not be allowed to make money iv.

;

;

by

;

office,

vi. 7.

ib.

i

3,

;

15

8,

;

18. Parrhon, of Aenos, v. 10, Partheniae,the (atLacedaemon), 2. conspiracy of, v. 7, Passion, intended bynature to be

6 controlled by reason, i. 5, present in the human soul from 8 the first, iii. 15, 16, 5, vii. 15, 10 blinds men 5 ;

;

;

34; u,3i; the multitude freer from passion than the individual, iii. 15, 8. Patrimony, laws forbidding the 6 ; 9, sale of a, ii. 7, 14 (cp. v. 8,

5-

Olympic Games, the, viii. 4, Olympus, melodies of, viii.

8.

5,

16.

Onomacritus, the Locrian,

ii.

12,

incorrectly

v.

4,

7-

Opici,the,orAusones,vii. 10,

Opus

iii.

(in Locris),

Oratory,

Oreus

:

v. 5,

see

5.

iii.

vi. 4,

3,

9.

6.

works iii.

ii, like other artists, observe rule of proportion, ib. 13, ;

those who,

like

vii.

17,

vii.

;

viii.

of,

5,

12, 4; bad of the practice, ib. iv. 6, 6; 5; vi. 2, 19 how they may be counteracted,

9.

Panaetius, tyrant of Leontini, v. 6; 12, 10, 13. Parent, the, relation of, to the child, i. 2, 2; 12; 2; 3, provides food for the offspring, ib. 8, 10 ; 10, 3.

ii.

effects

7>

;

vi. 5,

5-

Peace, the true object of war, vii. i, 5; the 14, 13, 22; 15, 3. dangers of, ib. 15, men of the Pediaei, the (or plain

),

at Athens, v. 5, v.

2

5!

>

v.

10,

9.

9;

12,

Peisistratidae,

the,

Peisistratus,

Poly-

gnotus, express moral ideas, to be preferred, viii. 5, 21. Paintings, obscene, not to be al

lowed,

4

7,

;

Painters, combine their from scattered elements,

;

paintings

and Ephialtes,

i.

-

21

Pauson,

;

i,

con

his

Payment of the democracy in troduced at Athens by Pericles

7.

12. 3; 8, Oxylus, king of Elis, v. 4,

10

v.

king,

20;

21.

Orthagoras, Ostracism, how far justifiable, 13, 13-25; 17. 7; v

Paches,

called 14,

spiracy, v. i, 20. 14,

i.

16,

Hestiaea. v. 12,

a

vii.

10;

Onomarchus, a Phocian,

20).

Pausanias, the assassin of Philip of Macedon, v. 10, 16. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus,

7-

4

;

to danger, v. 10,

15,

5,

34; II,

9; 12,

5iii. 3, 3 10, Peloponnesus, 5 Peloponnesian War, the : see War, Peloponnesian. 22 9, 2. Penestae, the, ii. 5, in Pentacosio-medimni, the, Solon s constitution, ii. 12, 6.

ii.

;

;

;

Penthalidae, the, at Mitylene, 10,

19.

v.

Index Penthilus v.

tyrant of Mitylene),

(?

10,

19.

Periander, tyrant of Ambracia, v. 4,

16.

9; jo,

Periander, tyrant of Corinth, 13,

16;

12,

3-

v.

4;

12,

4.

Perioeci (in Argos), v. 3, 7 (in Crete), ii. 9, 3, 3; 10, 16 tohave 5, 8, advantageous of as cul race perioeci foreign 8 tivators, vii. 9, 13. 10, :

:

;

Perrhaebians, the, iii.

Persia, 8,

24;

ii.

13, ii,

10; viii. 5, Persian War, Persian.

9,

3.

19; 6;

v.

4,

ro,

vii.

2,

5.

the

see

:

7

;

War,

1-3;

8,

i,8-io;

iii.

i

17,

;

i; all

;

iv.

2,

governments

perversions of the perfect state, i iv. 8, 5). (cp. ii. ii, Phalaris, of Agrigentum, v. 10, 6.

iv.

3-

Phrygian harmony, the:

Har

see

mony. 6. Phrynichus, v. 6, Phylarchs, magistrates at Epi-

10.

v. i,

Physician, the, must be judged by 10-12 the physician, iii. ii, is healed by the physician, ib. not 8 is 16, expected to per suade or coerce his patients, vii. must know both the 2, 13 end and the means of his art, 2 ib. 13, precepts of the ;

;

;

;

Phaleas of Chalcedon, 12,

9-

Phreatto, court of, at Athens,

damnus,

of government, ii

10, ii. Philoxenus, viii. 7, Phocis, v. 4, 7. Phocylides, quoted, iv. ii, 9. Phoxus, tyrant of Chalcis, v. 4,

16,

Perversions, the, of the true forms 6,

ii ; philo marriage, vii. 16, sophers who have treated of musical education, viii. 5, 23; 2, 3,8, 11,14. 7, Philosophy, especially necessary in the prosperous, vii. 15, 3, 4-

ii.

Pericles,

iii.

13; 11,

10,

343

ii.

7,

2

;

7, 12.

Pharsalus,

;

v. 6,

in

10.

Pheidon, tyrant of Argos,

v. 10,

6.

Pheidon, of Corinth, ii. 6, Philip, King of Macedonia,

Egypt,

v. 10,

iii.

Philosopher, the,

may be allowed

to discuss practical questions, i. i; has no difficulty in ii,

8-10; acquiring wealth, ib. must go below the surface of i his life iii. as 8, ; things, distinguished from that of the 6: statesman, vii. 2, philo sophers, the, not agreed about 2 the opinions slavery, i. 6, of natural philosophers about ;

13;

Plato, criticisms of;

8, 10.

12,

4.

v. 3,

;

15. iii.

14,

9, 10.

government ii.

