Persons And Family Relations Notes.docx

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES B. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES 2. Marriage When One Spouse is Absent FAMILY CODE Art. 41: A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) Art. 42: The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n) Art. 43: The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case

may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse. (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n) Art. 44: If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) Art. 349, RPC: Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. CASES: Jones v. Hortiguela ● Take note of the dates because what this case established is WHEN TO START counting the period of absence by the first spouse to enable the spouse present to validly remarry. - The case involves a dispute over the rightful heirs of a the estate of Marciana Escano, between her husband from a 2nd marriage (Respondent-Felix Hortiguela) or her daughter from a first marriage

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations (Petitioner Angelita Jones) Marciana Escaño died and a proceeding regarding her estate was commenced. Felix and Angelita were appointed as the heirs. - Jan. 1918: Marciana Escano’s husband Arthur W. Jones secured a passport to go abroad never to return again - Oct. 1919: Escano went to have her husband declared as an absentee. On the 25th of the said month, the court issued an order declaring that Arthur is an absentee and the declaration will not take effect until 6 months after its publication. (it was published from Dec. 1919 until June 1920) - April 1921: The court judicially declared Jones as an absentee - May 1927: Escano married Felix Hortiguela - Jones, in wanting to be declared sole heir of now contends that the decree should be understood as not having taken effect from Oct 1919, the date it was first published, but in April 1921, the date the court held that the decree has taken effect. - Therefore, from that date until the time of the second marriage, only 6 yrs and 14 days has elapsed, thus, in accordance with sec 3 par 2 of GO no. 68, their marriage was void. - WON the 2nd marriage was valid - YES - WHEN to start COUNTING THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE BY THE FIRST HUSBAND TO ENABLE THE SPOUSE PRESENT TO VALIDLY REMARRY - Upon date of last contact - For the purposes of remarriage, not necessary to have first spouse judicially declared absent (Civil Code). Only requirements (1) first spouse is absent for at least 7 consecutive years at the time of subsequent marriage (2) spouse present does not know if former spouse is living (3) former spouse is generally reputed to be dead (4) spouse present holds this belief at time of subsequent marriage - Court ruled that MARRIAGE IS VALID since Jones had been gone (counting from date of last contact) for around 9 years when subsequent marriage was celebrated - Additional: no copy of marriage contract in local registrar (fault of solemnizing officer + does not invalidate marriage). Angelita Jones, in treating Felix as stepfather shows that she also believed Jones to be dead. SSS v. Jarque - On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the CFI of -

Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. The petition was granted in 1970. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. She was designated as SSS beneficiary of Bailon. The two lived together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted to her. - On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Bailon. They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Bailon obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. - SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses. SSS cancelled the claim of Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage with Alice. And that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Bailon’s marriage with Jarque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Jarque appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Comission. Jarque protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid. However, the SSC affirmed SSS’ ruling. The CA however ruled the contrary. ISSUE: WON the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage. - In this particular case, NO. There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Bailon’s death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Bailon’s death.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations - SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action because she did not disappear in the first place. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. - In this case, since the subsequent marriage is not terminated by the registration of an affidavit of reappearance of Alice or by judicial declaration, but by the death of Bailon, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of Bailon can no longer be raised because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for annulment. Such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab inito. - In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify Bailon and Jargue’s marriage, Jarque is proclaimed to be rightfully the dependent spousebeneficiary of Bailon. Valdez v. Republic - Petitioner Angelita Valdez was married to Sofio in 1971 - Sofio left the conjugal dwelling in 1972 and 3 years passed without any word from him. - In 1975, Sofio and petitioner met and agreed to separate. After that, there was no news of his whereabouts or whether he was alive. - 1985, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes. Reyes’ application for naturalization was denied due to petitioner’s subsisting marriage to Sofio. - RTC held that Angelita “was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that Sofio was dead” under Art 41 of FC. - RTC found that petitioner did not try to find Sofio as they agreed to live separately. - Petitioner argued that it is the Civil Code that applies, not the Family Code W/N Sofio was rightly presumed dead YES W/N petitioner’s subsequent marriage is valid

YES - Under Art 83 of the Civil Code, the absent spouse needs only to be “generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the present spouse at the time of contracting the subsequent marriage.” - under the Civil Code “death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence” - “to retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code (“well-founded belief”) will result in the invalidation of her second marriage” - no such requirement was imposed by law at the time her second marriage was solemnized Republic v. Granada FACTS: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993. In May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC in Lipa City. On February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. Issue: W/N Cyrus can be presumed dead. - NO Ruling: Based on the criteria established in Republic vs. CA and Alegro, a wellfounded belief should be: 1. Belief must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse, WON spouse is alive or dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a wellfounded belief of 2. Death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. -

Cyrus’ relatives were not present in Court to strengthen the brother’s testimony

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She did not exhaust all available means to find her husband: Taiwanese consular office, government agencies of PH in Taiwan, (and this is the kicker) and Mass Media.

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Diligence was not enough to establish the well-founded belief criteria.

presumptive death of the absentee - “Well-founded belief” requires the spouse present to prove that his or her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts, he or she believes that the absent spouse is already dead. - The Court held that Nilda did not exert due diligence and active effort in finding Dante since she only inquired with his family when she could have asked information from the AFP or the authorities as well. - Petition to declare Dante presumptively dead was denied 3.

Republic v. Tampus - Respondent Nilda Tampus was married to Dante Del Mundo in 1975. - The latter, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, left for Jolo, Sulu, where he was assigned. He was never heard from again by Nilda. - 33 years after, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage. She claims that she exerted efforts to find him through inquiring from his family, but to no avail. - RTC granted the petition, but the Republic, through the OSG, filed an appeal to the CA. The latter affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Hence, this petition. I: W/N the CA erred in upholding the trial court’s decision declaring Dante presumptively dead. H: Yes. - Under Article 41 of the FC, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: 1) That the absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under circumstances laid down in Art. 391 CC 2) That the present spouse wishes to remarry 3) That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead 4) That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of

Effects of Pending Action/Decree

FAMILY CODE Art. 49: During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Art. 50: The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 51: In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n) Art. 52: The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n) Art. 53: Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. Art. 54: Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. CIVIL CODE Art. 369: Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father. Art. 371: In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Sec. 4, Rules on Provisional Orders (A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 15, 2003): In determining the right party or person to whom the custody of the child of the parties may be awarded pending the petition, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and shall give paramount consideration to the material and moral welfare of the child, the court may likewise consider the following factors: a) Agreement of the parties b) Desire and ability of each parent to foster an open and loving relationship between the child and the other parent c) Child’s health, safety and welfare d) History of child or spousal abuse by the person seeking custody or who has had any filial relationship with the child including anyone courting the parent e) Nature and frequency of contact with both parents f) Habitual use of alcohol or regulated substances g) Marital misconduct h) Most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological, and educational environment i) Preference of the child, of over 7, and of sufficient discernment, unless parent chosen is unfit

CASE: Yu v. Yu - Jan 2002 - Eric filed a petition for habeas corpus, with prayer for custody (CA) - Mar 2002 - Caroline filed for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of ACP, on the ground of psychological incapacity (Pasig RTC) - Mar 2002 - Eric is awarded full custody (CA) - Dec 2002 - Caroline dismissed petition for nullity, with prayer for custody (Pasig RTC) - Jun 2003 - Eric filed his own declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of ACP, with prayer for custody again (Pasig RTC; forum shopping, accdg to pasay RTC)

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations -

Jul 2003 - court dismissed Eric’s habeas corpus case (CA) Jul 2003 - Caroline filed a petition for habeas corpus, with prayer for custody (Pasay RTC) Court granted Caroline’s habeas corpus case (Pasay RTC)

I: W/N the court that acquires jurisdiction over the petition for declaration of nullity likewise exercises jurisdiction over the matter of custody of Bianca. YES P: Art. 49, 50 FC, Sec. 21 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 21 Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. R: - DOCTRINE: By petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage, he automatically submitted the issue of custody as an incident thereof. Therefore, filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to such issue of custody. - Husband’s petition for declaration of nullity before the Pasig RTC is the action that determines the issue of custody H: Petition for declaration of nullity is GRANTED, custody belongs to the husband

4.

Jurisdiction

Sec. 5, Republic Act 8369: Jurisdiction of family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: xxx

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; xxx d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains; e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment; xxx

CASE: Tamano v. Ortiz - In 1958, Sen. Abdul Jabar Tamano and Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano were married in civil rites. Prior to Tamano’s death in 1994, he also married the petitioner, Estrellita Tamano through civil rites in 1993. Because of this, Zorayda and her son Adib filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that their marriage was bigamous. - They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single respectively. (Not important because topic is jurisdiction but if asked: Tamano did not divorce Zorayda and Estrellita was not single during their marriage because the decision annulling her marriage with Romeo C. Llave was not final and executory) - Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has no jurisdiction over the case. She also alleged that only a party to the marriage could file an action for annulment against the other spouse. In addition to this, she contended that since she and Tamano were both Muslims and married in Muslim rights, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case was vested in shari’a courts in accordance with Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. - Lower court rejected the motion to dismiss and ruled that the case can be tried by RTC of Quezon City because Tamano and Zorayda were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case would be under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts only when filed in places where such

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations courts are present. Since there are no shari’a courts in Quezon City, the RTC can have jurisdiction over it. Issue: W/N the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case filed by the private respondents Held: YES. - Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, RTCs have jurisdiction over actions involving contract of marriage and marital relations. - Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. - Estrellita did not mention in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim Laws. She only specified it in her Motion for Reconsideration. - The court’s jurisdiction cannot depend on the defenses set up in the answer, a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, only on the allegations stated in the actual complaint. - As stated in the complaint, Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code, and so it is applicable in this case. - Art. 13 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws does not provide for a situation where parties were married in civil and Muslim rights, therefore, shari’a courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over marriages celebrated both under civil rites and Muslim laws. Petition denied.

LEGAL SEPARATION A. GROUNDS FAMILY CODE Art. 55: A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. For purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)

CIVIL CODE Art. 97: A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. (n)

CASES: Munoz v. del Barrio - Felicidad Munoz (petitioner) and Jose del Barrio(respondent) were married on September 1942. - During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels and during their arguments, Jose would maltreat Felicidad by deed. Because she was unable to bear such punishment, they unceremoniously separated in 1947, with her staying in Meycawayan and Jose living in Manila - They met again in Manila and she was again maltreated by her husband. - This moved her to institute an action alleging in the petition that the system of conjugal partnership of gains governs her marriage to the respondent; that no property has been acquired during the marriage of petitioner of respondent except a portion of land in Meycawayan and that the respondent has made several attempts on her life which compelled her to live separately and has not provided support for her and their children. I: WON the maltreatments that appellant suffered at the hands of the responder

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations after their separation of dwelling furnish ground for legal separation - NO R: -

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The maltreatment consisted merely in giving a fish blow on Felicidad’s face. It was also noted that Jose boxed his wife on the abdomen, pulled her hair, and had also twisted her neck. However, these do not constitute attempts made on life. An attempt on the life of the person implies that the actor in the attempt is moved by an intention to kill the person. In this case, the alleged maltreatments were not moved by intent to kill and was not proved by evidence. Jose only used at most his bare fists or hands and desisted from giving further chastisements after the first blows were given at the spur of the impulse and this was not indicative of his intent to kill her The court said that this is a civil case and that she is only bound to prove her right of action by preponderance of evidence and not by evidence beyond reasonable doubt upon which a conviction for attempted parricide would rest. From the book: This is a ridiculous decision with the court ignoring the gravity of the assault and discounting the fist as a powerful weapon

Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong F: Lucita Ong filed for legal separation alleging that her life with William Ong Eng Kiam was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation, and grossly abusive conduct. She claimed that after 3 years of marriage, they would often have quarrels about petty things regarding their children and business. William shouted expletives as he slaps, kicks, pulls her hair, and bangs her head on the concrete wall. William would also punish his children by beating them with his belt buckle. At some point, William even pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house. William argues that Lucita only wants control of their properties in Hong Kong, Manila, Baguio, and Dagupan. I: WON the abuse constitutes the violence as grounds for legal separation as stipulated in Art. 55. YES R: -

Lucita and her sister Linda gave numerous accounts of the instances

when William was violent against her and her children. The court gives more weight to this than to William’s denials since the RTC noted that William’s witnesses were tainted with bias since they depended on him for livelihood. William assails the credibility of Lucita’s witness because of their relationship with her. This is not reason enough to discredit their testimony. Linda’s and Dr. Elinzano’s testimonies were detailed and straightforward enough to be credible. Lucita cannot gain anything for pushing her family’s financial interests at the expense of her marriage. Lucita abandoned William with a justifiable cause: his abusive conduct. These prove that the respondent inflicted physical violence on petitioner during the marriage and that she has been subjected to grossly abusive conduct. Denied.

People v. Zapata and Bondoc - Andres Bondoc filed a complaint of adultery against his wife Guadalupe Zapata and her paramour, Dalmacio Bondoc for engaging in repeated sexual intercourse from 1946-1947 - Zapata plead guilty and was sentenced 4 months of arresto mayor as her penalty - Bondoc filed a new case of adultery against wife and paramour for engaging in repeated sexual intercourse from 1947-1948 - Respondents Dalmacio and Guadalupe filed for a motion to quash on the grounds of double jeopardy (being punished for same offense) - WON Bondoc can charge his wife and her paramour of the same crime they’ve already been punished for (adultery) - YES - The Court held that “adultery is punishable for EVERY sexual intercourse bet. wife and paramour” - Even though the acts are against the same person (husband, insti. of marriage, union), and identity is the same, a crime is still committed beacuse the status of the marriage does not change. The 2 are still married. - Adultery not a continuous crime. Each act is a different count which can be punished separately. - (a) plurality of facts performed during separate period of time (1946-1947 v 1947-1948)

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations -

(b) unity of penal provisions infringed upon 3) unity of criminal aim or purpose (to have sex with someone other than husband)

What Andres forgave/condoned was the previous acts (1st case) and not the subsequent acts (2nd case). Reason for it not being double jeopardy? If in case paramour uses defense of not knowing that woman is married, paramour can’t say the same for subsequent cases/charges. Gandionco v. Penaranda - Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite to be provided by Froilen for her and their child which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case. - WON a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage. - YES. - Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. - Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an

action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz - Plaintiff Estrella Dela Cruz alleged that her husband, defendant Severino Dela Cruz, had abandoned her and was mismanaging their conjugal properties - She prayed for support and separation of property - Plaintiff alleged her husband stopped residing in the conjugal dwelling and that he kept a mistress on whom their assets were being used on - She also alleged that defendant abused his administration of their conjugal properties by not discussing business activities with her - Defendant denied all charges but admitted her lived separately on a temporary basis a year before plaintiff filed action - Defendant said he made short visits to their children and regularly gave monthly financial support; wife even had enough money to play mahjong - Defendant also says he could not have mismanaged the conjugal properties as their value increased to over a million pesos - Defendant denied having a mistress W/N separation of defendant from plaintiff constitutes abandonment in law that would justify separation of conjugal assets - NO W/N defendant’s failure/refusal to inform plaintiff of their business’s affairs is abuse of his powers of administration that would warrant separation of matrimonial assets - NO R: - Plaintiff did not sufficiently prove her allegations - Allegations did not constitute abuse of power of administration as “abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership” - To entitle the plaintiff to the remedies she seeks under Art 178 of the Civil Code “the abandonment must not long be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion” - And that to constitute abandonment there “must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation” - Court said that continuing support of the husband contradicted allegations that he

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations intended not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties - Court held there was only physical separation and husband still managed properties well MAAM’S COMMENTS >Even if Court says they don’t condone husband’s acts, why werent the grounds enough? (he didnt live with them, only short visits, didnt speak to his wife) >Deprives other wives in the same situation of legal grounds for separation >Odd since the separation of bed and board in legal sep is already what is happening Lapuz v. Eufemio FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abates the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

