Philosophical Essay: Hitchens The Fundamentalist

M. CHRISTOPHER WHITE SCHOOL OF DIVINITY

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY: HITCHENS THE FUNDAMENTALIST

SUBMITTED TO DR. PERRY HILDRETH IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF RELI650 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION SEMINAR

BY THOMAS J. WHITLEY 1 DECEMBER 2008

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY: HITCHENS THE FUNDAMENTALIST

“Religion poisons everything.”1 These are the words with which Christopher Hitchens concludes the first chapter of his book god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, which is titled “Putting it Mildly.” Hitchens, actually, does not put things mildly at all. These three words are pointed and unambiguous and they are designed to be a heavy, if not fatal, blow to religion. The entirety of god is not Great is devoted to the task of proving his thesis, that “religion poisons everything.” Hitchens, however, is not alone. Karl Marx decried religion as the “opium of the people.”2 Friedrich Nietzsche comments, “The greatest haters in history were, at all times, priests.”3 There is much negative sentiment toward religion and, as a result, its various adherents and practitioners. In this paper, however, I will argue that religion does not, in fact, poison everything, as Hitchens would have all believe. Moreover, I will show how Hitchens’ argument is foundationally weak and fundamentally flawed by identifying examples of Hitchens’ practices of over-generalization and of avoiding direct critiques. Finally, I will argue that Hitchens’ entire argument is in effect humanistic fundamentalism. Hitchens’ argument is really quite simple. He believes that religion is detestable and he supplies as many examples as he can scrounge up where religion can be cast in a negative light. Beyond this, though, Hitchens does offer his four irreducible objections to religious faith:

1

Christopher Hitchens, god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York: Twelve, 2007), 13.

2

nd

Karl Marx, “The Opium of the Masses” in Kelly James Clark, Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (2 ed.; Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008), 263. 3

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Religion as Resentment” in Kelly James Clark, Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (2 ed.; Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008), 267. nd

1

2

1) It wholly misrepresents the origins of man and the cosmos 2) Because of this original error it manages to combine the maximum of servility with the maximum of solipsism 3) It is both the result and the cause of dangerous sexual repression 4) It is ultimately grounded on wishful thinking4 As can likely be deduced from these four objections, Hitchens’ argument is based almost solely in personal opinion. This opinion, though, is supported by a collection of negative examples from various religions. This is an area where Hitchens does not come up short in the least. Hitchens also makes the point that secular humanists believe that humans do not need religion to be moral or ethical. Of secular humanists, Hitchens says, “We speculate that it is at least possible that, once people accepted the fact of their short and struggling lives, they might behave better toward each other and not worse. We believe with certainty that an ethical life can be lived without religion.”5 In addition, Hitchens makes the point that religion “must seek to interfere” in the lives of those who are not believers.6 As support for this point, Hitchens offers an example from the life of Mother Teresa. He recounts her flying from Calcutta to protest a change in the state constitution of the Irish Republic that would permit divorce. Hitchens’ thoughts on this are clear: “In other words, an Irish woman married to a wife-beating and incestuous drunk should never expect anything better, and might endanger her soul if she begged for a fresh start.”7

4

Hitchens, 4.

5

Ibid., 6.

6

Ibid., 17.

7

Ibid.

3

While Christopher Hitchens does a terrific job of collecting examples where religion has been in the wrong, there are many flaws in his argument. Though the most odious of these flaws will be expounded upon later, it is worth noting now that the flaws in Hitchens’ argument essentially all fall under a single umbrella: Hitchens is wholly unwilling to see anything positive in religion. This blindness directs his argument. To begin with, I will respond to Hitchens’ view that “an ethical life can be lived without religion.”8 Once again, Hitchens is not alone in this view, being in the company of Karl Marx and others. However, those who disagree with Hitchens are not alone either. For they have Plato’s Euthyphro9 in their history as well as many others who have made arguments for the existence of God from morality. Robert Merrihew Adams says what many would agree with, “we believe quite firmly that certain things are morally right and others are morally wrong (for example, that it is wrong to torture another person to death just for fun).”10 In addition, it must be noted that underlying Hitchens’ statement that “an ethical life can be lived without religion” 11 is the belief that religion does not improve people or society.12 This statement cannot be supported, though. For, many have received their moral bearings from their religion and while maybe not being completely immoral previously, went on to live more morally and ethically acceptable lives; something about which the secular humanist should be happy. 8

Ibid., 6.

9

nd

Plato, “Euthyphro” in Kelly James Clark, Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (2 ed.; Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008), 97-9. 10

Robert Merrihew Adams, “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” in Kelly James Clark, Readings in the nd Philosophy of Religion (2 ed.; Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008), 100. 11

Ibid., 6.

12

See Hitchens, god is not Great, 184-5.