15,

i Piraeus, ii. 8, Pittacus, ii. 12,

13.

16.

Philolaus,

physicians about marriage, ib. ii law about physicians 16,

2

;

3,

4;

of men and J

i-

3>

ways 14

forms of

differ in kind, r

7)

women

i.

i

,

the virtue not the same, ;

9~n ; slaves not al to be harshly treated, ib.

;

disadvantages of

com

munity of wives and children, ii.

i.

3-c. 5

;

of

common pro

ib. 5; vii. 10, perty, 9; the unity of the state may be carried too far, ii. 2, 2-c. 3,

4

;

6 4>

;

5,

women ought

13 ; men and not to have the

Index

344 same

pursuits, ib. 5,

24

dan

;

ger from the rulers being always the same, ib. 25, 26; hap piness should not be confined Plato to one class, ib. 27 has neglected the foreign rela ;

tions of his state, ib. 6, 7 ; amount of property allowed by

him

insufficient,

ib.

9

he

;

should have limited population 10as well as property, ib. he has not said 4 14 7, how the rulers and subjects are ;

;

related, ib. 6, 14; not property in land

to a certain extent ?

should

why

be increased

ib.

1

5

;

diffi

culty of living in two houses, ib. 16; the best state not made up of tyranny and demo 18 ; the state of cracy, ib.

Laws

the

really

a mixture of

oligarchy and democracy, ib. 18-22 Plato s distinctions between good and bad constitu ;

his account of the classes necessary to a state, tions, iv. 2, ib. 4,

3

;

has not recog Polity in his enu

12-15

nized the

;

meration of constitutions, ib. 7, i his theory of revolutions, v. 12, 7-18; his error in saying that the guardians should be fierce to those whom they do that not know, vii. 7, 5-8 a valiant city needs no walls, ib. 8 the that ii, crying of children should be checked, ib. ;

:

:

6;

17,

his

inconsistency

in

retaining the Phrygian mode, the merits of 8-13

viii. 7,

Plato

:

s

writings,

ii.

6,

6

;

he

departs from ordinary practice more than other legislators, ib. 7,

i

;

peculiarities suggested

by him,ib. his

censure

monian

12: of the

12,

justice of

Lacedae

constitution, ib. 9,

34:

how far right in wishing that his city should not be near tie 1-4 speech of Aristophanes in the Symposium criticism of quoted, ii. 4, 6 the Republic, ib. i, 3-c. 5; of the Laws, ib. 6. sea, vii. 6,

:

:

Pleasure, always sought by man 12 ; kind, i. 9, 16; ii. 7, denied by Plato to his guardians, ii. 5, 27; is regarded differ ently by different persons, viii. the pleasure of living, 3, 5 iii. 6, 4; relation of pleasure to happiness, vii. i,6; thenatural ;

pleasure given by music,

viii. 5,

8: 15, 17, 25; 6, Pleasures, the, which are unac companied by pain, ii. 7, 12. ii,

Poetry, better judged by the many than the individual, iii. n, 3. Polity: see Government, the Con stitutional.

Polycrates,

v. ii,

9.

Polygnotus, the painter,

viii.

5,

21.

Poor, iii.

everywhere abound, 6 v. I, covet 14

the,

8,

;

;

the goods of the rich, iv. ii, their degraded state in 9 ;

Hellenic

ib.

cities,

5-7;

willing to fight if they are sup ported by the state, ib. 13, 9; equal to the rich in democracies, vi. 2, 9 the surplus revenue distributed among them in the ;

extreme democracy,

may

ib. 5, 7 ; if their

cause a revolution

numbers increase, v. 3, 6-8; begrudge the extravagance of courts, ib. II,

humanely iv.

13,

19

8

;

;

should be

20; 7, should be helped

treated,

ii.

5-11. by the rich, vi. 5, Population, decline of, at Sparta, ii. 16; importance of regu 9, lating, ib. 6, 10-14; 7, 4-

Index 6; 9, 15;

14-19; vii. 5, i; 16, changes of government brought about by the natural increase of population in Hellas, J 3; iv. 6, 5; 13, 15, 10 ; vi. 5, a limit of 5

i".

;

population necessary to good 6, 10 7, government, ii. 6, 1 vii 4 4-" 55 9. ;

-

5

9>

i; 16, 15. Poverty, not the cause of the worst crimes, ii. 7, 10; always antagonistic to riches, iv.4, 19 the parent of revolution and 5,

;

1 3 (but cp. v. 1 2, of the essential characteristics of democracy, vi.

crime, 17); 2,

ii.

6,

one

7-

Priests, are not political officers,

necessary to the state, vii. 8, 7,9; should be taken from the aged citizens who are past state service, ib. iv.

2

15,

;

189; their duties, vi. 8, 20 ; required to take their meals 6. at common tables, vii. 12, Property, a part of the household, i ; a condition i ; i. 8, 4, 9,

but not a part of the state, vii. in the sense of food, 8, 4 provided by nature for all, i. 8, 9; 10, 3; the pleasure of Plato s 8 property, ii. 5, limit of property unsatisfactory, ib. 6, 9 ; the limit should be such as to enable a man to live both temperately and liberally, i ; ib. vii. 5, inequality of ;

;

;

14property at Sparta, ii. 9, 15; 3, 10; 12, 19; v. 7, a great cause of revolutions, ii. 2-6. 7, Property, community of cism of Plato s scheme, ;

(see

Plato)

opposed 4,

;

to

16;

criti ii.

5

common property human nature, ib.

exists in a modified

friends, ib.

among

degree

6,

10, 9 found to some extent at Sparta and Tarentum,

7

vii.

;

;

J 6; would 7! y idestroy the virtues of temper 8ance and liberality, ii. 5, i o would not produce the marvellous results which Plato "

5>

5>

;

1 1

ib.

expects,

equalization

;

proposed by Phaleas,

of,

12

12,

ib. 7

;

would not remedy

;

the deeper evils of human nature, ib. 7, 8-13, 18. Property qualification, required in the holders of various offices, iv.