B. DEFENSES FC, Art. 56 Willan v Willan F: The husband alleges that throughout his marriage to his wife, she frequently and persistently assaulted him, verbally abused him, and demanded sexual intercourse when he did not wish to have it. She would pull his hair, shake his head violently, and would also pester him far into the night to have sex, so that eventually he was compelled to comply. The night before the husband left for the last time, an act of sexual intercourse took place between the parties. His petition for the dissolution of his marriage was denied on the ground that he condoned his wife’s acts by still engaging in sex with her. I: W/N the husband condoned the cruelty of his wife, and thus barred him from filing for the dissolution of his marriage. YES H: The case of a husband having intercourse with the wife, with full knowledge of the matrimonial offense, is conclusive evidence of condonation by the husband of the wife. It is condonation because it is the best possible way of showing that the

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations wife has been reinstated as a wife. Furthermore, the Court held that he was free to submit to or refrain from having sex with her. Ocampo v Floreciano Facts: ● 1938 - Ocampo and Serafina married ● 1951 - wife committed adultery with Jose ● 1951 - husband sent wife to manila to study beauty culture, where she stayed for a year ● 1952 - wife left the husband and lived separately ● 1955 - wife committed adultery with Nelson; husband expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation, wife agreed as long as she will not be criminally charged ● 1955 - two weeks after, ocampo filed for legal separation ● ca held that prescription period is over Issues/Held: 1. W/N there is condonation NO 2. W/N there is collusion NO Held: 1. DOCTRINE: Failure of the husband to search for his wife after she left their conjugal home is not tantamount to condonation. ● he has no duty to search for his wife because it was her who left the house ● she is the one who has the duty to return or at least inform the husband of her whereabouts ● therefore, NO CONDONATION 2. DOCTRINE: What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant’s confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it ● even if the wife confessed that she “liked also” to be legally separated from her husband, the husband presented other evidences to support the allegation of adultery ● therefore, NO COLLUSION WHEREFORE, petition for legal separation is GRANTED

Bugayong v. Ginez In 1949, Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, married Leonila Ginez while on furlough leave. After their wedding, they lived with Bugayong’s sisters in Asingan, Pangasinan, but before he returned to the US they had an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, Ginez left her sisters-in-law and informed Bugayong through writing hima letter than she would reside with her mother in Asingan, but later moved to Dagupan to study. In July 1951, Bugayong received letters from Valeriana Polangco and from anonymous writers that his wife allegedly committed acts of infidelity. He was also informed by his wife through a letter that an “Eliong” kissed her. In October 1951, he consulted the navy legal department about the propriety of a legal separation between him and his wife on the ground of infidelity. In August 1952, he went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife. They stayed in his cousin’s house for two nights and one day and lived as husband and wife. Bugayong tried to verify the alleged infidelity of his wife but instead of answering him, she just packed and left the house, which he took as confirmation. After this, he exerted efforts to look for her but failed to find her. Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan but it was dismissed. Issue: W/N the petitioner and the defendant can be legally separated despite the petitioner showing condonation after acquiring knowledge of the defendant’s alleged infidelity Held: NO. There was no sufficient evidence that the defendant committed adultery, however, it is not a question at issue. What needs to be considered is the petitioner’s line of conduct under the assumption that he believed that his wife committed adultery. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. The conduct that the petitioner showed under the belief that his wife was adulterous deprives him of any action for legal separation against his wife because his conduct comes within the restriction of Art. 100 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the case was filed.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations Art. 100, NCC: The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. According to American jurisprudence, single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties is sufficient to constitute condonation, and when they live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation. Matubis v Praxedes F: Socorro Matubis (P) and Zoilo Praxedes (D) were married in January 1943. They failed to agree on how they should live as husband and wife. On May 30, 1944, they agreed to live separately from each other. In 1948, they entered in an agreement which stated that they relinquish their right over each other as husband and wife. That they are free to get any mate and live with said mate and neither of them can file an action for a crime or suit. That the wife is no longer entitled for support by the husband or any benefit he may receive nor the husband is entitled to anything from the wife. that neither of them can claim anything from the other from the time they verbally separated (1944). In 1955, Praxedes began cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth to a child. Matubis filed for legal separation with the CFI alleging abandonment and concubinage in 1956. I:WON the period for filing a suit for legal separation has passed? – YES. WON the plaintiff consented to the concubinage? – YES R: By the plaintiff’s own admission she discovered the cause for the suit (concubinage) in January 1955. She instituted the complaint on April 24, 1956. Through writing of their agreement in 1948 (that both of them is free to get any mate and live with them), the condonation and consent to the concubinage had been expressly stated.

People v Sensano and Ramos -

B.3. CONNIVANCE ● Consent is unilateral act of ONE spouse for the commission of a marital offense by the other. ● Connivance is bilateral. ○ It’s a “willingness to secretly allow or to be involved in wrongdoing” ○ Inferred that the spouse desires for the other spouse to commit the offense ○ “hinahayaan mong gawin niya yung masamang action” Sargent v Sargent FACTS: Husband suspects the wife to be committing adultery with their driver, Charles Simmons. To support his allegations, he hired several detectives and enjoined his servants to keep a close eye on the actions of his wife. They staged a raid to catch the wife red handed of the crime alleged of her and testified against her. Wife and Simmons denied allegations. Arguments against testimonies: ● White woman would not have sex with negro ● If devices were placed, conversations would have been heard and not just mumblings ● No sex because was sick in bed due to gonorrhea and rheumatism from October of 1918, to her surgery in Sept. 1919 Details of TESTIMONIES IN CASE MA’AM ASKS (there are 7 testimonies, check case for more details): Ida Lewis ● Negress employed at the house and was fired for stealing some trunks ● Mrs. Sargent said that whites and blacks can intermarry if they loved each other, showed a photograph of a man not her husband saying that he was her lover ● Saw Simmons in multiple occasions be in the same room as Mrs. Sargent dressed only in her underwear, corsets, shoes, and stockings Charlotte Lunford ● Worked at the house, was not liked by Mrs. Sargent. Did not like Simmons couple because she was tasked to wait on the couple ● Drank wine and whisky with Simmons and Mrs. Sargent in the latter’s bedroom. ● Was told by the Mrs that Simmons was nice and handsome. Called Simmons Sweetheart and Dearie ISSUE: WON there was connivance on the part of the husband regarding his

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations wife’s actions? (Art. 56, par. 3) HELD: YES. Petitioner’s conduct may not have indicated that he wanted his wife to commit adultery, HOWEVER, his conduct did not indicate that he did not want her to. Petitioner was made aware of the rumors FOR 2 MONTHS regarding his wife’s actions with Simmons. He should have discharged Simmons, but instead kept Simmons employed as his chauffeur, giving him the opportunity to be with Mrs. Sargent. Petitioner was also often absent for business, leaving his wife without protection, even AFTER receiving additional reports from his spies and servants regarding the actions of his wife. It is to be inferred from his conduct that he did desire his wife to commit the offense in his absence, and that helping as he did to afford the opportunity which brought about the desired result, he was consenting thereto. *What could have Mr. Sargent done to prevent occurrence of connivance? He could have just fired Simmons or brought his wife with him on his business trips. Llave v Republic - Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Mamintal Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil indicated that he was divorced. - On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. - (1) WON the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous. - RULING: YES. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. - The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike

was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 (For a period of twenty years from the date of the approval of this Act, divorce among Moslems residing in non-Christian provinces shall be recognized and be governed by Moslem customs and practices) which was not availed of during its effectivity. - As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.” - Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. - WON the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment (judgment rendered w/o waiting for the SC’s final resolution on the certiorari petition; Estrellita has not yet filed her answer and hence denied due process, and the public prosecutor did not conduct investigation to establish whether or not there was collusion). - RULING: NO. Estrellita’s refusal to answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer, and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City. Also, it can never be argued that she was deprived of her right to due process. She was never declared in default, and she actively participated in the trial to defend her interest. Lastly, Estrellita’s vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. The Court is convinced that the non-intervention of the prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court. -

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations Brown v Yambao - July 14, 1955, William Brown filed a suit to obtain legal separation from his wife who engaged in adulterous relations with Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl - He learned of his wife’s conduct in 1945, after he was released from his internment by the Japanese invaders from 1942-45 - After such knowledge, spouses lived separately and executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership - Court declared the wife in default for failure to answer in due time - Asst. Fiscal Hose cross-examined Brown at trial and elicited that fact that, after his liberation, he cohabited with another women and had children with her - Court denied legal sep on grounds that, 1. while wife’s adultery was wellestablished, Brown had incurred similar misconduct which barred his right of action 2. there had been consent and connivance 3. Brown’s action prescribed - Brown argues that Fiscal acted as counsel to his defaulting wife by crossexamining him; and that the Fiscal is limited to finding out w/n there was collusion W/N Court erred in dismissing suit on these grounds - NO Court defined collusion as the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings - Court held that the Fiscal was within his duties to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference of collusion such as Brown’s cohabitation with another woman “evidence of such misconduct and the failure of the wife to set it up as defense were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion” - it was also true that his suit had already presrcribed as it had been 10 years since he learned of his wife’s adultery - 2 well established statutory grounds for denying remedy: Commission of similar offense Prescription of action Art 102, CC

file for leg sep w/in 1 year from time plaintiff became cognizant of cause and w/in 5 years of cause occurring - True that wife didn’t interpose prescription as defense but courts can take cognizance of it anyway because of state interest in preserving marriage Contreras v Macaraig Contreras vs Macaraig (1970) Ponente: Dizon Ma’am’s book: “One recurring issue that the Court had to resolve was how to determine that knowledge of the marital offense had already been acquired by the petitioner. “ Case summary: Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila which dismissed her complaint upon the ground that the same was filed more than a year from and after the date on which she had become cognizant of the cause for legal separation. Court ruled that the action to file for legal separation has not prescribed based on the petitioner having become cognizant of the infidelity of her husband only in the early part of December 1963 when the husband informed her that he could no longer leave his mistress and refused to return to his legitimate family. Facts: Petitioner (P) and Defendant (D) were married on March 16, 1952; out of which 3 children were born. Before the election of 1961, D was employed as a manager of the printing establishment (MICO Offset) owned by P’s father. That he met Lily Ann Alcala (the mistress). He began to be away from home often and to come home very late. He would not be home for month on end. In September 1962 P’s driver told her that D was living in Singalong with Lily Ann. In April 1963, there were rumors that D was seen with a woman on the family way on Dasmariñas street, but she failed again to either bring up the

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations matter of his infidelity. When D returned to the conjugal home, P would refrain from asking him if the rumors were true for fear that he would be driven away. P later learned that Lily Ann gave birth to a baby (bc sabi ni Agus one can give birth to an idea). D came home one day with a baby in his arms. (Child’s parents were proven by a baptismal certificate) P entreated her father to talk and convince D to come back home. Father said he couldn’t do anything. In November 1963, P requested the cooperation of D’s older sister to arrange a meeting with Lily Ann. In the said meeting, Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she does not want to be accused criminally (kahit na criminally liable naman na siya. That criminal. Jkjk). However, Lily Ann said that it was D who didn’t want to break up. In the early part of December 1963, P and her children met up with D and pleaded with him to give up Lily Ann and to come back to the conjugal home and that she was willing to forgive him. D refused to return to his legitimate family. On Dec. 14, 1963, P filed a petition for legal separation. RTC dismissed the petition on grounds that under Art. 102 of the CC, action for legal separation has prescribed. Hence, this petition.

Somosa-Ramos v Vamenta Jr. F: Petitioner Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation from her husband, Clemente Ramos, on the ground of concubinage and an attempt by him against her life. She also prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her exclusive property. Clemente opposed the petition for the writ based on Art. 103 of the Civil Code: “An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.” Respondent Judge Vamenta Jr. sided with Clemente, suspending the hearing of the petition for injunction. I: W/N Art. 103 CC precludes the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction. NO H: The Court recognizes the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself. Article 104 CC also expressly states that: “After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property... “

Issue: W/N the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted from Sept 1962 (first heard of the sexual infidelity) or Dec 1963 (when she talked to husband and he refused to come back home).

This is a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during the six-month period. Rank injustice may occur if the Court lets the six-month period pass without rendering judgment in terms of the spouses’ property.

Ruling:

D.

“We are persuaded that in the eyes of the law, the only time the appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of the husband was in the early part of the December 1963 when her husband informed her that he could no longer leave his mistress and refused to return to his legitimate family. Thus it was only then that she was ‘under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and…that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.”

E. Effects of Filing of Petition De la Vina v Villareal Facts: ● ●

Diego and Narcisa are married with nine children wife alleged that her husband was committing adultery with a certain Ana Calog whom he brought into their home as concubine

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations ● ● ●

husband then ejected the wife from their conjugal abode in Negros Oriental, which forced the wife to live in her habitual residence in Iloilo wife prayed for divorce, partition of property, alimony pendente lite, and writ of preliminary injunction to prevent Diego who was trying to alienate or encumber their conjugal property husband demurred that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since the wife’s domicile should be the same as his (Negros Oriental)

Issues: 1. W/N a married woman may ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of her marriage 2. W/N a wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action Held: 1. DOCTRINE: A married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband, where the husband has given cause for divorce or consent. ● husband unlawfully ejects her from conjugal home to freely indulge his illicit relations with another woman 2. DOCTRINE: In an action for divorce, a wife can seek an injunction to curtail the husband’s power of administration over the conjugal property to protect her interest. ● wife was not asserting her right to administer property, but right to share in CPG Reyes v. Ines-Luciano In 1976, the private respondent, Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed a complaint against the petitioner, Manuel Reyes for legal separation on the ground that he attempted to kill her. She asked for support pendente lite for her and her children, which the petitioner opposed on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician.

The respondent Judge issued an order granting Celia’s prayer for pendente lite in the amount of P5,000 per month. Manuel filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support and that even if she was, the amount as excessive. The respondent Judge reduced it to P4,000 per month. Manuel filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals asking that the order granting his wife’s prayer for pendente lite be annulled on the ground that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion and that the amount was excessive. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that Manuel has not presented a clear case of grave abuse of discretion and that he appears to be financially capable to support his wife and children. Issue: W/N the private respondent is entitled to receive support pendente lite from her husband Held: YES Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support, however, adultery must be established. Mere allegation will not bar the wife to receive support pendente lite. The petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife committed adultery. Private respondent was asking support to be taken from their conjugal property, which was managed by the petitioner, and not from his personal funds. It is therefore doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite. In addition to this, in fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000, the respondent Judge did not act capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the monthly support of P5,000, she considered the conjugal properties that were in the possession of the petitioner who is also the president, manager, and treasurer of their corporation namely: 2.) Standard Mineral Products, 2.) Development and Technology Consultants, Inc., and 3.) The Contra-Pop Marine Philippines, Inc. Also, the Judge considered that she needs P5,000 a month for her support in accordance with their station in life.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations Amount was reduced to P4,000 inasmuch as the children are in his custody and are being supported by him. The private respondent submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled by the petitioner entered multi-million contracts. -

The amount of P4,000 a month for support pendente lite is not excessive.

Effects of Decree Banez v Banez FACTS · The RTC granted a legal separation decree between Aida and Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity. · The effects of this decree include: o Dissolution of conjugal property relations o Division of net conjugal assets o Forfeiture of Gabriel’s ½ share in the net conjugal assets in favour of the common children o Payment of P100,000 to the petitioner’s counsel taken from her own share in the net assets o Surrender by Gabriel of the use and possession of his house and his car to Aida and their common children. · Aida filed a motion for execution of the decision pending an appeal (i.e., before it becomes final and executory) which the RTC granted partially in relation to the surrender of the house and the car. · Gabriel appealed to the CA which, in turn, set aside the RTC’s decision. · Aida filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it. ISSUES/HELD · WON the various effects of a legal separation decree were subject to multiple appeals.

