Philosphy Essay 2 - Free Will
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Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
Compatiblism is the view that free will (and moral responsibility) is compatible with determinism. State this view as clearly as you can, in part by explaining what “determinism” stands for. Then discuss its plausibility. Is it a reasonable doctrine? Give reasons for your answer.
The view that free will is compatible with determinism is a heavily contested argument with many differing views. In order to come to a conclusion of the plausibility of whether free will is compatible with determinism one must review the philosophical concept of compatibilism and its main arguments for why and how moral responsibility and free will can be reconciled with determinism.
Compatibilism is the philosophical doctrine in which the notion of free will is compatible with determinism, otherwise known as the reconciliation between moral responsibility and determinism*1.
Determinism is a
philosophical doctrine that denotes the idea that there is only one physically possible future and that this future is determined by the casual laws of nature and prior occurrences.
Therefore, before I began the action of writing this essay, I was already predisposed to writing this essay by prior occurrences, for example the 1
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism
1
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
occurrence of choosing to take philosophy, then choosing to take metaphysics, and promising myself to achieve academic merit in all areas of study.
It is these prior occurrences that according to
determinism have made this essay possible.
There are many arguments for the plausibility of determinism, and it being compatible with free will. The traditional view of determinism is that if all events are predetermined by the past, and there is only one discernable future, then we do not hold moral responsibility for our actions as they were not actions of our own free will2. The main obstacle to the compatibilists approach is that if the laws of nature and the past determine one possible future, and free will needs two possible choices to make an action free, it would mean that more than one future is necessary for free will.
Compatibilist theory attempts to reconcile these two positions though an analysis of the main factors of free will. Some of these would include the questions what is it to act freely and without constraint? What is an unfree action and what are the possible circumstances that arise to make a certain action unfree? Furthermore they would propose the question what it means to have acted differently3.
2 3
Folke Tersman Lecture Notes, Free Will ibid
2
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
Some defenders of compatibilism, like A. J. Ayer have continued the Humean4 approach to determinism that the laws of causation are in themselves enough to believe that determinism is true as it seems logically sound to propose that every cause will have an effect, therefore ever action in the past, will have an effect in the future5.
Ayer suggests that causality is the main point which proves that the positions of determinism and free will are compatible. If we do not have determinism, then our actions are not predisposed to our actions in the past, therefore our actions would be entirely random. Furthermore, if ones actions were just a matter of chance, then his actions may be considered free, but not morally responsible.
So, if it is considered
unreasonable to hold someone’s actions accountable if those actions were a matter of chance, then an action that is not based on the chance that I do one thing rather than another, has to have some casual explanation for it, and so we are lead back to determinism6.
Furthermore, Ayer suggests that it is a person’s character that establishes ones moral responsibility.
If I am said to be acting in
character, I am presumed to be morally responsible for my actions. Therefore my character has to be based on some of the prior actions of the past that I was considered morally responsible for.
So moral
responsibility seems to presuppose any arguments of the incompatibility 4
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 116 6 Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 113 5
3
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
of determinism with free will, as my past actions of free will have determined my future actions7.
Ayer goes around the principle of
alternate possibilities by proposing our actions of the past create our moral responsibility.
Ayer proposes that an action is only unfree when the agent inciting the action is under constraints of coercion8. Therefore, even in the presence of a deterministic universe, our actions are of our own free will, and it is not the prior occurrences that cause this constraint, but rather physical actions of others.
For example, say a man of no prior intentions to
commit violent acts was coerced by a terrorist to perform an action under duress; let that action be assassinating a foreign leader. Under the duress of a terrorist, who threatens the man with death if he does not comply with the demands, if the man was to commit the action he is not morally responsible for his action, as it was not an act of free will, rather an act of coercion.
The argument for the compatibilism of determinism is heightened by the positions asserted by Harry Frankfurt, in which he refutes the principle of alternative possibilities.