16;

4, 24; 5, 7; vi. 4, 5; not to be iv. excessive, ought in oligarchies should 13, 7

iii.

ii,

6,

i;

3,

;

be fixed according to two stan 2 dards, vi. 6, changes in, a ;

cause of revolutions, v. 3, 8, 10 the 16-18; 7, 6, 9 evil may be remedied by pe riodical revisions of the census, ;

;

10, ii.

ib. 8,

Proportion, importance 2i

13,

15; 3, 7

;

vii.

;

iv.

12

6; 7,

;

v.

8;

iii.

of,

i,

12-

8,i2;

9,

10.

4,

Psammetichus, son of Gordius, tyrant at Corinth,

v. 12,

Pyramids, the, of Egypt,

3. v. ii,

9-

Reason, an element of virtue, vii. 10-13; 15, i3 7; is the master artificer, i. 13, 8; di vided into two parts, the specu

and the practical, vii. 14, 10 ; is the end towards which nature strives, ib. 15, 8; in tended by nature to control the lative

passionate or irrational element in the soul, i. 5, 6 6 13, vii. 8 is not 14, 9 15, found in the animals, i. 2, n; ;

;

;

;

Index

34* vii.

12

13,

;

exists in slaves to

alimited extent, 1.5, 9; 13, 3; is not readily obeyed by those who have great advantages over others, iv. II, 5; may be

overcome by passion, 33

ri

;

31

>

!

takes, vii. 15,

v.

8,

9,

9-

18-21

;

ib.

i

3,

democratic

;

mea

sures taken by Cleisthenes and others after a revolution, ib. 2,

3~5

10,

vi. 4,

;

1

8

;

revolutions

imme

may make mis

may happen

7.

diate change in the constitution,

Religion, matters of, used to be entrusted to the kings, iii. 14, 3, 14 (cp. vi. 8, 20); the tyrant should have a care of 25; the ex religion, v. n, pense of public worship should be borne by the state, vii. 10, the officers of religion, 10: vi.

de jure and de facto, iii. 2, 34 should old debts be paid5

;

vii.

9

8,

;

Religious worship, one of the conditions of the state, vii. 8, 8.

Representation, principle of, once existed in the government of

Mantinea, vi. 4, 4. Republic, the, of Plato

iv. 5,

without an

v. i,

35

Rhegium,

ii.

8.

14;

12,

v.

12,

13-

Rhodes,

10,

ii.

v. 3,

3;

4, 5

;

a-

5,

Rich, the, one of the elements of the state, iv. 4, 15; every where few compared to the poor, 8, 6; v. i, 14; often hindered by the cares of property from attending to public busi 6 (butcp. i. 7, 5); ness, iv. 6, possess the external advantages of which the want occasions

iii.

crime, iv. 8, 4 (cp. ii. 7, 10); have too much power in so-called

see

aristocratical governments, iv. 6; v. 7, 12, 7; their en

see Leisure. Retail trade, not a natural mode of money-making, i. 9, 4, 1 2 arises out of the barter of

croachments more dangerous to

necessary articles, ib. 9-12. Revolutions, their objects, v. i their causes, ii. 7, 2, 5, 10; v. 2; 3; 4; 10, 13; 12, 14-18; their occasions, v. 1 1 the preventives of 4 7, 6 them, ii. n, 15 ; v. 7,

v. 9, 10 should be protected against the demagogues, v. 8, should be 20 vi. 5, 3 relieved from useless state ex 20 vi. 5, 9 ; penses, v. 8, should be generous to the poor,

:

Plato.

Rest

:

;

;

;

;

;

5

6

;

;

ii; vi. 4, 16-20; 5 9 revolutions in democracies, ;

;

in oligarchies, ib. 6 ; v. 5 in constitutional governments,

the state than those of the poor, 6 constantly in antago iv. i 2, nism to the poor, ib. n, 7 i ;

;

;

;

;

8 10 should vi. 5, 13, be public-spirited and munifi

iv.

;

;

cent, vi. 7,

6

;

are often spoilt

in

in aristocracies,

childhood, iv. 13; can alone afford the expense of keeping

in monarchies, ib. 10; 7; in tyrannies, ib. ; 1 1 ; Plato s theory of revolutions, criticized, ib. 12, 7-18; questions raised after revolutions; citizens

Riches and poverty, the opposing elements of the state, v. i, 14; 8, 14; riches more de sired by men than honour, iv.

;

ib.!7; ib.

7,5J

by indulgence 1 1

,

6

;

v. 9,

horses, iv. 3,

2.

Index 8

13,

16

v. 8,

;

vi.

;

2

4,

;

Solon wrong in thinking that no bound has been fixed to See Wealth. riches/ i. 8, 14. Royalty, the form of government in which one rules for the best, iii-

3

7>

!

v. 10,

analogous

3;

to aristocracy, v. 10, opposed to tyranny, iii. iv.

2

2,

v.

;

2,

7,

2

10,

better than the rule of

;

is

;

7; 5 it

thelaw?

16; arose (i) from the government of families by the iii.

15

;

6 ; 7, i ; 12, eldest,!. 2, 3; (2) from services rendered by the first chiefs, iii.

v.

3,

weakness lower classes,

8;

i5,n;

;

various forms

ii.

is

5>

despotic

;

Lacedae

only a general

33

i, 2

J

once 6 has

10,

life),ii. 9,

H;

(2) the

I3,n;

(i) the

:

monian (which ship for

(3)

iv.

existed in Crete,

3>

12

14,

from the of the middle and

10,

;

iii.