NO RATIONALE · The issues involved in the case relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. · They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. ·As they are mere incidents of legal separation, they may not be subject to multiple appeals. According to Archbishop v CA: the rationale behind the multiple appeals is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issues is resolved by the court and held final This can’t be applied because splitting the appeals in this case would only be a violative rule of multiple appeals. E.2 Support and Custody ● LegSep provides for the custody and support of legit children ● Can illegit children be supported in case of forfeiture? No. because unfair to legit family ● FC, Art. 213: parent chosen by court shall exercise parental authority over children ○ Choice will depend on age of child ■ < 7 y.o. will go to mother unless compelling reasons not to ■ 7 and over can choose unless choice is unfit Matute v Macadaeg Armando successfully filed a petition for legal separation against his wife Rosario based on her acts of adultery with her brother-in-law, Armando’s brother. Petition was granted w/ custody of 4 children aged 4, 8, 10, and 12 to the father. Father left them in sister’s care in Davao and then went to US; Rosario lived with the children.Rosario asked permission to bring them to Manila for her father’s funeral. Armando granted, on condition that they’d be back in 2 weeks. Rosario did not return them but instead filed for civil case for custody grant, because: (1) she is legit mother & children want to stay with her (2) 3 children are over 10 and choice should be taken into consideration

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations (3) act of infidelity does not have moral depravity and already thing of the past. (4) Father is living with another woman, though married, it was after securing a divorce in the US which makes him guilty of bigamy. HELD: Since custody was originally Armando’s, Rosario only obtained permission from him. She needs to file a modification of order of custody to determine if custody should be given to her. UNLIKELY because Rosario had no livelihood or own house, by her own accord depended on charity of brothers for support. Court: no grave abuse of discretion given that “poverty among other causes, rendered petitioner unfit to take charge of her children.” RECONCILIATION HOW DONE: Art. 65 If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation.

Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a)

EFFECTS: Art. 66 The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) Art. 67 The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding

DE FACTO SEPARATION Art. 100 FC. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in

said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned. Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. Arroyo v. Vazquez de Arroyo (1921): - Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazques de Arroyo were married in 1910 and ever since, they had few short intervals of separation. They have lived together as husband and wife until 1920, when Dolores went away from their common home with the intention of separating from her husband. - After efforts had been made by Mariano w/o avail to induce Dolores to resume their marital relations, an action was initiated by Mariano to compel Dolores to return. - Dolores answered, admitting that she had left their conjugal home, due to her husband’s cruel treatment. She prays for affirmative relief which consists of a decree of separation, liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. - CFI: Husband’s ill-treatment justified wife’s abandonment. - Appeal. - The tales of the cruelty on the part of the husband towards his wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in this court’s opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become involved, and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. - ISSUE: WON Dolores can be compelled to return to their conjugal dwelling (If no, is she entitled to support) - RULING: NO. - It is not w/in the province of the court to compel one of the spouses to cohabit w/, and render conjugal rights to the other. Mariano is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations domicile. But he is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself w/o sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Also, since she left without just cause, she is not entitled to support. - The interests of the parties as well as the society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses. From here follows that provisions should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife UNLESS it appears that the continued cohabitation of that pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. In this case, it does not appear. - Of course, where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. The court distinguished between maintaining an action for restitution of property rights in contrast to compelling the restitution of purely personal rights of consortium, which was not enforceable by an order of contempt.

children goes to Alfonso Alfonso shall pay monthly support Reciprocal rights of visitation That, for that year, all four children be given to Carmen for the summer. And that the 2 older children be sent back to Alfonso after. - CFI found the joint petition “conformable to law” and rendered judgment approving and incorporating their compromise agreement in toto - The 4 children were subsequently delivered to Carmen, after which she filed a motion for immediate custody of all her minor children. - She questioned the validity of her agreement with Alfonso respecting custody of the children, averring that the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering immediate execution of the compromise agreement. - CA declared null and void compromise judgment where it relates to custody over the 2 older children - Alfonso then appealed this decision W/N the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI on the agreement are conformable to law

Lacson v. San Jose (1968) - Alfonso Lacson (petitioner) and Carmen San-Jose Lacson (respondent) were married in 1953 and have four children. - On Jan 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and began residing in Manila. - She filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (JDRC) for custody of all her children (who at this time were all under 10 yrs old) as well as support for them and herself. - Before the case could be resolved, the spouses with their attorneys reached an amicable settlement regarding custody of the kids, support and separation of property. - They filed a joint petition in the CFI of Negros Occidental for the judicial approval of the settlement. - Settlement provided that, among others: Petitioners have mutually agreed upon dissolution of the CPR subject to judicial approval. The terms being: separation of property(they acquired no property of consequence together) power of administration of their separate estates The custody of the 2 younger children goes to Carmen and the 2 older

YES but not in relation to custody - Court held that the compromise agreement and the CFI’s judgment are valid w/ respect to property separation and dissolution of CPR. - Judicial sanction was secured allowing separation of property and dissolution as the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years, “the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests in manifest.” - Besides decreeing on their property, the Court cannot compel the spouses to live together as in Arroyo v Vasquez de Arroyo - By approving the separation of property, the Court still holds that they do not “thereby accord recognition nor legalize the de facto separation” - As for kids custody, Court says lower courts erred in allowing the separation of the children from their mother which is against the tender years presumption. Remanded to CFI of Negros Occidental Estrada v. Escritor (2006) Issue: W/N Escritor can be held to be administratively liable on grounds of her immoral conjugation. NO

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations The Court, while emphasizing the content of the SG’s arguments, stated: “Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religious freedom (aka my religion doesnt seem to think my arrangement with the guy is immoral, so it musnt be lol) - Court recognized the validity of the standards and measures taken by JW elders in giving the DPF. - Th Dec doesnt provide a blanket authority to cohabit without marriage given that once the legal impediment is lifted. Instant Administrative Complaint is dismissed. -

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In a sworn letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, petitioner Alejandro Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, in the RTC of Las Piñas, for living with a man not her husband and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Defendant was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” in violation of the Revised Administrative Code. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) defined “disgraceful and immoral conduct” as “an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the society” and “conduct which is willful, flagrant, ro shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community” Defendant asserted that as members of the Jehovah’s witnesses, their alleged immoral conjugation is in confomity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of their congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which allows members of the sect who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital unions. Said Declaration makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the said Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before declarations are executed. Once all legal impediments are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their union. Congregation: Escritor was widowed, but Quilapio still did not have the capacity to remarry; hence, there was nothing immoral about their declarations remain valid, they both remain in good standing. SolGen argued that marriage and the family are crucial to the stability of the nation; hence, Declaraton of PF should not be recognized or given effect: “it is utterly destructive of the avowed institution of marriage and the family for it reduces to a mockery these legally exalted and socially significant instititutions which in their purity demand respect and dignity.

Banaag v. Espeleta (2011) A letter complaint was filed by Evelina Banaag before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Olivia Espeleta with gross immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for engaging in an illicit and immoral relationship with her husband, Avelino Banaag. Evelina learned about the affair when her husband withdrew Php 180,000 that was supposed to be given to her sick brother in law. When Evelina asked the brother in law’s wife, she found out that only Php 80,000 was given. She was then told that her husband had a mistress working at the City Hall. Evelina confronted her husband who admitted to it. She also found out that he was using their conjugal funds to deposit substantial amounts to Olivia’s accounts for 3 years. Banaag has in her possession deposit slips amounting to Php 1.4M which she attached to her letter-complaint. The OCA directed respondent to comment within 10 days, buut she failed to comply. Multiples directions to her were given but these were all unserved since she was not at her given address. It was soon found that Olivia filed for resignation and informed the presiding judge that she had gone to the US. I: WON Respondent Olivia is guilty of immoral conduct. YES R: -

The Court finds respondent guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations under Sec. 46(b)(5), Ch. 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Definition of “Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct”: act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality, and decorum abhorred and condemned by the society. Another Definition: Conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community. Respondent’s act of having an illicit relation with a married man counts as being disgraceful and immoral, which is classified as a grave offense punishable with suspension from the service for 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second. Respondent was given the chance to be heard and refute the charges. However, she did not file any thing. She hastily resigned right after receiving the 1st Indorsement requiring her to answer the letter-complaint. Her perfectly-timed departure to the US is clearly a way to avoid accountability. These are strongly indicative of guilt. In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. The deposit slips indicating how amounts were transferred to respondent’s account prove the allegation that she had been receiving these from the complainant’s husband. Respondent is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. She is to pay a fine of Php 50,000.

Santos Sr. v. CA (1995) Facts: ● Leouel and Julia are married with one son ● the son was placed under custody of Julia’s parents ever since; they paid for all the hospital bills and support as Leouel can’t afford to do so ● Julia left to be a nurse in the US, called husband after 7 months, promised to return after expiration of contract, but never did ● Leouel looked for her, to no avail ● Grandparents claimed that Julia sent monthly financial support for the son ● Leouel allegedly abducted their son when he visited the grandparents’ house ● Grandparents filed for petition of custody, citing that:

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they are well-off, so they can provide material advantages, while Leouel had not given any support ○ Leouel is a military personnel, so he may be prevented from attending to his son at times court granted grandparents’ petition, Leouel appealed

Issue: Whether or not the custody belongs to the father - YES Held: ●

DOCTRINE: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. ● DOCTRINE: It is only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority. ○ no proof that father is in no position to provide support ○ his inability to provide cannot be construed as abandonment, as present action is to rectify his past misdeeds ○ his being a soldier as a compelling reason deprives soldiers merely because of the consequences of their duties ○ the fact that he kidnapped his son does not render him unfit THEREFORE, petition for custody is GRANTED, custody belongs to the FATHER Sy v. CA (2007) - In 1994, respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petiton of habeas corpus against petitioner Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court of Manila; she prayed that the writ be issued to order the petitioner to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah, 6 and 4 years old respectively, and for the custody to be given to her as their mother. - Petitioner contended that the custody should be awarded to him instead for the following reasons: 1.) the respondent abandoned their family in 1992, 2.) she is mentally unstable, 3.) she cannot provide proper care to the children. - The RTC caused the issuance of the writ and they awarded the custody to the respondent. It further ordered the petitioner to pay monthly support of P50,000 to the respondent and his children. - Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC erred in awarding the sole custody of their children to the respondent and in ordering him to give monthly support of P50,000. - CA found no merit in the appeal as they found that respondent was driven

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations away by the petitioner’s family because of religious differences, her stay in Taiwan not being abandonment. Also, the respondent’s act of praying outdoors when raining is not a sign of mental instability but an expression of one’s faith. The appellate court was satisfied with the respondent’s proof of financial stability. Issue: W/N the lower court erred in awarding the custody of the minor children to the respondent Held: NO. Court: “When the husband and wife are living separately and apart from each other, without decree of the court, the court shall award the care, custody, and control of each child as will be for his best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent he prefers to live with if he is over seven (7) years of age unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty.” - Section 213 of the Family Code states that in the case of separation of parents, parental authority shall be given to the parent designated by the court. But no child under seven years old shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reason to order otherwise. - The foremost consideration for the custody of children is the “physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parent.” - However, the law favors the mother if she is fit to take care of the children. This is because “the love, solicitude, and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender years than all things combined.” - The Civil Code Commission also explained this saying, “the general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.” Likewise, this preference is reiterated in Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. - The petitioner’s contention that the respondent is unfit was not substantiated. Perez v. CA (1996) F: Ray Perez, a doctor, and Nerissa Perez, a registered nurse, were married in Cebu in 1986. Nerissa gave birth to Ray Perez II (Jr.) in 1992 in New York. Ray took care of her while she was pregnant but they returned to Cebu in 1993.

However, Nerissa went back to the U.S. as she alleged that they came home for a 5-week vacation. Ray stayed behind to take care of his mother but promised to follower her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but when Nerissa came back to New York, she changed her mind and continued working there. When she came back for her son’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms and that they had frequent quarrels. She also did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s income and she did not want to leave her son but Ray kept her away from their son. On July 1993, she filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray Perez to surrender the custody of their son to her. The court issued an Order awarding custody of Ray II to her. Upon appeal by Ray to the CA, the CA reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody to Ray. Nerissa filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied and so she filed a petition for review. I: WON Nerissa should be given custody of their only child Ray II Perez - Yes R: Under art. 213 of the Family code “In case of separation...No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise”. It was also stated that since the code does not qualify the word “separation” to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact such as Nerissa and Ray, are covered within its terms. The use of the word “shall” also connotes as mandatory character of the law. In compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. There was no sufficient reason why the custody should not be given to the mother, provided that the child was only 3 years old by then. Salientes v. Abanilla (2006) Petitioner Marie Antonette Salientes and respondent Loran Abanilla are the parents of minor Lorenzo Abanilla. They lived with herein petitioners Orlando and Rosario. Due to conflicts with the in-laws, respondent wanted to transfer to their own house but Marie refused. He then left the Saliente’s house alone and was prevented from seeing his son from then on. Respondent then filed a petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody before the RTC. On Jan. 23, 2003, the trial court

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations directed the Salientes to produce and bring before the Court the body of Lorenzo and to show cause why the child should not be discharged from restraint. This was affirmed by the CA and it dismissed the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. I: WON the CA erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial court’s order directing Marie Antonette Saliente and her parents to bring to the Court the body of minor Lorenzo and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint. NO

administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. Liability of Properties for Support ● everything indispensable to sustenance, dwelling, clothing, transport and med expenses in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. ● CC: Husband has sole duty to provide for the family ● FC: Joint responsibility to provide for the family

R: The assailed order of the RTC did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and to explain why they are restraining his liberty in seeing his father. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from someone entitled to it. Art. 211 states that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority. Even if the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be decided by the court. In its absence, both parents are entitled to the custody of their child. The remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. Sec. 9 of AM 03-04-04-SC (Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to the Custody of Minors) requires the petitioners to present the minor before the court. Art. 213 can be raised in an argument concerning custody but it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his child. Trial court did not err. CA properly dismissed. Affirmed.

Dadivas v. Villanueva (1929) IMPORTANT BECAUSE: Determined extent of the Court’s power to punish a spouse for leaving conjugal dwelling

Effects on Property Relations Art 100 and 127

ISSUE: WON the wife is entitled to separate support from her husband.

(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to

1905: Petitioner-Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva and Respondent-Rafael Villanueva married and had 3 children 1927: Aurelia filed for separate maintenance from Rafael due to his infidelity and cruelty. She also asked for custody of 3 kids + allowance for lawyer’s fees ● 10 years prior to the institution of the case, Rafael was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with four different women. Even after the institution of the case it was shown that he has had an illicit relation with another woman. Court mentioned that it seems that Rafael is an incurable offender against sanctity of marriage because of his infidelity. - There was no sufficient evidence to establish the cruelty of the husband but there were sufficient evidence to establish the infidelity of the husband.

HELD: YES -In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from the husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the home. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside the conjugal home are sufficient grounds. Garcia v. Santiago (1928) 1910 Cipriana Garcia ♥ Isabelo Santiago married

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations 1925 Cipriana was compelled to leave conjugal dwelling: 1. continued family dissensions 2. Alejo, Isabelo’s son by his first wife seduced Prisca Aurelio, Cipriana’s daughter by her first husband. Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of requiring his son to marry Prisca, refused to interfere and he seemed to tolerate their illicit relationship. 3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latter’s whims and caprices and thus, damaging and prejudicing Cipriana’s rights. Some of these properties include lands acquired during their marriage with money belonging to the conjugal partnership. Land annually produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at P4.00/cavan. - Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court: 1. Their separation is necessary to avoid personal violence. She could not live in the conjugal dwelling due to the illicit relationship of Alejo and Prisca tolerated by Isabelo. 2. She is entitled to P500 pendente lite monthly pension from conjugal partnership. However, Isabelo refused to provide for her support despite her demands. 3. She should be in-charge of the administration of the property of their conjugal partnership because Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral conduct and acts by publicly maintaining an illicit relationship with Geronima Yap. - Isabelo answered with a general denial. - CFI dismissed ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave the house and threatened to treat her badly if she returned. Prisca’s situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Prisca’s pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further quarrels. 2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal - NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidences even show that it was acquired by him before their marriage.