4

While steeped in his work of showing how repugnant religion is, Hitchens does manage to comment that “other nonreligious organizations have committed similar crimes, or even worse ones.”13 This is nothing more than lip service, though, as Hitchens gives countless examples of horrible crimes committed by religious organizations and gives not a single example of a crime committed by a nonreligious organization. What is more, Hitchens attempts to claim certain religious people for the cause of humanism. “I can think of a handful of priests and bishops and rabbis and imams who have put humanity ahead of their own sect or creed. History gives us many other such examples, which I am going to discuss later on. But this is a compliment to humanism, not to religion.”14 Hitchens is unable to admit that religion might have offered something positive to the world, even if that is not its strong suit. How does Hitchens have the right to claim certain religions folk for the side of humanism simply because they actually did positive things and did not inflict pain and suffering? When non-religious people do evil, does that not offer a negative blow to humanism? Is one really to believe that the majority, if not all, of evil in the world comes from religion? Hitchens is playing the same card that Karl Rahner played with his “anonymous Christians.” Rahner tried to claim for Christianity people who were not Christians but who exhibited values which many label as “Christian.” These non-Christians would be “regarded in certain respects as anonymous Christians,” Rahner says.15 I cannot imagine that Hitchens would accept as valid Rahner’s theory of anonymous Christians and thus, I cannot accept as valid

13

Hitchens, god is not Great, 4.

14

Ibid.

15

Karl Rahner, Grace in Freedom (London: Burns & Oates, 1969), 85.

5

Hitchens’ attempt to claim religious people for the cause of secular humanism simply because he believes that nothing positive can come from religion. The next aspect of Hitchens’ argument that causes his case to be fundamentally flawed is the excessive use of over-generalizations. One such example of this is when Hitchens says of religion as a whole, “It must seek to interfere with the lives of nonbelievers, or heretics, or adherents of other faiths. It may speak about the bliss of the next world, but it wants power in this one.”16 This is certainly true of some religious adherents, but not of all. One need only to look at the vast ecumenical movement and the increase in recent years in interfaith dialogue. Moreover, does Hitchens think that there is no secular humanist anywhere who expects all religious people to abandon their beliefs? There are just as many secular humanists that are intolerant of religious people as there are religious people that are intolerant of secular humanists. I do not, by any means, intend to paint all secular humanists the same, as Hitchens has done to religion and religious people. In the same vein, Hitchens says, “The true believer cannot rest until the whole world bows the knee.”17 Once again this is not true. Hitchens clearly has not witnessed the privacy that many religious people live with and which many sects or branches of various religions advocate. How does Hitchens, who is not a believer, presume to determine what makes one a “true believer”? Should this not be left up to the religion itself, or even more specifically, to each particular adherent? I recognize the necessity of generalizations and have certainly

16

Hitchens, god is not Great, 17.

17

Ibid., 31.

6

already used some in this paper. However, generalizations must be used with great caution and any philosopher trying to argue a point must work to not paint with such broad strokes. It is appropriate now to return to the question of who should get credit when a religious person does something virtuous, because it helps to highlight Hitchens’ assumption that if he simply supplies enough examples, then his opponent will retreat in defeat. To defend his position that religious belief does not improve people or society, Hitchens offers this statement: “The first thing to be said is that virtuous behavior by a believer is no proof at all of – indeed is not even an argument for – the truth of his belief.”18 The first flaw in this aspect of Hitchens’ argument is that it portrays Hitchens’ apparent belief that just because he says it is not a proof, or even an argument, that it actually cannot be a proof or an argument for the truth of the believer’s belief. It is certainly not true that something becomes inadmissible as a proof or an argument just because Hitchens says so. However, Hitchens is right that “virtuous behavior by a believer” cannot act as a proof of his belief. What Hitchens does not seem to recognize is that if this is true, then the converse should also be true, that non-virtuous behavior cannot act as proof against his belief. Hitchens would likely respond to this critique by saying that he is merely attempting to show that religion poisons everything and that he is not supplying examples so as to argue against the veracity of religion and religious belief. This would not be true, though. For, Hitchens does use the examples he furnishes to argue against the truth of religion. He says that “there are, indeed, several ways in which religion is not just amoral, but positively immoral.” 19

18

Ibid., 184-5.