;

16,

14, i;

(among Bar

(5) the absolute

monarchy, ib. the people to whom

15 royalty is suited, ib. c. 17; causes of revolutions in mon means of their archies, v. 10 ;

1-3; preservation, ib. n, royalty more often destroyed from within than from without, ib. 10, 36 ; true royalty un

known vii.

in later Hellas, ib.

14,

Rule

3.

essentially different 2 ; 3, other, i. i, 7,

i

;

5-7; the

37;

SeeKing, Monarchy.

the various kinds of rule

;

12; 13, vii -

the

found

ruled

the better the rule, ib. 5, 2, 7 5 v. n, 34; the rule of free men better than despotic au thority, vii. 14, 19; rule over others, not the highest object of

the legislator, ib. 14, 14-22; rule must be learnt by obedience, iii.

10,

4,

14;

6

vii. 9,

;

6-

14.

Ruler, the, ought to have moral virtue in perfection, i. 13, 8 the virtue peculiar to him, iii. 4, ;

must learn to govern by 17 obedience, ii. 11, 14 iii. 4, 6 ; 14, 6 the 14 vii. 9, rulers ought to remain the same, ;

;

;

;

2, 4-8 ; dangers arising arrangement, ii. ii.

vii.

5,

2

14,

;

from this 24-27 ;

3; the difficulty solved, 14, the elder rule, and the younger

vii. if

vii. 9,

5;

14,

5.

6,

8, 14 ; iv. torships, iii. 14, 2 ; (4) the monarchies of 10, 11-14; theheroicage, iii. 14,

;

and

ruler

2 ; 5, throughout nature, i. 2, 2-7; the better the ruled,

obey,

14; iv. barians), 14, 2 ; (3) the ancient Dicta 10, iii.

347

3,

distinction

2

from each

4; 4-8;

5, iii.

6; 6,

6 i4>

;

between

the

;

Salamis, victory

Samos,

iii.

13,

of, v. 4, 19 ; v. 3,

8.

12

;

9-

"i

22. Sardanapalus, v. 10, Science, the, of the statesman, 2

I,

;

10,

i

;

iii.

12,

I

i. ;

of the master, i. 3, of the slave, 2, 4 4 7, ib. 7, 2, 3; in all sciences the whole must be resolved into the 3 parts, ib. i, every science capable of improvement, ii. 8, 1 8 ; the philosophical student of science must not neglect any iv. i,

3

;

;

;

;

i ; all sciences detail, iii. 8, at some good, ib. 12, i ;

aim

the political science the highest of all sciences, iii. 1 2, I aims at the good of the state, vii. 2, the subjects which it in 4 ;

;

cludes,

iv. i,

3-1

1.

Index

34 8

vii. 14, 3. 3. Scylletic Gulf, the, vii. 10, Scythians, the, vii. 2, 10, II.

Scylax,

Sedition

Revolution.

see

:

i

8

8,

;

would not

;

be promoted by extreme cation,

ii.

unifi

Senate see Council of Elders. Senators see Councillors. Servant, the, a kind of instrument :

:

in the arts,

i.

2

4,

many

;

ser

vants often less efficient than a the servants few, ii. 3, 4 who are employed in daily life, those with whom we most often children 4 disagree, ib. 5, ;

;

not to be vants,

vii.

much

too

left

17,

Sesostris, king of

to ser

Egypt,

vii. 10,

i,6. Seuthes, v. 10, 24. Shepherds, lead the laziest life i. 6 some 8, among men, times combine brigandage with 8 their other occupations, ib. form the second best material of a democracy, vi. 4, i, II ;

;

;

make excellent soldiers, ib. Sicily,

ii.

4

10,

Sicyon,

v. 12,

Simos

(?),

;

v. 12,

II. 13.

1

leader

at

3.

17. Slave, the, does he exist by nature ? i. 6-c. 6 different from the 4, ;

female (except

among Barba

how

2-4; rians), ib. 2, lated to his master, ib.

;

the slave in the

command

of

only

[against Plato, Laws, vi. 777], i. I3, 14; place of the slave in the management of the family, ib. i the slave an 8, 4 5, 9 ;

;

instrument taking precedence of other instruments, ib. 4, 2 ; the animals, ministers to the needs of life, ib. 5, 9; the science proper to him, i. 7, his share in virtue, ib. 2, 3

like

;

2-14 9; I3

13, 8,

in reason, ib. 5, 3 ; has not the

;

deliberative faculty, ib. 13, 7; is nearer to his master than the mechanic, ib. 13 ought to be trained in virtue by him, ib. Slaves, how related to 14 :

artisans,

i.

iii.

ia

4,

13

13, ;

5,

;

ii.

7,

22;

3; forbidden

gymnastic exercises in Crete,

ii.

19 difficulty in managing 22 them, ib. 9, 2-4; vii. i o, 13; the different classes of 5,

;

;

12 ; children of slaves, iii. 4, slaves only admitted to citizen

ship in extreme democracies, ib. vi. 4, 16; slaves can 5, 7 not form a state, iii. 9, 6 can ii ; not be self-sufficient, iv. 4, licence allowed to them in

re ;

-

;

tween slave and master, when natural, does not exclude kind ib. slave and ness, 6, 9 ;

democracies and tyrannies, v. ii vi. 4, 20 some ii, ;

times

;

emancipated by tyrants

to serve as a guard,

2-5 3, i-35 4, 5; vii 3, 55 not always distinguished by nature from the freeman, i. 5, 10 8 the relation be 6, ;

6

6,

;

party

Larissa, v. 6, Sirrhas, v. 10,

common interest,

;

i.

a

iii.

;

See Slave.

7.

;

must not be addressed

;

8.

2,

3

language

Self-sufficiency, the, of the state, 8 ; the end and the best, i. 2, vii. 5,

master have a ib. 2,

v. II,

32; should be encouraged by the of vii. freedom, 10, hope 14; their company dangerous for children, ib. 17,

Slavery, is i. 5; 6.

it

7.

according to nature

?

men should not think slavery to live according to the constitution, v. 9, 15.