3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500 monthly maintenance = NO. That’s too much. P50 is enough. Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng (1958) - Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married in Zamboanga City in May of 1951. After their marriage, the couple established their residence with the husband’s parents in Manila. In Oct of the same year, the couple visited Pilar’s parents in Zamboanga City at the husband’s initiative. It seemed that the husband was prevailed upon by Pilar’s parents to return to Manila, and allow Pilar to stay with them awhile w/ the understanding that she would follow him later, which apparently, she failed to do. - On Sept 30, 1953, Pilar filed w/ the CFI Zamboanga a complaint for support against her husband, alleging that they had been estranged and living separately since Oct 1952, by reason of incessant marital quarrels brought about by incompatibility of temperament, by defendant’s inability to provide for themselves a home separate from the latter’s parents, and that she was staying w/ her parents in Zamboanga City, w/o employment nor property of her own. - The husband prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. He argued that their married life in Manila was harmonious. Through insidious machinations, Pilar’s parents caused her to be alienated from him resulting in her refusal to return to Manila. Also, when he returned to Zamboanga to fetch her, through force and intimidation she was prevented by her parents from going w/ him. Pilar’s parents exerted undue pressure and influence upon her to file the complaint. - Ching Chung Beng also argued that he was not evading his obligation to her, he preferred to fulfill said duty by receiving and maintaining PIlar in Manila. Moreover, as a husband, he had the right to fix their family residence and he would even establish a conjugal dwelling in Manila separate from his parents if that was the plaintiff’s desire. - Trial court: Pilar granted w/ monthly allowance after finding that her refusal to return to Manila was because she wanted to live separately from her husband’s parents after some in-law troubles. Ching Chung Beng appealed. - ISSUE: WON Pilar is entitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live w/ him on account of some misunderstandings she had w/ the husband’s immediate?

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations - RULING: NO. - - SC: Pilar, 19 y/o, found herself involved in some sort of domestic controversy w/ her husband’s immediate relatives in the opposite camp, which made her feel that living with them would be unbearable. When she visited her parents, she recounted her plight to them and as the usual reaction of parents in matters of this nature; they picked up and championed the cause of their daughter, which resulted in the estrangement of the young couple. - The husband insists that Art 299 CC provides that he has the option to fulfill his duty, either by paying an allowance fixed by court or by receiving and maintain the person entitled to support in his house, and that he elects to perform his obligation by the second means, which on the other hand cannot be availed if there is moral or legal impediment. The husband acknowledged his obligation to support her, even to the extent of expressing his willingness to abide by her wish to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents. - The court does not think that misunderstanding with in-laws can be considered moral or legal obstacle, it is not seen by the law as a just cause to leave the conjugal home. - Also, there is no law compelling the wife to live w/ her husband, even if there is no legal justification of having a separate residence. YET there is still no plausible reason why she should be allowed any support, since the husband chose to avail the second alternative granted him Art 299 and there being no legal/moral hindrance to the exercise of the 2nd alternative as elected by him. - Decision appealed from is modified, giving Ching Chung Beng the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from his parents’ home. Should Pilar refuse to abide, the husband shall be relieved from the obligation of giving any support to his wife. Del Rosario v. Del Rosario (1949) Plaintiff Genoveva del Rosario, a widow with 2 kids and defendant Teoderico del Rosario, a mechanic, widower with a son got married. They lived together in the house of defendant's mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left the conjugal home in 1942. I: WON plaintiff is justified in leaving and is entitled to support. R: Yes. As the marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for the in-

laws, there is legal justification for wife’s refusal to live with husband, taking into account the “traditional hatred between wife and her mother-in-law”. It is true that wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish the residence (Art 58, CC), but this right does not include compelling wife to live with mother-in-law, if they cannot get along together. Alimony will be set according to husband’s ability to pay. Partosa-Jo v. CA (1992) - Prima Partosa (petitioner) is the legal wife of Jose Jo aka Ho Hang (respondent), they have one child together - Jose admits to having cohabited with three other women and having gathered 15 children - Prima filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for support; the two cases were consolidated and tried jointly - The trial court awarded support but the dispositive portion was silent on the matter of the judicial separation of property. - Jo appealed to the CA which affirmed the ruling for support but dismissed the judicial separation of conjugal property for lack of cause of action and that separation by agreement was not covered by Art 178 CC - Both parties’ motions for reconsideration were denied W/N CA erred in holding that the judicial separation of conjugal property was not allowed under Art 175, 178 and 191 CC YES W/N CA erred in holding that no such separation was decreed by dispositive portion of trial court’s decision YES - Court held that dispositive portion was incomplete but the court may clarify ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of a decision by an amendment even after judgment has become final - CA should have made modification instead of dismissing the case, CA chose form over substance - Agreement cited by CA was misunderstood by them; Spouses did not agree to

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations separate permanently - Agreement involved Prima staying with her parents during early pregnancy and he would visit and send support - Even if they did, arrangement would have ended in 1942 when she returned to conjugal home and he rejected her - Petitioner cited Art 178(3) of CC which has been superseded by Art 128 of FC If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. - In denying Prima admission to their conjugal home, Jo demonstrated that he had no intention of resuming conjugal relationship - Prima may also invoke the 2nd ground, failure to comply with obligations to the family in light of his rejection of her and womanizing - Also falls under Art 135 (6) of FC which provides that separation in fact for at least 1 year and reconciliation being highly improbable shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property -Petition GRANTED AND MODIFIED Conjugal property of the spouses is ordered divided between them

ABSOLUTE DIVORCE A. Brief History

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Siete Paredes (a.k.a. Libro de las Leyes) ○ governed rights pertaining to marriage ○ provided for relative divorce or legal sep. if one spouse wanted to enter a religious order OR was adulterous OR a heretic 1917: Act 2710 (Divorce Law) ○ Absolute Divorce if wife was criminally convicted of adultery or concubinage for husband Japanese Occupation: EO 121 ○ 11 grounds for divorce (similar grounds w/ leg sep.) Liberation of PH: Douglas MacArthur proclaimed all laws not passed by PH Commonwealth as null and void = Act No 2710 became prevailing law again. Divorce was contemplated during drafting of CC but never passed into law. Holy See in Vatican and PH are ONLY two countries who don’t grant divorce Law recognizes divorce: ONLY TWO SITUATIONS ○ 1988: Family Code recognizes divorce secured abroad by foreigner from his/her filipino spouse ○ Code of Muslim Personal Laws recognizes divorce for Muslims

HB 6027: An Act Providing for Grounds on the Dissolution of Marriage (2017) ● Objectives: (1) ease legal process of terminating marriage [annulment takes a long time and is expensive] (2) provide opportunity for peaceful co-existence between former spouses ● For the court to grant dissolution of marriage: Grounds: ○ irreconcilable differences ○ severe/chronic unhappiness *causing irreparable breakdown of marriage AND Joint Plan for Parenthood over common children ○ support, parental authority, custody and living arrangements of common children

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations HB 2380: An Act Introducing Divorce in the Philippines (2016) Introduced by Gabriela Women’s Party ● Objective: seeks to introduce divorce as another remedy for irreparable marriages ○ Greatly emphasized oppression women faces in marriage (VAW, Social and Trad Expectations of wives vs. Husbands etc.) ○ Divorce is a rights-based option based on the recognition that the right to enter into a marriage contract has the corresponding spousal right to end such contract when marriage has become irreparable ● 5 GROUNDS (all leading to irreparability of marriage) ○ separated de facto for at least 5 years and reconciliation is highly improbable ○ legally separated for at least 2 years and reconciliation is highly improbable ○ when any grounds for legal sep. has led to irreparable breakdown of marriage ○ one or both are psych incap ○ irreconcilable differences leading to irreparability of marriage ● Like for LegSep there will be Defenses against Divorce ○ Consent and Condonation SHOULD NOT be considered defenses because of societal pressures (many women are econ dependent on men etc.) ○ Defense: Collusion ● NO PRESCRIPTION FOR EITHER DIVORCE OR LEGSEP B. Absolute Divorce Distinguished From Other Remedies a. Divorce Distinguished from Legal Separation and Separation de facto

Divorce

Legal Sep

Sep de Facto

judicial termination of

separation of bed and

Spouse leaves conjugal

legal marriage

board

home or refuses to live therein, without just cause

marriage vows are permanently severed

marital ties are not dissolved

Spouse above loses right to support

Former spouses have no rights/obligations to each other

relieves duty of spouses to live together

Prop regime shall not be affected

Court May order spouse who cause sep. to provide support for innocent spouse and common children

Transactions that require consent of other spouse, judicial authorization shall be obtained

b. Divorce Distinguished from Annulment and Nullity of Marriage

Divorce

Void Marriage (Nullity)

Voidable Marriages (Annulment)

Grounds arose ONLY DURING married life

Grounds arose already in existence during marriage ceremony

Grounds arose already in existence during marriage ceremony

Art. 36 is NOT divorce PH Style. Line: even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization MISCONCEPTION ONLY.

Considered valid until annulled ; Can be ratified

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations C. Foreign Divorce a. Foreign Divorce Obtained by a Filipino Citizen Art. 15 NCC. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Art. 26 FC. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

b. Divorce between Two Filipino Citizens Tenchavez v. Escano (1966) Foreign Divorce bet. 2 Filipino citizens is not valid F: Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano, both Filipinos, were married secretly in 1948. However, only months after, they became estranged, because there was a letter received by Vicenta’s father claiming that Pastor had amorous relations with another woman. In 1950 Escano left for the United States without informing Tenchavez, where she filed for divorce on the ground of mental cruelty—such was granted and declared final and absolute. She also contracted a subsequent marriage in the US. Meanwhile, Tenchavez filed for legal separation, citing the divorce that his wife obtained abroad, and also charged Escano’s parents with alienating her affections for him, asking for damages. The trial court did not decree a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from supporting Escano, and permitted the Escano parents their counterclaims against Tenchavez. Hence, Tenchavez’s appeal.

I: W/N the divorce obtained by Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines. NO W/N Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation. YES H: The Court ruled: (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitles the latter to a decree of legal separation; (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages; and (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. The Court rejected the foreign divorce decree, because under Art. 15 CC, laws relating to family rights and duties, status, condition, or legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the PH. Although courts abroad may grant a divorce decree, it will not be recognized in the PH given that the latter does not have a divorce law and does not grant any Filipino the capacity to obtain divorce. c. Foreign Divorce between a Filipino and an Alien i. Marriage Between a Filipino and an Alien Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (1985) Dissolution of Marriage by Foreign Divorce Decree should bind not only alien but Filipino spouse as well. F: Van Dorn, Filipina, and Upton, American, were married in Hongkong in 1972, but were divorced in the US in 1982. Van Dorn has remarried in the US. In 1983, Upton filed a suit against Van Dorn stating that her business in Manila is conjugal property and asked that she be ordered to render an accounting of that business and he be declared to have the right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss, claiming that Upton is barred by the previous judgment in the divorce proceedings because he already acknowledged therein that they had no community property. Court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations property involved is located in the PH so that the divorce decree has no bearing in this case.

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divorce decree was released prior to his filing of suit for adultery

WHEREFORE, petition of husband for adultery is DISMISSED I: W/N the foreign divorce decree is valid and binding in the PH jurisdiction, and thus on both parties and their alleged conjugal property H: Yes. Art. 15 is only for PH nationals (no divorce) The decree is binding on respondent and he cannot sue petitioner since he is estopped by his own representation before the US courts from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. The Court also held that to consider Van Dorn as still married to the respondent is unjust, and that she should not be discriminated against in her own country if justice is to be achieved. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somerra (1989) Facts: ● 1979 - Imelda (Filipino) and Erich (German) were married in Germany, lived in the PH with one child ● 1983 - erich filed for divorce in Germany on ground of failure of marriage ● Imelda filed for legal separation in Manila ● 1986 - divorce decree promulgated, custody to Imelda ● five months after, erich filed for adultery against Imelda citing: ○ her affair with a certain William (1982) and jesus (1983) Issue: W/N he has standing to file a suit for adultery - NO Provisions: Art. 26 FC, Art. 344 RPC RPC, Art. 44 par. 1 The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. Held: 1. DOCTRINE: Legal effects of a valid divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines. 2. DOCTRINE: In prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. ● divorce is binding, therefore he has no legal standing to commence the adultery case as offended spouse

ii.

Marriage Between Filipinos with One Subsequently Changing Citizenship

Quita v. CA (1998) F: Petitioner Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, got married in the Philippines in May 1941. They had no children Their relationship soured. She sued Arturo for divorce. In the proceedings she submitted a private writing dated July 1950 regarding their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. In 1954, Fe obtained a final judgment of divorce in USA 3 weeks after the decree, she married for the 2nd time, but that was also divorced. Still in the US, she married for the third time. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died without a will Respondent Blandina Dandan claimed to be the surviving spouse of Arturo. She was with her children with Arturo. They presented certified photocopy of the final judgment of divorce b/w Fe and Arturo Respondent and children failed to appear on scheduled TC hearing. TC required the submission of the records of the birth of the children w/in 10 days from receipt of notice; after w/c, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. TC decided: invoked Tenchavez v. Escano, which held that “a foreign divorce b/w Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the Civil Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,” and disregarded the divorce b/w Fe and Arturo saying that Arturo’s marriage with Fe subsisted until Arturo’s death in 1972. On MR, Dandan allowed to present record of births; thus all children, except for one illegitimate child, were declared legal heirs. Dandan not declared an heir. Her marriage w/ Arturo was void since it was celebrated in 1947, while Arturo had a subsisting marriage with Fe.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations CA reversed TC and said TC violated the Rules of Court for deciding the case without hearing on intestate proceedings Petitioner argued Arturo, a Filipino, still legally married to her despite her remarriage in the US Respondent questioned Fe’s right to inherit considering she secured a divorce in the US and remarried twice after Respondent presented transcript of hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title and the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of that title before another trial court When asked, Fe said she was indeed a US citizen since 1954, same year she obtained decree of divorce I: WoN it is necessary to establish the citizenship of Quita to determine if she has right to inherit from her late first husband as the surviving legal wife - YES R: The Court should have solved citizenship issue by looking into documentary and testimonial evidence Once proved that she’s no longer Filipino, Von Dorn will apply and Fe could lose right to inherit from Arturo. SC affirmed CA remand of the case to TC for further proceedings to determine right of Fe to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse Ma’am Beth’s Book Though intended to liberalize the law on recognition of foreign divorce, the requirements under article 26 of the FC are stricter than those under article 15 of the CC. Under art.26, the divorce must have been obtained by the alien spouse and such decree must allow the alien to remarry for the Filipino to have capacity to remarry. Art 15 of the CC on the other hand, does not qualify the citizenship of the contracting parties at the time of the marriage nor does it require that the petitioner be the foreigner. All that art 15 applies is the nationality principle which can be read to refer to the nationality of the parties at the time of divorce. In Rep v Obrecido, the court affirmed that “the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the

parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. By employing art 15 of the CC, the court could have arrived at this same conclusion without straining the application of art 26 beyond its outer limits Republic v. Obrecido (2005) Par 2 of Art. 26 should be interpreted to allow Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and remarries, also to remarry. - In 1981, Cipriano Obrecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter. -

In 1986, Lady Myros went to the United States together with their son, Kristoffer.

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A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife has been naturalized as an American Citizen.

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Sometime in 2000, he learned from his son that Lady Myros obtained a divorce decree and married Innocent Stanley. Lady Myros, Innocent Stanley, and their child now live in one residence in California.

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Cipriano filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

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No opposition was filed. The court granted the petition.

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The Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but was denied.

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OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is not applicable to the case at bar because it only applies to a marriage between a Filipino citizen and an alien.

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Respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized wife obtained a divorce decree that

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated to remarry.

- These elements are present in the case at bar. The theory of OSG that the proper remedy is either annulment or legal separation cannot be sustained.

Issue: W/N the respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code Held: - Art. 26 of the Family Code was amended by EO 227, adding a second paragraph stating that when a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is valid and a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, then the Filipino spouse shall also have the capacity to marry under Philippine law. - However, it seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the marriage, one spouse is Filipino and the other one is an alien, and not to cases wherein both were Filipino citizens and one was naturalized as a citizen of another country. - In the Report of the Public Hearings on the Family Code, the CBCP registered objections to the aforementioned paragraph of Art. 26. They said that the rule “discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad; these spouses who are divorced will not be able to remarry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.” - In Quita v. CA, the Court hinted that by obiter dictum, a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry. - The Court held that Paragraph 2 of Art. 26 should include cases involving parties who at the time of the celebration of marriage were Filipino citizens but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce. The Filipino should be allowed to remarry. - Art. 26 has two elements: 1.) valid marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner, 2.) valid divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of celebration of marriage, but at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse.

- However, records are bereft of competent evidence. Respondent must prove his allegation that his wife is naturalized as American citizen. Before a foreign divorce decree is recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must be able to prove it to be a fact. Respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his wife to remarry. Petition granted.