7

Religions immorality, Hitchens holds, is built into its original precepts. These include, according to Hitchens: “presenting a false picture of the world to the innocent and the credulous, the doctrine of blood sacrifice, the doctrine of atonement, the doctrine of eternal reward and/or punishment, the imposition of impossible tasks and rules.”20 Thus, it becomes clear that Hitchens is not intending to remain neutral when the veracity of religion is questioned, but rather he is purporting that not only does religion poison everything, but it does so because it is so fundamentally in error. Coupled with Hitchens’ over use of generalizations is his ability to dodge direct critiques. Hitchens seems to applaud himself for anticipating a critique against his stance. The critique would go something like this: “…Is it not true that secular and atheist regimes have committed crimes and massacres that are, in the scale of things, at least as bad if not worse” than offenses like the Inquisition, the Crusades, and the Islamic imperial conquests? This question is posed at the beginning of the chapter “An Objection Anticipated: The Last-Ditch “Case” Against Secularism.” Hitchens does well to anticipate this response to his work, but he never answers the “case” against secularism. He merely does historical gymnastics to show that all of the crimes that seem to have been committed by secular or atheists regimes were actually perpetrated by religion. An example of this is when he is talking about totalitarianism. He points out that the word was made famous by the secular Jewish intellectual Hannah Arendt, “who had fled the hell of the Third Reich and who wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism.”21 This word

19

Ibid., 205.

20

Ibid.

21

Ibid., 230.

8

is useful because “it separates ‘ordinary’ forms of despotism – those which merely exact obedience from their subjects – from the absolutist systems which demand that citizens become wholly subject and surrender their private lives and personalities entirely to the state, or to the supreme leader.”22 Then, conveniently using the latter definition, Hitchens makes the point that “for most of human history, the idea of the total or absolute state was intimately bound up with religion.”23 Hitchens then goes on for eleven more pages to supply more negative examples of religion before he thinks he is at a position to make a pseudo-concluding statement: “Thus, those who invoke ‘secular’ tyranny in contrast to religion are hoping that we will forget two things: the connection between the Christian churches and fascism, and the capitulation of the churches to National Socialism.”24 One cannot be blind to the evil that religion has done in the world or sat by idly and watched happen, but one also cannot be so naïve as to think that religion poisons everything, or stated otherwise, that everything poisoned is made that way by religion. Hitchens presents himself as quite naïve on this point, as he cannot straightly answer a question about the evil done by secular and atheists regimes. Hitchens’ response to this question is reminiscent of a child that is caught doing something wrong and responds by telling all that his sibling has done wrong, vainly thinking this will make his original wrong be forgotten by the parent or that it will somehow magically disappear.

22

Ibid., 230-1.

23

Ibid., 231.

24

Ibid., 242.

9

The final point that I wish to make in this paper has hopefully already become clear, that Hitchens’ argument is essentially a humanistic fundamentalism. Hitchens does a stellar job of presenting an abundance of examples of the sins of religion. What he does not do well is present the other side fairly or justly. In addition to Hitchens’ strict adherence to the set of basic ideas or principles of secular humanism and his inability to see anything positive in a movement that is contrary to his own, Hitchens even uses language that is not only reminiscent of Christian fundamentalists, such as Jerry Falwell, but could easily be placed in the mouth of such a person and not be out of place at all.25 One such statement is very early in the book. “I simply knew, almost as if I had privileged access to a higher authority, that my teacher had managed to get everything wrong in just two sentences.”26 I am confident that if I had previously labeled this as a statement made by Jerry Falwell, no one would have argued. The profusion of ad hominem arguments, the narrow-minded style of argument and the language that Christopher Hitchens employs affords one no other option than to label Hitchens’ argument in god is not Great as humanistic fundamentalism. This paper argued that religion does not, in fact, poison everything, as Hitchens would have all believe. Moreover, I showed how Hitchens’ argument is foundationally weak and fundamentally flawed by identifying examples of his practices of over-generalization and of avoiding direct critiques. Lastly, I argued that Hitchens’ entire argument is in effect humanistic fundamentalism. God is not Great was clearly written for a popular audience, as can be seen

25

The abundance of statements made by fundamentalists that sound very much like Hitchens’ make referencing just one impossible. To see quintessential fundamental language, though, see Jerry Falwell, The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1981). 26

Ibid., 3.

10

through Hitchens’ witty and humorous style of writing. Likewise, this book was not intended to be taken into philosophical peer revision. This does not, however, mitigate the carelessness with which Hitchens fashioned much of his argument nor does it make acceptable the fact that Hitchens embodies that which he seems to detest so much in his opponents. Christopher Hitchens’ thesis that religion poisons everything is simply his opinion, complete with biases and prejudices, and must not be accepted on the grounds of its fundamental flaws and its fundamentalistic nature.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Kelly James Clark, 100-08. 2nd ed. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008. Falwell, Jerry. The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1981. Hitchens, Christopher. god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything. New York: Twelve, 2007. Marx, Karl. “The Opium of the Masses.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Kelly James Clark, 263-4. 2nd ed. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008. Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Religion as Resentment.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Kelly James Clark, 265-72. 2nd ed. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008. Plato, “Euthyphro.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Kelly James Clark, 97-9. 2nd ed. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008. Rahner, Karl. Grace in Freedom. London: Burns & Oates, 1969.

11