Slavery it

;

Index Slaves, the art of acquiring, a species of hunting or war, i. 7, 5

vii.

;

21.

14,

v. 10,

Smerdis,

19.

Society, political, the highest of all

i communities, exists, not for mere companionship, but for the sake of noble actions, i. i,

;

9, 12-14; man designed by nature to take part in society, 8-1 6 iii. 6, i. 2, bene 3 fit conferred on mankind by the iii.

;

;

establishment of society, i. 2, 15 society cannot exist with out judicial decisions and punish ;

vii. 13, 6. ments, vi. 8, 9 Socrates see Plato. Soldiers, according to Plato, should be taught to use both ;

:

hands alike, herds

make

vi. 4,

1 1

;

ii.

constitutions, ib. 7, the soldier must have

1-3 a good knowledge of the mili ;

12; soldiers tary art, vii. 1 1 , as necessary to the state as artisans or husbandmen [against 10Plato, Rep. ii. 369], iv. 4, 17;

vii.

4,

4-7;

8,

7

;

9,

the soldiers should be 10 taken from the youth, the coun cillors from the old, vii. 9, 3-10 14, 5 should form ;

;

;

served, ii. 8, 9 ; iv. 13, 9. Soldiers, light-armed, always at tached to democracy, vi. 7, 2 ;

in

Egypt,

the

heavy-

armed

in popular insurrections, ib. 3 ; the younger citizens in oligarchies should be trained in the exercises of light infantry, ib.

Solon,

i.

14

8,

2-6 (cp.

ii.

;

iii.

6

7,

8)

ii,

;

;

iv.

12,

n,

n. Sophocles, quoted, i. 13, Soul, the, rules by nature over the body, i. 5, 4-6 ; poste rior to the body in order of 9; more generation, vii. 15, truly a part of an animal than the body, iv. 4, 14 ; the beauty of the soul less easily seen than that of the body, i. 5, ii ; the interests of soul and body the same, ib. 6, 10; the ir rational element in the soul subject to the rational, ib. 5, 6; 13, 6; vii. 14, 9; 15, 8 the divisions of the soul, ;

;

a separate caste, as

master

generally

15-

excellent soldiers, relation of the dif

ferent kinds of soldiers to the different

7 ; form (with cavalry) the natural military force of an oligarchy, vi. 7, 1,2 ; generally worsted by the light-armed in popular insurrec the principal tions, ib. 3 magistrates elected from those who are serving, or who have at Athens, v. 3,

12; shep

12,

349

ib.

i.

5-7;

5,

6;

i3,

iii.

4,

10, ; 9, position of the soldiers in the constitution of Hippodamus, ii. 8, 2, 8-

9; the soul never wholly free from said to be passion, iii. 15, 5

12.

or to possess harmony,

10

i

;

Soldiers,heavy-armed,citizenship constitutional governments 16 ; iii. confined to the, ii. 6,

in

7,

4; 17,

growth of

4; their

Hellenic states, taken from the

iv.

13,

10;

importance in iv. 13, 9-12

;

roll of citizens

6;

vii.

14,

9; 15, ;

viii.

5,

25-

Lacedaemon. Speculation, life of, opposed to Sparta

:

see

that of contemplation,

3!

H.

vii.

State, the, is the highest of

munities,

2

;

9-22. i.

i ,

i

;

is

com

based upon

Index

35*0

the relations of husband and wife, father and child, master and

and subject, ib. 2 15; formed of a union

slave, ruler 13,

;

of villages, ib. 2, 8 exists for the sake of a good life, ib. iii. ;

;

6-14

,

;

ii

iv. 4,

vii. i,

;

not for the

i; 8, 4, 8; sake of alliance and security,

iii.

6-14; is distinguished from an alliance because it has 9>

an ethical aim,

ii.

3

2,

iii.

;

9,

from a nation, because it is made up of different elements, 2 is n t necessarily ii3 formed by a number of persons 8

;

3 ; 9, residing together, iii. 3, a) ; 9-12 ; (but cp. ii. i, is a work of nature, i. 2, 8, 9 ; prior to the family or the ib.

12; 13, 15 composed of dissimilar parts or 2 ii. iii. elements, 2, 3 i,

individual,

:

;

6-8

iv.

;

I

3, 4, 7; 1-4; v. i, 12-15; 3, 6 ; vii. 8 the parts not to be identified with the conditions of i the state, vii. 8, the parts and conditions enumerated, iv.

4,

;

;

12,

;

;

i-6;

3, 7

;

vii.

7-20;

4,

compared

animals, iv. 4,

8,

to the parts of

7-9

the state

:

depends for its identity mainly on the sameness of the constitu must be able to de tion, iii. 3 fend itself, ii. 6, 7 147, ;

;

17

;

1,

10 4, should be ;

ii. 2,

8

;

i>;

i-

vii. 4,

13,

6;

9

iv.

5

15,

self-sufficing,

i.

2,

end, as the individual,

;

1-3

;

13-15 may, like an individual, be wanting in self-discipline, v. ;

3

14,

of virtue,

14-

;

;

;

vii.

16;

2,

;

must have a care 8

iii.

vii.

9, 13, 9 must be happy, 4) (cp. iv. 7, not in regard to a portion of the citizens, but to them all, ii. ;

;

27

5,

;

vii.

7

9,

united

is

;

by friendship among the citizens, iv. n, 6; iii. 9, 13 5, 7; v. ii, 5 (cp.vi. 5, 7); must pay great regard to edu cation, i. 13, 8; 15; ii. 7,

ii.

;

v. 9,

1 1

;

viii. i

must not be

:

to fortune,

left

ii.

ii,

15,

13, 9; is not the growth of a day, v. 3, 11 is the preserved by principle of vii.