It must be shown that the principle of alternate
possibilities idea that an agent is morally responsible for his action only if he could have done otherwise is false9. Frankfurt does this by proposing
7
Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 113 Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 117 9 Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, p. 156 8
4
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
that we can still be morally responsible for our actions even if the circumstances made it unavoidable to perform it10.
Such a refutation of the principle of alternate possibilities can be seen in the Frankfurts counter examples. An interpretation of his examples is shown in; If two brothers where at there local pub, and both were expected home by a certain time for a prior arrangement. B1 wants to go home and see his wife, while B2 would rather stay at the pub and continue drinking. If the whether changes and the pub and surrounding roads are snowed in, it would be reasonable to say that B1 as he in the situation he could only stay at the pub. In contrast, B2 willed to stay at the pub, and because of the snow storm was unable to meet his wife. Therefore, B2 could be considered morally responsible for his actions as if he was not constrained by the snow storm, he would have still stayed at the pub.
This shows that free will and moral responsibility is in fact compatible with determinism. Therefore according to Frankfurt a person would not be morally responsible for an action if he performed the action only because he could not have done otherwise11. Moreover, this overcomes the problem of having free will without two options for an agent to do otherwise, further enforcing the argument that determinism is compatible with free will.
10 11
ibid Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, p. 165
5
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
The plausibility of compatibilism hinges on the reconciliation between determinism and free will.
The arguments of Ayer, which entail that
causation is enough for the plausibility of determinism, and of Frankfurt, which refutes the principle of alternative possibilities seem to establish that though it may not be a truth of the world that determinism and free will exist, in theory, the compatibilism between determinism and free will is logically plausible.
6
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
Bibliography
Readings: • • •
A.J. Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, from Philosophical Essays (pp. 217-84), first published 1954 Harry Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility from Journal of Philosophy (pp. 829-39) published 1969 Peter Van Inwagen, The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism from Philosophical Studies 27 (pp. 185-99) published 1975
Online Material: •
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
7
Samuel Carey
4491871
Compatiblism is the view that free will (and moral responsibility) is compatible with determinism. State this view as clearly as you can, in part by explaining what “determinism” stands for. Then discuss its plausibility. Is it a reasonable doctrine? Give reasons for your answer.
The view that free will is compatible with determinism is a heavily contested argument with many differing views. In order to come to a conclusion of the plausibility of whether free will is compatible with determinism one must review the philosophical concept of compatibilism and its main arguments for why and how moral responsibility and free will can be reconciled with determinism.
Compatibilism is the philosophical doctrine in which the notion of free will is compatible with determinism, otherwise known as the reconciliation between moral responsibility and determinism*1.
Determinism is a
philosophical doctrine that denotes the idea that there is only one physically possible future and that this future is determined by the casual laws of nature and prior occurrences.
Therefore, before I began the action of writing this essay, I was already predisposed to writing this essay by prior occurrences, for example the 1
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism
1
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
occurrence of choosing to take philosophy, then choosing to take metaphysics, and promising myself to achieve academic merit in all areas of study.
It is these prior occurrences that according to
determinism have made this essay possible.
There are many arguments for the plausibility of determinism, and it being compatible with free will. The traditional view of determinism is that if all events are predetermined by the past, and there is only one discernable future, then we do not hold moral responsibility for our actions as they were not actions of our own free will2. The main obstacle to the compatibilists approach is that if the laws of nature and the past determine one possible future, and free will needs two possible choices to make an action free, it would mean that more than one future is necessary for free will.
Compatibilist theory attempts to reconcile these two positions though an analysis of the main factors of free will. Some of these would include the questions what is it to act freely and without constraint? What is an unfree action and what are the possible circumstances that arise to make a certain action unfree? Furthermore they would propose the question what it means to have acted differently3.
2 3
Folke Tersman Lecture Notes, Free Will ibid
2
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
Some defenders of compatibilism, like A. J. Ayer have continued the Humean4 approach to determinism that the laws of causation are in themselves enough to believe that determinism is true as it seems logically sound to propose that every cause will have an effect, therefore ever action in the past, will have an effect in the future5.