Llorente v. CA (2000) ● Lorenzo Llorente was a member of the US Navy. ● On Feb. 22, 1937, he married petitioner Paula Llorente. ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

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Lorenzo left for the US before the outbreak of WW2. He acquired US citizenship from New York on Nov. 30, 1943. After the PH was liberated in 1945, he was permitted to visit his wife. He discovered that she was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce in California. This became final on Dec. 4, 1952. He then returned to the PH. On Jan. 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in Manila. They lived together for 25 years and had 3 children. Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. He died on June 11, 1985 Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor, claiming that she was his surviving spouse, that various property were acquired during their marriage, and that Lorenzo disposed all of it in favor of Alicia. The RTC ruled that the divorce decree is void and that Paula is the primary compulsory heir. Alicia’s motion was also denied and the CA affirmed the RTC. I: WON the divorce decree is valid. YES R:

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations The fact that Lorenzo became an American long before and at the time of his divorce from Paula, marriage to Alicia, execution of his will, and death is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Necessarily, issues arising from these are governed by foreign law. In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., owing to the nationality principle in Art. 15, only PH nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. Court also ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, as long as they are valid according to their national law. In Quita v. CA, it was held that once proven that respondent was no longer Filipino when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner can lose her right to inherit from him. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo from Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. As to the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and the parties’ successional rights, the Court REMANDS the case to the court of origin to allow proof of foreign law.

Garcia v. Recio (2001) Proving Foreign Divorce as a matter of FACT. Divorce Decree and National Law of Alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. The case involves a naturalized Australian citizen’s legal capacity to remarry at the time of his marriage to his Filipino wife. Facts: 1987: Respondent-Rederick Recio (Filipino) ♥ Editha Samson (Australian) in Malabon, Rizal 1989: Recio and Samson Divorced; decree by Australian courts 1992: Recio became an Australian citizen 1994: Respondent-Recio ♥ Petitioner-Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan City 1995 - 1996: Respondent and Petitioner started living separately (in Australia) and their conjugal assets were divided according to Australian law 1998: Petitioner-Garcia filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy; Reason: She only knew of Respondent-Recio’s previous marriage to Samson 3 years into their marriage. Respondent-Recio ALSO filed for a declaration of nullity, which was granted by AUSTRALIAN Family courts.

RTC: dissolved marriage, NOT DUE TO ANY GROUNDS (respondent’s lack of legal capacity), but on foreign divorce decree. Petioner petitions for the review of this decision. Issue: (1) WON the Divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven - NO (2) WON the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner - NO Held: (1) There is no PH Law on divorce hence PH Courts can’t grant it. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized in PH, it must be PROVEN AS A FACT. Presentation of divorce decree is not enough. To prove as a fact the divorce decree itself must be presented + foreign laws allowing absolute divorce (2) There are different kinds of divorce. Although respondent showed a divorce decree, it did not specify whether or not it is of an absolute divorce (terminates marriage completely) or a limited divorce (suspends marriage and leaves the bond in full force) + even if absolute marriage, foreign statues may still limit a person from remarrying. (a) The Australian Divorce decree presented says: “A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless other party has died) commits the offense of bigamy) SHOWS THAT DIVORCE OBTAINED MAY BE LIMITED. NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW LEGAL CAPACITY TO REMARRY. RULE: RTC erred in dissolving marriage based only on Australian Divorce Decree because it did not show legal capacity on respondent’s part. HOWEVER, Court can’t grant petitioner’s prayer to declare marriage null and void because although no evidence to show legal capacity, there is also no evidence showing legal incapacity on the part of the petitioner. CASE IS REMANDED TO LOWER COURT TO RECEIVE MORE EVIDENCE. Notes from Book/DOCTRINE:

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations A person who wishes to rely on a foreign divorce decree must first, PRESENT THE DIVORCE DECREE before it is given presumptive evidentiary value; and second, PROVE THAT THE DIVORCE IS OF A TYPE THAT LEGALLY DISSOLVED THE MARRIAGE AND CAPACITATED HIM TO MARRY.

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Stems from the principle that laws have legal effects only within their territory proof of foreign judgement and its authenticity must be made. -

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010) -

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Petitoner Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization in 2000. In 2005, he married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work, he left for Canada soon after their wedding. In 2005, he returned to PH to surprise his wife, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair w/ another man. Hurt and disappointed, he went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, and was then granted to him. 2 yrs after, he found another Filipina to love, and desiring to marry her, he went to Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of NSO informed him that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists in PH law. TO BE ENFORCEABLE, THE FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE MUST FIRST BE JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED BY A COMPETENT PH COURT. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition however it was denied by RTC. RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that Art 26 FC intended only for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. An alien spouse cannot claim a right under this provision. From RTC’s ruling, Gerbert filed the present petition. ISSUE: WON Art 26 FC par 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree? RULING: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art 26 par 2 as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. However, this does not prevent the alien spouse from instituting action w/ respect to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree in this jurisdiction as a foreign judgment. The foreign divorce decree is a presumptive evidence of a right that clothes Gerbert

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w/ legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. The practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, in this case of a foreign divorce decree, is grounded not only on the principle of comity but also for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. The foreign judgment’s authenticity must be proven as facts under or rules on evidence, together w/ the alien’s applicable national law, to show effect of the judgment on the alien himself. In accordance w/ PH law, a foreign judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In Gerbert’s case, the record showed that he attached to the petition a copy of the divorce decree proving its authenticity. However, he failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. The Court, despite its earlier discussion that the law recognizing foreign divorce decree is for the benefit only of Filipinos, allowed the case to be remanded, to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent w/ the Canadian divorce law. Accdg to the Court, this is the more appropriate course of action esp. since it will serve the interest of Gerbert’s former wife who has agreed to the filing of the petition. Petition granted, RTC decision reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings.

Fujiki v. Marinay (2013) FACTS - Petitioner Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay in the PH in 2004. His parents did not approve of the marriage so he was never able to bring Marinay to Japan where he resides. They eventually lost touch with each other. - In 2008, Marinay married Maekara,, another Japanese national, in Quezon City without dissolving her first marriage. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan where he allegedly abused her. Marinay left Maekara and contacted Fujiki. - Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and reestablished their relationship. - In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgement from a family court in Japan that declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. - In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC praying that they recognize the judgment of the Japanese family court, that the Marinay-Maekara marriage be declared void ab initio under Arts. 35(4) and 41 of the FC of the PH and for the RTC to direct the Civil Registrar to annotate the Jap Court judgment on the marriage certificate between Marinay and Maekara.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations -RTC dismissed the petition and cited the provisions from the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) based on improper venue and the lack of personality of Fujiki to file the petition, saying that solely the husband or wife can file. - Fujiki appealed. ISSUES: 1 W/N Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is applicable (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) - NO 2 W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy - YES 3 W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court - YES

whether to extend the effect of foreign judgment to the Filipino party under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Art 15 of the CC. - The validity of the marriage can be questioned only in a direct proceeding and not in a Rule 108 proceeding. Questioning the validity of the marriage does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment of annulment where one of the parties is an alien. Petition GRANTED; RTC ordered to REINSTATE petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision Maam’s comment (p.271) “...our laws should give legal effect to a divorce decree obtained abroad, regardless of whether it was the alien or Filipino spouse who filed the petition, for as long as their marital domicile was in that foreign State.” Medina v. Koike (2016)

RATIO: 1 - Court held that petitioner need only prove the Japanese Family Court judgment either through an official publication or a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. To hold that the (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment will defeat the purpose of allowing the recognition in the first place as the PH court will have to litigate the case anew. - PH courts can only recognize foreign judgments as a fact according to rules of evidence. Foreign judgment need only be admitted and proven. - Japanese Family Court judgment is also in accordance with PH public policy as bigamous marriage are also declared void from the beginning (Art 35(4) FC). 2 - The requirement that the petition for declaration of nullity be filed solely by the husband or wife refers to the husband or wife of the subsisting marriage since “the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has personality to file a petition for declaration of void marriage.” - Also, bigamy is a public crime. If anyone can file a criminal action, there is more reason to confer personality to sue to the spouse of a subsisting marriage. 3 - In the recognition of foreign judgments, PH courts cannot substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They can only decide

F: -

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. They had two children.

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On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for and were divorced on even same date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.

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Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC.

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At the hearing, with no one appearing to oppose, Doreen presented several foreign documents, [Just take note of the documents.] namely, “Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce”and “Family

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations Register of Michiyuki Koike” both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled “Divorce Certificate” issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled “The Civil Code of Japan 2000”and “The Civil Code of Japan 2009”were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan’s law on divorce. -

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RTC denied Doreen’s petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. RTC observed that the “The Civil Code of Japan 2000” and “The Civil Code of Japan 2009,” presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign judgments and law.

I: W/N the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce. NO R: -

the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

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The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.

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“no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. (The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.)

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Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.

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our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

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Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a reevaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Case referred to CA to determine and prove the divorce decree and the laws on divorce of Japan .

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations

d. Foreign Divorce Between Aliens

D. Muslim Divorces Yasin v. Shari’a District Court (2016) F: Hatima C. Yasin was formerly married to Hadji Yasin in accordance with Muslim rites. In 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce again in accordance with Islamic Law, after which Hatima’s former husband married another woman. Given the situation, Hatima filed a petition to resume the use of her maiden name, but the Shari’a District Court denied it, saying that the petition is one for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Under it, she supposedly does not have compelling reason to have her name changed. Petitioner claims that it is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name after her divorce and does not fall under Rule 103 ROC. I: W/N a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name H: No. The true and real name of a person is that give to him and entered in the civil register, and petitioner’s registered name is Hatima Centi y Saul. She does not seek to change her registered name but wants to resume the use of her maiden name. Under the Civil Code, use of the husband’s surname during the marriage (Art. 370 CC), after annulment (Art. 371 CC), and after the death of the husband (Art. 373 CC) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372 CC). The word ‘may’ is used, indicating the permissiveness of the provision. Thus, a woman need not seek judicial authority to use her husband’s name because the law grants her such right. Similarly, when the marriage is terminated, she need not seek judicial confirmation to revert to her maiden name because the use of her husband’s surname was optional in the first place. The petition is an unnecessary proceeding, yet the Court granted it for expediency and authorized her to resume her maiden name and surname.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE RA 10354 RH LAW Sec. 2 Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. Pursuant to the declaration of State policies under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, it is the duty of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution and equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of women especially mothers in particular and of the people in general and instill health consciousness among them. The family is the natural and fundamental unit of society. The State shall likewise protect and advance the right of families in particular and the people in general to a balanced and healthful environment in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The State also recognizes and guarantees the promotion and equal protection of the welfare and rights of children, the youth, and the unborn. Moreover, the State recognizes and guarantees the promotion of gender equality, gender equity, women empowerment and dignity as a health and human rights concern and as a social responsibility. The advancement and protection of women’s human rights shall be central to the efforts of the State to address reproductive health care. The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

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(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (b) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (c) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and (d) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs The State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, supplies which do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and relevant information and education thereon according to the priority needs of women, children and other underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to those identified through the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) and other government measures of identifying marginalization, who shall be voluntary beneficiaries of reproductive health care, services and supplies for free. The State shall eradicate discriminatory practices, laws and policies that infringe on a person’s exercise of reproductive health rights. The State shall also promote openness to life; Provided, That parents bring forth to the world only those children whom they can raise in a truly humane way.

Sec. 3 Guiding Principles for Implementation. – This Act declares the following as guiding principles: (a) The right to make free and informed decisions, which is central to the exercise of any right, shall not be subjected to any form of coercion and must be fully guaranteed by the State, like the right itself; (b) Respect for protection and fulfillment of reproductive health and rights which seek to promote the rights and welfare of every person particularly couples, adult individuals, women and adolescents;

(c) Since human resource is among the principal assets of the country, effective and quality reproductive health care services must be given primacy to ensure maternal and child health, the health of the unborn, safe delivery and birth of healthy children, and sound replacement rate, in line with the State’s duty to promote the right to health, responsible parenthood, social justice and full human development; (d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, nonabortifacient, effective and quality reproductive health care services and supplies is essential in the promotion of people’s right to health, especially those of women, the poor, and the marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a component of basic health care; (e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions; (f) The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions: Provided, That no one shall be deprived, for economic reasons, of the rights to have children; (2) achieve equitable allocation and utilization of resources; (3) ensure effective partnership among national government, local government units (LGUs) and the private sector in the design, implementation, coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered programs to enhance the quality of life and environmental protection; (4) conduct studies to analyze demographic trends including demographic dividends from sound population policies towards sustainable human development in keeping with the principles of gender equality, protection of mothers and children, born and unborn and the promotion and protection of women’s reproductive rights and health; and (5) conduct scientific studies to determine the safety and efficacy of alternative medicines and methods for reproductive health care development; (g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and supplies giving priority to poor beneficiaries as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization must be the primary responsibility of the national government

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations consistent with its obligation to respect, protect and promote the right to health and the right to life; (h) The State shall respect individuals’ preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State’s obligations under various human rights instruments; (i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women’s and people’s organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized;

throughout their life cycle.

Sec. 4 Definition of Terms. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows: (g) Gender equality refers to the principle of equality between women and men and equal rights to enjoy conditions in realizing their full human potentials to contribute to, and benefit from, the results of development, with the State recognizing that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. It entails equality in opportunities, in the allocation of resources or benefits, or in access to services in furtherance of the rights to health and sustainable human development among others, without discrimination.

(j) While this Act recognizes that abortion is illegal and punishable by law, the government shall ensure that all women needing care for post-abortive complications and all other complications arising from pregnancy, labor and delivery and related issues shall be treated and counseled in a humane, nonjudgmental and compassionate manner in accordance with law and medical ethics;

(h) Gender equity refers to the policies, instruments, programs and actions that address the disadvantaged position of women in society by providing preferential treatment and affirmative action. It entails fairness and justice in the distribution of benefits and responsibilities between women and men, and often requires women-specific projects and programs to end existing inequalities. This concept recognizes that while reproductive health involves women and men, it is more critical for women’s health.

(k) Each family shall have the right to determine its ideal family size: Provided, however, That the State shall equip each parent with the necessary information on all aspects of family life, including reproductive health and responsible parenthood, in order to make that determination;

(i) Male responsibility refers to the involvement, commitment, accountability and responsibility of males in all areas of sexual health and reproductive health, as well as the care of reproductive health concerns specific to men.

(l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the mitigation, promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health; (m) Gender equality and women empowerment are central elements of reproductive health and population and development; (n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the entire population, especially the poor, and allocations thereof must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life of the unborn is protected; (o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the harmonization and integration of policies, plans, programs and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of the people, more particularly the poor, the needy and the marginalized; and (p) That a comprehensive reproductive health program addresses the needs of people

(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes. This implies that people are able to have a responsible, safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to do so. This further implies that women and men attain equal relationships in matters related to sexual relations and reproduction. (q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following: (1) Family planning information and services which shall include as a first priority making women of reproductive age fully aware of their respective cycles to make them aware of when fertilization is highly probable, as well as highly improbable;

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations Sec. 7

(8) Treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers and other gynecological conditions and disorders;

Access to Family Planning. – All accredited public health facilities shall provide a full range of modern family planning methods, which shall also include medical consultations, supplies and necessary and reasonable procedures for poor and marginalized couples having infertility issues who desire to have children: Provided, That family planning services shall likewise be extended by private health facilities to paying patients with the option to grant free care and services to indigents, except in the case of non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group, but they have the option to provide such full range of modern family planning methods: Provided, further, That these hospitals shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health facility which is conveniently accessible: Provided, finally, That the person is not in an emergency condition or serious case as defined in Republic Act No. 8344. No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

(9) Male responsibility and involvement and men’s reproductive health;

Sec. 8

(2) Maternal, infant and child health and nutrition, including breastfeeding; (3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications; (4) Adolescent and youth reproductive health guidance and counseling; (5) Prevention, treatment and management of reproductive tract infections (RTIs), HIV and AIDS and other sexually transmittable infections (STIs); (6) Elimination of violence against women and children and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence; (7) Education and counseling on sexuality and reproductive health;

(10) Prevention, treatment and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction; (11) Reproductive health education for the adolescents; and (12) Mental health aspect of reproductive health care. (s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients. (v) Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.