16;

;

2, compensation, 4-7; is sometimes left at the mercy of the army by the violence of ii.

faction, v. 6,

13

;

its

perma

nence can only be secured by the toleration of all elements, ii. 9, 22 ; iv. 9, 10 ; 12, i v. ;

5

8,

;

5

9>

5

vi.

2

6,

;

any

state, however ill-constituted, may last a few days, vi. 5, i :

the various claims to autho rity in the state,

14; 10

;

12; 13;

iii. 9,

iv. 8,

~4; what share may be allowed I

3>

ordinary citizen?

vii-4; virtue,

vii.

3 conquest, ib. 2 14, 22 rests upon justice, i.

state

i has the same 5, and therefore the same life and ;

;

;

8 ;

size,ii.6,6;iii.3,4-7;

;

2;

8; vii. 4, 11 5, i 8, should not exceed a certain ;

12 ; must have the virtues of leisure, vii. 15, i can lead a life of virtuous activity isolated from others, ib. 2, 16 3, 810 is not made happier by 9,

8;

iv. 13,

5-8;

iii.

ii,

vi. 4,

1-5, 9; vi. in

to

the the

65; j}

5 (cp. ii. 12, 5). State, the ideal, of Aristotle, would require (i) a defensible position, vii. 5, 3; (2) a rate naval force, ib. (3)

mode

6-9; courageous and intelligent

citizens, ib. 7

;

(4) the exclusion

Index of mechanics and tradesmen from citizenship, ib. 9, 1-8 (5) slaves and Perioeci to till 14

not despise small things, ib. 3, I 10 ; 4, II 2 7, 8, must he have virtue, or is skill alone sufficient ? ib. 9, 1-4; must know the real effect of

and

political measures, ib. 9 ; will use tear as a means to bind the state together, ib. 8, 8 ;

;

the

soil,

ib.

8; 10,

9,

13,

; (6) common meals, ib. 10, 1-8, 10; (7) subdivision of the land into two parts, public

1 1 ; (8) private, ib. [for a. central situation, ib. 2 ; 3 J I] near, but not

the city ] 5>

>

upon, the sea, ib. 6, healthy site, ib. II, I water supply, ib. 3 fortifications

8-1

and

2

;

;

1-6; a a good

proper

;

and walls,

ib.

5,

an arrangement of houses

which

;

will not suppose that the great ness of the state depends merely on size, vii. 4, 4 the life of the statesman contrasted with the life of the philosopher, ib. 2 , 6. Statesman, the, the rale of, dif ;

ferent

from other kinds of

i-

*; 3.

combine the advantages of beauty and

Stentor,

6 ; an acropolis, security, ib. for the temples, and a freemen s

Symposium,

streets

will

ib. 12,

i-6; govern ment buildings and a trader s

agora,

agora, ib. 7. State, the best [absolutely], the enquirer into, must examine the best ideal and actual forms of

government,

ii.

i; differs from

i,

the so-called aristocracies be cause the citizens are absolutely 2 12 iv. 7, good, iii. 13, ;

(butcp. iii. 4, 5); presupposes the best life, vii. I in compari son with it, all existing govern ;

ments maybe called perversions, iv. 8,

i.

State, the best [under ordinary

circumstances], iv.

3;

i,

1 6). (cp. ii. 6, State, the best [for

n,2i

mankind

in

;

acquisition only,

i.

8,

15; 10,

i ought also to be acquainted with the art of money-making, ib. ii, 13; must be able to re

ment,

evil sat their

v. 4,

3; 8,

commence 9; must

rule,

i-

45

7>

ii.

vii.

4, Sybaris, v. 3,

ii, 12. the, of Plato

see

:

Plato. i.

Syracuse, v. 3,

iii.

;

-4,9;

5>

6, 23, 28,

10

7,

16;

15,

I

13; 4, 8; 10,

n,

30-2;

2

7,

5>

10; 6,

;

12,

6,

12.

Syrtis (?), a district of Southern Italy, vii. 10, 5.

Tarentum, 2

7,

;

21

iv. 4,

vi. 5,

iv. 4,

Tenedos,

;

v. 3,

7

;

10.

Telecles, of Miletus,

iv. 14,

4.

21.

8 Thales, of Miletus, i. 1 1 , [probably the Cretan poet],

:

12,

ii.

7-

Theagenes, tyrant of Megara,

v.

9-

Thebes; ii. 9, 10 iii. 5, 7 ;

16;

10, ;

v.

3,

5

12, ;

6,

15; vi 7, 4Theodectes, quoted, i. 6, 7. Theodorus, the actor, vii. 17, -

13-

;

cognize

i,

5,

i. 3 ii, general], iv. i, Statesman, the, is properly con cerned with the natural art of

;

;

Theopompus, king of Sparta, II,

Thera, one of the Sporades, 4>

v.

2.

5-

iv.

Index ii.

Thessaly, vii.

12,

22

5,

2

9,

;

;

Thetes, the (in Solon s constitu tion),

ii.

Thibron,

6.

12, vii.

14,

31

12,

;

of,

at

6.

Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, iii. 13, 16; v. 10, 13. v. 5,

Thrasymachus, Thurii,

12.

viii. 6,

Thrasyllus,

;

9,

12.

Timophanes of Corinth,

v.

6,

12.

Timophanes, of Mitylene,

v.

4,

6.

Trade

see

:

Commerce.

12; vii. 9, 3 ; ought to be excluded from citizenship, vii. admitted to office at 3 9, ;

Thebes after they had retired from business ten years, iii. 5, ;

vi. 7,

4

.

near

Triopium, promontory Cnidus, ii. 10, 3.

II vii. 16, Troezen, v. 3, 7Tyrannicide, esteemed honour ;

able in Hellas, v. 10,

26.