Ayer suggests that causality is the main point which proves that the positions of determinism and free will are compatible. If we do not have determinism, then our actions are not predisposed to our actions in the past, therefore our actions would be entirely random. Furthermore, if ones actions were just a matter of chance, then his actions may be considered free, but not morally responsible.
So, if it is considered
unreasonable to hold someone’s actions accountable if those actions were a matter of chance, then an action that is not based on the chance that I do one thing rather than another, has to have some casual explanation for it, and so we are lead back to determinism6.
Furthermore, Ayer suggests that it is a person’s character that establishes ones moral responsibility.
If I am said to be acting in
character, I am presumed to be morally responsible for my actions. Therefore my character has to be based on some of the prior actions of the past that I was considered morally responsible for.
So moral
responsibility seems to presuppose any arguments of the incompatibility 4
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 116 6 Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 113 5
3
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
of determinism with free will, as my past actions of free will have determined my future actions7.
Ayer goes around the principle of
alternate possibilities by proposing our actions of the past create our moral responsibility.
Ayer proposes that an action is only unfree when the agent inciting the action is under constraints of coercion8. Therefore, even in the presence of a deterministic universe, our actions are of our own free will, and it is not the prior occurrences that cause this constraint, but rather physical actions of others.
For example, say a man of no prior intentions to
commit violent acts was coerced by a terrorist to perform an action under duress; let that action be assassinating a foreign leader. Under the duress of a terrorist, who threatens the man with death if he does not comply with the demands, if the man was to commit the action he is not morally responsible for his action, as it was not an act of free will, rather an act of coercion.
The argument for the compatibilism of determinism is heightened by the positions asserted by Harry Frankfurt, in which he refutes the principle of alternative possibilities.
It must be shown that the principle of alternate
possibilities idea that an agent is morally responsible for his action only if he could have done otherwise is false9. Frankfurt does this by proposing
7
Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 113 Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, p. 117 9 Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, p. 156 8
4
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
that we can still be morally responsible for our actions even if the circumstances made it unavoidable to perform it10.
Such a refutation of the principle of alternate possibilities can be seen in the Frankfurts counter examples. An interpretation of his examples is shown in; If two brothers where at there local pub, and both were expected home by a certain time for a prior arrangement. B1 wants to go home and see his wife, while B2 would rather stay at the pub and continue drinking. If the whether changes and the pub and surrounding roads are snowed in, it would be reasonable to say that B1 as he in the situation he could only stay at the pub. In contrast, B2 willed to stay at the pub, and because of the snow storm was unable to meet his wife. Therefore, B2 could be considered morally responsible for his actions as if he was not constrained by the snow storm, he would have still stayed at the pub.
This shows that free will and moral responsibility is in fact compatible with determinism. Therefore according to Frankfurt a person would not be morally responsible for an action if he performed the action only because he could not have done otherwise11. Moreover, this overcomes the problem of having free will without two options for an agent to do otherwise, further enforcing the argument that determinism is compatible with free will.
10 11
ibid Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, p. 165
5
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
The plausibility of compatibilism hinges on the reconciliation between determinism and free will.
The arguments of Ayer, which entail that
causation is enough for the plausibility of determinism, and of Frankfurt, which refutes the principle of alternative possibilities seem to establish that though it may not be a truth of the world that determinism and free will exist, in theory, the compatibilism between determinism and free will is logically plausible.
6
Philosophy 100
Samuel Carey
4491871
Bibliography
Readings: • • •
A.J. Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, from Philosophical Essays (pp. 217-84), first published 1954 Harry Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility from Journal of Philosophy (pp. 829-39) published 1969 Peter Van Inwagen, The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism from Philosophical Studies 27 (pp. 185-99) published 1975
Online Material: •
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Compatibilism, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
7
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