Maternal Death Review and Fetal and Infant Death Review. – All LGUs, national and local government hospitals, and other public health units shall conduct an annual Maternal Death Review and Fetal and Infant Death Review in accordance with the guidelines set by the DOH. Such review should result in an evidence-based programming and budgeting process that would contribute to the development of more responsive reproductive health services to promote women’s health and safe motherhood.

A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and respect, Mutual Help and Support

RPC, Art. 247 Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. - Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (note: banishment or restraining order) FC, Art. 68 The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations fidelity, and render mutual help and support. FC, Art. 69 The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a) FC, Art. 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. NCC, Art. 344 The adopter may donate property, by an act inter vivos or by will, to the adopted person, who shall acquire ownership thereof. (n) (Anti-Rape Law) RA 8353, Sec. 2 Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows: "Chapter Three "Rape "Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed: "1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: "a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; "b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; "c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. "2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. "Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. "Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. "When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall become reclusion perpetua to death. "When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. "When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. "The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: "l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; "2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement or penal institution; "3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity; "4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime; "5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old; "6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations "7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or paramilitary units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime; "8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation or disability; "9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime; and "10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A."

"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal. "When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal. "When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. "When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. "Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten aggravating/ qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article. "Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. "Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as

(Anti-VAWC Act of 2004) RA 9262, Sec 2: Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Sec 3: Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts: A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm; B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to: a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations in the same room with the abuser;

under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

c) Prostituting the woman or child. C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children. D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following: 1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code; 2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common; 3. destroying household property; 4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties. (b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress. (c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse. (d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child

(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child. (g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary organization accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the victim. (h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological children of the victim and other children under her care. Sec 4: Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. Sec 5: Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; (b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; (e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: (1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations her/his family;

5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties; (f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; (g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor. (b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor; (c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor; (e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; (f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor. (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children. Sec 6: Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section. In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

Sec8 : Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm,

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;

employer liable for indirect contempt of court; (h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter; (i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income; (j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and

(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence; (d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member; (e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal belongings;

(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such relief. Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO. Sec 21: Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this Act must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial court that has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner; (g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his

A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court. During trial and upon judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without need of an application. Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations committed. Sec 26: Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim- survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code. In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

Magna Carta of Women RA 9710, Sec 19 Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. The State shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure: (a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law relationships referred to under the Family Code without prejudice to personal or religious beliefs; (b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;

Sec 28: Custody of children. – The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custody and support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman syndrome. Sec 35: Rights of Victims. – In addition to their rights under existing laws, victims of violence against women and their children shall have the following rights:

(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights; (d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses including the right to choose freely a profession and an occupation; (e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property; (f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether formal or customary; and

(a) to be treated with respect and dignity; (b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal assistance office; (c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and LGUs' (d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code; and

(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The State shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. Various statutes of other countries concerning dual citizenship that may be enjoyed equally by women and men shall likewise be considered. Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not discriminate against women.

(e) To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to apply for a protection order. FC, Art 68 The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and

CC, Art. 111 The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. These expenses shall be met first from the

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations support. FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.

conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and lastly from the wife's paraphernal property. In case there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute proportionately to the family expenses. (n)

FC, Art. 199 Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. (294a) FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. (295a)

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from previous marriages The husband’s son, Alejo and the wife’s daughter, Prisca bore a child The spouses fought often, causing the wife to leave conjugal home. She cited the following reasons: ○ husband refuses to interfere and seems to tolerate the illicit relation of his son and his wife’s daughter, not requiring his son to marry the other ○ husband transfers conjugal property to his son at the latter’s whim, to the detriment of the wife, as some of these properties include lands acquired during their marriage with money belonging to the conjugal partnership husband threatened violence if she returns husband publicly maintained illicit relations with a certain Geronima wife filed petition for support

Issues/Held: 1. W/N separation is justified - YES a. DOCTRINE: Considerations of morality are referred to in granting separate support for spouses who leave the conjugal dwelling. ■ continued cohabitation implies the parent’s approval of the immoral conduct 2. W/N she is entitled to support - YES a. DOCTRINE: Where the husband has ordered the wife to leave the conjugal home with threats of violence if she should return, she cannot be compelled to cohabit with her husband, and is entitled to support.

Goitia v. Campos Rueda (1916) -

Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were married in 1915. They lived together for about a month.

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Eloisa returned to her parents’ home.

Garcia v. Santiago Facts: ● Cipriana and Isabelo are married. They both have children they brought

- She filed a complaint against her husband for support outside their conjugal

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home.

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Mere act of marriage creates the obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife.

She alleged that one month after their marriage, Jose demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals and that she spurned the obscene demands of her husband.

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A judgement for separate maintenance is not payable either as damages or penalty, but it is a call to perform marital duty to give support. This is done with a view to preserve public peace and the “purity of the wife” when the husband makes so base demands and assaults his wife.

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The separation resulting from a decree of separate support does not breach the public policy of inviolability of marriage, instead, it is a stronger policy, being a means to preserve public peace and morals. It does not impair the marriage contract. Decision reversed.

Jose had been making the same demands, and because Eloisa would always refuse, Jose maltreated her by word and deed and inflicted injuries upon her lips, face, and different parts of the body.

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Because of this, she was obliged to leave their conjugal home. Eloisa went back to her parents’ home.

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The lower court sustained the defendant’s demurrer on the ground that the petitioner did not state a cause of action. The court held that the defendant cannot be compelled to give support to his wife except by maintaining her in his house, unless there is a judicial decree granting her divorce or separation from the defendant.

Issue: W/N the plaintiff, who left because of the bad conduct of the defendant towards her, is entitled to receive support from the defendant outside their conjugal domicile Held: YES -

Marriage is regulated and controlled by the State upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties.

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When the object of the marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties, relief in some way should be possible.

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Law provides that husband and wife must live together ( Art. 44 and Art. 48 of the Law of Civil Marriage) and to support each other reciprocally (Art. 143). Support can either be by paying a fixed pension or by maintaining in the house of the person obliged to give support (Art. 149). It is also in the law that the failure of the wife to live with her husband is not of the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease (Art. 152).

Warren v State (1985) FACTS: ● The appellant Daniel Warren, was indicted for rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife when they were living together as husband and wife. ● The appellant filed a pretrial general demurrer and motion to dismiss the indictment but the motion was denied. He then sought and was issued a certificate of immediate review and filed an application for an interlocutory appeal which was granted by the court. ● He asserts that within the rape statute, there is an implicit marital exclusion that makes it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife ISSUE: WON there is a marital exemption to rape that makes it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife - NO HELD: ● There are different theories for the basis of marital exemption from rape. The first comes from Lord Hale’s contractual theory - “but a husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retreat. - Basis of of Lord Hale’s theory possibly stems from English Law wherein the perpetrator could avoid rape charges by marrying the victim. ● 2nd Theory: A wife was regarded as property during Medieval Times.

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Rape was considered as a man making use of his own property. 3rd Theory: Unity of Marriage Theory: the very being or legal existence of a woman was suspended during marriage or at least was incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband. As one legal being, a husband could not be convicted of raping himself HOWEVER, there have been dramatic changes in women’s rights and the status of women and marriage. State Constitution provides that “no person shall be deprived of life liberty or property except by due process” and that the “protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government and shall be impartial and complete and no person shall be denied equal protection of the law. These guarantees are not reduced in marriage The implied consent theory to spousal rape is without logical reasoning and conflicts with our constitutional and statutory laws and our regard for all citizens of this state. There has never been an expressly stated marital exemption included in the Georgia rape statute. A reading of the statute indicates that there is no marital exclusion. “A person commits the offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. In regard to sodomy, appellant contends that there is also an implicit marital exclusion within the aggravated sodomy statute. Sodomy was originally defined as “the carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature by man with man or in the same unnatural manner with woman. One accused of somody could not defend by alleging consent. An allegation of consent would only show the other party’s guilt. There can be no common law marital exemption under the aggravated sodomy statute based on “implied consent” when the statute was enacted in 1968 and where there was no implied consent or marital exemption for sodomy based on consent under the original sodomy statute. Book: When a woman says I do, does she give up her right to say I won't? This question does not pose the real question, because *and aggravated sodomy are not sexual acts of an ardent husband performed upon an initially apathetic wife, they are acts of violence that are accompanied with physical and mental abuse and often leave the victim with physical and psychological damage that is almost always long lasting When a woman says "I do" in Georgia does she give up her right to State

protection from the violent acts of rape and aggravated sodomy performed by her husband. The answer is no People v Jumawan (2014) ● On Feb. 19, 1999, KKK executed a complaint-affidavit alleging that her husband raped her and that on Dec. 12, 1998, he boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him. ● Criminal charges on grave threats, less serious physical injuries, and rape were filed against Jumawan on the recommendation of the City Prosecutor of CDO. Jumawan was arrested and pleaded not guilty. ● KKK’s case was anchored on the testimonies of her daughters MMM and OOO who were present on 2 separate occasions of the alleged rape: 1. They were woken up by KKK’s crying and shouting while Jumawan forced himself into her. 2. They saw their mother crouched on the bed crying with her torn underwear. They helped shield her from their father and took care of her in their room. ● Jumawan denied raping his wife and contends that she filed the charges as a form of revenge because he took over the management of their business. ● RTC gave more weight to the testimonies of the daughters as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to speak against their own father for a crime such as rape if it were not truly committed. ● CA affirmed the RTC. They rejected the husband’s contention that he has the right to have sex with his wife and that there must be convincing physical evidence of the alleged force and intimidation. CA explained that physical showing of injuries is not required in rape. What is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sex. I: WON defendant is guilty of marital rape. YES R: ● ●

Court outlines the history of rape and marriage; that women were seen as chattel/property and that they lose their identity upon marriage and becomes one with the husband who has control of her. Court also cited Matthew Hale’s marital exemption rule in the 17th Century on the irrevocable implied consent theory wherein the husband cannot be

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guilty of rape on his wife since she has given herself to her husband which she cannot retract. The marital exemption rule was abandoned in the US case People v. Liberta in 1983 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital and non-marital rape. It held the Hale’s implied consent to an act that is violent and causes severe physical and psychological harm is irrational and absurd. Marriage license should not be a license for a husband to rape his wife. This is the first case of marital rape in the PH. PH joined in on the ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). In compliance, 1. PH enshrined the value and recognition of equality and the role of women in nation building in the 1987 Constitution (Art II. Sec. 11, 14) 2. RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law) was enacted. Art. 266-C’s second paragraph recognizes the reality of marital rape and criminalizes its perpetration. It penalizes crime of rape without regard to the rapist’s legal relation with his victim. 3. This is further affirmed by RA 9262 (VAWC Act) that regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence committed by a man against his wife. A husband who has sex with his wife is not merely using property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords himself. The FC obligates spouses to love one another but it sanctions sex as an expression of love that is mutual and not unilaterally exacted by force or coercion. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his wife’s refusal to have sex can seek have the wife declared psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. To treat marital rape differently infringes on the equal protection clause. Human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. The failure to immediately report to the authorities is not fatal to the credibility of a witness.

People v Liberta (1984) highly recommend reading, maraming magandang sinabi yung court The case involves a man accused of rape and aggravated sodomy against his wife, questioning the unconstitutionality of the rape statutes in an effort to absolve him of his crime F ● ●

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Mario Liberta and Denise Liberta were married in 1978 and have a son together Mario beat Denise. in 1980, she was granted a temporary order of protection from Mario which required him move out of their conjugal home, and to stay away from Denise. Mario however could still visit their son once every weekend. One weekend, mario didn’t show up for his weekly visit. Instead on Tuesday, he calls Denise to to ask if he could visit the house on that day. Denise refuses. Denise, with their son, agreed to be picked up by Mario and brought back to the motel he was staying in on the condition that Mario’s friend would be there as well. At the motel however, the friend left. As soon as he did, Mario “attacked Denise, threatened to kill her, and forced her to perform fellatio on him and to engage in sexual intercourse with him” all while their son was in the room, with Mario even telling Denise “to tell their son to watch what he was doing to her.” The next day, she made a felony complaint against Mario Sec. 130.35 (re: rape) of the Penal Law and Section 130.50 (re: sodomy) of the Penal Law provide a marital exemption, wherein, husbands are exempt from these crimes if they rape or sodomize their wife. This should’ve exempted Mario from his actions, HOWEVER, at the time of the attack, a temporary order of protection was in effect, which required Mario and Denise to live apart. Since they were living apart, they could be deemed as “not married” for the purposes of the statutes.

I WON marital rape is a crime? - FUCK YES. WON marital exemption from rape is unconstitutional - YES R: Conviction against Mario is affirmed.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations Mario argued for the ff: 1. Temp. Order of Protection didn’t make them NOT married therefore his case still falls under the statutes’ marital exemptions Court: Legislation expanded meaning of “not married” to include those who are living apart due to a court order, which is what happened to them. 2. Assuming the TOP does give him unmarried male status, still can’t try him because both statutes are unconstitutional by violating equal protection clause in that a. THEY BURDEN SOME (unmarried males) BUT NOT ALL MALES (married) - unconsti Court: There is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non marital rape. Marital Exemption for rape in New York statute is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. b. Burdens ONLY MEN and not women - unconsti Court: The fact that the act of a female forcibly raping a male may be difficult or rare occurrence does not mean that the gender exemption satisfies the constitutional test. (fit vs gov’t interest) GENDER NEUTRAL WOULD BE BETTER. OTHER IMPORTANT NOTES BY COURT: ● Marital privacy (like in Griswold) can’t be used to defend marital exemption to rape because no rational relation between allowing a husband to forcibly rape his wife and protecting marital privacy and encouraging reconciliation ● Clearly it is the violent act of rape and not the subsequent attempt of the wife to seek protect which “disrupts” a marriage ● FROM BOOK: If the marriage has already reached the point where intercourse is accomplished by violent assault, it is doubtful that there is anything left to reconcile

Thurman v City of Torrington (1984) - Summary: Between early Oct 1982 to June 1983, the plaintiff Tracey Thurman, living in the City of Torrington, and others on her behalf, notified the defendant Ciy through the defendant police officers of the City of the repeated threats upon her and the life of her child (plaintiff Charles J. Thurman Jr.), made by her estranged husband, Charles Thurman. Over the course of 8 months, attempts to file

complaints by Tracey against Charles in response to his death threats and maiming were ignored and rejected by the defendant police officers. The plaintiffs brought this action alleging that their constitutional rights to equal protection of laws were violated by the nonperformance/malperformace of official duties by the defendant police officers. - In Oct 1982, Charles attacked Tracey at the home of Jude Bentley and Richard St Hilaire in the City of Torrington. Mr. Bentley and Mr. St. Hilaire made a formal complaint of the attack to one of the defendant police officers and requested efforts to keep Charles off their property. - In Nov 1982, Charles went back to the said residence and used physical force, taking Charles Jr. with him. Tracey and Mr. St. Hilaire went to the Torrington police headquarters to make a complaint. The defendant police officers refused to accept the complaint, and even refused to accept the complaint from Mr. St. Hilaire even as to trespassing. - In the same month, Charles screamed threats at Tracey while Tracey was sitting inside her car. One of the defendant police officers stood on the street, witnessing the scene, until Charles broke the windshield of Tracey’s car, and he was then arrested after that. He was then convicted of breach of peace and received a suspended sentence of 6 months in jail and a 2-yr conditional discharge, during which he was ordered to stay completely away from Tracey and the Bentley-St. Hialire residence and to commit no further crimes. - During the period of conditional discharge, Tracey called the police department several times complaining that Charles was violating the terms of the discharge. The police refused to do anything about Tracey’s complaints. At one point, Charles threatened to kill Tracey. At that time, Tracey attempted to get Charles arrested for violating his conditional discharge. The police department refused to help Tracey. Officers repeatedly asked her to return to the police station at a later date. Tracey pursued her attempts to get Charles arrested, but to no avail. Charles appeared at the residence where Tracey was staying. Tracey, remaining indoors, called the police department and asked that Charles be arrested for violation of the conditional discharge. After about 15 minutes, Tracey went outside to persuade him not to take her or hurt Charles, Jr. Soon thereafter, Charles began to stab Tracey in the chest, neck, and throat. Approximately 25 minutes after Tracey’s call, a single police officer arrived at the scene. When the officer arrived, Charles dropped the knife, and in the officer’s presence, kicked Tracey in the head and ran into the house. Charles returned from the house holding Charles, Jr., and dropped the child on his wounded mother. Charles then