;

;

33

causes of revolution means of ; ii ; ib.

j

in tyrannies, ib. 10 their preservation,

governments into which tyranny

may change, ib. 12, ii. Tyrant, the, is the natural enemy of the freeman, iv. 10, 4 ; v. ii, 13 cuts off his rivals, iii. ii, 13 13, 16-19; v. 10, rules over involuntary sub 5 jects as the king over voluntary,

rules for his

;

;

aims at pleasure, 14, 7 10 ; the king at honour, v. 10, is guarded by mercenaries, iii. 10 sometimes v. 10, 14, 7 obliged to emancipate the slaves, v. n, 32 ; is much under the influence of flatterers, iv. 4, 1 2 28 v. 1 1, destroys the spirit and confidence of his iii.

;

;

;

;

;

n, 4, 13, 15; among them, ib. 7

subjects, v.

Tyranny, the government of the

monarch who

powers of the magistrates, ib. 5, 8 10, always a short 5 lived government, ib. 12, i; rarely becomes hereditary, ib.

;

Traders, the employments of, de void of moral excellence, vi. 4,

7

own

sends spies

;

them to quarrel, ib. 8 oppresses them by war and taxa incites

2 ; iv. 8, 5 7, akin to v. 10, 10, 3 9 27 ; v. 10, democracy, iv. 4, u, 30; n, 12; hardly to

and women, ib.

be called a constitution,

loves the bad,

interests,

iii.

;

;

;

i

;

10,

royalty, 2

2,

3

;

;

iii.

;

7,

4,

;

does not

justice i

i

iv. 8,

the perversion of i 5; 17, 2; 27; 5,

rest

;

iv.

10,

upon natural

or expediency, iii. 17, all the vices both of

has

7; in Sicily,

v. 8,

;

often arose out of oligarchy, v. 13, 13; was common in an cient times, owing to the great

>

7,

ii

n,

iv.

Io

4.

12

u,

v. 3,

;

extreme oligarchy or democracy,

17.

6. Athens, v. 6, 10. Thracians, the, vii. 2, Thrasybulus (brother of Hiero), v. 10,

ii, 30, 35

;

government

the,

Thirty,

and oligarchy, v. is unendur able to freemen, iv. 10, 4; r. 11, 13 may arise either from

democracy 10,

3.

tion, ib. ib.

fers

14

10

;

distrusts his friends,

gives licence to slaves

;

1 1

v.

;

n,

vi. 4,

12

;

foreigners to citizens, ;

is

ness, ib.

;

20

;

pre ib.

capable of any wicked ;

is

full

of self-indul

23; gence and sensuality, ib. may also preserve his tyranny by father of his playing the

Index 17-33; must be on his guard against assassins,

of the state, iii. 9, 6-8; vii. 13, 9 (cp. iv. 7, 4); gives a claim to superiority in the state, iii. i; has 9, 14, 15; 13, many kinds, ib. 7, 4 ; cannot ruin those who possess her, ib. 2 is a mean, iv. ii, 10, 3 how far required in the great officers of state, v. 9, 1-4; must be at least pretended by

country, ib.

especially against those who think that they have been in

30 must conciliate the poor or the rich, whichever is the stronger, ib. 32. Tyrants, the, of Hellenic cities put down by the Lacedae sulted, ib.

monians,

;

iii.

3

2,

;

v. 10,

30

;

;

of Sicily, by the Syracusans, v.

the tyrant, ib. ii, 25, 34; is regarded as a secondary object

30.

10,

most of the ancient, demagogues, v. 5, 4 sometimes great

Tyrants,

originally 6 10, ;

10,

can 5 by mankind, vii. i, not be separated from happiness, :

vri.

;

magistrates, or kings, ib. 5,

8

9

;

8,

results

from nature, habit, and reason, 7-io; 10-13;

ib. 13, is not a

6.

9

Usury, the most unnatural mode of money-making, i. 10, 5 ; 11,

i

2; 3, 3; 2, 3; 13; 5;

i,

5;

;

5.

Tyrrhenians, the, iii. 9, Tyrtaeus, v. 7, 4.

;

*5>

matter of chance,

;

3 should it the aim of education?

political life, ib. 2

be made viii. 2

3-

ib. 13,

how far consistent with the

;

;

;

consists in hating and lov

too much regarded by Hellenic legislators, vii. 14, 15; is not the sole aim of

ing and rejoicing aright, ib. 5, 1 should not (as is done by 7 the Lacedaemonians) be sup

education, viii. 2, 3; 3, 1 1 ; is not sought after by men of noble

posed inferior to external goods, 35 (cp. vii. i, 5) nor be 9. practised with a view to the

Utility,

mind,

ib. 3,

:

"

12.

;

single object of success in war,

5) 9i cannot be included under a general definition, i. 13, 10 must be taught to the

vii. 2, 9; 14, 16; the virtue proper to the slave, the woman, the child, ii~3 5 of the ruler and the subject different, ib. 4-6; iii. 4, 7-18; of the ruler, practical wisdom, of the subject, 18 ; of true opinion, iii. 4, men and women not the same, l6 iiii3 9-" 13. 4. less required in the artisan than the slave, i. 13, 12 (cp. vii. f the citizen relative to 7) 9 the constitution, iii. 4, 1-7 i y 7) i v. 9, of the good 3

slave

man

Village, the,acolonyofthe family, i. 2, 6; the state a union of

J

8. villages, ib. Virtue, the especial characteristic of aristocratical governments, ii.

5-10;

ii, ;

iv.

7;

v. 7,

5)

6

:

I3>

5-

often allied to force, i. 6, 3 more a concern of household 7

345

9,

"

;

management than wealth, ib. 1 i 3, depends upon the supre ;

:

of the rational principle in the soul, ib. 6; vii. 14, 9;

macy

>

>

;

-

;

12; by his master, ib. ought to be the aim and care

A

>

!

absolute, iii. 4, 1-7 7; of the good citizen:

vii. 13,

a

;

;

Index is

identical with that of

it

man

the good

10 4 5, 8; of the citizen ?

iii.