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations kicked Tracey in the head a second time. Soon thereafter, three more police officers arrived at the scene, but continued to let Charles wander about the crowd and to continue to threaten Tracey. Finally, when Charles approached Tracey again (this time, she was lying on a stretcher) Charles was arrested and taken into custody. - It is alleged that at all times mentioned, except for approx. 2 weeks following his sentence in Nov 1982, Charles resided in Torrington and worked there as a counterman and short order cook at a diner. There he served many members of the Torrington Police Dept including some of the defendant police officers. In the course of his employment, Charles boasted to the defendant police officers that he intended to get his wife and that he intended to kill her. - The defendant City brought a motion to dismiss the case. They allege that the plaintiffs failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right, and that the equal protection clause does not guarantee equal application of social services. They argue that police protection was fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim had no domestic relationship, but the police consistently afforded lesser protection when the victim was a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend or when a child was abused the a father or stepfather. ISSUE: WON the conduct of the Torrington Police Dept deprives Tracey of her right to equal protection. RULING: YES. The Court held that police action is subject to the equal protection clause, whether in the form of commission of violative acts or omission to perform required acts pursuant to police officers’ duty to protect. A law enforcement officer can be liable when his inaction/action fails to perform a statutorily imposed duty to enforce the laws equally and fairly, and thereby denies equal protection. - If the City wishes to discriminate against women who are victims of domestic violence, it must articulate important govt interest for doing so. And here, it has failed to put forward any justification. - English common law during the 18th century recognized the right of husbands to physically discipline their wives. However, today, any notion of a husband’s prerogative to physically discipline his wife is an increasingly outdated misconception. A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman merely because he is her husband. - A man is not allowed to physically abuse/engender a woman merely because he is her husband. Moreover, a police officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in such violence, and may not automatically decline to make an arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are marred to each other. In addition,

any notion that the defendant police officers’ practice can be justified as a means of promoting domestic harmony by refraining from interference in marital disputes, has no place in the case. - The motion to dismiss by the defendant city was dismissed and Tracey was awarded $2.3million. Garcia v. Drilon and Jaype-Garcia (2013) - Private respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed for herself and on behalf of her minor children a petition before the Bacolod City RTC for the issuance of Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under RA9262 against her husband and herein petitioner, Jesus C. Garcia. - This petition was prompted by her husband’s history of controlling and jealous behavior as well as his infidelity and violence towards her and their children. He has boasted about his sexual relations to the household help. Their fights often led to physical violence which he would also turn towards their eldest child. - Jesus’s behavior even drove Rosalie to attempt suicide by cutting her wrist at home. She was found by her young son. Jesus fled the house and did not take her to the hospital. - Jesus told her he was leaving her for good after she informed the boss of Jesus’s mistress that she was going to file charges against her. (Mistress worked at the bank; godmother of one their sons) - Rosalie is determined to separate from Jesus but is afraid he will take her children and deprive her of financial support. Jesus previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. - Jesus controls all the family businesses. - RTC issued the TPO, finding reasonable ground that they were in imminent danger of violence. The TPO ordered, among other things: >remove himself and all his belongings from the conjugal home, assisted by police officers >to stay away from her and her children, mother and staff (1000m) >not to harass aforementioned people directly or indirectly >to pay full financial support - Jesus did not desist and even attempted to kidnap his son - RTC continued issuing TPOs every time they expired which was every 30 days - Petitioner did not submit required comment to renewal of TPO arguing it would be “an exercise in futility” - During the pendency of Rosalie’s case, Jesus filed a petitioner before the CA for

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO. He challenged: the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses. the validity of the modified TPO as a “product of an invalid law” I: W/N RA 9262 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional - NO R: - Delving into the deliberations of RA 9262, the Court held that the intent in excluding men from the protection afforded by RA 9262 was in light of the inherent and historical inequalities between the genders in society. Statistics also clearly point to the prevalence of violence against women and children (“usual” and “most likely” victims) and that this was a special law to address the need for their protection. - There are, of course, cases of domestic violence against men but it is relatively few and these incidents do not render RA 9262 invalid as the classification used is valid. - They also held that the equal protection clause requires “that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.” - Held also that valid classification is allowed for as long as it is reasonable, meaning that “classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.” And that every classification by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. Ma’am quoted from the case in her book: “The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice MacIntyre succinctly states, the accommodation of differences...is the essence of true equality.” Go-Tan v Tan (2008

Pertinent Provisions: Sec.5(h)(5), RA 9262 (Anti-VAWC Act of 2004) - SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262: ‘‘[v]iolence against women and their children’’ as “any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”

“SEC. 47. Suppletory Application.—For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.”

Article 10 of the RPC : “ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. —Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.”

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations Facts: · Petitioner Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married on April 18, 1999, from which two children were born. · Petitioner filed on Jan. 12, 2005 a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order against Steven and her parents-in-law (Perfecto and Juanita Tan), herein defendants, on grounds that they are causing verbal, psychological, and economic abuse in violation of RA 9262. · Respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship · · ·

RTC ruled in favor of the defendants RTC denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration Hence, this petition

Issue: · W/N Respondents may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order in accordance with RA 9262. – YES Held: ·

While the said Sec 3 provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC

·

(Ito hahanapin ni Ma’am kasi ito nasa libro niya) “once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. “

· Notwithstanding the above quoted provision, Sec. 5 of RA 9262 expressly recognizes the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another.

· More so, Sec. 8 (Protection Orders) provides that POs may be issued to prohibit acts of violence done directly by the spouse or indirectly through other persons.

Fallo: · The Court decided that the PO can be issued against the husband and his parents who caused verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of RA 9262.

Pelayo v Lauron (1909) Facts: Arturo Pelayo, physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella o Pelayo alleged that the couple called him to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth o He performed a surgery necessary for the childbirth o Defendants refused to pay him for his services o Petitioner prays that they pay the costs Defendants answered: o Their daughter-in-law died as a consequence of the childbirth, and o Her stay at the couple’s house was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances o Defendants pray that they be absolved of the complaint Issue: W/N the in-laws were obliged to pay the medical bill Held: No. The husband is obliged to pay the costs.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support (Art. 142, 143 CC). This obligation has legal force between the contracting parties—in this case, the spouses. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance does not preclude the husband from his obligation The defendants only acted in view of the imminent danger their daughterin-law was under. Besides, within the meaning of the law, in-laws are strangers with respect to the obligation to provide support. Thus, plaintiff must direct his action against the deceased’s husband.

Graham v Graham (1940) Facts: ● Sydney and Margrethe are married ● They made a contract stipulating that the wife will pay the husband 300 USD monthly ● They divorced ● Husband files an action against his former wife to recover the amount stipulated in their contract, claiming that: ○ he agreed to the contract because his wife asked him to quit his job, so that he can accompany her to his travels, in exchange of her monthly payment ● Wife denies entering such agreement, claiming that: ○ his abandonment of work and continued reliance upon her for support was always distasteful to her Issue: W/N contract is valid - NO Held: ●

Marriage is not merely a private contract between the parties, but creates a status in which the state is vitally interested and under which certain rights and duties incident to the relationship come into being, irrespective of the wishes of the parties.

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Private agreement between persons married or about to be married which attempts to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract as defined by the law is contrary to public policy and unenforceable. ○ a provision releasing the husband from his duty to support his wife in a contract makes the same void

B. Management and Household FC, Art 71 The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70

CC, Art. 115 The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property.

C. Exercise of Profession FC, Art 73

NCC, Art. 117

Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: (1) The objection is proper; and

The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the husband may object, provided: (1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations (2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.

(2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family.

RA 7192 (Women in Development and Nation-Building Act) Responsible Agency is NEDA Objective: State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men. (nation-building) (1) A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the agencies concerned to support programs and activities for women; (2) All government departments shall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in the development programs and projects of said department, specifically those funded under official foreign development assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the development process; and (3) All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein. Equality in Capacity to Act: Married men = Married Women = Unmarried women

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obtain loans, insurance contracts, passports w/o need for consent of husband, Equality in Membership of Clubs - socio, civic clubs Admission to Military Schools. — women shall be accorded equal opportunities for appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police Sec. 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. — Married persons who devote full time to managing the household and family affairs shall, upon the working spouse's consent, be entitled to voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan — Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2) of the salary and compensation of the working spouse. The contributions due thereon shall be deducted from the salary of the working spouse. The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and regulations necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this section

Magna Carta of Women RA 9710 Sec 12 Equal Treatment Before the Law. - The State shall take steps to review and, when necessary, amend and/or repeal existing laws that are discriminatory to women within three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act.

Sec 13 Equal Access and Elimination of Discrimination in Education, Scholarships, and Training. - (a) The State shall ensure that gender stereotypes and images in educational materials and curricula are adequately and appropriately revised. Gender-sensitive

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations language shall be used at all times. Capacity-building on gender and development (GAD), peace and human rights, education for teachers, and all those involved in the education sector shall be pursued toward this end. Partnerships between and among players of the education sector, including the private sector, churches, and faith groups shall be encouraged.

Sec 14 Women in Sports. - The State shall develop, establish, and strengthen programs for the participation of women and girl-children in competitive and noncompetitive sports as a means to achieve excellence, promote physical and social well-being, eliminate genderrole stereotyping, and provide equal access to the full benefits of development for all persons regardless of sex, gender identity, and other similar factors. For this purpose, all sports-related organizations shall create guidelines that will establish and integrate affirmative action as a strategy and gender equality as a framework in planning and implementing their policies, budgets, programs, and activities relating to the participation of women and girls in sports. The State will also provide material and nonmaterial incentives to local government units, media organizations, and the private sector for promoting, training, and preparing women and girls for participation in competitive and noncompetitive sports, especially in local and international events, including, but not limited to, the Palarong Pambansa, Southeast Asian Games, Asian Games, and the Olympics. No sports event or tournament will offer or award a different sports prize, with respect to its amount or value, to women and men winners in the same sports category: Provided, That the said tournament, contest, race, match, event, or game is open to both sexes: Provided, further, That the sports event or tournament is divided into male or female divisions. The State shall also ensure the safety and well-being of all women and girls participating in sports, especially, but not limited to, trainees, reserve members, members, coaches, and mentors of national sports teams, whether in studying, training, or performance phases, by providing them comprehensive health and medical insurance coverage, as well as integrated medical, nutritional, and healthcare services. Schools, colleges, universities, or any other learning institution shall take into account its total women student population in granting athletic scholarship. There shall be a pro rata representation of women in the athletic scholarship program based on the percentage of women in the whole student population.

Sec 15 Women in the Military. - The State shall pursue appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination of women in the military, police, and other similar services, including revising or abolishing policies and practices that restrict women from availing of both combat and noncombat training that are open to men, or from taking on functions other than administrative tasks, such as engaging in combat, security-related, or field operations. Women in the military shall be accorded the same promotional privileges and opportunities as men, including pay increases, additional remunerations and benefits, and awards based on their competency and quality of performance. Towards this end, the State shall ensure that the personal dignity of women shall always be respected. Women in the military, police, and other similar services shall be provided with the same right to employment as men on equal conditions. Equally, they shall be accorded the same capacity as men to act in and enter into contracts, including marriage. Further, women in the military, police; and other similar services shall be entitled to leave benefits such as maternity leave, as provided for by existing laws.

Sec 16 Nondiscriminatory and Nonderogatory Portrayal of Women in Media and Film. - The State shall formulate policies and programs for the advancement of women in collaboration with government and nongovernment media-related organizations. It shall likewise endeavor to raise the consciousness of the general public in recognizing the dignity of women and the role and contribution of women in the family; community, and the society through the strategic use of mass media. For this purpose, the State shall ensure allocation of space; airtime, and resources, strengthen programming, production, and image-making that appropriately present women's needs, issues, and concerns in all forms of media, communication, information dissemination, and advertising. The State, in cooperation with all schools of journalism, information, and communication, as well as the national media federations and associations, shall require all media organizations and corporations to integrate into their human resource development components regular training on gender equality and gender-based discrimination, create and use gender equality guidelines in all aspects of management, training, production, information, dissemination, communication, and programming; and convene a gender equality committee that will promote gender mainstreaming as a framework and affirmative action as a strategy, and monitor and evaluate the implementation of gender

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations equality guidelines.

their skills and qualifications. Corollarily, the State shall also promote skills and entrepreneurship development of returning women migrant workers.

Sec 22 Right to Decent Work. - The State shall progressively realize and ensure decent work standards for women that involve the creation of jobs of acceptable quality in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human dignity. (a) Decent work involves opportunities for work that are productive and fairly remunerative as family living wage, security in the workplace, and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns organize, participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men. (b) The State shall further ensure: (1) Support services and gears to protect them from occupational and health hazards taking into account women's maternal functions; (2) Support services that will enable women to balance their family obligations and work responsibilities including, but not limited to, the establishment of day care centers and breast-feeding stations at the workplace, and providing maternity leave pursuant to the Labor Code and other pertinent laws; (3) Membership in unions regardless of status of employment and place of employment; and (4) Respect for the observance of indigenous peoples' cultural practices even in the workplace. (c) In recognition of the temporary nature of overseas work, the State shall exert all efforts to address the causes of out-migration by developing local employment and other economic opportunities for women and by introducing measures to curb violence and forced and involuntary displacement of local women. The State shall ensure the protection and promotion of the rights and welfare of migrant women regardless of their work status, and protect them against discrimination in wages, conditions of work, and employment opportunities in host countries.

Sec 23 Right to Livelihood, Credit, Capital, and Technology. - The State shall ensure that women are provided with the following: (a) Equal access to formal sources of credit and capital; (b) Equal share to the produce of farms and aquatic resources; and (c) Employment opportunities for returning women migrant workers taking into account

Sec 24 Right to Education and Training. - The State shall ensure the following: (a) Women migrant workers have the opportunity to undergo skills training, if they so desire, before taking on a foreign job, and possible retraining upon return to the country: (b) Gender-sensitive training and seminars; and (c) Equal opportunities in scholarships based on merit and fitness, especially to those interested in research and development aimed towards women-friendly farm technology.

Bradwell v Illinois (1940) Facts: · Mrs. Myra Bradwell of the State of Illinois applied to the judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois for a license to practice law. Her petition included the usual certificate from an inferior court of her good character, and that on due examination she had been found to possess the requisite qualifications. Pending this application, she also filed an affidavit to the effect: "that she was born in the State of Vermont; that she was (had been) a citizen of that state; that she is now a citizen of the United States, and has been for many years past a resident of the City of Chicago, in the State of Illinois." With the affidavit, she also filed a paper asserting that, under the foregoing facts, she was entitled to the license prayed for by virtue of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States, and of the fourteenth article of amendment of that instrument. · SC of Illinois: By the common law, which is the basis of the laws of Illinois, only men were admitted to the bar, and the legislature had not made any change in this respect, but had simply provided that: (1) No person should be admitted to practice as attorney or counselor without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from two justices of the Supreme Court, and that (2) No person should receive a license without first obtaining a certificate from the court of some county of his good moral character. In other respects, it was left to the discretion of the court to establish the rules by which admission to the profession should be determined.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations · Limitations by the court: (1) It should establish such terms of admission as would promote the proper administration of justice, and (2) It should not admit any persons, or class of persons, not intended by the legislature to be admitted, even though not expressly excluded by statute. In view of this latter limitation, the court felt compelled to deny the application of females to be admitted as members of the bar. Being contrary to the rules of the common law and the usages of Westminster Hall from time immemorial, it could not be supposed that the legislature had intended to adopt any different rule. Issue: Do the laws of Illinois regarding admission to the bar abridge any of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States? Held: No. They do not. Ratio: Bradwell’s contention: Fourteenth Amendment: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Therefore, the statute law of Illinois, or the common law prevailing in that state, can no longer be set up as a barrier against the right of females to pursue any lawful employment for a livelihood (the practice of law included) because it assumes that it is one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to engage in any and every profession, occupation, or employment in civil life. [She asserts that while she remained in Vermont, that circumstance made her a citizen of that state. But she states, at the same time, that she is a citizen of the United States, and that she is now, and has been for many years past, a resident of Chicago, in the State of Illinois.] US Supreme Court: Yes, there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States

the states must not abridge but the right to admission to practice in the courts of a state is NOT one of them. This right in no sense depends on citizenship of the United States. The protection designed by that clause has no application to a citizen of the state whose laws are complained of. If the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Illinois, that provision of the Constitution gave her no protection against its courts or its legislation. The right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a state is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to the federal government, and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license. (By Ms. Compuesto)

D. Use of Surname NCC, Art. 370 A married woman may use: 1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or 2. Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or 3. Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." NCC, Art. 373 A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with article 370. NCC, Art. 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other relief. NCC, Art. 378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter. Silverio v Republic supra Dunn v. Palermo (1975) -

Rose Palermo, a lawyer in Nashville married Denty Cheatham in 1973.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations -

She continued using her maiden name professionally, socially, and for other purposes.

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Tennessee has a state-wide compulsory Registration Law.

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After Rose’s marriage, she went to the Registrar to change her address form, listing her name as Palermo. However, she was advised that she was required to register under the surname of her husband, or have her name purged from the registration records, under the statute Sec. 2-206 TCA.

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Sec. 2-206 TCA states that the registration of a person shall be purged 90 days after he changes his name by marriage or otherwise.

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Upon Rose’s refusal to change her name, her name was purged from the registration list.

Issue: W/N it is mandatory that a married woman assume the name of her husband Held: NO - Tennessee has no statutory enactment providing that a woman automatically assumes her husband’s name upon marriage. - Sec. 2-206 alone does not mandate a change of name by marriage, instead, it merely recognizes the prevalence of the custom under which a woman adopts the surname of her husband. - The Court cited English and American cases emphasizing that a woman adopting the name of her husband upon marriage is a custom, and a person can use any name as long as such change is not intended for fraudulent purposes. - In addition to this, permitting a married woman to retain her own name would eliminate substantial administrative problems related to a change of name. - The Court held that a woman, upon marriage, has a freedom of choice with

regards to her name; she may choose to retain her own surname or use the surname of her husband. - The Court also held that the appellee’s legal name is Rosary T. Palermo.

Tolentino v CA (1988) FACTS: ● Petitioner Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino ● Respondent Consuelo David was married to Arturo but due to abandoning Arturo for 3 years, they were divorced. ● After the divorce, Arturo married Pilar Adornable who died soon after the marriage. ● Arturo then married Constancia Tolentino ● Consuelo, continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time of the filing of the complaint ● Arturo, as third party defendant, admitted that the use of the surname by Consuelo was with his and his’s family’s consent. ● Petitioner Constancia now is filing a complaint against Consuelo for using the surname Tolentino. ISSUES: ● WON the petitioner's cause of action has already prescribed - YES ● WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from who she was divorced - NO HELD: ● Petitioner insists that the use of surname Tolentino by David is a continuing actionable wrong and that every use of it is a new crime. The use of a surname by a divorced woman for a purpose not criminal in nature is not a crime. ● The CA is of teh opinion that the period of prescription should be 4 years since it appears to be an action based on quasi-delict. The action has long prescribed whether the cause accrued on April 1945, when the petitioner and Arturo married or on August 1950 when the Civil Code took effect or in 1951 when she came to know of that fact that David was still using the surname Tolentino. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations ● ● ● ●

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prescription. Petitioner should have brought the action immediately after she gained knowledge of the use of the surname Tolentino by the respondent David. The action was brought only in November 1971 (20 years). NO merit in petitioner's claim that to sustain the respondent’s stand contradict Art. 370 and 371. Art 371 speaks of annulment while the case here refers to absolute divorce and so is not applicable. Sen.Tolentino comments on Art 370 which states that “the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname”; She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain other s from using it Respondent has established that to grant the injunction would be an act of serious dislocation to her. SHe has given proof that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner has failed to show that she would suffer any legal injury There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case. Usurpation of name implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name, it consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and uspurer. Elements of Usurpation THere is an actual use of another’s name by the defendant the use is unauthorized the use of another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person None of these elements exist and neither is the claim that the respondent impersonated her. It is of public knowledge that Constancia Tolentino is the legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo David never represented herself as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino but simply as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino; she has legitimate children who have every right to use the surname Tolentino. She could not possibly be compelled to use the name Mrs. David, different from the surname of her children. The records do not show that she has legally married.

Yasin v Shari’a District Court supra Remo v Secretary of Foreign Affairs (2010) ● Petitioner Maria Remo is a married Filipino who sought to renew her passport. In her old passport, her surname is Rallonza. In her application

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with the DFA in Chicago, she requested to revert to her maiden name and surname. DFA denied the request. They stated that the use of maiden name is allowed only if the married name has not been used in a previous application. It can only be changed in cases of annulment, divorce, and death of the husband. Case was appealed to the Office of the President and was denied, saying that the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) offers no leeway for the interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration of nullity may a married woman revert to her maiden name. CA also denied the petition, finding no conflict between Art. 370 and RA 8239.

I: WON petitioner who originally used her husband’s surname in her passport can revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport despite the subsistence of her marriage. NO R: ●

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Court agrees with petitioner that the word “may” in Art. 370 indicates that the use of the husband’s surname is permissive rather than obligatory as held in Yasin v. Shari’a District Court. She is therefore allowed to use her maiden name upon marriage. However, unlike Yasin involving a Muslim divorce, her marriage is still subsisting. OSG argues that Sec. 5 of RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to her maiden name in the passport: 1. Death of husband 2. Divorce decree 3. Annulment or nullity of marriage The conflict between art. 370 and RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA 8239 does not prohibit the use of a woman’s maiden name in the passport. Even if these were in conflict, the special law governing passport issuance must prevail over general law (civil code). If the court were to allow this, nothing prevents her in the future to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. This unjustified change in one’s name and identity in a passport which is considered superior to all other official documents cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations ●

The acquisition of a PH passport is a privilege. It is the property of the PH government. Holder is merely a possessor.

E. Property Relations FC Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:

community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. (160) Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (n) On Conjugal Partnership of Gains

(3) By the local custom. (118)

Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a)

On Community Property

Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)

(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:

(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and

(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (2) By the provisions of this Code; and

(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property; (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the community property; (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a) Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the

(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. (148a) Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a) Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (174a)

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations

Carlos v. Abelardo (2002) F: -

Spouses Manuel Abelardo and Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo were sued by the latter’s father, Honorio Carlos, for a sum of money and damages 1989 Honorio alleged that he issued a check for US $25,000 for the spouses to purchase their conjugal home in Paranaque In 1994 Honorio made a formal demand for the money, after the spouses failed to pay him back By this time however, the spouses had already been separated for a year so they filed separate answers ● Maria Theresa Carlos - Abelardo admitted to securing a loan together w/ her husband from the petitioner but said that the loan was payable on a staggered basis. No need for immediate payment ● Manuel Abelardo admitted to receiving the US $25,000 not as a loan but as his income for the work he did in father-in-law’s construction company (H.L. Carlos Construction) ○ Used 10 checks amounting to P3,000,000 allegedly from Honorio to prove that if it were a loan and he had a debt, then Honorio could’ve just reduced the amount from P3,000,000 ○ Not believable because he is neither a stockholder nor an employee so why would he have a salary ○ Not believable because checks were not issued by company but from personal account of Honorio ○ Being compensated does not extinguish his obligation to pay loan

(1) xxx (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses, or by one of them with the consent of the other (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties - Spouses never denied that the sum was used to purchase a house and lot and they never denied that they used this house and lot as their conjugal home, which obviously was for the benefit of the family. - Since wife admitted to the loan, wife binds conjugal partnership since proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family THEREFORE defendant-husband and wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan *Respondents also had to pay for moral damages because Manuel Abelardo threatened Honorio as evidenced by 2 separate testimonies FROM BOOK: Spouses are solidarily liable (From Art. 1207 CC - a liability shared by two or more debtors to two or more creditors and that given any one creditor the right to demand or each one of the debtors bound to render entire compliance with obligation) for expenses of the family.

Selanova v. Mendoza (1975) I: WON the spouses are both liable for the payment of the loan? - YES R: -

Art. 121 of FC: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

FACTS: Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross ignorance of the law for having prepared and ratified a document dated November 21, 1972, extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations

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other and that they waived their "right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit against the other. Judge Mendoza in his comment on the charge purposed to convey the impression that he was aware of the invalidity of the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it and assured the spouses that they would ask the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (where they were residing) to approve the agreement. That pretension is disbelieved by the Judicial Consultant. Respondent Judge alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code). In that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses by allocating to the husband a thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife the residential house and lot. The last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in effect a ratification of their personal separation. The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil Code: ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;

ISSUE: WON the agreement separating the conjugal property and the spouses is void. RULING: YES. The Judge Mendoza overlooks the unmistakable ruling of this Court in the Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson case that judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage should be "secured beforehand." Also, it must be underscored that the extra-judicial dissolution w/o judicial approval is void. The case was not referred to a Judge of the Court of First Instance for investigation because actually no factual issues necessitate a hearing and presentation of evidence. Judge Mendoza already admitted that he was responsible for the execution of the questioned document. Judge Mendoza retired on February 27, 1975 when he reached the age of seventy. In his letter of April 8, 1975 he asked for a compassionate view of his case considering his forty-three years' service in the government (he started his public career in 1932 as a policeman and became a justice of the peace in 1954). He also cited the financial predicament of his big family occasioned by the delay in the payment of his retirement and terminal leave pay.

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Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good faith and honest desire to terminate the marital conflict between the complainant and his wife, we are of the opinion that a drastic penalty should not be imposed on him. But he deserves a severe censure for his mistake in preparing and notarizing the aforementioned immoral and illegal agreement. Such severe reprimand should not be an obstacle to his enjoyment of retirement privileges, assuming that there are no causes for depriving him of such benefits. WHEREFORE, the respondent is severely censured.

F. Sales and Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a) Arriola v. Arriola (2008) FACTS: Petitioner Anthony Arriola and respondent John Arriola were sons of

decedent Fidel Arriola. The former with his first wife Victoria Calabia, and the latter with his second wife named Vilma. On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each; the decision became final on March 15, 2004 The parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land, respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land Respondent filed with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, praying that petitioners be declared in contempt

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations The RTC denied the motion The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement erected on the property should not be included in the auction sale A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision clearly shows that nothing was mentioned about the house existing on the land subject matter of the case. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the same Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari where he sought to have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to proceed with the auction of the subject land including the subject house. In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject house is exempted from partition by public auction - YES

It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons First, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA Second, there is no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit

following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing restrictions on its partition: The heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein (10 year period in case: 2003-2013)

HELD: Article 159, FC. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. The RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof as the deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the subject house which is a mere accessory to the land.

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Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in coownership by his heirs the CA concludes that any decision in the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject house; and further pointed out that petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of the subject house in the partition of the subject land

From the Book: During marriage, the husband and wife may constitute jointly their family home. It is the dwelling house where they and their family reside and the land on which it is situated. It is deemed constituted as a family home form the time it is occupied as a family residence and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment. It can be sold, alienated, donated, or encumbered, only with the written consent of the owner, his or her spouse and majority of the beneficiaries of

The heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. -

No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home. -

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations legal age. The family home endures despite the death of one or both of the spouses and continues for 10 years or even longer for as long as there is a beneficiary who is still a minor, such as descendant, brother, or sister whether legitimate or illegitimate.

G. Duties Toward Their children RA 10354 RH Law SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows: Xxx (v) Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.

Republic v. Toledano (1994) F: - Petition for review on certiorari - “In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala” It raises a pure question of law. - Spouses Alvin A Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse filed a petition seeking to adopt Evelyn’s 12 year old younger brother, Solomon Alcala - The spouses were married in 1981. Alvin is a natural born citizen of the USA and Evelyn, a Filipino, is a naturalized citizen of the USA as of 1988. - They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon. - He has been under the care of the spouses in 1981 to 1984, and then from 1989 until time of petition. Both Solomon and Nery, his mother (also Evelyn’s mother) gave their consent to the adoption as Nery is unable to support and educate him. - Social worker favorably recommended the granting of petition. - RTC granted the petition for adoption. - OSG contends that the Spouses Clouse are not qualified to adopt under PH Law.

W/N aliens Alvin and Evelyn Clouse have the right to adopt Solomon under PH Law H: NO - Arts. 184 and 185 of the Family Code categorically disqualifies the spouses. Art 184, FC The following persons may not adopt: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law. - As an alien, Alvin is not qualified to adopt. Evelyn falls under the exception (a) but the couple still does not qualify to adopt because of Art 185 which states that: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. - Joint adoption is mandatory. As such, Alvin’s disqualification means the couple cannot qualify. - “As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.”

Johnston v. Republic (1963) “Surname of adopted child to follow that of adopter.”

Facts: · On June 24, 1960, petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old, then under the custody of the Hospicio de San Jose, an orphanage situated in the city of Manila. The petition shows that petitioner-appellant is 48 years old, married to Raymond Arthur Johnston;

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations that the couple are childless. · The petitioner-appellant filed a motion on October 24, 1960, praying that the surname given to the minor be “Valdes Johnston”, instead of “Valdes” only, but this motion was denied by the lower court in its order of October 31, 1960. Hence, this appeal. · Petitioner-appellant argues that since she is now using the surname of her husband by virtue of Article 370, par. 1 of the new Civil Code, and because that is the surname (Valdes Johnston) she used in filing the petition in the present case, under which she testified at the time of the trial, and under which she is now known to all her relatives, friends and acquaintances, she had to be known by her maiden surname, and the lower court should have decreed that the minor whom she adopted should be allowed to bear the surname she is now using. · She also argues that the use of the surname “Valdes” by the adopted child, as prescribed by the lower court, will create the impression that she is the illegitimate child of petitioner- appellant begotten before her marriage, a situation which is humiliating to both adopter and adopted.

· The provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopter’s surname, refers to the adopter’s own surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. · She made the adoption singly without the concurrence of her husband, and not as a married woman, her name as adopter was her maiden name. · The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes’ husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston’s own surname. · To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that he had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. · And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband’s consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.

Issue: · WON the RTC is correct in ordering the use of VALDES for the adopted. YES H. Other Rights and Duties Doctrine/Ruling: · Lower Court was correct in authorizing or prescribing the use of Valdes as the surname of the adopted child. · The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married woman is permitted to add to her surname her husband’s surname, the fact remains that appellant’s surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her husband’s surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because the public would be misled into believing that she was adopted by appellant’s husband also, which is not true in this case.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF UNMARRIED COHABITANTS A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and respect, Mutual Help and Support B. Exercise of Profession RA 9262 VAWC Act SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

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Thus, it is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino As to plaintiff Elenita Silva’s claim for moral damages, the Court held that she is not entitled to such given that Esther had acted in good faith, Silva having introduced her to other persons as Mrs. Silva, and sent her letters thus addressed Instead, it is Peralta who must be indemnified since she suffered loss of employment due to the litigation Damages must be exclusively shouldered by Saturnino Silva (he being the one who misled Peralta into invalidly marrying him)

D. Property Relations C. Use of Surname Silva v. Peralta (1960) FACTS: In 1944, Esther Peralta (respondent) met Saturnino Silva, an American citizen and officer of the United States Army Despite being married to an Australian citizen, Saturnino proposed a marriage to Esther, making her believe that he was single Their marriage was allegedly solemnized by Father Cote, but no documents of marriage were prepared nor executed In 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds and was transferred to the US for treatment He divorced his Australian wife in the States, and thereafter married Elenita Silva When Saturnino went back to the PH, Esther demanded support for their child - Action was filed against Esther by Elenita, seeking to enjoin her from using the surname Silva ISSUE: W/N Esther should be enjoined from representing herself to be the wife of Saturnino HELD: Yes. The fact that there were no marriage documents executed of any kind prior to, during or after the marriage, and the vigorous denial of the marriage by Saturnino, the Court concluded that no marriage had ever taken place

FC Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the

LAW 100 Persons and Family Relations cohabitation. (144a) Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a)

Valdes v. RTC (1996)

E. Sales and Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa F. Custody and Support of Children

RELIEF FROM COURTS