;

;

18; vii. 14, in the perfect state,

iii.

4,

5

;

2. 12; iv. 7, 13, Virtue, military, is found in the iii. masses, 4 the social, 7,

6 the Athens, ib. 13 6, 6. Thirty, ib. 6, War, the Persian, v. 3, 4, 7 4, 8 7, 4 effect of, upon ;

;

;

Athens,

i.

justice,

16;

2,

iii.

13,

3-

Virtues, the, of women and child ren important to the state, i. J5 5 of the state 13. 5 and the individual the same, vii. I, 12 of the military life, :

9>

;

9.

">

of leisure,

vii.

34;

vii. 15,

15,

3;

I.

part of the art of acqui when directed against wild beasts and against men who are intended by nature to be

sition

slaves, i. 7, 12; vii. 5 8, 21 exists for the 2, 15 14, sake of peace, vii. 14, 13,22 i; a school of virtue, ii. 15, 1 1 ; a 9, remedy against the dangers of prosperity, vii. 15, constant war a part of 3 10 ; tyrannical policy, v. n, success in war the sole object of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan ;

;

;

constitutions, 2,

progress in tactics,

ii.

iv.

war 13,

34, 35;

9,

16; 15,

9; 14, :

6;

invention of 10 of siege ;

machines, vii. 1 1, 9 improve ment of fortifications, ib. 12. \Var, captives taken in, ought they to be made slaves ? i. 6, ;

1-8. War, the Peloponnesian ; losses of the Athenian nobility, v. 3, 7

;

battle of

Oenophyta,

ib.

5 capture of Mitylene, ib. 6 ; battle of Mantinea, ib. 4, 9 ; the Sicilian expedition. ib. the Four Hundred at ;

;

5

8

v. 4,

;

;

the Sacred, v. 4,

:

7-

Wealth, always antagonistic to poverty, iv. 4, 19; forms an element of the state, ii. 7, 16 ;

iv. 4, 15; vii. 8, 7, 9; in cludes many varieties, i. 8, 3 ; 2 i vJ [the true kind] has a limit, i. 8, 12 ; i, 14 9, popularly confused with coin, ib. 9, not so much a 10, 14 concern of household manage 3>

;

ment

as virtue, ib. 13,

I

;

must

be used with both temperance and ii.

liberality,

vii. 5,

8;

6,

r.

Wealth, too highly valued Sparta and Carthage, ii. 7, *3 ii, 8-12; iv. J

4

;

vii.

12,

1 1

;

War, a

;

;

ii.

viii. 6,

;

is

;

;

at 9, 7,

the chief characteristic of

n, 9 ; iii. 8, 7; ii vi. 3, 19 ; v. 10, confers a claim to supe 2, 7 J 4riority in the state, iii. 9, 6, 15; 12, 8, 9; 13, 1-5; with associated popularly good birth and education, iv. 8, 4, i. See Riches. 8; v. 7, Wealthy, the, have the external advantages of which the want ii.

oligarchy, iv. 4,

;

tempts men to crime, ii. 7, 10; y ar e apt to be spoiled 3 by the luxury in which they are i

-

;

8>

6

reared, iv. ii,

;

v. 9,

13

;

form one of the classes necessary to the state, 8,

7

Whole, its

the,

parts,

and

14,

15;

vii.

i.

must be resolved into i,

therefore

parts, ib.

iv.

See Rich.

9-

2,

i 3 ; 8, prior superior to the ;

12-14;

"i-

J 7>

the part belongs entirely to the whole, i. 4, 5 ; every 7

;

Index and tyrannies,

whole has a ruling element, the whole and the ib. 5, 3 part have the same interest, ib.

cracies

10 ; the virtue of the parts 6, relative to the virtue of the

vii.

whole, ib. 13, 15 ; the happi ness of the whole dependent on the happiness of the parts, ii. 5, the sophism 27 ; vii. 9, 7

part their nature to their off

;

;

that

the parts are

if

whole

little

the

3; the care of the part and the care of the whole inseparable, viii. I, is

v.

little,

8,

has

the,

virtue to the

man,

a i.

different 13,

3-

16 shares in the 12 ; iii. 4, deliberative faculty, i. 13, 7\Vomen, should be trained with a view to the state, i. 13, 15 ;

ii.

9,

5)

;

cannot have

the same pursuits as men, ii. 5, 24; said to have been common

among

certain

Libyan

tribes, ib.

have great influence warlike races, ib. 9, 7 caused great harm to Sparta by their disorder and licence, ib. 3,

vi.

;

20

4,

ib.

cease to bear children after

16; marry too young, 1

6,

5,

spring, ib.

1 1

,

commonly

;

fifty,

should not ib. 6 j im

14.

Women

and children, the com munity of, proposed by Plato,

12 ; he has not ii. i, 12, 3 explained whether he would extend it to the dependent classes, ib. 5, 18-24; objec tions of Aristotle (i) unity would not be promoted, ib. 3, 2 2 there be a general would ( ) neglect of the children, ib. 4 ; ;

:

3-

Woman,

(cp.

u

9

;

among

!

5- 1 3 possessed two-fifths of the land in Laconia, ib. 15 ; too proud in oligarchies to be !

controlled, iv. 15, 13; have often ruined tyrannies by their v. ii, 23; are allowed great licence in demo

insolence,

;

(3) the parentage of the children could not be concealed, ib. 8; (4) expiations would be impos i ; sible, ib. 4, (5) the conceal

ment of relationship would lead to unnatural crimes, ib.

1-3,

10; (6) affection would be weakened, ib. 4-9; (7) the transfer of children to another rank would be found impractic 10 (8) the household able, ib. would be neglected, ib. 5, 24. ;

Xerxes,

King of

Persia, v.

21.

Zaleucus, ii. 12, 12. Zancle, v. 3,

7.

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